Published by

Swami Vimuktananda,
Secretary, Ramakrishna Mission Sarada Pitha,
Belur Math, Dt. Howrah.

Printed in India by

K. C. Banerjee
at the Modern Art Press,
1/2, Durga Pituri Lane, Calcutta.
FOREWORD

I congratulate most heartily Swāmī Mādhava-nanda on his English translation of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā. I also appreciate the annotations that he has given. The Vedānta Paribhāṣā is an epistemological work on Śaṅkara Vedānta as interpreted in the Vivaraṇa school. The epistemological implications of the Pañca-pādikā of Padmapāda as interpreted in the Vivaraṇa, had already been collected and worked out by Rāmā-dvaya in his Vedānta Kaumudī. The work has not yet been published. When we compare the contents of the Vedānta Kaumudī with those of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā of Dharmarājādīvarīndra, the indebtedness of the latter appears to be so colossal that its claim to originality vanishes. There are also here and there traces of confusion which his son vainly tried to justify or to explain away in his commentary on the Vedānta Paribhāṣā. On the whole, this epistemological compendium on account of its brevity and lucidity of exposition has commended itself to the readers of Śaṅkara Vedānta. It is also interesting to notice that in accordance with the scheme of epistemology formulated in the Vivaraṇa, the perceptual situation is taken in a realistic manner. Parts of it, however, are not fully developed, and important questions which could be raised regarding it have not been anticipated. This may be regarded as a hypercriticism, but it cannot be denied that there is much scope for
elaborating the views of the Vivaraṇa school on epistemological matters.

This English translation of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā will introduce the epistemology of the Śaṅkara Vedānta to such readers as are not adepts in philosophical Sanskrit. The public owe a deep debt of gratitude for this work to Swāmī Mādhavānanda. It is also very gratifying to see that the Rāmakṛṣṇa Mission that has become so famous in the country for social service has also turned its attention towards intellectual service in such a significant work as the present one and many other translations that the learned author has done.

S. N. DASGUPTA
INTRODUCTION

The *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* by Dharmarāja Adhvarindra is a very important manual of the Vedānta philosophy, and is the most widely read book on the subject next to Sadānanda Yogindra's *Vedānta-Sūra*. The author, who seems to have flourished in the seventeenth century, was a reputed scholar of Southern India, as we know from the introductory verses to the *Paribhāṣā*, as also from similar verses by his son and commentator. And we have ample evidence from the body of the book that, of the two main branches of the Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta, founded by Padmapādācārya and Ācārya Vācaspati Miśra respectively, our author belonged to the former. In his discussions he has adopted the method and phraseology of Navya-Nyāya, introduced by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya in the fourteenth century.

The first six chapters of the *Paribhāṣā* are devoted to establishing the means of valid knowledge from the Vedāntic standpoint, and as such often contain refutations of other systems of philosophy, particularly Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Being to some extent of a polemical character, these chapters are rather abstruse for the beginner. But once he has ascended these rugged steps, he is ushered into the realm of Vedānta proper in the last two chapters of the book, where he will find a delightful compendium of the essential
doctrines of the philosophy, embodying its subject-matter and aim.

As regards the means of knowledge there is great divergence among the different systems of philosophy. For instance, the Cārvākas, who are out and out materialists, believe only in perception; the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas in perception and inference; the Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools in perception, inference and verbal testimony (śabda); the Naiyāikas add to these comparison as well; the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsakas include presumption; while the Vedāntists, along with the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsakas, believe in six means of knowledge, viz., perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption and non-apprehension. As against the Naiyāyikas, the Vedāntins argue that presumption cannot be classed under inference, for it is based on negative invariable concomitance (vyatireka-vyāpti), which Vedānta does not admit; while non-apprehension cannot come under perception, for, according to the logicians, it presupposes contact of the organ with the object, but non-existence cannot come in contact with the organ.

Again, with regard to the conception of knowledge, Nyāya holds that knowledge is a product of the contact of the mind with the self, while according to Vedānta it is eternal Pure Consciousness (caitanya); only it is manifested through mental states (vṛtti). The Vedāntin’s theory of perception is in sharp contrast with the
Naiyāyika’s. Vedānta holds that Pure Consciousness has three forms—as associated with (that is, manifested as) the subject or knower (or Consciousness limited by the mind), as associated with the object, and as associated with the mental state, and perception of any external object (that is present and capable of being perceived) takes place when these three occupy the same space, by the mental state issuing through the organ and spreading over the object so as to assume the same form—like the water of a tank reaching a field through a channel and being shaped like the field. The mental state serves to remove the veil of nescience (avidyā) from the Consciousness associated with the object, which is revealed by a reflection of the Consciousness associated with the subject (that is, of the self, which is of the nature of intelligence). Vedānta denies that the mind is an organ—which is a postulate of Nyāya—and according to it, the perception of internal objects like pleasure and pain is done by the witness—by which is meant that aspect of the self in which the mind, instead of being a qualifying attribute (viśeṣana), is a limiting adjunct (upādhi)—directly, that is, without the help of the mental state, as in the case of external objects. The distinction between a qualifying attribute and a limiting adjunct is this, that the former actually (of course, speaking from the phenomenal standpoint) limits the self, while the latter only distinguishes it without producing any actual difference.
In Nyāya a cognition like, "The hill has fire, because it has smoke," is inferential, whereas in Vedānta it is a composite experience, being perceptual in respect of the hill and inferential in respect of the fire. In Nyāya the validity of knowledge arises from particular favourable conditions, and is ascertained through a separate inference, while in Vedānta it arises spontaneously and is self-evident. Unlike Nyāya, Vedānta holds that perceptual knowledge may arise even from verbal testimony, as, for example, from a sentence like, "This is that Devadatta," or "Thou art That." While, according to Nyāya, a word primarily signifies an individual possessed of a generic attribute, in Vedānta it primarily signifies a generic attribute. In Nyāya, only words have implication (lakṣaṇā), but in Vedānta sentences also have it. Nyāya postulates eternal generic attributes (jāti), and inherence (samavāya), which is a special kind of intimate relation. Vedānta denies both, and substitutes transitory common features for the former, and identity for the latter. In Nyāya all error is taking one thing for another (anyathā-khāti); in Vedānta, according to some, it is so only when the thing for which something else is mistaken is close enough to the latter to be in contact with the organ, as when we see a crystal beside a ruby as red; in other cases we have a logically indefinable cognition (anirvacanīya-khyāti)—which is the general view. In inference, Nyāya admits an intermediate cause
(vyāpāra), viz., consideration (parāmarśa), or the knowledge that the reason, or ground from which we infer, is present in the thing in or about which something is inferred. In Nyāya the effect is something quite different from the cause; in Vedānta they are essentially the same, which accords with the Sāṅkhya view also. The above list is by no means exhaustive. The reader will come across other differences as he goes through the book.

A glance at the table of contents will give an idea of the nature and variety of the topics discussed in the book. We refrain from adverting to them here. It will be noticed that the author has bestowed a good deal of attention on the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the definitions, inserting one qualifying epithet after another into them for this purpose—to which not a little of the stiffness of books of this kind is due. He has faithfully presented in a nutshell the traditional views on important questions relating to Vedānta, and it is rarely that he has put forward any views of his own, as he has once done under IMPLICATION (lakṣaṇā). He has often referred to great authorities like Padmapāda, Prakāśātma-yati and Vācaspati Miśra in his book, and his debt to these masters is indubitable. The question as to how far the contributions of our author are original, or the question of his close indebtedness to any subsequent author, for example, Rāmādvaya, as Dr. Dasgupta asserts, can be decided only when
the works in question have been published. We leave the issue open, and trust that future research scholars will be in a position to settle the matter conclusively. That he has eminently succeeded in producing a handy volume for the general reader, is a fact that will be evident to all who study the book.

Of all the systems of philosophy, Pūrva-Māmāsā and Vedānta follow the Vedas as closely as possible, the latter relying on Śruti confirmed by reason and realisation. But there is this outstanding difference between the two that, while Pūrva-Māmāsā is a staunch believer in the ceremonial portion of the Vedas (karma-kāṇḍa), Vedānta lays the emphasis, and justly too, on the philosophical portion (jñāna-kāṇḍa), consisting of the Upaniṣads. Another point of difference between the two systems is that Vedānta believes in the Vedas having emanated from God, while Māmāsā holds that they are eternal and do not depend on any agent, either for emanation or for creation.

Although Vedānta has three main phases, viz., Dualism, Qualified Monism and Monism, represented by Madhvacārya, Rāmānujācārya and Saṅkarācārya respectively, it is Monism or Advaita that is the culmination of the philosophy. Its theme, the essential identity of the individual self and Brahman and the unreality of the universe, has been ably dealt with in the Pari-bhāṣā, and the ways to its realisation, viz., hearing, reflection and meditation, by the qualified
aspirant have been clearly shown. Incidentally, the place of meditation and rites, as preparing the ground for the higher form of practice, has been indicated. No difficulty will be experienced in harmonising these apparently conflicting stand-points, if we remember that the scriptures provide different ways of approach to the highest Truth according to the temperament and capacity of the aspirant. Since the one indivisible Brahman appears, through the veil of mâyā or the cosmic illusion, as the manifold universe, the whole phantasm with its attendant evils will disappear the moment a person realises his identity with Brahman—an identity that has never been lost, but only forgotten.

The popularity of the Vedānta-Paribhāṣā is testified by the number of commentaries written on it and printed, beginning with the Vedānta-sikhāmani by the author’s son, Rāmakṛṣṇa Adhvarin, which again has got a gloss named the Vedānta-maniprabhā by Amaradāsa. Other published commentaries on the book are the Arthadipikā by Śivadatta, the Vedānta-paribhāṣā-prakāśikā by Peddā Dīkṣita, the Āśubodhini by Paṇḍita Kṛṣṇanātha Nyāyapañcānana, the Paribhāṣā-prakāśikā by MM. Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī, as well as one by Paṇḍita Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara, b.A. All these have been consulted with profit in preparing this translation.

The only English rendering so far made of the book was that by Principal Arthur Venis, m.A.,
of the Sanskrit College, Benares, which appeared, with notes, serially in The Pandit in 1882-1885, but never came out in book form. Accordingly the present book is, I think, imperative, which leaves little room for considering the fitness of its author. Advantage has been taken of the above edition as well as of the Bengali version of the book by Śrī Śaraccandra Ghoṣāla, M.A., B.L.

I have also received considerable help from Paṇḍita Upendracandra Tarkāchārya, Kāvyavāyakaraṇa-Purāṇa-Sāṅkhya-Veda-ta-Vara-Śaḍdarśana-tīrtha, of the Belur Math Catuspāṭhi, with whom I read the book. I am much indebted to Mahāmahopādhyāya Yogendranātha Tarkatīrtha, Professor of Vedānta and Mīmāṁsā, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, and to Dr. Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Ph.D., Lecturer in Sanskrit, Pāli and Philosophy in the University of Calcutta, for valuable help during the revision. Last but not least, my thanks are due to Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, C.I.E., M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt., King George V Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Calcutta, and lately Principal, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, for his learned Foreword to the book.

The text has been prepared by comparing the above-named editions. An attempt has been made to make the translation faithful, and as literal as practicable. Notes have been added wherever they were deemed necessary, without, however, making them lengthy. References have been given to most of the quotations. The
Sanskrit Glossary and the Index are other features that should prove useful. The book in its present form will, it is hoped, popularise the study of Vedānta among the English-knowing people in all parts of the world.

MĀDHAVĀNANDA

Belur Math, April, 1942.
### KEY TO TRANSLITERATION AND PRONUNCIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sound</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>अ</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>आ</td>
<td>ā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>इ</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ई</td>
<td>ī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उ</td>
<td>u</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ऊ</td>
<td>ū</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>र</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ए</td>
<td>e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ऐ</td>
<td>ai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ऐ</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ओ</td>
<td>au</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>क</td>
<td>k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ख</td>
<td>kh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ग</td>
<td>g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>घ</td>
<td>gh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>च</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>छ</td>
<td>ch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ज</td>
<td>j</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>झ</td>
<td>jh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ञ</td>
<td>ŋ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ठ</td>
<td>ṭ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>थ</td>
<td>th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ह</td>
<td>h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ध</td>
<td>ḍ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ठ</td>
<td>ḍh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>त</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>थ</td>
<td>th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>द</td>
<td>d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ध</td>
<td>dh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प</td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>फ</td>
<td>ph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ब</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>भ</td>
<td>bh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>म</td>
<td>m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>य</td>
<td>y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>र</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ल</td>
<td>l</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>व</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>श</td>
<td>š</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ष</td>
<td>ṣ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>च</td>
<td>s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ह</td>
<td>h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ं</td>
<td>ŋ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>:</td>
<td>h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# CONTENTS

## CHAPTER I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCEPTION</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTORY</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERATION THE SUPREME END OF LIFE</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VALID KNOWLEDGE AND ITS MEANS</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCEPTION AS A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE: THE MENTAL STATE</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE CRITERION OF THE PERCEPTION OF COGNITION: THREE KINDS OF CONSCIOUSNESS</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIONS TO THE DEFINITION OF SUBJECTIVE PERCEPTION ANSWERED</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE PERCEPTION OF OBJECTS: ITS DEFINITION VINDICATED</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUR KINDS OF MENTAL STATES</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCEPTION BY THE WITNESS OF THE SELF AND THE WITNESS OF GOD</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCEPTION OF COGNITION DEFINED: THE NATURE OF ERROR</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DREAM PERCEPTION</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOWFOLD DESTRUCTION OF EFFECTS: ITS BEARING ON ERROR</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCEPTION THROUGH OR WITHOUT AN ORGAN</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# CHAPTER II

**Inference**

| Inference is the Knowledge of Invariable Concomitance | 71 |
| Inference is Only Affirmative | 76 |
| Inference for Oneself and for Others: Syllogism | 79 |
| Inference Proves the Unreality of the Universe: Definition of Unreality | 80 |
| Existence is Threefold | 84 |

## CHAPTER III

**Comparison**

| 86 |

## CHAPTER IV

**Verbal Testimony**

| Expectancy | 89 |
| Consistency and Contiguity | 93 |
| Significance of Words | 96 |
| Implication: Its Varieties | 99 |
| Intention | 109 |
| The Authority of the Vedas Explained | 116 |

## CHAPTER V

**Presumption**

| Conditions of Presumption | 121 |
| Two Varieties of Presumptive Knowledge | 122 |
TWOFOLD PRESUMPTION FROM WHAT IS HEARD ... ... 124

CHAPTER VI

NON-APPREHENSION

NON-APPREHENSION: MEANING OF ITS CAPACITY ... ... 130
NON-APPREHENSION CANNOT BE REPLACED BY PERCEPTION ... 135
FOUR KINDS OF NON-EXISTENCE ... 142
MUTUAL NON-EXISTENCE IS TWOFOLD ... 146
THE VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE IS INTRINSIC AND SELF-EVIDENT ... 148

CHAPTER VII

THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF VEDĀNTA

TWOFOLD VALIDITY OF THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE ... ... 155
ESSENTIAL AND SECONDARY CHARACTERISTICS OF BRAHMAN: THE MEANING OF ‘THAT’ IN “THOU ART THAT” ... 156
COSMOGONY: ITS ORDER ... ... 162
COMBINATION OF THE ELEMENTS ... 167
SUPERIOR AND INFERIOR SUBTLE BODIES 168
ORIGIN OF THE VARIOUS WORLDS AND BODIES ... ... ... 169
FOUR KINDS OF COSMIC DISSOLUTION ... 172
THE ORDER OF COSMIC DISSOLUTION ... 178
CHAPTER VIII

THE AIM OF VEDĀNTA

THE AIMS OF LIFE: RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE BLISS

THE NATURE OF LIBERATION

TWO VIEWS ABOUT IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE

THE MEANS TO REALISATION: THEIR MUTUAL RELATION

AIDS TO LIBERATION

THE GOAL OF MEDITATION ON THE CONDITIONED AND THE UNCONDITIONED BRAHMAN

FRUCTIFYING AND ACCUMULATED WORK

IS LIBERATION SIMULTANEOUS?
# ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ait Br.</td>
<td>Aitareya Brāhmaṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Br.</td>
<td>Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brhannār.</td>
<td>Brhannāradīya Purāṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Br. S.</td>
<td>Brahma-Sūtras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Br. Vā.</td>
<td>Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad-Vārtika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chā.</td>
<td>Chāndogya Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. or ff</td>
<td>and following</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.</td>
<td>Bhagavad-Gītā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ka.</td>
<td>Kaṭha Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kū.</td>
<td>Kūrma Purāṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kau.</td>
<td>Kauśitakī Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mā.</td>
<td>Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mār.</td>
<td>Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbh.</td>
<td>Mahābhārata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mu.</td>
<td>Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.</td>
<td>note</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. S. Ed.</td>
<td>Nirṇaya Sāgara Edition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pū. Mī. Sū.</td>
<td>Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa-Sūtras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.</td>
<td>Rg-Veda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śiv.</td>
<td>Śiva Purāṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śv.</td>
<td>Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tai.</td>
<td>Taittirīya Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tai. Br.</td>
<td>Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tai S.</td>
<td>Taittirīya Samhitā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up.</td>
<td>Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vāj. S.</td>
<td>Vājasaneya Samhitā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viṣ.</td>
<td>Viṣṇu Purāṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. S. S.</td>
<td>Vizianagram Sanskrit Series</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

PERCEPTION

INTRODUCTORY

यद्विद्याविद्यासेन भूतभौतिकाश्रयः ॥
तं नौमि परमात्मानं सचिवानन्दविग्रहम् ॥ १ ॥

1. To that Supreme Self, the embodiment of Existence, Knowledge and Bliss (Absolute),¹ by
the manifestation of the nescience (avidyā)² relating³ to which the projection⁴ of the (simple)
elements⁵ and things⁶ made up of these elements takes place, I bow.

¹ These are not qualities of the Supreme Self, in
which case they would be transitory, thereby making
the Self changeful, but the latter is Existence-Knowl-
edge-Bliss Absolute.

² An inscrutable entity without a beginning, to which
are attributed the projection, maintenance and dissolu-
tion of the whole universe. It explains how the one
indivisible Brahman is cognised as the multiple universe.
It is not a mere absence of knowledge, but a positive
entity. It is not real, because it ceases with the realisa-
tion of one’s identity with Brahman; nor unreal,
because we perceive its effects, the subjective and
the objective universe. It is neither identical with
Brahman nor different from It.

³ According to Prakāśātma-yati, the author of the
Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa, a gloss on Padmapādācārya’s
commentary, Pañcapādikā, on Śaṅkara’s Sāriraka-Bhāṣya on the Brahma-Sūtras, nescience is in Brahman as well as about Brahman. But according to Vācaspati Miśra (9th century), the author of the famous commentary Bhāmaṭi on the same Bhāṣya, it is in the individual self (jīva), although it is about Brahman.

4 This includes maintenance and dissolution as well.

5 The original or uncompounded (apañcikṛta) forms of the five elements—earth, water, fire, air and ether—are meant.

6 In fact, the whole universe of name and form.]

यवन्तेवासिष्यास्त्यैनिरस्ता भेदिभारणा: ||
	तं प्रणोमि नूसिंहाख्यं यतीन्द्रं परमं गुरुम् ॥ २ ॥

2. I salute that prince of monks, my teacher’s teacher, named Nṛsimha, whose pupils have routed dualists, as lions do elephants.

श्रीमहेंद्रनाथायाव्यान्वेशाङ्गनिवासिन: ||
अहं गुरुववर्णे सर्वतन्त्रप्रवर्त्कान ॥ ३ ॥

3. I salute the world-teacher named Śrīmat Veṅkaṭanātha,1 resident of Velāṅguḍi,2 who was an expounder of all3 systems of philosophy.

[1 This was his own teacher.

2 Probably the cultured village called Vilaṅguḍi lying to the south of the Cauvery and east of Kumbakonam.

3 Not Vedānta alone.]

चेन चिन्तामणौ टीका वशंतीकाविभिन्निनी ।
	तर्कचूड़मणिनां कृता विद्यमनोरसा ॥ ४ ॥
4. He who has written a commentary on the Cintāmani,¹ called Tarkacūḍāmani, in which he has smashed ten commentaries, and which has been appreciated by scholars—

[¹ Tattva-cintāmani by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the founder of the new school of Hindu logic.]

टोका शाश्चरस्यापि बाल्युत्पसिद्धाविनी ।
पद्योजनया पञ्चपादिका ग्यात्तता तथा ॥ ५ ॥

5. Who has also written an illuminating commentary¹ for the students on Śaśadhara,² and has besides expounded the Pañcapādikā³ by construing its words⁴—

[¹ Called Nyāyaratna.
² Author of the Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa.
³ See note 3 on verse 1. Padmapāda was a favourite disciple of Śaṅkara.
⁴ This verse does not occur in many of the printed editions.]

तेन बोधाय मन्दानां वेदान्तायथाबालमिनी ।
धर्मराजाभविन्नेन परिभाषा वितत्तये ॥ ६ ॥

6. That Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra¹ is composing this Parībhāṣā² based on Vedāntic teachings, for the enlightenment of backward students.

[¹ Literally, ‘Prince of adepts in performing sacrifices.’
² The word generally means terminology. Here, however, it means a lucid exposition of the accepted principles of the philosophy.]
Liberation the Supreme End of Life

Among the four kinds of human ends in this world, called righteousness (dharma), wealth, objects of desire and liberation, it is liberation that is the supreme human end, for that alone is known to be eternal from such Śruti texts as, "(And) he (the qualified aspirant) does not return" (Chā. VIII. xv. i, adapted), while the other three are known to be transitory by perception or from such Śruti texts as, "Now, as in this world the comforts gained through one’s labours are exhausted, exactly so in the other world the comforts achieved through one’s good deeds are exhausted" (Chā. VIII. i. 6). And that liberation comes through the knowledge of Brahman. Hence Brahman, the knowledge of It, and the means (pramāṇa) of that knowledge are being described in detail.

[¹ Strictly speaking, its results, viz., heaven and so forth.

² To this earth, to take up a fresh body.

³ As the case may be. Righteousness, being imperceptible, is known only through the scriptures.]
Valid Knowledge and its Means

तत्त्र प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणम्। तत्त्र स्मृतिव्यवहृतं प्रमात्मनधिगताबाधितार्थविषयक्षानत्वम्, स्मृतिसाधारणं अबाधितार्थविषयक्षानत्वम्। नीृपस्थाौप कालस्तेन्द्रियवेधतत्वाभ्युपगमेन, धारावाहिकबुद्धेर्म पूर्वपूर्वब्याजाना-बिषय-तत्तत्त्वंविशेषविषयक्षानत्वेन न तत्रात्मायात। किंच सिद्धान्तेधारावाहिकबुद्धिस्थाये न शाश्वेत; किंतु यावहव-घटस्फुरणं तावद्धुर्दाकारान्तंकरणबुद्धिर्वेक, न तु नाना, 
कुरोः स्वविरोधिःस्युत्पतिःस्पर्शं स्थायित्वाभ्युपगमात्; 
तथाच तत्त्वतिफलिष्ठचैतन्यरूपं धराविश्वासमिपि तत्त्र तात्त्व- 
कालीनमेकमेव, इति नाव्यातिशाक्ति।

Now the word ‘means’ stands here for the instrument¹ of valid knowledge (प्रमाण)². Here,³ if recollection is excluded from it, then valid knowledge would mean that knowledge which has for its object something that is not already known and is uncontradicted⁴; while if recollection is included in it, it would mean that knowledge which has for its object something that is uncontradicted. Since time, although it is colourless, is admitted to be cognised through the organs,⁵ even a continuous cognition⁶ has for its object particular moments that are not the objects of the preceding cognition; hence the definition does not fail to apply there. Moreover,⁷ according to the tenets of Vedānta, in the case of a continuous cognition there is no break in knowl-
edge, but so long as there is the cognition of a jar, the mental state\(^8\) that assumes the form of the jar is just one, and not multiple, for a mental state is admitted to last till another state opposed to it has arisen. Hence, in this case, the knowledge of the jar etc., which is but Pure Consciousness\(^9\) reflected in the mental state in question, also being just one throughout that time, there is not the least suspicion about the definition being too narrow.

\(^1\) A thing is produced by a number of causes. Only the extraordinary cause is called the instrument (\textit{karana}).

\(^2\) As opposed to illusion or error, as when we mistake a rope for a snake.

\(^3\) Opinion is divided as to whether recollection, say of a jar that has been seen on the previous day, is valid knowledge or not. Two definitions are being given to suit these differing views.

\(^4\) By an experience of a diametrically opposite nature.

\(^5\) When we say, "The jar exists now," we not only see the jar but also the present moment. Here time is cognised by the eye.

\(^6\) For example, when we see a jar for some length of time. In each successive moment we see the same jar no doubt, but the cognition in each case is different, because it also takes note of the particular moment in which it takes place and which belongs to no preceding cognition. Hence the object not being already known, the definition is quite applicable.

\(^7\) The objection is being answered in another way.

\(^8\) This will be dealt with on p. 16.

\(^9\) The unconditioned Brahman, free from attributes.]
Objection: According to the tenets of Vedānta, a jar etc. are contradicted as being unreal.¹ So how can the knowledge of it be valid knowledge?

Reply: The answer is this. It is only after the realisation of Brahman that a jar etc. are contradicted, for the Śruti says, “But when to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should one see and through what?” (Br. IV. v. r5); but they are not contradicted in the transmigratory state,² for the Śruti says, “Because when there is duality, as it were, then one sees something,” (Ibid.) Hence the word ‘uncontradicted’ means ‘not contradicted during the transmigratory state,’ and therefore
the definition is not too narrow to include the valid knowledge of a jar etc. So it has been said, "Just as the notion of one’s identity with the body is assumed to be valid knowledge, exactly so is this ordinary knowledge—till the self is truly known." The last clause means, "Till Brahma is realised." By ‘ordinary knowledge’ is meant the knowledge of a jar etc.

\[ ^1 \text{Brahman alone being real.} \]
\[ ^2 \text{The state of relative existence, when one thinks oneself to be different from Brahma and passes from one body to another, being subject to birth and death.} \]
\[ ^3 \text{As when one says, "I am stout," or "I have come here."} \]

Perception as a Means of Knowledge: The Mental State

तानि च प्रमाणानि बह्र—प्रत्यक्षानुमानानोपमानागमार्था—
पत्यनुपललछिधिमेवहात्। तत्र प्रत्यक्षप्रमाया: करणं प्रत्यक्ष-
प्रमाणम्। प्रत्यक्षप्रमा चाचा चैतन्येव, "यत् साक्ष्याः-
परोक्षाः श्रद्धा" द्वति श्रुतेः। "अपरोक्षादित्यस्य अपरोक्ष-
मित्यर्ह्।"

Those means of knowledge are six in number, their divisions being perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption and non-apprehension.\(^1\) Of these, the means known as perception refers to the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge, which knowledge, according to Vedānta, is nothing but Pure\(^2\) Conscious-
ness, for the Śruti says, "The Brahman that is immediate\(^3\) and direct\(^4\)" (Br. III. iv. 1). ‘Aparokṣat’ (direct) in this text stands for ‘aparokṣam.’

\(^1\) All these will be taken up in their proper places.
\(^2\) For the sake of convenience, this epithet will henceforth be dropped, the word ‘Consciousness’ in this connection beginning with a capital.
\(^3\) Not obstructed from the seer or subject by anything.
\(^4\) Not used in a secondary sense."

"नन्तः चैतन्यमनादि, तत्त कथं चक्षुरादेस्तत्तकरणत्वेन प्रमाणत्वमिति? उच्चतः। चैतन्यस्यानादिित्वेपि तद्भविष्यष-कान्तःकरणव्युपनिर्द्वियसङ्क्रणणविविधाबिं योगके, इति वृत्त-विशिष्टेन्न्तःचैतन्यमाननिर्विविधुत्वः। श्लानाच्छेदक्तथाय वृहल्ली
श्लान्त्वोपवरः। ततुकं विवरणे, "अल्टःकरणवसृशी। श्लान्त्वो-पचारात्।"

Objection: Is not Consciousness without a beginning? So how can the eye etc., as instruments of that, be the means of knowledge\(^1\)?

Reply: The answer is this. Although Consciousness is without a beginning, yet that mental state which reveals it arises through the contact of the organs, etc. Hence Consciousness qualified\(^2\) by the mental state is spoken of as having a beginning. And as the mental state limits the (resulting) knowledge, it is figuratively\(^3\) designated as knowledge. So it has been said in the Vivarana, "On account of the mental state being figuratively spoken of as knowledge."\(^4\)"
The contention is that knowledge should not need any instrument.

That is, reflected in it; not Pure or Absolute Consciousness as It is, for It is identical with Brahman. Of course, according to the Advaïta school of Vedânta, any such qualification or limitation is but apparent.

Because, being insentient, it cannot properly be called knowledge.

An adaptation of line 17, p. 41, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, to which edition the subsequent references to the Vivarana will also refer. See note 3 on p. 1.]

नन्दन निवृत्यवस्यान्तःकरणस्य परिणामात्मिका शृवति: कथम् ? इत्यम्। न ताबद्दलःकरण्य निरक्षयवम्, सार्वि- द्रुष्यत्वैः सावर्यवत्वात्। सार्विकव्य “तत्मनोऽक्रियत” इत्याविभूतः। शृवति रुपशनस्य मनोथर्मत्वे च “कामः सद्धीयो विचिकित्सा अहााःाः शृवतिर्प्रतिहर्दीर्वां- रित्वेतेतु सर्व मन पव” इति शृवतिमानम्, “धी”-शतदेन शृवति- रुपशनानाभिधानात्। अत पव कामादेरापि मनोथर्मत्वम्।

Objection: The mind being devoid of parts, how can there be a mental state, which is a modification?

Reply: In this way: In the first place, the mind is not devoid of parts, for, being a substance with a beginning, it must have parts. And that it has a beginning is proved by such Sruti texts as, “It projected the mind” (Br I. ii. 1, adapted). That the knowledge which is a mental state is an attribute of the mind is borne out by the Sruti
text, "Desire, deliberation, doubt, faith, want of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shame, intelligence and fear—all these are but the mind" (Br. I. v. 3); for the word 'intelligence' refers to the knowledge that is a mental state. For this very reason desire etc. are also attributes of the mind.

नन्दु कामादेवतन्तः करणधर्मेत्वे, "अहंमिच्छामि," "अहं जानामि," "अहं विलेज्ञमि," इत्यादयुभव आत्मधर्मंत्रवमवः-गाहमान: कथमुपपचते? उच्च्यते। अयः पिण्डेय दश्यत्वा-भावेवपि दश्यत्वायवाभिताप्रात्म्याभ्यासात् यथा "अयो वृहति" इति व्यवहारः, तथा सुखायातारपरिणाम्यन्तः-करणेक्याभ्यासात् "अहं सुखी;" "अहं दुःखी" इत्याविव-व्यवहारः।

Objection: If desire etc. be attributes of the mind, how can experiences such as "I wish," "I know," "I fear," which apprehend them as attributes of the self, be explained?

Reply: Just as a lump of iron has not the property of burning, yet, on account of the false identification with fire, which is the substratum of the burning property, we use the expression, "The iron burns," similarly the use of expressions such as, "I am happy," "I am miserable," is due to the false identification¹ (of the self) with the mind, which is modified in the form of happiness etc.

¹ Produced by nescience.]
Objection: The mind, being an organ, is imperceptible. So how can it be an object of perception?

Reply: The answer is that in the first place there is nothing to prove that the mind is an organ.

Objection: The statement of the Bhagavad-Gītā, "(The ātman draws) the organs, with the mind as the sixth" (XV. 7), is a proof.
PERCEPTION

Reply: No, for there is nothing contradictory in making up the number six by the mind, although it is not an organ. There is no hard and fast rule that the making up of a number relating to the organs must be done by an organ alone; for in the passage, "They, with the sacrificer as the fifth one, eat the iḍā,"

1 we find that the number five relating to the priests is made up by the sacrificer, who is not a priest, and in the passage, "He taught the Vedas, with the Mahābhārata as the fifth" (Mbh. I. lxiv. 131, XII. cccil. 20), the number five is made up by the Mahābhārata, which is not a Veda. And that the mind is not an organ is evident from such Śruti texts as, "Higher than the organs are the objects; higher than the objects is the mind" (Ka. III. 10).

It cannot be urged that if the mind thus be not an organ, the perception of happiness etc. will not be immediate 2 (sākṣāt); because the immediacy of knowledge does not lie in its being due to an organ; for in that case inference etc. 3 also, being due to the mind, 4 would be immediate, 5 and Gōḍ’s knowledge, which is not due to any organ, would not be immediate. 6

1 A special portion of the sacrificial offerings, which at a certain stage of the sacrifice used to be eaten by the priests and the person performing the sacrifice. The deity connected with it was also named Iḍā, and is identified with the goddess of speech.

2 But would require some organ as medium.
That is, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

Which, according to the logicians, is an organ.

And hence would be classed as perception.

So that God will never have any perceptual knowledge.]

THE CRITERION OF THE PERCEPTION OF
COGNITION: THREE KINDS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

सिद्धान्ते प्रत्यक्षविज्ञानोज्जर्णं किमिति चेतु, किं ज्ञान-
गतस्य प्रत्यक्षविज्ञानम् प्रयोजकं पृच्छवति, किंचि विषयगतस्य?
आचे प्रमाणचैतन्यस्य विषयविश्वाचिन्तन्यांचैतन्याभेदं इति गूँमः।

तथाहि बौद्धिकं चैतन्यम् —विषयचैतन्यं प्रमाणचैतन्यं
प्रमाणचैतन्यशर्तेति। तत्र धर्मवचिन्तनं चैतन्यं विषय-
चैतन्यम्, अन्तःकरणवृत्तचिन्तनं चैतन्यं प्रमाणचैतन्यम्,
अन्तःकरणवृत्तचिन्तनं चैतन्यं प्रमाणचैतन्यम्।

Objection: What, then, is the criterion\(^1\) (prayojaka) of perception according to the tenets of Vedānta?

Reply: Do you inquire about the criterion of the perception of knowledge or of objects\(^2\)? If it be the former, we say it is the unity of the Consciousness reflected in the means of knowledge with the Consciousness limited by the object. To be explicit: Consciousness is threefold—as associated with the object (viṣaya), with the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and with the
subject or knower (pramātṛ). Of these, Consciousness limited by a jar etc. is the Consciousness associated with the object; that limited by the mental state is the Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge; and that limited by the mind is the Consciousness associated with the subject.

[¹ The condition or circumstances under which the term may be used.

² When we say, "This jar," or "I am happy," these are instances of the perception of knowledge as well as of objects. Of course their criteria are different. That of the perception of objects will be dealt with on p. 27.]
Now, as the water of a tank, issuing through a hole, enters in the form of a channel a number of fields, and just like them assumes a rectangular or any other shape, so also the luminous mind, issuing through the medium of the eye etc., goes to the space occupied by objects such as a jar, and is modified into the form of a jar or any other object. That very modification is called a state (vṛtti). But in the case of inference etc. the mind does not go to the space occupied by fire etc., for the latter are not in contact with the eye etc. Thus in cases of perception such as, “This jar,” the jar etc. and the mental state in the form of those combine in the same space outside the body, and hence the Consciousness limited by both is one and the same; for the mental state and objects such as a jar, although (usually) they are dividing factors, do not (here) produce any difference, since they occupy the same space. For this very reason the ether limited by a jar that is within a monastery is not different from the ether limited by the monastery. Similarly, in the case of the perception of a jar as, “This jar,” the mental state with the form of the jar being in contact with it, the Con-
sciouness limited by that mental state is not different from the Consciousness limited by the jar, and hence the knowledge of the jar there is a perception so far as the jar is concerned. Again, since the Consciousness limited by happiness etc. and the Consciousness limited by the mental state relating to them are invariably limited by the two limiting adjuncts that occupy the same space, the knowledge, "I am happy," is invariably a perception.

1 Transparent, light and mobile, like the sun’s rays. This explains its power to reach and reveal objects.

2 That is, following the course of the eye or any other organ. When it goes out and touches the object, the mind also goes out with it, and when it makes the contact from within the body, the mind also does that. This contact is essential to the perception of external objects only, happiness etc. being directly perceived by the mind. The simile is not brought out in complete detail. For instance, there is no mention of the form—corresponding to the channel—in which the mind reaches the object.

3 When, for instance, we infer the presence of fire in a distant hill by seeing smoke in it.

4 The entity is one and the same; only the limiting adjuncts (upādhis) vary. The ether (ākāśa) is the subtlest of the elements and pervades everything. It is one and indivisible.

5 In the case cited.

6 But not in respect of the qualities or actions in the jar. For the perception of these, the mental state should be of that particular form.

7 In the perception of internal objects.
Objections to the Definition of Subjective Perception Answered

Object: In that case the recollection of the happiness etc. abiding in oneself would also be a perception so far as the happiness etc.¹ are concerned.

Reply: No, for there the happiness that is being recollected being a past event, and the mental state in the form of recollection being a present event, the two limiting adjuncts² in the mind belong to different times, and hence the two Consciousnesses limited by them are different; for the criterion of the unity of substratum is that the two limiting adjuncts must occupy the same space at the same time. If, however, the
criterion of that unity be occupation of the same space alone, then in order to prevent (the definition of perception) from unduly extending to a recollection\(^3\) such as, "I was happy before," the object must be qualified by the idea of presence.\(^4\)

\(^1\) Though not in respect of the time, place, etc., related to them.

\(^2\) Viz., the happiness that is being recollected and the mental state in the form of the recollection.

\(^3\) Which is not a perception.

\(^4\) That is, the concluding portion of the definition given in the last paragraph of p. 14 should read: "Limited by the object, which must be present."\]

\[\text{नन्वेवमपि स्वकीयधर्मांध्रमेन वर्तमानो यदा श्रवादिना ज्ञाते तदा तादृशशास्त्रश्रव्यालाबित्वाति, तत्र धर्मांध्र-}
\[वच्छिंच्छ-तदवृत्तन्यन्यस्मित्वातिथता मेतू, न।
\[योग्यतवस्यापि बिषयबिश्रेष्णत्वात्। अन्तःकरणधर्मत्वानिर्माणपि किंतुक्षोव्यू विश्वासपूण्यममित्वम् फलवत्कल्यः}
\[स्वभाव पव शरणाम्। अन्यथा न्यायमतेऽप्यत्वधर्मत्वानिर्माणपि बिश्रेष्णात सुखादिवत स्वभाविरपि प्रत्यक्षत्ववस्तुविद्या।

\textit{Objection:} Even then, when the present righteousness and unrighteousness relating to oneself are known through verbal testimony\(^1\) and so forth,\(^2\) the definition unduly extends\(^3\) to such verbal comprehension etc., because there the Consciousness limited by righteousness and unrighteousness and the Consciousness limited by the mental state in the form of those are one.\(^4\)
Reply: No, for capability of perception also must form a qualifying attribute of the object. That in spite of their being equally attributes of the mind, some are capable of being perceived while others are not, can be explained only by a reference to the inherent nature of things, which we must assume on the basis of the actual result. Otherwise, even in the Nyāya system, righteousness and unrighteousness would inevitably be matters of perception like happiness etc., because they are equally attributes of the self.

[1 By somebody saying, "You are righteous," or "You are unrighteous."

