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Translated by various Sanskrit Scholars

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SAMKHYA PHILOSOPHY

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THE

SAMKHYA PHILOSOPHY

CONTAINING

SÂMKHYA-PRAVACHANA SÛTRAM, WITH THE VRITTI OF ANIRUDDHA,
AND THE BHÂṢYA OF VIJNÂNA BHIKṢU AND EXTRACTS
FROM THE VRITTI-SÂRA OF MAHÂDEVA VEDANTIN;
(2) TATVA SAMÂSA; (3) SÂMKHYA KÂRIKÂ;
(4) PANCHAŚIKHÂ SÛTRAM.

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PREFACE.

The present volume of the *Sacred Books of the Hindus* which bears the modest title of the *Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram*, is, in reality, a collection of all the available original documents of the School of the Sâṃkhyas, with the single exception of the commentary composed by Vyâsa on the *Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Yoga-Sûtram* of Patañjali. For it contains in its pages not only the *Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram* of Kapila together with the *Vṛitti* of Aniruddha, the *Bhâṣya* of Vijñâna Bhikṣu, and extracts of the original portions from the *Vṛittisâra* of Vedântin Mahâdeva, but also the *Tattva-Samâsa* together with the commentary of Narendra, the *Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ* of Îśvarakṛiṣṇa with profuse annotations based on the *Bhâṣya* of Gauḍapâda and the *Tattva-Kaumudî* of Vâchaspati Miśra, and a few of the Aphorisms of Pañchaśikha with explanatory notes according to the *Yoga-Bhâṣya* which has quoted them. An attempt, moreover, has been made to make the volume useful in many other respects by the addition, for instance, of elaborate analytical tables of contents to the *Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram* and the *Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ*, and of a number of important appendices.

The Contents of the Volume.

In the preparation of this volume, I have derived very material help from the excellent editions of the *Vṛitti* of Aniruddha and the *Bhâṣya* of Vijñâna Bhikṣu on the *Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram* by Dr. Richard Garbe, to whom my thanks are due. And, in general, I take this opportunity of acknowledging my indebtedness to all previous writers on the Sâṃkhya, living and dead, from whose writings I have obtained light and leading in many important matters connected with the subject.

An introduction only now remains to be written. It is proposed, however, to write a separate monogram on the Sâṃkhya Darśana, which would be historical, critical and comparative, in its scope and character. In this preface, therefore, only a very brief account is given of some of the cardinal doctrines of the Sâṃkhya School.

The first and foremost among these is the *Sat-Kârya-Siddhânta* or the Established Tenet of Existent Effect. It is the Law of the Identity of Cause and Effect: what is called the cause is the unmanifested state of what is called the effect, and what is called the effect is only the manifested state of what

The Law of the Identity of Cause and Effect.

is called the cause; their substance is one and the same; differences manifestation and non-manifestation give rise to the distinctions Cause and Effect. The effect, therefore, is never non-existent; whetl before its production, or whether after its destruction, it is alw existent in the cause. For, nothing can come out of nothing, and nothi can altogether vanish out of existence.

Definition of Cause and Effect.

This doctrine would be better understood by a comparison w the contrary views held by other thinkers on relation of cause and effect. But before we proc to state these views, we should define the terms "cause" and "effec One thing is said to be the cause of another thing, when the lat cannot be without the former. In its widest sense, the term, Cau therefore, denotes an agent, an act, an instrument, a purpose, so material, time, and space. In fact, whatever makes the accomplishm of the effect possible, is one of its causes. And the immediate result the operation of these causes, is their effect. Time and Space, howev are universal causes, inasmuch as they are presupposed in each and ev act of causation. The remaining causes fall under the descriptions "Material," "Efficient," "Formal," and "Fin

Aristotelian Division of Causes.

The Sâṃkhya Division.

The Sâṃkhyas further reduce them to two d criptions only, *viz.*, *Upâdâna*, *i.e.*, the mater which the Naiyâyikas call *Samavâyi* or Combinative or Constituti and *Nimitta*, *i. e.*, the efficient, formal, and final, which may be v ously, though somewhat imperfectly, translated as the instrumen efficient, occasional, or conditional, because it includes the instrume with which, the agent by which, the occasion on which, and the conditi under which, the act is performed. Obviou there is a real distinction between the *Upâdâna* the *Nimitta*: the *Upâdâna* enters into the cor tution of the effect, and the power of taking the form of, in ot words, the potentiality of being re-produced as, the effect, resides in while the *Nimitta*, by the exercise of an extraneous influence only, operates with the power inherent in the material, in its re-production the form of the effect, and its causality ceases with such re-product To take the case of a coin, for example: the material causality was i lump of gold; it made possible the modification of the gold into the f of the coin, it will remain operative as long as the coin will last as a c and after its destruction, it will pass into the potential state again; the operation of the *Nimittas* came to an end as soon as the coin minted.

Causes *Upâdâna* and *Nimitta* distinguished.

Similarly, the Sâṃkhyas distinguish the Effect under the twofold aspect of simple manifestation and of re-production. Thus, the coin is an instance of causation by re-production, while the production of cream from milk is an instance of causation by simple manifestation.

Theories of the Origin of the World.

Now, as to the origin of the world, there is a divergence of opinion among thinkers of different Schools: Some uphold the Theory of Creation, others maintain the Theory of Evolution. Among the Creationists are counted the Nâstikas or Nihilists, the Buddhists, and the Naiyâyikas; and among the Evolutionists, the Vedântins and the Sâṃkhyas. The Nâstikas hold that the world is non-existent, that is, unreal, and that it came out of what was not; the Buddhists hold that the world is existent, that is, real, and that it came out of what was not; the Naiyâyikas hold that the world is non-existent, that is, non-eternal, perishable, and that it came out of the existent, that is, what is eternal, imperishable; the Vedântins hold that the world is non-existent, that is, unreal, and that it came out of what was existent, that is, real, namely, *Brahman*; and the Sâṃkhyas hold that the world is existent, that is, real, and that it came out of what was existent, that is, real, namely, the *Pradhâna*. Thus, there are the *A-Sat-Kârya-Vâda* of the Nâstikas that a non-existent world has been produced from a non-existent cause, and of the Buddhists that an existent world has been produced from a non-existent cause, the *Abhâva-Utpatti-Vâda* of the Naiyâyikas that a non-eternal world has been produced from an eternal cause, the *Vivarta-Vâda* of the Vedântins that the world is a re-volution, an illusory appearance, of the one eternal reality, *viz.*, *Brahman*, and the *Sat-Kârya-Vâda* of the Sâṃkhyas that an existent world has been produced from an existent cause.

Arguments which establish the Sâṃkhya theory.

Against the theories of *A-Sat-Kârya*, *Abhâva-Utpatti*, and *Vivarta*, and in support of their theory of *Sat-Kârya*, the Sâṃkhyas advance the following arguments:

I. There can be no production of what is absolutely non-existent; *e.g.*, a man's horn.

II. There must be some determinate material cause for every product. Cream, for instance, can form on milk only, and never on water. Were it as absolutely non-existent in milk as it is in water, there would be no reason why it should form on milk, and not equally on water.

III. The relation of cause and effect is that of the producer and the produced, and the simplest conception of the cause as the producer is that it possesses the potentiality of becoming the effect,

and this potentiality is nothing but the unrealised state of the effect.

IV. The effect is seen to possess the nature of the cause, *e.g.*, a coin still possesses the properties of the gold of which it is made.

V. Matter is indestructible; "destruction" means disappearance into the cause.

It follows, therefore, that cause and effect are neither absolutely dissimilar nor absolutely similar to each other. They possess *essential* similarities and *formal* dissimilarities. Such being the relation between cause and effect, the world cannot possibly have come out of something in which it had been absolutely non-existent, and which accordingly was, in relation to it, as good as non-existent. For the world is neither absolutely unreal nor absolutely real. The test of objective reality is its opposition to consciousness. It is distinguished as *Prâtibhâsika* or apparent, *Vyâvahârika* or practical or phenomenal, and *Pâramârthika* or transcendental. Of these, the world possesses phenomenal reality, and must, therefore, have a transcendental reality as its substratum. Thus is the Doctrine of *Sat-Kârya* established.

The World possesses phenomenal reality.

A natural corollary from the above doctrine is the other doctrine of *Pariṇâma* or transformation. It is the doctrine that, as all effects are contained in their causes in an unmanifested form, the "production" of an effect is nothing but its manifestation, and that, as cause and effect are essentially identical, an effect is merely a transformation of the cause.

The Doctrine of Transformation.

Now, the question arises, whether the cause of the world be a single one, or whether it be manifold. Some think that, according to the Naiyâyikas, who declare the existence of *Parama-Aṇus* or the ordinary Atoms of Matter, the world has sprung from a plurality of causes. This is, however, to take a very superficial view of the Nyâya-Vaiśeṣika Darśana. The Naiyâyikas were certainly not timid explorers of metaphysical truths; there is absolutely no reason for supposing that they either would not or could not penetrate behind and beyond the ordinary Atoms of Matter. As I have elsewhere pointed out, it would be a mistake to treat the six Darśanas as each being a complete and self-contained system of thought; in respect of their scope and purpose, they bear no analogy to the philosophies of the West. They are singly neither universal nor final; but they mutually supplement one another. Their Ṛiśis address themselves to particular sets of people possessing different degrees of mental and spiritual advancement. They reveal

The Cause of the World, one or manifold?

The Position of the Naiyâyikas explained.

and explain the truths embodied in the Vedas to them from their point of view and according to their competence, and thus help them in realising the truths for themselves and thereby in progressing towards Self-realisation. If the Naiyâyikas, therefore, do not carry their analysis of the world further than the ordinary Atoms of Matter, it must not be assumed that they teach a sort of atomic pluralism as the ultimate theory of the origin of the world, and are in this opposed to the authors of the other Sâstras which teach a different origin. The right explanation is that they make but a partial declaration of the Vedic truths and cut short the process of resolution at the ordinary Atoms of Matter, because they address themselves to a class of students who do not possess the mental capacity to grasp subtler truths.

Unity of the Cause of the World.

For the sense of unity which has found expression in the Law of Parsimony, points to a single original of the world or material manifestation, as revealed in the Vedas. And the Sâṃkhya makes its students acquainted with this. It is called the Root, and is described as the *Pradhâna*, that in which all things are contained, and as *Prakṛiti*, the mother of things.

The Scope of the Sâṃkhya.

It is a long way from the ordinary Atoms of Matter to the Pradhâna or Primordial Matter. The Sâṃkhya undertakes to declare and expound the successive transformations of the Pradhâna down to the Gross Matter, with the object of accomplishing the complete isolation of the Self from even the most shadowy conjunction with the Pradhâna.

Definition of Prakṛiti.

The definition of Prakṛiti is that it is the state of equilibrium of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, called the Guṇas. It is the genus of which the Guṇas are the species. Their state of equilibrium is their latent, potential, or inactive state, the state of not being developed into effects. The Guṇas are extremely fine substances, and are respectively the principles of illumination, evolution, and involution, and the causes of pleasure, pain, and dullness. For, Sattva is light and illuminating, Rajas is active and urgent, and Tamas is heavy and enveloping. They are in eternal and indissoluble conjunction with one another, and, by nature, mutually overpower, support, produce, and intimately mix with, one another.

The Doctrine of the Three Guṇas.

This doctrine of the Three Guṇas is the very foundation of the Sâṃkhya Tantra. It is explained in the following manner: (1) Everything in the world, external as well as internal, is in constant change; and there can be no change, whether it be movement in space, or whether it

be movement in time, without rest. Side by side, therefore, with the principle of mutation, there must be a principle of conservation. And, as Berkeley tells us, existence is perception,--whatever is not manifested to Consciousness, individual or universal, does not exist. Another principle is, therefore, required which would make the manifestation of the other two principles and of their products, (as also of itself and of its own), to Consciousness possible. Thus, at the origin of the world, there must be a principle of conservation, a principle of mutation, and a principle of manifestation. (2) Similarly, an examination of the intra-organic energies would disclose the existence of three distinct principles behind them. These energies are the eleven Indriyas or Powers of Cognition and Action, and Prâṇa or Vital Force. Among them, the Powers of Cognition, *e.g.*, Seeing, Hearing, etc., cause manifestation of objects, the Powers of Action, *e.g.*, seizing by the hand, etc., produce change, and Prâṇa conserves and preserves life. (3) In the mind, again, modifications of three distinct characters take place; *viz.*, cognition, conation, and retention; and these could not be possible without there being a principle of manifestation, a principle of mutation, and a principle of conservation respectively. (4) Likewise, a psycho-æsthetic analysis of our worldly experience yields the result that everything in the universe possesses a threefold aspect, that is, it may manifest as agreeable, or as disagreeable, or as neutral, *i.e.*, neither agreeable nor disagreeable. It must then have derived these characteristics from its cause; for nothing can be in the effect which was not in the cause. The principles of manifestation, mutation, and conservation, therefore, which are operative in the change of the states of agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral, must also possess the nature of being pleasant (śânta), unpleasant (ghora), and dull (mûḍha).

It is these principles of manifestation, mutation, and conservation, possessing the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness, that are respectively the Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, of the Sâṃkhyas. They are the constitutive elements of Prakṛiti. They are Guṇas in their manifested forms; they are Prakṛiti in their unmanifested form.

The Transformations of Prakṛiti enumerated and distinguished.

The transformations of Prakṛiti are either *prakṛiti-vikṛiti*, original or evolvent as well as modification or evolute, or *vikṛiti*, modification or evolute merely. The former are themselves transformations of their antecedents, and, in their turn, give rise to subsequent transformations. They are Mahat, Ahaṃkâra, and the five Tan-mâtras. The latter are the eleven Indriyas and the five gross Elements. The transformation of Prakṛiti [illegible] with them. Of course, the gross Elements combine and evolve the

material world ; but the world is not a different Tattva or principle from the Elements, because it does not develop a single attribute which is not already possessed by them. For the test of a Tattva or original or ultimate principle is that it possesses a characteristic property which is not possessed by any other Tattva.

The Objective World consists of Twenty-four Tattvas.

The objective world thus contains twenty-four Tattvas, namely, Prakṛiti, Mahat, Ahaṃ-kâra, Manas, the five Indriyas of Cognition, the five Indriyas of Action, the five Tan-mâtras, and the five gross Elements.

The Transformation of Prakṛiti is Mahat or Buddhi.

At the beginning of creation, there arises in Prakṛiti *Spandana* or cosmic vibration which disturbs its state of equilibrium, and releases the Guṇas from quiescence. Rajas at once acts upon Sattva and manifests it as Mahat. Mahat denotes Buddhi, the material counterpart and basis of what we term Understanding or Reason. Buddhi is called Mahat, great, because it is the principal among the Instruments of Cognition and Action. Mahat also means "light"; it is derived from the Vedic word *Mahas* or *Maghas*, meaning light. And Buddhi is called Mahat, because it is the initial transformation of Sattva which is the principle of manifestation. Or, Buddhi which is the first manifestation of the Guṇas and which is the material cause of the world, is called Mahat, in order to distinguish it from individual or finite Buddhis which are its parts. For "what is the Buddhi of the first-born golden-egged (Brahmâ), the same is the primary basis of all Buddhis; it is here called the 'great self.'"

Universal and Individual Buddhis distinguished.

Definition of Buddhi.

The function of Buddhi is *Adhyavasâya* or certainty leading to action. It manifests in eight forms; *viz.*, as virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power, while Sattva is predominant in it, and as vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness, while Tamas is predominant in it. And these, again, are modified into innumerable forms, which are classified as Error, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection. Such is Pratyaya-sarga or the creation of Buddhi or intellectual creation as contra-distinguished from elemental creation.

The Transformation of Buddhi is Ahaṃ-kâra.

From Buddhi springs Ahaṃ-kâra: from "*cogito*," I think, "*sum*," I am. Ahaṃ-kâra is literally the I-maker. It is the material counterpart and basis of what we term egoism, and causes modifications of Buddhi in the forms of "I am," "I do," etc., etc. It is the principle of personal identity and of individuation. Its function is *Abhimâna*, conceit, thinking with reference to itself, assumption of things to itself. But it is not a mere function; it is a sub-

in which reside *Vâsanâs* or the resultant tendencies of accumulated experience, and which is capable of modification into other and grosser forms.

Universal and Individual Ahaṃ-kâras distinguished.

This Ahaṃ-kâra, which is the first transformation of Buddhi, is the cosmic Ahaṃ-kâra, the Upâdhi or adjunct of the golden-egged Brahmâ, the Creator. It is the infinite source of the finite Ahaṃ-kâras of individual Jîvas.

The Transformations of Aham-kâra are: The Indriyas.

The modification of Ahaṃ-kâra is twofold, according as it is influenced by Sattva or by Tamas. The Sâttvic modifications are the eleven Indriyas, that is, the five Indriays of Cognition, *viz.*, the powers located in the Eye, Ear, Nose, Tongue, and Skin, the five Indriyas of Action, *viz.*, the powers located in the voice, hand, feet, and the organs of generation and of excretion, and Manas. Manas is both a power of cognition and a power of action. Assimilation and differentiation are its distinctive functions.

And the Tan-mâtras.

The Tâmasic modifications of Ahaṃ-kâra are the five Tan-mâtras, *viz.*, of Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour and Smell. They are pure, subtle or simple elements, the metaphysical parts of the ordinary Atoms of Matter. They are "fine substances," to quote from Vijñâna Bhikṣu, "the undifferentiated (a-viśeṣa) originals of the Gross Elements, which form the substratum of Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour and Smell, belonging to that class (that is, in that stage of their evolution) in which the distinctions of Śânta (pleasant), etc., do not exist." The process of their manifestation is as follows: The Tan-mâtra of Sound, possessing the attribute of Sound, is produced from Ahaṃ-kâra; then, from the Tan-mâtras of Sound, accompanied by Ahaṃ-kâra, is produced the Tan-mâtra of Touch, possessing the attributes of Sound and Touch. In a similar manner, the other Tan-mâtras are produced, in the order of their mention, by the addition of one more attribute at each successive step.

The Transformations of the Tan-mâtras are the Gross Elements.

The transformations of the Tan-mâtras are the Gross Elements of Ether, Air, Fire, Water, and Earth,—the ordinary Atoms of Matter, in which appear for the first time the distinctions of being pleasant, painful, and neutral. All Bodies, from that of Brahmâ down to a stock, are formed of them.

How the Existence of a Subjective Principle, Puruṣa, is explained.

Now, all this objective world is non-intelligent, because its material cause, Prakṛiti, is non-intelligent. It does not, therefore, exist or energise for its own sake. There must be some one else of a different nature,

some intelligent being, for whose benefit, *i.e.*, experience and freedom, all this activity of Prakṛiti is. Thus do the Sâṃkhyas explain the existence of Puruṣa.

The Twenty-five Tattvas.

To classify the Tattvas logically, they may be exhibited thus:



Puruṣa and Prakṛiti contrasted

Of these, Puruṣa is the principle of Being, Prakṛiti is the principle of Becoming: Puruṣa eternally is, never becomes, while Prakṛiti is essentially Movement; even during *Pralaya* or Cosmic Dissolution, its activity does not altogether cease; it then undergoes homogeneous transformation: Sattva modifying as Sattva, Rajas modifying as Rajas, and Tamas modifying as Tamas. Puruṣa, on the other hand, is eternal consciousness undisturbed. Nothing can come into him, nothing can go out of him; he is *Kûṭa-stha*, dwelling in the cave. And these two eternal co-ordinate principles are in eternal conjunction with each other. But conjunction as such does not set Prakṛiti in movement. Creation is caused by *Râga* or Passion. *Râga* is a change of state which spontaneously takes place in the Rajas of Buddhi, through the influence of Dharma and A-dharma. These are the natural consequences of the previous changes in the transformations of Prakṛiti,

The Spontaneity of Prakṛiti.

and they reside in Ahaṃ-kâra in the form of *Vâsanâ* or tendency, and render impure the Sattva of Buddhi. The activity of Prakṛiti, in the form of the disturbance of its Rajas element, is spontaneously evoked for the purpose of working out and exhausting the stored up Vâsanâ; its successive transformation is really a process of purification of the Sattva of Buddhi. This spontaneous tendency towards purification is due to the vicinity of Puruṣa.

The Nature of Puruṣa.

The Sâṃkhyas constantly hammer on the theme that no pain, no suffering, no bondage ever belongs to Puruṣa. Puruṣa is eternally free, never bound, never released. And because they thus thoroughly reveal the nature of Puruṣa, their doctrine is described as the Sâṃkhya, thorough-revealer.

The Meaning of the word, Sâṃkhya.

The "Bondage" of Puruṣa:

The "experience" of Puruṣa consists in his being the indifferent spectator of the changes that take place in Buddhi; his "bondage" is nothing but the reflection on him of the bondage, that is, the impurities, of Buddhi; his "release" is merely the removal of this reflection which, again, depends upon the recovery by Buddhi of its state of pristine purity, which means its dissolution into Prakṛiti. To say that the activity of Prakṛiti is for the benefit of Puruṣa is, therefore, a mere figure of speech. It is really for the purification of the Sattva of Buddhi.

Is due to A-vivaka.

To think, as people generally do, that pleasure and pain, release and bondage really belong to Puruṣa, is a mistake pure and simple. It is *A-vidyâ*. *A-viveka* is the cause of *A-vidyâ*. And *A-viveka*, non-discrimination, is the failure to discriminate Puruṣa from Prakṛiti and her products. Many are ignorant of the very existence of Puruṣa. Many are ignorant of his exact nature: some identify him with Prakṛiti, some with Mahat, some with Ahaṃ-kâra, and so on. Many, again, know the Tattvas in some form or other, but they know them not: knowledge, in the sense of mere information, they have, but no realisation, and it is realisation which matters. The Sâṃkhya, for this reason, enters into a detailed examination of the *Tattvas*, their number, nature, function, effect, inter-relation, resemblance, difference, etc., and insists on *Tattva-abhyâsa* or the habitual contemplation of the *Tattvas*, so that they may be *Sâkṣât-kṛita* or immediately known or realised. The way is also shown as to how, and the means, too, whereby, to discriminate, on the one hand, the gross Elements from the Tan-mâtras, the Tan-mâtras from the Indriyas, and both from Ahaṃ-kâra, Ahaṃ-kâra from Buddhi, and Buddhi

The Aim of the Sâṃkhya.

from Puruṣa, and, on the other hand, to discriminate Puruṣa from the gross and subtle Bodies and to prevent their further identification.

The Relation of the Yoga to the Sâṃkhya is that of Practice to Theory.

The Yoga which is the practice of the Sâṃkhya, which is the theory, takes up, and starts from, these central teachings of its predecessor, *viz.* (1) All activity—all change—is in and of Prakṛiti. (2) No activity—no change—is in Puruṣa. (3) The modifications of the mind are reflected in Puruṣa, and make him look like modified. (4) When the mind is calm and purified, Puruṣa shines as he really is. (5) Save and except these, reflection and its removal, bondage and release do not belong to Puruṣa. (6) Bondage and release are really of Prakṛiti, or, more strictly speaking, of the individualised form of its first transformation, *viz.*, Buddhi. From the point of view of the philosophy of the history of the Darśanas, these are the last words of the Sâṃkhya.

The Doctrine of the Subtle Body.

The Sâṃkhya also has brought the doctrine of Sûkṣma or Liṅga Śarîra, the Subtle Body, prominently to the fore. For, the purification of the Sattva of Buddhi may not be, and, as a general rule, is not, possible in one life, nor in one region of the Universe. But death seems to put an untimely end to the process of purification, by destroying the gross Body. How then can the process of purification be continued in other lives and in other regions? The Sâṃkhya replies that it can be and is so continued by means of the Subtile Body. It is composed of the seventeen *Tattvas*, beginning with Buddhi and ending with the Tan-mâtras. It is produced, at the beginning of Creation, one for each Puruṣa, and lasts till the time of Mahâ-Pralaya or the Great Dissolution. It is altogether unconfined, such that it may ascend to the sun dancing on its beams, and can penetrate through a mountain. And it transmigrates from one gross Body to another, from one region of the Universe to another, being perfumed with, and carrying the influence of, the *Bhâvas* or dispositions of Buddhi characterised as virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power, and their opposites.

The Plurality of Puruṣas.

The Sâṃkhyas, again, teach a plurality of Puruṣas. This topic has been very fully discussed in the *Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram*, I. 149-159, and the commentaries. Therein Vijñâna Bhikṣu has mercilessly criticised the doctrine of Non-duality maintained by some of the Vedântins, and has sought to establish the plurality of Puruṣas. And Garbe, in his characteristic style, contents himself with a flippant criticism of Vijñâna Bhikṣu's explanations. But Vijñâna Bhikṣu's criticisms are not aimed principally against the unity of Puruṣas, but at those interpretations of it, according

to which the empirical Puruṣas, that is, mundane Puruṣas, the plurality of whom is established by irrefutable arguments, as in the Sâṃkhya Śâstra, are reduced to mere shadows without substance. He does not so much attack the unadulterated *A-Dvaita* of the Vedas and the Upaniṣats as its later developments. He was fully aware of the fact that none of the six Darśanas, for example, was, as we have hinted more than once, a complete system of philosophy in the Western sense, but merely a catechism explaining, and giving a reasoned account of, some of the truths revealed in the Vedas and Upaniṣats, to a particular class of students, confining the scope of its enquiry within the province of Creation, without attempting to solve to them the transcendental riddles of the Universe, which, in their particular stage of mental and spiritual development, it would have been impossible for them to grasp. Similarly, Garbe is wrong in thinking that Vijñâna Bhikṣu "explains away the doctrine of absolute monism." It is only a matter of interpretation and of stand-point; compare Râmânuja, Madhva, etc. For Vijñâna does not hesitate to do away even with the duality of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa when he observes that all the other *Tattvas* enter into absorption in Puruṣa and rest there in a subtle form, as does energy in that which possesses it. (*Vide* his Commentary on S-P-S., I. 61). For an explanation, therefore, of the apparent contradictions in the Darśanas, one must turn to the Vedas and Upaniṣats and writings of a similar scope and character. The Bhagavat-Gîtâ, for instance, declares :—

द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च ।
क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते ॥ १५ । १६ ॥
उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः ।
यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य बिभर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः ॥ १५ । १७ ॥

In the world there are these two Puruṣas only, the mutable and the immutable. The mutable is all created things; the intelligent experiencer is said to be the immutable.—XV. 16.

While the highest Puruṣa is a different one, who (in the Upaniṣats) is called the Parama-Âtmâ, the Supreme Self, and who, presiding over the three worlds, preserves them, as the undecaying, omniscient, omnipotent Îśvara.—XV. 17.

Along such lines the so-called contradictions of the Darśanas find their reconciliation and true explanation in the higher teachings of the Upaniṣats.

The Sâṃkhya does not deny the Existence of God.