2 Refers to inference such as, "I possess righteousness and unrighteousness, for I experience happiness and misery."

3 For the conditions of perception are satisfied here, though it is not a case of perception.

4 For these two limiting adjuncts occupy the same space, viz., mind, at the same time.

5 To make the effect, viz., perception, possible.

6 So the logician should not raise this objection.]

न जैवमपि सुखस्य वर्तमानतातद्वाय त्वं सुखी
इत्याविवाक्यजन्यशानस्य प्रत्यक्षता स्थादिति बाल्यम्,
इष्टत्वात्। "दशमस्तथमसि" हृत्यादेव संसिद्धविषये
शब्दाद्विपरोक्षशानाभ्युपगमात्।

It cannot be urged that even then, while happiness is present, the knowledge arising from sentences such as, "You are happy," would be
a perception; for we accept this view, inasmuch as in sentences like, “‘You are the tenth man,’”¹ of which the objects are in contact (with the organ²), we admit immediate or perceptual knowledge even from verbal testimony.

¹ Ten rustics swam across a stream, and one of them counted their number to see if all had crossed. To their dismay, one was found missing. Then everyone took his turn at counting, but the result was the same. So they began to lament, when a kind passer-by inquired what it was all about. On being told what had happened, he readily understood the situation, and asked one of them to count again. When the man stopped at nine, the new-comer said to him, “‘You are the tenth man.’” This he repeated with the rest of them. Then they saw their mistake and went away happy. Everyone had left himself out in the counting!

² This is with regard to external objects. In the case of internal objects, the contact is with the mind.]

अत पि “पर्वतो वाहिमान्” इत्यादििश्वासामपि वहचंशे परोक्षम्, पर्वतंशे परोक्षम्, पर्वताध्वचिंचश्रैतन्त्यस्य बाहिनि:स्ततान्तः करणव्रुत्यवचिंचश्रैतन्याभेदात्; वहचंशे तु अन्तः करणबुशिरिन्गमनाभावेत् वहचवचिंचश्रैतन्त्यस्य प्रमाणचैतन्त्यस्य च परस्परं भेदात्। तथाचानुभवः “पर्वतं पश्यामि,” “बाहिमन्तुमिनोमि” इति। न्यायमते तु “पर्वत- मनुमिनोमि” इत्यादिववसायपसि।

Therefore knowledge such as, “‘The hill has fire,’” is also mediate¹ so far as the fire is concerned, and immediate² in respect of the hill;
for the Consciousness limited by the hill etc. is not different from that limited by the state of the mind that has gone out, but in respect of the fire, since the mind does not go out to form a state, the Consciousness limited by the fire and the Consciousness\(^3\) associated with the means of knowledge are different from each other. Thus the experience\(^4\) takes the form, "I see the hill," and "I infer the fire." But in the system of logic\(^5\) the self-reflective cognition (anuvyavasāya)\(^6\) would be of the form, "I infer the hill.""\(^7\)

\(^1\) That is, not a perception.
\(^2\) That is, a perception.
\(^3\) Or Consciousness limited by the mental state.
\(^4\) It is a composite experience, partly perceptual and partly inferential.
\(^5\) Which does not admit this twofold character of the cognition.
\(^6\) Perception of a cognition—linking it to the self, represented by the ego. The cognition, "This jar," is a perception, while the perception, "I know the jar," is a self-reflective cognition. Similarly with inference.
\(^7\) Instead of, "I infer fire in the hill." The hill is perceived, not inferred.

असत्रिद्धक्ष्यपक्षानन्ममि तु सवात्श्चिपि श्वान परोक्षम्।
“हयुरमि चन्द्रम्” इत्यादिश्वानमापि चन्द्रमांश्चपरोक्षम्,
सौरभांशे व परोक्षम्, सौरभस्य चकुरिनित्रियायोग्यताया
योग्यत्वाधृतवस्तय निकलक्षणस्याभावात्।

In an inferential knowledge, however, in which the subject\(^1\) is not in contact with the organ,\(^2\) the knowledge is wholly mediate. Knowl-
edge\(^3\) such as, "A fragrant piece of sandal," is also immediate in respect of the piece of sandal,\(^4\) and mediate in respect of the fragrance, because the latter being incapable of apprehension by the eye,\(^5\) the definition, mentioned before,\(^6\) based on capability of being perceived cannot apply here.

\(^1\) \textit{Pakṣa}: that in or about which something is inferred.

\(^2\) For example, in the inference, "An atom of earth has smell, because it is earth, as is the case with a jar." Here the atom, being an imperceptible substance, can never come in contact with the eye or skin, which are the only two organs that can perceive substances. Therefore the knowledge is not perceptual, but inferential, both in respect of the thing to be inferred, viz., smell, and of the subject, viz., the atom.

\(^3\) Ocular knowledge is meant, as when on seeing a piece of sandal from a distance we make the statement.

\(^4\) Because it is actually in contact with the eye.

\(^5\) Because smell is an object of the nose, which owing to the distance is not in contact with the fragrance. Even if it were in contact, it would have produced a separate cognition of the fragrance only.

\(^6\) See p. 20.]

अ ध्वनिकमे भ्रान्ते परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वयोग्यः युग्मे तथो-जागतिकम न स्थविति वाचयम्, इत्यत्वात्। जागतिकघोषित्व-परिभाषायः सकल्प्रमाणागृहरत्वाप्रामाणिकत्वात्।

"चरोक्षयम्" इत्याविप्रत्यक्षं हि घटाविदिस्नाचे मानम्, न
tु तस्य जागतिकेषपि। जागतिकघोषित्षाप्रभुश्रुति तत्-
साधकानुमानस्थायथवकाशात्। समवायाविद्व्या ब्रह्म-
It cannot be urged that if we thus admit both mediacy and immediacy in the same knowledge, they would not be generic attributes (jātī)\(^1\); for we accept this objection, because technical terms regarding something being a generic attribute or a characteristic other than that (upādhi) are unsupported by any means of knowledge, and as such are unauthorised. Perceptions such as, 'This jar,' are a proof of the existence of the attribute 'jarhood,' but not of its being a generic attribute as well; for since the thing to be established, viz., generic attribute, is something fictitious, the inference that establishes it also has no room. Moreover, since inference (samavāya)\(^2\) is unfounded, and the whole universe, which is other than Brahman, is transitory, the definition of a generic attribute, which is based on its being eternal and inherent in many things, cannot apply to jarhood etc. Exactly in a similar way, the fact of being a characteristic other than a generic attribute may (also) be refuted.

\(^1\) A generic attribute (jātī) is a distinct category in the Nyāya philosophy, and is defined as "that which is eternal and inherent in many things," for example, jarhood (ghaṭatva). It is present in all jars, and would persist as an entity even if all jars were gone. That is, it is eternal. Vedānta denies such generic attributes. According to it, jarhood is the sum total of the
characteristics of a jar, which distinguishes it from other things. It is not eternal. Now, according to the old school of Nyāya, cross division (sāṅkara) is one of the impediments to a generic attribute. It consists in two things being mutually exclusive and also co-existent. For example, materiality (bhūtatva) and limitedness (mūrtatva) thwart each other’s being a generic attribute, for materiality is in earth, water, fire, air and ether, while limitedness is in the first four and mind. Hence if mediacy and immediacy, which exclude each other, co-exist in knowledge, they lead to a cross division, and therefore they cannot be generic attributes. This is the contention. The Vedāntin replies that it is a welcome objection, because he does not admit such generic attributes. Examples of characteristics other than generic attributes are: the state of being a blue jar (niḥagrhaṭatva) and etherhood (ākāśatva). These also, according to the Vedāntist, should not be put in a separate class. They are just attributes.

² According to Nyāya, inherence is eternal relation. It is the relation between the whole and parts, generic attributes and individuals, qualities or actions and the substances possessing them, and ultimate difference (viśeṣa) and the eternal substances. Vedānta denies inherence and substitutes identity (tādātmya) for it.]

“पर्वतो वाहिमान्” हत्यादौ च पर्वतांशे वहतंशे चान्तः
करणवृक्षेप्रति वीर्यस्वारस्वात्मस्वात्मकमेण परोक्षत्वा
परोक्षत्वोपरंक्षवेष चैतन्य ग्रहो न कठिन्त विरोधः।
तथा च
tasādhvānīdayovartakamālahūvābhāvāsaśvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvাত्मकवत्वं
tasviṣhāvābhāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvāvात्मकवत्वं
tasviṣhāvābhāvāvāvāvात्मकवत्वं
tasviṣhāvābhāvात्मकवत्वं
tasviṣhāvābhात्मकवत्वं
tasviṣhात्मकवत्वं
tasviṣhात्मकवत्वं
In sentences like, “The hill has fire,” since the mental states are admitted to be different in respect of the hill and the fire, their distinguishing characteristics (avacchedaka) also are different, and hence there is no contradiction in mediacy and immediacy being together in the same Consciousness. So¹ knowledge that is limited by mental states in the form of particular objects, is a perception in respect of such knowledge, when it is not different from the Consciousness limited by objects that are present and are capable of being apprehended by particular organs.

¹ Here a comprehensive statement about the criterion of the perception of knowledge is given, summing up the points discussed in the preceding pages.

THE PERCEPTION OF OBJECTS: ITS DEFINITION VINDICATED

गदादेर्विषयस्य प्रत्यक्षस्तत्ततु प्रमाणभिस्तत्वम्। नन्तु कथं
गदादेशतःकरणावचित्त्रतैतन्यामेवः “अहमिवं पश्यामि”
इति सदानुभवविरोधादितिचेत, उच्चते। प्रमाणभेद्वो नाम
न ताब्दैक्यम्, किंतु प्रमात्मस्ततातिरिक्तस्तातःक्तमाभावः।
तथायथ घटादेह्विचित्रतैतत्वेऽप्यस्यस्तता विषयजैतन्य-
स्तैव घटादिक्त, अचित्तस्ततातिरिक्ता आरोपित-
स्तता अनुप्रविना।। विषयजैतन्यः पूवार्वकप्रकारण
प्रमात्मजैतन्यमेवस्तदं प्रमात्मजैतन्यस्यैव घटादिक्तः
The perception of objects such as a jar, however, consists in their not being different from the (Consciousness associated with the) subject.

Objection: How can a jar etc. be one with the Consciousness limited by the mind, since it contradicts our experience of difference, as when we say, "I see this"?

Reply: The answer is this. The absence of difference from the subject does not indeed mean identity, but not having an existence apart from that of the subject. To be explicit, since a jar etc. are superimposed on the Consciousness limited by them, their existence is but the existence of the Consciousness associated with the object, for the existence of what is superimposed is not admitted to be something over and above that of its substratum. And since the Consciousness associated with the object is, in the manner described above, but the Consciousness associated with the subject, the latter Consciousness alone is the substratum of a jar etc., and hence their existence is but that of the subject, and not something else. So the immediacy of a jar etc. (in knowledge) is proved. But in cases of inference etc., since the mind does not go out to
the space covered by the fire etc., the Consciousness limited by the fire is not one with the Consciousness associated with the subject, and therefore the existence of the fire etc. is distinct from that of the subject. So (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend to such cases.

[1] This is the answer to the second part of the question mentioned on page 14, viz., the criterion of the perception of objects.

2 In the illustration of the water of a tank. See p. 16.

3 That is, nothing over and above the existence of the Consciousness associated with the subject.

4 The fact of their being objects of perception.]

Objection: Even then, in the case of an inference regarding righteousness and unrighteousness, the latter would be objects of perception, because the Consciousness limited by them not being distinct from the Consciousness associated with the subject, the existence of righteousness etc. is not apart from that of the subject.

Reply: No; for capability of perception is also a qualifying attribute of the object.
Objection: Even then, in the case of the perception, "A coloured jar," the size etc.¹ of the jar would be objects of perception; for since the Consciousness limited by the colour is one with that limited by size etc., and the former is not different from the Consciousness associated with the subject, therefore the Consciousness limited by size etc. is also not different from the subject, and hence the existence of size etc. is not apart from that of the subject.²

Reply: No, for the fact of having as limiting adjuncts the mental states in the form of those particular objects³ is also a qualifying attribute of the subject. Thus, when the mental state has the form of colour, there is no mental state in the form of size etc. Hence size etc. not having an existence same as that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental
state in the form of size etc. is a limiting adjunct, 
(the definition of perception) does not wrongly 
extend (to the size etc.).

\[1\] That is, all perceptible qualities and actions.
\[2\] Since they co-exist in the same mind.
\[3\] Colour etc., as the case may be.]

वन्देवं वृत्ताव्यासि; अनवस्थायिष्या चृःतिगोचर- ्
चत्यन्द्वीकारण तत्र स्वाकारचुर्णयुपहितत्वघटितोकलक्षणाः-
भावात् हि च चेत्, न। अनवस्थायिष्या चृःतेवृत्यन्तरा-
विषयतत्वेषपि स्वविषयत्वाभ्युपगमन स्वविषयबृत्तयुपहित-
प्रमातुः चैत्याथाभिषेकस्त्राकल्वस्य तत्रापि भावात्।

Objection: In that case the definition will 
not extend to the mental state, for, since for fear 
of a regressus in infinitum you do not admit that 
a mental state can have for its object another 
mental state, the definition stated above will not 
apply there, as one of its factors is that the mental 
state in the form of the object—here, the mental 
state itself—is a limiting adjunct (of the Con-
sciousness associated with the subject).\[1\]

Reply: Not so, for although in order to 
avoid a regressus in infinitum a mental state is 
not admitted to be the object of another mental 
state, yet it is assumed to be its own object, and 
hence, even in the instance cited, there is the 
Consciousness associated with the object, that 
has an existence not different from that of the 
Consciousness associated with the subject, of
which the mental state, with itself as its own object, is the limiting adjunct.

[¹ For there will be no such thing as a mental state in the form of itself. Hence the definition will be futile.]

Similarly, although the mind and its attributes,¹ etc.,² are objects of the witness (p. 40) alone, yet, as we assume³ (them to be objects of) mental states in the form of those, the definition mentioned above applies there also, and hence it is not too narrow. It cannot be urged that if the mind and its attributes etc. are assumed to be
objects of mental states (in the form of those), it will contradict the assumption that they are cognised by the witness alone; for, being cognised by the witness alone does not mean that they are objects of the witness without the mental states (corresponding to them), but that they are objects of the witness without the activity of the means of knowledge, such as the organs and inference. Hence the Ācārya\(^4\) in his gloss, in the passage dealing with egoism,\(^5\) has admitted a mental state in the form of the ego. Hence also, in the case of an illusory\(^6\) piece of silver, a state of nescience in the form of the silver has been admitted by the traditional interpreters.\(^7\) So the definition (of perception), of which mental states (with the form of the objects) as limiting adjuncts (of the subject) are a factor, applying to the mind and its attributes, etc., which are cognised by the witness alone, it is not too narrow. Therefore the gist of the matter is this: An object is said to be cognised by perception when it is capable (of being perceived) and is devoid of any existence apart from that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, which (Consciousness) has for its limiting adjunct a mental state with the form of that object.

\(^1\) Such as pleasure and desire.

\(^2\) Refers to illusions, such as seeing a nacre as silver.

\(^3\) That is, if we admit that the mind and its attributes, as also illusions, are apprehended by mental states in the form of those objects.

Vivaraṇa, p. 55, l. 21.

Prātiḥāśīka, as opposed to vyāvahārika or conventional.

For example, Sarvajñātma-muni (9th century), the author of Samkṣepa-Sāriraka, a metrical epitome of Sankara’s Sāriraka-Bhāṣya.

तत्र संयोग-संयुक्ताद्वात्म्यादिनां सचिकर्षणां चैतन्याते
मिल्युक्तंकृतस्यन्फलने विनियोगः।

Now the (various) connections of the organs, viz., conjunction, identity with what is conjoined, and so on, are considered to produce mental states that reveal Consciousness.

[¹ Samyoga, as in the case of substances such as a jar. This is a direct connection.

² Samyukta-tādātmya, as with qualities and other attributes of substances, such as the colour of a jar. Here the organ is connected with the jar, and the colour, according to Vedānta, is identical with that.

³ Refers to: (i) Identity with what is the same as what is conjoined (samyuktābhīnna-tādātmya), as in the case of the characteristics of a colour, which are identical with it. (ii) Identity, as in the case of sound, which, being a quality of the ether, is identical with it. (iii) Identity with what is the same (abhīnna-tādātmya), as in the case of the totality of the characteristics of sound (śabdātva). This is identical with sound, which again is the same as the ether. (iv) The relation of substantive and qualifying attribute (viśeṣya-viśeṣāṇa-bhāva), as in the sentence, “The ground has no jar.” Here the ground is the substantive and the absence of the jar a qualifying attribute. In Nyāya these connections are practically the same. Only in place of identity (tādātmya) it substitutes inherence (samavāya), and in
place of the word 'same' (abhinna) it uses the word 'inherent' (samaveta).

FOUR KINDS OF MENTAL STATES

सा च वृन्दिश्चतुर्विधा—संशयो निविष्यो गर्वः स्मरण-मिति। पविविधवृन्दिति भिदिति, शक्यमुनि भिदिति, बुद्धरूपाः शिष्याः चाक्ष्यायते। तदुक्तम्—
मनोबुद्धिरहुडङ्गारक्षितं करण्मान्तरः।

संशयो निविष्यो गर्वः स्मरणं विषयं हेमे॥

That (mental) state is of four kinds: doubt, certitude, egoism and recollection. Owing to this diversity of states, the mind, though one, is designated as the manas, the intellect, the ego and the citta. So it has been said: “The manas, the intellect, the ego and the citta constitute the internal instrument (mind). Doubt, certitude, egoism and recollection—these are (respectively) their objects.”

DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION

तत् प्रत्यक्षं हिविधम्, सविकल्पकनिविकल्पकभेदात्।
तत् सविकल्पकं वैशिष्ट्याववण्गाहि श्लामम्। यथा “घटमहं जानामि” इत्याववण्गाम्। निविकल्पकं नु संस्मानववण्गाहि श्लामम्। यथा “सोहं देखवृः,” “तत्वमसि” इत्याववि-
वाक्यजन्यं श्लामम्।

The perception spoken of above is of two kinds: determinate (savikalpaka) and indeterminate (nirvikalpaka). Of these, the former is
that knowledge which apprehends relatedness (of the substantive and the qualifying attribute) (vaiśīṣṭya); for example, knowledge such as, "I know the jar."¹ Whereas indeterminate perception is that knowledge which does not apprehend this relatedness; for example, knowledge arising from sentences like, "This is that Devadatta," or "Thou art That" (Chā. VI. viii. 7—xvi. 3).²

¹ Here the object of the knowledge is the jar as related to the subject ‘I.’ Hence it is determinate knowledge.

² In these cases the knowledge arises by ignoring the particular features. For example, ‘this’ refers to the present and ‘that’ to the past, and these two, being contradictory elements, have to be left out of consideration in recognising the person Devadatta. Similarly, in the other example, ‘thou’ and ‘That,’ referring to something present and absent respectively, have to be ignored before one can grasp the essential unity of the individual self and Brahman. Hence in such cases the knowledge is indeterminate.]
Objection: But this knowledge is verbal comprehension, not perception, for it is not due to the organs.

Reply: No, for being due to the organs is not the criterion of perception, since it has already been condemned, but, as has been stated, it is the fact of the Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge not being different from the Consciousness associated with objects, when the latter are present and are capable of being perceived. Thus, as the knowledge due to the sentence, "This is that Devadatta," has for its object something connected with the organ, and as states of the mind that goes out are assumed, the Consciousness limited by Devadatta is not different from that limited by the mental state (in the form of the object), and hence the knowledge due to the sentence, "This is that Devadatta," is a perception. Similarly, with the knowledge due to sentences like, "Thou art That," for there the subject itself being the object, the condition about the unity of the two is present.

[1 On p. 13, par. 2.
2 On p. 27.
3 That is, limited by the mental state in the form of the objects.]
Objection: Since knowledge due to sentences apprehends the relation subsisting between the meanings of words,¹ how can it be indeterminate?

Reply: The answer is this. For something to be the object of knowledge that is due to sentences, the criterion is not that it should apprehend the relation between the meanings of words—for in that case even something the relation of which is not intended² may become the object of such knowledge—but that it should apprehend the intention.³ And in the passage
under discussion, beginning with, "This universe, my dear, was but Existence in the beginning" (Chā. VI. ii. 1), and concluding with, "It is the truth, It is the Self, and thou art That, O Śvetaketu" (Ibid. VI. xvi. 3), the purport of Vedāntic texts is held to be the Pure Brahman. So how can it express something that is not the intended meaning? That sentences like, "Thou art That,"6 convey a simple notion of identity, only means that they produce valid knowledge that does not apprehend the relation (among the meanings of the words in them). So it has been said, "That words6 produce valid knowledge without reference to the (mutual) relation of their meanings, is what has been spoken of as their conveying a simple notion of identity. Or it is that which comprises only the meanings of their stems." The meaning of the last foot of the verse (the last sentence) is: Or the conveying of a simple notion of identity (by words) consists in their denoting the meanings of their stems only.8

[1] Any sentence, such as, "Bring the cow," conveys a sense in which the mutual relation of the objects denoted by the different words in that sentence—the nominative, verb and object—is involved. So obviously it is determinate. This is the contention.

2 For example, when a cricketer says, "Bring me a bat," nobody thinks of the flying quadruped. But if the sense is to be determined just by the relation of things denoted by the words, then what is there to prevent that being understood?
In the above example, the cricket accessory.

The passage first occurs in *Chā. VI. viii. 7*, and is repeated nine times to emphasise the central idea of the Upaniṣads, viz., all that exists is Brahman.

Other examples are: "I am Brahman" (*Bṛ. I. iv. 10*), "This self is Brahman" (*Mā. 2*), etc.

Only nouns denoting co-existent substances that do not bear a causal relation to one another and are not synonyms, are meant. Otherwise the definition would be too wide.

*Tattva-pradīpikā* or *Citsukhī*, Ch. I, verse 20. The author Citsukhacārya (13th century), is one of the highest authorities on Advaita Vedānta.

Not the suffixes or case-endings.]

**Perception by the Witness of the Self and the Witness of God**

तथा प्रत्यक्षः पुनःद्वितियम्—जीवसाक्षी हैववसाक्षी
चेति। तत्र जीवो नाम अन्तःकल्पाबिच्छिन्नं चैतन्यमेतद्,
तत्साक्षी तु अन्तःकरणोपस्वं चैतन्यम्। अन्तःकरणस्य
विशेषणत्वोपाधिचित्राभ्यामनयोमेवः। विशेषणमुल्ला
कार्यान्ववी
व्यावर्तकम्, उपाधिश्च कार्यान्वयी व्यावर्तको वर्तमानश्च।
“सूपिबिश्वो घटोनित्यः” इत्यत्र रूपं विशेषणम्;
“कर्णेणकुलविच्छिन्नं नभः प्रोक्तम्” इत्यत्र कर्णेणकुलुः
पाथः। अयमेवोपाधिवैयायिकः परिचायक इत्यत्वेते।
प्रकते चान्तःकरणस्य जड़तया विषयभासकत्वायोगी
विषयभासकैैतन्योपाधित्वम्। अयस्म जीवसाक्षी प्रत्यात्मम
नाना, नक्ते वैष्णावः मैत्रस्यायनस्मन्त्यानप्रसङ्गः।
That perception, again, is twofold—that due to the witness of the individual self (jīva-sākṣīn) and that due to the witness of God (Īśvarāsākṣīn). Now the individual self is Consciousness limited (avacchinna) by the mind, and the witness of that is Consciousness that has the mind as its limiting adjunct (upādhi). The difference between them is that in the former the mind is a qualifying attribute (viśeṣana) and in the latter a limiting adjunct. A qualifying attribute is that which differentiates,¹ (is present),² and is connected with (what is predicated in respect of)³ something⁴ related to it⁵; while a limiting adjunct is that which differentiates and is present, but is not connected with the predicate in respect of something related to it. In the sentence, "The coloured jar is transitory," the colour is a qualifying attribute,⁶ and in the sentence, "The ether enclosed by the auditory passage is the ear," the auditory passage is a limiting adjunct.⁷ It is this limiting adjunct that is called an indicator (paricāyaka)⁸ by the logicians. In the topic under consideration, since the mind is insentient and hence incapable of revealing objects, it is a limiting adjunct of Consciousness, which reveals things. This witness of the individual self is different in each individual. For if it were one, what Caitra has known, Maitra also would recollect.

¹ Generates the cognition that something is different from another.
This is also a part of the definition. It is omitted here as being obvious.

This portion follows the interpretation of the word kāryānvayin by the author's son, Rāmakṛṣṇādhvarin, the writer of the commentary Vedānta-sikhāmaṇī. This interpretation certainly makes the definition more comprehensive. But perhaps the author intended to give a simpler definition for practical purposes.

Viz., that which is qualified—the substantive (viśesya).

The qualifying attribute.

Here the colour differentiates a particular jar that is related to it from other jars. And it is connected (through the jar) with transitoriness, which is predicated only in respect of the jar. Hence colour is a qualifying attribute. In simpler language, the qualifying attribute is a differentiating property and co-exists, in the thing qualified, with what is predicated of it. The presence of the colour is presumed from its connection with the jar and transitoriness.

The auditory passage is present, and differentiates the ether enclosed by it from the remaining ether, but it is not connected with the totality of characteristics of an ear as such (śrotratva), which is predicated only in respect of the ether related to the auditory passage. Hence the latter is a limiting adjunct. Because, unlike the colour in the other case being transitory, the auditory passage is not an ear, but only the ether enclosed by it is such. In simpler language, a limiting adjunct, while being a differentiating property actually present in the thing of which it is the adjunct, does not co-exist with what is predicated of that.

Also called upalaksana or an accidental feature, as the word 'crows' in the sentence, "Notice the house by the crows." Another form of the indicator is the permanent epithet, e.g., white snow.]
The witness of God is that Consciousness of which the cosmic illusion (māyā) is the limiting adjunct. And it is one, for its limiting adjunct, the cosmic illusion, is one. The plural in Śruti texts such as, "The Supreme Lord is perceived as having manifold forms through His powers of cosmic illusion (māyābhīḥ)" (Ṛ. VI. xlvi. 18), can be explained by a reference to the diversity of powers that are in the cosmic illusion, or to the three ingredients (guṇas)—serenity (sattva), activity (rajas) and inertia (tamas)—constituting it.
PERCEPTION

The unity of the cosmic illusion is decided from the use of the singular number, backed by considerations of simplicity (lāghava),¹ in such Śruti and Smṛti texts as, "One should know the cosmic illusion to be Nature (prakṛti)² and the Ruler of that to be the Great Lord" (Śv. IV. 10); "Salutation to that unknowable Embodiment of Knowledge who being established in the heart, a yogin transcends the cosmic illusion—the all-pervading nescience" (Viṣ. V. xvii. 15); "One birthless (masculine) principle (aja)³ attends and follows⁴ a birthless (feminine) principle (ajā)⁵ that is red, white and black⁶ and brings forth a large progeny of similar form⁷; while another birthless principle,⁸ having finished its enjoyment of that, gives it up" (Śv. IV. 5).⁹

¹ Explanation of a thing by a minimum number of assumptions: the law of parsimony.
² Out of which the whole sentient and insentient universe has proceeded.
³ The individual self.
⁴ And on account of this identification experiences happiness and misery and transmigrates.
⁵ Prakṛti or Nature.
⁶ Is composed of the three ingredients (guṇas)—activity, serenity and inertia, respectively.
⁷ Also composed of those three ingredients.
⁸ One who has acquired discrimination between the self and the cosmic illusion.
⁹ The interpretation given above is according to Sāṅkhya. According to Vedānta, the birthless female principle is the primordial state of the universe (bhūta-prakṛti or māyā). The red, white and black colours
stand for the elements—fire, water and earth, respectively (the two invisible elements, air and ether, being understood). If the Sāṅkhya view of *prakṛti* is modified so as to make it sentient and dependent on God, then Vedānta will have no objection to accepting it as a synonym of *māyā*. The author, who accepts the three *guṇas* as the constituents of *māyā*, may have some such compromise in his mind.]

तत्तथा तदुपाहितं चैतन्यम् ईश्वरसाक्षिः। तत्वानाविदे,
तदुपाधिर्मायया अनावित्वाद। मायावचिल्लबं चैतन्यम्
परमेश्वरः। मायाया बिशेषणत्वे ईश्वरत्वं, उपाधित्वेतः
साक्षित्वम् इति ईश्वरत्वसाक्षित्वयोभेंदः, न तु धर्मिणो-
रीरक्षत्वसाक्षित्योऽः।

स च परमेश्वर एकोपि स्वोपाधिभूतमायानिष्ठस्यत्-
रजस्तमोगुणमेव ब्रह्मविणमहेश्वरादिश्वाप्यतां भजते॥

Hence the Consciousness which has that for its limiting adjunct, is the witness of God, and it is without a beginning, because its limiting adjunct, the cosmic illusion, is so. While the Consciousness that is limited by the cosmic illusion is the Supreme Lord. When the cosmic illusion is a qualifying attribute, Consciousness is called God, and when it is a limiting adjunct, it is called the witness (of God). So the distinction is between Godhead and the state of being the witness of God, and not between the two entities possessing those attributes, viz., God and His witness.
PERCEPTION

That Supreme Lord, although one, is designated by such terms as Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara (Śiva),¹ according to (the preponderance of) serenity, activity or inertia, which are the constituents of His limiting adjunct,² the cosmic illusion.

¹ Representing His projecting, maintaining and destroying aspects, respectively.
² Qualifying attributes are meant. So also below.]

नन्तु हेथ्यतःसाक्षिणोऽनंति “तदैक्षत बहु स्वात्म प्रजायेय” हयादेः सुखिपूर्वसमेऽ परमेश्वरस्य आत्मरुकमीक्षणमात्रम् कथमपयथते? उच्यते। यथा विष्णुनिर्यासनिन्दिकसिद्धः कारणवशेषेन जीवोपाध्यंतः करणस्य वृत्तिप्रेम्वा जायते, तथा स्नुत्यमानप्राणिकर्मचरेण परमेश्वरोपाधिभूतमायाय वृत्ति-विशेषम् “इत्यैवर्णानाः भ्रमणम्,” “इत्यैवर्णानां पालियितव्यम्,” “इत्यैवर्णानां संहर्तव्यम्” इत्यादिकारा जायते। तासां बृक्षों सादित्वात् तत्ततितिक्षितचैतन्यमापि सादीत्युष्ट्यते।

Objection: If the witness of God be without a beginning, how is one to explain the adventitious reflection on the part of the Supreme Lord just before projecting the universe, mentioned in texts like, “It reflected, ‘Let Me multiply, let me be effectively born’” (Chā. VI. ii. 3)?

Reply: The answer is this. Just as, owing to the connection of the organs with objects and other such causes, different states arise in the mind, which is the limiting adjunct of the indi-
vidual self, similarly, owing to the past work of beings that are about to be projected, particular states in the form of, "Now this is to be projected," "Now this is to be maintained," "Now this is to be destroyed," etc., arise in the cosmic illusion, which is the limiting adjunct of the Supreme Lord; and since these states have a beginning, the Consciousness reflected in them is also described as having a beginning.

[¹Not being present all the time.]

**Perception of Cognition Defined:**

**The Nature of Error**

Thus on account of the twofoldness of the witness, perceptual knowledge is twofold. The
character of perception both as regards objects and as regards cognition has been ascertained. Of these, the general definition of perception with regard to cognition is that it is just Consciousness, for even in instances like, "The hill has fire," the Consciousness that has mental states in the form of the fire etc. as limiting adjuncts, being self-revealing in respect of itself, is a perception. As for the perception in respect of its objects, it has already\(^1\) been dealt with.\(^2\) It cannot be said that this definition extends unduly to the perception that is of the nature of an illusion; for that too is intended to be covered by the general definition\(^3\) of perception, which includes both valid knowledge and illusion. When, however, a definition of valid perception alone is to be stated, then in the above definition the object has to be qualified by an attribute signifying that it is uncontradicted.\(^4\) Since illusions like that of silver in a nacre have for their objects the illusory silver etc., which are contradicted during the transmigratory state of existence,\(^5\) the above definition does not apply to them, and hence there is no unwarranted extension of it.

\[^1\] On p. \textit{27 et seq.}

\[^2\] In the inference, "The hill has fire, because it has smoke," both the hill and the smoke, being visible, are objects of perception, but not the fire, which is being inferred. Hence, if the perception be considered only with regard to the objects, then the fire would be excluded from its scope. But if it be considered in
respect of the cognition, then the cognition of the fire is a case of perception. So here is the distinction between the two forms of perception—that of cognition and that of objects.

3 Given on p. 32.

4 That is, the last word should be amplified into, “Object, which must not be contradicted.”

5 That is, even prior to the realisation of one’s identity with Brahman. See note 2 on p. 8.]

वन्नु विसंवादिष्टत्वं श्रावतिसानसिद्धावपि तस्य प्रातिभासिक्रिक्तकाळङ्कप्रज्ञज्ञाविद्विषयकत्वेन प्रमाणं,

केषान्तरीयज्ञातस्य क्लूस्त्वैव तद्विषयत्वसम्भवाविरिति चेत्तु, न प्रक्षसकसीक्षतयाप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वायोगात्। न च ब्यां

तत्र प्रत्यासंस्कारं शास्त्त्व प्रत्याससंस्कारं तत्पव वाहवादेः

प्रत्यक्षत्वापि अनुमानायुष्मानेऽपि।

Objection (by the logician): Although false knowledge may be established by one’s unsuccessful effort,¹ yet there is no proof that it has for its object illusionary silver etc. produced at the moment; for it may have for its object silver that is already existent at some other place.²

Reply: No, for that, not being connected with the organ,³ cannot be an object of perception. Nor is knowledge the (needed) connection there,⁴ for if it were so, that alone would make fire etc.⁵ objects of perception,⁶ and this would obliterate inference etc.⁷

¹ Visāṃvādi-pravṛtti, as when we mistake the reflection of a light for a jewel, but on going to the spot to
take it, are baffled. This proves that there is such a thing as false knowledge.

2 According to the logician, all error is knowing one thing for another (*anyathā-khyāti*), as, in the present instance, seeing the silver, already seen somewhere, in the nacre, owing to some defect such as distance or darkness.

3 Which, according to the logician, is a necessary condition of perception.

4 Logicians believe in extraordinary perception, which is brought about by three kinds of extraordinary connection between the organ and object. One of these is the connection based on knowledge (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarśa*). A man who knows that sandalwood is fragrant, perceives immediately on *seeing* a piece of it that it is fragrant, and says, "A fragrant piece of sandalwood." Here the previous knowledge is the connection that enables him to do so. But since the eye is not connected with the fragrance, he perceives it only by the connection based on knowledge. This is also the case with all illusions.

5 Inferred in a hill from smoke.

6 The Vedāntin argues that if previous knowledge serves as the connection, then the sight of the smoke might as well lead to a perception of the fire, since here also previous knowledge of it would supply the needed connection. So why admit inference etc. as separate means of knowledge? Perception alone would do.

7 That is, all the means of knowledge except perception.

नन्तु रजतोत्पादकां। रजताक्षङ्कादीनामभावे ज्ञाती रजतमुत्पन्तन्ते श्रीति चेत, उच्यते। नहीं लोकसिद्धसम्मानी प्रतिभासिकरजतोत्पादिका, फिक्तु विलक्षणेण। तथाहि—— कावशिवरोषिष्टितलोचनस्य पुरो-
वर्तित्रूच्यसंयोगाविद्वामाकारा चाकविक्याकारा च काविद्वात:-
करणवृत्तिकदेति। तस्यांश चूतौ द्वमववच्छिन्धवैतन्यं प्रति-
बिम्बते। तत्र पूर्वोर्नुल्ल्या बुद्धनिर्मितमनेन द्वमववच्छिन्ध-
वैतन्यं वृत्तवच्छिन्धवैतन्यं प्रमात्रवैतन्यं चासिन्नं भवति।
ततः प्रमात्रवैतन्याभिभिभिव्यव्यसिन्निधि पुष्कित्व-
प्रकारिकाविडिच चाकविक्याविसादृश्यसंदर्शितन्यवहित-
रजतसंस्कारसघीचीना काचाविक्योषसमवाहिता रजानेपार्थारे-
कारण रजात्स्वानाभासाकारेण च परिणमते।

*Objection*: In the absence of the parts of silver, etc., which produce the silver, how according to your view also is the silver produced in the nacre?

*Reply*: The answer is this. It is not the totality of causes as generally accepted that produce the illusory silver, but quite a distinct one. To explain: To a man whose eyes are afflicted with defects such as *kāca*,¹ when the eyes are in contact with a substance in front, there arises a state of the mind in the form of ‘this’ coupled with ‘brightness,’² and in that mental state the Consciousness limited by ‘this’ is reflected. Then, by the issuing of the mind so as to form a state in the manner already³ mentioned, the Consciousness limited by ‘this,’ that limited by the mental state, and that associated with the subject become one. Thereafter the nescience that⁴ is in the form of the nacre and abides in the Consciousness associated
with the object, which again is not different from the Consciousness associated with the subject, is joined to the latent impressions of silver roused by seeing points of similarity such as the brightness, and in combination with ocular defects such as kāca, transforms itself into the object called silver as also the apparent knowledge in the form of that.

[^1 An eye disease in which shining things only are seen.
^2 That is, in the form of “something bright” which has not been truly discerned.
^3 On p. 16.
^4 The adjectival clause distinguishes this subsidiary nescience (tūlāvidyā) from the primal nescience (mūlāvidyā), which is the material cause of the universe consisting of the ether etc. The latter abides in Pure Consciousness, has that for its object, and is destroyed by indeterminate knowledge, while the former abides in the Consciousness limited by the nacre, has the form of the nacre, which is different from the silver, and is destroyed by determinate knowledge. For the distinction between determinate and indeterminate knowledge see p. 34.

^5 That is, Consciousness limited by the mind.
^6 The mental state. See p. 9, last paragraph.]
Transformation (actual change: *parināma*) means the production of an effect that has the same kind of existence as that of its material cause.\(^1\) Apparent change (*vivarta*) means the production of an effect that has a different kind of existence from that of its material cause.\(^2\) The illusory silver is called a transformation in respect of nescience,\(^3\) and an apparent change in respect of Consciousness.\(^4\) And that silver which is a transformation of nescience abides in the substratum of the latter, viz., the Consciousness limited by ‘this’\(^5\); for according to our view, all effects whatsoever abide invariably in the substratum\(^6\) of their material cause, nescience.

\(^1\) As in the case of milk and curd, or threads and cloth. Here both cause and effect have a conventional (*vyāvahārika*) existence.

\(^2\) As when we mistake a piece of rope for a snake or a nacre for a piece of silver. Here the rope or the nacre has a conventional existence, while the snake or the silver has only an illusory (*pratibhāsika*) existence.

\(^3\) Because both nescience and silver have a conventional existence, the one being but a modification of the other.

\(^4\) Since Pure Consciousness has an absolute or noumenal existence, and the silver only an illusory existence.

\(^5\) See p. 50.

\(^6\) Pure Consciousness.]
Objection: How can the silver that abides in Consciousness be identified with something that is in front, as expressed in the statement, ‘“This is silver”’?