It will probably be contended that, in the case in question, such reconciliation is impossible in view of "one of the fundamental doctrines of the genuine Sâṃkhya, which

is the denial of God" (Garbe). No graver blunder has ever been committed by any student of the Sâṃkhya! The genuine Sâṃkhya no more denies the existence of God than does Garbe's illustrious countryman, Emmanuel Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason.* To make this position clear, let us paraphrase the *Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram* on the subject. Thus, Îśvara is not a subject of proof (I. 92). For, we must conceive Îśvara as being either *Mukta*, free, or *Baddha*, bound. He can be neither free nor bound; because, in the former case, being perfect, He would have nothing to fulfil by creation, and, in the latter case, He would not possess absolute power (I.93-94). No doubt, in the *Śrutis*, we find such declarations as "He is verily the all-knower, the creator of all," and the like; these, however, do not allude to an eternal, uncaused Îśvara (God), but are only eulogies of such Jîvas or Incarnate Selves as are going to be freed, or of the Yogins, human as well as super-human, who have attained perfection by the practice of Yoga (I. 95). Some say that attainment of the highest end results through absorption into the Cause (III. 54). But this is not so, because, as people rise up again after immersion into water, so do Puruṣas, merged into Prakṛiti at the time of *Pralaya*, appear, again, at the next Creation, as Îśvaras (III. 54-55). The Vedic declarations, *e. g.*, "He is verily the all-knower, the creator of all," refer to such Highest Selves (III. 56). Neither is the existence of God as the moral governor of the world, proved; for, if God Himself produce the consequences of acts, He would do so even without the aid of Karma; on the other hand, if His agency in this respect be subsidiary to that of Karma, then let Karma itself be the cause of its consequences; what is the use of a God? Moreover, it is impossible that God should be the dispenser of the consequences of acts. For, His motive will be either egoistic or altruistic. But it cannot be the latter, as it is simply inconceivable that one acting for the good of others, should create a world so full of pain. Nor can it be the former; because (1) in that case, He would possess unfulfilled desires, and, consequently, suffer pain and the like. Thus your worldly God would be no better than our Highest Selves. (2) Agency cannot be established in the absence of desire, for, behind every act, there lies an intense desire. And to attribute intense desire to God would be to take away from his eternal freedom. (3) Further, desire is a particular product of Prakṛiti. It cannot, therefore, naturally grow within the Self, whether it be God or the Jîva; it must come from the outside. Now, it cannot be said that desire, which is an evolute of Prakṛiti, directly has connection with the Self, as it would contradict hundreds of

Vedic declarations to the effect that the Self is *Asaṅga*, absolutely free from attachment or association. Neither can it be maintained that Prakṛiti establishes connection of desire with the Self by induction, as it were, through its mere proximity to it; as this would apply equally to all the Selves at the same time (V. 2-9). Furthermore, the above arguments might have lost their force or relevancy, were there positive proof of the existence of God; but there is no such proof. For, proof is of three kinds, *viz.*, Perception, Inference and Testimony. Now, God certainly is not an object of perception. Neither can He be known by Inference; because there is no general proposition (Vyâpti) whereby to infer the existence of God, inasmuch as, Prakṛiti alone being the cause of the world, the law of causation is of no avail here. And the testimony of the Veda speaks of Prakṛiti as being the origin of the world, and hence does not prove the existence of God (V. 10-12).

Thus the Sâṃkhyas maintain that it cannot be proved by evidence that an eternal, self-caused God exists; that the ordinary means of proof, Perception, Inference and Testimony, fail to reach Him; and that there is no other means of correct knowledge on our plane of the Universe. And when, therefore, Kapila thus declares that the various objective arguments for the establishment of theism, *viz.*, the ontological, the cosmological, the teleological, and the moral, cannot stand, and pronounces the verdict of 'non-proven' in regard to the existence of God, he takes up the right philosophical attitude, and there is absolutely no justification for branding his doctrine as atheistical merely on this score. "The notion that the existence of God is susceptible of dialectic demonstration has been surrendered, in later times," as Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall remarks, "by most Christian theologians of any credit: it now being, more ordinarily, maintained that our conviction of deity, on grounds apart from revelation, reposes solely on original consciousness, antecedent to all proof."

Nir-Îśvara and Nâstika are not convertible terms.

Thus the Sâṃkhya is *Nir-Îśvara*, but not *Nâstika*. It is not *Nâstika*, atheistical, because it does not deny the existence of God. It is *Nir-Îśvara*, *lit.* god-less, as it explains all and every fact of experience without reference to, and without invoking the intervention of, a divine agency. Those who imagine that, in the Sâṃkhya, there is a denial of God, obviously fail to recognize the distinction between the two words, *Nâstika* and *Nir-Îśvara*. They, further, fail to bear in mind that the Sanskrit *Îśvara* and the English *God* are not synonymous terms. For, the opposite of *Nâstika* is *Âstika* (believer), one who believes in the existence of God, the authority of the

eda, immortality, and so forth. Accordingly, the Hindu Darśanas have been classified as being either "*Âstika*" or "*Nâstika*," and the "*Nir-Îśvara*" Âṃkhya has been always regarded as falling under the former category.

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THE
SÂṂKHYA-PRAVACHANA-SÛTRAM

VṚITTI OF ANIRUDDHA.

SALUTATION TO ŚRI GANESA.

AUM.

SALUTATION TO THE ORIGIN OF THE MANIFESTED.

INTRODUCTION.

After saluting Vinâyaka, Viṣṇu, Sûrya, Sarasvati, Lakṣmi, Gaṅgâ, and Maheśâna, I begin to write the Vritti (of the Sâṃkhyâ-Sûtram).

Verily, in consequence of Vairâgya, dispassion, Puruṣa, man, is inclined to the study of the Śâstra, (writings), which teaches the means of attaining Mokṣa, Release. Vidyâ, knowledge of Truth, also comes through Vairâgya, dispassion. Vairâgya, again, arises after the exhaustion of Pravṛitti, inclination to, or desire for, external enjoyments, by means of Bhoga, experience, or it arises after the extinction of Dûrita, demerits, acquired in previous births. Thus says the Śruti:

यदहरेव विरजेत तदहरेव प्रव्रजेत्—(Jâbâla Upaniṣat, 4).

The very day one grows dispassionate, the same day let one retire from the world.

Man inclined to the study of Śâstra (as stated above) is, next, released through Para-vairâgya, higher dispassion. Accordingly Patañjali has declared:

दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यं तत्परं पुरुषख्यातेर्गुणवैतृष्ण्यम्

(*Vide* Patañjali's Yoga-Sûtram, I. 15,16, S. B. H., Vol. iv, pp. 28-30). —Vairâgya is the consciousness of self-command in one who has killed within oneself all desires for visible (*e. g.*, garland, sandal paste, woman, etc.) as well as Vedic (or invisible, *e. g.*, heaven and the like) objects of enjoyment. This is higher Vairâgya. It results from knowing the Puruṣa (*i.e.*, from spiritual intuition of the self), and its effect is absence of desire for association with Prakṛiti, the root-cause of the world.

Now, the very kind and great sage Kapila, being desirous of saving the world, commences this Mokṣa-śâstra, Lessons on Release, and, in order to teach this very para-vairâgya, lays down the first aphorism:

BHÂṢYA OF VIJNÂNA-BHIKṢU.

SALUTATION TO THE SUPREME LORD.

Sâṃkhya-pravachana-bhâṣyam, Commentary in Elaboration of the Sâṃkhya Philosophy.

INTRODUCTION.

One, without a second (*Cf.* Chhândogya Upaniṣat, VI. ii. 1)—these words of the Veda declare absence, in the Puruṣa, of difference characterised as Vaidharmya or difference in essential attributes, for the purpose of showing that he attains Mukti or release through annihilation of all Abhimâna, egoity, that is, the sense of separate personality; and not that Puruṣa is one and one only, as is the sky, because of the non-contradiction of hundred attributes.

(*Note.*—One of the charges levelled against the Sâṃkhya Philosophy as a whole is that its teachings conflict with the teachings of the Veda, inasmuch as it admits plurality of Selves, while the Veda says there is but one Self. Vijñâna-Bhikṣu has undertaken to defend the Sâṃkhya against all such adverse criticisms. In these opening verses, he prepares the ground for his future arguments. Now, the diversity of embodied selves can be by no means ignored. Philosophy, again, seeks unity. And thus the problem of the One and the Many has ever been the crux of all philosophies. Some explain the relation of the two on the analogy of a sheet of water and the bubbles that appear on it. According to them, as bubbles rise out of, and ultimately coalesce into, the water, so finite souls rise out of, and ultimately coalesce into, the Supreme Self, and the words, One, without a second, refer to one individual reality. Vijñâna-Bhikṣu does not accept this view. He thinks that the state of Mukti does not imply a state of coalescence, but of harmony, as in a choir, and that, therefore, the above words of the Veda refer simply to absence of difference in kind amongst a plurality of Selves, so that there can be no conflict between the teachings of Kapila and the teachings of the Veda.)

Now, in order to teach a complete system of valid arguments for the purpose of Manana, intellection, that is, assimilation, differentiation, and elaboration, in thought, of the truth, thus *heard*, *i.e.*, learnt, from the Veda, there appeared on earth Nârâyaṇa, in the person of Kapila, as the Author of the Sâṃkhya System of Thought, for the purpose of annihilation of the infinite sufferings of all Jîvas or embodied Selves: I bow down to Him.

(*Note.*—This verse is directed against those who say that the teachings of Kapila are not worthy of acceptance, because he is an atheist. Vijñâna-Bhikṣu proposes to show, on the contrary, that Kapila is verily an incarnation of God.)

We adore that Universal of (Pure) Consciousness, the same in all created things, which shines in various forms, in various upâdhis, receptacles or limiting situations, like fire (in different pieces of wood which give to it differences of size, shape, colour, smell, etc.) and like the sun (in mirrors of different shape, colour, etc.).

I am that Supreme Power or Light, that Being of the uniform essence of consciousness, in which the bewildered distinguish the characteristics of divinity, non-divinity, and the like.

Only a portion (*lit.*, a sixteenth part) is left of the Sâṃkhya-Śâstra, Lessons on Sâṃkhya, which, moon-like, contains the ambrosia of knowledge, after the rest has been swallowed up by the Sun of Time; I shall make it grow again by means of the nectar of (my) words.

And by cutting asunder the knot of consciousness and unconsciousness, I shall deliver (men) from (the limitation imposed on them by) consciousness also, under the cover of a Commentary on Sâṃkhya. May Hari, the Giver of Release, accordingly be pleased.

Non-difference in essential attributes amongst all the Selves, declared by hundreds of texts of the Veda, in such forms as "Thou verily art That," is within the cognisance of this Śâstra alone.

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ।

—Lo, the Self has to be beheld, to be heard about, to be reasoned about, to be constantly meditated upon (Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat, II. iv. 5),—in this and other passages of the Veda, the triplet of Śravaṇa, hearing, *i.e.*, acquiring information about the Self from authoritative external sources, and the rest, (*i.e.*, Manana, intellection, *i.e.*, assimilation, differentiation and elaboration, of the knowledge so acquired, and Nididhyâsana, constant meditation, for the realization of that truth), has been prescribed as the cause of Âtma-sâkṣâtkâra, intuition of the Self or Self-realization, which is the source of Parama-puruṣa-artha, the Supreme Purpose of Personal Existence or the Highest Object of Volition. Now, what, again, are the ways of Śravaṇa, etc.? So it is recalled:—

श्रोतव्यः श्रुतिवाक्येभ्यो मन्तव्यश्चोपपत्तिभिः ।
मत्वा च सततं ध्येय एते दर्शनहेतवः ॥

(Truth about the Self) should be learnt from the teachings of the Veda, subjected to reasoning by means of arguments and, after such reasoning, constantly meditated upon, (as) these are the causes of Darśana, intuition of the Self.

The words 'in the manner laid down in Yoga-Śâstra or Lessons on Yoga' complete the meaning of the word 'Dhyeya,' should be meditated upon. Now, the Lord, in the person of Kapila, taught, by this Viveka-Śâstra, Lessons on Discrimination between the Self and the Not-Self, consisting of Six Books, valid arguments, not conflicting with the Veda, in respect of Puruṣa-artha, Purpose of Life, Jñâna, knowledge, which is its source, Âtma-svarûpa, Nature of the Self, which is the object of knowledge and the like, as learnt from the Veda.

An objector may say: The Nyâya and the Vaiśeṣika also have (already) shown the way to these objects, and have thus taken away the necessity of the present Śâstra. Again these Śâstras being demonstrative of the Self under the contradictory forms of Saguṇa, phenomenal, and Nirguṇa, noumenal, characteristics, there is opposition between the arguments of the Nyâya and Vaiśeṣika systems and the arguments of this System; hence the validity of either is difficult to establish.

To this we reply that it does not stand thus, inasmuch as the difference of their subject-matter as Vyavahârika or practical truth, in the one case, and Pâramârthika or ultimate truth, in the other, leaves no room for absence of necessity and for opposition as apprehended. For, the Nyâya and the Vaiśeṣika, by bringing forward such facts as 'I feel pleasure,' 'I feel pain,' etc., have merely differentiated the Self from its embodiment, etc., and have thus raised it, by means of inference, to the first higher plane, as it is impossible to enter at once into the Para-sûkṣma or most abstract. And the knowledge that is derived from them, by removing the idea of the Self in respect of the embodiment and the like, becomes only practical or moral Tattva-jñâna or cognition of reality, in the same way as, (when, on seeing something possessing height and extension at a distance, doubt arises, at the first blush, whether it be a person or a pillar), knowledge of the possession of hands, legs, and the like, by removing the mistake of a pillar in respect of the person, becomes cognition of reality for all practical purposes. Hence—

प्रकृतेर्गुणसंमूढाः सज्जन्ते गुणकर्मसु ।
तानकृत्स्नविदो मन्दान् कृत्स्नविन्न विचालयेत् ।

Being blinded by Ahaṃkâra, egoity, and other limitations, they stick to the modifications of Prakṛiti, Primeval Matter, and to activities. (Not knowing the Self) they do not know all and are therefore ignorant. He who knows all should not divert them from the Path of Action.—Gîtâ, III. 29.

In the above verse of the Gîtâ it is declared that in comparison with the all-knowing Sâṃkhya philosophers, the debater (*i.e.*, the follower of the Nyâya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy), who thinks that he is the agent in all acts apparently done by him, does not really know all as he does not know the Self, and not that he does not know anything at all. So that the knowledge that is derived from them also, certainly becomes the source of Mokṣa, Release, through successive steps, by means of what is called lower dispassion. And, also, as compared with that knowledge, it is knowledge derived from the Sâṃkhya Śâstra that is ultimate or spiritual, and that becomes the immediate source of Mokṣa by means of higher dispassion, inasmuch as it is proved by the above passage of

the Gîtâ, that it is only he who knows that the Self is not the agent in actions, that knows all. Hundreds of texts of the Veda also prove this point. For example :—

तीर्णो हि तदा भवति हृदयस्य शोकान्—कामादिकं मन एव मन्यमानः—सन्नुभौ लोकावनु संचरति ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव—स यदत्र किञ्चित् पश्यत्यनन्वागतस्तेन भवति ।

He then overcomes all the sorrows of the heart.—Considering desire, etc., as nothing but (modifications of) the mind.—(The Self) is existent, moves into the two worlds, seems as if it thinks, seems as if it desires (Bṛihad. Upa, IV. iii. 7)—Whatever he (the self) sees here cannot influence, or produce any impression on, him.

It is proved also by hundreds of texts of the Smṛiti, treating of spiritual truths. For example :—

प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि सर्वशः ।
अहंकारविमूढात्मा कर्त्ताहमिति मन्यते ॥ गीता ३ । २७ ॥
निर्वाणमय एवायमात्मा ज्ञानमयोऽमलः ।
दुःखाज्ञानमया धर्मा प्रकृतेस्ते तु नात्मनः ॥

He whose self is blinded by Ahaṃkâra, thinks that he is the agent of actions which are, in all cases, performed by the attributes of Prakṛiti (Gîtâ, III. 27).—Verily this self is full of peace and full of knowledge and free from impurities. Pain and ignorance are qualities of Prakṛiti, and not of the self.

Besides, the knowledge by the Nyâya and the Vaiśeṣika Śâstra is obstructed in, *i.e.*, does not reach up to, Paramârtha-bhûmi or the spiritual plane, the level of ultimate reality. But the Nyâya and the Vaiśeṣika do not, on this ground, become worthless, because there is the maxim, *viz.*, यत्परः शब्दः स शब्दार्थः that the significance of a word is that to which it is directed, and there is no obstruction to the Nyâya and the Vaiśeṣika to prove (in man) an element over and above the body, etc., which they are intended to prove, (so that they fulfil their own purpose). The possession of pleasure, etc., in the Self is proved by ordinary experience or is the experience of ordinary people. In the absence, therefore, of the necessity of further proof in this respect, the above additional element has been simply translated into these Śâstras, and hence it does not fall within their scope.

(*Note* :—The Nyâya and the Vaiśeṣika undertake to teach that the body is not the whole man, in other words, that the self is not identical with the physical organism. For this they appeal to the experience of man, namely, that man feels pleasure, pain, and so on, and then show that pleasure, pain, and the like cannot be properties of the body, and that, therefore, there is in man something different from the body, which is the seat of pleasure, pain, etc. Hence it cannot be said that it is a defect in these Śâstras that they do not teach what the self is in itself, whether pleasure, pain, etc., are properties, of the self or are mere accidents, and so on, for that they do not undertake to teach.)

The objector may still say :— It may be so. There may be no contradiction between the Sâṃkhya, on the one hand, and the Nyâya and

the Vaiśeṣika, on the other. But certainly there is conflict with the Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ, *i.e.*, the Vedânta, and the Yoga Śâstra. For, they prove an eternal Îśvara, God, whereas here Îśvara is going to be excluded. It cannot be said that here too there is non-contradiction between the theistic and the atheistic theory on account of their distinction as being practical or moral and ultimate or transcendental, seeing that theism may possibly be said to have been designed for the ends of worship; for, there does not exist any principle of such distinction, since it is equally possible to say that such atheism as that Îśvara is unknowable, which is proved by the conduct of men, is designed to produce indifference towards the lordliness of Îśvara. On the other hand, like the existence of attributes in the Self, Îśvara has been nowhere manifestly excluded in the Veda and other sacred books, whereby it could have been ascertained that the theory of the existence of Îśvara serves only a practical purpose.

To this it is replied as follows: Here too the relation of the practical and the transcendental exists. For, असत्यमप्रतिष्ठं ते जगदाहुरनीश्वरम्—they say the World is unreal, unfounded, God-less (Gîtâ, XVI, 8.)—by teachings like this, the theory that there is no Îśvara has been condemned, and it is in this (*i.e.*, Sâṃkhya) Śâstra that the exclusion of Îśvara has been made for practical purposes only, and it is, therefore, proper to translate it as designed to produce indifference towards the lordliness of Îśvara. The idea of the Sâmkhya teachers is that should eternal lordliness be not contravened in the manner of the Lokâyatika or sensualist doctrines, then Chitta or the inner sense being drawn away towards it by the vision of perfect, pure and eternal lordliness, there would arise an obstacle to the formation of the habit of Viveka or discrimination between the Self and the Not-Self. Is it not also a fact that nowhere there is any condemnation or the like of the theistic theory? That theory, therefore, should not be distorted so as to make it serve only the purposes of worship, etc. Passages such as—

नास्ति सांख्यसमं ज्ञानं नास्ति योगसमं बलम् ।
अत्र वः संशयो मा भूत् ज्ञानं सांख्यं परं मतम् ॥

There is no knowledge comparable with Sâṃkhya. There is no power equal to Yoga. Here let there be no doubt in you. Sâṃkhya is believed to be the highest knowledge.—*Mahâbhâratam, Śânti Parvan.*

prove the superiority of the Sâṃkhya System of Thought to all other systems, only in respect of Viveka or discrimination between the Self and the Not-Self, but not also in respect of the exclusion of Îśvara. Similarly, it is ascertained, from the unanimous verdict

of Parâśara and hundreds of other men of light and leading, that it is the theory that there is Īśvara that is transcendentally true. Moreover

अक्षपादप्रणीते च काणादे सांख्ययोगयोः ।
त्याज्यः श्रुतिविरुद्धोंऽशः श्रुत्येकशरणैर्नृभिः ॥
जैमिनीये च वैयासे विरुद्धोंऽशः न कश्चन ।
श्रुत्या वेदार्थविज्ञाने श्रुतिपारं गतौ हि तौ ॥

In the writing of Akṣapâda (*i.e.*, Gautama, the author of the Nyâya), in the teachings of Kaṇâda (the author of the Vaiśeṣika), in the Sâṃkhya and in the Yoga, the portion that conflicts with the Veda, should be given up by those whose only resort is the Veda. In the works of Jaimini (the author of the Pûrva-Mîmâṃsâ), and of Vyâsa (the author of the Vedânta), however, there is no such contradictory portion; for by understanding the meaning of the Veda from the Veda, they have gone to the end of the Veda (*i.e.*, have thoroughly mastered it).

these passages of the minor Purâṇa by Parâśara and other writings also establish the superiority of the Vedânta so far as it treats of Īśvara. Similarly—

न्यायतन्त्राण्यनेकानि तैस्तैरुक्तानि वादिभिः ।
हेत्वागमसदाचारैर्यद्युक्तं तदुपास्यताम् ॥

Various theorists have propounded manifold systems showing the way to salvation. That system should be followed which is supported by Reason and Revelation and is in accordance with pious conduct.

Pursuant to this direction of the Mahâbhârata, given in the portion dealing with Mokṣa Dharma or religion which secures Release, as well as the conduct of all pious men such as Parâśara, etc., only the argument or method of reasoning which demonstrates the existence of Īśvara, as propounded in the Vedânta, the Nyâya, the Vaiśeṣika and other Systems of Thought, should be accepted as being of greater validity. So also—

यं न पश्यन्ति योगीन्द्राः सांख्या अपि महेश्वरम् ।
अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म तमेव शरणं व्रज ॥

Seek shelter in Him alone, Who is Brahman, the Great Lord, without beginning and without end, whom the master Yogins and even the Sāṃkhyas fail to behold.—Kûrma Purâṇa ?

by these and like words of the Kûrma and other Purâṇas what has been already declared by Nârâyaṇa and others, is only this that the Sâṃkhyas lack in knowledge of Īśvara. Moreover, it is Īśvara that is the principal object of the Vedânta, consciously aimed at from the very beginning. Were it obstructed or futile in that part, the Śâstra would have been altogether useless, because of the maxim, 'The significance of a word is that to which it is directed.' The principal object of the Sâṃkhyâ Śâstra, on the other hand, is Puruṣa-artha, the Supreme Purpose of Life, and Prakṛiti-puruṣa-viveka, Discrimination

between the Self and the Not-Self, which is its source. Hence it cannot be said to be useless, even though it be opposed in that part of it which deals with the exclusion of Îśvara, because of the maxim, 'The significance of a word is that to which it is directed.' Therefore, there being room for adverse criticism in it, the Sâṃkhya is certainly weak, in so far as it deals with the exclusion of Îśvara. It cannot be said, however, that in the Vedânta only Îśvara is the principal subject but not (His) eternal lordliness. For, it presupposes that the view that there can lie no interval between the idea of Îśvara, the Lord, and the idea of lordliness, entails an error, and the presupposition is not proved. It has been accordingly ascertained that Îśvara comes within the scope of the Brahma Mîmâṃsâ, Enquiry into Brahman, the Vedânta, only under the characteristic of being possessed of eternal lordliness. But the word Brahman, in its primary sense, denoting only Para-Brahman, Vyâsa did not frame his aphorism thus, Now, therefore enquiry into Higher Brahman, instead of as, Now therefore, enquiry into Brahman, (*vide* Vedânta-Sûtras, I. i. 1, S. B. H., vol. v, p. 6). From this, again, it should not be apprehended that in consequence of their opposition to the Sâṃkhya, the Vedânta and the Yoga Darśana, Philosophy, have in view only Kârya-Îśvara, *i. e.*, Îśvara as manifested in Creation, which is an effect. For in that case, Prakṛiti would become independent in Creation and consequently design in Creation would not be proved, and a series of Vedânta Sûtras beginning with अनुमानम्, Not the inferred one, (Vedânta Sûtras, I. iii. 3, S. B. H. Vol., V., p. 104), would become out of place. In like manner स पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात् He is the teacher of them also who have passed away, because (being uncaused) He is not delimited by time (Yoga-Sûtras, I. 26, S. B. H., Vol. iv. p. 48)—this aphorism of the Yoga System and the commentary on it by Vyâsa clearly bring home to the mind that Îśvara is eternal. Thus it is by Abhyupagama-vâda, concession to current views, Praudhi-vâda, a bold or dogmatic assertion and the like that the exclusion of Îśvara in the Sâṃkhya appears as being designed to serve a practical purpose. Hence there is no contradiction with the Vedânta and the Yoga. Abhyupagama-vâda also is found in the Śâstras; for example, in the Viṣṇu Purâṇa (I. XVII. 83):

एते भिन्नदृशां दैत्य विकल्पाः कथिता मया ।
कृत्वाभ्युपगमं तत्र संक्षेपः श्रूयतां मम ॥

These, the divergent views of thinkers of different standpoints, have been, O Daitya, described by Me. *Accept* them and hear their summary from Me.

Or, it may be that, for the purpose of impeding the knowledge of the sinful men, even in theistic Darśanas, theories have been established,

ich are opposed to the Veda. Of course, these Darśanas are not thoritative in those portions of them; but authoritativeness certainly longs to them in respect of their principal subjects, which are not posed to the Veda and the Smṛiti. It is, therefore, on this ground one that the disparagement of all Darśanas except the Vedânta and Yoga in the Padma-Purâṇa can be justified. Thus, in the Padma-rana, Śiva says to Pârvatî :—

शृणु देवि प्रवक्ष्यामि तामसानि यथाक्रमम् ।
येषां श्रवणमात्रेण पातित्यं ज्ञानिनामपि ॥
प्रथमं हि मयैवोक्तं शैवं पाशुपतादिकम् ।
मच्छक्त्यावेशितैर्विप्रैः संप्रोक्तानि ततः परम् ॥
कणादेन तु संप्रोक्तं शास्त्रं वैशेषिकं महत् ।
गौतमेन तथा न्यायं सांख्यं तु कपिलेन वै ॥
द्विजन्मना जैमिनिना पूर्वं वेदमयार्थतः ।
निरीश्वरेण वादेन कृतं शास्त्रं महत्तरम् ॥
धिषणेन तथा प्रोक्तं चार्वाकमतिगर्हितम् ।
दैत्यानां नाशनार्थाय विष्णुना बुद्धरूपिणा ॥
बौद्धशास्त्रमसत् प्रोक्तं नग्ननीलपटादिकम् ।
मायावादमसच्छास्त्रं प्रच्छन्नं बौद्धमेव च ॥
मयैव कथितं देवि कलौ ब्राह्मणरूपिणा ।
अपार्थं श्रुतिवाक्यानां दर्शयल्लोकगर्हितम् ॥
कर्मस्वरूपत्याज्यत्वमत्र च प्रतिपाद्यते ।
सर्वकर्मपरिभ्रंशान्नैष्कर्म्यं तत्र चोच्यते ॥
परात्मजीवयोरैक्यं मयात्र प्रतिपाद्यते ।
ब्रह्मणोऽस्य परं रूपं निर्गुणं दर्शितं मया ॥
सर्वस्य जगतोऽप्यस्य नाशनार्थं कलौ युगे ।
वेदार्थवन्महाशास्त्रं मायावादमवैदिकम् ।
मयैव कथितं देवि जगतां नाशकारणात् ॥

——Listen to me, O Devi, I enumerate, in their order, the Tâmasa Śâstras (*i.e.*, teachings which, instead of illuminating, still more darken the understanding), by the very hearing of which even the wise undergo a fall (1). First of all, I myself taught the Śaiva Śâstra, *e. g.*, the Pâśupata, etc., and after that, Śâstras were composed by Brâhmaṇas possessed by my influence (2). Kaṇâda composed the great Vaiśeṣika Śâstra; similarly, Gautama, the Nyâya, and Kapila, the Sâṃkhya (3). And the twice-born Jaimini, the Pûrva-Mîmâṃsâ, which, in its teachings, is identical with the Veda. Dhiṣaṇa composed a greater Śâstra, by the doctrine of atheism; so was composed the very contemptible Chârvâka Śâstra, the Philosophy of Sensualism. For the purpose of the annihilation of the Daityas, Viṣṇu, in the form of Buddha (4-5), composed the Bauddha Philosophy of Nihilism, thereby creating the Naked Order, the Order of the Blue Cloth, &c. And the Theory of Mâyâ, which also teaches Nihilism, and is only Buddhism in

disguise (6), has been taught by myself, O Devi, in the Kali Yuga, Dark Age, in the form of a Brâhmaṇa, giving wrong meanings to the words of the Veda, which should be condemned by all right-thinking men (7). It proves that Karma, action, *i. e.*, religious performance, and the like, should be abandoned, and it is also said there that Naiṣkarmya, non-performance of acts (from selfish motives) results from breaking loose from all Karmas (8). I have proved there the unity of Para-Âtmâ, the Supreme Self, and Jîva, the Embodied Self, and have shown that the ultimate form of Brahman is Nirguṇa, devoid of attributes, *i. e.*, changeless (9). For the purpose of the annihilation of the whole world, I myself have, in the Kali Yuga, taught the great Śâstra, purporting to convey the teachings of the Veda, namely, the Theory of Mâyâ, which in reality is not taught in the Veda, intending it to be the cause of the annihilation of the world (10-11).