Reply: The answer is this. As, in the system of Nyāya, happiness etc., which abide in the soul, are experienced as abiding in the body, since the latter is what determines the fact of being the substratum of happiness etc., similarly, since Pure Consciousness is not the substratum of the silver, but only the Consciousness limited by the meaning of the word ‘this’ is such, and is therefore limited by the meaning of the word ‘this’—the cognition that the silver is connected with something that is in front, is explicable. And since that Consciousness associated with the object is one with the Consciousness that has the mind as its limiting adjunct, the silver,
although it is superimposed on the Consciousness associated with the object, is spoken of as being cognisable by the witness alone\(^2\) and not cognisable through any other agency—like happiness etc.

\(^1\) While Consciousness is all-pervading.
\(^2\) According to Nyāya, happiness etc., although they are qualities of the soul, are said to be produced in the body, because they are invariably produced within the limits of the body.
\(^3\) By the relation of identity.
\(^4\) That is, the witness.
\(^5\) For the explanation of this term as also the following phrase, see p. 31.]

नन्दु साखिष्ण्यभस्त्तते “अहं रजतम्” शति, “तद्रान्” शतिः वा प्रत्ययः स्यात्, “अहं सुखी” शतिवत, शति चेत, उच्यते। नहि खुलाशोनामस्: करणावचिर्भैतंयशनियाविचारार्थरुपकम् “अहं सुखी” शति श्रानम्, खुलाशोनां घटार्थवचिर्भैतनयं पवाभायासात्। किन्नु यस्य यद्रानुभावाहितस्त्रासहकृताविचारार्थवत् तस्य तत्रानुभावविषयतवम्, यत्वेवानुगतं नियामकम्। तथाच द्रवमाकारानुभावाहितस्त्रासहकृताविचारार्थवादु घटादेशादर्शमाकारानुभवविषयतवम्, अहमाकारानुभावाहितस्त्रासहकृताविचारार्थवादु श्रावद्विधादेशभविधानुभवसस्त्रासहकृताविचारार्थवादु—भविधानुभवविषयतवम्। तथाचोभविधानुभवम्—
Objection: If (the silver) be superimposed on the witness, the cognition should be, "I am silver," or "I have silver," like, "I am happy."

Reply: The answer is this. The cognition, "I am happy," is not due to happiness etc. being the effects of the nescience that abides in the Consciousness limited by the mind, for happiness etc. are, like a jar and so on, superimposed only on Pure Consciousness; but the universal rule is that a thing is the object of experience in a particular form according as it is the effect of nescience attended with the latent impressions left by an experience of that particular form. So a jar etc. are objects of an experience in the form of 'this,' because they are the effects of nescience attended with the latent impressions left by an experience in the form of 'this'; the mind etc. are objects of an experience in the form of 'I,' because they are the effects of nescience attended with the latent impressions left by an experience in the form of 'I'; and the body,
organs, etc., are objects of an experience in the form of both ‘this’ and ‘I,’ because they are the effects of nescience attended with the latent impressions of an experience in the form of both. Thus there are two types of experience: “This is the body,” and “I am the body,” “I am a man,”¹ or “I am a Brāhmaṇa”²; “This is the eye,” and “I am blind”; “This is the ear,” and “I am deaf.” In the example cited, although the illusory silver is an effect of nescience abiding in the Consciousness that is limited by ‘this,’ which again is not different from the Consciousness associated with the subject, yet it is the object of an experience in the form of ‘this,’ and not that of an experience in the form of ‘I,’ expressed in the statement, “I am silver,” because it is due to the latent impression left by an experience in the form of ‘this’ in a genuine case of silver, as expressed in the statement, “This is silver.”³ This should be borne in mind.

¹ Here the identification is with the human body.
² This also can apply to the body only.
³ The form of the original experience the latent impression of which acts as an auxiliary cause in subsequent experiences, is the determining factor regarding the forms of the latter.]

नन्वेवमपि मिथ्यार्ज्जस्य साक्षात् साक्षिसम्बन्धितया
भानसमब्धे रज्जगोचरब्याबामासस्त्रयाया भविष्यवाच्येऽयप-
गमः किमर्थमिति चेत्, उच्चयते। स्वगोचरवृत्तयुपहितः
Objection: Even then, since the illusory silver can be cognised as being directly connected with the witness, why assume a state of nescience that\(^1\) is an apparent knowledge having the silver for its object?

Reply: The answer is this. It is assumed in order to establish the perceptual character of the cognition of the silver, because the perception of an object consists in its not having an existence apart from that of the Consciousness of which the state (here, of nescience) cognising the object is a limiting adjunct.\(^2\)

Objection: Since the (mental) state in the form of ‘this’ and the state (of nescience) in the form of the (illusory) silver have each a separate object, and since, as in the view of the Teacher,\(^3\) a qualified knowledge is not admitted,\(^4\) how can you account for erroneous knowledge?

Reply: Not so, for as one and the same Consciousness reflected in the two states brings
out the identity of a real and an unreal thing, it is admitted to be an error. Therefore the cognition on the part of the witness, having for its object both a real and an unreal thing, and hence lacking\(^5\) uniform validity, is declared as invalid by the traditional interpreters of Vedānta.

\(^1\) Refers to the ‘state.’
\(^2\) See p. 27.
\(^3\) The nickname of Prabhākara, a student of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (8th century), from whom he differed and founded a new school of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy.

\(^4\) According to his school, the knowledge of ‘this’ (something in front) is perception, and that of the silver is recollection of a previous genuine experience. The two mental states are distinct, but they lead to one cognition, because they co-exist and hence the same Consciousness is reflected in them. According to this school, there is no such thing as error, all cognition being valid knowledge.

\(^5\) It is valid in respect of ‘this’ and invalid in respect of the silver.]

ननु सिद्धान्ते देशान्तरीयरजतमथविद्याकार्यामथ्यस्तकेति
कथं रूढत्नयत ततो वैलक्षणणमू हति चेत, न।
त्वन्मते सत्यत्वादिष्कोपिकैणजीतु क्षणिकत्वं केषान्तितः
स्थायित्वमू, इत्यत्र यदव नियमकं तदेव स्वभावविशेषार्थिं
ममापित। यदा घटाध्यायं भविष्यव दोषत्वेन हेतुं,
शक्तिरूढ्याध्यायं तु काचार्योपितं दोषं। तथा-
चागन्तुकप्रेषज्ञत्वं प्रातिभासिकत्वं प्रयोज्यकम्। अत एव
Objection: According to the tenets of Vedānta, the silver that is elsewhere is also an effect of nescience and superimposed. So how does the silver appearing in the nacre differ from that?

Reply: Not so; for although according to you all things are equally real, some of them are fleeting\(^1\) and others stationary\(^2\); and whatever may be the determining factor in this, such as peculiar nature, applies to my case also.\(^3\) Or (we may say) in the superimposition\(^4\) of a jar etc., nescience alone, being a defect, is the cause, while in the case of the superimposition of silver on the nacre, and so on, the eye-disease kāca etc. also are defects. So the criterion of something being illusory is its being produced by some adventitious defect. Hence a chariot etc. experienced in a dream are illusory, since they are produced by an adventitious defect, viz., sleep.

\(^1\) Lasting for two moments only. Examples of these are sound, knowledge, desire, etc.

\(^2\) As, for instance, a jar.

\(^3\) That is, it is on account of their natural peculiarity etc. that the silver in the one case is real, and in the other case unreal.

\(^4\) On Pure Consciousness.]

Dream Perception

नन्तु स्वप्नस्थले पूर्वानुभूतरथादेः स्मरणमात्रेणैव व्यव-हारोपप्तो न रथाविविष्कित्त्यनमं, गौरवात्, हति चेतु, न,
Objection: In the case of dreams, only the recollection of a chariot etc. seen before serves to account for the phenomena; so the creation of a chariot etc. need not be assumed, because it is cumbrous.

Reply: Not so, for if only the recollection of the chariot etc. be assumed, it would contradict such experiences as, "I see a chariot," or "I saw a chariot in a dream." Besides, it would clash with scriptural texts establishing the creation of chariots etc., such as, "But he creates the chariot, the animals to be yoked to them, and the roads" (Br. IV. iii. 10). Therefore, like the silver appearing in the nacre, the chariot etc. experienced in a dream are also illusory, and stay as long as the illusion lasts.
Objection: In a dream, the particular spot which is experienced as the support of the chariot etc. not being also connected with the eyes, an indescribable illusory spot has to be assumed. So where does the superimposition of the chariot etc. take place?¹

Reply: The objection is not valid, for Consciousness, which is self-effulgent, is the substratum of the chariot etc. Because the chariot etc. that are experienced (in the dream), are experienced as but existent; hence it is Consciousness manifesting itself as Existence that is the substratum. The particular spot also is superimposed on the Consciousness and is illusory. The fact of the chariot etc. being cognised by the (corresponding) organ is also illusory, for then all organs are at rest. As for the possibility of the experience being in the form of, "I am a chariot,"² etc., it should be refuted in the manner already stated.³

Some hold that the chariot etc. seen in a dream are direct modifications of the cosmic illusion (māyā); others, that they are its modifications through the medium of the mind.
The implication is that in the absence of the substratum, the superimposition is impossible.

Here and in the following pages the word ‘elephant’ is substituted for ‘chariot’ in most of the editions. ‘Chariot’ is obviously the better reading.

On p. 55.

Two Fold Destruction of Effects: Its Bearing on Error

ननु स्थाये: शुद्धचैतन्याध्यस्तत्वे इवानी तत्त्वाक्षरात्-शारामावेन जागरणेऽपि स्वप्रवृत्तवधयथायो: स्वतन्त्रतर्तन।
उच्चयते। कार्यविनाशो हि द्विविधः। कण्ठितुपपांचानेन सह, कण्ठितु विधमान पवोपांचाने। भावे बाधः, द्वितीयस्तु निवृत्ति:। भ्रायस्तु कारणपरिष्कारतत्त्वाक्षरात्-कारः, तेन विनोपावानभृताय अविद्या अविनये।
द्वितीयस्तु कारणं विरोधविशेषत्यसिद्धाख्यिन्यातिविविभिस्तिवो। तविष्ठ ब्रह्माक्षरात्त्वारामावात् श्वप्रपक्षे: मा वाबिष्ठ, मुसः-प्रहारण घटादीरि विरोधप्रत्ययाध्यात्तरद्वये श्वजनकीमृत्त-निद्राविविद्वेषानए वा स्थाद्रिनिविष्टानि को विरोधः?

Objection: If the chariot etc. be superimposed on Pure Consciousness, since this is not realised in the present state, the chariot etc. experienced in a dream would persist even in the awakened state.

Reply: The answer is this. The destruction of an effect is of two kinds. In one the destruction is together with that of the material cause,
and in the other the material cause is left untouched. The first is nullification (bādha), the second is cessation (nivṛtti). The cause of the first is realisation of the truth of the substratum,² for without that, nescience,³ which is the material cause, is not removed. The cause of the second is the rise of a contrary mental state, or the removal of defects. Hence, although in the awakened state the world conjured up in dreams may not be nullified⁴ in the absence of a realisation of Brahman,⁵ yet, like the cessation of a jar etc. by the blow of a club, what is there to prevent the cessation of the chariot etc. (seen in a dream), through the rise of a contrary cognition, or through the removal of defects such as sleep that caused them?

¹ The transmigratory state of existence.
² Brahman or Pure Consciousness.
³ Though earth is commonly spoken of as the material cause of a jar, yet it is but nescience in another form. So that is the true material cause.
⁴ That is, destroyed with its material cause, nescience.
⁵ That is, of the identity of the individual self with Brahman.

पवश्च शुक्लिन्द्र्यस्य शून्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यनिभूताविद्या-
कार्यत्वप्रक्षे शुक्लितिः क्षणेन तत्क्षणेन सह रजस्त्रय बाधः ।
मूलाविद्याकार्यत्वप्रक्षे तद्मूलाविद्याया श्राहसाक्षात्कार्मणां-
निवर्त्यत्याय रजस्त्रयं तत्र शुक्लानाप्रियविहृतिमात्रम् , मुसल-
प्रहरैयं घटस्येव ।
Thus, according to the view that the silver seen in a nacre is an effect of the subsidiary nescience abiding in the Consciousness limited by the nacre, there is nullification of the silver together with the nescience regarding the nacre by the knowledge that the (supposed) silver is a nacre. While according to the view that it is an effect of the primal nescience, since the latter is destroyed only by the realisation of Brahman, there is just a cessation of the silver through the knowledge that it is a nacre—as in the case of a jar through the blow of a club.

\[ \text{नन्तु शुक्लो रजतस्य प्रातिभाससकमये प्रातिभासिकस्सता-} \]
\[ \text{भुपमे "नेवं रजतम्" इति ब्रैकालिकलिपिवर्ध्यानं न स्यात्,} \]
\[ \text{किंतु "प्र्द्धार्नी न रजतम्" इति स्यात्, "ह्यार्नी घटः श्यामो} \]
\[ \text{न" इतिवत्, इति चेत्, न, नहीं तत् रजतत्वावच्छिन्नप्रति-} \]
\[ \text{योगिताकामावो निषेधधीवीपयः, किंतु लौकिकपार्थिर्यिक-} \]
\[ \text{त्वावच्छिन्न-प्रातिभासिकरजतप्रतियोगिताकः, व्यधिकरण-} \]
\[ \text{धर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकामावाभुपमान्।} \]

**Objection:** If we admit an illusory existence for the silver during the time that a nacre appears as that, there would be no (subsequent) knowledge of its negation for all time—past, present and future—in the form, “It is not silver,” but it should be of the form, “Now it is not silver,” like, “Now the jar is not black.”

**Reply:** No, for the object of the knowledge of negation there is not a non-existence² the
counterpositiveness relating to which is characterised by silverhood, but one the counterpositiveness relating to which, abiding in the illusory silver, is characterised by conventional reality; for we admit that kind of non-existence the counterpositiveness relating to which is characterised by an attribute abiding in a different substratum from its own (vyadhikaranā).

1 That is, the negation should be felt as temporary —just confined to the period of disillusion.

2 Non-existence etc.—That is, an absence of identity, or a non-existence of the form, “It is not silver.” The counterpositive (pratiyogin) of a non-existence is that whose existence is denied; here, the silver. Counterpositiveness (pratiyogitā) is an attribute of that. The distinguishing characteristic (avacchedaka) of that counterpositiveness here is silverhood (rajatatva: all that makes silver what it is). The plain meaning of the passage is that the denial here is not of all silver as silver (but only of illusory silver).

3 One etc.—That is, a non-existence of the form, “It is not silver that has conventional reality.” The counterpositive of this non-existence is illusory silver, which never possesses conventional reality like a jar or cloth, being ascertained to be false even during one’s relative state of existence. A jar or cloth lacks the absolute reality of Brahman, but they possess reality in the popular acceptance of the term, inasmuch as they persist till realisation. Dreams, illusions, etc., are of a much flimsier character, for they are dispelled as soon as a person gets out of those states.

4 Of the counterpositiveness.

5 When we say, “A cloth does not exist as a jar,” that whose existence is denied is the cloth, which is
therefore the counterpositive of this negation. A jar is a different substratum from the cloth. The property of that, viz., jarhood, is the distinguishing characteristic of the counterpositiveness of this negation \( \textit{pratiyogitāvaccheda} \). So the non-existence here is \textit{vyadhikaranā-dharmāvacchīna-pratiyogitā-abhāva}, and it is always to be found in a cloth. Similarly, in the sentence, "It is not silver that has conventional reality," the absence of being silver possessed of conventional reality is always to be met with in a nacre, because, though the latter may sometimes appear as silver, it is never the conventionally real silver.]

ननु प्रातिभासिके रजते पारमार्थिकत्वमवगतं न वा?
भवगमे प्रतियोगिताबच्छेदकावचिश्ररजतसत्वशास्त्राभावाक्षरप्रतिमेतुपपि।
भवगमेपरोक्षाभासस्य तत्कालीनविषयसांतानियतत्वात् रजते पारमार्थिकत्वमन्यनिवर्णनीयं रजतवदेशवोपणाभवति तद्विश्रारजतसत्वे तद्विश्रारामवर्धन्तः कथं वर्तत ८४ति चेत, न, पारमार्थिकत्वव्याधिगृहिष्यह रजते प्रतिभाससम्बन्धो रजतनिष्ठपारमार्थिकत्वोप्यन्ययुपगमात।
यत्रा रोप्यप्रशिक्षिकं तथैव प्रातिभासिकवस्तूत्यन्ते भेंडायकारतः।
अत एव द्वितीय-संशोधनवात् जपाकुलमति लोकहित्यस्य स्फटिको भान-सम्भवात्, न स्फटिको निन्यशनीयलोकहित्योपपि।
नन्वें यथ जपाकुलम् द्वाग्नातराब्यद्वानाद्विक्षितसंकीर्तनं तत्र लोहित्य-प्रतीत्या प्रातिभासिकं लोहित्य स्वीकृत्यताभवति चेत, न,
प्रश्नवातः।
**Objection:** In the illusory silver, is the (conventional) reality known or not? If it is unknown, there being an absence of knowledge of the existence (in the illusory silver) of silver that is possessed of the distinguishing characteristic of the counterpositiveness (relating to the absence), there cannot be a perception of the absence. And if the reality is known, since perceptual knowledge depends on the existence of its object at the time, a (conventional) reality that is indescribable is also produced in the silver, just as the latter is (in the nacre); therefore how can there be the absence of silver characterised by (conventional) reality in the nacre while there is the presence of silver so characterised?

**Reply:** Not so; for since it is possible for the (conventional) reality belonging to the substratum (of the illusory silver) to be cognised in the silver, we do not admit that (conventional) reality is produced in the silver. It is only where the thing superimposed is not connected with the organ, that the origination of an illusory thing is admitted. Hence, there being the possibility of cognition of the redness belonging to a hibiscus in a crystal, since the flower is connected with the organ, there is no origination of an indescribable redness in the crystal.

**Objection:** In that case, where the hibiscus is not connected with the organ on account of the
intervention of some other substance, and yet redness is cognised, you must admit an illusory redness.

Reply: No harm, for we accept this.

Thus in other cases of erroneous perception also it may be shown that the general definition of perception is applicable, and that of a valid perception\(^4\) is inapplicable.

[^1] Viz., conventional reality, the counterpositive being the knowledge of the existence of such silver.

[^2] The perception of non-existence depends upon the knowledge of its counterpositive as possessed of its distinguishing characteristic. For instance, the absence of a jar as possessed of jarhood cannot be perceived unless such a jar has already been known. Now, since no illusory silver ever possesses conventional reality, the absence of it as possessed of that reality cannot be perceived in the illusory silver.


[^4] Viz., that it must be uncontradicted.]

**Perception Through or Without an Organ**

उत्तर प्रत्यक्षं प्रकाशान्तरेण द्विविधम्—हिन्द्रियजन्यं तद-जन्यश्रेष्ठति। तत्रेंद्रियायजन्यं सुखाविप्रत्यक्षम, मनस्
हिन्द्रियत्वविनिरुज्जान्ति। हिन्द्रियाणि पञ्चं, ध्राणरसनचक्षुः—
श्रोतव्यत्गात्मकानि। सत्वाणि चेतनिर्द्वायणि स्वस्वभाष्य-
संयुक्तायेव प्रत्यक्षां जनयन्ति। तत्र ध्राणरसन-
त्वांनिन्द्रियाणि स्वस्थानस्थितायेव गन्धरसस्पष्टायपल्लभानु—
The above-mentioned perception is twofold in another way—that due to the organs, and that not due to them. Of these, that not due to the organs is the perception of happiness etc., for the view that the mind is an organ has been refuted. The organs are five, consisting of the nose, tongue, eye, ear and skin. All the organs lead to perceptual knowledge only when they are connected with their respective objects. Among them, the nose, tongue and skin generate cognitions of smell, taste and touch, just remaining at their seats, while the eye and ear apprehend their respective objects by themselves reaching the space occupied by those objects; because it is possible for the ear, too, to reach the space occupied by a kettle-drum etc., since it is limited like the eye and so on. Hence we have the experience, “I have heard the sound of the kettle-drum.” The assumption that an endless series of sounds is produced in the region of the
auditory passage, like a series of waves, or otherwise,\(^3\) is cumbrous, and such also is the assumption that the perception, "I have heard the sound of the kettle-drum," is an illusion.\(^4\)

Thus perception has been explained.

\[^1\text{On pp. 12-13.}\]
\[^2\text{Of the Nyāya philosophy.}\]
\[^3\text{Refers to the manner of kadamba buds, all the filaments of which appear simultaneously.}\]
\[^4\text{Because, according to this view, what one hears is a sound of the same class as the sound of the kettle-drum.}\]
CHAPTER II

INFERENCE

Inference is the Knowledge of Invariable Concomitance

अथातुमान निरूप्ते। अनुमितिकरणमानाम।
अनुमितिभव व्यास्तिघातवेन व्यास्तिघातजन्य। व्यास्तिघातातु-
व्यवसायःदेस्तत्वेन तत् ज्ञन्यत्वाभावावाग्नुमितित्वम।

Now inference (anumāna) is being described. It is the instrument of inferential knowledge (anumiti). And the latter is produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) purely in its character as the knowledge of invariable concomitance. The self-reflective cognition etc. of the knowledge of invariable concomitance are not inferential knowledge, because they are not produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance as such.

[¹ Between the thing to be inferred (sādhyā) and the reason or ground from which we infer (hetu), the latter being the subordinate concomitant (vyāpya). In the sentence, "The hill has fire, because it has smoke," fire is the thing to be inferred, the hill is the subject or thing in which it is inferred (pakṣa), and smoke is the reason. We know from experience that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. In other words, smoke never exists where fire does not. This is invariable concomitance. According to the Nyāya philosophy, the sight of smoke in the hill, followed by the recollection of this invariable concomitance and
the consideration (\textit{parāmarśa}) that the hill has smoke, which is the subordinate concomitant of (i.e. never exists without) fire, leads to the inferential knowledge that the hill has fire. The Vedāntic conception of the origin of inferential knowledge differs from this in certain respects, which will presently be dealt with.

\textsuperscript{2} And not as an object etc. See note 4.
\textsuperscript{3} See note 6 on p. 22.
\textsuperscript{4} Refers to recollection, verbal comprehension, etc.

In the self-reflective cognition of the knowledge of invariable concomitance (that is, when we know that we have this knowledge), the latter is a cause as an object; in the recollection of that, it is a cause as the experience of an identical object (with that of the corresponding perception); and in the verbal comprehension of it, as the knowledge of the meaning of words, and so on.]

\begin{verse}
अनुमितिकरणम् व्यासित्वानम्।
तत्संस्कारोऽवन्तर-व्यापारः।
न नु तृतीयकङ्गप्रमाणोऽवनमितः करणम्।
तस्यानुमितिहेतुत्वासिद्धांतक करणत्वस्य दूरनिरस्तःस्तवात।
न च संस्कारजन्यत्ववेनानुमिते: स्मृतित्वापि:।
स्मृतिमानागाधर-जन्यत्वस्य संस्कारमात्रजन्यत्वस्य वा स्मृतित्वप्रयोजकत्वात्संस्कारअन्तसाधारणसंस्कारजन्यत्वस्य तवप्रयोजकत्वात्।
\end{verse}

The instrument of inferential knowledge is the knowledge of invariable concomitance. The latent impression of that knowledge is the intermediate operation (\textit{vyāpāra}).\textsuperscript{1} But the consideration (\textit{parāmarśa})—which is the third cognition\textsuperscript{2}—of the sign\textsuperscript{3} or reason as being present in the thing where something is inferred (\textit{pākṣa}), is
not an instrument of inferential knowledge; for since it cannot be proved that it is (even) a cause of inferential knowledge, the question of its being an instrument\(^4\) of that is easily set aside.

It cannot be urged that since inferential knowledge is produced by latent impressions,\(^5\) it comes under recollection; for since the criterion of recollection is the fact that it is produced by the previous non-existence\(^6\) of recollection or by latent impressions alone, the fact of its being produced by latent impressions, which is applicable to their destruction\(^7\) as well (as to recollection), is not a criterion of recollection.

\(^1\) Vyāpāra in Nyāya is defined as that which is caused by something else and yet helps to produce the result of that something; the intermediate cause. Here is another point of difference with Nyāya, according to which the operation is parāmarśa.

\(^2\) According to the logicians, first we see the presence of smoke in a kitchen etc.; then we recollect that smoke is never without fire; next we consider that the smoke is in the hill where the fire is inferred. So consideration is cognition of the reason for the third time, and is an instrument of inferential knowledge. This view of the logicians is rebutted.

\(^3\) Liṅga: that from which something is inferred; the reason.

\(^4\) Which is an extraordinary cause.

\(^5\) Which constitute the operation of it.

\(^6\) According to Nyāya, prior to the moment that a positive entity comes into being, there is the previous non-existence of it, which is without a beginning. And when that ceases, the thing is produced.
The destruction of latent impressions would be impossible, were they non-existent. Hence the latter are a cause of that.]

Nor can it be questioned how, in a case where inferential knowledge arises from recollection, latent impressions can be the cause; for even in the case of a recollection of invariable concomitance, it is the latent impressions of that which are the cause. There is no hard and fast rule that recollection destroys latent impressions, for we come across a series of recollections. Nor would inferential knowledge arise even from un-
awakened latent impressions, for the awakening of them is also an auxiliary (to it). Thus the inferential knowledge, "(The hill) has fire," arises when one has knowledge of the reason (smoke) being present in the thing (the hill) where something (fire) is to be inferred, in the form, "This has smoke," and there is awaken- ing of the latent impression left by the (previous) experience, "Smoke is a subordinate concomi- tant of fire." But neither the recollection of invariable concomitance nor a qualified knowl- edge\(^1\) resulting from it, such as, "This has smoke, which is a subordinate concomitant of fire,"\(^2\) should be assumed in between\(^3\) as the cause, for it is cumbrous and unwarranted. That knowledge of invariable concomitance is an in- strument\(^4\) only in respect of the knowledge of the fire, and not in respect of that of the hill. Hence the knowledge, "The hill has fire," is inferential only in respect of the fire, and not of the hill, for we have already\(^5\) proved that in respect of the latter the knowledge is a perception.

\(^1\) A knowledge which apprehends both the substanti- tive and the qualifying attribute. In a valid cognition, for example, "The hill has fire, because it has smoke," the qualifying attribute (fire) is present in the substanti- tive (hill). But in a case of error, as in the sentence, "The lake has fire, because it has water," the qualifying attribute (fire) is absent in the substantive (lake).

\(^2\) This is consideration (parāmarśa)—the knowledge that a thing (e.g. smoke) possessed of the invariable concomitance of some other thing (fire), that is,
invariably dependent on it, is present in the subject or the thing where the latter is to be inferred (paksā).

3 Between the awakening of the recollection and the inferential knowledge.

4 Of inferential knowledge.

5 On pp. 21-22.]

Invariable concomitance is co-existence with the thing to be inferred that must abide in all substratums of the reason. It is apprehended by the observation of concomitance when no violation of the latter has been noticed. As to whether this observation of concomitance should be repeated experience or a first experience, no importance need be attached to this distinction, for the deciding factor is simply the observation of concomitance.

**Inference is only Affirmative**

तदानुमानमन्यथायिरिप्रेक्षय न तु केवलान्विते, सर्वेष्यापि धर्मं स्मरणयते ब्रह्मानिद्रात्यत्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वेन अत्यन्तभावप्रतियोगिसाधूमक्तित्वकेवलान्वित्वासिद्धः। नाप्यनुमानस्य व्यतिरेकसहस्त्रमू, साध्याभावे साधनाभावे निरूपितव्यतिश्रावस्य साधनेन साध्यानुमितात्तुपयोगात्।
That inference is only of one form,¹ viz., affirmative, \((anvayin)\),² but not purely affirmative \((kevalänvayin)\)³; for according to our view, every attribute is the counterpositive of the absolute non-existence⁴ abiding in Brahman,⁵ and hence there is no scope for the purely affirmative inference, in which the thing to be inferred must not be the counterpositive of non-existence. Nor has inference a negative \((vyatirekin)\) form⁶; for the knowledge of invariable concomitance subsisting between the absence of the thing to be inferred and that of the reason—the former leading to the latter—is of no use for deducing the thing to be inferred from the reason.⁷ How then can even a person who is unaware of the affirmative invariable concomitance⁸ of smoke etc. (with fire etc.) have inferential knowledge⁹ through his knowledge of negative invariable concomitance?¹⁰ From the means of knowledge called presumption \((arthāpatti)\), as we shall explain.¹¹ For this very reason,¹² inference has no such form as both affirmative and negative \((anvaya-vyatirekin)\),¹³ for the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is not a cause of inferential knowledge.

¹¹ Not three, as in Nyāya, viz., purely affirmative
(kevalānvayin), purely negative (kevala-vyatirekin) and both affirmative and negative (anvaya-vyatirekin).

2 In which from the presence of something in a particular place or thing some other thing is inferred. For example, "The hill has fire, because it has smoke." Here we have both similar and contrary instances.

3 For example, "A jar is namable, because it is knowable." Here there is no contrary instance, since everything is namable.

4 As in the proposition, "There is no jar."

5 Since Brahman is absolutely devoid of attributes, there is always the absence of all attributes in It; and every attribute is a counterpositive of that non-existence.

6 Where from the absence of something we infer the absence of some other thing. For example, "The lake has no smoke, because it has no fire." This includes the second form of inference admitted by the logicians, viz., the purely negative, illustrated by the proposition, "Earth is different from other things, because it has smell."

7 Even if two negatives stand to each other in the relation of principal and subordinate concomitant, it does not warrant us to infer the same kind of relation between the two positive entities of which they are negations.

8 For example, "Wherever there is smoke, there is fire."

9 Such as, "The hill has fire."

10 For example, "Where there is no fire, there is no smoke."

11 In Chapter V.

12 This is explained by the last part of the sentence.

13 Since negative inference is repudiated by Vedānta, this third form of inference admitted by the logicians, which involves negative inference, is also inadmissible.]
INFERENCE

INFERENCE FOR ONESELF AND FOR OTHERS: SYLLOGISM

तत्त्वानुमानं स्वार्थपरार्थभेदेन द्विविधम्। तत्र स्वार्थ-
न्तूकमेव, परार्थन्तु न्यायसाध्यम्। न्यायो नामायुक्त-
समुदायः। अववाच्याश्च च यथा पत्र—प्रतिशाहादूहारणूपः,
उद्दाहरणोपनयनिणमस्तुः। न तु पत्र, अववहष्णैरे-
णौ व्यास्तिपश्वयम्मत्योपपद्धृतैसम्बोधाधिकाववषयवद्यस्य
व्यवस्थात्।

That inference is again twofold according to its division into that meant for oneself and that meant for others. Of these, the former has already¹ been described. The latter, however, requires the help of syllogisms. A syllogism is a group of component parts. These are but three in number, viz., the proposition to be proved, reason and example, or example, application² and conclusion, and not five³; for, since it is possible to exhibit the invariable concomitance and the presence of the reason in the subject (पक्ष) by three component parts only, two additional component parts are useless.

¹ On p. 76, in the passage beginning with, "It is apprehended," etc.
² A statement that the reason (e.g. smoke), which never exists where the thing to be inferred (e.g. fire) does not, is present in the subject of the inference (e.g. a hill).
³ As the logicians hold. According to them the component parts are: The proposition to be proved
(pratijñā), reason (hetu), example (udāharana), application (ūpanaya) and conclusion (nigamana). The following are illustrations of these in order:

(1) The hill has fire.
(2) Because it has smoke.
(3) Whatever has smoke has fire, as a kitchen.
(4) This is also like that.
(5) The hill has fire, which is always present where there is smoke.

**Inference Proves the Unreality of the Universe: Definition of Unreality**

पवमनुमाने निरूपिते तस्मात् ब्रह्मामिष्णिनिकिष्ठप्रपञ्जस्य मिथ्यात्बसिद्धः। तथाहि—ब्रह्मामिष्णं सवं मिथ्या, ब्रह्म-मिष्णत्वात्, यदेवं तद्वेचम, यथा शुक्रियुप्यम्। न च दृष्टान्तसिद्धः, तस्य साधितत्वात्। न च चाप्रयोजकत्वम्, शुक्रियुप्यरज्जुसपर्यवैन्यां मिथ्यात्वे ब्रह्मामिष्णत्वस्यैव लाघवेन प्रयोजकत्वात्। मिथ्यात्वस्य स्वाध्रयत्वेनाभिमत्यावचिष्णा-त्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वम्। 'अभिमत'-पदं वस्तुः स्वाध्रय-प्रसिद्धचाससमभववाचाय, 'याच्य'—पदमययंतिब्रवाचाय।

taduṣkṛtaḥ—

"सर्वेषामपि भाषानां स्वाध्रयत्वेन सम्बते। प्रतियोगित्वमत्यन्ताभायं प्रति मृषालमता॥" शति।

After inference has thus been set forth, it will prove the unreality of the entire universe, which is other than Brahman. For instance: All that is other than Brahman is unreal, because it is
other than Brahman; whatever is such (other than Brahman) is like this (unreal), as silver in a nacre. It cannot be urged that the example cited is unfounded, because it has already been proved.¹ Nor is the reason proffered without any corroborative argument, for in order to prove the unreality of silver in a nacre, a snake in a rope, etc., it is the fact of their being other than Brahman that is the corroborative argument, because this is simpler.² Unreality consists in something³ being the counterpositive of the absolute non-existence⁴ that abides in whatever⁵ is supposed⁶ to be its substratum. The term ‘supposed to be’ is used to guard against the futility of the definition on account of the absence of any true substratum of the thing that is unreal, and the word ‘whatever’ is for precluding a different thing⁷ from the one in question. So it has been said,⁸ "The unreality of all things consists in their being counterpositives of the absolute non-existence that abides in what is supposed to be their substratum."

¹ On p. 64, in the first paragraph.
² Than stating, as one may, that a thing is unreal if it is produced by a defect other than nescience.
³ E.g. silver in the nacre.
⁴ As expressed in the sentence, "There is no silver here."
⁵ E.g. a nacre.
⁶ Not simply actually so. The cognition may be an erroneous one.
⁷ Thus, the nacre being the supposed substratum, the definition will apply to it.
8 Viz., real co-existence, as in the case of the conjunction of a monkey with a tree. Since the conjunction is at the top, but not at the root, there is the non-existence of the conjunction as well as its counter-positive, conjunction, in the same substratum, the tree. And yet the conjunction is not unreal. The word ‘whatever’ excludes such a case from the purview of the definition.

8 By Citsukhācārya in the Citsukhi, Ch. I, verse 7, p. 39, N. S. Ed.]

यद्य भर्यं परं पत्तत्तुनिष्कात्वत्तामाक्रृत्यप्रतियोगी, परत्वात्, पदान्तरवत्—इत्यादयुमानं मिथ्यात्वे प्रमाणम्। तदुकस्—
“अर्द्धिन: स्वांशाळात्वत्ताभावस्य प्रतियोगिनः।”
अर्द्धत्वादितरंशीवं, विन्यासं गुणाविश्वौ॥” इति।

Or the proof of a thing’s unreality is an inference like the following: “This cloth is a counterpositive of the absolute non-existence\(^1\) abiding in these threads, because it is a cloth; as is the case with any other cloth.’’ So it has been said,\(^2\) “‘Things\(^3\) that have parts are counterpositives of the non-existence abiding in those parts,\(^4\) because they have parts; as is the case with other things that have parts. With regard to quality etc.\(^5\) (also), the same kind of inference holds good.’’\(^6\)

\(^1\) That is, a non-existence of the form, “There is no cloth here.”
\(^3\) E.g., a cloth.
\(^4\) Viz., threads.
\(^5\) That is, quality, action, generic attribute, etc.
For example, "This colour of the cloth is a counterpositive of the absolute non-existence abiding in the threads, because it is a colour; as is the case with other colours." Similarly, other qualities as also generic attribute etc. are to be taken as counterpositives of the absolute non-existence abiding in those threads.


It cannot be urged that if a jar etc. are unreal, it would contradict the perception, "The jar is existent"; for since the existence of the substratum of the jar, viz., Brahman, is the object of this perception, the reality of a jar etc. is unfounded.

It cannot be urged: How can Brahman, which is colourless, be an object of ocular cognition? For colour etc., which are without colour, are objects of perception. Nor does the accepted principle that a colourless substance is
incapable of being perceived by the eye etc. (go against us), for according to our view, the fact of Brahman’s being a substance is unfounded. You hold that a substance is that which is the substratum of qualities, or which is an inherent cause. But Brahman, which is devoid of qualities, cannot be the substratum of qualities; nor is It an inherent cause, for inherence is unfounded.⁴ Or, even if Brahman be admitted to be a substance, still there is no contradiction in Its being an object of ocular cognition, like time, which is colourless.⁴

¹ The printed editions read cākṣusādi (ocular or any other). The word ādi (etc.) is obviously out of place here, as also in the last sentence of this paragraph.

² Because, according to Nyāya, a quality or action does not possess any other quality or action.

³ See p. 24, l. 17, and note 2 on p. 25.

⁴ According to the Mīmāṃsakas, in every perception the particular time also is perceived. See p. 5 and note 5 on p. 6.]

Existence is Threefold

यद्य बिबिधं सत्त्वम्—पारमार्थिकं व्यावहारिकं प्राति-भासिकश्चेति। पारमार्थिकं सत्तं ब्रह्मणं, व्यावहारिकं सत्त्वमाकाशाद्वे, प्राति-भासिकं सत्वं शुक्तिरततादेव। तथा-च "घटः सन्" इति प्रत्यक्षस्य व्यावहारिकसत्तविविषयस्य प्रामाण्यम्। अस्मिन् पक्षे घटादेवश्राणि निषेधो न स्वरूपेण, किन्तु पारमार्थिकतेवेते न विरोधः। अस्मिन् पक्षे च मिथ्यात्वचक्षुः पारमार्थिकत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकारः—
Or (we may say) there are three kinds of existence: absolute,\(^1\) conventional\(^2\) and illusory.\(^3\) Absolute existence belongs to Brahman, conventional existence to the ether etc., and illusory existence to silver in a nacre. Thus the perception, “The jar is existent,” is valid, as it treats of conventional existence. In this alternative, the negation of a jar etc. in Brahman is not a negation of those things as they actually are,\(^4\) but only as absolute reality.\(^5\) Again, in this alternative, we should understand that in the definition\(^6\) of unreality the absolute non-existence is to be so qualified as to convey the additional idea, “And the counterpositiveness relating to which is characterised by absoluteness.”\(^7\) Therefore the inference about the unreality (of the universe) is valid.

\(^1\) Which remains uncontradicted for all time.

\(^2\) Which abides till the realisation of one’s identity with Brahman—that is, what is popularly known as real.

\(^3\) Which is destroyed as soon as the obstacles to proper vision, such as distance, diseases of the eye and sleep, are removed; e.g. a mirage.

\(^4\) That is, as phenomenal entities.

\(^5\) Which Brahman alone is.

\(^6\) Given on p. 81, ll. 10-13.