We have further elaborated our view in our commentary on the Brahma-Mîmâṁsâ, Enquiry into Brahman, the Vedânta.

It follows, therefore, that none of the Âstika, theistic or orthodox, Darśanas is either unauthoritative or vitiated by contradiction among themselves. All of them are unimpeded in their progress towards the ends which they respectively have in view, and there is (as shown above) no opposition among themselves.

Our objector may rejoin: Well, likewise, in that portion of it also where it teaches plurality of Puruṣas or Selves, the (Sâṃkhya) Śâstra may be merely an Abhyupagama-vâda, an adopted or conceded doctrine.

We reply that it cannot, inasmuch as (on this point) there is no contradiction. For, in the Vedânta also, by a number of aphorisms such as नाना व्यपदेशात्—(Selves are) manifold, on account of predication (in manifold ways) —(Vedânta-Sûtras II. iii. 41, S. B. H. Vol. V., p. 381), nothing but plurality of Jîva Âtmâs or Embodied Selves has been established. The doctrine of the Sâṃkhya, namely, that the Puruṣas established by it, are also Selves, of course, goes against the teaching of the Vedânta, since, by the aphorism आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति—But (they) approach (Him) as the Self (Vedânta-Sûtras, IV. i. 3, S. B. H., Vol. v, p. 682)—it has been ascertained that the Parama-Âtmâ or Supreme Self is the only Self on the transcendental plane, *i.e.*, the plane of Paramârtha or the ultimate reality. But still the Sâṃkhya is not unauthoritative, inasmuch as there is no obstruction to its fulfilling its avowed purpose, that is, to show that the knowledge of the difference of the worldly or phenomenal Self, *i. e.*, the Jîva, from the Not-Self, is the source of Mokṣa or Release. In the Vedânta, we have pointed out in detail that, such being the case, *i. e.*, in consequence of the distinction of the practical or phenomenal standpoint and the point of view of the ultimate reality, there is no contradiction between the doctrines of Plurality of the Self and of the Unity of the Self, which are well-known in the Veda and the Smṛiti.

The objector may urge further: Even then this Śâstra contains the defect of saying the same thing over again, inasmuch as there are the older aphorisms called Tattva-Samâsa or Compendium of Principles dealing with the same subject.

Our reply to this is that there is no such defect. For, the Tattva-Samâsa is an epitome, while the present treatise is an elaboration, of the Sâṃkhya System, and hence neither of them can be a useless repetition.

It is for this reason that this Collection of Six Books, like the Yoga Darśana, is appropriately designated as the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana or Elaboration of the Sâṃkhya Theory. For, that which has been called the Compendium of Principles, gives an epitome of the Sâṃkhya Darśana, and it is of this that an elaborate exposition has been given in this Collection of Six Books. There is, however, this difference between the Sâṃkhya and the Yoga Darśana that in the Collection of Six Books there is only an elaboration of the subjects enunciated in the treatise called the Compendium of Principles, whereas, in the Yoga Darśana, incompleteness has been also avoided by the determination of Îśvara, by means of similar enunciation and elaboration, so far as Îśvara was excluded by the Abhyupa-agama-vâda, or popular view.

The name, Sâṃkhya, is also significant here as will appear from the sayings of the Mahâbhârata, etc., such as :—

संख्यां प्रकुर्वते चैव प्रकृतिं च प्रचक्षते ।
तत्त्वानि च चतुर्विंशत् तेन सांख्याः प्रकीर्तिताः ॥

They are known as Sâṃkhyas, because, they make Saṃkhyâ, and unveil the nature of Prakṛiti, Primeval Matter, as well as of the twenty-four Tattvas, Truths, Principles, or Realities.—(Mahâbhârata, Śânti Parvan).

Saṃkhyâ means declaration of the nature of the Self by means of thorough differentiation.

(*Note.*—The word, Sâṃkhyâ, is derived from the word, Saṃkhyâ, formed from the prefix, *sam*, complete or perfect, and the root, *khyâ*, to declare or state, and, therefore, meaning complete enumeration or perfect declaration. Hence Sâṃkhya denotes the Śâstra which gives a complete enumeration of all the Tattvas or Principles, or which perfectly declares the nature of the Self. The word is accordingly, Yoga-rûḍha, *i.e.*, a compound word formed in a general way but universally known as denoting a particular object).

Thus Sâṃkhya being a Yoga-rûḍha word, (it has been referred to in) such passages of the Veda and the Smṛiti as :—

तत् कारणं सांख्ययोगाधिगम्यम्

That is the Cause, and is accessible to knowledge by means of the Sâṃkhya and the Yoga.—Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat, VI. 13.

एषा तेऽभिहिता सांख्ये बुद्धिर्योगे त्विमां शृणु ।

This then I have said unto you the knowledge taught in the Sâṃkhya. Now listen to this of the Yoga.—(Gîtâ, II. 39).

By the word, Sâṃkhya, only the Sâṃkhya Śâstra should be understood. A different meaning should never be supposed.

Now, this same Mokṣa-Śâstra, Lessons on Release, like the Science of Medicine, contains four Vyûhas or divisions. As the Science of Medicine has to demonstrate Disease, Healthy State, Cause of Disease, and Cure, so a Mokṣa-Śâstra also has to demonstrate Heya, the Avoidable, Hâna, Avoidance, Heya-Hetu, the Cause of the Avoidable, and Hâna-Upâya, the Means of Avoidance, because curiosity or enquiry is directed to them by those who desire Mokṣa. Among them, the threefold pain is the Avoidable; Avoidance is its final cessation; A-viveka, non-differentiation, due to the conjunction of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, is the Cause of the Avoidable; while Viveka-khyâti, knowledge of their difference or separateness, is the Means of Avoidance. The word, Vyûha, also includes the ingredients or constituents of these. Out of the above four, Avoidance comes nearest to the heart, being the end desired. The author of the Śâstra also intends to demonstrate the Avoidable, just in the manner of its being the counter-opposite of Avoidance. Accordingly, in order to draw the attention of the disciples, he proposes the opening of the Śâstra:

BOOK FIRST—THE BOOK OF TOPICS.

Supreme Good described.

अथ त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः ॥ १ । १ ॥

अथ Atha, now. त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिः Trividha (threefold)-duḥkha (pain)-atyanta (absolute, permanent, final)-nivṛittiḥ (cessation, prevention), permanent prevention of threefold pain. अत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः Atyanta (*ne plus ultra*, absolute, supreme)-Puruṣârthaḥ (object desired by the Puruṣa), supreme object of volition or purpose of life.

1. Now, Permanent Prevention of the threefold Pain is the Supreme Purpose of Life.—1.

Vṛitti.—Atha: This word conveys the sense of Maṅgala, an auspicious observance, and not of sequence to Karma, religious performances, as it is clear from the Śruti अथर् .etc., (quoted above), that there is no need of the sense of sequence in the auspicious observance. It is also proper that auspicious ceremonies should be observed at the start of an undertaking. Moreover, the word Atha is observed to denote a good omen. Thus—

ओङ्कारश्चाथशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ ब्रह्मणः पुरा । कण्ठं भित्वा विनिष्क्रान्तौ तेन माङ्गलिकावुभौ ॥

Om and Atha, these two words came out, at the beginning, by breaking through the throat of Bramhâ; hence both of them are auspicious. Trividha-duḥkha, etc.:—Pains arising from bodily and mental processes, being classed together as referring to the Embodied Self, form one kind, (called

dhyâtmika). Âdhibhautika pains, referring to created beings, are those used by beasts, birds, and the like. Âdhidaivika pains, referring to supernatural forces, are those caused by Graha (planetary powers), (unfavourable) stars, Bhûta, fallen spirits, and so on. If it be urged that cessation of these pains will take place of itself, seeing that pleasures and pains last for only two moments; so the author adds Atyanta; for cessation of particular pains only is not intended but also of all future experiences of painful kind. Here the word, Atyanta, conveys the sense of cessation of also future experiences of painful kind. Dharma, acquisition of merits, Artha, acquisition of wealth, Kâma, satisfaction of desires, and Mokṣa, attainment of Release, are objects of volition. But the characteristic of being ultimate or final does not belong to the first three, because they are perishable, and the pleasure that is found in them is derived from objects of the senses. This is, however, not the case with Mokṣa, since it is eternal and possesses the form of illumination Hence it has been stated to be the ultimate object of volition.—1.

Bhâṣya :- This word, Atha, by its very pronunciation, assumes the form of a Maṅgala or good omen. It is for this reason that the author himself will declare, in the Fifth Book, मङ्गलाचरणं शिष्टाचारात्—Observance of a Maṅgala (is obligatory) according to the practice of enlightened men (Sûtram V. I, *infra*). The sense, however, of the word, Atha, in this aphorism, is this that it introduces the main theme. Here it can have no other meaning.

(*Note.*—The other sense which the word, Atha, conveys, is that of sequence. If the same is said to be the sense conveyed here, then it will be either sequence to the query of the disciples, or sequence to the acquisition of knowledge, and the like. The aphorism will, then, mean either that the disciples asked Kapila what the Supreme Purpose of Life was, and so he laid down this aphorism, or that the final cessation of the three-fold pain results after knowledge, etc. The commentator shows that the aphorism can bear neither of these meanings.)

For, sequence, *e.g.*, to the enquiry of the disciples, can possibly have no connection with the Supreme Purpose of Life.

(*Note.*—What the commentator means is this that even a schoolboy knows that the final cessation of the three-fold pain is the Supreme Purpose of Life, so that there can be no occasion for enquiring about it.)

And sequence to knowledge, etc., being the subject of treatment in the sequel, by means of aphorisms specially laid down for that purpose, it is useless to bring out the same sense by the word, Atha. Moreover, if Atha carry a sense different from Adhikâra or the principal or leading topic, the result will be that we shall find no proposition or premiss declaring the opening of the Śâstra, and such other matters. Hence, seeing that the Supreme Purpose of Life has been consciously aimed at at the opening

of the Śâstra and arrived at at the end, it is proper to hold that Atha conveys the sense of Adhikâra only. The conclusion (of the Śâstra) will be तन्निवृत्तिः पुरुषार्थः—The eradication of that is the Supreme Purpose of Life (VI. 70). Adhikâra, again, means introduction as the principal thing. Although commencement is obviously of the Śâstra, *i. e.*, the book itself, still, through the Śâstra, it is also of the end which the Śâstra has in view as well as of its discussion. So that the meaning of the sentence in the aphorism is that it has been begun by us (the author) principally to determine the Supreme Purpose of Life, as described here, together with its Sâdhana or means, and other subsidiary topics.

Pain is three-fold: Âdhyâtmika, originating from the sufferer himself, Âdhibhautika, originating from created beings, and Âdhidaivika, originating from the gods. Therein, Âdhyâtmika is so called, because it arises by reference to Âtmâ or one's own embodiment. It is bodily as well as mental, of which the bodily is that springing from disease, and the like. Similarly, the Âdhibhautika is so called, because it arises by reference to Bhûtas or created beings. It springs from the tiger, thief, and the like. The Âdhidaivika is so called, because it arises by reference to the Devas such as Agni, Vâyu and other Gods. It springs from burns, colds, and the like. Such is the idea expressed by the term, Tri-vidha-duḥkha. Although all pain is, without exception, mental, yet there is the distinction of the mental and the not-mental in consequence of the fact that some pains are produced entirely by the mind, while there are other pains which are not so produced. That which is the Atyanta, complete, without leaving any remainder, Nivṛitti, cessation, of these threefold pains, in their gross or sensible or actual as well as in their fine or ideal or potential forms, the same is Atyanta, supreme, object, agreeable to the understanding of Puruṣas, men,—such is the meaning of the sentence in general. Of these two, gross or sensible pain exists in the present state, and it will die out of itself after the second moment (of its origin); hence there is no necessity of knowledge in this case. Pain that is past, again, has already disappeared; hence there is no need of taking steps towards its destruction. By the method of exhaustion, therefore, it is the cessation of fine or ideal or potential pain, in the state of future, that comes to be the subject of investigation as the Supreme Purpose of life. Thus, there is the aphorism of the Yoga, हेयं दुःखमनागतम्. The avoidable is pain not yet come (Yoga Sûtras, II. 16, S. B. H., vol., iv., p. 20). Nivṛitti, cessation, again, does not signify destruction or non-existence, but the past state, since, Dhvaṃsa, consequent non-existence, and Prâgabhâva, antecedent non-existence, being

essentially the same as the past and the future state, respectively non-existence is not admitted by those who hold the Sat-kârya-vâda, the theory that effects are existent prior as well posterior to their production, that is the Sâṃkhyas.

(*Note.*—The Sâṃkhyas maintain that an effect, *e.g.*, a water-pot, *exists*, in an enveloped form, in its cause, *viz.*, earth, and that production means only development. The opposite school, such as the Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, contend that an effect is altogether *non-existent* so long as it is not produced, but that it is capable of coming into existence. For the purpose of their theory, they divide non-existence as Atyanta-abhâva or absolute non-existence, as for example, of a castle in the air, and Saṃsarga-abhâva or non-existence associated with existence, which they further divide as Prâg-abhâva or antecedent non-existence, as, for example, of a water-pot so long as it was not produced, Dhvaṃśa-abhâva or consequent non-existence, as, for example, of the water-pot after its destruction by means of a club or the like, and Anyonya-abhâva or mutual non-existence or absence of identity, that is, difference, as, for example, the non-existence of the nature of a cow in a horse, and *vice versa* (*vide* the Vaiśeṣika Sûtras, IX. i. 1-10, S. B. H., Vol. vi. p. 287 *et seq*). The Sâṃkhyas do not accept this theory of non-existence. What is called antecedent non-existence is, according to them, potential existence, and what is called consequent non-existence is existence in the state of being past).

An objector may argue: Pain which is not-yet-come, that is, which is not present or existent at any time, is incapable of proof, *i.e.*, unreal. Hence, like a flower in the sky, it cannot appropriately become an object of volition.

We reply that this is not the case. For, it has been established in the (Yoga) Darśana of Patañjali that the power or force of things to produce their respective effects lasts so long as the things themselves endure, since the existence of fire and other things, devoid of the power of burning, etc., has been nowhere observed. And this power lies in the form of those respective effects in the state of not-yet-come. It is the same which is also described as capability of being the Svarûpa or original or unmodified form of the material cause (*e.g.*, of the pain subsequently produced).

(*Note.*—Pain, for instance, is a state of consciousness. So long as pain is not actually produced, this consciousness remains in a pure, unmodified condition. This is its original form. When pain is actually produced, this consciousness becomes its material cause. And the power that is inherent in this consciousness and that makes it capable of being modified into a painful state, is called the capability of being the original form of the material cause. It is, in other words, potentiality of subsequent transformation into a state of pain.)

It is, on this ground, inferred that the existence of pain not-yet-come, (*i.e.*, the possibility of pain), remains so long as the existence of Chitta or the inner sense continues. The cessation of that, therefore, is the Purpose of Life. There is, however, this minor distinction that, in what is called Jîvan-mukti-daśâ or the state of Release during Life, pains,

over and above Prârabdha-karma-phala (or consequences of acts previously performed, which are actually experienced and thereby exhausted in the present life), that is, pains in the state of not-yet-come, known as the seeds of pain, are burnt up, while, in what is called Videha-kaivalya or disembodied isolation, they are destroyed together with the Chitta or the inner sense. The burning up of the seed, again, means only the destruction of the contributory cause of A-vidyâ or false knowledge, since everybody admits that Vidyâ or knowledge can eradicate only A-vidyâ or false knowledge. It is for this reason that destruction of pain takes place along with that of the Chitta or the inner sense; for, there is no proof that knowledge can directly destroy pain, etc.

(*Note.*—For an account of the theory of Saṃsâra and Mokṣa, here alluded to, see our introduction to the Vaiśeṣika Sûtras, S. B. H., Vol. vi, p. xxxii-xxxiv.)

The objector may argue further: But still the cessation of pain cannot possibly be Puruṣa-artha, an object desired by the in-dwelling Self, *i.e.*, an object of volition, because pain being a property or quality of Chitta, the inner sense, the cessation of it is not possible, in the Puruṣa. The theory lies open to the same objection, even if the expression, Duḥkha-nivṛitti, cessation of pain, be taken to mean non-production of pain, as, in that case, it is a permanently-established fact with regard to the Puruṣa that no pain can arise in him (so that there is no necessity of proving it over again). It may be urged, however, that as in cases of sudden forgetfulness, such as of an article of ornament hanging round the neck, people search for articles erroneously believed to be missing, so here also, although it is established, (by the very conception of the Puruṣa as being eternally free from all changes of states, and altogether unaffected by external influences), that pain cannot be produced in the Puruṣa, still it may be erroneously believed that such characteristic does not belong to the Puruṣa; and that, in consequence of such error, the state of non-production of pain in the Puruṣa may become an object of voluntary pursuit. But the position is not a tenable one. For, even were this the case, the error would be removed, the moment one learns (Śravaṇa) and thinks about (Manana) it that the Puruṣa is, by nature, free from pain, and accordingly the subsequent Pravṛitti, application, to meditation and the like for the purpose of annihilation of pain, would have no legs to stand upon. For, activity in the direction of employing means which require so much exertion, proceeds only when there is certainty about the result to be attained by it, but in the case of the matter under discussion, it is known, by means of Śravaṇa (learning from authoritative external sources) and Manana (thinking) that no pain can be produced

in the Puruṣa as he is, and hence here there can arise no such certainty, unaffected by the knowledge that it is groundless, that non-production of pain is not present in the Puruṣa as an essential characteristic, and is therefore a result to be secured by voluntary attempt. Granted, moreover, that, on account of error and the like, non-existence of pain may occasionally come to be an object of desire to the Puruṣa; but why should the Veda which possesses the power of removing all infatuation (Moha), seek to establish that which is already in existence, as a result to be attained by voluntary effort? For, there are passages in the Veda such as तरति शोकमात्मवित् —He who knows the Self, overcomes sorrow (Chhând. Upan., VII. i. 3); विद्वान् हर्षशोकौ जहाति —He who knows, avoids joy and grief (Kaṭha Upan., I. ii. 12); and so forth.

To this it is replied as follows: The above Pûrva-pakṣa, adverse argument, will be solved by the very aphorism (I. 19 *post*), namely that, except connection with Prakṛiti, there is no other bond in the Puruṣa who is, by nature, eternally pure, eternally enlightened, and eternally free, which aphorism determines the Cause of the Avoidable. Thus, pleasure and pain exist also in the Puruṣa in the form of reflections or images, as otherwise there would be no reason or possibility of their being Bhogya or objects of experience under the Law of Karma. For, Bhoga or experience consists in the reception of pleasure, etc., and reception means transformation into their shape. But such transformation, like transformation of Buddhi, Understanding or Reason, into the shape of the objects apprehended by it, is not possible in the case of Kûtastha-chiti or Consciousness seated in the cave (*i.e.*, the Self into which, according to the Sâṃkhya conception, no ideas can enter from the outside). And, there being no other alternative, Tat-âkârata, 'transformation into their shape,' is necessarily reduced, in the case of the Puruṣa, to nothing but the nature of an image. It is this reflection of the function of Buddhi or Reason, that has been declared by the Yoga aphorism, वृत्तिसारूप्यमितरत्र.—In other states, (there is in the Self) similarity in form to the functions (of the mind).—(Yoga-Sûtras, I. 4, S. B. II., vol. iv., p. 10). *In the commentary on the Yoga-Sûtras also, in the passage,* [illegible] *—While burning (i.e., suffering) is caused to the mind, the Puruṣa also, because he is obliged to transform into the shape of the mind, appears as though burning were caused to him* he image or reflection of pains such as 'burning,' etc., is mentioned, pecifically and without leaving room for doubt, by the expression, [illegible], influence, that is, inflow, of the form of the mind. It is for his reason also that the author of the aphorisms (Kapila) will later on

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give the example of the crystal, in the case of the Puruṣa taking on the colour of the function of Reason, *Cf.* कुसुम्भ मणेः—As the crystal by means of the flower (II. 35 *post*). The Vedânta thinkers also declare that Dṛiśya, that which is visible, *i.e.*, the object of cognition, is manifested, *i.e.*, is known, only as it is super-imposed upon, or reflected in, consciousness. Here Adhyâsa, super-imposition cannot be anything but reflection of one thing into another, inasmuch as to argue that knowledge as such is Adhyâsa or super-imposition would be arguing in a circle in this way that knowledge results from Adhyâsa, while knowledge itself is Adhyâsa. On this point the following also may be recalled :—

तस्मिंश्चिद्दर्पणे स्फारे समस्ता वस्तुदृष्टयः ।
इमास्ताः प्रतिबिम्बन्ति सरसीव तटद्रुमाः ॥

All these same appearances of things are reflected in that large mirror of the mind, as (are reflected) in a lake the trees that stand on the banks (*Yoga-Vâsiṣṭha Râmâyaṇa*).

Here the word, Dṛiṣṭi, appearance or, *lit.*, vision, from the similarity of argument, denotes function of the Reason in general. And reflection means transformation of the mind into the form of those shining bodies which serve as Upâdhis or things which super-impose their shadows upon adjacent things.

It follows, therefore, that association of pain, called Bhoga or experience, exists in the Puruṣa, in the form of reflection. Hence the cessation of pain, in that very form, properly becomes an object of voluntary pursuit by the Puruṣa. Hence also, even the man on the street, as is observed, prays, Let me not suffer pain. Cessation *of the experience of pain*, moreover, could not reasonably be an object of volition, were it only a means to an ulterior end; it is, therefore, by itself, the object of voluntary pursuit by the Puruṣa. Cessation *of pain*, on the other hand, being, like the removal of thorns, etc., a means to an end, is not itself an object desired by the Puruṣa. Likewise, pleasure also is not in itself an object desired by the Puruṣa. It is the *experience* of them that, as such, comes to possess the characteristic of being an object desired in itself by the Puruṣa. Vyâsa-deva also has said the same thing, *viz.*, that cessation of the *experience* of pain is an object desired by the Puruṣa, in his commentary on the Yoga-Sûtras; for, he says तस्मिन्निवृत्ते पुरुषः पुनरिदं तापत्रयं न भुङ्क्ते.—That having ceased, the Puruṣa does not again suffer these threefold afflictions. Hence the teaching of the Veda also that cessation of pain is an object desired by the Puruṣa, should be understood only in the relation of pain being an object of experience. All this has been fully discussed by us in our

Yoga-Vârtika. Thus, by this aphorism, the first two divisions of the subject in discourse, (the Avoidable and the Avoidance), have been briefly enunciated; and a detailed account of them will be given in the sequel.—1.

Ordinary means inadequate for the purpose.

न दृष्टात्तत्सिद्धिर्निवृत्तेऽप्यनुदर्शनात् ॥ १ । २ ॥

न Na, not. दृष्टात् Dristât, From observed, visible, or ordinary (means). तत्-सिद्धिः Tat-siddhih, the production, accomplishment, or realisation of that (*i. e.*, the permanent cessation of the experience of pain). निवृत्ते Nivritte, being stopped or prevented. अपि Api, even. अनुवृत्तिदर्शनात् Anuvritti-darśanât, on account of the observation of return, re-appearance, or recurrence.

2. The realisation of that (*i.e.*, permanent cessation of the experience of pain) (can-) not (take place) by ordinary (means, such as men and money), because, when (by those means) (pain is) prevented (at one time), it is found to return (at another time).—2.

Vritti.—(Pûrva-pakṣa or *prima facie* adverse argument): Let cessation of pain be an object desired by the Puruṣa. Still this object can be attained by quite ordinary means also, means which, again, are of easy employment. What sane man will, therefore, resort to such means as inhibition of Chitta or the inner sense, and so forth, which the Śâstras, (and not ordinary experience), prove to be useful, and which can be completed or brought to perfection by a succession of many births? As it has been said:

अके चेन्मधु विन्देत किमर्थं पर्वतं व्रजेत् ।
इष्टस्यार्थस्य संसिद्धौ को विद्वान् यत्नमाचरेत् ॥

If (there is a honey-comb) in a corner of the house, (from which) honey can be obtained, for what purpose will a man go to the mountain? What wise man will take pains to secure the object desired in an arduous manner?

Thus, for the prevention of bodily pain, there are medicines, etc., for the prevention of mental pain, there are progeny, wife, sweatmeats, etc., for the prevention of Âdhi-bhautika pain or pain causd by beasts, birds, etc., there are various means declared by the authors of the Art of Government, etc., and for the prevention of Âdhi-daivika pain or pain caused by planets, evil spirits, etc., there are pacifications (*i.e.*, performances by which cruel and offended planetary powers are pacified), jewels (which ward off evil spirits), incantations, etc.

The reply to the above Pûrva-pakṣa is given in the present aphorism,

We do not call mere cessation to be the object desired by the Puruṣa, but cessation of production (of pain), we say, is the object desired by the Puruṣa. By means of medicines, and so forth, again, pain does not invariably cease. Or, if it ceases to a certain extent, there is no certainty or law of nature that it will not appear again in another form.—2.

Bhâṣya.—Now, in order to show the necessity for the Means of Avoidance, the fourth division of the subject-matter, which will be described hereafter, the author declares, by a number of aphorisms, that all other means cannot effect the Avoidance of Pain desired.

The realisation of the permanent cessation of pain does not result from ordinary means such as wealth, etc., Why? Because it is found that where pain is prevented by means of wealth, and the like, it comes back again afterwards on the disappearance of the wealth, etc. Thus says the Veda :—

अमृतत्वस्य तु नाशास्ति वित्तेन

There is no hope of attaining immortality by means of wealth (Bṛihad-âraṇyaka Upaniṣat, IV. V. 3).—2.

Still they have their uses.

प्रात्यहिकक्षुत्प्रतीकारवत् तत्प्रतीकारचेष्टनात् पुरुषार्थत्वम् ॥ १ । ३ ॥

प्रात्यहिकक्षुत्प्रतीकारवत् Prâtyahika-kṣut-pratîkâra-vat, like the satisfaction of daily hunger. 'Pratîkâra' is a general word, meaning remedy, relief, redress. तत्प्रतीकारचेष्टनात् Tat-pratîkâra-cheṣṭanât, on account of the endeavour or solicitation for relief or removal of pain by means of that, *i.e.*, ordinary objects such as wealth. पुरुषार्थत्वम् Puruṣa-artha-tvam, the being an object desired by the Puruṣa. It is an object of volition or end of consciously purposive activity.

3. (Cessation of pain by ordinary means also) is an object desired by the Puruṣa, inasmuch as, like the satisfaction of hunger every day (by means of food), people, (as a matter of fact), earnestly seek relief of pain by those means.—3.

Vṛitti.—(It has been said above that pain may cease to a certain extent by ordinary means. Now, one may go to the other extreme, and urge): Let there be (temporary) cessation of pain (by ordinary means); still it cannot, on that account, be a proper object of desire for the Puruṣa, inasmuch as such relief has to be repeated over and over again.