\(^7\) The above words should be added at the end of the sentence setting forth the definition.]
CHAPTER III

COMPARISON

अथोपमानं निरुपयते। तत्र साधुश्रवश्याकरणमुपस्मानम्।
तथावि—नगरेषु द्विषोपिण्डस्य पुरुषस्य वञ्ज गतस्य गवथे—
निन्द्रसाभिकर्ष्यं सति भवति प्रतीति: “अथ विण्डो गोस्त्र्वशः”
इति। तदनन्तरस्य भवति निध्यय: “अनेन सद्वशी मद्वीया
गोः” इति। तत्रान्तःवयन्तिरेकाभ्यं गवथनिन्यश्वसाधुश्रवश्यां
करणम्, गोनिन्यश्वसाधुश्रवश्यां फलम्।

Now comparison is being described. The instrument of the valid knowledge of similarity is comparison. For instance, a man who has seen a cow in cities and has gone to a forest, where his eyes have come in contact with a gayal (gavaya), has the cognition,¹ "This creature is like a cow.” Then he has the certitude, "My cow is like this.” Here, by a process of agreement and difference, the knowledge of that likeness of a cow which exists in a gayal is the instrument, and the knowledge of that likeness of a gayal which exists in a cow is the result.²

¹ Which is a recognition.
² That is, comparison.]
This is not possible through perception, for then the cow is not in contact with the eyes. Nor is it possible through inference, for that likeness of a cow which exists in a gayal is not the sign (reason) of that likeness of a gayal which exists in a cow. Nor can it be urged that this is possible through the following inference:

My cow is like this gayal.
Because it corresponds to its likeness existing in a gayal.
That which corresponds to its likeness existing in a thing is like the latter.
As Caitra, who corresponds to his likeness existing in Maitra, is like him.
For even without this inference, the cognition, "My cow is like this," is a matter of common experience, and one has also the self-reflective cognition, "I am comparing (the two)." Hence comparison is a distinct means of knowledge.

[1 As it is held by Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika.
2 See note 6 on p. 22.
3 Not inferring.]
CHAPTER IV
VERBAL TESTIMONY

अथागमो निरूप्यते। यस्य वाक्यस्य तात्पर्यविषयीभूत-संसर्गोऽ मानान्तरेण न बाध्यते तद्वाकृत्य प्रभावम्। वाक्य-जन्यशाने च अर्कांक्ष्नायोग्यताः सत्यसत्यतात्पर्यभांनेव चतुर्वृति कारणानि।

Now verbal testimony is being discussed. That sentence is a means of valid knowledge in which the relation (among the meanings of words) that is the object of its intention\(^1\) is not contradicted by any other means\(^2\) of valid knowledge. The knowledge arising from a sentence has four causes, viz., expectancy, consistency, contiguity and the knowledge of the intention.\(^3\)

\(^1\) That is, which is intended by the sentence.
\(^2\) Of the same class.
\(^3\) In Nyāya, it is the knowledge of the other three as well that is the cause.]

EXPECTANCY

तत्र पदार्थानां परस्परज्ञानार्थविश्वसणत्वपर्यायत्वात्माकार्याः। क्रियाभावने कारकस्य, कारकभावने क्रिया:। करणश्रवणे इतिकर्तव्यतायाथ जिज्ञासाविश्वसत्वात्। अजिज्ञासोवृप्ति

कार्यार्थवोधात् ‘योग्यत्व’मुपाश्च। तद्वच्छेद्वक्ष्य क्रियत्व-कारकत्वादेकमिति नातिभायत:। गौर्णव दृष्ट्याऽरू।
Of these, expectancy is the capacity of the meanings of words to become objects of inquiry regarding each other. For when we hear a word signifying an action, something connected with the latter becomes an object of our inquiry; when we hear a word meaning something connected with an action, that action becomes such an object; and when we hear a word conveying an accessory of an action, its modus operandi becomes an object of our inquiry.\(^1\) The word ‘capacity’ is inserted (in the definition), because even one who is not inclined to inquire comprehends the meaning of a sentence. Since the determining characteristic (avacchedaka)\(^2\) of that capacity is the fact of being an action, that of being something connected with an action (kārakatva), and so on, the definition is not too wide so as to include words (in the nominative case) like, ‘A cow,’ ‘A horse,’ etc.\(^3\) While in cases where words in apposition bring out an identity of meaning, that determining characteristic is the fact of being signified by words having the same case-ending; hence the definition is not too narrow to include sentences like, ‘Thou art That’ (Chā. VI viii. 7 ff).\(^4\)

\(^1\) For example, when somebody says, ‘Bring,’ we are inclined to ask: ‘What?’ or ‘Whom?’ Similarly when we hear the word ‘him,’ we expect a verb like ‘bring.’ And when we hear the sentence, ‘One who
desires heaven should perform the new and full moon sacrifices,’’ the concluding phrase (which) in Sanskrit is in the instrumental case) leads us to inquire into its steps—how exactly the sacrifice should be done.

By which instances of that kind of capacity can be spotted out and grouped together.

Which do not, according to the rules of Sanskrit grammar, normally suggest any corresponding terms, as do words in the accusative and other cases.

Here the words ‘thou’ and ‘That,’ being appositional, might be excluded from the purview of the definition, if the determining characteristic of the capacity for rousing inquiry were the same as before. Hence a different one is given.]

पताल्लभाभायुप्रयोगस्तबभाबाधिकरणे “सा वेष्यदेयामलिक्षा, वाजिन्यो वाजिनम्” इत्यत्र वेष्यदेयामलिक्षाः-मिश्रान्तत्तुभेन न वाजिनाकांश्या इत्यादिल्वबहारः। नन्तु तत्रापि वाजिनस्य जिञ्ञाससाधितिष्ठतथुभेदापि तद्योग्यत्वमस्त्येव, 
प्रदेयद्वयत्वस्य यागानिक्षिप्तजिञ्ञासाबिष्टतावच्छेक्कत्वादिति चेतु, न, स्वसमानजातीयपदार्थान्यान्ययोगविरहसहक्तपदेयद्वयत्वस्त्येव तद्वच्छेक्कत्वेन वाजिनद्वयस्य 
स्वसमानजातीयमालिक्षाद्वयान्ययोगोभोधसहक्तत्तुभेन तादृशावच्छेक्कत्वाभावात्। आभिल्लाभायन्त्रैव, वाजिनान्यत्वस्य तद्योग्यत्वादृश्यात्। उदाहरणान्तरेष्यापि दुर्लभत्वप्रमोदके 
आकांस्वाभिरुप वर्ण द्रष्ट्यः।

It is in view of such expectancy that under the topic of “Relative Strength,’”’ in the passage,
"Those curds belong to the Viśvadevas, and the whey is for the Vājins," the procedure is laid down to the effect that there is no expectancy of the whey, since the sacrifice pertaining to the Viśvadevas has connection with curds only.

Objection: Even there, although the whey is not actually an object of inquiry, yet it certainly has the capacity for being such, because the determining characteristic of something being an object of inquiry in connection with sacrifices is the fact of its being an article of offering.

Reply: Not so; for the determining characteristic in question is the fact of something being an article of offering in the absence of an apprehension of the connection of something else of the same class as itself; and as with regard to the article whey there is an apprehension of the connection of another thing of the same class as itself, viz., curds, the whey is not such a determining characteristic. But in the case of the curds, it is not so; for then there is no apprehension of the connection of the whey. In other instances also, it is the absence of expectancy that should be understood to be the criterion of weakness.

[1] Topic 7 of Jaimini's Pūrva-Mimāṃsā-Sūtras III. iii., aphorism 14 of which reads as follows: "Where direct enunciation (case-endings, affixes, etc.—śruti), indication (liṅga), supplementary statement (vākya), context (prakaraṇa), order (stāna) and derivation (samākhya) relate to the same thing, each succeeding item is weaker, because it conveys its meaning in a more
distant way”—that is, through the medium of the preceding ones.

2 The passage is actually discussed in Śabara’s commentary, not in chapter III, but under II. ii. 23. The discussion on it, however, is based on the relative strength of the first and third of the above tests for determining “the parts of a sacrifice,” which is the subject-matter of the second chapter, the issue being whether the offering of the whey is a part of the sacrifice relating to the Viśvadevas. This is decided negatively on the ground that direct enunciation is stronger than supplementary statement. The words immediately preceding those quoted in the text are: “In hot milk one should put curd.”

3 Which belongs to another sacrifice, viz., that relating to the Vājins.

4 Because of direct enunciation, viz., the adjectival suffix.

5 In the sacrifice relating to the Viśvadevas.

6 E.g. curds.

7 With the Vaiśvadeva sacrifice, in which both curds and whey are used.

8 Viz., whey.

9 As being an article of offering.

10 Which is not an article of offering of the kind specified above.

11 At the time of the verbal comprehension of the meaning of the word first heard, viz., ‘curds.’

12 Where the relative strength of the other items in the series, such as direct enunciation and indication, is the issue. For examples of these see op. cit.]

CONSISTENCY AND CONTIGUITY

योग्यता तत्पर्यंविषयसंस्तर्गबाधः। “वहिना स्तिथ्थति”
इत्यादि तात्पर्यसंस्तर्गबाधाभास्य योग्यता। “स प्रजापति–
Consistency is non-contradiction of the relation¹ that is intended. Since in sentences like, "He is sprinkling (plants) with fire," there is contradiction of such a relation, they have no consistency. Even sentences like, "That Prajāpati took out his own omentum" (Tai. S. II. i. 4, adapted), have consistency, because there is non-contradiction of the object of the intention, viz., a eulogy on animals.² Sentences like, "Thou art That" (Chā. VI. viii. 7 ff), also have consistency, because, although there is contradiction of the identity of their direct meanings,³ still there is non-contradiction of the identity of their implied meaning, viz., their real essence.⁴

¹ Between one thing and another signified by two words.

² As a result of the offering of his omentum by Prajāpati, a large number of kids were born. And kids are prescribed as offerings for the attainment of children and animals. Hence the sentence quoted is meant simply to extol animals, and from that standpoint it is consistent.

³ Viz., the individual self and God, respectively, that are as the poles asunder as regards power, knowledge, etc.

⁴ Viz., the Brahman without attributes, which is the underlying essence of both.]
Contiguity is the apprehension,¹ without an interval, of the meanings² of words that is produced by those words. The clause, “That is produced by those words,” is inserted, as the meanings of words apprehended by other means³ of knowledge do not lead to any (verbal) comprehension of their mutual connection. Hence in cases where particular words are not uttered, they are to be supplied; as, for instance, in the case of the word dvāram (the door), the word pidhehi (shut) is to be supplied. Hence (also) in the mantra beginning with, “For the sake of rain⁴ thee,⁵” (Vāj. S. I. i. 22, Tai. S. I. i. i. 1, etc.), the words “I cut” are to be supplied. Hence (again) in the variant sacrifices the words should run as follows: “To (the god) Sun⁶ I offer thee so as to please him.”⁷

¹ Recollection by association.
² The things signified by them.
³ Such as perception and inference.
⁴ As the producer of crops.
⁵ The branch of a palāśa tree (Butea Frondosa) is being addressed.
6 Or any other deity, according to the sacrifice.
7 Addressed to an oblation of rice-cake. In the typical sacrifice (prakṛti), the deity of which is Fire, the words of the mantra are: “To (the god) Fire I offer thee so as to please him" (Tai. S. I. i. iv. 2). In the variant sacrifice (vikṛti), the word ‘Fire’ is changed into ‘Sun’ to suit the deity. In a typical sacrifice all the details are given; in a variant sacrifice the points of difference only are noted.]

SIGNIFICANCE OF WORDS

पदार्थार्थ द्विविधः—शक्यो लक्ष्यात्वति। तत्र शक्ति-
नाम पदार्थार्थवेषु मुख्य व्रति। यथा 'घट'-पदार्थपूर्व-
भूप्राणरात्मातिविशिष्टे वस्तुविशेषे व्रति। सा च शक्ति:
पदार्थान्तरम्, सिद्धान्ते कारणेऽ फार्यानुकूलशक्तिमात्रस्य
पदार्थान्तरत्वात्। सा च तत्तत्त्वं जन्यपदार्थान्तररूपायाः-
नुमेया। तद्भवशक्तिविषयतवं शक्यत्वम्।

The meanings of words are of two kinds—primary and implied. Now significance (śakti) is the direct reference of words to their meanings. As, the word ‘jar’ refers to a particular thing of a form having a large bottom and body etc. That significance is a distinct category,¹ for, according to Vedānta, any power in a cause to produce an effect comes under a distinct category. And it is to be inferred from its effect, viz., the comprehension of the meanings of particular words produced by those words. To be signified (śakyațva) is to be an object of (the comprehension produced by) such significance.²
[¹ According to the logicians, significance (sakti) is the relation of a word to its meaning. It is of the form of a divine will that such and such a word should mean such and such a thing. And they do not admit its being a distinct category. The Mîmâṃsakas, however, side with the Vedântists.

² That is, something is said to be directly meant by a word when it is known through the significance of that word.]

तद्ध जातेकं, न भक्तं, व्यक्तीनामांनस्येन गुरुत्वादृ।
कथं ताहि गवार्षियाद्यक्तिमानमिति चेतु, जातेवर्तिकः-
समानसांविविधसंवेख्यात्वादिति भूम। यद्वा गवार्षियानं
व्यक्ति शक्तं स्वभापति, न तु श्लात; जातो तु सा श्लात
हेतु। न च व्यत्तयं शक्तिभाषानमपि कार्यम, गौरवात।
जातिशक्तिमत्त्वाने सति व्यक्तिशक्तिमत्त्वानं चिना व्यक्ति-
धीविल्लभाभावाच। अत पव न्यायमतेजप्लं वेश शक्ति
स्वभापत्तित्व सिद्धान्तः।

That capacity of being signified belongs to a generic attribute (jāti),¹ not to individuals,² for individuals being infinite in number, it would be cumbersome (to assume otherwise). It may be urged: How, then, are individuals known through words like ‘cow’? The answer is: Because the same cognition that comprehends a generic attribute also comprehends the individuals. Or (we may put it this way): With regard to individuals, the significance of words like ‘cow’ is (a cause of verbal comprehension) per se,³ not as being known; while with regard
to a generic attribute, it is a cause as being known. It cannot be urged that the knowledge of significance in respect of individuals also is a cause, for it would be a cumbrous assumption. And, besides, even in the absence of a knowledge that significance refers to individuals, there is no delay in knowing those individuals, simply when one is aware that significance refers to the (corresponding) generic attribute. Therefore, even in the Nyāya philosophy, the conclusion is that significance (of words) regarding the logical connection is (a cause of verbal comprehension) per se.¹

¹ Meaning the common property of a class, which characterises all the individuals comprised in that class; for example, jarhood, which is found in all jars. This kind of generic attribute is admitted in Vedānta. What was refuted on p. 24 was the technical interpretation of the term as a distinct category upheld by the logicians.

² According to the logicians, however, it belongs to the individual possessed of a particular generic attribute and form.

³ That is, by its mere existence.

⁴ Which would be inevitable if the knowledge of significance as referring to individuals were a cause of verbal comprehension.

⁵ Not as being known.]

श्यामान्ताचित्तिष्यत्वमेव बाच्यत्वमिति जातिवेच बाच्या ।
अथवा व्यक्तिर्लक्षणंवाचरः । यथा “नीलो घटः” इत्यथ
‘नीलः’-शब्दसः नीलगुणविशिष्टे लक्षणः, तथा जाति-
वाचकसः तद्विशिष्टे लक्षणः । तदुत्तमम् “अनन्यदम्यः
शब्दार्थः” ह्रति । पवं शब्यो निरूपितः ।
A direct meaning (vācya) is that which is an object of significance as being known. Hence a generic attribute alone is directly meant. Or (we may say) individuals are comprehended by implication (lakṣanā). As in the phrase, “A blue jar,” the word ‘blue’ implies something possessed of the blue colour as a quality, similarly a word meaning a generic attribute may convey by implication an individual possessing it. So it has been said\(^1\): “The meaning of a word is to be obtained from no other source\(^2\) (than the word itself).” Thus the primary meaning of a word has been ascertained.

\(^1\) By the Mīmāṃsakas.
\(^2\) Such as implication.

**Implication: its Varieties**

अथ ‘लक्ष्य’-पदार्थों निरूप्यते। तत्र लक्षणाविषयो
लक्ष्यं। लक्षणा च द्विविधा—केवललक्षणा लक्षितलक्षणा
चेति। तत्र शक्यसाक्ष्यात्सम्बन्धः। केवललक्षण। यथा
“गुड़ाया घोषः” इत्यत्र प्रवाहसाक्ष्यात्सम्बन्धिनि तीरे
‘गुड़ा’-पद्वस्य, केवललक्षण। यथा शक्यपरस्परासम्बन्धे-
नार्थान्तरप्रतीतिस्तत्र लक्षितलक्षणा, यथा ‘द्विरेफ’-पद्वस्य
रेफर्ड्ये शक्यस ‘अमर’-पद्धवित-परम्परासम्बन्धेन मधुकरे
शृष्टि।। गौण्यापि लक्षितलक्षणेव। यथा “सिंहो मानवकः”
इत्यत्र ‘सिंह’-शब्द्वाच्यसम्बन्धिनिकृ ष्टिसम्बन्धेन मानव-
कस्य प्रतीतिः।
Now the meaning implied by a word is being described. An implied meaning is the object implied by a word. Implication is of two kinds—pure and double. Of these, pure implication is the direct relation to the primary meaning of a word. As, in the sentence, "The cowherd station is on (lit., in) the Ganges," the word 'Ganges' refers by pure implication\(^1\) to the bank (of the river), which is directly connected with the stream. Double implication occurs where, by an indirect relation to the primary meaning of a word, some other meaning is known. As, the word *dvirepha*, which signifies two *r*’s, refers to a bee by an indirect relation to the intermediary word *bhramara* (a bee).\(^2\). What is called figurative use is also nothing but double implication. As, in the sentence, "The boy is a lion," the boy is known through his relation to ferocity etc., which are associated with what is primarily meant by the word 'lion.'

\(^1\) Because the station cannot be in the river.

\(^2\) ‘Dvirepha’ literally means two *r*’s. From this we are led by pure implication to something containing two *r*’s, viz., the word *bhramara*, which means a bee. Then by a second implication we get the synonymous word *dvirepha*, although it does not contain two *r*’s. Hence this is an instance of double implication.]

प्रकारान्तरेण खङ्गणा त्रिविधा—जहलऊश्चण, अजह-खङ्गणा, जहदजहलऊश्चण चेति। तत्र शक्यमन्नभव्य यथायोन्तप्रतीतिस्त्र जहलऊश्चण। यथा "विषं भुष्यभ,”

इत्यतः स्वार्थ विहाय शासुगुहं भोजननिब्रृत्तिलङ्क्ष्यते। यत्र
In another way, implication is of three kinds—exclusive (jahat), inclusive (ajahat) and quasi-inclusive (jahad-ajahat). Of these, exclusive implication occurs where, excluding the primary meaning, some other meaning is comprehended. As, in the sentence, “Take poison,” discarding the original meaning of the words, abstinence from eating in an enemy’s house is implied. Inclusive implication occurs where, along with the primary meaning, some other meaning is comprehended: as, “A white jar.” Here the word ‘white’ includes its original meaning, viz., the quality white colour, and yet refers by implication to a substance possessing it. Quasi-inclusive implication occurs where a word signifying some qualified entity discards one part of its meaning and refers to another part; as, “This is that Devadatta.” Here, since the qualified
entities primarily meant by the two words⁴ cannot be identical,⁵ the latter refer only to the substantive (viśeṣya).⁶ Or⁷ as, according to the traditional interpreters of Vedānta, in a sentence like, “Thou art That” (Chā. VI. viii. 7 ff), since the entity meant by the word ‘That,’ viz., God as possessed of omniscience etc., cannot be identical with what is meant by the word ‘thou,’ viz., the individual self endowed with a mind, in order to make their identity possible, the words refer by implication to their essential nature.⁸

[¹ ‘This’ and ‘that.’
² Because ‘this’ refers to Devadatta as associated with the present time and ‘that’ to Devadatta as associated with the past.
³ Just the person Devadatta, unrelated to time past or present.
⁴ This is a Vedic example. The other is a popular one.
⁵ The Brahman without attributes.]

वयन्तः त्रूमः—“सोऽसं देवदात्,” “तत्त्वमिति” इत्यादि विशिष्टवाचकपदानामेकदेशपरत्वेऽपि न लक्षणा, शक्तयुप-स्थितविशिष्यो: अभेदान्त्वानुपप्तसौ विशेष्ययो: शक्त्युप-स्थितयोरेव अभेदान्त्वाविरोधात्। यथा “घटोऽन्नित्यः” इत्यत्र ‘घट’-पद्यचायेौकेशष्ठत्वस्यायोगपद्यत्वेऽपि योगघट-व्यत्या सहानित्यत्वान्यः। यत्र पद्यांवेकेशष्ठ्य विशेषणतयो-पन्थितैः, तत्रेव स्वतत्त्वेऽण उपस्थितये लक्षणायुपगमः।
यथा “नित्यो घटः” इत्यत्र ‘घट’-पद्यं घटत्वस्य शक्त्या
VERBAL TESTIMONY

स्वातन्त्र्येणानुपस्थित्या तादृशोपरिचितत्वर्थः ्घट्ट-पद्मस्य घटत्तं लक्षणा। पद्मेव "तत्त्वसितस" इत्यादिविवाक्षेपिन लक्षणा, शास्त्र्या स्वातत्त्वेणोपस्थितलयो: ‘तत्त्व’-पद्मार्यो- रमेदान्तवे बाधकाभाषा। अन्यथा “नेहे घटः,” “घटे रूपम्,” “घटमानय” इत्यादिए घटत्वेहत्त्वादेतिरसिमतात्- म्योधयोधयोम्यूत्तया तत्त्वापि ‘घटः’दिवद्वारान्विण्विष्यमानापपरात्म लक्षणीयं स्वात्। तस्मात् “तत्त्वसितस” इत्यादिविवाक्षेषु आचार्योग्रं लक्षणोत्त्वर्मायुगमवदेन बोधा।

We, however, maintain that in sentences like, "This is that Devadatta," and "Thou art That," although words signifying qualified entities refer only to one portion of their meaning, yet there is no implication; for, notwithstanding the fact that two qualified entities presented (to the mind) by significance¹ cannot be (logically) connected with each other to convey an identical meaning, there is no contradiction in connecting two substantives, also presented by significance, so as to yield an identity of meaning. As, in the sentence, "The jar is transitory," although it is inconsistent² to connect with transitoriness only one part³ of what is meant by the word ‘jar,’ viz., jarhood, yet it is all right with regard to an individual jar, which is capable of being so connected.⁴ Only where one part of the meaning of a word is presented as a qualifying attribute (viśeṣaṇa), implication is admitted in order that the meaning may be presented independently.⁵ As, in the sentence,
"The jar is eternal," since jarhood is not independently presented by the significance of the word 'jar,' the latter refers by implication to jarhood, in order to effect such presence. Similarly, in sentences like, "Thou art That," there is also no implication, because the meanings of the words 'thou' and 'That' are presented independently by significance (of those two words), and there is no obstacle to their being logically connected so as to mean an identical thing. Otherwise, in sentences like, "There is a jar in the house," "There is colour in the jar," "Bring the jar," since jarhood, household, etc., are incapable of leading to the desired comprehension of the logical connection, even in these cases words such as 'jar' would convey pure substantives just by implication. Therefore the statement about implication by the (traditional) teachers in sentences like, "Thou art That," should be understood as mere tentative admissions.

[1] Of the two words 'this' and 'that' in the first example, and 'thou' and 'That' in the second.

[2] From the logician's standpoint, because jarhood, being a generic attribute, is according to him eternal.

[3] In Nyāya, the significance of a word is with regard to individuals. See note 2 on p. 98.

[4] Because individual jars are perishable.


[7] If implication be admitted even with regard to words signifying pure substantives.

[8] Which are presented as qualifying attributes.
Of the meanings of words comprising those sentences.

Examples of quasi-inclusive implication, again, are only sentences like these: "Protect the curd from the crows"; for here the word 'crows' gives up its primary meaning, viz., mere crows,¹ and refers, through the attribute² of being a spoiler of the curd, which³ is not the primary meaning, to creatures other than crows as well.

¹ That is, crows as crows.
² Possessed by crows.
³ A spoiler of the curd.

The root of implication, however, is the frustration of intention alone, and not that of the logical connection (of words); for in the sentence, "Protect the curd from the crows," there is no frustration of the logical connection, and in sentences like, "The cowherd station is in (on) the Ganges," there is the possibility of a frustration of intention¹ as well.
The word ‘crows’ being intended by the speaker to mean crows and other pests.]

...

Implication belongs not to words alone,¹ but also to a group of words or sentences. As, in the sentence, "There is a cowherd colony in (on) the deep river," the group consisting of the two words ‘deep river’ refers by implication to its bank. It may be urged: Since a sentence does not possess significance (sakti), how can it have implication, which is a relation to what is conveyed by significance? The answer is this: Implication is a relation to what is conveyed by significance, which is a relation of words² (to their meanings). And just as the meaning of a word is conveyed by significance, so is also that of a sentence. Hence there is no anomaly.

¹ As Nyāya holds.
² Not sentences.

...
Thus (Vedic) corroborative statements (arthavāda) that are of the nature of eulogies refer by implication to praiseworthiness,¹ while deprecatory statements like, "He cried" (Tāi. S. I. v. i. ṭ),² refer by implication to blameworthiness.³ If the words comprising a corroborative statement be admitted to refer by implication to praiseworthiness etc., then, it being possible for one of those words to present that before the mind through implication, the other words would be redundant. So the group of words comprising a corroborative statement virtually serves as one word, inasmuch as it leads to the apprehension of that meaning of the words, viz., praiseworthiness, which is required by the injunction,
and thus it constitutes a unitary passage with the sentence setting forth the injunction. Hence corroborative statements constitute (what is called) a unitary passage in respect of a word. Where, then, does a unitary passage in respect of a sentence occur?—Where two sentences, each of which conveys distinct relations (between words and their meanings), express, by virtue of their expectancy, the meaning of a longer passage. As, a sentence like, "One who desires heaven should perform the new and full moon sacrifices,\(^5\)" and one like, "One should perform the Samidh sacrifice" (Ait. Br. VI. 4), form a unitary passage, inasmuch as they express the mutually expected relation of whole and part. So it has been stated by the illustrious Kumārila Bhaṭṭa: "Sentences that are complete in themselves as regards the expression of their meanings, again combine in view of their relation of whole and part etc. and become a unitary passage" (Tantra-vārtika, verse 4, under Pū. Mi. Sū. I. iv. 24).

\(^1\) Of actions prescribed by the Vedic injunctions.
\(^2\) The story is this: Once the deity Fire ran away with some precious booty the gods had deposited with him. When they chased him, he cried, and his tears became silver. Hence silver should not be given as remuneration to the priests in the Barhis sacrifice; for it is sure to cause weeping in the sacrificer's family within a year.

\(^3\) Of actions prohibited by the Vedas.
\(^4\) Amplifying the purport of the injunction.
\(^5\) These are the main sacrifices, of which the Samidh
sacrifice, named after its deity and forming the first of the Prayāja sacrifices, is a part. Hence the two sentences, although complete in themselves, form one whole—a unitary passage.

∀वं द्विविधोपि पदाथ्् निस्पितः। तदुपस्थितिभवः-
सात्। सा च शाब्दबोधे हेतु:, तथैवान्वयन्तिरेक-
दृश्नात्। पवं महावाक्यार्थबोधेःवान्तरवाक्यार्थबोधो हेतु:,
तथैवान्वयायादवधारणात्।

Thus both the varieties of the meanings of words have been determined. Contiguity is the knowledge¹ of those. It is also a cause of verbal comprehension, for we observe just that kind of agreement and difference (between them).² Similarly, the comprehension of the meanings of subsidiary sentences is a cause of the comprehension of a longer passage, for we have a certitude about such agreement etc.³ between them.⁴

¹ Recollection produced by the utterance of words.
² If there is that recollection, there is verbal comprehension, otherwise not.
³ Refers to difference.
⁴ If the meanings of the component sentences are grasped, then the meaning of the paragraph also is grasped; otherwise not.]

INTENTION

कम्प्रासं तात्पर्य निरूपते। तत्र तत्प्रतीतीच्छयोष्ण-
रीतितवं न तात्पर्यम्; अथैवान्वयन्यन पुष्चेणोष्णरितात्त्रवाद्य-
प्रत्याभानप्रस्सद्धात्, “अयभापकोऽयुत्पन्न्” इति विशेष-
Now intention, which comes next in order, is being described. Regarding this (we must know that) intention is not the utterance (of words) with the object of producing the cognition of a particular thing, for then Vedic texts uttered by a person who does not know their meaning would not be intelligible, and there is no error¹ also about (the speaker’s) intention,² since the listener has quite a different comprehension,³ as (expressed in his words), “This teacher does not understand (what he utters).” ⁴ It cannot be urged that in the case cited above,⁵ verbal comprehension takes place from a knowledge of God’s intention,⁶ for we find that even a person who does not believe in God⁷ understands the meaning of the Vedic passages.⁸ (What, then, is intention?) This is being stated: Intention is the capacity to produce the cognition of a particular thing. The sentence, “There is a jar in the house,” is capable of producing a cognition of the relation of a jar, and not that of a cloth, to the house. Hence that sentence is said to
mean the relation of a jar, and not that of a cloth (to the house).

[1 In the mind of the listener.
2 Viz., his desire to convey a particular meaning.
3 Which settles the question of error.
4 Where one listens to Vedic or other words uttered by a person who does not understand them.
5 Because He produced the Vedas.
6 As the author of the Vedas.
7 Uttered by one who does not know their meaning.]

Objection: A sentence like, “Bring the saindhava,”¹ even when it is uttered with the object of producing the cognition that salt should be brought, has the potentiality of producing the cognition that it relates to a horse; hence, even when one has the knowledge that it means salt,
one may have the idea that it relates to a horse or the like.

**Reply:** Not so; for (the definition of) intention has the additional qualifying attribute that the sentence must not be uttered to produce the cognition of any thing else but that (which is in the speaker’s mind). So a sentence that has the potentiality of producing the cognition of a particular thing, and at the same time is not uttered with the object of producing the cognition of anything else, is said to relate to that particular thing.\(^2\) In the case of words uttered by a parrot etc., and of Vedic or other sentences uttered by a person ignorant of their meaning, since there is no desire at all to produce any cognition, and consequently there is the absence of an utterance with the object of producing the cognition of anything else but that (which is in view), the definition is applicable, and hence it is not too narrow. Nor is it too narrow to include a sentence uttered to mean both salt and horse (for instance); for the idea (behind the definition) is that the sentence must not be uttered to produce the cognition of that only which is other than the thing in view.

\(^1\) Lit., a product of *sindhu*, which (among other things) means a sea, as also the territory called Sind. Hence the word means both salt and a species of horse.

\(^2\) So, although ‘saindhava’ may mean a horse, it will not be taken in that sense if somebody who is eating utters the sentence, because it has not been uttered to mean a horse.]
VERBAL TESTIMONY

Significance (śakti) is the determining characteristic of the capacity (of words) to produce just the above-mentioned cognition. Since, according to us, inherent power alone is everywhere the determining characteristic of causality, there is no anomaly here.

[¹ As in the case of fire, for instance, the reason why it can burn things is that it possesses that inherent power, so in the case of words, the reason for their conveying particular meanings is to be sought in their inherent power, viz., significance.]

It thus being proved that intention, which is the (capacity for) generation of the cognition of
a particular thing, is the cause of verbal comprehension, the passage\(^1\) in the fourth chapter (varṇaka) of the Vivarana\(^2\) refuting the causality of intention in producing verbal comprehension, is meant to refute the contention\(^3\) that intention is the utterance (of words) with the object of producing the cognition of a particular thing. Otherwise discussions on Vedānta, which result in a certitude about the intention, would be futile. Some,\(^4\) however, maintain: The passage in the fourth chapter of the Vivarana means that knowledge of the intention is not a cause of all verbal comprehension; but that with regard to the particular verbal comprehension that takes place after a doubt or error regarding the intention, it certainly is a cause; for in case of a doubt as to whether a particular sentence means this or something else, as also of an error regarding it, the ascertainment of its particular meaning thereafter cannot take place without the ascertainment of the intention.

\(^1\) Pp. 181-182, V. S. S.
\(^2\) See footnote 3 on p. 1.
\(^3\) Of the logicians.
\(^4\) The reference is to the author of the Abheda-ratnākara.

तत्त्व तात्पर्यं वेदे मीमांसापरिशोधिततत्त्वादेववाच्यार्थविशेषतः, लोके तु प्रकरणादिना। तत्र लौकिकवाच्याः मानान्तरावगतार्थित्यावनवाच्यकत्वम्, वेदे तु वाक्यार्थस्यापूर्वत्त्वानासुवाच्यकत्वम्। तत्र लोके वेदे च कार्यपराणामिव
That intention is determined with regard to the Vedas only by reasoning rectified by the principles of interpretation, while with regard to secular sentences, by means of the context etc.¹ Of these, secular sentences are of the nature of restatements, since their meanings are apprehended through other means of knowledge; but with regard to the Vedas, since the meanings of Vedic sentences are known at first hand, they are not of the nature of restatements. Now, both in secular and Vedic sentences, even statements of fact are, like those conveying something to be done, means of valid knowledge, as supplying first-hand information; for in utterances like, "A son has been born to you," words are definitely known to have the power of conveying meanings that are statements of fact. Hence Vedāntic sentences are means of valid knowledge with regard to Brahman.² How this is so, will be dealt with in the chapter relating to the subject-matter of Vedānta.³

¹ Refers to perception, the words of a trustworthy person, etc.
² Which is an eternal Reality.
³ Chapter VII.]
The Authority of the Vedas Explained

Now, according to the logicians, the Vedas are means of valid knowledge because they are produced by God, who is eternal and omniscient. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, who deal with sacrifices, the Vedas are means of valid knowledge because they are eternal and as such free from all human defects. In our view, however, the Vedas are not eternal, for they have an origin, which is proved by such Śruti texts as, "The Ṛg-Veda, Yajur-Veda, Sāma-Veda, Atharva-Veda are (like) the breath of this infinite Reality" (Br. II. iv. 10, adapted).

नापि बेदान्त ब्रह्मवाचस्यायित्वम्, "य पव बेदो 
देख्यं देवसर्वनाशीः स पव मयापि" हित्यादिप्रत्यभिभाविरोधात्।
भत पव गक्षारदिवर्णानां न क्षणिकत्वम्, "सोऽऽय गक्षार:” हित्यादिप्रत्यभिभाविरोधात्।
तथा वर्णपदवक्षय- 
समुदधारस्य बेदस्य विद्यविविधत: सत्कालानोत्पत्तिकत्वम् 
प्रक्ष्ठकालीनवच्चस्त्रात्यपिरतिगत्वः, न नु मध्ये वर्णोना-
And the Vedas have not a duration of three moments only, for it clashes with such recognition as, "The same Veda that was studied by Devadatta was also studied by me." Hence also the syllables such as *ga* are not momentary, for it contradicts such recognition as, "This is that syllable *ga*." So the Vedas, which are a collection of syllables, words and sentences, originate like the ether etc. at the time of cosmic projection, and are counterpositives of the destruction that takes place at the time of cosmic dissolution. It is not that the syllables are subject to origin and destruction in the interim, for it is cumbersome to assume an endless series of the syllable *ga*, for instance. The non-manifestation of the syllables during the time they are not uttered, is nothing contradictory, because then there is an absence of the revealing medium, viz., utterance—as with the non-apprehension of a jar in darkness. As for the cognition, "The syllable *ga* has been produced," and so on, it is invalid, since it
contradicts such recognition as, "This is that syllable *ga."" Or it may be valid, as being indirectly an object of the origin relating to the articulate sound that manifests the syllable. Therefore the Vedas are not momentary.

\[1\] The view of some logician of the old school.
\[2\] That is, they are destroyed at that time.
\[3\] When a light is brought, the jar is visible. Similarly, utterance reveals the already existing syllable *ga.*
\[4\] The origin abides in the sound, and the sound abides in the syllable *ga.*]
Objection: Although the Vedas are not momentary, yet, on account of their having an origin like the ether and other phenomenal things, and being produced by a person in that they are the handiwork of God, your conclusion that they are not connected with a person would be shattered.

Reply: No. In the first place, connection with a person does not mean being uttered by a person, for even according to the school of the Teacher,¹ the Vedas would be connected with persons, being handed down from one teacher to another. Nor does connection with a person mean having an origin due to a person, for that inference² about the personal origin of the Vedas which is approved by the logicians is condemned by our school as proving what is already established.³ But it is being the object of utterance that is independent of any utterance of the same kind. For instance, in the beginning of cosmic projection, the Lord produced Vedas having a sequence of words similar to that which had already existed in the Vedas in the previous cosmic projection, and not Vedas of a different type. Hence the Vedas, not being the object of utterance that is independent of any utterance of the same kind, are not connected with a person. The utterance of the Mahābhārata etc., however, is not at all dependent on any utterance of the same kind. Hence they are connected with a person. Thus two kinds of verbal testimony
have been determined, viz., that which is connected with a person, and that which is not.

[¹ See note 3 on p. 58.
² Viz., that the Vedas are connected with a person, because they consist of sentences, as is the case with the Mahābhārata etc.
³ By the Vedas, e.g. Br. II. iv. 10.]
CHAPTER V

PRESUMPTION

CONDITIONS OF PRESUMPTION

Now presumption (arthāpatti) is being described. It is the assumption of an explanatory fact (upapādaka) from a knowledge of the thing to be explained (upapādyā). Here the knowledge of the thing to be explained is the instrument, and the knowledge of the explanatory fact is the result. That which is inexplicable without (the assumption of) something, is the thing to be explained with reference to the latter, and that in the absence of which something is inexplicable, is the explanatory fact with reference to the latter. As, the stoutness of a man who does not eat at day-time is inexplicable unless we assume his eating at night; hence such stoutness is the thing to be explained. Again, in the absence of eating at night such stoutness
is inexplicable; hence eating at night is the explanatory fact.

रात्रिभोजनकल्पनारूपां प्रमितौ "अर्थस्य आपसिः" कल्पना इति पश्चिसमासेन "अर्थापसिः"-शब्दः वर्तन्ते; कल्पना-करणे पीनत्वाविद्धगाने तु "अर्थस्य आपसिः" कल्पना यस्मात् इति बहुव्रीहिसमासेन वर्तन्ते; इति फलकारणयोजयोभस्त्यत्वद-प्रयोगः।

With regard to the (resulting) valid knowledge, viz., the assumption of eating at night, the word arthāpatti is a compound of the class known as Saṣṭhi-tatpurusa, meaning 'the assumption (āpatti) of a thing (artha).’ But with regard to the instrument of the assumption, viz., the knowledge of stoutness etc., the word is a compound of the class known as Bahuvrihi, meaning 'that from which a thing is assumed.’ Hence the word arthāpatti applies both to the result and to the instrument.

Two Varieties of Presumptive Knowledge

ता चार्यापार्शभन्त्रिविधा—द्वाशार्यापार्शभन्त्रिविधरिविधा।
तथा दशार्यापार्शभियो व "द्वारः रजस्यम्" इति पुरोवर्तिनि प्रतिप्रशस्य रजस्यम् "नेवः रजस्यम्" इति तत्रेव निषिद्धान्तः सत्यत्रेव नुप्रशस्यम्, इति रजस्य सदान्तः सत्यत्रेव सत्यत्वात्यथान्तः-भाववत्तः चा मिश्यात्तः कल्पयति। अर्थार्यापार्शभियोधा,
That presumption\(^1\) is of two kinds—presumption from what is seen and presumption from what is heard. Of these, presumption from what is seen is as follows: If silver has been (wrongly) apprehended in something\(^2\) in front as, "This is silver," and (later) it is denied\(^3\) in that very thing as, "This is not silver," this denial would be unreasonable if the silver were real. So one assumes that the silver is false, that is, other than real, or possessed of the absolute non-existence of reality. Presumption from what is heard occurs where, on account of the incongruity of the direct meaning of a sentence that is being heard, one assumes a different meaning for it. As, in the sentence, "The knower of the Self transcends grief" (Chā. VII. i. 3), since the manifold bonds signified by the word ‘grief’—which actually occurs in the Śruti—cannot reasonably be destroyed\(^4\) by realisation, they are assumed to be false. Or\(^5\) as, after one has heard the sentence, "Devadatta is living, but not at home," the absence from home of a person who is alive makes one assume that he is outside.
[1 According to the first interpretation of the word; that is, the resulting knowledge, not the instrument.
2 Other than silver.
3 By a trustworthy person.
4 Unless they are unreal from the absolute standpoint.
5 This is a familiar example of the Mīmāṃsakas.]

TWOFOLD PRESUMPTION FROM WHAT IS HEARD

श्रुतार्थार्थसिद्धां—अभिधानात्मकस्थिति: अभिषेष्यतिः
तत्र यद्य वाक्यैःकेष्यांनेवैव वाक्याभिधानात्मक
युपस्त्या अन्यथाभिधानोपयोगे पतत्त्वं कहते तत्राभिधानात्मकस्थिति:।
यथा ‘धृःम’ हि स्त्वस ‘विषेषी’ हि सति
पद्यः यथा, यथा वा ‘विशेषजिता ग्लेट’ हि स्त्वस ‘स्वर्गः
कामः’-पद्यः।

Presumption from what is heard, again, is of two kinds—(that due to) failure of expression (intention) (abhidhānānupapatti) and (that due to) incongruity of meaning (abhihitānupapatti). Of these, the former occurs where, on hearing part of a sentence, there is failure of the expression of (i.e. intention regarding) the logical connection (anvayābhidhāna), and for that reason some additional word helpful to the latter is assumed. As, after the word dvāram (door), the word pidhehi (shut) is supplied; or1 as with the words, “should perform the Viśvajit sacrifice,” the words, “One who desires heaven,” are supplied.2
[¹ This is a Vedic example, as the other is a conventional one.

² The sentence, to be complete, requires a subject, and a man who is possessed of desires can be the required agent. Now it is an accepted principle with the Mīmāṃsakas that where no result is specifically mentioned for an action enjoined by the Srutis, heaven is assumed to be that result. See Pū. Mi. Śū. IV. iii. 15.]

नन्तु ‘शार्म‘ इत्यादिव्यावन्त्याविधानात् पूर्वम्, इवमन्यावि-
धान्यात् पिधानोपस्यापकः विनासुपपञ्चमिति कथं शान-
मिति चेत, न, ‘अभिधान‘-पदेन करणम्युत्त्त्वम् तात्पर्यस्य
विवक्षितवात्। तथाच द्वारकर्मकमिधानमियासंसारंपर्वां
पिधानोपस्त्यापकः विनासुपपञ्चमिति शानं तथापि
सम्भाव्यते।

Objection: In the case of a word like dvāram, before the expression (abhidhāna) of the logical connection, how can one know that this expression fails without a word meaning shutting?

Reply: Not so; for the word abhidhāna (lit., expression), by a derivation signifying instrumentality,¹ means ‘intention.’² Thus the sentence cannot mean a relation³ (of the word dvāram) to the act of shutting, having for its object the door, without some word signifying shutting. Hence the knowledge in question is possible even in this case.

¹ Signifying that by means of which the meaning of the sentence is expressed, and not the act of expressing.
Of the sentence, a part of which, viz., the word *dvāram*, has been heard.

This is the ‘intention’ of the sentence.]

(Provision from what is heard due to) incongruity of meaning, however, is to be looked for where the meaning understood from a sentence is found to be incongruous and leads to the assumption of some other thing. As, in the sentence, ‘‘One who desires heaven should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice,’’ since the property of leading to heaven, which is cognised as abiding in the transitory sacrifice, is incongruous,¹ an intermediate thing,² viz., the unseen result (*apūrva*),³ is assumed.

¹ Because the effect, viz., heaven, will be attained at some remote future time, while the sacrifice is short-lived.

² Serving as the operation or intermediate cause (*vyāpāra*). See note 1 on p. 73.

³ Postulated by the *Mimāṃsakas* to explain the above incongruity. It lasts till the fruition of the ultimate result, viz., heaven or hell.]
This presumption cannot be included in inference. For since affirmative invariable concomitance cannot be apprehended here, it cannot be classed under affirmative inference; and we have already refuted the contention that inference of the negative form is also an inference. Hence in cases of presumption the self-reflective cognition is not, "I am inferring it," but, "I am assuming it from this."

[1 As the logicians hold.
2 Between the reason and the thing to be inferred, that is, between living and existence outside the home, in the instance cited. Living proves only existence.
3 The only kind of inference admitted by Vedânta.
4 On p. 77.
5 See note 6 on p. 22.]

It may be urged: It has been stated that in cases of presumption the instrument is the knowledge, "This is inexplicable without such and such"; now what is this 'inexplicability without such and such'? We reply: It is the counter-positiveness of a non-existence that includes (necessarily signifies) the non-existence of something else.
[\(^1\) In effect. See p. 121.
\(^2\) See note 1 on p. 124.
\(^3\) See note 2 on p. 65.
\(^4\) Of the thing to be explained, e.g., stoutness.
\(^5\) The explanatory fact, e.g., eating at night, in the case of a man fasting by day. Since stoutness depends on this, where it is wanting, stoutness also is wanting.]

पञ्चमथराप्तेऽमोऽनान्तरत्वसिद्धौ व्यतिरेकि नानुमानान्तपरमणू, “पृथिवीविरेभ्यो भिड्यते” इत्यादिणौ गन्धवच्चमित्राति। विनातुपपश्चमित्रविद्वानस्य करण्तवात्। अतः गुणानु-व्यवसायः “पृथिव्यामित्रसमि फल्प्यामि” श्रिति।

श्रितिः वेदान्तपरिभाषायमथराप्तेः परिच्छेदः।

Thus presumption being proved to be a distinct means of valid knowledge, inference of the negative form is not a variety of inference.\(^1\) For in a sentence like, ‘‘Earth is different from other things (for it has smell),’’ the knowledge that the possession of smell is impossible without the difference from other things, is the instrument (of presumption).\(^2\) For this very reason\(^3\) the self-reflective cognition is, ‘‘I am assuming the difference in earth from other things.’’

\(^1\) It should not be reckoned as a distinct kind of inference, as is done by the logicians, but instances of the kind should be classed under presumption.

\(^2\) So one must not think that owing to the absence of an instrument of presumption, as described on p. 121, this is not a case of presumption, but of inference of the negative form, advocated by the logicians. According to them, this negative form of inference is resorted to
only in cases where the thing to be inferred is not something known. For instance, in the example cited above, the thing to be inferred is difference from other things, and this can exist in earth alone, which, however, is the subject of the inferential knowledge (pakṣa), and as such the presence in it of the thing to be inferred is disputed. In negative invariable concomitance, the absence of the reason (e.g. smell) is of wider extension than the absence of the thing to be inferred (e.g. difference from other things), and from the former the latter is inferred. This method of inference is adopted, since otherwise no example is available.

* Because the knowledge of incongruity as such is the instrument of presumption.

* Not, "I am inferring."*]
CHAPTER VI
NON-APPREHENSION

Non-apprehension: Meaning of its Capacity

Now the sixth means\(^1\) of valid knowledge is being described. The means of valid knowledge known as non-apprehension is the extraordinary cause of that apprehension of non-existence which is not due to knowledge as an instrument.\(^2\) The clause, “Which is not due,” etc. is inserted to preclude the definition from unduly extending to an inference or the like which causes that apprehension of the non-existence of imperceptible objects which is due to inference etc.\(^3\) The word ‘extraordinary’ is used to prevent a too wide
extension to such general causes as merit and demerit. And the qualifying term 'apprehension' is for precluding a similar unwarranted extension to latent impressions, which are the extraordinary cause of a recollection of non-existence. It cannot be urged that even in the case of an inferential knowledge about the non-existence of imperceptible objects, the non-existence may as well be grasped through non-apprehension, since there is no difference. For although merit and demerit etc. may not be perceptible, still, there being no certitude of their non-existence, only a non-apprehension that is possessed of capacity (yogyānupalabdhi) is (to be regarded as) the instrument of an apprehension of non-existence.

[1 Viz., non-apprehension.
2 Inference, comparison, verbal testimony and presumption, dealt with in the four preceding chapters, are all due to knowledge, viz., that of invariable concomitance, similarity, words possessing an intention, and the thing to be explained, respectively. Hence these are excluded from the purview of the definition.
3 Refers to verbal testimony and presumption.
4 Other general causes are space, time and God.
5 Instead of the general term 'knowledge,' which includes recollection.
6 Between the two cases, both being non-existence.]
Objection: What is this yogya\-\textit{nupalab\-\textit{dhi}}
\textsuperscript{1}? Is it the non-apprehension of something capable of being perceived that abides in something else? Or is it the non-apprehension of something abiding in a substratum that is capable of being perceived? It cannot be the former, for then the difference\textsuperscript{2} a pillar has from a ghoul, for instance, would be imperceptible. Nor can it be the latter, for then even the non-existence of merit etc. in the self would be perceptible.\textsuperscript{3}

Reply: Not so, for the compound used in the word is \textit{Karmadh\-\textit{araya}}, meaning ‘a non-
apprehension that is possessed of capacity.' And the capacity of non-apprehension is the fact of being that whose counterpositive is assumed by the hypothetical existence of its counterpositive. That is to say, the capacity of non-apprehension is the fact of its being a non-apprehension whose counterpositive, viz., apprehension, may be assumed by the existence, assumed in the substratum, of the counterpositive of that non-existence of a thing which is apprehended. For instance, if there be a jar on a well-lighted floor, then there would be an apprehension of the jar—on account of the possibility of this supposition, the non-existence of the jar on such a floor is to be known through non-apprehension. But such a supposition being impossible in darkness, the absence of the jar in that case cannot be known through non-apprehension. Again, if there be a ghoul in a pillar by a relation of identity, it would be perceptible like the pillar; hence its absence is to be known through non-apprehension. But although merit etc. exist in the self, since these are imperceptible, there is no possibility of the above-mentioned supposition regarding apprehension, and hence the absence of merit etc. cannot be known through non-apprehension.¹

¹ The word can be expounded in three ways, as meaning: a non-apprehension that is possessed of capacity; a non-apprehension of something that is capable of being perceived; and a non-apprehension in something that is perceptible. In the first the compound is
Karmadhāraya (cf. black-bird); in the second it is Saṣṭhi-tatpurusa (cf. riverside); and in the third it is Saptami-tatpurusa (cf. homespun). The second and third alternatives are being rejected one by one in favour of the first.

A difference of the form, "The pillar is not a ghoul." This difference is perceptible. But if the first interpretation be taken, then the ghoul being by nature imperceptible, non-apprehension would have no capacity here to distinguish the pillar from the ghoul; but as a matter of fact, it does. This is the difficulty.

Merit etc. are imperceptible, but the self, in which they abide, is perceptible to the mind. Hence, according to the second interpretation, merit etc. would be known to be absent through non-apprehension; but they are not. This is the anomaly.

In the form, "The jar would be perceived (were it here)."

In the form, "If the jar were here."

Of the non-existence mentioned in the last clause of this sentence; e.g. a floor.

E.g. a jar.

E.g. non-existence of a jar.

Through non-apprehension.

Since non-apprehension that is possessed of capacity is the means of valid knowledge regarding non-existence.

That is, a difference of the form, "The pillar is not a ghoul."

If there be merit etc. in the self, they would be perceptible.

Because there it is not possessed of capacity.]
Non-apprehension Cannot Be Replaced by Perception

ननूकरीत्यादिकरणेन्द्रियसंबिनिर्मितस्य स्थले अभावस्यानुप-लिखिताम्यतें त्यदनुपतम्; तत्र फलस्तेन्द्रियप्रेमाविवायाकार-चुक्तावपि करणम्, इन्द्रियान्वयनतिरित्रेकानुविधानातिनि चेत, न। तत्त्वतियोग्यनुपलङ्गेयप्रभावः हेतुत्वेन कल्पतवेन करणत्वमात्रस्य कल्पनात्; इन्द्रियस्य वामावेन समं सचिन-कर्षोभावानाभावमहाभेदितुत्वात्, इन्द्रियान्वयनतिरित्रेकोर्धिकारणात्नायुपक्षीणत्वेनान्यथासिद्धेः।

Objection¹: In cases where there is a contact² between the organ and the substratum of non-existence, you maintain that the non-existence is cognised in the above-mentioned manner³ through non-apprehension. There, with regard to the mental state⁴ in the form of the non-existence also, it is the prescribed⁵ organ that should be the instrument, in deference to the association (of the cognition of non-existence) with the organ by the method of agreement and difference.⁶

Reply: Not so, for the non-apprehension of the counterpositive of non-existence being also prescribed as a cause of the apprehension of non-existence, we simply assume that (non-apprehension) to be the instrument.⁷ Moreover, since the organ, not being in contact with non-existence,⁸ cannot be a cause⁹ of the apprehension of non-existence, and since the association with the organ
by the method of agreement and difference exhausts itself by generating a knowledge of the substratum of the non-existence and so on, the organ is a superfluity.^[1]

^[1] By the logician.

2 Without which even non-apprehension would be inoperative.

3 By the argument, "If there were a jar here, it would be perceived."

4 Which must be assumed in the apprehension of non-existence.

5 Admitted as the instrument for the perception of objects.

6 If the eye is in contact with the floor, the non-existence of the jar etc. is apprehended; otherwise not.

7 According to Nyāya as well as Vedānta the organ and non-apprehension are both causes. What the Vedāntin does is to call the latter an instrument, or an extraordinary cause. That is all.

8 As mainatined by the logician, but with its substratum.

9 Much less an instrument.

10 So it cannot in addition lead to an apprehension of non-existence.

11 Which in its turn causes the apprehension of non-existence.

12 Refers to the knowledge of what abides in the substratum.

13 Anyathā-siddha—an attendant circumstance not to be confounded with a cause, which must be a necessary invariable antecedent. For example, a potter's father with regard to a jar made by the former. For other instances see the Bhāṣā-Pariccheda, verses 19-22.]
non-apprehension

नहु “भूतः घटो न” इत्यादिभावानुपस्थते भूतांशे प्रत्यक्षत्वमुभयसिद्धामिति तत्र वृत्तिनिग्रंमनस्यावश्यकत्वेन भूताविचिन्द्रचैतन्यवत् तत्क्रियङ्गटाभावाविचिन्द्रचैतन्यस्यापि प्रमाणभित्तितया घटाभावस्य प्रत्यक्षतैव सिद्धान्तेषापि इति चेत, सत्यम्, अभावप्रतीते: प्रत्यक्षत्वेषापि तत्क्रियानुप-लक्ष्येमानान्तरत्वात्। न भो फलोभूतानुस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वेषा तत्क्रियानुस्य प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणात्तानियतत्त्वात्। “दृश्मात्म-मसि” इत्यादिवाचायजन्यानुस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वेषापि तत्क्रियान्य वाक्यांश्य प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणाभिप्राप्तात्त्वाभुय्रप्यत्वात्।

Objection: In cases of apprehension of non-existence, such as, “There is no jar on the floor,” that it is a perception in respect of the floor is accepted by both.\(^1\) Hence, it being necessary that the mental state should reach there,\(^2\) the Consciousness limited by the non-existence of the jar abiding in the floor is, like the Consciousness limited by the floor, not different from the subject,\(^3\) and therefore the non-existence of the jar is but a matter of perception\(^4\) even in Vedānta.

Reply: It is true; for although the apprehension of non-existence is perceptual knowledge, its instrument, viz., non-apprehension, is a distinct means of knowledge. There is no fixed rule that if the resulting knowledge be perceptual, its instrument, too, must be the means of knowledge called perception; for although the knowledge generated by a sentence like, “You are the
tenth man,"" is perceptual, yet its instrument, viz., the sentence, is admitted to be a distinct means of knowledge from that called perception.

[¹ Vedānta and Nyāya.
² See p. 16.
³ Consciousness limited by the mind. See p. 16.
⁴ And not of non-apprehension. See p. 17.
⁵ See note 1 on p. 21.
⁶ Viz., verbal testimony.]

**Objection:** How can there be a different means of knowledge unless the resulting knowledge is of a different class?

**Reply:** Not so, for simply from the fact of the mental state being of a different class, we understand that the means of knowledge must be different. Thus the mental state in the form of the absence of a jar etc. is not generated by the organ, for the latter is not in contact with the object,¹ but it is generated by a distinct means of knowledge, viz., non-apprehension of the jar etc. Hence non-apprehension is a distinct means of valid knowledge.

[¹ Viz., the absence of a jar etc.]
Objection: Admitting that non-apprehension is a distinct means of knowledge, since the apprehension of non-existence is perceptual knowledge, even a mistaken apprehension of the non-existence of a jar in a place containing a jar would be perceptual knowledge, and hence even in such a case one will have to admit an indescribable non-existence of the jar.¹ You cannot say this is a welcome objection, for if that non-existence be a product of the cosmic illusion (māyā), it cannot reasonably be a non-existence²; and if it be not a product of the cosmic illusion, the latter cannot be held to be the material cause of all effects whatsoever.³

Reply: Not so. The mistaken apprehension of the non-existence of a jar in a place containing a jar has not for its object an instantly produced non-existence of the jar, but inasmuch as that normal non-existence of a jar
which is already present in the colour etc.\textsuperscript{4} of the
floor, is superimposed on the floor, it is but a
case of mistaking one thing for another\textsuperscript{5}; for in
a case\textsuperscript{6} where there is vicinity of the thing super-
imposed, it is this mistaking of one thing for
another\textsuperscript{7} that is always held to be the fact.
\[1\] As in the case of a rope mistaken for a snake.
\[2\] Because the cosmic illusion as a positive entity
can produce only positive entities.
\[3\] Which is a postulate of Vedānta.
\[4\] Refers to touch etc. A jar never exists in qualities
etc.
\[5\] Anyathā-khyāti, advocated by the logicians.
\[6\] See p. 67.
\[7\] And not a knowledge of things as indescribable,
that is, as neither same nor different from the reality
(anirvacaniya-khyāti).]

अस्तु वा प्रतियोगिमति तद्भावस्यार्थममधु मधुपादुभा-निर्भरितमर्यादम, तथापि तदुपादानं माधवम। नहुपादानो-
pādayoṣṭतत्त्तसाजात्तम, तन्तुपर्योरपि तन्तुस्वत्तव-विना वैजात्त्तातु, यत्विक्षितात्तसाजात्तमम भावाया अनिष्ठव-नीयघटाभावस्य च विश्वात्त्त्तघर्मस्य विद्यमानत्त्तात्।
अन्त्येण व्यवहारिकं घटाभावं प्रति करं मायोपादानामिति
कुलो नाशक्त्या? न च विजातीयोष्टत्त्त्तुपादानोपद्यमभावे ब्रह्मव जगद्धुपादानं स्वाच्छित्तमम, प्रपञ्चविश्वमाधिसातत्त-च्छस्य तस्येश्वत्तात्, परिणामित्त्तस्योपादानत्त्तस्य निर-
वयव्यवेश्याणायनपचें। तथाच प्रपञ्चस्य परिणामस्युपादानं
भावा, न ब्रह्म, इति सिद्धान्त इत्यल्लमतिप्रसंहारे।
Or, in cases where there is a mistaken apprehension of the non-existence of a thing in a substratum containing it, we may concede that the non-existence in question is indescribable; still its material cause is but the cosmic illusion. It is not that the material cause and the effect must be altogether similar, for even threads and a cloth are heterogeneous in respect of their attributes such as threadhood and clothhood; and there is some homogeneity between the cosmic illusion and the indescribable non-existence of a jar, viz., in respect of the attribute of falsity. Otherwise,¹ why don't you raise the objection² how the cosmic illusion can be the material cause of the conventional non-existence³ of a jar? Nor can you urge that even if two heterogeneous things may stand to each other in the relation of material cause and effect, it is Brahman⁴ that should be the material cause of the universe. For Brahman is accepted as that, as being the substratum of the phantasm of the universe; but being devoid of parts, It cannot be the transformative material cause of the universe. So the conclusion of Vedānta is that the transformative material cause of the universe is the cosmic illusion, not Brahman. There is no need to dilate on the point.

¹That is, if the cosmic illusion be not the material cause of non-existence.
²About the last portion of paragraph 1 on p. 139: "And if it be not" etc.
3 As opposed to illusory non-existence. That is, where the jar is actually non-existent.
4 And not the cosmic illusion.]

FOUR KINDS OF NON-EXISTENCE

स चाभावच्छति—प्रागभावः प्रव्यसामाभावोत्तन्ताभावोर्योन्यामाभिषिनति। तत्र मृतिप्रज्ञाद्रो कारणे कार्यस्य घटदेहस्य पूर्वं योडभावः स प्रागभावः। स च भविष्यतो दित्र ततो निविषयः। तत्रैव घटस्य मुद्ररपताणन्तरं योडभावः स प्रव्यसाभावः। ब्यंसस्यापि स्वात्मिकाणकपालनाशे नाश पव। न च घटोन्मज्ञनापि, घटव्यस्य ब्यंसस्यापि घटप्रत्ययोगिग्यसंसत्त्वात्; अन्यथा प्रागभावः प्रव्यसात्मकघटस्य चिनाशे प्रागभावोन्यामाणपि। न चैव-मष्ठयो यथा प्रव्यसाधिकरणं नित्यं तत्र कथं प्रव्यसंनाश दत्तवाभ्यम्। ततः भावमधिकरणं यद्य चैतन्यव्यवासरितस्य तत्रा तस्य निम्नत्वमसिद्धम्, प्रश्चार्यतिक्रिक्य सर्वस्य ब्रह्मान-निवृत्तात्या बहुमाणित्वात्। यद्य च प्रव्यसाधिकरणं चैतन्यं ततदः सदिः, आरोपितप्रत्ययोगिग्यसंसस्याधिकरणे प्रतीयमाणस्याधिधानमाणित्वात्। तदुक्तम्—“अधिश्रावयोगो हि नाशः कल्यितवस्तुन्” दत्त। पवं तुष्टिकाण्ड-चिनाशोऽपिदेस्यबन्धवचिन्तामचैतन्यमेव।

That non-existence is of four kinds—previous non-existence, non-existence as destruction, absolute non-existence and mutual non-existence.
Of these, previous non-existence is the absence of an effect such as a jar in its cause, a lump of clay, for example, before the effect has originated. It is the object of a cognition that the thing will come into being. Non-existence as destruction is the absence of a jar in that very thing,¹ after the jar has been dealt a blow with a club. (This non-existence as) destruction is also certainly destroyed² when its substratum, the pieces of a jar, is destroyed. It cannot be urged that this would lead to a reappearance of the jar, for even the destruction of destruction of a jar is a destruction of which the counterpositive is the jar.³ Otherwise, when a jar, which represents the destruction of its previous non-existence, ceases to be, the previous non-existence would reappear.⁴ It cannot be questioned how there can be a cessation of destruction where the substratum of the destruction is eternal.⁵ For if such substratum be apart from Consciousness, then its eternity is untenable, because it will be stated later on⁶ that everything but Brahman terminates with the realisation of Brahman. And if the substratum of the destruction be Consciousness, this⁷ is also untenable, for a destruction the counterpositive of which is fancied, and which merely appears in its substratum, is nothing but that substratum.⁸ So it has been said: "The destruction of an imaginary thing is but its being reduced to its substratum." Similarly, the destruction of silver appearing in a
nacre is nothing but Consciousness limited by 'this.'

[1] Viz., the material cause, such as a lump of clay.

[2] This is contrary to the view of the logicians, according to whom it has a beginning, but no end.

[3] And not the preceding destruction. That is to say, when a jar is first broken into pieces, it is destroyed, and when these pieces are further broken, the previous destruction ends. But this end of destruction does not mean that the jar re-emerges, on the analogy of two negatives making an affirmative. For we still cognise that the jar has been destroyed.


[5] As, for instance, in the case of an atom, which is the substratum of the destruction of a dyad.

[6] In Chapter VIII.

[7] The fact of Consciousness (Brahman) being the substratum of the destruction.

[8] Hence destruction being identical with Consciousness (Brahman), the latter cannot be called its substratum.

[9] Something shining connected with the eye, not yet identified as a nacre. See p. 50.]

यन्त्राधिकरणं वयस्य कालश्रयेष्ठयमावः सोत्तत्त्वाभावः; यथा बायौ रूपात्यत्त्वाभावं। सोचिपि विकम्बितवर्त्यं प्रतियोग्यः। "हृदमित्रं न" हति प्रतीतिविषयोन्योन्या-भावं। अथात्र विभागो भेदः पुरूषकृत्वाभ्रेति व्यवस्थिते, भेदार्थिरिक्तपृथक्कृत्वादृ भ्रमणाभावात्। अथ चाल्योन्या-भावोऽधिकरणस्य साधित्वे साधिः, यथा घटे धातेयें; अधिकरणस्यानाधित्वेनानिदित्वं, यथा जीवे ब्रह्मेवद्; ब्रह्मणि
That whose non-existence in a particular substratum is for all time—past, present and future—has absolute non-existence (there); as, the absolute non-existence of colour in air. It, too, is indeed the counterpositive of destruction,¹ like the ether etc. Mutual non-existence is what is an object of the cognition, "This is not such and such." It is this difference that is designated as disjunction and separateness,² for there is nothing to prove that separateness etc. are something over above difference (mutual non-existence). This mutual non-existence is possessed of a beginning when its substratum has a beginning³; as, the difference a jar has from a cloth.⁴ But it is indeed without a beginning when its substratum is such; as, the difference of the individual self from Brahman, or the difference of Brahman from the individual self. Both these kinds of difference are indeed the counterpositives of destruction,⁵ for when nescience ceases, all that depend on it necessarily cease.

¹ That is, subject to destruction—not eternal, as in Nyāya.
² Which are distinct qualities according to Nyāya.
³ According to Nyāya, mutual non-existence is eternal.
⁴ A difference of the form, "A jar is not a cloth."
⁵ That is, are subject to destruction or transitory.
Mutual Non-existence is Twofold

Difference is again of two kinds—conditioned and unconditioned. Of these, conditioned difference is that the existence of which is the subordinate concomitant (vyāpya) of the existence of its limiting adjunct (upādhi), and unconditioned difference is that which has not this kind of existence. An example of the first of these is this: One and the same ether is differentiated by different limiting adjuncts such as a jar. Or as the one sun is manifold according to different water vessels. Thus one and the same Brahman appears as different owing to different minds. Unconditioned difference is—as is the difference a jar has from a cloth.

[2] Here the existence of the ether enclosed by the jar is the subordinate concomitant of the existence of the jar; that is, it is never present where the latter is not.
[3] In which the sun is reflected. The two examples point respectively to what is known as the doctrine of (apparent) limitation (avacchina-vāda) and the doctrine
of reflection (*pratibimba-vāda*), with regard to the relation between the individual self and the Supreme Self or Brahman.

4 Serving either as (apparent) limiting adjuncts or as reflecting media.

5 See note 4 on p. 14.]

न च ब्रह्माण्यि प्रपञ्चमेदाध्युपगमेष्टैतविरोधः, तात्त्विक- 
आत्माक- 
मेत्रान्युपगमेत वियुदाविधक्यवायागातकत्वात् ; प्रपञ्चस्य- 
हृदेत ब्रह्माणि कल्पितत्वासङ्कृतिकारात्। तदुक्तं सुरेश्वराचार्येन—
“अल्पमा भवत् केवल साधकत्वप्रकल्पने।
किं न पश्चाति संसारर्त तन्त्राजानकल्पितम्॥”

इति। अतः पव विवरणः,विवाणुमाने भ्रामाववैतरिकित्व- 
विशेषणम्, तत्त्वप्रत्यक्षायामविवाणूक्ष्णे भावव-विशेषण 
च समुच्छते।

It cannot be urged that if a difference in the form of the universe be admitted even in Brahman, it will contradict Monism. For since real difference is not admitted, the universe does not, like the ether¹ etc., serve as an impediment to Monism; because it is admitted to be superimposed on Brahman, the One without a second. So it has been said by Sureśvarācārya: “Why this intolerance of yours about Brahman being assumed to be an aspirant? Don’t you see that the (whole) universe has been superimposed on Brahman Itself through ignorance?” (*Br. Vā. I. iv. 1279*). Hence the qualifying epithet, ‘Other than previous non-existence,’ in
the inference regarding nescience in the Viva-raṇa, as also the qualifying clause, ‘Which is a positive entity,’ in the definition of nescience in the Tattva-pradipikā is appropriate.

[1 The distinction between the all-pervading ether and that enclosed by a jar is only apparent, there being only one indivisible ether. So with Brahman.

2 The reference is to the following passage, “One may also infer: Valid cognition, which is in dispute, must be produced by something other than its previous non-existence (viz., nescience), which covers the objects (e.g. a jar) of that cognition and is removed by it, and which co-exists with that cognition; for it reveals undiscovered objects; as is the case with the first beam of a lamp in darkness” (V. S. S., p. 13, ll. 4-7).

3 See note 3 on p. 1.

4 The definition is like this: “Nescience is that which is a positive entity without a beginning and is terminated by knowledge” (N. S. Ed., p. 57).

5 Under verse 9 of Chapter I. See note 7 on p. 39.]

The cognition of the above four kinds of non-existence is through non-apprehension that is possessed of capacity. Hence non-apprehension is a separate means of knowledge.

**The Validity of Knowledge is Intrinsic and Self-evident**

The example of pramāṇaṇaṇa prāmaṇyam svat phoṭpadyate śrāvyate ch. Therefore śrutyanubhavastādhāraṇam śambhūṭārṇaṃ
The validity of knowledge generated by the above-mentioned means of knowledge originates by itself and is self-evident.¹ To explain: Valid knowledge is that knowledge regarding something² possessing a particular attribute,³ which has that attribute as its feature (prakāra),⁴ which is conducive to successful effort,⁵ and which includes recollection as well as fresh experience.⁶ That validity is due to the totality⁷ of causes producing knowledge in general, and does not depend on extra merit,⁸ for there is no merit that abides in all valid knowledge. Nor is the contact of an organ with a large number of parts (of the object) a merit of valid perception, for it is absent in the perception of colour etc.⁹ as also of the self,¹⁰ and in spite of the contact, the perception, “The conch is yellow,” is an
error. Hence a valid consideration\textsuperscript{11} of the sign, or the like,\textsuperscript{12} is also not a merit of other forms of valid knowledge such as inferential knowledge, for even when there is a fallacious consideration of the sign and so forth, inferential knowledge etc. are valid if their objects are uncontradicted.\textsuperscript{13} It cannot be urged that in that case\textsuperscript{14} even invalid knowledge would be valid knowledge, since the totality of causes of knowledge in general are the same; for the absence of defects is also admitted to be a cause. Nor does valid knowledge become thereby dependent on other things, for dependence comes only when adventitious positive entities act as causes.

\textsuperscript{1} Both the points are denied by logicians.
\textsuperscript{2} E.g. a floor containing a jar, or silver possessed of silverhood.
\textsuperscript{3} Viz., the jar, or silverhood.
\textsuperscript{4} In the phrase ‘a floor containing a jar,’ the jar is the qualifying attribute (\textit{viṣeṣaṇa}). Similarly in the word ‘silver,’ silverhood is that attribute. The qualifying attribute of a thing that is known is the feature (\textit{prakāra}) in the knowledge of the thing. Hence the gist of this portion of the definition is: Valid knowledge is knowing a thing as it is, and not as something else, which would be error. For instance, the sentence, “The lake has fire,” does not give us valid knowledge, for a lake contains water, and not fire.
\textsuperscript{5} One that can be fulfilled. When we see a real piece of silver, our effort to take it can materialise. Not so, however, when we mistake a nacre as silver. This latter leads to unsuccessful effort. See p. 48.
\textsuperscript{6} On p. 5 two definitions of valid knowledge were given, in the second one of which recollection was
included. The present definition is relating to that. According to Nyāya, recollection is not valid knowledge.

7 Viz., the conjunction of the self and mind.

8 As the logicians say. Particulars of these merits or favourable conditions are enumerated in the Bhāṣā-Pariccheda, verses 132-134.

9 Refers to taste, smell, etc., which also have no parts.

10 In which perception no contact is admitted.

11 See p. 73. For the consideration to be valid, the sign also must be true.

12 Refers to consistency etc.

13 That is, accidentally happen to be true.

14 If validity is held to depend on the totality of causes of valid knowledge in general.]

क्षयते च प्रामाण्यं स्वतः। स्वतो प्राहात्वश्च दोषाभावे सति यावत्स्वाध्यप्राहकसामग्रीप्राहात्वच। स्वाभ्रोयो वृत्ति-क्षयाम्, तद्यथाहकं साक्षिक्षानम्। तेनापि वृत्तिकाने गृहामाणे तदुगतं प्रामाण्यमये गृहते। न चैवं प्रामाण्यसंशयांनुप-पति:, तत्र संशयानुरोधेन दोषस्यापि सत्तेन दोषाभाव-घर्तिस्वाध्यप्राहकामावेन तत्र प्रामाण्यस्यैवाप्रहात। यद्या यावत्स्वाध्यप्राहकाहत्योग्यतं स्वतस्तत्वम्। संशयस्यतेप्रामाण्यस्येक्षणयोग्यतासत्तेदिपि दोषाशेषाप्रहात् न संशयानुपपति:।

The validity of knowledge is also spontaneously apprehended.¹ Spontaneous apprehension is the fact of being grasped by the totality² of
causes that apprehend the substratum\(^3\) of the validity, provided no defect is present. The substratum of the validity is the Consciousness manifested as the mental state,\(^4\) and the cause of its cognition is the Consciousness designated as the witness.\(^5\) That too, when it apprehends the Consciousness manifested as the mental state, apprehends the validity of the latter as well. It cannot be urged that in that case\(^6\) there cannot be any room for doubt about the validity of knowledge. For in order that doubt may arise, there must be some defect also in the validity, and therefore, owing to an absence of the causes of apprehending the substratum\(^7\) of the validity, which (absence) is bound up with an absence of defects, there would be no apprehension at all of the validity of the knowledge. Or spontaneity (self-evidence)\(^8\) is the capacity of being cognised by all that apprehends the substratum of the validity. In a case of doubt, although the validity may possess that capacity, yet it is not apprehended on account of some defect. Hence there is a reasonable chance for doubt.

\(^{1}\) That is, is self-evident. Not, as in Nyāya, to be established by inference.

\(^{2}\) That is, all the causes involved in the act of cognition by the witness.

\(^{3}\) According to Nyāya, the knowledge, ‘This jar.’

\(^{4}\) A modification of the mind in the form of the object. See p. 16.

\(^{5}\) Consciousness having the mind as its limiting adjunct. See p. 40. The witness, however, is only one of the causes. See note 2 above.
If the validity of knowledge be self-evident.

Consciousness associated with the mental state, "Is this a jar or not?"

Of the validity of knowledge.

The invalidity of knowledge, however, is not due to the totality of causes of knowledge in general, for in that case even valid knowledge would be invalid; but it is due to some (adventitious) defect. Nor is the invalidity apprehended by all that apprehends its substratum. For since the circumstances leading to the invalidity, for example, the cognition that the knowledge in question possesses the absence of the qualifying attribute (višešana), are not presented by the Consciousness associated with the mental state, the witness cannot apprehend them; but it is the object of an inferential knowledge, for instance, that has for its sign unsuccessful effort etc. Thus the invalidity of knowledge arises and is apprehended through some extraneous agency alone.
[\textsuperscript{1} Being produced by the same cause.  
\textsuperscript{2} Of the thing that \textit{appears} in something else, e.g. silver.  
\textsuperscript{3} When a nacre is mistaken for silver, there is no mental state in the form of the nacre or the absence of silver.  
\textsuperscript{4} For example, "This knowledge of silver is invalid, for it leads to unsuccessful effort."  
\textsuperscript{5} Refers to verbal comprehension etc.—for example, if somebody says, "This is not silver, but a nacre."  
\textsuperscript{6} Refers to sleep etc.]
CHAPTER VII

THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF VEDĀNTA

TWOFOLD VALIDITY OF THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

पवं निरूपितानां प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यं द्विविधम्—व्याख्या-हारिकत्रववेद्वृक्तयं पारमाध्यिकतववेद्वृक्तव्यतीति। तस्म
ब्रह्मस्वरूपगाहिप्रमाणव्यतिरिक्तानां सर्वप्रमाणानामां प्रामाण्यम्, तद्विध्यानां व्यवहारवशयां बाधाभावाद।
तृतीयस्य जीवजीविक्षणपरां “सत्यं सोम्येद्वप्रण भासौ”
इत्यादिवैं “सत्यमसि” इत्यत्यातानाम्, तद्विषयस्य जीवपरै-
क्यस्य कालराववावत्वत्वात्। तत्वान्य ‘तत्त्र’-पदार्थाणाधानीन-
शान्तियति प्रथमं ‘तत्त्र’-पदार्थां लक्षणप्रमाणाभ्यं निरूपये।

The validity of the means of knowledge that have been described in the above manner is of two kinds—as setting forth conventional reality and as setting forth absolute reality. Of these, the validity of all means of knowledge except that¹ which apprehends the true nature of Brahman is of the first variety, since their objects are free from contradiction during the phenomenal state of existence.² The second kind of validity belongs to Vedāntic texts that set forth the identity of the individual self with Brahman, for instance, those beginning with “This universe, my dear, was but Existence in the beginning”
(Chā. VI. ii. i), and ending with, "Thou art That" (Ibid. VI. viii. 7—xvi. 3); for the thing they teach, viz., the identity of the individual self with the Supreme Self, is uncontradictable for all time—past, present and future. And since the realisation of that identity depends on a knowledge of the meanings of the words 'That' and 'thou,' the meaning of the word 'That' is being first ascertained with the help of characteristics and the means of knowledge.

[¹ That is, verbal (scriptural) testimony.
² That is, prior to the realisation of one's identity with Brahman.]

ESSENTIAL AND SECONDARY CHARACTERISTICS OF BRAHMAN: THE MEANING OF 'THAT'
IN "THOU ART THAT."