For this reason the author says :

As the satisfaction of hunger every day, by means of delicious rice and other articles of food, is an object of desire to him who is so satisfied,

for cessation of pain, medicines, and such other things are objects of desire, inasmuch as they bring relief over and over again.—3.

(*Note.*—The extremist urges that the effect produced by ordinary remedies is not permanent, and that their use has to be repeated on every occasion, and therefrom argues that they are not proper objects of desire. Aniruddha seems to reply that precisely for the very same reason, namely, that they are capable of constant repetition, these worldly remedies are really objects of desire, because by means of constant repetition, the effect produced by them somewhat assumes the character of permanency).

Bhâṣya.—(*Pûrva-pakṣa*) If the acquisition of wealth and the like fails, in this way, to give relief from pain, then it is useless, like the bathing of the elephant. Why do then people engage in such pursuits?

To this the author gives the reply:

Cessation of pain, producible by means of worldly objects, is simply not the *ultimate* object of desire or the Supreme Purpose of Life; otherwise, in some degree, it is certainly an object of desire. Why? Because, as in the case of the removal of the pain of hunger which is felt every day, people also seek removal of pain by means of wealth, and the like. Hence activity in the acquisition of wealth, and the like, is justified. The bathing of the elephant, etc., inasmuch as they give, at least, temporary relief from pain, are really objects of desire, although of a lower order.—3.

Nevertheless, they must be rejected.

सर्वासम्भवात्तत्सम्भवेप्यत्यन्तासम्भवाद्धेयः प्रमाणकुशलैः॥१।४॥

सर्वासम्भवात् Sarva-asambhavât, on account of absence of universal possibility. On account of non-existence of visible means at all times and at all places. तत्सम्भवे Tat-sambhave, in the case of their existence. Vijñâna-Bhikṣu does not read the pronoun Tat in the aphorism. अपि Api, even. अत्यन्तासम्भवात् Atyanta-asambhavât, on account of impossibility of complete (cessation.) Vijñâna-Bhikṣu reads Sattâ-sambhavât instead of Atyanta-asambhavât. Sattâ-sambhavât means on account of possibility of existence (of other pains). हेयः Heyaḥ, should be given up. प्रमाणकुशलैः Pramâṇa-kuśalaiḥ, by (men) skilful in argument or reasonable men.

4. (Cessation of pain by visible means) should be given up by reasonable men, because it is not possible in all cases, and because, even where it is possible, it cannot be permanent (Aniruddha), or there is possibility of existence of other pain (Vijñâna-Bhikṣu).—4.

Vṛitti.—He gives the conclusion:

For physicians and the like (*i. e.*, visible means) do not exist in all places and at all times. Even if they do so exist, they cannot bring about permanent cessation of the threefold pain, inasmuch as attraction or desire and the like (which are causes of pain) must necessarily arise

through intimate connection with the body. It has not been found that an embodied self has been happy. Hence this Puruṣa-artha or object of desire should be forsaken by reasonable men, and that which is learnt from the Śâstra should be adopted.—4.

Bhâṣya.—He states that the above-mentioned Puruṣa-artha, object of volition of a lower kind, should be rejected by men of wisdom :

And the above-mentioned remedy of pain, producible by visible means, 'heyaḥ,' should be thrown into the side of pain, 'Pramâṇa-kuśalaiḥ,' by those who are well versed in the Śâstra, learning, of discrimination between pain and not-pain. Why? 'Sarva-asambhavât' : Because remedy by visible means is not possible in all cases of pain. He further observes that even where there is such possibility, there still pain arising from sins of acceptance of gifts, etc., is inevitable : 'Sambhave api,' that is, even in case of such possibility, there must necessarily exist connection with pain not preventible by visible means. Compare Yoga Sûtra, परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च सर्वमेव दुःखं विवेकिनः—To the discriminative, all, without exception, is pain, inasmuch as (enjoyment of pleasure is accompanied) with affliction, (in the shape of aversion to all that interferes with the enjoyment of pleasure), and is followed by resultant pain and by pain due to the recollection that the enjoyment of pleasure has passed away, and also on account of active opposition among the functions (*e. g.*, pleasure, pain, etc.) of the Guṇas or principles, (namely, of illumination, Sattva, evolution, Rajas, and involution, Tamas, which are constantly struggling to overpower one another).—(Yoga Sûtram, II. 15, S. B. H., Vol. iv., p. 114).—4.

Because MOKṢA *or Release is the good* PAR EXCELLENCE.

उत्कर्षादपि मोक्षस्य सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेः ॥ १ । ५ ॥

उत्कर्षात् Utkarṣât, on account of excellence or superiority. अपि Api, also; or. मोक्षस्य Mokṣasya, of Mokṣa or Release. सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेः Sarva-utkarṣa-Śruteḥ, from the texts of the Veda, which declare excellence over all else.

5. (Cessation of pain by visible means should be rejected), because it varies in degrees of excellence, (according as different means are applied), whereas Mokṣa is, as is evident from the Veda, absolutely the most excellent. (Aniruddha); or, (Existence of pain in objects of desire attainable by visible means is inferred) from the superiority of Mokṣa to those objects, and the superiority of Mokṣa to all else is proved by the Veda. (Vijñâna-Bhikṣu.)—5.

Vritti—The author advances another argument:

Again, comparative excellence (in different acts) of cessation of pain (by visible means) is an observed fact. Mokṣa, on the other hand, is the most excellent of all, being permanent and uniform and possessing the form of eradiction of all pain.—5.

Bhâṣya.—An objector may urge: Intermixture with pain is not applicable to one and all cases of relief of pain producible by visible means. Hence it is also realled:

यत्र दुःखेन सम्भिन्नं न च ग्रस्तमनन्तरम् ।
अभिलाषोपनीतं च तत् सुखं स्वःपदास्पदम् ॥

That which is not intermixed with pain, nor is afterwards eclipsed or swallowed up in pain, and which comes to one as soon as it is desired, the same is pleasure or happiness fit to be called heavenly enjoyment. (*Saṃkhya-Tattva-Kaumudî, introduction to Saṃkhya-Kârikâ* 2)."

In view of this argument the author states:

Existence of pain in them is ascertained from the superiority of Mokṣa, which is not realisable by visible means, to kingdom and other objects of desire, attainable by visible means. From the word, Api, also it follows that there are also such other reasons as that those objects are, in essence, modifications of the three Guṇas or creative principles (*vide post*), etc. If it be asked, what evidence there is as regards the superiority of Mokṣa, so he says, Sarva-utkarṣa-śrutch, which means that the superiority of Videha-kaivalya, disembodied isolation or singleness, is proved by such texts of the Veda as—

न च वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति

Verily obliteration of the distinction of the agreeable and the disagreeable cannot take place in the state of embodied existence—(*Chh. Upa.* VIII. xii. 1).

अशरीरं वाव सन्तं प्रियाप्रिये न स्पृशतः

The agreeable and the disgraceable cannot touch him who exists in a disembodied form (*ibid.*)—5.

Scripturlal remedies are equally inadequate.

अविशेषश्चोभयोः ॥ १ । ६ ॥

अविशेषः Aviśeṣaḥ, non-distinction. च Cha, and. उभयोः Ubhayoḥ, between the two.

6. (As regards the temporary character of the result contemplated by them), there is no distinction between the two theories.—(Aniruddha). Or, (as regards the temporary character of their effect, *i.e.*, cessation of pain), there is no distinction between the two (*i.e.*, visible means, on the one

hand, and religious performances, prescribed in the Veda, on the other).—(Vijñâna-Bhikṣu.)—6.

Vritti:—An objector may say: "Well, but there is not a Darśana or System of Thought in which Mokṣa has not been held up as the Puruṣa-artha or supreme object of life. Nor does Mokṣa consist in the mere cessation of pain by means of medicine and the like. Hence that which is your conclusion, will also be ours." To this the author replies:

An opponent's theory can be condemned by proof of one's own theory, but not otherwise. It has been also said:

यत्रोभयोः समो दोषः परिहारोऽपि वा समः ।
नैकः पर्यनुयोज्यः स्यात्तादृगर्थविचारणे ॥

Where the same defect exists in both, or where the rejection of both is equally immaterial, there one of them cannot be selected for censure, as regards the consideration of the particular subject in question.—6.

Bhâṣya:—An objector may say: "Let it be so that permanent cessation of pain cannot result from visible means. But it may result from invisible means, namely, religious performances, prescribed in the Veda, there being such texts of the Veda as अपाम सोमममृता अभूम—We drank the Soma juice and we became immortal (Atharvaśiraṣ Upaniṣat, 3)." In that case, the author says:

The meaning is that 'Â-viśeṣaḥ,' non-difference, only should be regarded to exist, 'ubhayoḥ,' in the case of both of them, that is, visible and invisible means, in respect of their not being the means of permanent cessation of pain, and in respect of their being the causes of what has been already stated, (*i.e.*, temporary effects). The very same thing has been observed in the Kârikâ: दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः सह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः

The means or practices taught in the Veda are similar to the visible ones; for, they are attended with impurity, waste, and excess.—(*Sâmkhya-kârikâ, Verse* 2).

'Ânuśravika,:' Anuśrava means that which is heard from the Guru or preceptor, after recital by him, that is, the Veda; Ânuśravika means sacrifices and so forth enjoined in it. The meaning is that these scriptural means are, like the visible ones, admixed with impurity, *i. e.*, sins due to killing, etc., and possess the characteristic of producing perishable as well as superfluous results.

As objector may argue:—(Killing in a sacrifice is lawful, being enjoined in the Veda, and) the significance of an injunction consists in the form of (conduct in accordance to it) being the means of realization of a good which is not followed by a greater evil. If, therefore, lawful killing be productive of sin, the significance of the injunction would be difficult to maintain.

But we say that such is not the case. For, that part of the injunction, *viz.*, that conduct in accordance to it is not followed by a greater evil, is of this form that it is not productive of pain in addition to the pain *immediately* following the production of the good. Inasmuch as, therefore, the evil producible by lawful killing, *immediately* follows the production of the good, the above significance of the injunction remains unimpaired. Some, however, think that only killing other than lawful killing, is productive of sin. But the explanation is not correct, there being no reason for so curtailing the meaning (of the texts on the sinfulness of killing). It is also heard that Yudhiṣṭhira and others had to perform penances in order to avert the evil consequences of having killed their kinsmen and of other acts of cruelty towards them, on the field of battle and elsewhere, even though, by their *Svadharma*, or dictates of their personal morality (as Kṣattriyas or deliverers from oppression), they were required, nay, compelled, to do so. There is, moreover, the observation of Mârkaṇḍeya :

तस्माद् यास्याम्यहं तात दृष्ट्वेमं दुःखसन्निधिम् ।
त्रयीधर्ममधर्माढ्यं किम्पाकफलसन्निभम् ॥

I shall, therefore, go away, my son (or sire), seeing that it is the receptacle of pain—that merits springing from Vedic performances are rich in demerits, hence resembling a fruit hard to digest.—Mârkaṇḍeya Purâṇa, X. 31.

There is, of course, the text of the Veda : अहिंसन् सर्वभूतान्यन्यत्र तीर्थेभ्यः—Not killing any creature elsewhere than in sacred places (Chh. Upa., VIII. LXV. 1, S. B. II., Vol. III, Pt. II. p. 587). But it declares only that forbearance from killing besides that which is lawful, is the means to the attainment of some good, but not also that in lawful killing there is absence of casuality towards the production of evil. More on this point may be looked for in the Yoga-Vârtika.

There are, again, texts of the Veda such as :

न कर्मणा न प्रजया न धनेन त्यागेनैकेऽमृतत्वमानशुः

Some attained immortality, not by action, nor by progeny, nor by wealth, but by renunciation.—(*Kaivalya Upaniṣat*, I. 2) ;

✓ तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय

Only by knowing Him, one can pass beyond Death ; there exists no other path for travelling—(Śvetâśvatara Upa., III. 8).

(On the other hand, it is also revealed in the Veda, that immortality can be attained by means of drinking the Soma juice, etc.) By reason of this obvious contradiction, which, otherwise, must necessarily appear in the Veda, immortality, attainable by means of drinking the Soma juice,

etc., should be understood in a relative or secondary sense, on the authority, for example, of the Viṣṇu-Purâna, which declares:

आभूतसंप्लवं स्थानममृतत्वं हि भाष्यते

Existence till the dissolution (Pralaya) of the Cosmic System, is called immortality. (Viṣṇu-Purâṇa, II. viii. 90).—6.

Bondage is not natural to Puruṣa.

न स्वभावतो बद्धस्य मोक्षसाधनोपदेशविधिः ॥ १ । ७ ॥

न Na, No. स्वभावतः Svabhâvataḥ, by nature. बद्धस्य Baddhasya, of (one who is) in bondage, or confined. मोक्षसाधनोपदेशविधिः Mokṣa-sâdhana-upadeśa-vidhiḥ, observance of instructions regarding the means for the attainment of Mokṣa or Release.

7. Observance of instructions regarding the means for the attainment of Mokṣa (can-) not (be enjoined) in the case of one who is confined by nature.—7.

Vṛitti:—It may be asked whether instructions regarding the means for the attainment of Mokṣa refer to one who is confined by nature, or otherwise. So the author says:

(Observance of instructions regarding the means for the attainment of Mokṣa does not refer to one who is confined by nature), because destruction of natural condition will entail destruction of Svarûpa, *i.e.*, the thing in itself. (*vide* Bhâṣya below). It has been also said:

वस्तुस्थित्या न बन्धोऽस्ति तदभावान्न मुक्तता ।
विकल्पघटितावेतावुभावपि न किंचन ॥

There is no confinement or bondage by the nature of things, nor does the state of release follow from its non-existence. Both of these, (Confinement and Release), being constituted by error, have no real existence.—7.

Bhâṣya:—It has been thus established that 'visible' (popular) and 'invisible' (scriptural) means are not directly the means for the realisation of Puruṣa-artha or the (highest) object of desire. What then is the means for its realisation? The author will say that the means (required) is the knowledge of the Viveka or distinction (between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti). Now, it is only by way of rooting out the cause of pain, known as A-viveka or non-differentiation between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, that knowledge of Viveka or their distinction becomes the means of the avoidance (of pain). With this in view, by a minor section at the very beginning, the author shows, by the method of exhaustion, by the exclusion of all others, that A-viveka itself is the cause of the avoidable (*i.e.*, pain);

Permanent cessation of pain having been already declared to possess the characteristic of Mokṣa, Bandha here means nothing but connection or association with pain.

It, Bondage, does not possess the characteristic of being natural, as described below, to the Puruṣa, inasmuch as 'Vidhiḥ,' observance or performance, 'Sâdhana-upadeśasya,' that is, of Vedic precepts regarding the means to be employed, Mokṣâya, for the purpose of release, of one who is confined by nature, is not possible for those who are enjoined in this behalf. For, the release, *i.e.*, separation, of fire from its natural hotness is not possible, because that which is natural to a thing, is co-existent with the thing itself. Such is the meaning.

Accordingly it has been declared in the Îśvara-Gîtâ:

यद्यात्मा मलिनोऽस्वच्छो विकारी स्यात् स्वभावतः ।
न हि तस्य भवेन्मुक्तिर्जन्मान्तरशतैरपि ॥

Were the Self, by nature, impure, untransparent, mutable, verily Release would not accrue to it even by hundreds of re-births.—Kûrma-Purâṇa, II. ii. 12.

One thing is said to be *natural* to another, when, the former existing, no delay occurs in the production of the latter, from delay (in the appearance) of the cause. Such is the definition of the characteristic of being natural.

An objector may interpose that there can be no doubt at all that pain is natural, as there is the incidence or possibility of constant experience of it. But this is not so. For, although pain is inborn to, or of the very nature of, the Chitta or the mind, for the reason that the latter is essentially constituted by the threefold Guṇas or elements of Prakṛiti, yet, as there is not constant experience of pain in consequence of the overwhelming preponderance of Sattva or the element of stability in the Prakṛiti, so the non-experience of it is possible for the Self also. Furthermore, the Bauddhas who maintain that pain is inborn to the Chitta or mind, make a concession to the popular view that the Chitta or mind itself is the Self.

Our opponent may urge: Now, that being so, (*i.e.*, if Bondage does not by nature belong to the Self), let Mokṣa or Release result only from the annihilation of the Self.

But we do not grant this. For, 'I am in bondage, I will be completely released'—such states of mind clearly prove that Mokṣa or Release is the highest object of volition only in so far as it is co-extensive with Bondage.—7.

Bondage is not natural to Puruṣa.—(contd).

स्वभावस्यानपायित्वादननुष्ठानलक्षणमप्रामाण्यम् ॥ १ । ८ ॥

स्वभावस्य Svabhâvasya, of the nature of a thing. अनपायित्वात् Ana-apâyitvât, on account of the undecaying-ness, unchangeableness, or permanence. अननुष्ठानलक्षणम् An-anuṣṭhâna-lakṣaṇam, characterised by non-performance. अप्रामाण्यम् Aprâmâṇyam, irrelevancy, unathoritativeness.

8. (Were Puruṣa confined by nature), because the nature of a thing is unchangeable, (the instructions laid down in the Sâstras for the attainment of Release), would be conspicuous by non-performance, and, therefore, irrelevant and unauthoritative.—8.

Vṛitti:—The author only strengthens the argument of the preceding aphorism:

Whereas confinement or bondage which had an eternal nature, could not be dissolved, performance for the sake of its destruction would be, therefore, impossible.—8.

Bhâṣya:—(*Pûrva-paksa*). "Let there be non-performance, what does it matter?" To this the author replies:

(Were bondage a part of the Puruṣa's nature), the nature of a thing being co-eval with the existence of the thing itself, there could be no Release. Consequently, the teachings of the Veda for the attainment of Release, would not be carried into practice. And being thus characterised by non-performance, they would be irrelevant or unauthoritative.—8.

Above continued.

न अशक्योपदेशविधिरुपदिष्टेऽप्यनुपदेशः ॥ १ । ९ ॥

न Na, no. अशक्योपदेशविधिः A (im)-śakya (possible)-upadeśa-(instruction)-vidhiḥ, precept containing instruction for the impossible. उपदिष्टे Upadiṣṭe, were (it) instructed. अपि Api, even. अनुपदेशः An (non)-upadeṣaḥ (instruction), non-instruction.

9. There can be no precept (in the Veda and other authoritative writings) imparting instruction for the attainment of that which is impossible. Were even (such attainment) instructed (in them), (the instruction would be) no instruction.—9.

Vṛitti:—It may be argued that someone, for the sake of deception, may instruct something impossible, as, *e.g.*, the presence of a hundred elephants on the tip of the finger. Accordingly the author says:

The meaning of the aphorism is clear.—9.

Bhâṣya :—To those who would contend that the practical observance of those precepts will follow by virtue of their being revealed texts, the author says :

It is not possible to carry into practice an instruction for a 'fruit' or result which is incapable of attainment. For, 'Upadiṣṭo api,' were even some means laid down (in a precept) for an impossible end, that (precept) would really be no instruction at all, but merely the semblance of an instruction, according to the maxim that even the Veda cannot teach that which is contrary to reality.—9.

Bondage is not natural to Puruṣa.—contd.

शुक्लपटवद् बीजवच्चेत् ॥ १ । १० ॥

शुक्लपटवत्-Śukla (white)-pata (cloth)-vat (like), like a piece of white cloth. बीजवत् Bîja (seed)-vat, like a seed. चेत् Chet, if it is said.

10. (One may argue that change of nature is observed) as in the case of a piece of white cloth (when it is coloured otherwise) and as in the case of a seed (when it grows into a shoot or is burnt), (and that, therefore, there is nothing strange in the theory that Bondage is the natural state of Puruṣa, which, however, can be removed by appropriate means).—10.

Vṛitti :—The author apprehends an objection :

Annihilation of nature also is observed, as of whiteness in a piece of cloth, by means of colouring matter, etc., and of a seed, through the growth of the shoot.—10.

Bhâṣya :—At this place the author apprehends an objection :

An objector may argue as follows : Annihilation of even that which is natural is observed. For example, the natural whiteness of a piece of white cloth is removed by means of some colouring matter, so also the natural sprouting power of a seed is destroyed by fire. Hence, as in the case of a piece of white cloth, and as also in the case of a seed, annihilation of natural bondage also is possible in the case of the Puruṣa. In the very same way, therefore, as in the case of the analogues, there is legitimate ground for instruction of means for its (of bondage) dissolution.—10.

Bondage not natural to Puruṣa—(contd.)

शक्त्युद्भवानुद्भवाभ्यां नाऽशक्योपदेशः । १ । ११ ॥

शक्त्युद्भवानुद्भवाभ्यां Śakti (power)-udbhava (appearance, development)-an (non)-udbhavâbhyâm, by reason of the development and envelopment of power. न Na, no अशक्योपदेशः: A (im)-śakya (possible)-upadeśaḥ (instruction), instruction for the impossible.

11. By reason of the development and envelopment of power, there is no instruction for the impossible (in the instances cited). —11.

Vṛitti:—The author concludes :

An effect being existent prior to its appearance as such, the whiteness of the cloth is not *destroyed*, but is enveloped by the colouring matter, and is again developed after washing. (For the same reason), in consequence of the growth of the sprout also, the seed is not *destroyed*, but is enveloped or overpowered. Its re-appearance, however, is not observed, owing to the variety of things in nature.—11.

Bhâṣya :—The author gives the solution :

In the case of the given examples also, people do not give instruction for the removal or *annihilation* of the Aśakya or impossible, that which is incapable of destruction, *i.e.*, the natural. Why not? Śakti-udbhava-anudbhavâbhyâm, by reason of the development and envelopment of power. For, in the case of the two given examples, only the appearance and disappearance of whiteness, etc., take place, and not, on the contrary, the non-existence or annihilation of whiteness and of the sprouting power, seeing that whiteness and sprouting power again appear in the reddened or coloured cloth and fried seed, respectively, by means of the operations of the washerman, etc., in the one case, and by the volition or will force of Yogins, in the other. Such is the import.

Objection :—Likewise let Release consist only in the disappearance of the power of pain in the Puruṣa (*i.e.*, of the influence of pain upon the Puruṣa).

Answer:—No; for the common experience of mankind as well as the authority of the Veda and the Smṛiti prove that it is the absolute or permanent cessation of pain that is the (highest) object of desire, and not, on the contrary, the mere disappearance (of pain), as in the case of the instances cited.

Moreover, the theory that Release consists in the mere disappearance of the power of pain, would entail non-(permanent) release, by making

evolopment of power of pain again possible in the case of the released nes also, as in the case of fried seeds, by means of the will force, etc., of Yogins and of God.

(*Note.*—A seed, for instance, does not really undergo a change of nature by burning. According to the Sâṃkhya theory of causation, all production is development and all destruction is envelopment, so that the effect antecedently exists in the cause in an endeveloped form and the cause afterwards exists in the effect in an enveloped form. Therefore, after burning, a seed still retains its power of sprouting as evidenced by the fact that the Yogins, by willing, can make a burnt seed to sprout again. That being so, if a man instructs another to take away (for a time) the sprouting power of a seed, he does not instruct something impossible, as the act does not involve a change of nature. But this is not so in the case of the Puruṣa. For Release or permanent removal of Bondage, Bondage, being *ex-hypothesi* the natural state of the Puruṣa, involves a change of nature which is impossible. The hypothesis, therefore must be abandoned)—11.

Neither is Bondage a temporal state.

न कालयोगतो व्यापिनो नित्यस्य सर्वसम्बन्धात् ॥ १ । १२ ॥

न Na, not. कालयोगतः Kâla (time)-yoga (connection)-tah (from), from connection with time. व्यापिनः Vyâpinah, of the pervading. नित्यस्य Nityasya, of the eternal. सर्वसम्बन्धात् Sarva (all)-sambandhât (relation), on account of relation to all.

12. (The bondage of the Puruṣa can-) not (be constituted) by connection with time, because (time which is) all-pervading and eternal, is related to all (Puruṣas, released and unreleased).—12.

Vritti :—It may be contended that the Puruṣa may not be in bondage from nature, but that he will be in bondage by virtue of time. So the author says :

The Puruṣa would have been so bound, did his connection with time sometimes exist and sometimes not exist. But this is not the case, because relation to all times is one of his upâdhis or adjuncts, since he is eternal and all-pervading.

(*Note.*—It will be observed that Aniruddha has taken the words, 'eternal' and 'pervading' as qualifying Puruṣa, whereas we have, following Vijñâna Bhikṣu, applied them to time.)

The sense of 'relation to all times' having been conveyed by the word, 'eternal,' the word, 'pervading,' has been stated simultaneously with the former, by reference to the next aphorism.—12.

Bhâṣya :—After refuting the theory of Bondage from nature, the author refutes, by a group of aphorisms, the theory of Bondage from Nimittas, occasional causes or conditions. Were pain, on the other hand, occasional in the Puruṣa, it would not be capable of being rooted outby

knowledge and like other means, inasmuch as subtle pain, in the form of not-yet-come, (*i.e.*, the possibility or potentiality of pain) would remain so long as the substance in which it inheres, lasts. Having this in view, the author refutes the theory of occasional pain :

Nor is the Bondage of the Puruṣa occasioned by connection with time. Why not? Because time, all-pervading and eternal, by the determination or delimitation of everything, is connected with all Puruṣas, released and unreleased, and the determination of everything by time will entail the Bondage of all Puruṣas at all times, (so that Release would be impossible).

In this section the conditional, occasional, or instrumental causality of time, space, action, and the like is not confuted, because it is established by the Veda, Smṛiti, and argument. But that which is denoted by Naimittikatva, occasionality, that is, the characteristic of being produced by an occasion, condition, or instrument, as in the case of colour, etc., produced by burning (*vide* Kaṇâda Sûtram, VII. i. 6, S. B. H., Vol. VI, p. 212)—the same is forbidden in the case of Bondage, in consequence of the admission of the accidental nature of Bondage so far as Puruṣa is concerned.

Objection : Even in the theory that Bondage is occasioned or conditioned by time, etc., gradation or difference of status (as released and unreleased Puruṣas) can be accounted for by the presence and absence of other contributory causes.

Answer : In that case, it is proper for the sake of simplicity, to refer Bondage to that contributory alone, that is, that conjunction which taking place, Bondage must necessarily be caused, since there is no harm in the use of Bondage, with regard to the Puruṣa, in an accidental, transferred, or derivative sense.

Thus there is an end of the theory of the occasional or conditional nature of pain.—12.

Nor is Bondage a spatial state.

न देशयोगतोऽप्यस्मात् ॥ १ । १३ ॥

न Na, not. देशयोगतः Deśa (space)-yoga (connection)-taḥ (from), from connection with space. अपि Api, again. अस्मात् Asmât, for the same (reason).

13. Nor, again, (is Bondage constituted) by connection with space, for the same (reason as given above).—13.

Vṛitti :—May not the Puruṣa be in bondage by virtue of space? To this the author replies :

(It cannot be so), because Puruṣa, eternal and infinite as he is, has connection with all space.—13.

Bhâṣya :—Nor does Bondage result from connection with space. Why not? 'Asmât,' owing to the same, as stated in the preceding aphorism, (objectionable) connection with all Puruṣas released and unreleased. The import is that the theory would entail the bondage of even the released Puruṣa.—13.

Nor does Bondage result from embodiment.

नावस्थातो देहधर्मत्वात् तस्याः ॥ १ । १४ ॥

न Na, not. अवस्थातः Avastâtaḥ, from location, situation, environment, organisation, or circumstances. देहधर्मत्वात् Deha (body)-dharma (property)-tvât, being a property of the body. तस्याः Tasyâḥ, its, of the environment.

14. Nor is Bondage constituted by organisation, the latter being the property of the body.—14.

Vṛitti :—Now, to meet the suggestion whether the Puruṣa may not be bound from organisation or circumstances, the author says :

'Tasyâḥ' means 'of circumstances.' 'Deha-dharmatvât' is indicative; the ultimate significance is (that the reason why the Puruṣa cannot be bound by organisation or circumstances is) that (the Puruṣa) undergoes no change or transformation.—14.

Bhâṣya :—'Avasthâ' consists in the form of the body described as the appearance of a particular Saṃghâta, organisation or embodiment. The bondage of the Puruṣa does not result from 'avasthâ' or embodiment as an occasional or instrumental cause. Why not? Because 'avasthâ' is a property of the body, that is to say, a property of an insentient object. The application of the property of one object as directly causing bondage in a different object, would be too wide, and would entail the bondage of the released ones also.—14.

Above continued.

असङ्गोऽयं पुरुष इति ॥ १ । १५ ॥

असङ्गः Asaṅgaḥ, free from all attachment or association, detached. अयं Ayaṃ, this, he. पुरुषः Puruṣa, Self. इति Iti, because.

15. (Embodiment cannot be a property of the Puruṣa), because he, the Puruṣa, is free from all association.—15.

Vṛitti :—May not organisation be a property of the Self also? To the author replies :

(It cannot be), as, in that case, the Śruti, असङ्गोऽयं पुरुषः, he, the Puruṣa, is free from all attachment (Bṛih-Âraṇ Upa. IV. iii. 15), would be contradicted.—15.

Bhâṣya :—But, it may be asked, what is the objection to 'avasthâ,' organisation or embodiment, being a property of the Puruṣa? To this the author replies :

The word, 'iti,' gives the reason. This aphorism should be read with the preceding one : thus, the Puruṣa being free from all association or attachment, 'avasthâ,' organisation or embodiment, must be a property of the body alone. The purport of the aphorism is that to admit change or transformation in the shape of 'avasthâ' or embodiment, in the case of the Puruṣa, would entail that the Puruṣa possesses association or attachment which may be here described as conjunction with the cause of that change or transformation.

That the Puruṣa is free from all attachment is proved by the Śruti :

स यदत्र किंचित् पश्यत्यनन्वागतस्तेन भवति असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः ।

Whatever he sees here, cannot enter into him, for, he, the Puruṣa, is free from all attachment.—(Bṛihad Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat, IV. iii. 15).

Saṅga, again, is not mere conjunction or connection. For, it has been stated above that the Puruṣa has connection or conjunction with time and space. It is also learnt from the Veda and Smṛiti that the freedom of the lotus leaf from attachment with the water resting on it is an example of the Puruṣa's freedom from all attachment.—15.

Nor does Bondage result from karma.

न कर्मणान्यधर्मत्वादतिप्रसक्तेश्च ॥ १ । १६ ॥

न Na, not. कर्मणा Karmaṇâ, by action. अन्यधर्मत्वात् Anya (another)-dharma (property)-tvât (being), being the property of a different object अतिप्रसक्तेः Ati (over)-prasakteḥ (implication), going too far, being too wide. च Cha, and, also.

16. Nor (is the Puruṣa bound) by action, because (action) is the property of a different object, and also because (the argument) is too wide.—16.

Vṛitti :—The author shows the defect in the suggestion that the Puruṣa may be in bondage by virtue of action :

The Self being void of Guṇas, states or modifications, action possesses the characteristic of being the property of the Not-Self. If it be said that the Puruṣa will be bound by action, notwithstanding that the latter is the property of a different object ; that would be improper : for (i) nothing can be deposited by the property of one thing in another, (ii) the

diversity in the universe would not be explained, and (iii) the argument would be too wide, inasmuch as, in the absence of (the effect of) the distinction of other-ness, it would entail the bondage of the released Selves also.—16.

Bhâṣya:—Bondage does not certainly accrue to the Puruṣa by means of action, prescribed and prohibited, Anya-dharma-tvât, because actions are the property of the Not-Self. For, the theory of the bondage of one being immediately caused by the property of another, would entail the bondage of the released Puruṣa also. Thinking that it may be argued that this defect will not arise if we admit that Bondage is caused by the action of the respective Upâdhis or adjuncts of the Puruṣas, the author gives another reason in the words, 'Ati-prasakteḥ cha,' which mean that the theory of bondage by the action of the Upâdhis would entail bondage in the form of conjunction or incidence of pain during Pralaya or dissolution of the cosmic system, and such other times. The supposition of the continuance of pain during Pralaya, in consequence of the continuance of other contributory causes, has been already controverted in the aphorism (12 *ante*) beginning with 'Na kâla-yoga.'—16.

Above continued.

विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे ॥ १ । १७ ॥

विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिः Vichitra (diverse)-bhoga (experience)-an (non)-upapattiḥ (proof, explanation), possibility of diverse experience. अन्यधर्मत्वे Anya (another)-dharma (property)-tve, (that which produces action in one thing), being the property of another thing. This is according to the Vṛitti of Aniruddha. Vijñâna-Bhikṣu interprets the terms as meaning, (bondage in the form of conjunction or incidence of pain) being the property of another thing.

17. Were it the property of a different thing, diversity of (worldly) experience would not be explained.—17.

Vṛitti:—The author points out another defect;

Some people, it is observed, enjoy pleasure, while others suffer pain. Nor is it the case that in the beginningless Saṃsâra, stream of transmigration, neither action which is the source of pleasure, nor action which is the source of pain, has been performed by a single individual. Did the property of one produce change in another, all would either enjoy pleasure or suffer pain.—17.

Bhâṣya:—It may be objected: It is well known that pain is a property of the Chitta, the mind or intellect. In compliance, therefore, with the rule that action appears in the same substratum where that

which produces the action resides, let also bondage in the form of conjunction or incidence of pain be of the Chitta or intellect alone Why do you suppose the bondage of the Puruṣa also?

Apprehending this, the author says:

If bondage in the form of conjunction or incidence of pain were the property of the Chitta or intellect alone, diversity of (worldly) experience would not be explained. For, if the experience of the Puruṣa described as Duḥkha-sâkṣâtkâra or the presentation of pain to the senses, be admitted, even in the absence of conjunction or incidence of pain, then, there remaining nothing to govern or determine the experience of pain, etc., the pain, etc., of all the Puruṣas will become the object of experience of all the Puruṣas. And consequently diversity of experience, such as, for example, "He is the experiencer of pain," "He is the experiencer of pleasure," and so on, will not be explained or justified. This is the meaning. Therefore, for the sake of the proof or explanation of diversity of experience, bondage in the form of conjunction of pain, etc., should be admitted in the Puruṣa also, (by the characteristic of its being the determinant of, or) as determining experience.

And this conjunction of pain in the Puruṣa, is, as has been already stated, merely of the form of a reflection, and the reflection is only of the Vṛitti or function of one's own Upâdhi or adjunct, (*i.e.*, of the states of consciousness). Hence the experience of all pains does not fall to the lot of all men. Such is the purport.

The above conclusion follows from the following passage in the Commentary on the Yoga Aphorisms:

चित्तवृत्तिबोधे पुरुषस्यानादिः स्वस्वामिभावः सम्बन्धो हेतुः

The beginningless relation of the Puruṣa (to the Chitta or intellect), namely, the relation of the thing owned and the owner of it, is the cause of (the Puruṣa's) knowing the function of the Chitta.

And the ownership of the Puruṣa in the Chitta or intellect consists in its possession of the Vâsanâ, tendency, sub-conscious latency, persistence, or potentiality, of its own function which has been experienced by the Puruṣa. The declaration in the Vedas and Smṛitis, however, that Bondage and Release appertain to the Chitta or intellect alone, and not to the Puruṣa, should be understood by reference to Bondage in the ultimate or transcendental sense, namely Bondage constituted by conjunction of pain in the form of a reflecting disc.—17.

(*Note.*—The substance of Bondage is in the Chitta or intellect while its shadow falls on the Puruṣa.)

Nor is Bondage due to Prakṛiti.

प्रकृतिनिबन्धनाच्चेन्न तस्या अपि पारतन्त्र्यम् ॥ १ । १८ ॥

प्रकृतिनिबन्धनात् Prakṛiti-nibandhanât, from Prakṛiti as the cause. चेत् Chet, if, is ...? न Na, no. तस्याः Tasyâḥ, her. अपि Api, also. पारतन्त्र्यम् Pâratantryam, subjection, dependence.

18. Does Bondage result from Prakṛiti as its cause? No, because Prakṛiti herself is not autonomous.—18.

Vṛitti:—It may be said that Prakṛiti will be the determinant in the matter of the production of change in one thing by the property of another thing, that is to say, that Bondage will accrue to that Puruṣa towards whom she will be inclined or active, or move. Hence the author says:

Prakṛiti also is all-pervading, and consequently there can be no distinction or peculiarity of her connection with all the Puruṣas. (She cannot, therefore, be the determinant, and) there can be no determination or uniformity without the help of action. Hence she too is dependent on action. And the defect in that case has been pointed out (*vide* 16 *ante*).—18.

Bhâṣya:—The author rejects the theory that Prakṛiti is the direct cause of Bondage:

But cannot Bondage follow from Prakṛiti as its cause? No Because, in being a cause of Bondage, she also is, as will be shown in the sequel, dependent on conjunction. If it be contended that she may be the cause of Bondage even without the help of particular conjunctions, then it will entail (the existence of) pain and Bondage even during the state of Pralaya or dissolution, etc. This is the meaning.

Where the reading is, Prakṛit-nibandhanâ chet, there the meaning (or rather construction) is, 'if Bondage have Prakṛiti as its cause.'—18.

Bondage, in the form of reflection of pain, accrues to Puruṣa *from connection with* Prakṛiti.

न नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावस्य तद्योगस्तद्योगादृते ॥ १ । १९ ॥

न Na, not. नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावस्य Nitya (eternal)-śuddha (pure)-buddha (enlightened)-mukta (released)-svabhâva (nature)-sya, of him who is by nature, eternal, and eternally pure, enlightened, and released. तद्योगः Tat-yogaḥ, conjunction of that, *i.e.*, Bondage. तद्योगादृते Tat-yogât-ṛite, without the conjunction of that, *i.e.*, Prakṛiti.

19. Without the conjunction of Prakṛiti, (there can no conjunction of Bondage in the Puruṣa who is, by

nature, Eternal, and eternally Pure, Enlightened, and Unconfined.—19.

Vṛitti:—If there be no bondage of the Puruṣa caused by Prakṛiti, etc., and if, again, there be no bondage by nature also, then the teaching of a Mokṣa-Śâstra, Lessons on Release, will be fruitless. In reply to this possible objection, the author says:

Śuddha means not attached or adhering to the Guṇas, states or modifications (of Prakṛiti). Buddha means transparent. Tat-yogaḥ means conjunction of bondage. Tat-yogât-ṛite means without the conjunction of Prakṛiti. Bondage can never accrue to the Self without A-viveka or non-discrimination between the Self and the Not-Self. But, on the other hand, that which arises from A-viveka or non-discrimination is (not actual bondage, but) the Abhimâna, sense or idea, that one is in bondage. And this (wrong notion) should be certainly removed by the teaching of the Śâstra.—19.

Bhâṣya:—Prakṛiti, then, in order to be the cause of bondage, is dependent on a particular (*vide* below) conjunction. It is, therefore, from the self-same species of conjunction that Aupâdhika (due to Upâdhi), reflectional, shadowy, adventitious, accidential, bondage results, like the hotness of water from the conjunction of fire. The author establishes the above conclusion of his own system, in this very context, in the middle of his criticism of the theories of different thinkers.

Therefore, Tat-yogât-rite, without the conjunction of Prakṛiti, Puruṣa's 'tat-yogaḥ,' association with bondage, does not exist. In fact it is this (conjunction of Prakṛiti) that constitutes bondage. This roundabout statement, by means of two negatives, has been made for the purpose of obtaining the shadow-like, adventitious, or super-imposed character of Bondage. For, if Bondage were the *effect* of the conjunction of Prakṛiti, like colour produced by burning (*vide* Kanâda-Sûtram, VII. I. 6, S. B. H., Vol. vi, p. 212), then similarly to that also, it would continue even after the disjunction of Prakṛiti. Nor should it be supposed that the moment next to that in which pain is produced, and such other things will be the cause of the destruction of pain, as we have not made this supposition, seeing that the destruction of pain is explained or accounted for by the destruction of its cause alone, on the supposition that the destruction of the cause produces destruction of the effect. For, Vṛitti, function, activity, or modification, (of the chitta or intellect), is the material cause of pain, etc. Therefore, as in the case of the flame of a candle, destruction of pain, desire, and other properties or products of the Vṛitti (or activity of the chitta or intellect) becomes

possible entirely by means of the speedy destructibility of the Vṛitti which breaks down in a moment. Hence, non-existence of Bondage being consequent on (the non-existence of conjunction, *i.e.*) disjunction of Prakṛiti. Bondage is merely Aupâdhika, (ideal as opposed to real), accidental or adventitious or reflectional, and neither natural nor occasional (*i. e.*, produced by instrumental causes or the necessary conditions as distinguished from the principal cause).

In like manner, it is also the effect of this indirect statement that the immediate means of the avoidance of pain is the dissolution of the conjunction of Prakṛiti, and nothing else. So also says the Smṛiti :

यथा ज्वलद्गृहाश्लिष्टगृहं विच्छिद्य रक्ष्यते ।
तथा सदोषप्रकृतिविच्छिन्नोऽयं न शोचति ॥

As a house attached to another, burning, house, is saved by dividing it off from the burning one, so he (Puruṣa), being separated from Prakṛiti, the mother of all faults, does not come to grief.—(*Source not traced.*)

Thinkers of the Vaiśeṣika School labour under the mistake that conjunction of pain is (not ideal but real, *i.e.*) ultimately true. In order that a similar mistake may not crop up here, the author declares Nitya, etc. As conjunction of redness does not take place in the crystal which is naturally pure, (*i.e.*, white), without the conjunction of the China rose, in the very same way, there being no possibility of the existence of pain, etc., by themselves, conjunction of pain cannot take place in the Puruṣa who is, by nature, eternally pure, etc., without the conjunction of Upâdhi or adjunct or super-imponent. That is the meaning. So it has been declared in the Saura Purâṇa :

यथा हि केवलो रक्तः स्फटिको लक्ष्यते जनैः ।
रञ्जकाद्युपधानेन तद्वत् परमपूरुषः ॥

For, as the pure crystal is observed by people to be red on account of the superimposition laid on it by some red colouring matter, etc., so is the great Puruṣa.

Eternality consists in not being limited by time. The characteristic of being, by nature, pure, etc., also denotes eternal purity, etc. Therein, eternal purity means constant freedom from virtue and vice. Eternal enlightenment denotes possession of the form of inextinguishable sentiency. The being eternally released, *i.e.*, eternal freedom, denotes the characteristic of never being in conjunction with ultimately true, *i. e.*, real, pain. Conjunction of pain in the form of reflection, however, is not-ultimately-true, *i. e.*, not-real or ideal, bondage. This is the import.

As regards the eternal purity, etc., of the Self, there is the Śruti :

अयमात्मा सन्मात्रो नित्यः शुद्धो बुद्धः सत्यो मुक्तो निरञ्जनो विभुरित्यादि ।

This Self is purely Existent, Eternal, Pure, Enlightened, True, Free, Stainless, Universal, etc. (Nṛisiṃha-Uttara-Tâpanî Upaniṣat, II. ix. 9).

Objection :—But this being a Manana Śâstra, rational or intellectual science, reasons also must be given in support of the conclusion that the Self is eternal, *etc.*

Answer :—Quite so: By the expression 'Na tat-yogaḥ tat-yogât ṛite,' reasons have been certainly advanced in proof of the eternal purity, etc., of the Self. Thus, eternality, universality, and other characteristics have been completely established in the Self in Darśanas or Systems of Thought like Nyâya, etc. (*vide* Kaṇâda Sûtram, III. ii. 5 and VII. i. 22, S. B. H., Vol. vi, pp. xxv, 131 and 229). Now, the Self being eternal and universal, there must exist some cause without which it can have no conjunction with pain and all other similar changes or disorders. That cause is, by common consent, no other than the Antaḥ-karaṇa or inner sense. For the sake of simplicity, therefore, Antaḥ-karaṇa or the inner sense itself should be properly regarded as being the only material cause of pain and other disorders. There is also another reason, namely, the concomitant variation of the Antaḥ-karaṇa or inner sense with regard to all changes or disorders (that is to say, that the activity of the Antaḥ-karaṇa is invariably present where there is any change, and is invariably absent where there is no change). In the case, again, of intra-organic changes or disorders, it will not be reasonable to suppose instrumental causality (or causality as a necessary condition) for the Manas or intellect, and material causality for the Self, since the supposition of two causes will involve superfluity.

Objection :—That the Self is the material cause of (pain and other) changes, is proved from perception such as "I feel pleasure," "I feel pain," "I do," etc.

Answer :—Such is not the case. For, these perceptions, falling as they do within the class of hundreds of mistakes such as "I am fair in complexion," etc., are not free from the apprehension of being invalid as means of proof, and accordingly carry less weight than the inference supported by the argument stated above.

The hint may be given here that the reason for the view that the Self is pure consciousness will be stated in the sequel.

The sense of this very aphorism has been declared in the Kârikâ also.

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ॥

Therefore, through proximity to him (sentient Puruṣa), the insentient Liṅga (*i. e.*, Mahat, Ahaṃkâra, Buddhi, Manas, and the Tan-mâtras) seems sentient; and, similarly, though agency or activity belongs to the Guṇas (states or modifications of Prakṛiti), the bystander (Puruṣa who is indifferent or inactive) appears as the agent.—Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ of Iśvarakṛiṣṇa, verse 20.

The mere expression, agency or to be agent, is indicative of all changes or disorders, such as to suffer pain, etc.

In like manner, in the Yoga Aphorisms also, the sense of this very aphorism has been declared. Thus—

द्रष्टृदृश्ययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः ॥ २ ॥ १७ ॥

Conjunction of the seer (Puruṣa) and the seen (Mahat or Buddhi) is the cause of the avoidable (*i.e.*, pain).—Yoga Sûtram, II. 17. S. B. H., Vol. IV., p. 121.

Also in the Gîtâ :

पुरुषः प्रकृतिस्थो हि भुङ्क्ते प्रकृतिजान् गुणान् ॥ १३ । २१ ॥

For the Puruṣa, dwelling in Prakṛiti, experiences the Guṇas, states or modifications, produced from Prakṛiti—Gîtâ, XIII. 21.

'Prakṛitiṣṭhaḥ,' dwelling in Prakṛiti, means being combined in Prakṛiti. Similarly in the Śruti also :

आत्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेत्याहुर्मनीषिणः ।

Thoughtful men call the Self, combined with the Senses or Powers of Cognition and Action and Manas, by the name, experiencer—Kaṭha Upa., III. 4.

Objection :—In the very same way as are time and the rest, conjunction of Prakṛiti also is common to all Puruṣas released and unreleased. How can it, therefore, become the cause of Bondage ?

Answer :—The objection does not arise. For, here the denotation of the word, Saṃyoga, conjunction, is exclusively or simply a particular form of the conjunction of Prakṛiti, reduced into, or appearing in, the form of individual Buddhis or Understandings or Reasons, which conjunction is otherwise designated as birth. In his commentary on the Yoga Aphorisms, the revered Vyâsa has explained the term in the above sense. Moreover, it is only by reason of the function of Buddhi as the Upâdhi or super-imponent that conjunction of pain takes place in the Puruṣa. Again, just like the Vaiśeṣika and other thinkers, it is desired also by ourselves that conjunction of the Antaḥ-karaṇa or inner sense, having the effect of determining the power of causing experience (bhoga), possessed by conjunction of Buddhi, is different in kind from the latter conjunction. Consequently there is no implication of Bondage in dreamless sleep and such other states. On the other hand, the stream of whatever functions of the intellect it may be and its Saṃskâra, impression, recept, or after-image, accompanied by the Vâsanâ, sub-conscious latency or persistence, of the function respectively experienced by the Puruṣas, is beginningless, and hence the continuity or uniformity of the relation of the thing owned and the owner of it (between Mahat and Puruṣa, *vide* Aphorism 17 above) is sustained.

Some, however, are of opinion that the hypothesis of conjunction between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa would necessarily involve transformation and attachment of the Puruṣa, and that, therefore, the denotation of the word, Yoga, in this place, is only A-viveka or non-discrimination, and not conjunction. But their opinion cannot be upheld. For, by the aphorism तद्योगोऽप्यविवेकात्(I. 55 post, q. v.), the author of the aphorisms will declare that A-viveka or non-discrimination is (not the same as, but really) the cause of Yoga, association or conjunction. Again, in the (Yoga) System of Patañjali also, by the two aphorisms :

स्वस्वामिशक्त्योः स्वरूपोपलब्धिहेतुः संयोगः ॥ २ । २३ ॥

Saṃyoga or conjunction is the name given to the cause of the knowledge of the true nature—(of the Puruṣa) as he who experiences and (of Prakṛiti) as the object of experience)—of the power of the thing owned (Prakṛiti) and of the power of the owner of it (Puruṣa), (*i. e.*, perceptibility and percipiency respectively).—Yoga Sûtram, II. 23.

तस्य हेतुरविद्या ॥ २ । २४ ॥

A-vidyâ, Nescience, is the cause thereof (*i. e.*, of Saṃyoga or conjunction).—Yoga Sûtram, II. 24. S. B. H. Vol. iv. p. 144.

A-vidyâ has been declared as being only the cause of conjunction. Moreover, were A-viveka (non-discrimination), in the from of absence of Viveka or discrimination, the same as Saṃyoga or conjunction, then Bhoga or experience, etc., would be entailed during Pralaya or dissolution, etc, also, by reason of the existence therein of the conjunction of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa. To hold that conjunction consists in A-viveka or non-discrimination in the form of false knowledge, would involve a form of Âtma-âsraya, (Self-dependence) *i. e.*, the fallacy of arguing in a circle, inasmuch as conjunction of the Puruṣa and Prakṛiti is the cause of false knowledge, etc. (In the above passage of the Śruti), therefore, Yoga (in 'yuktam') must denote something more than A-viveka or non-discrimination. The same is nothing but Saṃyoga, conjunction or union, there being no reason for any other supposition.

Saṃyoga or conjunction, again, is not the same as Pariṇâma, development or evolution, since we speak of a thing as undergoing development or evolution only when some particular property, in addition to the general attributes of the class, is produced in it. Otherwise, the universality of the immutable (Puruṣa, etc.), in the form of omnipresence, would not be proved or possible. Nor, again, does Saṅga or attachment or association consist in mere Saṃyoga or conjunction, as it will be later on declared that it is Saṃyoga or conjunction which is the cause of Pariṇâma or evolution, that is the denotation of the word, Saṅga or attachment or association.

Objection:—But, still, how does temporary conjunction which is the origin of Mahat, etc., take place between Prakriti and Puruṣa both of whom are eternal ?

Answer:—There is nothing impossible in this. For, Prakṛiti appears in the form of the sum-total or collection of the three Guṇas, states or modifications, conditioned as well as unconditioned, and thus production of conjunction with Puruṣa is possible by means of the limitation imposed by the conditioned or manifested Guṇas. This conjunction of Prakṛiti and her perturbation (by which the Guṇas are manifested) are proved by the Veda and the Smṛiti. And upon the same theme we have elaborately discoursed in our Yoga-Vârtika.

There are, however, others who think that the conjunction of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti consists merely in their respective fitness as the enjoyer and the enjoyable. But this too cannot be admitted; for, if fitness were eternal, it would be unreasonable to say that it could be terminated by knowledge. If it be non-eternal, then there is no harm in admitting Saṃyoga or conjunction, as the objection of entailing the characteristic of undergoing Pariṇâma or evolution on the part of the Puruṣa, equally applies to both. Moreover, the view that fitness as the enjoyer and the enjoyable constitutes the form of Saṃyoga or conjunction, has been nowhere declared in the aphorisms, etc., and is, therefore, unauthoritative.

It follows, therefore, that only a particular form of conjunction is here intended by the author of the aphorisms as the cause of the avoidable. Thus the cause of Bondage, according to the author, is ascertained—19.

Nor is Bondage caused by A-vidyâ.

नाऽविद्यातोऽप्यवस्तुना बन्धायोगात् ॥ १ । २० ॥

न Na, not. अविद्यातः A-vidyâ-taḥ, from A-vidyâ, *i. e.*, non-existence of Vidyâ or knowledge. अपि Api, too, again. अवस्तुना Avastunâ, by an unreality, a non-entity. बन्धायोगात् Bandha-ayogât, on account of unfitness, non-adaptation, or impossibility of bondage.

20. Nor (does Bondage result) from A-vidyâ also, because of the impossibility of Bondage by means of a non-entity.—20.

Vṛitti :—If it be asserted that Bondage will accrue to him (Puruṣa) by means of A-vidyâ, so the author says:

(It cannot). For, A-vidyâ denotes either the antecedent non-existence of Vidyâ or knowledge or its consequent non-existence, (*i.e.*,

either that knowledge has not yet been acquired but that it may be acquired afterwards, or that knowledge which was acquired, has been afterwards lost). And, either way, it is a non-entity. Nor is Bondage by means of a non-entity possible in the case of the Self which is an entity. It is, therefore, a mere form of speech, and no truth, to say that Bondage results by means of A-vidyâ.—20

Bhâṣya :—The causes of Bondage maintained by the unbelievers (Nâstikas, *i. e.*, those who say that it—God, Veda, etc.,—does not exist) also should be now refuted. Amongst them, a sect of the Bauddhas who hold the theory that the Self is a stream of temporary states of consciousness, as evidenced by the description or saying:

षड़भिज्ञो दशबलोऽद्वयवादी विनायकः ।

The Vinâyaka (Bauddha) (is he) who holds the theory of non-duality, is armed with the ten, and is conversant about the six.—Amara-koṣa I. i. (1) 9.

argue as follows: There is no second, external, reality or entity, such as Prakṛiti and so forth, whereby Bondage, real or reflectional, may take place through conjunction with it. But the mere continuity of succession of momentary states of consciousness is the reality, and it is without a second. All else is due to Samvṛitti or obscurity. And Samvṛitti or obscurity is A-vidyâ, described as false knowledge, from which alone results Bondage. Thus has it been declared by them:

अभिन्नोऽपि हि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासनिदर्शनैः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते ॥

For, although the Self consisting of Buddhi or Reason or Understanding, is not different from acts or instances of Viparyâsa or inversion of correct knowledge, yet it is observed as though possessing the distinction of the consciousness of that which is apprehended and the consciousness of that which apprehends.—Sarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha.—(Ed. Bibl. Ind., p. 16.)

Their opinion is first of all being disproved:

The word, 'Api,' also, has been used by reference to time, etc. mentioned above. From A-vidyâ also, there is no immediate possibility of Bondage. The A-vidyâ of the above non-dualists is also a non-entity, and hence no bondage can properly take place by means of it; for, the binding of any one with a rope seen in a dream has never been observed. This is the meaning.

It cannot be asserted that Bondage too is unreal; as the author of the aphorisms himself will afterwards show that it is not, and also because the theory that Bondage is unreal, would be in conflict with the admission or concession that, subsequent to the learning of the theory of the non-dualism of consciousness or idealistic monism, practice of Yoga or holy communion should be resorted to for the annihilation of Bondage,

smuch as it is not probable or reasonable that men should observe practices subsidiary to Yoga, which can be done with great hardship, en in consequence of the teaching of the unreality of Bondage, there n remain no doubt that the fruit or result, called annihilation of ndage, is already accomplished.—20.

Nor is Bondage caused by A-vidyâ. A-vidyâ cannot be an entity.

वस्तुत्वे सिद्धान्तहानिः ॥ १ । २१ ॥

वस्तुत्वे Vastu-tve, in the case of the reality of A-vidyâ. सिद्धान्तहानिः, Siddhânta net)-hânih (loss, abandonment), abandonment of the tenet, A-vidyâ is a n-entity.