तथ्र लक्षणं द्विविधाम्—स्वरूपवलक्षणं तदस्यवलक्षणश्चैति ।
तथ्र स्वरूपमेव लक्षणं स्वरूपवलक्षणम्। यथा सत्याविद्वेदः
भ्राह्मस्वरूपवलक्षणम्, "सत्यं भ्राह्ममनन्तं भ्राह्," "आनन्दो भ्रोहति व्यज्ञानात्" इत्याविष्टुः। ननु स्वस्य स्वच्छतित्वाभावे
कथं लक्षणतथामिति चेतु, न, स्वस्तैव स्वच्छेऽत्यो धार्मिकम्
भावफलवाय लक्ष्यवलक्षणवस्तवभावात्। तदुत्तमः—"आनन्दो
विषयानुभो नित्यत्वश्चैति सन्ति धर्मोऽपृथक्क्ते। क्षेतन्यातु पृथिविवावमास्ते" हृति ।

Now characteristics are of two kinds—essential and secondary. Of these, essential characteristics
(svārūpa-lakṣāṇa) consist in the very nature (svārūpa) of a thing. As, Truth etc. are essential characteristics of Brahman, for this is borne out by such Śruti texts as, “Brahman is Truth, Knowledge and Infinitude” (Tai. II. 1) and “He knew that Bliss was Brahman” (Ibid. III. 6).

**Objection:** Since a thing cannot abide in itself, how can it be a characteristic (of itself)?

**Reply:** Not so, for since the same thing can be conceived of as a possessor of attributes and an attribute with regard to itself, it can be a thing having a characteristic as also a characteristic.¹ So it has been stated, “Bliss, the experience of objects and eternity are the attributes. Although they are not separate from Consciousness (Brahman), they appear to be so” (Pañcapādikā, p. 4, l. 3).

¹That is to say, Truth, Knowledge, etc. are Brahman, but they are assumed to be Its attributes. Hence these can be regarded as both.]

तत्स्च्यालक्षणं नाम यावलक्ष्यकालमनवस्थितते वाति यद्यावर्तं तदेव। यथा गण्यतं वृद्धिवीलक्षणं, महाप्रवृत्ते परमाणु, उत्पत्तिकाले धर्माविद्रु च गण्याबाबात्। प्रकटे च जगज्ञानमार्थकारणत्वम्। अत्र जगत्-पदेन फार्ज्ञातं विवक्षितम्। कारणत्वं फल्फलम्, अन्तराबिचारो नातिन्याति। कर्तृत्वं तत्तदातानगोचरप्ररोक्ष्यानन्तर-चिकिर्षेक्षितत्त्वम्। इत्यवस्थ तात्तदातानगोचरप्ररोक्ष्य-श्रानस्तृते—
A secondary characteristic is that which, although not lasting as long as the thing possessing it lasts, yet differentiates it from other things. As, the possession of smell is a (secondary) characteristic of earth, for there is no smell in atoms (of earth) on the dissolution of the universe, nor in jars etc. at the time of their origin. With regard to the subject under discussion (Brahman), its being the cause of the birth etc.\(^1\) of the universe is such a characteristic. Here the word ‘universe’ means the sum total of effects. And causality is agency. Hence the characteristic does not unwarrantedly extend to nescience etc.\(^2\) Agency is the possession of an immediate knowledge, the desire to do and activity regarding particular material causes.\(^3\) About God’s possessing an immediate knowledge of all material causes, Śruti texts like the following are evidence:

“From Him who knows all things in a general and a particular way, and whose meditation is a (natural) result of His knowledge, are produced this Hiraṇyagarbha,\(^4\) and names, colours and foods” (Mu. I. i. 9). About His desire to do of the above kind,\(^5\) Śruti texts like, “It desired:
Let Me multiply, let Me be effectively born” (Tai. II. 6), are evidence. And about that kind of activity of His, passages like, “He (Hiranya-garbha) produced the mind” (Bṛ. I. ii. 1), (are proofs).

[¹ Refers to maintenance and dissolution.
² Refers to Nature and atoms, for example, which, being insentient, are not agents.
³ Of things to be done.
⁴ The ‘effect-Brahman,’ that is, Brahman as the sum total of the manifested universe.
⁵ That is, concerning all material causes of things to be done.]

शानेच्छादन्यतमगामि लक्षणत्रितयं विवक्षितम्, अन्यथा
व्यर्थविशेषापि:। अत पव जन्मस्थितिशिशवसानामन्य-
तमस्यैव लक्षणं प्रवेशः। पववश्च लक्षणानि नव सम्पन्नते।
ब्रह्मो जगज्ञानान्विकारणवे च “यतो वा इमानि भूतानि
जायते, येन ज्ञातानि जीवन्ति, यतु प्रयत्न्यमिसोंविश्वान्ति”
इत्यादिचुतिमौनम्।

Here three characteristics, each embodying only one of the items—knowledge, desire, etc.,¹ are meant, for otherwise it would involve the fallacy of ‘redundant qualifying attributes.’² For the same reason only one of the following three items, viz., origin, maintenance and dissolution, should at a time enter into the characteristic. Thus there are altogether nine³ characteristics (of Brahman). As regards Brahman’s being the
cause of the origin etc. of the universe, Śruti texts like the following are proofs: "From which these beings\(^4\) are born, in which they live after birth and to which they (finally) return and become merged" (Tai. III. i).

\(^1\) Refers to activity.
\(^2\) As in the sentence, "The hill has fire, because it has blue smoke." Here the word 'blue' is redundant, smoke alone being sufficient for inferring the presence of fire.

\(^3\) By combining knowledge, desire and activity severally with cosmic origin, maintenance and dissolution.

\(^4\) From Hiranyagarbha down to a clump of grass.

यद्य निशितजगदुपात्रानत्वं ब्रह्मणो लक्ष्याम्। उपाश्रान्त्वः जगद्भ्यासाधिशिश्चानत्वः, जगद्धारणेष पारिपपमानमायाधिशिश्चानत्वः वा। पतारमेनोपप्रात्रानत्वमभिपेत्य "इत्यं सर्वं यद्यमात्मा," "सर्वं त्यस्यायमः, "बहु स्यं प्रजायंयं" इत्याविभिन्नितिः ब्रह्मापप्रत्यो प्रात्रात्ममवर्ष्कदेशः। "घरः सत्," "घरे भाति," "घर घरः" इत्याविभिन्नकपदेशोधपि साधित्वानन्द्वधप्रवृज्ञाध्यायः।

Or the characteristic of Brahman is that It is the material cause of the entire universe. By 'material cause' is meant the substratum of the superimposition of the universe, or the substratum of the cosmic illusion (māyā) that transforms itself in the shape of the universe. It is in view of such material causality that Brahman and
the universe have been described as identical in Śruti texts like the following: "This all is that Self" (Ṛg. II. iv. 6), "It became the gross and the subtle" (Tai. II. 6), and "Let Me multiply, let Me be effectively born" (Ibid. II. 6; Chā. VI. ii. 3). Conventional statements like, "The jar exists," "The jar is manifest," and "The jar is desirable," are also on account of the superimposition of identity (of the jar) with Brahman, the Existence-Knowledge-Bliss Absolute, (on It).

नन्दान्त्वात्मकचित्त्वासाधुर्गदरिष्ठत्ववचहारे दुःख-स्यापि तत्राभ्यासातः तस्यापीथ्ववचरापलिकिति चेत्, न;
“आरोपे सति निमित्तानुसरणम्, न तु निमित्तस्तीत्वारोपः;” हत्यम्युपगमनं दुःखाद्राः सत्विवृत्ताभ्यासेःपि
आनन्दांशाभ्यासाभावात्। जगति नामसपांशद्धवन्यवहारस्तु
बबिष्यापरिष्ठनामात्मकनामस्तपसम्बन्धात्। तदुक्तम्—

"अस्ति भाति प्रियं रूपं नाम चेत्यंशपभक्तम्।
अच्छं भवं श्राहरूपं जगद्वृं ततो ब्रह्मम्।" इति।

**Objection:** If a jar etc. are treated as desirable on account of their superimposition on the Consciousness that is Bliss, then, since pain also is superimposed on That, it too would be treated as desirable.

**Reply:** No; for accepting the principle, "If there is superimposition, its cause may be traced; but it does not follow that just because there is a cause, there must be superimposition," although
there may be a superimposition on pain of the
Existence and Knowledge aspects (of Brahman),
there is no superimposition of the Bliss aspect.
The application of the two aspects, viz., name
and form, with regard to the universe is due to
its relation to name and form, which are
the modifications of nescience. So it has been
said: "Existence, manifestation, agreeableness,
form and name—these are the five aspects (of
phenomena). The first three are characteristics
of Brahman, and the next two of the universe."¹

¹Śaṅkarācārya’s Vākyasudha, 20. So the relation
of Brahman to name and form and that of the universe
to existence etc. are but cases of a transference of
attributes.]

COSMOGONY: ITS ORDER

अथ जगतो जन्मकमो निरुपयते। तत्र सर्गायकादे
परमेभयः सूक्तमानप्रपशिविच्येहतुप्रणालिकर्मसहकरोऽ
परिमितानिकितशक्तिविशेषबिशिष्यमायसहितः सन् नाम-
सूक्तमानविशिष्यमायसहितः"व्रं करिष्यामि"
दति ससुक्तपयति, "तदैस्त बहु स्वां प्रजायेय," "सौंस्त्रम-
यत बहु स्वां प्रजायेय" इत्याविषयते। तत भाकाशाद्र्वीि
पश्चभूतान्यपश्चीकृतानि तन्मात्रपदप्तिपाधान्यन्युत्पत्ति
तताकाशशय श्यो गुणः, वायोस्तु शव्द्वप्शरोऽ, तेजस्तु
शव्द्वप्शरूक्ताणि, अर्थं तु शव्द्वप्शरूक्तपरसाः, पृथिव्यास्तु
Now the order of the manifestation of the universe is being described. At the beginning of creation, the Supreme Lord, aided by the (past) actions\(^1\) of beings, which are the causes of the variety of the universe that is about to be created, as also by the cosmic illusion,\(^2\) which is endowed with an unlimited and inscrutable power, first conceives in His mind the entire universe\(^3\) consisting of names and forms, and resolves, "I shall do this"; for the Śruti says, "It reflected: Let Me multiply, let Me be effectively born" (Chā. VI. ii. 3), and "It desired: Let Me multiply, let Me be effectively born" (Tai. II. 6). From that the five\(^4\) simple\(^5\) elements beginning with the ether, which are signified by the word tanmātra\(^5\) (subtle element), are produced. Of these, the property of the ether is sound; those of air are sound and touch; those of fire are sound, touch and colour; those of water are sound, touch, colour and taste; and those of earth are sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. Sound is not the property of the ether alone, for it is found in air etc. also. Nor is this an error, for there is nothing to contradict it.

\(^1\) This explains the differences that we find in the universe. For these not God, but the beings themselves, are responsible.

\(^2\) Māyā, which is the material cause.

\(^3\) As it was in the previous cycle (kalpa). So the
present manifested universe is a replica of the previous one.

4 Ether, air, fire (or light), water and earth.

5 Not combined with the other four; hence subtle. For the process of combination see p. 167.

6 Lit., ‘only that,’ that is, not combined with the other elements.]

इमानि भूतानि त्रिगुणमायाकारयांगि त्रिगुणानि।
गुणां सत्तरजस्तमांसि। पत्तैश्च सत्तगुणोपेतैः पञ्चभूतैः-
व्यस्तैर्यांकमः श्रोत्रत्वक्षुक्षुरसन्धागाणि पञ्चबालनेन्त्रियाणि
जायते। पत्तैश्च सत्तगुणोपेतैः पञ्चभूतैमिलितैर्मोनोबुङ्गह-
हुलार्चिता नाति जायते। श्रोतार्द्धनां पञ्चानां क्रमेण
विग्नातार्किकवस्तुणामिनोभिग्रामाद्वेदता:। मन आदिनां
चतुर्णां क्रमेण चन्द्रचतुर्मुखशुद्धराच्युतः अधिग्रामाद्वेदता:।

These elements, being effects of the cosmic illusion, which is made up of the three ingredients (guṇas), are (also) composed of the three ingredients. The ingredients are serenity (sattva), activity (rajas) and inertia (tamas). From these five elements as particularly possessed of the ingredient of serenity, taken singly, are produced in order¹ the five sense-organs known as the ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose. From these same five elements as particularly possessed of the ingredient of serenity, taken in combination,² are produced the manas,³ the intellect, the ego and the citta.⁴ The presiding deities of the five organs beginning with the ear are the Quarters,
Air, the Sun; Varuṇa (the god of water) and the two Aśvins, respectively. The presiding deities of the four beginning with the manas are the Moon, Brahmā, Śiva and Viṣṇu respectively.

[1 The ear from the ether, the skin from air, the eye from light, and so on.

2 The text of this line has a different reading: एतेऽक्ष: दनराकाशार्दिगतसात्त्विकार्थो मिलितेन्; meaning, “From these portions of the ether etc., again, that are characterised by serenity, taken in combination.”

3 The mind as doing the function of deliberation. See p. 34.

4 The mind as doing the function of recollection.

5 The Quarters control the ear, Air the skin, the Sun the eye, and so on.]

पत्रेव रजोगुणोपेते: पञ्चभूतेयथःक्रमं वाक्पाणिपाद-पायूपस्यायत्वात् कर्मेन्द्रियाणि जायते। तेषाः ऋक्षेण बहीन्द्रोपेत्रमुल्यप्रजापतीयोहिष्ठिताशुद्धेऽदेवताः। रजोगुणोपेते: पञ्चभूतेयथः मिलिते: पञ्च वायवः प्राणापाणव्याध्वान-समानार्थया जायते। तत्र प्राणामनवान् वायु: प्राणो नासादिर्वसानवति। अर्धगमनवानपाण: पाय्यादिस्थानवति। विषगमनवान् व्यान: अक्षिलशारिरवति। उर्ध्गमनवानु-क्रमवायुवान् औषधस्थानवति। अशित्पिताःशास्त्रित्वसमी-करणकः समान: नामिन्यानवति।

From these same five elements as particularly possessed of the ingredient of activity are pro-
duced in order the organs of action we call the tongue, the hand, the feet, the anus and the organ of generation. Their presiding deities are Agni (Fire), Indra, Viṣṇu, Yama (Death) and Prajāpati, respectively. The same five elements as particularly possessed of the ingredient of activity, taken in combination, produce the five vital forces named prāṇa, āpāṇa, vyāṇa, udāna and samāna. Of these, prāṇa is the vital force that moves forward and has its seat in the nose etc.\(^2\) Apāṇa is what moves downwards and has its seat in the anus etc. Vyāṇa is what moves in all directions and pervades the whole body. Udāna is the vital force that moves upwards and helps the soul’s departure from the body; it has its seat in the throat. Samāna is what metabolises the food etc. that we eat and drink and has its seat in the navel.

\(^1\) Taken singly.
\(^2\) Refers to the mouth, heart, etc. Authorities differ slightly as to the seats and functions of the five vital forces.\]

"तैरेख तमोगुणोपेतैरपञ्चीकृतभूते पञ्चीकृतभूतानि जायले। "तासां तिरुत्त तिरुत्तमेकैकृं करवाणि" हति श्रुते: पञ्चीकरणोपलक्षणार्थवादः।"

Out of the same simple elements as particularly possessed of the ingredient of inertia are produced the compound elements that are combined with the other four. For the Śruti text, "‘Let Me make each one of these\(^1\) a triple\(^2\) entity’” (Chā.
VI. iii. 3), is indicative of combination with the other four\(^3\) (*pañcikarana*).

\(^1\) Fire, water and food or earth.

\(^2\) With a preponderance in each one of that particular element in the ratio of four to one.

\(^3\) Not the other two only; for the creation of fire was presumably preceded by that of the ether and air. Thus the mention of only three elements in Chā. VI. ii. 3-4 will harmonise with that of five elements in Tai. III. r.]

**Combination of the Elements**

पक्षीकरणप्रकारश्चेत्यम्—आकाशामात्रैं खिण्य विभज्य
	तयोरेकं भागं पुनःशतुर्या विभज्य तेजसं चतुर्णामेंशानां
	वायुविद्वृत्ते चतुर्वे भूलेषु संयोजनम्।
	पञ्चां भार्तूं खिय्य विभज्य तयोरेकं भागं पुनःशतुर्या विभज्य
	तेजसं चतुर्णामेंशानामाकाशाविद्वृत्ते संयोजनम्।
	पञ्चां तेजस्तात्राकाशमीष्टि।

tadbhayamakṣaṇभूतस्वाध्यं स्वांशात्मकम्, अर्थात् चतुर्विंिभूतमयमिति
	पृथियविद्वृत्ते स्वांशाधिक्यात् पृथियवाक्रि-
	व्यवहारः।

tadubbam—“वेशेष्याणु तद्वृक्षस्तद्दातः” हृति।

The process of combination with the other four elements is as follows: First dividing the ether into two, and again dividing one of these halves into four, each one of these four parts is to be added to (halves of) the (other) four elements—air and the rest.\(^1\) Similarly, dividing air into two, and again dividing one of these halves into four, each one of these parts is to be
added to (halves of) the (other) four elements—ether and so forth. Similarly with fire etc. also. Thus half of each (compound) element is derived in the above manner from itself, and the other half from the remaining four elements. So the use of the terms ‘earth’ and so on with regard to earth and the other elements is on account of the preponderance of their own parts in them. So it has been said, “But the use of special names is on account of the preponderance (of that element).”

[1 That is, each compound element will consist of half of itself and one-eighth of each of the other four.

2 Br. S. II. iv. 22. The repetition of the last word in the original, omitted in the translation, marks the close of the chapter.]

**Superior and Inferior Subtle Bodies**

पूर्वोक्तप्रकीर्तनात्मकवेदान्तैविद्वादिशीर्षीत्वां परतोक्यात्रानिभिवाहं
मोक्षार्थपर्यन्तस्यायि मनोबुद्धिभ्रामणेऽस्मां ब्राह्मणपर्यन्तः
कर्मनिर्देशयथा-प्राणायामयथा-संयुक्तं जात्यते। तदुक्तम्—
“पञ्चप्राणमनोबुद्धिक्षेत्रेष्यसमष्टिविभाग्यं।
अपप्रकीर्तत्त्वोत्तरं सूक्ष्मांसं भोगसाधनवं।” द्वात्।
तथा द्विविशिष्टं—परमप्रक्ष्ण। परं हिरण्यगमभित्रशरीरम्
अपरमस्वादविलिङ्गशरीरम्। तथा हिरण्यगमभित्रशरीरं
महत्त्वम्, अस्मवादविलिङ्गशरीरं श्राहङ्गार इत्यार्थायते।

Out of the above-mentioned simple elements is made the subtle body (linga-śarīrā), consisting
of the manas and intellect as well as the five sense-organs, the five organs of action and the five vital forces. It helps (the soul’s) passage to other worlds and lasts till liberation.¹ So it has been said, “The subtle body, consisting of the five vital forces, the manas, the intellect, and the ten organs, is produced from the simple elements, and is the means of (the soul’s) experiencing the results of (its) actions” (Śaṅkarācārya’s Ātma-bodha, 13). It is of two kinds—superior and inferior. The superior one is the subtle body of Hiraṇyagarbha;² the inferior one is the subtle body of beings like us. Of these, the subtle body of Hiraṇyagarbha is called mahat-tattva (the cosmic intellect), while that of people like us is called the ego.

¹ On the realisation of one’s identity with Brahman.
² The being identified with the sum total of all minds. See also note 4 on p. 159.]

Origin of the Various Worlds and Bodies

पं तमोगुणयुक्तेऽः पञ्जीक्रतभूतेऽः भूम्यतारिक्षः
स्वर्गंहर्जनतपः सत्यात्मक्ष्योर्भेकोत्सतकस्य अतल-वित्तल-
स्तुतल-तडातल-रसातल-महातल-पातालाव्यस्य अधोलोकोऽसतकस्य
इश्वाणस्य जरायुजाण्डजस्वेद्योधिज्ञाश्चयंतु-
विन्धस्यलशरीराणांश्वचित्तः। तत्र जरायुजानि जरायुभयो
जातानि मनुष्यफ्रवादिशारीराणि। अण्डजान्यपेत्यो
जातानि पश्चिपत्सनगादिशारीराणि। स्वेद्यानि स्वेदाङ्गानि
Similarly, from the compounded elements as particularly possessed of the ingredient of inertia is produced the universe consisting of the seven upper worlds, viz., earth, sky, heaven, mahar, jana, tapas and satya, and the seven nether worlds, viz., atala, vitala, sutala, talātala, rasātala, mahātala and pātāla, as also the four kinds of gross bodies, viz., those born of the mother's womb, those born of eggs, those born of moisture and those that shoot from the earth. Of these, those born of the mother's womb are the bodies of men, cattle, etc.; those born of eggs are the bodies of birds, snakes, etc.; those born of moisture are the bodies of lice, mosquitoes, etc.; and those that shoot from the earth are plants etc. Plants are also bodies, since they are the seats in which the results of (past) sins are experienced.¹

¹ As we know from the scriptures. Cf. Manu Samhitā XII. 9.]
Now, in the origination of the five subtle elements etc.,¹ the subtle body² consisting of seventeen³ components, and the gross body⁴ of Hiranyagarbha, God is a direct agent; while in the origination of all the rest of the universe He is such through the medium of Hiranyagarbha and others.⁵ For the Śruti says, “Well, let Me enter these three deities⁶ as this individual self and manifest name and form” (Chā. VI. iii. 2).

¹ Refers to the five gross elements.
² Superior and inferior.
³ See p. 169.
⁴ The gross universe. Here Hiranyagarbha is identified with Virāj, who represents the sum total of all bodies.
⁵ Refers to the Prajāpatis, the progenitors of different beings.
⁶ Fire, water and earth.]

हिरण्यगर्भेऽनाम सूतित्रयाद्वेष्यः प्रथमो जीवः ।

“स वै शरीरी प्रथमः स वै पुरुष उच्यते ।
आविक्षिता स भूतानां ब्रह्माणे समवर्तेत् ॥”

“हिरण्यगर्भे समवर्तताप्रेषे,” इत्याविश्वुःः ।

पवं मृतभौतिकसुधिनिन्धिपिता ।

Hiranyagarbha is the first individual to be born, and is different from the Trinity (Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva). (Witness the Smṛti text), “He indeed is the first embodied being. He indeed is called a person (puruṣa). He is the first progenitor of beings. (That) Brahmā appeared first of all” (Śiv. V. i. viii, 22; Mār. XLV. 64; etc.).
As also the Śruti text, "Hiranyaagarbha appeared first of all," etc. (R. X. cxxi. 1; Vāj. S. XIII. 4; etc.).

Thus the projection of the elements and of things made with the elements has been described.

![Image](image)

FOUR KINDS OF COSMIC DISSOLUTION

Now cosmic dissolution is being described. It is the destruction of the world in general. It is of four kinds—diurnal, basic, occasional and absolute. Of these, diurnal (nitya) dissolution is the condition of profound sleep, for it represents the dissolution of all effects. Merit, demerit and past latent impressions then remain in their
causal form. Hence, for a person awaking from sleep, pleasure, pain, etc. are not incongruous; nor is recollection inexplicable. Though the mind is destroyed in profound sleep, yet the function of respiration etc., which depend on that, are not incongruous, because, although in reality there are no respiration etc., yet their knowledge is just a phantasy of another person,¹ like the knowledge of the body of a sleeping man.² It cannot be urged that in that case a sleeping man would be indistinguishable from a dead man; for there is this distinction that the subtle body of a sleeping man remains here itself in the form of latent impressions, while that of a dead man remains in another world.

¹ Viz., the on-looker.
² Who does not feel it himself, and therefore for him it does not exist.]

यद्रा अन्तःकरणस्य द्रै शक्ति—शानशक्तिः क्रियाशक्ति-
श्रेति। तत्र शानशक्तिविशिष्यान्तःकरणस्य हुष्ठतौ चिनाशः
न तु क्रियाशक्तिविशिष्यस्त्र इति प्राणायाब्वस्थानमविविद्धम्।
"यद्रा स्रुवः स्वप्नं न कश्चन पश्यति, अव्यासितम् प्राण पवेक्षधा
भवति, अथैनं बाक्स सर्वेऽन्मभि: सहास्येति," "सता सोम्य
तद्वा सम्प्न्नो भवति, स्वमपीतो भवति" ह्याविश्वतिष्ठक-
हुष्ठतौ मानम्।

Or¹ the mind has two functions—the function of knowledge and that of activity. Of these, the mind as possessed of the function of knowledge
is destroyed in profound sleep, but not the mind as possessed of the function of activity. Hence the continuity of the vital force etc. is not contradictory. Śruti texts like the following are proofs of the above condition of profound sleep: “When a person is asleep and sees no dreams, he verily becomes one with (Brahman associated with) this vital force. Then the organ of speech with all names merge in It” (Kau. IV. 19), “He is then united with Existence, my dear—is merged in his Self” (Chā. VI. viii. 1).

[¹ To explain it differently.]

"Brhadāṇa sah te sāraṁ sampratye pratisākṣere.
Parsyante kutatmaṁ pravishanīṁ parparmanvam."  
Drīt śrutiṁ.  
Pav bhūlokaśvaśaṁ: sah kāryabhradāṇi mudhyamanena tadvishīditamahāvī-terativāntiṁivaśaṁklokatadvastānti- 
śaśaśaśādharīnāṁ bhūtiśākānāṁ bhūtānaḥ prakṛtāṁ maṇḍāṅgāḥ,  
na tu brhadāṇi, bādṛupavānāśaṁśeṇa brhadāṃśāṃvatā, ātma- 
prakṛtī dūtyukte.

Basic dissolution is the destruction of all effects consequent on the destruction of Hiranya-
garbha. (To be explicit:) When Hiraṇyagarbha, who has already⁴ had realisation of Brahman, attains, on the termination of his fructifying (prārabdha)² work in the form of suzerainty of the universe, supreme liberation consisting in isolation characterised by disembodiedness, then those denizens of the world⁵ of Hiraṇyagarbha who⁴ have already realised Brahman, also attain with him isolation characterised by disembodiedness. Witness the Smṛti text, ‘‘When, at the end of the lifetime of Hiraṇyagarbha, cosmic dissolution comes, all those who have realised the Self enter the supreme state with him’’ (Kū. I. xii. 269). Thus, when Hiraṇyagarbha together with the inhabitants of his world is liberated, the universe ruled by him, with all its subsidiary worlds⁶ and the stationary⁶ or other bodies, made up of the elements, that are comprised in them, as also those elements themselves, is merged in prakṛti or the cosmic illusion (māyā), and not in Brahman—for only destruction in the form of nullification (bādha)⁷ abides in Brahman.⁸ Therefore it is called basic (prākṛta).⁹

¹ Before the dissolution of the universe.
² Lit., ‘commenced’: that is, that part of one’s past work which has already begun to bear fruit by causing the present body. It is exhausted through actual experience of pleasure and pain.
³ Satya-loka.
⁴ Not others who have gone there through the mechanical performance of certain rites.
⁵ The fourteen worlds enumerated on p. 170.
Such as those of plants.
See p. 63.
As its substratum. See p. 75.
Lit., ‘pertaining to prakṛti’ or the primal material cause of the universe.]

The dissolution of only three\textsuperscript{1} worlds consequent on the end of a day of Hiranyagarbha is occasional dissolution. A day of Hiranyagarbha is a period measured by four thousand eras (yuga),\textsuperscript{2} as we have it from such scriptural statements as, “A period of four thousand eras is called a day of Brahmā” (Brhannār. XXXII. 86). The period of dissolution also is as long as the day, for the duration of a night is equal to that of a day.

\textsuperscript{1} The earth, sky and heaven.
\textsuperscript{2} Equivalent to 4,320,000 human years.]

\begin{quote}
प्राकृतप्रलये नैमितिकप्रलये च पुराणवचनानि प्रमाणानि \।

“ह्यपराते त्वतिकान्ते ब्रह्मणः परमेश्वरः \।

तद्रा प्रकृतयः सत कल्याणः प्रलयाय हि \।

एष प्राकृतिको राजच प्रलयो यथा लीयते \।

इति वचनं प्राकृतप्रलये मानम् \।
\end{quote}
Regarding basic and occasional dissolution, the statements of the Purāṇas are proofs. The statement, "When two hundred thousand billion human years comprising the lifetime of Hiraṇyagarbha, the Parameśthin, have passed, the seven causes undergo dissolution." This, O King, is basic dissolution, when (every effect) is merged," is a proof of basic dissolution. And the statement, "That is called occasional dissolution when the Creator of the universe regularly withdraws the three worlds into himself, and lies on the serpent Ananta as his bed," is a proof of occasional dissolution.

[1 Entities that are causes only and never effects, viz., the cosmic mind, the ego and the five subtle elements.

2 In the primal prakṛti.

3 Brahmā or Hiraṇyagarbha.

4 On the approach of every night of his.

5 As identified with Viṣṇu.]
The fourth kind of dissolution is the liberation of all\(^1\) consequent on the realisation of Brahman. According to the doctrine of a single individual self,\(^2\) it is just simultaneous, but according to the doctrine of multiple individual selves,\(^3\) it is gradual. Witness Šruti texts like, ‘‘All are united.’’

Of the above kinds of dissolution the first three\(^4\) are all caused by the cessation\(^5\) of past work,\(^6\) while the fourth kind of dissolution is due to the dawning of knowledge, and it takes place together with the dissolution of nescience itself. This is its difference from the others.

\(^1\) In which there is a destruction of all created things together with their cause, nescience.

\(^2\) In which nescience, which is one, is the limiting adjunct of the self.

\(^3\) In which the different minds are the limiting adjuncts.

\(^4\) Viz., diurnal, basic and occasional.

\(^5\) Due to one’s profound sleep, the passing of Hiranyagarbha, and his falling asleep respectively.

\(^6\) Of individuals; but not the cessation of nescience.

**The Order of Cosmic Dissolution**

पवं चतुर्विधप्रलयो निरुपितः। तत्स्येवानीं कमो
निरूप्यते। भूतानां भौतिकानां न कारणाहयक्षेमेण लयं,
कारणहयसये कार्यात्माध्रुवमत्रतेरणाळस्थानाःूपस्येते,
किंतु स्वद्धिकमविपरीतक्षेमेन; तत्तत्कार्य्याणाश्चैतकका-
दृढःशस्यैव प्रयोजकतया उपादानाशस्यायोजकातिवात्।
Thus the four kinds of cosmic dissolution have been described. Now the order of such dissolution is being set forth. The dissolution of the elements and of things made out of them is not according to the order of the dissolution of their causes—for when the causes are dissolved, the effects cannot possibly stay without substratums—but it is in the inverse order to that of projection. For with regard to the destruction of particular effects, the destruction of the particular merits or demerits that caused them is the sole determining factor; hence the destruction of their material causes is not a necessary condition. Otherwise, even according to Nyāya, the colour, taste, etc., belonging to atoms of earth would
not be destroyed\(^1\) at cosmic dissolution. So dissolution takes place in the following manner: Earth is merged in water, water in fire, fire in air, air in the ether, the ether in the ego\(^2\) of the individual self, that in the ego of Hiraṇyagarbha, that, again, in nescience. So it has been said in the \textit{Viṣṇu Purāṇa},\(^3\) "Earth, which is the support of the world, O divine sage (Nārada), is merged in water, water is merged in fire, fire in air, and air in the ether; this in its turn is merged in the Undifferentiated,\(^4\) and the Undifferentiated, O Brahman, in the Supreme Self, which is devoid of parts."

The secondary characteristic\(^5\) of Brahman, the meaning of the word ‘That,’\(^6\) is that It is the cause of this kind of dissolution.

\[^1\] Since, according to Nyāya, atoms are eternal.
\[^2\] That is, the subtle body.
\[^3\] The passage does not seem to occur in the available editions of the book.
\[^4\] Nescience.
\[^5\] See p. 81.
\[^6\] In the dictum, "Thou art That.’’

\textbf{Why the Scriptures Deal with Creation and Meditations}

\begin{quote}

नन्तु \textit{वेदांतेवर्धाणि जगत्कारणत्वेन प्रतिपाद्याने सति सर्वप्रथं ब्रह्म स्थात, अन्यथा सृष्टिवाक्यानामप्रामाण्यप्रतिरिति चेत, न। नहि सृष्टिवाक्यानां स्थ्रे तत्त्वलेख, किन्तु अहंकारप्रभण्येव। तत्त्वतिपत्ति कर्थ सुखेस्ययोगं?

\end{quote}
इत्यादि—यदि सृष्टिमुपमयत्स्य व्यपारस्य निवेदयो ब्रह्माणि प्रतिपाद्येत ततः ब्रह्माणि प्रतिषिद्धस्य व्यपत्स्य, वायौ प्रतिषिद्धस्य रूपस्येव, ब्रह्माणोर्वभावस्यावश्चानस्तःर्वय्र प्रतिपादित्वं स्थान । ततः स्रोतिसाश्च ब्रह्मोपादेयत्वं निर्देशनां सति, उपादानं धिना कार्यस्यान्यश्र च निर्देशनां "नेति नेति" इत्यादिना ब्रह्माणि तस्यास्त्रोपादेयं व्यपत्स्य तुच्छत्वादग्रहे निर्देशनावित्यातिविज्ञममंखण्डं सचिवालैक्षरसं ब्रह्म सिद्धीतीति परम्परा रूपितामपि अवैतिशयो व्यपायं देखि इत्यादि ब्रह्माणि तात्त्विकम् । उपादानाप्रकरणपरिपठितस्गुरुणार्वाक्यामानाः उपादानाविच्छे पेक्षितगुणारोपामात्तत्वम्, न गुणपरम्पत् । निर्गुणप्रकरणपठितान् स्गुरुणार्वाक्यान्तु निषेधाक्याक्या- पेक्षितनिषेध्यसमर्पकत्वेन विनियोग देशि न किङ्किर्दिपि बाक्यमहिष्ठीयो ब्रह्मप्रतिपाद्येन विरुध्यते।

Objection: If Brahman is established by Vedāntic texts as the cause of the universe, then It must be inclusive of the universe, for otherwise the passages dealing with creation would cease to be authoritative.

Reply: No. The passages dealing with creation are not intended to establish creation, but only Brahman, the One without a second. It may be urged: But how does the delineation of creation help to establish It? In the following manner: If, without introducing creation,
the universe were negated in Brahman, then, like colour denied in air,\(^1\) the universe might be supposed to exist outside of Brahman, and hence Its indubitable solitariness would not be proved. Therefore, when one has got the idea from the texts delineating creation, that the universe is the outcome of Brahman, the contingency of an effect existing outside of its material cause is set at rest; and when the universe is known to be insubstantial through the denial of its existence even in Brahman by texts like, "Not this, not this" (\textit{Br. II. iii. 6}), Brahman is established as the indivisible, homogeneous\(^2\) Existence-Knowledge-Bliss Absolute, divested of the phantasm of the entire world of duality.\(^3\) Hence even the texts delineating creation are indirectly intended to establish only Brahman, the One without a second. The passages\(^4\) dealing with the conditioned Brahman that occur in the section relating to meditations, convey only the superimposition of attributes required by the injunctions,\(^5\) and not the actual presence of such attributes (in Brahman). While the texts\(^6\) dealing with the conditioned Brahman that occur in the section relating to the unconditioned Brahman, are of use as presenting the things to be negated that are required by the passages\(^7\) denying the world. Hence not a single text militates against the establishment\(^8\) of Brahman, the One without a second.

\(^1\) Colour does not exist in air, but it exists in earth, water and fire.
Devoid of all differences whatsoever, whether within Itself, or from things of the same class, or from things of other classes. 

Imagined by ignorant persons.

Such as, "This resplendent Being who is seen inside the sun," etc. (Châ. I. vi. 6). 

Such as, "One should meditate on the syllable Om, which is designated as udgītha" (Ibid. I. i. i).

Such as, "Brahman has only two forms," etc. (Br. II. iii. i).

Such as, "Now therefore the instruction is: Not this, not this," etc. (Ibid. II. iii. 6).

By texts like Châ. VI. ii. i. See p. 155.]

**Views about Consciousness as God and as the Individual Self**

Some say that the Consciousness called God (Iśvara), which is referred to by Its essential
and secondary characteristics in the above-mentioned manner, and is the significance of the word ‘That,’⁹ is a reflection of the cosmic illusion. Their idea is this: The Pure Consciousness that is common to both the individual self and God is the thing reflected, and the reflection of that very thing in the cosmic illusion, which is of the nature of nescience, is the Consciousness called God, while the reflection in different minds is the Consciousness called the individual self; for the Śruti says, “This individual self has for its limiting adjunct the mind, which is an effect (of nescience), while God has for His limiting adjunct nescience, which is the cause” (Maitreyī Uṭp., 61). According to this view, the difference between God and the individual self is like² that between the reflections of the sun in a tank and in the water of a saucer. Since the limiting adjunct consisting of nescience is all-pervading, God, who has that as His limiting adjunct, is also all-pervading, while the mind being limited, the individual self, which has that for its limiting adjunct, is also limited.

[¹ In the dictum, “Thou art That.”
² That is, it is only apparent, not real.]

पतन्येतेऽविधाक्तद्रोषा जीव इव परमेवर्देण्पि स्यूः,
उपासे: प्रतिभिषम्पक्षपातित्वात्, इत्यस्वरसात् बिम्बात्मकः-
भीज्वरचैतन्यमित्यपे । तेषामयमाशयः—पकमेव चैतन्यं
बिम्बत्वचाक्तान्तमीभवरचैतन्यमूर, प्रतिभिषभवत्वाक्तात् जीव-
Others, however, regard this view as unsatisfactory, because according to it the defects caused by nescience would be in God as well as in the individual self, for a limiting adjunct imparts its own character to the reflection. So they say that the Consciousness called God stands for the thing that is reflected. Their idea is this: One and the same Consciousness is the Consciousness called God when it is stamped with the character of the thing reflected, and is the Consciousness called the individual self when it is stamped with the character of a reflection. In this assumption of a thing reflected and its reflection, the limiting adjuncts are nescience according to the doctrine of a single individual self, but different minds according to that of multiple individual selves. The difference between the individual self and the Supreme Self is due to the limiting adjuncts—nescience and minds. The defects caused by a limiting adjunct, however, are in the individual self, which is a reflection, and not in God, who is the thing reflected, for a limiting adjunct tends to influence the reflection. According to this
view, the difference between God and the individual self is like that between the sun in the sky and its image reflected in water etc.

\[1\] Such as bondage, agency, the experience of pleasure and pain, etc.
\[2\] And not a reflection.
\[3\] So this is the advantage of the second view.\]

\textbf{Objection:} Since God, who is the Consciousness standing for the thing reflected, is absent from the place\(^1\) where the individual self exists, as a face resting on the neck is absent from the place occupied by the mirror, He would not be the Internal Controller of everything.

\textbf{Reply:} Not so. For when the sky with its clouds and stars is reflected in water etc., the all-pervading sky, which is the thing reflected, is also observed to have a connection with the place occupied by the water etc. Therefore, although the limited thing that is reflected\(^3\) may not be connected with the place\(^4\) where the reflection\(^4\) is, there is nothing to prevent the connection of the unlimited thing that is reflected, viz., (the un-}
conditioned) Brahman, with the place where the
reflection exists.  

[1 Viz., the mind.
2 Viz., the Consciousness called God (Iśvara).
3 The mind.
4 The individual self.
5 Which is at bottom identical with God, for His
limiting adjunct, nescience, is not real.
6 So the charge of limitation is refuted.]  