21. If the reality (of A-vidyâ be asserted by the nonist, then there is) abandonment of (his) tenet.—21.

Vṛitti :—It may be said that A-vidyâ denotes something different rom Vidyâ or knowledge, and is, as such, an entity. So the author lays lown :

In our view, A-vidyâ certainly possesses the form of that which xists. Consequently, there being no destruction of it, there is no Release. The A-vidyâ of the non-dualists, on the contrary, is not ranscendental or real. While the A-vidyâ of the dualists is beginningless nd is an entity, and, therefore, on account of the impossibility of its lestruction, the teaching of the annihilation of Bondage is useless.—21.

Bhâṣya :—If, on the other hand, the reality of A-vidyâ be admitted, hen there will be abandonment of the non-reality or non-existent character of A-vidyâ already admitted or advanced by the monist himself. This is he meaning.—21.

Above continued.

विजातीयद्वैतापत्तिश्च ॥ १ । २२ ॥

विजातीयद्वैतापत्तिः Vijâtiya (heterogeneous)-dvaita (duality)-âpattiḥ (entailment), ailment of duality through there being an entity of a different kind. च Cha, o.

22. (On the assumption of the reality of A-vidyâ, ere would be) entailment of duality by means of a eterogeneous second.—22.

Vṛitti :—The author points out another defect in the theory of the ality of A-vidyâ :

Were A-vidyâ existent as an entity, and beginningless, it would be, e the Self, eternal. It being different from the Self, the duality con-tuted by it would be heterogeneous duality.—22.

Bhâṣya:—Moreover, if the reality of A-vidyâ be assumed, there will be then involved a second entity different in kind from the succession of momentary states of consciousness, which is not desired by you (*i.e.*, the monists). This is the meaning.

The adjective, heterogeneous, has been used in view of the possible reply, (in case homogeneous duality were also raised as a point in objection), that, owing to the infinity of the individuals falling within (and making up) the stream of consciousness, homogeneous duality is certainly desired.*

Objection:—Well, but A-vidyâ also being a species of knowledge, how can there arise heterogeneous duality by means of A-vidyâ also?

Answer:—The objection cannot stand. For, A-vidyâ which is a form of knowledge, is subsequent to Bondage, whereas it is only A-vidyâ in the form of Vâsanâ or acquired tendency of the Self, that is recognised by them (the non-dualists) as the cause of Bondage. And Vâsanâ is certainly different in kind from knowledge.

The mistake must not be committed that by these aphorisms the tenet of the Vedânta System is confuted, inasmuch as it has not been declared therein, even by a solitary aphorism, that Bondage results from mere A-vidyâ. Moreover, even in the case of the reality of A-vidyâ and the like, there is no contradiction of the non-duality characterised as non-division or non-differentiation, which is intended in the Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ, by such aphorisms as—

अविभागो वचनात्

(There is) non-division (of Brahman into many), (as follows) from the declaration (of the Veda).—Vedânta Sûtram, IV. II. 16, (S. B. H., Vol. V, p. 717).

As regards, however, the modern doctrine of Mâyâ or limitation, preached by the so-called Vedânta thinkers, of which the characteristic mark is in evidence in this context, the author's remarks quite properly apply to them also, because they form a sub-division of the (Bauddha) Vijñânavâdins or idealists, as we learn from the traditions of the sayings of Śiva in the Padma-Purâṇa beginning with:

मायावादमसच्छास्त्रं प्रच्छन्नं बौद्धमेव च ।
मयैव कथितं देवि कलौ ब्राह्मणरूपिणा ॥

In the Kali Age, O Devi, the system of non-existence, namely, the doctrine of Mâyâ, which is merely Buddhism in disguise, has been declared by no other than myself in the form of a Brâhmaṇa.

The doctrine of Mâyâ, however, is not a tenet of the Vedânta System as we learn from the concluding words of Śiva:

वेदार्थवन्महाशास्त्रं मायावादमवैदिकम् ।

That great system, the doctrine of Mâyâ, containing the truths of the Veda, but not supported by the Veda.

The Mâyâ-vâdins (those who hold the doctrine of Mâyâ) are not directly attacked here, as, in that case, the use of the adjective, heterogeneous, would be meaningless, inasmuch as in the doctrine of Mâyâ homogeneous duality also is not recognised In this section, therefore, only the explanation of the cause of Bondage, given by the Vijñâna-vâdins or idealists, is directly refuted. It should be understood that, by the selfsame method (of reasoning), the view of the moderns, the disguised Bauddhas, *i. e.*, the Mâyâ-vâdins also, that an insignificant thing like here A-vidyâ is the cause of Bondage, is refuted.

In our view, on the other hand, A-vidyâ, of course, lacks transcendental or ultimate reality in the form of immutability and eternality, but it possesses as much reality as a water-pot, etc., and, therefore, there is no opening for the impediment or objection stated above in respect of its being the cause of Bondage by means of the conjunction to be declared in the sequel. Similarly, in the view of the Yoga and also in the view of the Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ Darśana.—22.

Above continued.

विरुद्धोभयरूपा चेत् ॥ १ । २३ ॥

विरुद्धोभयरूपा Viruddha-(contradictory)-ubhaya (both)-rûpâ (form), possessing the form of both the contradictories, *i.e.*, the real and the unreal. चेत् Chet, if it be assumed.

23. If it be assumed that A-vidyâ possesses the form of both the contradictories (*i.e.*, is both real and unreal).—23.

Vṛitti:—Well, such will be the fate of other predicables. but A-vidyâ which is real and beginningless, will be also perishable, in our theory. The author states the above argument of the opponent:—

'Viruddha-ubhaya-rûpâ,' possessing mutually contradictory forms, that is, although (A-vidyâ) is beginningless, yet, inasmuch as it undergoes annihilation, it also possesses the form of antecedent non-existence, (like things which have a beginning).—23.

Tîkâ of Vedântin Mahâdeva: An objection is apprehended: A-vidyâ is not real or existent, wherefrom duality of dissimilar things might result, nor is it unreal or non-existent, as its effects are observed. On the other hand, therefore, it possesses both real and unreal forms.

Bhâṣya:—The author apprehends (an objection):

It may be asserted by the objector that A-vidyâ should be conceived as possessing exclusively the form either of the two which are contradictory

to each other, *viz.*, the real and the unreal, or of that which is different from the real and the unreal, and that consequently there is no harm of (the theory of) transcendental non-duality. Such is the meaning of the aphorism. The author himself will, however, afterwards declare that the fabric of creation is both real and unreal. But there reality and unreality, in the form or sense of manifestedness and unmanifestedness, are not really contradictory to each other. This is indicated by the inclusion of the word, Viruddha (contradictory), in the aphorism.—23.

Above continued.

न तादृक्पदार्थाप्रतीतेः ॥ १ । २४ ॥

न Na, not. तादृक्पदार्थाप्रतीतेः Tâdṛik (such)-padârtha (thing)-a (non)-pratîteḥ (perception, observation), because of the non-observation of such a thing.

24. (It can-) not, because of the non-observation of such a thing.—24.

Vṛitti:—The author gives the reply:

Such a thing (as is both real and unreal) has never been observed by any man whatever in any place.—24.

Bhâṣya:—The author removes the above apprehension:

(The sense is) quite clear. Moreover, were A-vidyâ the direct cause of Bondage described as connection with, or liability to, pain, then there will be left no possibility of the experience of Prârabdha or operative Adṛiṣṭam after the annihilation of A-vidyâ by means of knowledge, in consequence of the destruction of the cause of the experience of pain, of which Bondage is a synonym. In our and other theories, however, this is no defect, for, (we maintain), A-vidyâ, Karma or moral conduct, and the like become causes of Bondage by way of (establishing) conjunction (of soul with body). And the conjunction (of body and soul) described as birth (*vide* Kaṇâda Sûtram, VI. ii. 16, S. B. H., Vol. vi, page 207) does not pass away except on the termination of Prârabdha or operative Adṛiṣṭam.—24.

(*Note*:—Prârabdha: Karma or Merits and Demerits are divided as past and future. The former, *i.e.*, consequences of action which have been already acquired, are further divided as Sañchita, stored up, and Prârabdha, operative. Sañchita Karma is that the experience of which has not yet begun. Prârabdha is that Karma for the experience of the consequences whereof the present birth has taken place. The future or Âgâmi Karma is that which will be afterwards acquired).

Above continued.

न वयं षट्पदार्थवादिनो वैशेषिकादिवत् ॥ १ । २५ ॥

न Na, not. वयं Vayam, we. षट्पदार्थवादिनः Saṭ (six)-padârtha (predicable) (holding the theory), those who hold the theory of the six predi

[illegible] Vaiśeṣika (the Vaiśeṣika school of [illegible] Adi (other)-vat (like), like the Vaiśeṣika and other thinkers.

25. We do not hold the theory of Six Predicables, like the Vaiśeṣika and other thinkers (*vide* Kaṇâda Sûtram, I. i. 4, S. B. H., Vol. vi, page 8; Gautama Sûtram, I. i. 1, S. B. H., Vol. viii, page 1).—25.

Vṛitti:—Our opponent may ask: If this be your argument, where will Prakṛiti, etc., enter, when they are essentially different from the Six Predicables? So, with reference to it, the author says:

(The meaning is) clear. - 25.

Note.—The word, Adi, refers to the Nyâya School who teach the theory of Sixteen Predicables.—*Vedântin Mahâdeva.*

Bhâṣya:—The author further apprehends:

Well, like the Vaiśeṣika and other Âstika or orthodox philosophers, we do not hold the theory that Predicables are constant in number, *e.g.*, six, sixteen, and so on. Hence a predicable which embraces the nature of both the real and the unreal, or which is different from both, for example, A-vidyâ, should be admitted by us, although it may remain unobserved. This is the import.—25.

Above continued.

अनियतत्वेऽपि नायौक्तिकस्य संग्रहोऽन्यथा
बालोन्मत्तादिसमत्वम् ॥ १ । २६ ॥

अनियतत्वे A (in)-niyata (constant)-tve (ness), in the case of the inconstancy or unlimitedness of the number of predicables. अपि Api, even. न Na, not. अयौक्तिकस्य (un)-yautikasya (reasonable), of that which is unreasonable. संग्रहः Saṃgrahaḥ, inclusion. अन्यथा Anyathâ, otherwise. बालोन्मत्तादिसमत्वम् Bâla (children)-unmatta (madmen)-âdi (and the like)-samatvam (equality), equality with children and madmen and the like.

26. Even in the case of the indefiniteness (of the number of predicables), inclusion of something illogical (can-) not (be allowed), (as), otherwise, we would come to the level of children and madmen and the like.—26.

Vṛitti:—If the predicables are indefinite (in number), how, it may be asked, can we say that, there are twenty-five Principles? Hence the author declares:

We do not say that there are only six predicables, but we do not say that we do not admit even that which is established by valid

arguments. Otherwise, we shall be on the same footing with children and madmen. So it has been said:

न ह्याप्तवचनान्नभसो निपतन्ति महासुराः ।
युक्तिमद्वचनं ग्राह्यं मयान्यैश्च भवद्विधैः ॥

Huge giants do not verily drop from heaven, because an Âpta, competent or trustworthy person, so says. Only sayings which are supported by reason, should be accepted by me and others like yourself.—26.

Bhâṣya:—The author removes the above apprehension:

Let there be no fixed rule regarding the number of predicables; still it is not possible for the disciples to accept or admit, relying upon your bare words, a predicable, (A-vidyâ), at once real and unreal, which is opposed to reason by means of the opposition between existence and non-existence. Were it otherwise, there should be acceptance also of unreasonable things mentioned by children and the like. This is the meaning. On this subject (*i.e.*, the conception of A-vidyâ as at once real and unreal) there is no clear text of the Veda, etc., and a different object is proved from passages of the Veda rendered doubtful on account of their opposition to reason. This is the import.

The same is the sense of such sentences of the Saura Purâna, etc., as—

नासद्रूपा न सद्रूपा माया नैवोभयात्मिका ।
सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वाच्या मिथ्याभूता सनातनी ॥

Mâyâ (the principle of determination) possesses neither the form of unreality nor the form of reality, nor does it partake of the nature of both. It is indescribable by the terms, real and unreal. It is Falsity itself, and is everlasting.

Prakṛiti, designated as Mâyâ, and proved by such texts of the Veda as—

विकारजननीं मायामष्टरूपामजां ध्रुवाम्

Mâyâ, the mother of transformations or modifications, possessing eight-fold form, unborn, permanent.—*Śâlika Upaniṣat*, 3.

cannot be real in the ultimate sense or as a transcendental object, inasmuch as she undergoes waste or passes away by the forms of successive modifications, the prior giving rise to the posterior. Nor can she be absolutely unreal, since she differs from the (imaginary) horns of a hare by the characteristic of being capable of producing object and exerting activity. Nor can she partake of the nature of both, because of the self-contradiction involved in the supposition. Hence सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वाच्या—"indescribable by the terms, real and unreal," that is, incapable of teaching, after obtaining certain knowledge, that she is real and nothing but real, and that she is unreal and nothing but unreal. But she is मिथ्याभूता—"false-like," that is, she possesses practical or phenomenal unreality designated as (laya dissolution), the state of dissolution of all phenomenal existences, and at the same time also possesses practical or phenomenal

pauity in the form of eternally undergoing transformation. The hint is hereby given that we shall develop this point in the sequel.

And everyone of the defects brought out in this sub-division of the book can be put down also against the modern doctrine of Mâyâ.—26.

Nor is Bondage caused by unbroken influences of external objects.

नानादिविषयोपरागनिमित्तकोऽप्यस्य ॥ १ । २७ ॥

न Na, not. अनादिविषयोपरागनिमित्तकः Anâdi (beginningless)-viṣaya (object)-upa-râga (stain)-nimittakaḥ (occasioned), occasioned by the tint of objects from all eternity. अपि Api, again. अस्य Asya, his, of the Puruṣa.

27. His bondage, morever, is not caused by means of the tint (reflected) from objects from all eternity.—27.

Vṛitti.—The author refutes the Bauddha view.

It cannot be maintained that 'his', *i. e.*, of the Self, bondage will be caused by the instrumentality of the Vâsanâ, tendency to or longing for, objects, from all eternity or of which no beginning can be traced. With us there can be, by no means, connection of the Self with Vâsanâ, and consequently bondage cannot result from it. (While) in the Bauddha system, since a permanent Self does not exist, and Vâsanâ also does not endure for ever, who will be bound?—27.

Bhâṣya:—Others, the Nihilists, assert that external objects of momentary duration, exist, and that in consequence of their influence, or tendency towards them, bondage of the Jîva or embodied Self takes place. The author condemns this view also:

Bondage occasioned by tendency towards objects which continues from all eternity in the form of a stream (of temporary tendencies), is also not possible for the Self. Such is the meaning.

The reading निमित्ततोऽप्यस्य Nimittato'pyasya,—(Nor does) his (bondage) result from (the influence or reflection of objects from all eternity as) the instrumental cause, is preferable to निमित्तकः Nimittikaḥ, having, etc., as the instrumental cause.—27.

Above continued.

न बाह्याभ्यन्तरयोरुपरज्योपरञ्जकभावोऽपि
देशव्यवधानात् श्रुघ्नस्थपाटलिपुत्रस्थयोरिव ॥१। २८॥

न Na, not. बाह्याभ्यन्तरयोः Bâhya (external)-abhyantara (internal)-yoḥ, between the external and the internal. उपरज्योपरञ्जकभावः Uparajya (that which is tinted by adjacent object)-uparañjaka (that which tints)-bhâvaḥ (relation), relation that which is tinted and that which tints. अपि Api, also. देशव्यवधानात् Deśa

(space)-vyavadhânât (interval), because of interval of space. Aniruddha reads देशभेदात् Desa-bhedât, because of difference of space. श्रुघ्नपाटलिपुत्रस्थयोः Śrughnastha-pâtaliputrasthayoḥ, between one staying at Śrughna (an ancient place to the north of Thanesvar) and another staying at Pâtaliputra (Patna). इव Iva, as.

28. Also between the external and the internal there is not the relation of that which is tinted and that which tints, because of the interval of space (between them), as between one staying at Śrughna and another staying at Pâtaliputra.—28.

Vritti.—It may be replied (by the Bauddha) that bondage of the continuous stream of conscious states composing the self, will take place with the continuous stream of Vâsanâ, tendencies, arising from reflections cast by external objects. Hence the author declares:

If it is said that the relation of that which is tinted and that which tints has been observed also between the sun and a vessel of water, (we reply that) there the infusion of colour is due to the connection (established) by the sun-beam, and that in the present case, no such connection exists. If it be rejoined (that, in the present case, 'infusion of colour,' i. e., affection, is possible) by means of Vâsanâ or tendency or impression (supplying the connecting link, we say, it is) not; when it does not exist for all time, how (can Vâsanâ form) the connection? If it is said (that the required connection consists not of an individual impression, but) of the continuous stream (of impressions, in that case), if that to which the stream of the passing states, belongs, be different from the states, then your theory (that the Self is but a stream of conscious states) is gone. On the other hand, (if you say that) although it (the soul) is not different (from the stream of passing states), yet something may be deposited or superimposed upon it by the latter, (we reply that) to deposit or superimpose is impossible on account of its momentary character. While, in the case of non-superimposition, what is the use of it which is almost a non-entity, (as it has no reason for its existence)? —28

Bhâṣya.—The author gives the reason for the above:

In your theory, it is something limited and lying wholly within the body, that is called the soul. Now, also the relation of the tinted and the tinter is not possible in the case of that which is thus *within*, as regards an *external* object. Why? Because of the intervention of space, as in the case of two persons, the one of whom remains at Śrughna and the other at Pâtaliputra. Such is the meaning. For it is only

here conjunction exists that adjacent tincture, called Vâsanâ or affection, observed, as in the case of madder and cloth, or of flower and crystal.

By the word, api (also), it is implied that absence of conjunction, etc., apply to the author's own theory *also*.

Śrughna and Pâtaliputrâ are two particular places at a distance from each other.—28.

Above continued.

द्वयोरेकदेशलब्धोपरागान्न व्यवस्था ॥ १ । २९ ॥

द्वयोः Dvayoḥ, of the two. एकदेशलब्धोपरागात् Eka (same)-deśa (place)-labdha (received)-uparâgât (tincture), on account of tincture received from the same place. न Na, no. व्यवस्था Vyavasthâ, rule.

29. The Law (of Bondage and Release) will be impossible, in consequence of tincture of both of them received from the same place.—29.

Vṛitti.—(The objector may continue :) Granted that internal tincture cannot be induced by means of Vâsanâ or affection. Inasmuch, however, as the soul is all-pervading, tincture will arise through the connection of the soul with a portion of the external (world).

To this the author replies :

(On this theory), there is no Release for those who hold that there is but one soul, because they *always* receive tincture, and hence, with them, there can be no rule or distinction (of bondage and release). On the other hand, it does not exist in the case of those who hold that there are a multiplicity of souls, because equal knowledge will be produced, at one and the same time, in all of them, through their connection with the entire universe of objects.—29.

Bhâṣya :—(The objector may reply :) The tincture of objects should be asserted (in the soul) by means of conjunction with objects, because the soul, according to us, goes out to the place of objects, just as the senses do according to you.

In that case the author declares :

In consequence of 'tincture,' *i. e.*, the tincture of objects, 'in both' *e.*, in bound and released souls, 'received' at the 'same' 'place,' *i. e.*, e place of objects, there will be no rule or distinction of bondage and lease, because of the liability, (according to this hypothesis), of the leased soul also to bondage. Such is the meaning.—29.

Above continued.

अदृष्टवशाच्चेत् ॥ १ । ३० ॥

अदृष्टवशात् A (un)-dṛiṣṭa (seen)-vaśât. (virtue), in virtue of Adṛiṣṭam or the unseen *i. e.*, destiny. चेत् Chet, if (you suggest).

30. If (the objector suggest that a distinction between the bound and the released souls does exist) in virtue of Adṛiṣṭam, (the answer is as given in the next aphorism).—30.

Vṛitti:—The author apprehends:

Although (equal) knowledge is entailed in all cases through connection with objects at all times, still it is the same Adṛiṣṭam by which a particular knowledge is produced in a man, that is the cause of that—that distinctive knowledge—(in him). Hence no knowledge can arise universally—30.

Bhâṣya:—Here the author apprehends:

Granting that they (the bound and the released soul) are alike in respect of their conjunction with objects by means of connection with the same locality, yet the reception of the tincture may (or may not) result from the force of adṛiṣṭam alone. Such is the meaning.—30.

Above continued.

न द्वयोरेककालायोगादुपकार्योपकारकभावः ॥ १ । ३१ ॥

न Na, not. द्वयोः Dvayoḥ, between the two. एककालायोगात् Eka (same)-kâla (time)-a (non)-yogât (possibility), on account of non-compossibility at one and the same time. उपकार्योपकारकभावः Upakârya (the benefited)-upakâraka (the benefactor)-bhâvaḥ (relation), the relation of the deserver and the bestower.

31. The relation of deserver and bestower (can-) not (subsist) between the two on account of their non-compossibility at one and the same time.—31.

Vṛitti:—The author points out the defect (in the above suggestion):

(The meaning is) clear.—31.

Bhâṣya:—The author discards (the above suggestion):

On the admission of momentary duration (of souls), the agent-soul and the experiencer or patient-soul cannot exist at the same (moment of) time, and hence the relation of deserver and bestower cannot subsist. Tincture of objects, pertaining to the patient-soul, is not possible by means of Adṛiṣṭam pertaining to the agent-soul. Such is the meaning.—31.

Above continued.

पुत्रकर्मवदिति चेत् ॥ १ । ३२ ॥

पुत्रकर्मवत् Putra (son)-karma (performance)-vat (like), like the performances towards a son. इति चेत् Iti chet, if it is suggested.

32. If (it is suggested that the case is) like that of performances toward a son, (we reply that the illustration is not a fact for the reason given in the next aphorism).—32.

Vritti :—The author (further) apprehends :

Just as by Prutreṣṭi, a sacrifice for the birth of a son, and like other performances, (in which the father is the agent), benefit is conferred on the son, the patient, who is yet unborn, through the purification of his flesh, so it will be here also.—32.

Bhâṣya :—The author (further) apprehends :

The objector may urge that as benefit accrues to the son by means of ceremonies in regard to the son which (really) belong to the father who performs them, in like manner tincture of objects may be induced (in the soul, for instance, of to-day) by Adṛiṣṭam inhering in a different subject (*i. e.*, for instance, the soul of yesterday). Such is the meaning.—32.

Above continued.

नास्ति हि तत्र स्थिर एकात्मा यो गर्भाधानादिना संस्क्रियते ॥ १ । ३३ ॥

न Na, not. अस्ति Asti, is, exists. हि Hi, because. तत्र Tatra, there, in the opponent's theory. स्थिरः Sthiraḥ, permanent. एकात्मा Eka (one)-âtmâ (soul), self-same soul. यः Yaḥ, which. गर्भाधानादिना Garbha (embryo)-âdhâna (depositing)-âdi (etc.)-nâ, by the ceremony of depositing the embryo in the womb, and the like संस्क्रियते Saṃskriyate, is consecrated.

33. (The above illustration is not a real one), because in your theory there is no self-same permanent soul which could be conscreated by the ceremonies beginning with the ceremony of depositing the embryo in the womb.—33.

Vritti :—The author declares a demonstrated fact :

(The opponent's illustration is not a real one on his *own* theory). In my theory, on the other hand, the soul is uncaused, eternal, pure, and enlightened. Oblation of clarified butter, and like other performances,

for its benefit, are quite possible. Thus the soul, conceived as permanent, is proved.—33.

(*N. B.*—The words, 'In our theory, on the other hand,' and 'Thus the soul, conceived as permanent, is proved' are not found in Garbe's edition of Aniruddha's Commentary, with the result that the portion of the Commentary under notice is not easily intelligible.)

Bhâṣya :—The author removes the above apprehension by showing the falsity of the illustration :

Even by the sacrifice for the sake of a son, no benefit can accrue to the son on your own theory : 'hi,' because, 'tatra,' in your view, there is no permanent, self-same soul, continuing from the time of depositing the embryo in the womb up to the moment of birth, which could be consecrated by the Putreṣṭi sacrifice, so as to acquire fitness for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth. Hence follows the falsity of the illustration also. Such is the meaning. On the other hand, the permanency of the soul being an implied tenet of our theory, at that time also, (*i. e.*, at the time subsequent to birth), Adṛiṣṭam certainly co-exists with the soul in its self-identity, (in which it was originally produced), inasmuch as it is by means of Adṛiṣṭam belonging to the Upâdhi or the sum-total of external conditions which make the son what he is, that benefit accrues to the son through the Upâdhi or external condition of sonship. Hence does not follow the falsity of the illustration in our theory also. Such is the import.—33.

Bondage is permanent :

Theory of the transiency of things criticised.

स्थिरकार्यासिद्धेः क्षणिकत्वम् ॥ १ । ३४ ॥

स्थिरकार्यासिद्धेः Sthira (permanent)-kârya (effect)-a (want of)-siddheḥ (proof,) since there is no proof of a permanent effect. क्षणिकत्वम् Kṣaṇikatvam, momentariness.

34. Since there is no proof of a permanent effect, the momentariness (of Bondage is to be admitted).—34.

Vṛitti :—The author cites the view that the soul is not-permanent-consciousness :

Existence and possibility of particular uses (belong to the soul). These characteristics are pervaded by succession and non-succession. And they cannot possibly belong to a non-momentary thing. Hence they establish momentariness.—34.

Bhâṣya :—Well, bondage also being momentary, let bondage either have no fixed cause or have non-being for its cause. With this in mind, another unbeliever puts forward :

'Of bondage'—such is the complement. The import has been ily stated above. Here the application of the argument is as follows:

The subject in dispute, bondage, etc., is momentary,

Because it exists,

(For whatever exists is momentary),

As the flame of a lamp.

And, (continues the unbeliever), the argument does not fail in the ıse of (what you choose to regard as a permanent product, such as) a ater-pot, and the like, because that also (in my opinion) is like the sub-ct in dispute (in being momentary). This is precisely what is asserted the expression "Since there is no proof of a permanent effect."—34.

Above continued.

न प्रत्यभिज्ञाबाधात् ॥ १ । ३५ ॥

न Na, nay. प्रत्यभिज्ञाबाधात् Pratyabhijñâ (recognition)-bâdhât (obstruction), on count of obstruction to recognition.

35. Nay, (things are not momentary in their duration), s (in that case) there would be obstruction to knowing them ver again.—35.

Vritti:—The author rejects the above view:

Although the existence of a permanent thing should be demonstrated y arguments that a thing is a principal cause or is not a principal cause, ccording to the presence or absence of co-operative causes, yet, (the fact f recognition) being proved by the common consent of all thinkers, ɔstruction to unobstructed recognition in the form, 'This is that,' has ɔen mentioned here. This has been elaborated elsewhere, and hence it not here dealt with at large.—35.

Bhâṣya:—The author proves his theory of permanency of things:

"Momentariness does not belong to a single thing"—such is the ɔmplement. Facts of recognition such as "What I saw,—that same do touch," prove permanency, and consequently there is obstruction to the ıeory of momentariness, that is, by an opposite argument to that of the nbeliever, which may be fully stated as follows:

Bondage, etc., is permanent,

Because it exists,

(For whatever exists is permanent),

As the water-pot, etc.

It is only in our theory that, by the existence of favourable argu-ments, there is no opposition by an equally valid argument to the contrary.

And in the case of the lamp and the like, the idea of momentariness is merely an error which the others fall into by not recognising the numerous minute instants through which they endure.—35.

Above continued.

श्रुतिन्यायविरोधाच्च ॥ १ । ३६ ॥

श्रुतिन्यायविरोधात् Śruti (Veda)-Nyâya (logic)-virodhât (contradiction), because of contradiction by the Veda and by logic. च Cha, and, also.