न च सूपहोनस्य ब्रह्मणो न यत्रितिसम्बवः, रूपवत
पव तथात्वदर्शनात्, इति वाच्यम्; नीरूपस्यापि रूपस्य
प्रतिचित्रमदर्शनात्। न च नीरूपस्य द्रव्यस्य प्रतिचित्रितमाभाव-
नियमः, आतमो द्रव्यत्वाभावस्य उक्तत्वात्।

“पक्षा बहुधा वेश दृश्यते जलश्रंगदृश्।”

“यथा हार्य ज्योतिरात्मा विवस्त्रा-
नपो मिश्रा बहुध्रैकोशनुगच्छन्।”

इत्याविवाक्येन ब्रह्मप्रतिचित्रितमाभावानामस्य वाहितत्वत्थाब।

तदेवं ‘तत्र’-पदायो निरूपितः।

It cannot be urged that Brahman, which is
colourless, cannot possibly be reflected, since only
coloured objects are observed to be so. Because
although colour is devoid of any colour, we
observe that it is reflected. Nor can it be urged
that a colourless substance is as a rule devoid of
any reflection; for we have already stated that
the self is not a substance. And any inference
regarding Brahman’s not possessing a reflection
is nullified by scriptural texts like the following: "It is seen as one and as manifold, like the moon reflected in water" (Amṛtabindu Up., 12), and "Just as this luminous mass, the sun, although one, becomes manifold by being reflected in different sheets of water," etc.³

So the meaning of the word 'That' has been ascertained in the foregoing manner.

¹ See note 2 on p. 84.
² On p. 84.
³ Refers to the rest of the verse: "Similarly the shining, birthless Self is made to appear as multiple in different bodies by limiting adjuncts."

THE MEANING OF ‘THOU’: WAKEFULNESS

इवार्दि ‘त्वम्’-पदार्थों निरुप्यते। पक्षजीववादेवविधा-
प्रतिबिम्बो जीवः, अनेकजीववादे तु अन्तःकरणप्रतितिविस्मः।
सं च जागृतस्वमस्तुपुलिपावस्मात्स्मिव। तथा जागृतशा
नाम इन्द्रियजन्यभावावस्था, अवस्थान्तरे इन्द्रियभावात्
नातिव्यासः। इन्द्रियजन्यभावान्तःकरणवृत्तिः, स्वरूप-
भावस्याविविधायात्।

Now the meaning of the word ‘thou’ is being ascertained. According to the doctrine of a single individual self, the latter is a reflection (of Brahman) in nescience, while according to the doctrine of multiple individual selves, it is a reflection (of Brahman) in different minds.¹ It is possessed of the three conditions of wakefulness, dream and profound sleep. Of these, the waking
condition is that in which knowledge is obtained through the organs. Since the organs do not function in the other (two) conditions, the definition does not unwarrantedly include them. This knowledge obtained through the organs is a state of the mind,\(^2\) for the knowledge that is the essence of the Self\(^3\) is without a beginning.\(^4\)

\[^{1}\text{Which accounts for the multiplicity of the selves.}\]
\[^{2}\text{And not Pure Consciousness, which is eternal.}\]
\[^{3}\text{That is, Pure Consciousness.}\]
\[^{4}\text{It is never caused.}\]

**TWO VIEWS ABOUT THE FUNCTION OF THE MENTAL STATE**

सा चाचान्तःकरणवृत्तिरावरणाविभवाभः इत्येकं मतम्।
तथावहिः अविच्छोपवहिः चैतन्यस्य जीवत्पक्षे घटाचिह्नान-
चैतन्यस्य जीवरपत्या जीवस्य सर्वदा घटाविभागन्त्रस्त्रोतौ
घटाचिह्नक्षेपः चैतन्यवर्ग्यायरस्यमत्रस्यं मूलचिह्नं
पद्वाच्चुम्यमुपण्यात्मकम्। यवं सति न सर्वदा घटाविभागन्त
प्रसः, अनावृत्वाचैतन्यसंवाध्यमत्रस्यैव भानप्रयोज्यकत्वात्।
तस्य चावरणस्य सदातनत्वे कर्षाचिह्निपि घटाविभागन्त
सतमस्य न स्याविभि
ततः तत: चक्ते, ततः जनकः न चैतन्यमात्रम्, ततः तस्य
तत्तत्त्विनिवर्तकत्वात्, नापि व्रृत्यापविं चैतन्यम्, परोक्षस्यथेपि
तत्तक्रियापत्तेति परोक्षस्यावृत्ततःश्रुतिशिष्यस्य, ततुपविं
चैतन्यस्य वा, आवरणमानकत्वम्, इति आवरणाभिभवाभः
ब्रजित्त्वते।
One school holds that this mental state serves to remove the covering (off Brahman). To explain: According to the view¹ that the individual self is the Consciousness of which nescience is a limiting adjunct, the Consciousness that is the substratum of a jar etc. not being different² from the individual self, the latter would have a constant cognition of the jar etc.³ To preclude this, one must admit a nescience dependent on the primal nescience, signified by the word 'condition,'⁴ which covers the Consciousness limited by the jar etc. In that case there would not be a constant cognition of a jar etc., for only a relation to the Consciousness that is not covered can lead to cognition. Now, if that covering be permanent, there would never be a cognition of the jar. So its break must be admitted. But the cause of that break can neither be Pure Consciousness—for what brings the covering to light⁵ cannot be its remover—nor Consciousness that has a mental state⁶ for its limiting adjunct, for even in a case of mediate⁷ knowledge that covering would be removed.⁸ Hence a particular state not classed⁹ under mediate knowledge, or¹⁰ the Consciousness having that state for its limiting adjunct must be the breaker of the covering.¹¹ So the state is described as serving to remove the covering.

¹ See the preceding paragraph.
² See p. 16.
³ Which is contrary to fact.
⁴ That is, a modification of that nescience.
⁵ As the universal revealer.
6 That is, an unqualified mental state.
7 That is, non-perceptual cognition, such as inferential knowledge and recollection.
8 For there also the mental state is present.
9 This is the specification of the mental state in question.
10 If the previous alternative is rejected on the ground that the state, being insentient, cannot remove the covering.
11 So only in perception, where the mental state is in contact with an object, there is a removal of the covering, and not in inference, recollection, etc.]

सम्बन्धायां बृत्तिरित्यपरं मलम्। तदाविद्धोपाधिकोपरिच्छिले जीवः। स च घटाविदि"प्रदेशो विद्यमानोपि घटाविदिकारापरोक्षबृत्तिरित्यपरं न घटाविदिकमवभास्यति, घटाविदिना समं सम्बन्धाभावात्, तदावाकारवृत्तिविद्यायं तु भास्यति, तदा सम्बन्धसत्वात्।

Another school holds that the state serves to establish a connection.¹ According to this view, the individual self, which has nescience for its limiting adjunct, is (really) unlimited. Although it is present at the place occupied by a jar etc., it does not reveal them when there is an absence of a perceptual mental state of the form of the jar etc., for then it is not connected with the latter; but it does reveal them when there is a mental state of the form of those things, for then there is the connection.

[¹ Between Consciousness and objects.]
Objection: The individual self, which has nescience for its limiting adjunct and is unlimited, is naturally connected with everything. So it is
absurd to speak of it as having no connection when there is an absence of a mental state; and if in view of its non-attachment it is spoken of as having no connection, then even after the appearance of the mental state there would not be any connection.

Reply: The answer is, we do not deny a general connection of the individual self with a jar etc. when there is an absence of a mental state.

Objection: What, then?

Reply: But we deny that particular connection which leads to the cognition of the jar etc. That particular connection is a contingent relation of revealed and revealer between objects and the Consciousness associated with the individual self, which is caused by mental states of the form of those objects. For instance, the luminous mind, being a transparent substance, can by itself manifest the Consciousness associated with the individual self, but a jar etc. cannot do so, because they are opaque substances. When, however, they are connected with a mental state of the same form as they, their inertness is overcome by it; and being possessed of a capacity to manifest Consciousness, imparted by the mental state, they manifest that Consciousness after the appearance of the mental state. So it has been stated in the Vivaraṇa, "For the mind imparts to a jar etc. connected with it, as well as to itself, the capacity to manifest Consciousness" (p. 70, l. 13, adapted). It is also observed that even an opaque substance receives reflections when it is connected.
with a transparent substance; as, a wall, for instance, reflects the face etc. when it is in con-
tact with water and the like. The property of manifestation possessed by a jar etc. is its capacity
of catching a reflection of Consciousness, while the property of being manifested that is possessed
by Consciousness is Its being reflected in them.

[¹ As set forth in Br. IV. iii. 15 and other Srutis.
² Without the aid of any other thing.
³ That is, catch the reflection of.]

पर्यविधाभिव्यञ्जकत्वसिद्धगर्भमेव वृत्तेयपरोक्षस्यते
बहिनिगमनाभूतिकारः। परोक्षस्यते तु वहयादेव्यस्तिसंसर्गाभवेन
चैतन्याभिव्यञ्जकत्व नापरोक्षत्वम्। पतन्त्यते
च भिषयाणामपरोक्षत्वं चैतन्याभिव्यञ्जकत्वमिति दृष्ट्यम्।
एवं जीवस्यापरिचित्रभवेपि वृत्ते: सम्बन्धार्थत्वं
निरूपितम्।

It is for establishing such property of mani-
festation that in cases of perception the mental
state is admitted to issue outside.¹ But in cases
of mediate knowledge,² since fire etc. have no
connection with the mental state, they cannot
manifest Consciousness, and hence they are not
immediately known. It should also be noted
that according to this view, the perceptibility of
objects is their capacity to manifest Conscious-
ness. Thus, even if the individual self be un-
limited, it has been demonstrated how the mental
state serves to establish a connection.
Now it is being shown how, even if the individual self be limited, the mental state serves to establish a connection. For instance, the individual self has the mind for its limiting adjunct. It cannot be the material cause of a jar etc., for it has no connection\(^1\) with the place occupied by them.\(^2\) But it is Brahman which is the material cause of the jar etc., for with the cosmic illusion as Its limiting adjunct, It is connected with all jars etc. For this very reason Brahman is omniscient. So, it being impossible for the individual self to reveal\(^3\) a jar etc. except through its identity with the Consciousness that is Brahman, which is their substratum, mental states of the form of the jar etc. are admitted in order to establish that identity with the Consciousness that is Brahman, which is their substratum, with a view to making the revelation possible.
[\^1 Being limited.
\^2 Whereas the cause and effect must co-exist.
\^3 Through perception.]

**Objection**: How can an identity between the Consciousness associated with the subject and that associated with the object be effected even by a mental state, since their limiting adjuncts, viz., the mind and a jar etc., being different, the two Consciousnesses circumscribed by them cannot be identical?

**Reply**: Not so, for by the admission of the mental state reaching places outside the body it has already been mentioned that that state, the mind and the object occupy the same place, and hence the things that have them for their limiting adjuncts are not different from each other.\(^1\) Thus the application of the mental state to a case of perception has been demonstrated according to alternative views.\(^2\)

[^1 See p. 16.
^2 About the individual self being unlimited or limited.]
The dream condition¹ is that in which objects are immediately cognised by a mental state that is not caused by the organs.² The clause, “That is not caused by the organs,” is for excluding the waking condition.³ In order to guard against the definition unwarrantedly including profound sleep, which has a state of nescience, the word ‘mental’ has been inserted. Profound sleep is that condition in which a state of nescience has nescience for its object.⁴ Since the state resembling⁵ nescience in the waking condition and dream is a mental state, the definition does not unwarrantedly include them. Regarding this⁶ some say that death and swoon are other conditions. Others, however, maintain that they are included in profound sleep. Now as their in-
clusion in the three conditions or exclusion from them has no bearing on the ascertainment of the meaning of the word ‘thou,’ no attempt is being made to deal with it.

¹ Of the individual self.
² But by an adventitious defect, viz., sleep.
³ In which objects are cognised with the help of the organs. See p. 189.
⁴ A man waking from sleep says, ‘I slept happily, I knew nothing.’ This recollection of the natural bliss of the self as also ignorance is a proof that in profound sleep nescience only functions, not the mind; and the object of that immediate modification of nescience is also nescience.
⁵ For example, in the statement, ‘I do not know a jar.’ Here the object of the unawareness is not nescience.
⁶ Classification of the conditions.]

तस्य मायोपाभ्येक्षया पक्त्वम्, अन्तःकरणोपाभ्येक्षया
च नानात्यं व्यवहिते। पतेन जीवस्याणुत्वं प्रत्युत्तमः,
“बुद्धिपुरुषानात्मगुणेन चैव
ह्याराग्रमात्रो ह्यब्रोधपि हृद्य।”
इत्यादै जीवस्य ‘बुद्धि’-शब्दवाच्यान्तःकरणपरिणामो-पाधिकस्य परमाणुत्वाध्यवणात्।

The individual self¹ is treated as one in respect of its limiting adjunct, nescience,² and manifold in respect of its limiting adjuncts, the different minds. By this³ the atomicity⁴ of the individual self is refuted, for in texts like, ‘‘Through the
attribute of the intellect it is seen to have the size of the point of an awl, and by its own attribute, vaster than anything else, (Śv. 7), the Śruti speaks of the individual self as infinitesimal, because that modification of the mind which is signified by the word ‘intellect,’ is its limiting adjunct."

\[1 Which is the meaning of the word ‘thou.’

2 Which is one.

3 That is, as the manifoldness is but apparent, being merely due to limiting adjuncts.

4 Held by Rāmānujācārya and others.

5 That is, subtlety.

6 Viz., omnipresence.

7 So the word ‘infinitesimal’ here means ‘subtle,’ as the mind is. The last line of the text has got several readings, one of which is परिमाणोपाधिकारमाणुत्वश्रवणात, meaning, “Because the size of the mind” etc. In another reading the end portion is परिमाणश्रवणात, in which case the sentence would mean: “The Śruti speaks of the individual self as being of a size that has for its limiting adjunct the size of the mind, signified by the word ‘intellect.’”

स च जीवः स्वर्यंप्रकाशः, स्वप्रावस्थामधिपक्ष्य “अत्यन्त पुरुषः स्त्रयं ज्योतिः” इति श्रुते: । अनुभवस्य पद्यः, “प्रभानधन पव” इत्यदिश्रुते: । ‘अनुभवामि’ इति कथवहारस्तु वृत्ति-प्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यमात्राय उपपच्चते ।

पवं ‘त्यम्’-पदार्थों निरूपितः: ।

That individual self is self-effulgent, for regarding its dream condition the Śruti says, “In
this state the man himself becomes the light’’ (Bṛ. IV. iii. 9). And it is Knowledge itself,\footnote{That is, Knowledge Absolute.} for the Śruti says, ‘‘It is Pure Intelligence alone’’ (Bṛ. IV. v. 13). As for the use of the expression, ‘‘I know,’’ it is explicable by a reference to the Consciousness reflected in the mental state. Thus the meaning of the word ‘‘thou’’ has been ascertained.

\[1\text{That is, Knowledge Absolute.}\]

**The Identity of the Meanings of ‘That’ and ‘Thou’**

अधुना ‘तत्त-त्वम’-पदार्थयोरैवं महावाक्यप्रतिपाद-मभिधीयते । ननु “नाहमीश्वर:” इत्याविप्रत्यक्षेण, किष्टिज्-श्चतवसर्वस्वत्वादिविविरुपस्मानंश्चतवातिविलिङ्गे, “द्रा सुप्” इत्याविश्रुत्या, 

“द्वारायमि पुरुषो लोके क्षरश्लाघर पव च । 
क्षरं सवर्णः भूतानि कुटस्थोक्षरं उच्चयते॥”

इत्याविश्रुत्या च जीवपरमेवश्वास्वागतवेन “तत्त्वस्य”-विवाक्षयम् “आदित्यो शूपः,” “यजमानः प्रस्तरः” इत्यावि- 
वाक्षयबुधणवरितार्थमेव, दृति चेतु, न। भेवप्रत्यक्षस्य 
सम्भावितकरणदोषस्यासम्भावितकरणोवेद्जन्यक्षानेन वाय- 
मानत्वात। अनुष्ठा चन्द्रगताधिकपरिमाणग्राहिज्योति:-

शाश्वस्य चन्द्रप्रादेशग्राहिप्रत्यक्षेण बाधयते। पाकरने घटे 
“रक्तोन्यम्, न शयमः” दृतिवचं “सविशेषण हि” दृति
Now the identity of the meanings of the words 'That' and 'thou,' which is the signification of the great dictum,\(^1\) is being set forth.

**Objection:** Since difference between the individual self and Brahman is known from such perception as, "I am not God," from (the inference based on) the sign\(^2\) of the self possessing\(^3\) contradictory attributes such as limited knowledge and omniscience, from the Śruti texts, "Two birds of beautiful wings" etc. (Ṛ. I. clxiv. \(\Pi\); Mu. III. i. 1; Śv. IV. 6),\(^4\) and from such Smṛti texts as, "In the world there are these two entities (puruṣa)—the mutable and the Immutable; the mutable one comprises all beings,\(^5\) and the changeless (Brahman) is called the Immutable" (G. XV. 16)—dictums like, "Thou art That" (Chā. VI. viii. 7 ff), convey only a figurative meaning,\(^6\) like sentences such as, "The sacrificial post is the sun" (Tai. Br. II. i. v. 2), and "The sheaf of kuśa\(^7\) grass is the sacrificer" (Ibid. III. iii. ix. 2, 3).

**Reply:** No, for the perception of difference, which is likely to be attended with the defects of its instruments,\(^8\) is nullified by the knowledge arising from the Vedas, in which there is no possibility of any defect.\(^9\) Otherwise,\(^10\) astron-
omy, which observes the great size of the moon, would be nullified by perception, which notices it to be no bigger than a span. Besides, like the perception of a jar baked red that it is red, not dark,\(^1\) the perception that cognises a difference between the individual self and God concerns the difference between their qualifying attributes only,\(^2\) on the principle, "In the case of a qualified entity," etc.\(^3\) Hence neither is inference a proof on the matter, for it contradicts scriptural evidence, as is the case with the inference about Mount Meru being made of stone.\(^4\)

\(^1\) "Thou art That."
\(^2\) The reason or ground for inference.
\(^3\) If the dictum, "Thou art That," were taken literally.

\(^4\) The whole verse runs thus: "Two birds of beautiful wings (the self and Brahman), which are friends and constant companions, perch on the same tree (the body). One of these (the self) eats sweet fruits (enjoys heaven etc.), and the other merely looks on, without eating." Here the self and Brahman are clearly differentiated.

\(^5\) The bodies of all beings from Hiranyagarbha downwards. These are called 'beings,' as the ignorant identify themselves with their bodies.

\(^6\) And not identity.

\(^7\) *Poa cynosuroides*.

\(^8\) The organs such as the eyes.

\(^9\) Because they are not of human origin.

\(^10\) If perception be given precedence over scriptural testimony simply because it is the first of the means of knowledge.

\(^11\) Where the difference is not in the thing, but in its attributes only.
And not the underlying substance, viz., Pure Consciousness, which is identical.

The whole passage reads thus: “In the case of a qualified entity, if the injunction or prohibition cannot refer to the substantive, then it refers to the qualifying attributes.” For example, when a robber turns a saint, we may say, “The robber is dead, the saint is born.” Here the difference is not with regard to the identity of the person, but only with regard to his attributes. Similarly, all the difference between the individual self and God is in respect of limited knowledge and omniscience, etc. Divested of the qualifying attributes, the two are identical.

While according to the scriptures it is made of gold. In the face of that, it cannot be inferred to be made of stone simply on the ground of its being a mountain. In the unseen realm the primacy goes to the scriptures.]

नाप्यागमान्तरबिरोथः। तत्परात्तपयावाराक्ष्योस्तप्यवाचक्ष्ययम बलवत्वेन लोकसिद्धभेदानुचारिः “श्वसुपण्यस्ति- बाक्षापेश्या उपक्रमसंहारायचयगतात्त्वत्त्वात्तत्तत्पर्यविशिष्टस्य “तत्वमस्या”विवाचक्ष्यस्य प्रबलत्वात्। न च जीवपरीक्ष्ये विरुद्धप्राच्यत्वानुपलितः, शीतलयेच जलस्पौपाधिकौष्ठ्य-श्रायत्वत्व भवतो निर्गुणयेच जीवस्यान्त्करणाचष्ट-पाथिककर्तृत्वाच्यत्वप्रतिभासौरपपत्तः। यदि च जला- द्राकौष्ठ्यमारोपितम्, तदा प्रक्षतेपि तत्त्वम्। न च सिद्धान्ते कर्तृत्वस्य क्षिप्तिभाविभावारोप्रमाहितसंस्काराभावे कथमारोपः, इति बाच्यम्, लाखस्वरोष्यविषयकसंस्कार-
Nor is there any conflict with other scriptural texts, for, between a sentence inculcating an identity of the individual self with Brahman and one not doing so, the former is stronger, and hence dictums like, "Thou art That" (Chā. VI. viii. 7 ff), which from their introduction, conclusion, etc., are known to convey non-duality, are stronger than texts such as, "Two birds of beautiful wings," etc., which merely repeat the difference that is already accepted in the world. It cannot be urged that if the individual self be identical with Brahman, its possession of contradictory attributes cannot be explained; for just as (naturally) cold water may (temporarily) possess heat belonging to its limiting adjunct, similarly, we can understand that the individual self, which is naturally devoid of attributes, may appear to possess agency etc. owing to its limiting adjuncts, such as the mind. If it is said that the heat is superimposed on the water etc., then it is equally the case with the matter at issue. It cannot be questioned how, in the absence of any latent impression left by a valid knowledge of the thing superimposed, there can ever be a superimposition, since according to Vedānta, there is no (real) agency anywhere. Because, on grounds of simplicity, that impression can be a cause as a latent impression regarding the thing superimposed. Nor can it be urged: How to explain
the first superimposition? For the stream of superimpositions regarding agency etc. has no beginning.⁹

[¹ The six tests for determining the purport of a scriptural passage, viz., introduction, conclusion, repetition (of the topic at intervals), originality (of the teaching), result (achieved from it), eulogy, and demonstration (through reasoning etc.). For instance, the topic of chapter VI of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, viz., the unity of Brahman, is introduced in section ii and concluded in the last section. It is repeated nine times in the last paragraphs of sections vii—xvi. The unity of Brahman is known only from the Upaniṣads and from no other source (originality). It results in liberation. It is eulogised in the third paragraph of section ii as bringing within one’s reach things that have not even been thought of. The topic has been demonstrated in section i. 4-6 by three illustrations showing that effects are not different from their material causes.

³ Viz., the next element fire, which is mixed up with it.
⁴ Agency.
⁵ Either in the self or in the mind.
⁶ Of the superimposition.
⁷ Whether the previous knowledge that leaves it is valid or not.
⁸ That is, instead of saying that the latent impression of a valid knowledge of agency causes the superimposition, it is simpler to say that any latent impression of it, whether valid or invalid, is the cause.
⁹ Like the universe of which they are a part, superimpositions are but continually repeating themselves from cycle to cycle.]
Here,¹ although the qualified entities² which are the primary meanings of the words ‘thou’ and ‘That’ cannot be identified, yet the identity of their implied meaning,³ the underlying essence,⁴ is conclusively proved.⁵ Hence sentences like, ‘‘Thou art That,’’ which inculcate that identity, convey a simple notion of identity,⁶ like sentences such as, ‘‘This is he.’’ It is not that only sentences expressing action have validity,⁷ for in the case of sentences like, ‘‘Caitra, a son has been born to you,’’ the meanings of the words are apprehended even with regard to statements of fact.⁸

¹ In the great dictum, ‘‘Thou art That.’’
² Viz., the individual self and God, which are possessed of contradictory attributes.
³ This is stated in accordance with the traditional view. See p. 102. According to the author himself there is no implication in such cases. See p. 103.
⁴ Viz., Pure Consciousness.
⁵ In this discussion.
⁶ See p. 38.
⁷ As the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsakas maintains.
⁸ Which require no activity to bring them about.]
Thus the identity of the individual self and Brahman, which is taught by the Śrutis, Smṛtis, histories and Purāṇas, and is in consonance with the findings of all means of knowledge, is the subject-matter of the Vedānta philosophy.
CHAPTER VIII

THE AIM OF VEDÂNTA

THE AIMS OF LIFE: RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE BLISS

Now the aim of Vedânta is being described. That which being known is desired to belong to oneself is called an aim. It is of two kinds—primary and secondary. Of these, pleasure and the absence of pain are primary aims, and the means to either of them is the secondary aim. Pleasure is also of two kinds—relative and absolute. Of these, relative pleasure is a particular manifestation of a modicum of bliss caused by differences in the mental state generated by a contact with objects. Witness such Śruti texts
as, "Other beings live on a particle of this very bliss" (Br. IV. iii. 32). Absolute bliss is Brahman alone. For we have such Śruti texts as, "He knew that Bliss was Brahman" (Tāi. III. 6), and "Brahman, which is Knowledge and Bliss" (Br. III. ix. xxviii. 7).

The Nature of Liberation

आनन्दात्मकब्रह्मावाचार्य भोज्य, शोकनिवृत्तिश्च, "ब्रह्म बेद्र ब्रह्मव भवति," "तरं शोकमात्मवित्" हत्यादि-
श्रुते। न तु लोकान्तरावासिः, तत्जन्यवैषयिकानन्दो वा 
मोक्षः, तस्य क्तकत्वानानित्यत्वे मुक्तस्य पुनरारुच्यापिेः।

The attainment of Brahman, which is Bliss, as also the cessation of pain is liberation; for we have Śruti texts like, "(He who knows that Supreme) Brahman becomes Brahman Itself" (Mu. III. ii. 9), and "The knower of the Self transcends grief" (Chā. VII. i. 3). Going to another world, or the joy derived from objects consequent on that, is not liberation, for, being a product, it is ephemeral, and this would lead to a return of the liberated.

नन्तु त्वन्मतेप्रयाणान्दावातिेर्यन्निजुस्मेष्य सादित्वे तुल्यो 
दोषः, अनाविदत्वे मोक्षमुदिष्य श्रवणादृश्य प्रबृत्तिमुपपतितिः 
चेतु, न, सिद्धवै ब्रह्मचतुर्वस्तु मोक्षस्यासिद्धत्वभ्रमेन 
तत्साधने प्रबृत्तिमुपपस्वे। अनयन्निवृत्तिप्राप्तिचामभूतयुग- 
स्वस्कुर्यत्सिद्धैव। लोकेःपि प्रातिप्रातिपरीत्यप्रियाः।
Objection: Even according to your view, if the attainment of bliss and the cessation of troubles have a beginning, then it is open to the same defect,¹ and if it is without a beginning, then there cannot be any inclination² for hearing etc.³ for the purpose of liberation.

Reply: Not so, for although liberation, which is identical with Brahman, is already achieved, yet, through a mistaken notion about its not being achieved, one can feel inclined to attain it. And the cessation of troubles, since it is identical with its substratum,⁴ Brahman, is also a thing already achieved. In the world, too, the attainment of what is already attained and the avoidance of what is already avoided, are patent aims. For instance, with regard to gold that is in one’s hand but has been forgotten, the instruction of a trustworthy person saying, “The gold is in your hand,” makes one attain it as if it were not already attained. Or when one has mistaken a garland twining round one’s leg for a snake, the words of a trustworthy person saying, “This
is not a snake,” make one get rid of the snake that was already got rid of. Similarly, the attainment of bliss, although it is already attained, and the cessation of troubles, although they are already got rid of, is liberation, and it is the aim of Vedānta.

[^1 That is, being a product, it will cause the liberated to return.
[^2 Since the result is already achieved.
[^3 Refers to reflection and meditation.
[^4 Everything in the universe, whether positive or negative, is a superimposition on Brahman, and hence has no independent existence of its own.]

That liberation is achieved only through knowledge, for the Śruti says, “Knowing Him alone one transcends death; there is no other way to follow” (Śv. III. 8, VI. r5), and, besides, it is the rule that the cessation of ignorance takes place only through knowledge. That knowledge has for its object the identity of the individual self with Brahman, for the Śruti says, “You have attained fearlessness, O Janaka” (Br. IV. ii. 4), and “It knew Itself as: I am Brahman”
(Ibid. I. iv. 10), and there is the statement of the Br̥hannāradiya Purāṇa, "The means to liberation is the knowledge arising from dictums like: Thou art That" (XXXIII. 66).

**Two Views about Immediate Knowledge**

तत्स श्लामपरोक्षः, परोक्षतत्वे परोक्षभ्रमणिवर्तकत्वानुपलवे। तत्सार्यावरोऽस्मि "तत्स्मया"दिवाशिष्यादिति केवलूः, मनननिविय्यासनसंस्कृतान्तःकरणादेवेवत्यपे।

That knowledge, again, is immediate, for were it mediate, it would not be calculated to remove error, which is immediate. According to some,¹ that immediate knowledge arises from dictums like, "Thou art That" (Chā. VI. viii. 7 ff). According to others,² it arises from the mind itself, purified by reflection and meditation.

¹The reference is to the author of the Vivaraṇa.
²The reference is to Vācaspati Miśra.]

तत्र पूर्वाचार्यांमायमाशयः—संविवारोक्षं न करण-विशेषोपत्तिनिनिबन्धनम्, किन्तु प्रमेयविशेषनिनिबन्धनम् इत्युप-पावितम्। तथाच ब्रह्म: प्रमादुस्वाभिविश्रतया तत्रोचरं शब्दजन्यमणी श्लामपरोक्षम्। अत पव प्रत्येकांडिकारणे प्रत्येकं प्रति "प्राणोदस्सिम प्रक्षक्तमा, तं मामात्युर्मृतमुपारस्तय" इति इत्यः "प्राणोदस्सिस्म प्रक्षक्तमा, तं मामात्युर्मृतमुपारस्तय" इति इत्यः "प्राणोदस्सिस्म प्रक्षक्तमा, तं मामात्युर्मृतमुपारस्तय" इति इत्यः "प्राणोदस्सिस्म प्रक्षक्तमा, तं मामात्युर्मृतमुपारस्तय" इति इत्यः "प्राणोदस्सिस्म प्रक्षक्तमा, तं मामात्युर्मृतमुपारस्तय" इति इत्यः "प्राणोदस्सिस्म प्रक्षक्तमा, तं मामात्युर्मृतमुपारस्तय"
Of these, the teachers of the former school opine as follows: The immediacy of cognition, as has been proved,\(^1\) is due not to its originating through a particular instrument, but to a particular object of knowledge.\(^2\) So Brahman, not being different\(^3\) from the individual self or the subject, the knowledge of It, although produced by words,\(^4\) is immediate. Hence under the topic relating to Pratardana,\(^5\) after it has been decided\(^6\) that the word Prāṇa, in the sentence, "I am Prāṇa, the intelligent Self; meditate on Me as that and as longevity and immortality’’ (Kau. III. 2), spoken by Indra to Pratardana, refers to Brahman, an objection is raised’ as to how the use of a form of the word ‘I’ in "Meditate on Me’’ is justified. And in the aphorism, "But the instruction is from the scriptural point of view, as in the case of Vāmadeva,”\(^8\) which sets about to answer the objection, it is stated that the phrase ‘scriptural point of view’ means: an attitude that is recommended by the scriptures, that is, the knowledge, ‘I am Brahman,” produced by sentences like, ‘Thou art That.”

\(^1\) On pp. 21 and 36.
\(^2\) Whether a cognition is immediate or mediate depends not on the organ or mind, but on the object.
3 That is, since the individual self is identical with Brahman.
4 That is, the verbal comprehension of Brahman.
6 Ibid., aphorism 28.
7 Ibid., aphorism 29. Because apparently the 'me' refers to Indra, whereas meditation on Brahman alone can be of the highest good to man. The allusion is this: Pratardana, the son of Divodasa, went to Indra's heaven by dint of his valour in battle. Indra offered him a boon and was requested by him to choose for him one that would be most beneficial to men. Thereupon Indra spoke those words.
8 Ibid., aphorism 30. Vamadeva, realising his identity with Brahman, said, "I was the sun, as also Manu" (Br. I. iv. 10). Here also Indra spoke with that feeling of identity with Brahman.

अन्येषां त्वेवमाश्च—करणविशेषनिविषयनमेव ब्रह्मानां प्रत्यक्षत्वम्, न विषयविशेषनिविषयनमेव, पक्षमश्रेष्ठ सूक्षम-वस्तुनि पदुकरणापदुकरणयों प्रत्यक्षत्वाप्रत्यक्षत्वव्यवहार-वर्णनात्। तथाच सशिक्षाद्विन्हेन इन्द्रियज्ञात्वेव प्रयोजकतथा न शब्दज्ञात्वानस्त्रापरोक्षत्वम्। ब्रह्म-साक्षात्कारेिपि मननविद्विभासनसंस्कृतं मन एव करणम्, "मनसैवानुदश्यवम्" इत्यादिश्रुतेः। मनोपगमंत्वाभित्वथा-संस्कृतमनोविशिष्य। न चैवं ब्रह्मण भौपनिषद्वानुपपत्तिः, असंदुक्कमसो वेदज्ञानानस्ताद्वेदेः प्रवृत्ततथा वेदोप-जीवितवात्; वेदान्तजीविमानान्तराज्यत्वस्यैव वेदगम्यत्व-
The other school, however, maintains thus: The perceptuality of cognitions depends only on particular instruments, and not on particular objects; for we observe that with regard to one and the same subtle object, the expression 'perceptible' or 'imperceptible' is used by a person who has a strong or a weak instrument.   

Hence, since the criterion of the immediacy of cognition is only its being caused by an organ, the knowledge produced by words is not immediate. With regard to the realisation of Brahman also, only the mind purified by reflection and meditation is the instrument, for we have Šruti texts like, "Through the mind alone It is to be realised." And the Šruti texts that speak of Brahman as being inaccessible to the mind, refer to a mind that is not purified. And this does not militate against the fact that Brahman is to be known only from the Upaniśads, for the mind as described by us proceeds on its inquiry only after it has the knowledge inculcated by the Vedas, and hence it depends on them. What contradicts the fact of Brahman's being known only through the Vedas is the fact of Its being known through other means of knowledge.
that do not depend on the Vedas. The aphorism relating to the scriptural point of view, too, is justified, because the mental perception of Brahman is based on (knowledge derived from) the scriptures. So it has been said, "The valid knowledge that arises from meditation on the meaning of the (Vedāntic) scriptures is regarded as the scriptural point of view. We know this from the aphorism, 'Besides during adoration.' But Vācaspati alone knows it well.'"

[1] A man with keen eyes notices things that a man with weak eyes does not. The former would call them visible, and the latter, invisible.

2 That is, since a cognition is immediate only when it arises through an organ.

3 Br. IV. iv. 19. The prefix anu in the verb anudraśātvayam, translated here simply as 'realised,' suggests that the realisation should be after the instruction of the teacher.

4 Such as, "That which one cannot think of through the mind" (Kena Up. I. 6), and "That from which words come back together with the mind without attaining It" (Tai. III. 9).


6 Br. S. III. ii. 24. The whole aphorism runs thus: "Besides (yogins see It) during adoration, (as we know) from perception (the Śruti) and inference (Smṛti)."

7 Vedānta-kalpataru. This is a gloss by Amalānanda Svāmin on Vācaspati Miṣra's Bhāmaṭī. See note 3 on p. 1.]
THE MEANS TO REALISATION: THEIR MUTUAL RELATION

तस्य शान्त पापक्षयात्, स च कर्मानुप्राणादिति परमपर्या कर्मणां विनियोगः। अतः प्रथम "तत्मेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविधिषयिति यक्षेन द्वानेन तपसासनाज्ञकेन" इत्याविश्वासितः। चेताये कर्मांचि पवने ततो शान्त प्रवर्तते" इत्याविस्मृतितिष्ठ सज्ज्वच्छते।

That knowledge comes from the exhaustion of demerits, and that, again, from the performance of rites. Hence rites are indirectly of use. Therefore Śruti texts like, "The Brāhmaṇas seek to know It through the study of the Vedas, sacrifices, charity, and austerity consisting in a dispassionate enjoyment of sense-objects" (Br. IV. iv. 22), and Smṛti texts such as, "When the taint (of the mind) has been burnt by rites, knowledge manifests itself," are appropriate.

पवं अवण्मनननिदिघ्यासनान्यथिः शान्तसाधनानि, मैत्रेयीव्राह्मणे "आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्ट्वं:" इति कर्णमनूप तत्साधनत्वेन "श्रौवत्यो मन्तव्यो निदिघ्यासितत्वं:" इति अवण्मनननिदिघ्याससनानि विधानात्। अवण्मन नाम वेदान्तानामार्द्वितीये ब्राह्मणे तात्पर्यवधारणानुकूल्य मानसी श्रीया। मननं नाम श्रीवार्द्धारितेवर्ये मार्यात्सचिरोधशक्तियां तत्सिद्धार्थमुक्तत्कात्मकशानजनको मानसो व्यापरः। निदिघ्यासनं नाम अनाविदुर्वासनया विपयेवात्मयामाणस्य
Similarly hearing, reflection and meditation also are means to knowledge, since in the section\(^1\) relating to Maitreyī, for the purpose of realisation—introduced in the passage, "'The Self indeed, my dear (Maitreyī), should be realised'" (\(Br\). II. iv. 5; IV. v. 6)—hearing, reflection and meditation are enjoined as means to that in the words, "'Is to be heard of, reflected on, and meditated upon'" (\(Ibid\.). Hearing is a mental activity leading to the conviction that the Vedāntic texts inculcate only Brahman, the One without a second. Reflection is a mental operation producing ratiocinative knowledge that leads to the refutation of any possible contradiction from other sources\(^2\) of knowledge regarding the meaning established by scriptural testimony.\(^3\) Meditation is a mental operation helping to fix the mind on the Self by withdrawing it from objects, when it is drawn towards them by latent evil impressions that have no beginning.\(^4\)

\(^1\) \(Br\). II. iv. and IV. v.
\(^2\) Perception, inference, etc.
\(^3\) Such as, "'Thou art That.'"
\(^4\) Because they are innate in the self, which is eternal, it is impossible to trace their origin.]

तत्र निद्रिष्यासनं ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारे साक्षात् कारणम्, "ते ध्यानयोगायुगता अपशयन, देवात्मशक्ति स्वयमैविनिग्रहितां"
Of these, meditation is the direct cause of the realisation of Brahman, for we have Ār̥ta texts like, “Following the yoga of meditation, they visualised that power,¹ which is identical with the Supreme Being, and is hidden by its own ingredients (gunae)″ (Śv. I. 3). Reflection is a cause of meditation, because it is not possible for a person who has not reflected to meditate on the meaning of what has been heard of, for he lacks a conviction about it. And hearing is a cause of reflection, because in the absence of hearing, the intention (of a passage) cannot be ascertained, and consequently no verbal comprehension can take place, with the result that there cannot be reflection leading to a certitude about the reasonableness or otherwise of the meaning of what has been heard of. Some teachers² say that all the three are causes of the origination of knowledge.

¹ The cosmic illusion.
² The reference is to Vācaspati Miśra.]
Others,\textsuperscript{1} however, maintain that hearing is the principal cause, while reflection and meditation, although they are subsequent to hearing,\textsuperscript{2} merely serve to usher\textsuperscript{3} the realisation of Brahman, which is the result of hearing, and therefore, being helpful from a distance, are subsidiary factors. This subsidiariness, too, does not consist in their being parts of the kind discussed in the third chapter of the \textit{Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras},\textsuperscript{4} for the latter, being known from one or other of the (six) tests such as direct enunciation (\textit{śruti}), cannot fit in with the topic under discussion, since direct enunciation etc. are absent here. For instance, there is no third case-ending to show
that reflection and meditation are parts (of some main sacrifice), as in the case of passages like, "One should sacrifice with rice grains," and "One should sacrifice with curd." Nor is there any indication, such as the capacity of sacred texts like, "I cut thee, O kuśa grass, who art the seat of the gods" (Maitrāyani Samhitā I. i. 2, i. 9), to express the cutting of the kuśa grass. Nor is there any supplementary statement directing the use of reflection and meditation for the purpose of hearing, like the statement, "One should perform the Pravarga rite in the Agnistoma sacrifice," with regard to the Pravarga, mentioned in a different place. Nor are reflection and meditation mentioned by the Śruti in a context relating to hearing, which is known to be a means to the result, as the Prayāja sacrifice etc. are mentioned in a context relating to the new and full moon sacrifices, which are known to be means to the result (heaven) from the sentence, "One who desires heaven should perform the new and full moon sacrifices."

[1 The reference is to the author of the Vivaraṇa.  
2 And hence nearer to the result.  
3 So they stand for the operation or intermediate cause (vyāpāra). See note 1 on p. 73.  
4 See note 1 on p. 92.  
5 Although there is no specific direction to that effect, it is clear from this sentence.  
6 Which might make them parts of hearing.  
7 This deals with the third item, context.  
8 The realisation of the highest truth, viz., the identity of the self with Brahma.
A sacrifice performed before certain main sacrifices. See note 5 on p. 108.

To satisfy the expectancy about the *modus operandi* of the new and full moon sacrifices.]

नन्दु ‘द्रष्ट्वे’ इति दर्शनानुवादेन श्रवणे विहिते सति फलेषुक्तम् श्रवणप्रकरणे तत्साधिकावाश्चात्यस्यननिर्विध्यासनयोः प्रयाजन्यायेन प्रकरणादेवागुरुतिवेत, न, “ते भ्यायामागानुगता अपशयनु” इत्याविधिशुत्यतन्त्रे व्यास्य दर्शनसाधनतवेनावगत्तयं अद्विकाद्वयं प्रयाजन्यायेन श्रवणामनन्योगेवागुरुत्वप्यः। क्रमसमाख्यो त दूरनिःस्ते।

*Objection:* Since for the purpose of realisation, introduced in the words, “‘Is to be realised’ (Br. II. iv. 5, IV. v. 6), hearing is enjoined, and since it is possessed of a result,¹ reflection and meditation, which are mentioned in a context relating to hearing in proximity to it, should from the context itself be parts² of that, on the analogy of the *Prayāja* sacrifice.

*Reply:* No, because from another Śruti text, “Following the *yoga* of meditation they visualised,” etc. (Śv. I. 3), we know that meditation is a means to realisation, and an expectancy being raised regarding its parts,³ it is hearing and reflection that would be treated as those parts,⁴ on the analogy of the *Prayāja* sacrifice. As for order⁵ and derivation,⁶ they are entirely out of account.⁷

¹ Viz., realisation.
2 As satisfying the expectancy about how to do the hearing.
3 Constituting the process of meditation.
4 Instead of reflection and meditation forming parts of hearing.
5 Parallel position. This also helps us to ascertain the relation of whole and part between two things, for example, a certain sacrifice and a particular sacred text, each occupying an identical place in two parallel series.
6 Which also helps us to fix this relation.
7 Because there is no question of parallelism with another series, nor is the derivation of the words a guide to their mutual relationship.

Besides, in the case of the Prayāja and other sacrifices, a discussion on their relationship as a part of something else fulfils a purpose, viz., that according to the prima facie view¹ the Prayāja etc. are not to be performed in the variant sacrifices, but that according to the decision, even
there they should be performed. In the passage under discussion, however, hearing is not the typical rite with regard to anything, in which case the performance of reflection and meditation even in the latter\(^3\) might be the result of a discussion on the question of their relationship as parts of something. Therefore we must understand that reflection and meditation are not parts of hearing in the manner discussed in the third chapter of the *Pūrva-Mimāṃsā-Sūtras*, but just as with regard to an effect such as a jar, we speak of the relative importance of its causes, saying that the lump of clay, for instance, is the principal cause, and the wheel etc. are auxiliary causes, similarly with regard to hearing, reflection and meditation also.\(^4\)

\(^1\) Which holds that the *Prayāja* etc. are not parts of the new and full moon sacrifices.

\(^2\) Such as the sacrifice to the sun. See note 7 on p. 95.

\(^3\) That is, the variant sacrifice.

\(^4\) That is, hearing is the principal cause and the other two auxiliary causes of the realisation of one’s identity with Brahman.

शृंचित्सैतहतिवरणाचारः—“शक्तितात्पर्यंबिशिष्टशास्त्राय
धारणं प्रमेयावगमं प्रत्यव्यवधानेन कारणं भवति, प्रमाणस्य
प्रमेयावगमं प्रत्यव्यवधानात्। मननविविघ्नसाने तु चित्स्य
प्रत्यगत्मप्रवणं संस्कारपरिनिष्पणं - तदेकप्रवज्ञतिकार्यव्रूणं
ब्रह्मातलभवहेतुतां प्रतिपच्चते श्रवः प्रत्यव्यवहितकारणस्य

}\[^{224}\]
This has also been indicated by the author\(^1\) of the *Vivarana* in the following passage: "The comprehension\(^2\) (of the meanings) of words\(^3\) that are possessed of significance and the speaker's intention\(^4\) is the immediate cause of a cognition of the object to be known, for a means of knowledge is the immediate antecedent\(^5\) to the knowledge of objects. But reflection and meditation become causes of the realisation of Brahma through a concentrated state of the mind with regard to the Supreme Self\(^6\)—an effect accomplished by the latent impressions produced by a tendency\(^7\) of the mind towards It. Hence with regard to the comprehension of words possessing significance and intention, which is the immediate cause of the result,\(^8\) reflection and meditation, which are farther removed,\(^9\) are admitted to be its parts\(^10\)" (V. S. S., p. 104).

\(^{[1]}\) See note 3 on p. 1.

\(^{[2]}\) *Comprehension….intention*—All this stands for hearing.

\(^{[3]}\) Such as ‘thou’ and ‘That’ occurring in the Upaniṣads.

\(^{[4]}\) The meaning of a Vedāntic dictum like, ‘‘Thou art That.’’

\(^{[5]}\) A cause is an invariable and immediate antecedent.

\(^{[6]}\) Same as Brahman.

\(^{[7]}\) That is, a more or less intermittent effort at concentration.
The comprehension of the meaning of dictums indicating the identity of the self with Brahman.

From the result than the comprehension mentioned above, that is, hearing.

That is, auxiliary causes of the comprehension of the identity of the self with Brahman.]

AIDS TO LIBERATION

It is aspirants after liberation who are qualified for hearing etc., for (only) one who desires (finite) results is qualified for optional rites. To stimulate a desire for liberation, the discrimination between eternal and transitory things,¹ a dispassion for the enjoyment of sense-objects and their result² here and hereafter, calmness, self-control, self-withdrawal, fortitude, concentration and faith are of use. Calmness is control of the mind. Self-control is mastery over the senses. Self-withdrawal is the absence of distractions. Fortitude is the bearing of the pairs of opposites such as cold and heat. Concentration is the one-
pointedness of the mind. Faith is believing in the words of the teacher and Vedānta.

[^1 Only Brahman is eternal, and all else is transitory.
^2 Viz., pleasure.]

अतः ‘उपर्म’-श्रद्धेन सज्ज्यासोरमिहिभीते; तथा ज्ञ्यासिनामेव श्रवणादावधिकारः, ध्वंति केवल इति अपरे तु ‘उपर्म’-श्रद्धेऽस ज्ञ्यासासवाचकत्वाभावात्, विश्वेपाभाव-मात्रस्य गुहुस्येष्वपि सम्भवात्, जनकादेवरि श्रवणबिचारस्य श्रूयमाणत्वात्, संबंधसमसाधारणं श्रवणदिविधाणमित्याह:।

Here some say that the word ‘self-withdrawal’ means renunciation[^1], so that only monks are qualified for hearing etc. Others, however, maintain that the injunction about hearing etc. is common to all the orders[^2] of life, because the word ‘self-withdrawal’ never signifies renunciation, and a mere absence of distractions is possible even in the case of householders[^3], and also because even Janaka and others are reported to have held discussions on Brahman.

[^1 Sannyāsa or giving up the world.
^2 Viz., those of the student, householder, hermit and monk.
^3 Not monks alone.]

THE GOAL OF MEDITATION ON THE CONDITIONED AND THE UNCONDITIONED BRAHMAN

सम्पर्काप्रत्यक्षाय प्रभावात्मारो निर्बिज्ञशास्त्रसाधारो-कार्य्यत: । तत्रुत्त्यः—
The meditation on the conditioned Brahman is also a cause of the realisation of the unconditioned Brahman through the concentration of the mind. So it has been said, ‘‘Those dull-witted persons who are unable to realise the unconditioned Supreme Brahman are done a favour by the delineation of the conditioned Brahman. When their minds are brought under control by the practice (of meditation) on the conditioned Brahman, that very unconditioned Brahman, divested of the superimposition of limiting adjuncts, directly manifests Itself.’’

\[1\]
Those who meditate on the conditioned Brahman go by the path of light etc.\textsuperscript{2} to the world of Brahman, and attaining there itself a realisation of the Truth by means of hearing etc., they are liberated along with Hiranyagarbha.\textsuperscript{3} Ritualists,\textsuperscript{4} however, go by the path of smoke etc.\textsuperscript{5} to the world of the manes, and when their past work has been exhausted through fruition, they are reborn, according to their past good or bad deeds, in bodies beginning with that of Hiranyagarbha down to those of plants. Witness the \textit{Sruti}, "Those who lead good lives attain agreeable births, while those who lead impious lives attain evil births" (\textit{Chā. V. x. 7}, adapted). While those who do forbidden acts, suffer excruciating pain appropriate to their particular sins, in hells such as the \textit{Raurava}, and are then born in the bodies of lower animals such as dogs and swine, or in plant bodies etc. It is needless to dilate on this incidental matter.

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Vedānta-kalpataru}, verses 1-2, on \textit{Br. S. I. i. 20.}
\textsuperscript{2} That is, the northern route or the path of the gods, in which the deities identified with light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the sun's northward journey, the year, the world of the gods, air, the sun, the moon and lightning, as also Varuṇa (the god of water), Indra and Prajāpati, serve as successive guides, the last three only helping the superhuman being who takes charge of the travellers from the deity of lightning and conducts them to the \textit{Satya-loka}.
\textsuperscript{3} See p. 175.
\textsuperscript{4} Who mechanically perform scriptural rites, works of public utility and charity.
That is, the southern route or the path of the manes, in which the deities identified with smoke, the night, the dark fortnight, the six months of the sun's southward journey, the world of the manes and the sky, successively guide the travellers to the moon, where they serve the gods and have a limited measure of enjoyment.

To be more precise, the moon.

One who has realised the unconditioned Brahman, however, never goes to any other world, for the Śruti says, "His vital forces do not depart" (Br. IV. iv. 6); but experiencing pleasure and pain till his fructifying work is exhausted, he is afterwards liberated.

\(^1\text{See note 2 on p. 175.}\]

Fructifying and Accumulated Work

\[\text{तत् क्षोयते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् द्विदेव परावर्ते}\]
\[\text{इत्याविद्वृत्ता, "शानन्दिः सर्वकर्माणि भृगुसात् कुहरे तथा"}
\[\text{इत्याविद्वृत्ता च आश्ति सकलकर्मनस्यहेतुत्वनिविष्ये सति}
\[\text{प्रारंभकर्मांविस्थानमुपपश्चाति चेतु, न। "तस्य तावदेव}
\[\text{विरं यावन विमोक्षे, अथ समपलसे” इत्याविद्वृत्ता, “नाभुकं}
\[\text{क्षोयते कर्मं” इत्याविद्वृत्ता चोत्ताविनिविष्यकार्यकर्मन्यतिरिक्तां}
\[\text{संक्षिप्तकर्मणामेव शान्तिविनाशत्वावगमात्।} \]
Objection: Since from such Śruti texts as, “And his actions are destroyed when He who is both high and low is seen” (Mu. II. ii. 8), and from such Smṛti texts as, “So does the fire of knowledge burn to ashes all actions” (G. IV. 37), knowledge is definitely known to be the cause of the destruction of all actions, the survival of the fructifying work does not stand to reason.

Reply: Not so; for from such Śruti texts as, “The delay in his case is only till he is freed from the body; after this he is one with Brahman” (Chā. VI. xiv. 2), and from such Smṛti texts as, “Work is not exhausted without fruition” (Bṛhannār. XXIX. 76), we know that only accumulated actions which are other than those which have already commenced their effects,¹ are destroyed by knowledge.

¹ Which is the meaning of the word prārabdha.

Accumulated work is of two kinds, consisting of good deeds and bad deeds. Witness the Śruti,
"His sons inherit his legacies, friends his good deeds, and enemies his bad deeds.""

**Objection:** With the cessation of primal nescience through the realisation of Brahman, its effect, viz., the fructifying work, also ceases. So how can one account for the continuity of bodies of men of realisation?

**Reply:** Not so, for since it is unobstructed knowledge that removes nescience, so long as the obstacle of fructifying work persists, the cessation of nescience is not admitted to take place.

[^1] That is, their results.

**Is Liberation Simultaneous?**

नन्येवपित सत्यानादेकस्य मुक्तो सर्वं मुक्तिः स्यात्, अविद्या एकत्वेन तत्षुद्वासी क्वचिदेव संसारायोगारं चेत, न, इत्यपतित्वेषे। अपे तु पद्धोपपरिहारायेव “इन्द्रो मायामि” तति भावनःसुल्खुनुर्गुर्गीतमविद्यानात्म-मधुकर्त्तव्यमित्यादिः। अन्ये तु पवैवाविचया, तस्याभ्या-विधाया जीवमेधेषे ब्रह्मवर्तपवारणेश्वरताने नाना। तथाच यस्य ब्रह्मानं तस्य ब्रह्मवर्तपवारणश्चिन्निविष्याविधानाना।, न त्यन्त्र व्रति, इत्युपगमात् नैवमुक्तो सर्वमुक्तिः। अत पव "यात्राधिकारमध्यतिराधिकारिकानान।” इत्यस्मिनेर्घन-करणे अधिकारिपुरुषामुलवस्यतत्त्वानामिन्द्रादीना। देह-धारणानुपविरागाय अधिकारापावंप्रार्थकपमन्मस्मात्-
THE AIM OF VEDÂNTA

नन्तरं विदेहकैवन्यमिति सिद्धान्तितम्। तदुकमाचार्ये-
वाचस्पतिमित्रः—

"उपासनादितिसिद्धिः तोषितें भवन्ति विद्वितम्।
अधिकारं समाप्यैते प्रविशान्ति परं पद्मम्॥"

इति। पतच्चैतकुकोर्कर्मेति पश्चे नोपपधेते।
तथ्याक्षाविद्यापश्चे कन्या विशिष्टावमावरणमेंद्रोपगमेन व्यव-
स्थोपपादुनीया।

तदेवं ब्रह्मान्तान्नमोक्षः। स ज्ञान्यनिन्दिवसिन्निरतिशये-
ब्रह्मान्न्यावासितिशेषति सिद्धं प्रयोजनम्।

इति वेदान्तपरिभाषाय योगोजनपरिच्छेदः।

Objection: Even in that case, when one person is liberated through the realisation of Truth, all would be liberated, for since nescience is one, when that ceases, transmigration can never exist for anybody.

Reply: It is no harm, for some would welcome this objection. Others, however, just to avoid this objection, say that nescience must be admitted to be manifold, as is supported by the use of the plural in the Śruti text, “The Supreme Lord through His powers of cosmic illusion,” etc. Still others maintain that nescience is but one, yet its powers that cover the nature of Brahman are manifold according to different individual selves. So for one who has realised Brahman, there is destruction of nescience that
is possesed of the power to cover Brahman, but not with regard to others. From the above viewpoint, the liberation of one would not lead to the liberation of all. Therefore, under the topic covered by the aphorism, "Those who hold particular authorities live as long as their authority lasts" (Br. S. III. iii. 32), a doubt is raised as to how persons like Indra, who hold particular positions and who have attained a realisation of Truth, can continue in their bodies, and the conclusion reached on the point is that they attain absolute isolation characterised by disembodiedness after finishing the fructifying work that led them to the particular position. So it has been said by Ācārya Vācaspati Miśra, "After finishing the authority conferred on them by God, who was pleased with their perfection in meditation etc., they attain the supreme state." This does not fit in with the view that the liberation of one leads to the liberation of all. Therefore, even according to the view that nescience is one, things are to be explained by the admission of a different covering power (of nescience) for every individual self.

So this kind of realisation of Brahman leads to liberation, which is the cessation of troubles and the attainment of the absolute bliss of Brahman. Thus the aim of Vedānta (liberation) has been established.

\[1^1 \text{R. VI. xlvii. 18. See p. 42.}
\[2 \text{Verse in the Bhāmati on the above aphorism.} \]
GLOSSARY

(*Arranged according to the Sanskrit alphabet*)

akhanḍopādhi : unanalysable characteristic
 ativāpti : too wide application
 atindriya : imperceptible
 atyantābhāva : absolute non-existence
 adhikaraṇa : (1) substratum; (2) topic
 adhiṣṭhāna : substratum
 adhyāsa : superimposition
 anavasthā : *regressus in infinitum*
 anirvacanīya : indescribable, logically indefinable
 anupapatti : inexplicability
 anupalambha : non-apprehension
 anubhava : experience
 anumāna : inference (the instrument)
 anumiti : inferential knowledge
 anuyogin : support, substratum
 anuvāda : restatement
 anuvyavasāya : self-reflective cognition
 antah-karaṇa : the internal organ, mind
 anyathā-khyāti : error, taking one thing for another
 anyathā-siddha : superfluous
 anyonyābhāva : mutual non-existence
 anvaya : (1) (method of) agreement; (2) logical connection
 anvaya-vyatirekin : having both similar and contrary instances
 aparokṣa : (1) immediate; (2) perceptual
 apūrva : (1) the unseen result; (2) original
 apramā : invalid knowledge, error
 abhyupagama : (1) admission; (2) tentative admission
 arthavāda : corroborative statement
arthāpatti : presumption
alaukika : extraordinary
avacchedaka : determining characteristic
avacchinna : limited or determined
avayava : part, component
avayavin : aggregate, whole
avidyā : nescience
avyāpti : too narrow application
asiddha : unfounded
ākāṁkṣā : expectancy
ākāśa : ether
āgama : verbal or scriptural testimony
āpta : a trustworthy person
āropya : the thing superimposed
āśraya : basis, substratum
āsatti : contiguity
indriya : organ
iṣṭa : desirable
upacāra : metaphor
upamāna : comparison (the instrument)
upamānti : knowledge based on comparison
upasthiti : knowledge
upahīta : possessed of a limiting adjunct
upādāna : material cause
upādhi : (1) a general property other than the generic attribute (jāti); (2) limiting adjunct; (3) condition
kapāla : one-half of a jar, or potsherdi
kāraṇatā : causality
kṛti : activity
klīrpta : prescribed, necessarily to be accepted
kevalānvayin : having no contrary instance, universally present
kevala-vyatirekin : having no similar instance
guṇa : (1) quality, (2) ingredient, (3) merit
gaurava : cumbrousness
graha : apprehension
cit : Pure Consciousness
citta : the recollective aspect of the mind
caitanya : Pure Consciousness
jāti : generic attribute
jīva : individual self
jñāna-lakṣaṇa : based on knowledge
tarka : argument, *reductio ad absurdum*
tātparya : intention
tādātmya : identity
tejas : fire, light
desa : space, place
dravya : substance
dharma : (1) attribute; (2) righteousness
dharmin : something possessing an attribute
naya : system
nigamana : conclusion
nirvikalpa : indeterminate
pakṣa : subject, that in or about which something is inferred
pakṣa-dharmatā : presence in the subject
pada : (1) word; (2) status
padārtha : (1) category; (2) the thing signified by a word
paramāṇu : atom
paramparā-sambandha : indirect relation
parāmarśa : consideration, the knowledge that a subordinate concomitant of the thing to be inferred is in the subject
parināma : transformation, actual change
parokṣa : mediate
pāramārthika : absolute
puruṣa : (1) man; (2) person; (3) soul
puruṣārtha : human end
prakaraṇa : context
prakāra : feature in knowledge, corresponding to the adjectival part of its object
prakṛti: (1) Nature; (2) typical (sacrifice)
pradhvaṁsābhava: non-existence as destruction
pratiyogin: (1) counterpositive, that which is negated;
          (2) that which rests on something else; (3) that
          which corresponds to something
pratyakṣa: (1) perception (the instrument); (2) per-
          ceptual knowledge
pratyabhijñā: recognition
pratyaya: cognition
pratyāsatti: connection, especially between a sense-
           organ and its object
pramāṇa: valid knowledge
pramāṇa: instrument of valid knowledge
pramātṛ: subject or knower
prameya: object of valid knowledge
prayojaka: (1) criterion; (2) corroborative argument;
           (3) cause
pravṛtti: effort
prāgabhāva: previous non-existence or potential exist-
           ence
prātibhāsika: illusory
bādhya: (1) contradiction, nullification; (2) incongruity
bādhita: contradicted, nullified
buddhi: intellect; (2) cognition
bhāna: cognition
bhāva: (1) positive entity; (2) existence
bhūta: element (such as earth)
mahat-tattva: cosmic intellect
māyā: cosmic illusion
yogyatā: (1) consistency; (2) capacity
rūpa: (1) colour; (2) form
lakṣaṇa: definition, characteristic
lakṣaṇā: implication, secondary meaning
lāghava: the law of simplicity or parsimony
liṅga: (1) sign, reason; (2) indication
laukika: ordinary, conventional
vijñāna : knowledge
vipakṣa : contrary instance
viruddha : contradictory
vivarta : apparent change
viśiṣṭa-buddhi : (1) cognition of a qualified entity ;
             (2) qualified knowledge
viśeṣaṇa : qualifying attribute
viśeṣya : substantive
viṣaya : object
visaṁvādin : unsuccessful
vṛtti : (1) mental state ; (2) existence ; (3) existent ;
             (4) reference
vaiśiṣṭya : relatedness
vyakti : individual
vyatireka : (method of) difference
vyatireka-vyāpti : negative invariable concomitance
vyadhikaraṇa : not abiding in the substratum of a
             thing, extraneous
vyavahāra : use, convention
vyāpaka : inclusive
vyāpāra : operation, intermediate cause
vyāpti : invariable concomitance
vyāpya : subordinate concomitant
vyāvartaka : that which generates the idea of distinction
vyāvahārika : conventional, relatively real
vyāvṛtta : excluded
śakti : (1) power ; (2) significance
śabda : (1) sound ; (2) word ; (3) verbal testimony
śābda-bodha : verbal comprehension
śruti : (1) revealed knowledge, the Vedas ; (2) direct
       enunciation
saṅkara : cross division
saṁyoga : conjunction
saṁvādin : successful
saṁsāra : transmigratory existence
sarīskāra : latent impression
sannikarṣa : see pratīyāsatti
sapakṣa : similar instance
samavāya : inheritance
samavāyi-kāraṇa : inherent cause
samaveta : inherent
samānādhikaraṇa : having a common substratum, co-existent
savikalpa : determinate ; consisting of a substantive, a qualifying attribute and a relation between the two
sahacāra : co-existence
sākṣātkāra : realisation
sākṣin : witness
sādharmya : similarity
sādhya : the thing to be inferred
sāmagrī : totality of causes
siddha : established, proved
smṛti : (1) recollection ; (2) sacred literature based on the Vedas
hetu : reason or ground for inference
INDEX

Agency—defined 158; no real — anywhere, 204
Agni—166
Agništoma (sacrifice)—221
Aim—two kinds of, 208
Air—165
Amalānanda Svāmin—216 n.
Amaradāsa—xi
Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī, MM—xi
Apparent change—defined, 52
Arthadipikā—xi
Āśvodhini—xi
Āśvins—165
Bhāmati—2 n., 216
Bhāṣā-Pariccheda—136 n., 151 n.
Brahmā—165, 171
Brahman—appears as the universe through the veil of cosmic illusion, xi; nescience is neither identical with nor different from, 1 n., 2 n.; liberation comes through knowledge of, 4, 211-212, 234; is not a substance, 84; can be an object of ocular perception, 83-84; is the substratum of the phantasm of the universe, 141; is different from the individual self, 145; appears as different owing to different minds, 146; the universe is superimposed on, 147; essential and secondary characteristics of, 157-162, 180; is Truth, Knowledge and Bliss, 157; is the cause of the origin of the universe, 158-162; is alone established by the Vedāntic texts, 181-182; is omniscient, 195; the individual self is identical with, x, 201-207; unity of, 205 n.; is absolute Bliss, 209; what the immediate knowledge of — arises from, 212; purified mind is the instrument for the realisation of, 212, 215; is known only through the Vedas, 215-216; means to realisation of, x, xi, 217-225; meditation on conditioned, 228-229; result of the realisation of unconditioned, 230 f.
Brahma-Sūtras—2 n.
Bṛhannāradiyā-Purāṇa—176, 212, 231
Buddhists—means of knowledge according to, vi
Calmness—an aid to liberation, 226
Cārvākas—only one means of knowledge according to, vi
Characteristic(s)—essential, 156-157; secondary, 158
Cintāmaṇi (Tattva)—3
Citsukhācārya—39 n., 82 n.
Citsukhi—39 n., 82 n.
Citta—34, 165 n.
Cognition—See Knowledge
Comparison—a means of valid knowledge, 8; defined, 86; is a distinct means of knowledge, 87-88
Consciousness—is knowledge, vii; is perceptual knowledge, 8; is threefold, vii, 14, 15; as God and individual self, 183, 184
Consideration (parāmarśa)—is not an instrument of inferential knowledge, 72-73; described, 75-76 n.
Consistency (yogyaṭa)—89, defined, 94
Contiguity (āsatti)—89, defined, 95; is the knowledge of the meanings of words, 109
Cosmic dissolution (pralaya)—described, 172; four kinds of, 172-178; diurnal, 172-174; basic, 174-175; occasional, 176-177; absolute, 178; order of, 179
Cosmic illusion—x; is one, 42-43; is the transformative material cause of the universe, 141, 163
See also Nescience
Counterpositive(ness)—defined, 65 n.
Creation—order and process of, 163-172
Death—and the condition of profound sleep, 197
Dharmarāja Adhvarindra—iii, v, 3
Difference—See Non-existence
Dream(s)—objects perceived in—are illusory, 60-63; condition of, 197
Effect(s)—the same as the cause, ix; twofold destruction of, 62-63
Ego—described, 34; creation of, 164
Elements—creation of the, 163-167, 171-172; combination of the, 167-168; creation out of the, 168-170; dissolution of the, 179-180
Error—nature of, viii, 48-59; how caused, 50-59; according to logicians, viii, 49 n.; criterion of, 59
See also Invalid Knowledge and Unreality
Existence—is threefold, 85
Expectancy—described, 89-93
Faith—an aid to liberation, 226-227
Fortitude—an aid to liberation, 226
Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya—v, 3 n.
Generic attribute—is fictitious, viii, 24, 25; significance refers to—directly, viii, 97-99; meaning of, 98 n.
God (Supreme Lord)—the witness of, 42-46; agency of, 158-159; is the Creator, 171; as reflection of Consciousness in cosmic illusion, 183, 184; as Consciousness that is reflected, 185-188; difference
INDEX

between individual self and — due to, 202, 203
Gods—path of the, 229 n.
Great dictum, the—meaning of the words of, 180, 198 f.; knowledge from, 212, 213
Gross bodies—four kinds of, 170
Hearing—as a means to the realisation of Brahman, 218-226
Hiranyagarbha—creation of the subtle body of, 169; is the first individual to be born, 171-172; destruction (liberation) of, 174, 175, 177, 180, 229; day of, 176
Human end—four kinds of, 4
Implication—pure and double, 100; exclusive, inclusive, and quasi-inclusive, 101-105; root of, 105; belongs to words or a group of words, 106; defined, 106
Indicator—40
Individual—significance does not refer to it directly, 97-99
Individual self—See Self
Indra—160, 213, 229, 234
Inference—a means of valid knowledge, 8; described, 71 f.; factors of, 72-76; is not recollection, 73; is purely affirmative, 77; for oneself and for others, 79; syllogistic, 79; proves the unreality of the universe, 80-85; of the negative form is not an inference, 127-128
Ingredients—the three, 164
Inherence—is identity, viii, 24, 25 n.; is unfounded, 24, 25, 84
Intellect—34, creation of the, 164
Intention—defined, 110; is the cause of verbal comprehension, 111-114; how determined, 115
Invariable concomitance—71; defined, 76
Jaimini—92 n.
Janaka—227
Jivänananda Vidyäsägara, Pañḍita—xi
Knowledge—is eternal Pure Consciousness, v; valid—defined, 5-8, 149; the six means of, 8; is an attribute of the mind, 9, 10, 11; qualified, 75; intrinsic validity of, 149-150; its validity is self-evident, viii, 151-152; invalid—is due to extrinsic defect, 153; twofold validity of the means of, 155-156; as a state of the mind, 189; what its immediacy is due to, 213, 215
Kṛṣṇanātha Nyāyapañcānana, Pañḍita—xi
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa—58 n., 108
Latent impression(s)—in profound sleep, 172-173; the cause of superimposition, 204
Liberation—is the supreme human end, 4; nature of, 209 f., 234; is already
achieved, 210-211; is achieved only through knowledge, 211; aids to, 226-227; of one does not lead to liberation of all, 233-234
Limiting adjunct—defined, 40; distinction between it and a qualifying attribute, vii.
Logicians—40; error according to, 49 n.; refutation of the theory of error according to, 48, 49 n.
See also Nyāya system
Lord, the Supreme—as Creator, 163 f.
See also God
Maitreyī—218
Madhvācārya—x
Manes, path of the—229, 230 n
Manu Samhitā—170
Meditation—a means to the realisation of Brahman, 218 f.; a direct cause of the realisation of Brahman, 219; result of—on conditioned Brahman, 228-229
Mental state(s)—is knowledge, 9, 189; described, 16; how formed in perception, 16, 194, 196; can be its own object, 30, 31; its causes, 33; four kinds of, 34; removes the covering of Brahman, vii, 190; as serving to establish a connection between Consciousness and objects, 191-195; necessity for its admission, 195, 196
Mīmāṃsakas—84 n., 125 n., 126 n.; significance according to, 97 n.; the Vedas according to, 116; the Prābhākara school of—on valid knowledge from sentences, 200; on means of knowledge, vi; means of knowledge according to the Bhāṭṭa school of, vi
Mind—is a substance and with parts, 10-11; is not an organ, vii, 12, 13, 69; its attributes are objects of the witness, 31, 32; is the internal instrument, 34; creation of the, 164; is destroyed in deep sleep, 173; two functions of, 173, 174; is the limiting adjunct of the individual self, 184, 195; knowledge of Brahman arises from the purified, 212, 215
Monism—147, x
See Vedānta
Moon—165
Mount Meru—202
Nature—43, 44 n.
See Cosmic illusion
Nescience—1; is inscrutable, 1 n.; and Brahman, 2 n.; subsidiary and primal, 51 n.; is removed by unobstructed knowledge, 232; is one or manifold according to different views, 233-234
See also Cosmic illusion
Non-apprehension—a means of valid knowledge, 8; defined, 130-131; as possessed of capa-
city, 132-134; instrument of, 135-136; a distinct means of knowledge, 137-138, 148; and mistaken apprehension of non-existence, 139-141
Non-existence—a p p r e h e n s i o n of, 130 f., 148; four kinds of, 142-145; two kinds of mutual, 146
Nṛsiṁha—2
Nyāya system (Naiyāyikas)—v; means of knowledge according to, vi; some points of difference between Vedānta and, vi-ix, 20, 22, 24, 25, 33 n., 53, 84 n.; inference according to, 71-73 n., 77 n., 78 n.; syllogism according to, 79 n., 80; significance according to, 97 n., 98 n., 104; on the Vedas, 116; and presumption, v, 127 n.; on non-apprehension, v, 136 n., 138 n.; on non-existence, 144 n., 145 n.; on valid knowledge, 151 n., 152 n.; and cosmic dissolution, 179, 180 n.
Nyāyaratna—3 n.
Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa—3 n.
Operation—73 n.
Organs—five, 69; creation of the, 164-166; the presiding deities of the, 164-165
Padmapādācārya—iii, v, ix, i n., 3 n.
Pain, cessation of—is an aim, 208; is liberation, 209 f.
Pañcapādikā—2 n., 3, 157
Pañcapādikā-vivāraṇa—See Vivaraṇa
Pandit, The—xii
Paribhāṣā (Vedānta)—iii, iv, v f., xi, 3
Paribhāṣā-prakāśikā—xi
Peddā Dīkṣita—xi
Perception—of internal objects, vii; perceptual knowledge may arise from verbal testimony, viii, 36; a means of valid knowledge, 8-70; perceptual knowledge is pure Consciousness, 8, 9; criterion of, 14 f., 36; of knowledge, 14-26; psychology of, 16, 17; is immediate knowledge, 14 f.; of objects, 27-32; finally defined, 32; determinate and indeterminate, 34-38; by the witness of the self and the witness of God, 40-46; of knowledge, defined, 47; of illusory objects, 47-68; in dreams, 60-63; through or without an organ, 69-70
Pleasure—an aim and two kinds of, 208-209; absolute—is liberation, 209 f.
Prabhākara—58 n., error according to the school of, 58 n.
See also Mīmāṁsakas
Prajāpati—166, 229
Prakāśatma-yati—ix, i n., 32 n.
Pratardana—313
Pravarga (rite)—221
Prayâja (sacrifice)—109 n., 221-224

Presumption—a means of valid knowledge, 8; defined, 121-122; from what is seen and what is heard, 123; twofold— from what is heard, 124-126; cannot be included in inference, 127; and inference of the negative form, 128-129

Proposition (sentence)—conveying a simple notion of identity, 35, 38

Purânas—on cosmic dissolution, 177

Pûrva-Mimâmsâ—some points of difference between Vedânta and, v, x

Pûrva-Mimâmsâ-Sûtras—92 n., 220, 224

Qualifying attribute—distinction between it and a limiting adjunct, vii; defined, 40

Quarters—164

Râmâdvaya—iii, x

Râmâkrśâdhvarin—xi, 41 n.

Râmânujâcârya—x, on individual self, 199 n.

Raurava—229

Recollection—34; and valid knowledge, 56; is not perception, 18, 19; criterion of, 73

Reflection—as a means to the knowledge of Brahman, 218 f.; a cause of meditation, 219

Renunciation—meaning of; 227

Rites—as an indirect means to the realisation of Brahman, 217

Ritualists—path followed by the, 229

Śabara—93 n.

Sadânanda Yogendras—v

Samidh (sacrifice)—108 n.

Saṅkṣepa-Sâriraka—33 n.

Śaṅkara—2 n., 3 n., 33 n., 162 n.; school of Vedânta, iii, iv, v, x

Śaṅkhya—means of knowledge according to, vi; effect according to, ix; Nature according to, 43, 44 n.; view on comparison, 88 n.

Śaraccandra Ghośâla, Śrî—xii

Śâriraka-Bhâṣya—2 n., 33 n.

Sarvajñâtma-muni—33 n.

Śaśadhara—3

Self—the Supreme, 1; difference between the supreme Self and the individual self, 184-186

Self, the individual—defined, 40; witness of the, 40; is different from Brahman, 145; doctrine of single and multiple, 178, 188, 189; as reflection of Consciousness in different minds, 184, 185; is unlimited, 191 f.; is limited by the mind, 184, 195; is both one and manifold, 198; is not atomic, 198, 199; is self-effulgent, 199-200; is identical with Brahman, 201-207

Self-control—an aid to liberation, 226
Self-withdrawal—an aid to liberation, 227
Sentence(s)—a means of valid knowledge, 89 f., 115; secular and Vedic, 115; conveying a simple notion of identity, 38, 206
Significance—defined, 96, 113; a category, 96; refers directly to a generic attribute, viii, 97-99
Śiva—165, 171
Śivadatta—xi
Sleep, profound—and diurnal dissolution, 172-174; described, 197
Subtle body—of a sleeping and a dead man, 173; creation and composition of the, 168-169; inferior and superior, 169
Sun—165
Superimposition—how caused, 204-205
Sureśvarācārya—147
Swoon—and profound sleep, 197
Syllogism—the parts of, 79; Nyāya view of it refuted, 79, 80 n.
Tantra-vārtika—108
Tarkacādāmaṇī—3
Tattvapradīpika—39, 148
Transformation—defined, 57
Universe—is transitory, 24; its unretaility is proved by inference, 80-85; is superimposed on Brahman, 147; Brahman is the cause of the origin of, 158-162, 182; creation of the, 170; is in-substantial, 182
Unreality—defined, 81, 85; proof of, 82
See also Error
Vācaspati Miśra—v, ix, 2 n., 212, 216, 234
Vaiśeṣika(s)—v; means of knowledge according to, vi; view on comparison, 88 n.
Vākya-sudhā—162 n.
Vāmadeva—213, 214 n.
Varuṇa—165, 229 n.
Vedānta—some points of difference between Nyāya and, vi-ix; some points of difference between Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and, v, x; phases of, x; subject-matter of, x, 207 f.; aim of, 208
Vedānta-kalpataru—216 n., 229 n.
Vedānta Kaumudi—iii
Vedānta-maniprabhā—xi
Vedānta-Paribhāṣā—see Paribhāṣā
Vedānta-paribhāṣā-prakāśikā—xi
Vedānta-Sāra—v
Vedānta-sikhāmaṇi—xi, 41 n.
Vedas, the—are means of valid knowledge, 116 f.; are not eternal, 116; are not momentary, 117-118; are not produced by a person, 119-120
Venis, Principal Arthur—xi
Veṇkaṭanāṭhā, Śrīmat—2
Verbal comprehension—criterion of, 37; due to, 89 f.
Verbal testimony—perceptual knowledge may arise from, viii, 36; a means of knowledge, 8; defined, 89
Viṣṇu—165, 166, 171
Vital forces, the five—creation of, 166
Vivaraṇa—iii, iv, i n., 9, 10 n., 33, 109, 148, 212, 221 n., 225
Wakefulness—described, 188, 189
Word(s)—significance of, 96 f.; meanings of, 96-109; two kinds of meanings of, 96; primary meaning of, 99; implication of, 99-109; implication belongs to a word or a group of words, viii, 106-107
Work—survival of fructifying — after the realisation of Brahman, 230-231; accumulated, 231; two kinds of accumulated, 231-232
Worlds—creation of the, 170
Yama—166
Yoga system—means of knowledge according to, vi