36. And (things are not momentary), also because this is contradicted by the Veda and by logic.—36.

Vritti:—The author points out another defect in the unbeliever's theory):

The Veda says:

अस्ति जन्मान्तरोपभोग्यभोक्ता पुरुषः

There exists Puruṣa, Self, the experiencer of the objects of experience in a different birth.

Logic also: Who so will exert himself in an act which is incapable of enjoyment or in the employment of means for its accomplishment?

(The objector may say that) the activity of kind-hearted persons is observed (to proceed) from unselfishness; but this is really not so, since even in such cases one acquires merit for oneself by doing good to others, and hence, although this merit is not directly aimed at, still it becomes the means of Release.—36.

Bhâṣya:—The meaning is that nothing whatever is momentary, because the inference of momentariness, in the whole web of the world consisting of effects and causes, is contradicted by texts of the Veda such as—

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्

All this, O peaceful one, was verily existing at the beginning.—Chhând. Up. VI. ii. 1, S. B. H., Vol. III, p. 380.

तम एवेदमग्र आसीत्

At the beginning all this was more darkness.—Maitreya Upaniṣat, V. 2.

and by such scriptural and other arguments as—

कथमसतः सज्जायेत

How can that which exists proceed from that which exists not?—Chhând. Upa., VI. ii. 2, S. B. H., Vol. III., p. 380.—36.

Above continued.

दृष्टान्तासिद्धेश्च ॥ १ । ३७ ॥

दृष्टान्तसिद्धेः Dristânta (instance)-a (un)-siddheh (reality), because of the unreality of the instance. च Cha, also.

37. (Things are not momentary), also because the instance (adduced in the above syllogism, *vide* Sûtram 34) is not a fact.—37.

Vritti:—The author points out another defect (in the opponent's theory).

All things, without exception, being included in the pakṣa (the subject of the conclusion proposed to be drawn, *i.e.*, the minor term in which the existence of the major term, *i.e.*, momentariness, is doubtful), there is no (independent) familiar example. If it is not included therein, the same is permanent (falling, as it would do, outside the class of momentary things). If you say that the momentariness of this also may be established by another syllogism, we reply that there too the unreality of the instance will (similarly) be a defect.—37.

Bhâṣya:—The meaning is that there can be no inference of momentariness, also because there is no proof of momentariness in such instances as the flame of a lamp and the like.—37.

Above continued.

युगपज्जायमानयोर्न कार्यकारणभावः ॥ १ । ३८ ॥

युगपज्जायमानयोः Yugapat, (simultaneously)-jâyamânayoḥ (produced), between (two things) simultaneously produced. न Na, no. कार्यकारणभावः Kârya (effect)-kâraṇa (cause)-bhâvaḥ (relation), relation of effect and cause.

38. (There can be) no relation of effect and cause between (two things) simultaneously produced.—38.

Vritti:—The author declares that it is only on the theory of momentariness that no predication is possible.

"Between (two things) simultaneously produced," that is, between (two things) possessing predicates identical with themselves, (because, on the theory of momentariness, they perish no sooner than they are produced), as, *e. g.*, between the right and the left horn, (there can be no relation of effect and cause). And this has been declared more than once.—38.

Bhâṣya:—Moreover, the author declares, the relation of effect and cause which, according to those who maintain the transiency of things, established by the impossibility otherwise of activity and inactivity, does not hold good even in the case of earth and water-pot, and so forth:

Does the relation of effect and cause subsist, between (two things) simultaneously produced, or between successive ones? Of these, the former (is) not (the case), as there is no particular reason for believing that it is so, and on other grounds. Such is the import.—38.

Above continued.

पूर्वापाये उत्तरायोगात् ॥ १ । ३९ ॥

पूर्वापाये Pûrva (precedent)-apâye (passing away), on the passing away of the precedent. उत्तरायोगात् Uttara (subsequent)-a (no)-yogât (connection), because there can be no connection with the subsequent.

39. (The relation of effect and cause cannot subsist between temporary things even though they be successive), because, on the passing away of the precedent, there can be no (causal) connection with the subsequent.—39.

Vritti:—(The opponent may reply that) the relation of effect and cause will arise from the mere appearance of the things in prior and posterior times. Hence the author says:

It would be so, if it (the prior or the posterior thing) could extend beyond itself. But that is impossible on account of its momentariness.—39.

Bhâsya:—The author shows that the latter also cannot be the case:

The relation of effect and cause is not possible on the theory of momentariness, because the production of the 'subsequent,' *i. e.*, the effect, cannot properly take place at the time of the passing away of the 'precedent,' *i.e.*, the cause, inasmuch as the effect is observed only as dependent upon, or being made up of, the material cause. Such is the meaning.—39.

Above continued.

तद्भावे तदयोगादुभयव्यभिचारादपि न ॥ १ । ४० ॥

तद्भावे Tat-bhâve, during the existence of that, *i. e.*, the cause. तदयोगात् Tat-ayogât, on account of the non-connection of that, *i. e.*, the effect. उभयव्यभिचारात् Ubhaya (both)-vyabhichârât (violation), because of the violation of both. (*N.B.* Here 'both' refers to the two rules of positive and negative inference, *viz.*, that if there is a cause there will be an effect, and that if there is no cause there will be no effect.) अपि Api, also. न Na, not.

40. (The relation of effect and cause is) not (possible on the theory of transiency), because of the violation of both (the rules of positive and negative inference) in consequence of the non-appearance of the effect during the existence of the cause.—40.

Vritti:—The author elucidates the above proposition :

The relation of effect and cause is not possible, because of the violation of both, in consequence of the non-existence of the effect during the existence of the relation of the cause and that of which it is the cause. Let aside the question of predication or practical use, uses such as 'This is the cause, this is the effect,' will also be not possible.—40.

Bhâṣya:—The author points out yet another defect by reference to the material cause alone :

The meaning is that the relation of effect and cause cannot subsist, also 'Ubhaya-vyâbhichârât,' because of the violation of (the rule of) positive and negative inference, in consequence of the non-connection of the subsequent during the existence of the precedent. Thus, apprehension of the relation of effect and cause between the constituent and the constituted is possible only by the rules of agreement and disagreement, *viz.*, that where there is production of the constituted there is the constituent, and when there is non-existence of the constituent there is absence of the production of the constituted. That being so, the relation of effect and cause is not established on the theory of momentariness, because of the violation of the rules of agreement and disagreement, in consequence of the fact, that these two things, the constituent and the constituted, being successive and having only a momentary duration, belong to two different, opposite, moments of time.—40.

पूर्वभावमात्रे न नियमः ॥ १ । ४१ ॥

पूर्वभावमात्रे Pûrva (prior)-bhâva (existence)-mâtre (mere), in the case of mere antecedence. न Na, no. नियमः Niyamah, uniformity, restriction.

41. In the case of mere antecedence there will be no uniformity.—41.

Vritti:—The opponent may argue that the existence of the cause at the time of the production of the effect is inoperative, and that the effect will result by the mere existence of the cause at the preceding moment. Hence the author says :

(Will the effect result by the mere antecedence) of something belonging to a different series, or of something belonging to the same series with the effect? If you say 'of something belonging to a different series,' then the causation will be too remote (*i. e.*, the cause will operate where it exists not). If, on the other hand, you say 'of something belonging to the same series with the effect,' in that case also as, (being momentary), it would perish without subsequence (of the effect), it would be similar to

something belonging to a different series, and therefore there will be no uniformity. That there can be no subsequence or agreement between them has been already stated (*vide* Sûtram 40).

It may be said that the causality of a non-existent cause also is observed. For example, an archer shoots another man with an arrow, and immediately dies of apoplexy; afterwards the man shot with the arrow dies; here the death of the former is the cause of the death of the latter. But it is not so, because the subsequence of the death of the latter, even in the non-existence of the archer, is due to the (physiological) processes which resulted in death.—41.

Bhâṣya:—(The opponent may urge:) Let the causality of the material cause also, like that of the efficient or instrumental cause, arise solely by means of mere antecedence. To this the author replies:

On the admission, again, of mere antecedence, there will be no such uniformity or fixed certainty as 'It is this that is the material cause,' because there is no distinctive peculiarity in the antecedence of the efficient causes also. (Whereas) the division of material and efficient causes is recognised by all men. Such is the meaning.—41.

The cause of Bondage really exists. The world is not an idea.

न विज्ञानमात्रं बाह्यप्रतीतेः ॥ १ । ४२ ॥

न Na, not. विज्ञानमात्रं Vijñâna (idea)-mâtram (mere), mere idea. बाह्यप्रतीतेः Bâhya (external)-pratîteḥ (intuition), on account of the intuition of external things.

42. (The world is) not a mere idea, on account of the intuition of objective reality.—42.

Vṛitti:—It has been stated that Bondage results from the tinctorial reflection cast upon the Self by adjacent external objects. But external reality, says the Vijñâna-vâdin, (Bauddha) Idealist, does not exist, since the world is in its essence ideal. The author replies to him:

The world is not mere idea. Had it been so, the intuition would have been 'I am a water-pot,' and not 'This is a water-pot,' (as is the case). It cannot be said that the difference is caused by a distinctive peculiarity in the Vâsanâ, mental impression or recept; for, in the absence, *ex-hypothesi*, of external reality, the recept of the water-pot itself can have no existence, and consequently how can there be any such distinctive peculiarity? What, again, is the cause of the mental impression? Is it the mental impression itself or some other impression coming from the outside? In the case of the (second) alternative, that it is some

external impression, something else also would exist, and consequently the same would be an external reality.

But external reality, our opponent may argue, cannot verily exist, by reason of the non-existence of a whole exceeding the parts of which it is made up. For, thus, the parts and the whole being identical, there is the intuition of unity. When the part moves, the whole moves; where the part is small, the whole does not move. By the attribution of the contradictory property, *viz.*, that it does not move, there exists difference (between the part and the whole), and hence there is no unity. In like manner, other defects such as being red and not-red, covered and not-covered, confined-to-a-place and not-confined-to-a-place, and so forth, may be cited in example.

We reply: Granted that the whole (containing properties contradictory to those of its component parts) does not exist; still there is no disproof of external reality, inasmuch as it is of the cluster of ultimate atoms that apprehension or intuition takes place under the characteristic of largeness.

It is not so, rejoins our opponent. For, ultimate atoms have to be inferred (as the cause) by means of the whole as (their) effect; in the case of its non-existence, by means of which are they to be inferred? Ultimate atoms being super-sensible, they cannot also deposit in their cluster something which they themselves do not contain; consequently, 'It is large or bulky,' such intuition is erroneous. Hence follows that the world is mere idea.

Here it is said: (This is not so), because of the difference between part and whole. Moreover, the two being different from each other, the whole does not move when the parts move. Where, however, there is movement or vibration of a larger number of parts, there the whole certainly moves. Similar reconciliation in the case also of the contradiction of red and not-red, etc., may be declared. External reality, therefore, is proved.

In the case of the other alternative, *viz.*, that it is the mental impression itself that is the cause of the mental impression, there would be production of knowledge at all times.—42.

Bhâṣya:—Other unbelievers, again, say: There is no existence of an entity which is not an idea. Therefore, Bondage also is a mere idea, like an object seen in a dream. Hence, it being absolutely unreal, there is no cause of it.

The author sets aside their opinion :

The meaning is that reality is not limited to ideas only, because like ideas, external objects also are proved by intuition.—42.

Nor is the world a Void.

तदभावे तदभावाच्छून्यं तर्हि ॥ १ । ४३ ॥

तदभावे Tat-abhâve, in the non-existence or absence of that, *i.e.*, external objects. तदभावात् Tat-abhâvât, there being non-existence of that, *i.e.*, knowledge. शून्यं Śûnyam, void. तर्हि Tarhi, therefore.

43. There being non-existence of external objects, there is non-existence of knowledge : (the world), therefore, is a void.—43.

Vṛitti :—Knowledge, devoid of object, is not observed. Therefore, (if the external reality does not exist, then,) in consequence of the non-existence of objects to be known, knowledge also does not exist. Thus declares the Śûnya-vâdin, the Bauddha Nihilist :

Void follows from the non-existence of knowledge in the absence of objects to be known. If knowledge were its own object, there would be the contradiction of the agent and the patient. —43.

Bhâṣya :—" Well, (the mere fact of intuition does not prove external reality.) The simple and natural form of reasoning is," argue those heretics, " the inference, by means of the examples of dreams and the like, of the unreality appertaining to the object supposed to be the cause of presentation to the senses or sensible appearances. By this inference the sensation of external reality as such should be opposed. On this point there is also the testimony of your Śruti and Smṛiti. For example—

चिद्वीदं सर्वम्

Verily all this is consciousness.—*Nṛisiṃha-Tâpani Upa.*, II. 1. 7.

तस्माद् विज्ञानमेवास्ति न प्रपञ्चो न संसृतिः

Therefore, only Thought exists, neither creation nor transmigration.—*Liṅga-Purâṇa* (?)"

Hence the author points out another defect :

Were it so, from the non-existence of external reality only the Void would result, and not even Thought. Why not? Because, 'Tat-abhâvât,' in the absence of external reality, there being the implication of the non-existence of thought or idea also, the inference is possible that the intuition of idea also, like the intuition of external reality, corresponds to no reality as its object. The infallibility of the evidence of Thought is also sometimes disproved. Furthermore, the proofs of (the existence of)

Thought are also repudiated, because they are derived from external sources. Such is the meaning.

(The Vijñâna-vâdin may reply): The fact of intuition is disputed by none whatever, and hence it does not stand in need of any proof. But this is not so, because the Śûnya-vâdins themselves dispute that.

If (the Vijñâna-vâdin contends): (The existence of) a thing is proved by a non-existent thing also as the means of proof, inasmuch as it is the non-opposition to (the existence of) the object (to be proved) that is the cause of certain knowledge (of its existence), and not the ultimate or absolute reality of the means of proof.

(We reply): It is not so, as, in that case, non-existent things, as means of proof, being everywhere easily available, there would be no (need of) seeking after the means of proof with regard to any object whatever.

Now, (if the Vijñâna-vâdin admits): Even amongst non-existent things, a distinction in the form of practical or phenomenal existence is desirable in the case of those which serve as means of proof.

(We say): You have come to the path. What, again, is (the meaning of) this practical or phenomenal existence? If it denotes the characteristic of undergoing change of form, then it is existence of this kind only that is also desired by us in the case of the means of proof of the perceptible and the percipient, for we exclude from the web of the universe—creation—only its imputed resemblance to the illusory silvery appearance of the oyster shell. If, on the other hand, it denotes mere appearance or manifestation, in that case also, by means of proof exactly similar to those (of the existence of Thought), the proof of (the existence of) external objects also would result. Opposition to proof of existence, by means of the very same kind of haphazard inference under the auspices of simple and natural form of reasoning, (as is raised against the existence of external reality), would equally arise in the case of Thought also.

Hereby is set at rest the opinion of the so-called Vedântins of the present day, which stands on no stronger basis than the teaching of the Vijñâna-vâdin.

On the other hand, the texts of the Śruti and the Smṛiti (quoted above), demonstrative of the reality of Thought alone, refute only the absolute or transcendental existence of external objects in the form of freedom from change, but not also their practical or phenomenal

existence in the form of the characteristic of being liable to transformation.

वस्तु राजेति यद्लोके यत्तु राजभटादिकम् ।
तथान्यच्च नृपेत्थं तु न सत् सङ्कल्पनामयम् ॥ ९४ ॥
यत्तु कालान्तरेणापि नान्यसञ्ज्ञामुपैति वै ।
परिणामादिसम्भूतां तद्वस्तु नृप तच्च किम् ॥ ९५ ॥

'This entity is the king,' 'These are the king's army,' and so on,—these and such other (predications), O king, are similarly made (*i. e.*, made by reference to the body). These designations are not real but purely imaginary (94). But the reality is that which, even by the passage of time, does not pass into a different designation derived from change of form and the like. O king, what is it (*i.e.*, how shall I describe it to you)? (95.)—*Viṣṇu-Purâṇa*, II. XIII. 94-95.

From these verses of the Viṣṇu-Purâṇa and from other sources we learn that it is the liability to change of form that is regarded as possessing the characteristic of non-existence. 'Saṃkalpanâ-mayam,' *i.e.*, invented by the imagination or mind of Îśvara and others.

Hereby it should be understood that by—

विज्ञानमयमेवैतदशेषमवगच्छत

Know all this, in its entirety, to be constituted by Thought alone.—*Viṣṇu-Purâṇa*, III. XVIII. 16.

this and other propositions, it was just the truth that was taught, as the story is related in the Viṣṇu-Purâṇa, to the Asuras, the enemies of the Gods, by Viṣṇu in the form of Mâyâ-Moha (*vide* Viṣṇu-Purâṇa, III. XVIII), but that they, owing to their unfitness for these instructions and other imperfections, received these instructions in a contrary sense, and thereby became Vijñâna-vâdin Nâstikas or Idealistic Heretics.

All this, however, has been elaborately dealt with by us, in our Commentary on the Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ, in connection with the refutation of the Doctrine of Mâyâ.—43.

Above continued.

शून्यं तत्त्वं भावो विनश्यति वस्तुधर्मत्वाद् विनाशस्य ॥ १।४४ ॥

शून्यं Śûnyam, the void. तत्त्वं Tattvam, reality. भावः Bhâvaḥ, existence. विनश्यति Vinaśyati, perishes. वस्तुधर्मत्वात् Vastu (thing)-dharma (nature)-tvât, being the nature of things. विनाशस्य Vinâśasya, of destruction.

44. The Void is the reality, existence passes away, it being the nature of things to pass away.—44.

Vritti:—(The Śûnya-vâdin goes on:)

If reality consisted in the form of existence (as perceived by us), then on the destruction of existence there being destruction of reality,

there would be no emancipation. 'Vastu-dharma-tvât vinâśasya,' because a thing, (phenomenal being), must necessarily perish.—44.

Bhâṣya :—Let it be so, rejoins the high priest of the heretics, that only the Void is the reality. Then, necessarily, the enquiry into the cause of Bondage is not justified, being altogether useless.

Only the Void is the reality, because all (perceptible) existence whatever perishes, and that which is by nature perishable, is unreal, as a dream. Hence all things, being non-existent at the beginning and at the end, have a temporary existence during the interval, and so Bondage, etc., are creational, incidental or occasional, and not real in the ultimate sense. Consequently, which will be bound by which? Such is their inward significance. The reason, (for the assertion), that existences are by nature perishable, is (given in the words): 'Vastu-dharma-tvât vinâśasya,' which mean that to perish is of the nature of things. And no object can continue to exist after divorcing its nature. Such is the meaning.—44.

Above continued.

अपवादमात्रमबुद्धानाम् ॥ १ । ४५ ॥

अपवादमात्रम् Apavâda (incorrect or false statement)-mâtram (mere), a mere false statement. अबुद्धानाम् Abuddhânâm, of the unenlightened.

45. ('Existence passes away'—this is) a mere false declaration or cavillation on the part of the unenlightened.—45.

Vṛitti :—The author states his own solution (of the doubt raised by the Śûnya-vâdin):

Non-existence does not perish,—this is a mere form of speech, and not a real proposition, 'A-buddhânâm,' on the part of those to whom the Śâstras or sacred writings are unknown. For, the destruction of antecedent non-existence is observed, and on the establishment of the theory of Sat-kârya, *i.e.*, that of the existence of the effect in the cause even prior to its appearance as the effect, there is non-destruction of existence. Even if the term, destruction, is applied to denote disappearance, there is still non-destruction of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa.

(If the Śûnya-vâdin asks): Non-existence itself does not exist, how can arise the consideration of its destruction and non-destruction?

(We reply): How, then, takes place the cognition, the water-pot does not exist on the ground, (*lit.*, the ground is where-the-water-pot-does-not-exist)? If it arises by the help of the ground, the result would be that cognition of the non-existence of the water-pot will take place even when

the water-pot exists on the ground, inasmuch as the ground remains the same in both the cases.

(If the Śûnya-vâdin holds): Cognition of Non-existence arises by the help of the bare ground. But the water-pot being there, the ground lacks bareness.

(We ask): Is bareness a mere part of the nature of the ground, or is it something beyond that? If it constitutes the very nature of the ground, then, inasmuch as it would continue to exist even during the existence of the water-pot on it, cognition of non-existence would take place. If, on the other hand, it is something beyond that, then the same is non-existence.

(If the Śûnya-vâdin argues): The use of (the term), non-existence, is in respect of the aloneness or singleness of the ground. While the water-pot exists, there is no singleness in the ground. Where, then, is the reason for the application of (the term) non-existence?

(We say): Such is not the case. Is singleness the number unity, or something else? The number unity, again, exists in the ground even when it contains the water-pot. In the case of the second alternative, *viz.*, that it is something else, the very same would be non-existence. For, where there is no characteristic difference in the objects, there can be no characteristic difference in the cognitions thereof.

(If the Śûnya-vâdin asks): How can there be cognition of non-existence, when there is no relation between existence and non-existence?

(We reply): As the cognition, this is a water-pot, arises from the agreement and non-agreement, stimulation, and non-stimulation, of the senses, in like manner, the cognition of non-existence also proceeds from a cause. For, the supposition of the cause is made by the observation of the effect, but it is not possible to wilfully disregard (the existence of) an observed effect, (*e.g.*, the cognition of non-existence). Moreover, as we hold the theory of an indefinite number of predicables (*vide* Sûtram 25 and 26 *supra*), it will do us no harm if there exists some such relation also (between existence and non-existence) as is required.

Non-existence, therefore, is established.—45.

Bhâṣya :—The author discards (the above view):

Existence as such is perishable,—such is 'Apavâda-mâtram,' merely a false declaration, of the ignorant. For by reason of the non-existence of destructive causes, the destruction of (simple) substances which are not made up of parts, is impossible. There is also no proof of the destruction of their effects; just as the intuition, the water-pot is worn out,

(proves the worn out condition of the water-pot), so intuitions such as, the water-pot is past and gone, prove nothing but the condition of the water-pot, etc., designated as past. The unmanifested state (of a thing) also really enters into our theory on the admission of the past (or unproduced) state of the effect. Further, even if it is conceded that destruction is of the essence of the web of the universe, still it is possible that the destruction of Bondage can properly become an object of desire.

Someone, however, explains (the Sûtram as follows) :—

The Void is the reality,—this is only a coarse theory of the ignorant, while there is no argument in its favour. For it does not bear the alternatives of the existence and non-existence of proof: if you admit that there is proof of the existence of the Void, then, by that very proof, voidness is disproved; if you do not admit this, then, owing to the absence of proof, the void is not proved; and if you say that the Void proves itself, then the implication would be that it possesses the form of consciousness, and the like. Such is the meaning.

It cannot be contended that the void is established as the reality by the Śruti and the Smṛiti also in such passages as—

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।
न मुमुक्षु र्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥

Neither suppression nor, again, production, neither entangled nor, again, engaged in the pursuit of freedom, neither desirous of release nor, again, released; such is the absolute truth.—Gauḍapâda's Mâṇḍukya Kârikâ, II. 32; Brahma-Bindu Upa., 10.

सर्वशून्यं निरालम्बं स्वरूपं यत्र चिन्त्यते ।
अभावयोगः स प्रोक्तो येनात्मानं प्रपश्यति ॥

Where the pure form (of the soul), devoid of everything else, and having no other support but itself, is meditated upon, that is called Abhâva-yoga, connection with non-existence or communion in non-existence, whereby one fully beholds the Self.—Kûrma-Purâṇa, II. XI. 6.

For, in similar passages of the Śruti, it is the non-existence of the suppression or destruction, and so forth, of the Puruṣas that is declared to possess the characteristic of reality, inasmuch as we get it from the preceding and succeeding passages that it is the Puruṣa that is the subject-matter of discourse there. Besides, in such passages of the Smṛiti as quoted above, it is the firmament or sphere of consciousness in which the universe has found its setting, that is established as the reality, inasmuch as these passages convey the same meaning as the following and like others :—

त्रैलोक्यं गगनाकारं नभस्तुल्यं वपुः स्वकम् ।
चिद्गगनमि मनो ध्यायन् योगी ब्रह्मैव गीयते ॥

The Yogin is regarded as having become Brahman itself, when he contemplates the three-fold world as possessing the form of the sky, his own body as similar to the sky, and his Manas or mind as dissolving into the sky.—(Source not traced.)

Sky and void are synonymous terms. 'Manas' denotes all the inner senses, *viz.*, the principles of Mahat, Ahamkâra, and Manas. 'Viyat-gâmi' means dissolved into the firmament of consciousness.

Above continued.

उभयपक्षसमानक्षेमत्वादयमपि ॥ १ । ४६ ॥

उभयपक्षसमानक्षेमत्वात् Ubhaya (both)-paksa (party)-samâna (same)-ksematvât (preservation or worth), because it possesses as much worth as both the (other) theories (of transiency and idealism). अयम् Ayam, this, the theory of the void. अपि Api, also.

46. This (theory) also (should be rejected), because it possesses no more worth than the other two theories (*viz.*, of transiency and idealism).—46.

Vritti:—The author gives another solution:

This also, the theory of the void, should be set aside, because it possesses as much strength as the theory of momentariness and the theory of idealism. As momentary existence is contravened by the recognition of things previously perceived, as ideal existence is contravened by the perception of external entities, in like manner this also, the theory of the void, should be contravened by the observation of the entire universe in perception itself —46.

Bhâsya:—The author points out another defect (in Sûnya-vâda):

This theory also falls to the ground, 'Samâna-ksematvât,' because the reason for its rejection is the same as that for the rejection of 'Ubhayapaksa,' the theories that things are momentary and that external objects are mere ideas,—such is the sentence rendered complete by means of words brought over from elsewhere. For, the ground for the rejection of the theory of momentariness, *e.g.*, impossibility or unaccountableness of recognition, etc., is equally applicable to the theory of the void also. Similarly, the ground for the rejection of the theory of idealism, *e.g.*, intuition of external objects, etc., equally applies here also. Such is the meaning.—46.

अपुरुषार्थत्वमुभयथा ॥ १ । ४७ ॥

अपुरुषार्थत्वम् A (not)-purusa (Purusa)-artha (object)-tvam, the not being an object of desire to the Purusa. उभयथा Ubhyathâ, in both ways.

47. Either way the void cannot be an object of desire to the Purusa.—47.

Vritti.—The author shows another defect in Śûnya-vâda.

If void means non-existence, (it cannot be an object of desire), for what sober-minded man will strive after a non-existence? Again, the use of the word (Mokṣa, release) denoting positive existence, in 'Release is the object desired by the Puruṣa,' will be meaningless. If the void denote, on the other hand, something beyond existence and non-existence, then also it cannot be an object of desire to the Puruṣa, because also of the non-observation of a thing of this nature.—47.

Bhâṣya.—These heretics again think that voidness itself may become an object of desire to the Puruṣa, either as being of the form of cessation of pain, or as being the means thereof. But, the author shows, that also is impossible.

For voidness, to be an object of desire to the Puruṣa, is not possible, intrinsically as well as extrinsically. Because pleasure and the like possess the characteristic of being objects of desire to the Puruṣa by the very fact of its being inherent in them. Besides (the existence of) a permanent Puruṣa is not admitted (by these heretics). Such is the meaning.—47.

Nor does Bondage result from particular movements of Puruṣa.

न गतिविशेषात् ॥ १ । ४८ ॥

न, Na, not. गतिविशेषात् Gati (going)-viśeṣât (distinction), because of the distinction of movement.

48. (The Void is) not (the reality), because (in the reality) there is the distinction of movement. (Aniruddha). Or, (Bondage does) not (accrue to the Puruṣa) from (his) particular movements. (Vijñâna-Bhikṣu.)—48.

Vritti.—With a view to discard the Śûnya-vâdin, the author states the doctrine of the Kṣapaṇakas (another section of the Bauddhas) that the soul is of the measure of the body:

The Void is not the reality, because the Void is not capable of movement. Movement (of the soul) is, on the other hand, observed. For instance, (we find in) the Śruti—

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रं पुरुषं निश्चकर्ष बलाद् यमः

Yama, the Moral Governor of the World, forcibly extracted the Puruṣa having the size of the thumb only.

पापेन नरकं याति पुण्येन स्वर्याति ज्ञानेन ब्रह्मलोकं याति

By vice, (the Puruṣa) goes to hell, by virtue to heaven, by knowledge to the world of Brahmâ.—48.

Bhâṣya.—(The author has done with the unbelievers, Nâstikas, so far as the cause of Bondage is concerned.) Some of the theories of the Âstikas (those who believe in Revelation, etc.) also have been already refuted. The remaining other causes of Bondage that may be possibly attributed by them, are also now going to be refuted:

The word, Bondage, is obtained from the context. The meaning is that Bondage does not accrue to the Puruṣa, also 'Gati-viśeṣât,' from particular movements, such as entering into a body, etc.—48.

For Puruṣa is incapable of movement.

निष्क्रियस्य तदसम्भवात् ॥ १ । ४९ ॥

निष्क्रियस्य Niṣkriyasya, of the inactive. तदसम्भवात् Tat (that)-a (im)-sambhavât (possibility), owing to impossibility thereof, *i. e.*, of movement.

49. Because that which is inactive, is incapable of movement.—49.

Vṛitti.—The author condemns the above view.

The sense of the Sûtram is obvious.—49.

Bhâṣya.—The author gives the reason for the above conclusion:

The meaning is (that Bondage does not accrue to the Puruṣa from particular movements), because movement is impossible for the Puruṣa who is inactive and all-pervading.—49.

Above explained.

मूर्त्तत्वाद्घटादिवत् समानधर्मापत्तावपसिद्धान्तः ॥ १ । ५० ॥

मूर्त्तत्वात् Mûrtatvât, being consolidate or corporeal. घटादिवत् Ghaṭa (water-pot)-âdi (and the like)-vat (like), like water-pot, etc. समानधर्मापत्तौ Samâna (similar)-dharma (property)-âpattau (implication), in view of the implication of similar properties. अपसिद्धान्तः Apa (wrong)-siddhântaḥ (conclusion,) wrong or reverse conclusion.

50. If the Puruṣa were corporeal, (and, therefore, limited or finite), like the water-pot, etc., then he would possess properties similar to those of the latter, and hence the reverse conclusion (would follow).—50.

Vṛitti.—The author explains the inactivity or unchangeableness of the Puruṣa.

Corporeal or finite things, the water-pot, etc., undergo change. If the Puruṣa possess a like property, he would also perish. But the mortality of the Puruṣa is the reverse of truth. Moreover, in the course of

migration into different births, the Puruṣa would have, according to the supposition of his having a finite size, to adapt himself to the size of the body of the elephant and the worm. If he thus undergoes contraction and expansion, he must be a whole made up of parts, and, therefore, non-eternal, (which also is the reverse of truth).—50.

Bhâṣya.—The doubt may arise that only finiteness, and not infiniteness, probably belongs to the Puruṣa, inasmuch as we hear from the Śruti and the Smṛiti about his going and not going to this world and to the world beyond. Thus, there is the Śruti also—

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मा

The Puruṣa, of the size of the thumb, the inner Self.—*Kaṭha Upa.*, II. vi. 17, Śvetâśvatara Upa., III, 13.

The author removes the above apprehension:

If, again, the Puruṣa is admitted to be 'Mûrta,' divided off from other things, *i. e.*, definite, like the water-pot, etc., then the result would be that he will possess properties similar to those of the water-pot, etc., by being a whole made up of parts, perishable, and so forth. Hence the finiteness of the Puruṣa is a perverse conclusion. Such is the meaning.—50.

Above continued.

गतिश्रुतिरप्युपाधियोगादाकाशवत् ॥ १ । ५१ ॥

गतिश्रुतिः Gati (going)-śruti (text of Śruti), teaching of the Śruti about the going of the Puruṣa. अपि Api, also. उपाधियोगात् Upâdhi (adjunct, investment, condition or limitation)-yogât (connection), in respect of connection with external investment. आकाशवत् Âkâśa (sky)-vat (like), as in the case of the sky.

51. The teaching of the Śruti about the 'going' (of the Puruṣa) is in respect of his external investment, as in the case of the sky.—51.

Vṛitti.—(It may be said that), such being the case, there is conflict with the Śruti, *e. g.*, 'of the size of the thumb,' etc. Accordingly the author explains (those passages of the Śruti.)

As, according to the division caused by the external investment such as the water-pot, etc., the cognition, *viz.*, that Ghaṭa-âkâśa (the portion of the sky confined within the water-pot) moves, arises while the water-pot moves, likewise arises the intuition, *viz.*, that the Self moves, from the delimitation caused by the bodily vesture, etc.—51.

Bhâṣya:—The author explains the teaching of the Śruti about the going of the Puruṣa:

There are, of course, Vedic declarations about going with reference to the Puruṣa. But these should be regarded as having been made certainly in accordance with the arguments and teachings of the Śruti and Smṛiti about the universality or all-pervading character of the Puruṣa, and, therefore, only with reference to his connection with an external investment, in the same way as motion may be attributed to the sky. Such is the meaning.

On this point, the evidence is as follows:

(*i*) *Śruti*: *e.g.*—

घटसंवृतमाकाशं नीयमाने घटे यथा ।
घटो नीयेत नाकाशं तद्वज्जीवो नभोपमः ॥

As the sky, enveloped within the water-pot, (seems to move), while the water-pot is carried (from place to place), (whereas, in reality), the water-pot is removed, and not the sky, so the Jîva, the embodied Self, which is like the sky (in this respect).—*Brahma-Bindu Upaniṣat*, 13.

बुद्धेर्गुणेनात्मगुणेन चैव आराग्रमात्रोह्यवरोऽपि दृष्टः

Another (Self, the Jîva) also is observed, of the size of the half-moon, (attended) with the quality of the Buddhi (Understanding) and with the quality of Âtman (Self).—*Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat*, V. 8.

(*ii*) *Smṛiti*: *e.g.*—

नित्यः सर्वगतः स्थाणुः

(The Self is) eternal, all-penetrating, immoveable, etc.—*Bhagavat-Gîtâ*, II. 24.

(*iii*) *Argument*: *e.g.* –

(*a*) If the Self is held to be of medium size, (*i.e.*, neither all-pervading nor atomic), then, he will be, by necessary implication, a whole made up of parts, and, consequently, perishable.

(*b*) If, on the other hand, it is said to be atomic in size, then, it will not be possible for it to have cognition, etc., spreading over the whole body.

It is for these reasons, that Prakṛiti alone is specifically mentioned as possessing motion in the form of activity or change, in such passages of the Smṛiti as—

प्रकृतिः कुरुते कर्म शुभाशुभफलात्मकम् ।
प्रकृतिश्च तदश्नाति त्रिषु लोकेषु कामगा ॥

Prakṛiti performs action which contains, as its essence, 'fruits' (consequences), good or bad. Prakṛiti also eats those fruits in the three worlds where she goes, being led by desire.—*Mahâbhârata*, *Śânti Parvan*.—51.

Nor is Bondage caused by Adriṣṭam or Destiny.

न कर्मणाप्यतद्धर्मत्वात् ॥ १ । ५२ ॥

न Na, not. कर्मणा Karmaṇâ, by action or adriṣṭam. अपि Api, also, even. अतद्धर्मत्वात् A (not)-tat (its)-dharma-(property)-tvât (being), not being its property.

52. Nor even by Action (Bondage results), Action not being a property of the Self.—52.

Vṛitti:—(The opponent may interpose): What will the Upâdhi do? Difference will arise from diversity of action.

Hence the author declares:

It would be so, if action were a property of the Self. But no property whatever belongs to the Self, it being devoid of all attributes.—52.

Bhâṣya:—Nor even does Bondage accrue to the Puruṣa directly by means of Karma or Adṛiṣṭam or destiny. Why not? Because it lacks the characteristic of being a property of the Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

Before this (*vide* Sûtram 16) has been refuted (the theory of) Bondage by means of action in the form of prescribed and prohibited observances. While here (is refuted the theory of Bondage) by means of Adṛiṣṭam or destiny produced thereby. Hence, owing to this difference in meaning, there is no tautology.—52.

(*N. B.*—Vijñâna-Bhikṣu, Nâgeśa Bhaṭṭa, and Mahâdeva Vedântin, the last of whom, by the way, offers merely to explain the Vṛitti of Aniruddha, read the 53rd and 54th aphorisms in the order adopted by us, while Aniruddha transposes them).

Above continued.

अतिप्रसक्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे ॥ १ । ५३ ॥

अतिप्रसक्तिः Ati- (too far)-prasaktiḥ (implication), too far implication. अन्यधर्मत्वे Anya (different)-dharma (property)-tve (being), being properties of different things.

53. If (Bondage and its cause) be properties of different things, the implication would go too far.—53.

Argument concluded.

निर्गुणादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेति ॥ १ । ५४ ॥

निर्गुणादिश्रुतिविरोधः Nirguṇa (absolute, devoid of attributes)-âdi (and the like)-śruti (Vedic declaration)-virodhaḥ (conflict), conflict with Vedic declarations such as that the Puruṣa is devoid of attributes, and the like. च Cha, and, also. इति Iti, finish. According to Vijñâna-Bhikṣu this word marks the close of the enquiry into the cause of Bondage. But Aniruddha does not seem to have taken notice of it. Perhaps this accounts for his transposition of the two aphorisms.

54. (Did Bondage result from any other cause than Upâdhi or external investment, there would be) also conflict with the Vedic declarations such as that the Puruṣa is devoid of attributes and the like.—54.

Vṛitti:—(The opponent may urge): Action may be just a property of the Self. Where is the conflict?

To this the author replies:

The Śruti—

असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः

For the Puruṣa is unattached.—*Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat*, IV. iii. 1

will be contradicted.—54.

Vṛitti:—(The opponent may still argue): Granted (that action is) not a property of the Self, (but of something else). Yet a particular action, *i.e.*, change, (that is to say, Bondage), may take place (in the Self), even by means of the property of another thing, inasmuch as the Self, being all-pervading, has connection with all things.

Accordingly the author declares:

(If it were so, then), there being nowhere any peculiarity in the universal connection of the Self, the theory would entail the bondage of the released Selves also.—53.

Bhâṣya:—If it is maintained that Bondage will accrue to one even by the property of another, the author replies:

If Bondage and its cause were properties of different things, 'Atiprasaktiḥ,' it would entail the bondage of the released Puruṣa also. Such is the meaning.—53.

Bhâṣya:—What is the use of further prolonging the discussion? The production of Bondage, in the case of the Puruṣa, cannot take place from any of the causes cited above, beginning with nature and ending with Adṛiṣṭam, or by any other cause whatsoever, inasmuch as in all these cases, there would be conflict with the Śruti. The author states this general objection:

On (the theory of) the non-reflectional character of the bondage of the Puruṣa, there would be conflict with such Vedic declarations as—

साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च

(The Puruṣa is) the witness, conscious, standing alone, and devoid of attributes.—*Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat* VI. 11.

Such is the meaning.

The word, Iti, has been used to denote the close of the enquiry into the Cause of Bondage.—54.

Association of Puruṣa with Prakṛiti happens by non-discrimination.

तद्योगोऽप्यविवेकान्न समानत्वम् ॥ १ । ५५ ॥

तद्योगः Tat (that)-yogaḥ (connection), connection with that, property and not-property (Aniruddha), Prakṛiti (Vijñâna-Bhikṣu). Aniruddha also reads the word with the locative inflection. अपि Api, also, even. अविवेकात् Avivekât, through non-discrimination. न Na, no. समानत्वम् Samânatvam, equality, similarity.

55. (Puruṣa's) connection, with property and not-property (Aniruddha), or, with Prakṛiti (Vijñâna-Bhikṣu), takes place through Non-discrimination. Hence there is no similarity.—55.

Vṛitti:—(Our opponent may say quite complacently): In your theory also there is distribution of property and not-property to the Self; for, activity of the entangled Self, for the purpose of attaining release, is observed. What is your conclusion (solution of the difficulty) here, the same will be ours too. Thus (the two cases are) similar.

To him the author says:

Notwithstanding connection with property and not-property, there is no similarity in property between the entangled and the released Self, on account of non-discrimination. If the connection of property and not-property were real to the Self, there would be equality. But, on the other hand, the sense or idea, abhimâna, of the connection of property and not-property arises in the Self on account of non-discrimination. Where, then, is the similarity?—55.

Bhâṣya:—Thus, therefore, in the above minor section beginning with "Nor.....of one who is bound by nature" (न स्वभावत इत्यादि, Sûtram 7), it is ascertained, by the exclusion of all other possible causes, that conjunction between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, and nothing else, is the immediate cause of Bondage. In that theory there is this apprehension. Well, (an objector may contend), why is not also the conjunction of Puruṣa with Prakṛiti affected with the qualifications of naturalness, etc.? And if the characteristics of being natural and of having time and the like as its instrumental causes, belong to that conjunction, then, the defects, such as the possibility of Bondage in the case even of the released Puruṣa, etc., are certainly correspondingly the same on both the theories.

The author avoids this very apprehension:

'Tat-yogaḥ,' connection with that which has been stated above (Prakṛiti or Dharma and A-dharma), 'api' (also), 'a-vivekât' (from non-discrimination) of Puruṣa. For conjunction (of Puruṣa with Prakṛiti) takes

place only from non-discrimination, which will be presently explained, as its instrumental cause. Hence the defects mentioned do not equally exist in this theory. Such is the meaning. And the same non-discrimination does not exist in the released Puruṣas; hence they do not again enter into conjunction (with Prakṛiti).

Objection:—Well, non-discrimination here does not consist in the realisation of non-difference between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, because of its non-existence prior to conjunction, but it consists either in the antecedent non-existence of discrimination or in the vâsanâ or tendency towards, or sub-conscious latency of, knowledge which is called discrimination. Neither of these is a property of the Puruṣa. But they are surely properties of Buddhi or Understanding. Hence conjunction takes place in one thing (*i. e.* Puruṣa) by means of the properties of another thing (*i.e.* Buddhi.) Thus arises the defect of too much implication, in which respect the two theories certainly stand on an equal footing.

Answer:—This is not so, because the characteristic of being a property of the Puruṣa belongs to non-discrimination by means of the relation of its being an object (to the Puruṣa). Thus, for the purpose of showing up all her modifications, Prakṛiti enters into conjunction, by the form of his Buddhi or Understanding, with that very Puruṣa to whom, as her lord, she, having taken the form of Buddhi, has not previously exhibited her body, discriminating every part thereof. Such being the rule, there is not too much implication. So has it been declared by the *Kârikâ*:

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥ सांख्यकारिका, २१ ॥

Conjunction of Puruṣa and Pradhâṇa is, like that of the halt and the blind, for mutual benefit, for the exhibition of Pradhâna to Puruṣa and for the purpose of the isolation of Puruṣa. From this Conjunction proceeds Creation.—*Kârikâ of Îśwvara Kṛiṣṇa*, verse 21.

The meaning is (that their conjunction takes place) in order that Pradhâna may exhibit herself to Puruṣa, her lord, and for the purpose of their separation.

To say that A-viveka, Non-discrimination, is, in form, a function or modification of Buddhi, is a mere figure of speech, and not a real proposition, because, as we shall explain in a future aphorism, of the continuance of the Chitta or mind (after the removal of A-viveka).

A-viveka, moreover, becomes the cause of Bondage only by way of Conjunction, inasmuch as Bondage is not observed during Dissolution, and also as the Jîvan-muktas are observed to experience pain even after A-viveka has been destroyed. For this reason, it has not been declared above that Aviveka is *directly* the cause of Bondage.

Note.—The Jîvan (living)-mukta (released) are those who have, before the close of their earthly career, acquired discriminative knowledge, and have thereby obtained release, but who have still to undergo the experiences of life and thereby to exhaust their past Karma.

Objection :—The supposition of the relation without beginning, of the thing owned and the owner, of it, has been made, (between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa), as being regulative of the relation of the object of experience and the experience of it. This relation of the thing owned and its owner, or Karma, or the like, may possess the characteristic of being the cause of Conjunction. How, then, A-viveka, Non-discrimination, also is desired to be the cause of Conjunction ?

Answer :—There can be no question on this point, as it may be recalled that the conceit or misconception (abhimâna), designated as saṅga or attachment, has been declared to be the cause of Conjunction, in the Gîtâ :

पुरुषः प्रकृतिस्थो हि भुङ्क्ते प्रकृतिजान् गुणान् ।
कारणं गुणसङ्गोऽस्य सदसद्योनिजन्मसु ॥ गीता ।१३।२१ ॥

For, Puruṣa, resting in Prakṛiti, experiences the changes produced from Prakṛiti. The cause of his births in the pure and impure species, is his attachment to the Guṇas.—Gîtâ XIII. 21.

Besides, Release by means of knowledge, as demonstrated by the Veda and the Smṛiti, is not explainable otherwise than by the sayings and arguments which will be later on declared, and the like.

Objection :—If it is so, then, the Karma etc., which form the particular Upâdhi or investment of Puruṣa, will also be a cause of Conjunction. Why, then, are these excluded, and A-viveka itself said to be the sole cause thereof ?

Answer :—We reply : Karma and the like depend upon A-viveka, and, so, they also are related to Puruṣa only mediately. In other words, A-viveka alone is capable of being directly cut down by Puruṣa, while Karma and so forth are so capable only by means of the eradication of their cause, namely A-viveka. For this purpose, A-viveka alone has been declared as being primarily the cause of Conjunction.

And this A-viveka which consists in the knowledge of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti without apprehending the absence of attachment between them, is intended by the author just as holding the place of A-vidyâ, as may be gathered from the following two aphorisms (of the Sâṃkhya Pravachana Sûtram) :

बन्धो विपर्ययात् ॥ ३।२४ ॥

Bondage results from Error (III. 24.)

विपर्ययभेदाः पञ्च ॥ ३।३७ ॥

Kinds of Error are five (III. 37).

Also in the Yoga Sûtras of (Patañjali)—

तस्य हेतुरविद्या ॥ २।२४ ॥

A-vidyâ is the cause thereof. (II. 24, S. B. H. Vol. IV. page 144).

A-vidyâ alone, which contains five-folds, has been declared to be the cause of conjunction of Buddhi and Puruṣa. The distinction of the Sâṃkhya from the Yoga on this point should be observed to lie only in the mere non-recognition of anyathâ-khyâti, *i. e.*, the mistaking of one thing for another, *e.g.*, of a shining oyster shell for a piece of silver, as a form of A-vidyâ.

Neither, again, is A-viveka here mere a-bhâva or non-existence, nor is it the antecedent non-existence of Viveka or Discrimination. Because that would entail the bondage of the released Puruṣa also. It would also entail bondage over again in the case of even the Jîvan-muktas by means of the production of Merit and De-merit, by the antecedent non-existence of future manifestation of Viveka. Moreover, the familar instance of darkness, given in the next aphorism, would be inapplicable, as it is impossible for non-existence to be the cause of obscuration, like darkness. Furthermore, the increase and decrease also of A-viveka, of which, we hear people speak, would not be justified.

In our theory, on the other hand, it is A-viveka only in the form of vâsanâ, aroma or tendency, that is the cause of birth designated as Conjunction, and consequently the causing of obscuration, like darkness, increase, decrease, and so forth, become at once explained. Commenting on the aphorism of Patañjali :—

तस्य हेतुरविद्या ॥ २।२४ ॥

the Bhâsya-kâra also has explained the term A-vidyâ to mean the seed of A-vidyâ, inasmuch as the production of cognition being subsequent to that of Conjunction, the former cannot be the productive cause of the latter. Further, it is obtained from the sayings beginning with—

पुरुषः प्रकृतिस्थो हि भुङ्क्ते इत्यादि

For Puruṣa, resting in Prakṛiti, experiences etc.,

that it is Conjunction designated as abhimâna or conceit or misconception, that is the cause of the Conjunction designated as the resting in Prakṛiti. For this very reason Vyâsa Deva has carefully ascertained, in his Commentary on Yoga, that A-vidyâ is not Non-existence, but a form of Cognition opposite to Vidyâ or Right Knowledge.

A-viveka and A-vidyâ being, therefore, similar in every respect, it is established that A-viveka also is a species of Cognition.

Now, this A-viveka becomes the cause of birth designated as Conjunction in three ways: (1) immediately, (2) by the production of Merit

and De-merit, and (3) by means of 'visible' influences such as Desire, and the like, as observed in the Yoga aphorism:

सति मूले तद्विपाकः ॥ २।२३ ॥

'It ripens into life-state, life-experience, and life-time, if the root remains' (Yoga Sûtras II. 15, S. B. H. Vol. IV. page 106).

in the Smṛiti:

कर्त्ताऽस्मीति निबध्यते

He becomes confined, thinking that he is the agent.

and also in the Nyâya aphorism.

वीतरागजन्मादर्शनात् ॥ ३।२ ॥

Because of the non-observation of birth of those from whom Desire has fled away. (Nayâya Sûtras III. i. 25).

So also has it been said in the Mokṣa-dharma (Mahâbhârta, Śânti-Parvan.)

ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियार्था नोपसर्पन्त्यतर्षुलम् ।
हीनञ्च करणैर्देही न देहं पुनरर्हति ॥
तस्मात्तर्षात्मकाद्रागाद्बीजाज्जायन्ति जन्तवः ।

The powers of Cognition and the objects of the senses do not come near him who is not-thirsty. And Puruṣa who is devoid of (lit. deserted by) the senses, does not merit a future body. Beings, therefore, are born from Râga or attachment in the form of thirst or desire as the seed of their birth.

Rága or attachment, again, is the effect of A-viveka or Non-discrimination. This should be taken to be also the sense of the two aphorisms of Yoga, on account of the similarity of thought in the two systems. And these two aphorisms are:

क्लेशमूलः कर्माशयः ॥ २ । १२ ॥
सति मूले तद्विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगः ॥ २ । १३ ॥

The vehicle of actions has its origin in afflictions. It ripens into life-state, life-experience, and life-time, if the root exists.—*Yoga Sûtras* of *Patañjali*, II. 12 and 13, S. B. H. Vol. IV. pages 104 *et seq.*

And affliction is the pentad of A-vidyâ, etc. (*Yoga Sûtra*, II. 3, *ibid.* p. 91.)

The various ways in which A-viveka, or Non-discrimination operates towards the production of Bondage, have been thus declared in the Îśvara-Gîtâ in a collected form:

अनात्मन्यात्मविज्ञानं तस्माद्दुःखं तथेतरत् ।
रागद्वेषादयो दोषाः सर्वे भ्रान्तिनिबन्धनाः ॥
कार्योऽस्य भवेद्दोषः पुण्यापुण्यमिति श्रुतिः ।
तद्दोषादेव सर्वेषां सर्वदेहसमुद्भवः ॥

(A-viveka causes), in respect of the Not-Self, the Cognition that it is the Self. From this arises pain as well as its opposite. Desire, aversion, and all other passions (lit. faults) are linked with Error (*i.e.* A-viveka) as their cause. For, as declares the Veda, the effect thereof will be fault, *viz.* virtue and vice. From this fault alone results the incarnation of all beings into all bodies.—*Kûrma Purâṇa*, II. ii. 20, 21.

The very same doctrine has been aphorised in the Nyâya. *Cf.*

दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः ॥ १ । १ । २॥

Pain, Birth, Activity, Faults, and False Cognition,—after the disappearance of these in turn, on the disappearance of each succeeding one, (in the order of mention), there follows Emancipation.—*Nyâya Sûtras* of *Gotama*, I. i. 2.

It follows, therefore, that A-viveka or Non-discrimination is the root cause of the Avoidable, designated as Bondage, which it effects through birth designated as Conjunction. Thus, then, the cause of the Avoidable is established.—55.

A-viveka is eradicable by Viveka alone.

नियतकारणात्तदुच्छित्तिर्ध्वान्तवत् ॥१।५६॥

नियतकारणात् Niyata (uniform, constant, invariable and unconditional)-kâraṇât (cause), from a determinate cause, *i. e*, *Viveka* or discrimination. तदुच्छित्तिः Tat (its)-ut-chchittiḥ, eradication thereof. ध्वान्तवत् Dhvânta (darkness)-vat (like), as of darkness.

56. The removal thereof (*i.e. A-viveka*) takes place from a determinate cause (namely, *Viveka*); as of darkness.—56.

Vṛitti :—Granted, says an objector, that Bondage accrues from *A-viveka*; still there is a parity between our theories in this respect, that both of us have to admit or postulate *Dharma* or Merit for the annihilation of *A-viveka*, as, otherwise, Bondage would be continuous.

To this the author replies:

If the law of causes and effects established by the methods of agreement and difference, does not hold good, there can be no certainty and expectation in respect of anything. As light is the (sole) cause for the destruction of darkness, so, here too, annihilation of Non-discrimination follows from Discrimination (alone).

And where is the harm in the admission of Merit for the purpose of Discrimination? The purpose may be accomplished by Merit belonging to Prakṛiti.

Now, what is it that is called Darkness? Darkness, according to some, is non-existence. It is not so, as its apprehension arises in a positive way. If it be non-existence, is it the antecedent non-existence of light, or its consequent non-existence? If it be antecedent non-existence, then, as on the water-pot being produced, the antecedent non-existence of the water-pot is destroyed, in like manner, on the appearance of light, there would be the intuition that the antecedent non-existence of light is destroyed. (But), notwithstanding the existing light, Darkness will

remain undestroyed, there being the antecedent non-existence of the future light. On the other hand, if it be consequent non-existence, in that case also, Darkness (as non-existence) being indestructible, there will be occasion for the intuition of Darkness on the appearance of another light, in the same way as, when another water-pot is produced, consequent non-existence of the water-pot that has been destroyed, verily exists. Reciprocal non-existence, again, is found in existences also. Reciprocal non-existence, moreover, is faulty in theory and need not be apprehended.

So has it been said :

न च भासामभावस्य तमस्त्वं वृद्धसंमतम् ।
छायायाः कार्ष्ण्यमित्येवं पुराणेषु गुणश्रुतेः ॥
दूरासन्नप्रदीपाद्रि महदल्पा चलाचला ।
देहानुवर्तिनी छाया न वस्तुत्वाद्विना भवेत् ॥

That Darkness is the non-existence of light, is not approved by the elders. We hear of its quality in such passages of the *Purâṇas* as 'blackness belongs to Darkness.' For, shadow, large or small according as the light is distant or near, moving or not-moving according as the body moves or does not move, could not be possible, were it not a reality.

That Darkness is a reality, is, however, a mere predication, as it is perceived only where some reality exists.

Objection :—Where light exists, objects are perceived. Where it does not exist, how can objects be perceived ?

Answer :—A mere diversity of nature—as the owl sees objects even without the help of light, so also does the perception of Darkness take place even independently of light, from the variety of things in nature.

It, therefore, follows that Darkness is a particular kind of *Rûpa* or form-and-colour, and is perceived, where there is an object to obstruct light, by being referred to that object.

Others opine that Darkness is a different substance. So it has been said :—

तमः खलु चलशीलं परापरविभागवत् ।
प्रसिद्धधर्मवैधर्म्याद्भवभ्यो भेदुमर्हति ॥

Darkness, moving, blue, and capable of being distinguished as this and that, certainly requires to be divided off from the nine substances, as it possesses attributes different in kind from the well-known attributes of those substances.

Note.—The above verse directly refers to the Vaiśeṣika Darśana, S. B. H. Vol. VI. For these nine substances, see *Ibid.* page 17, for darkness, page 18, and for an account of the Theory of Non-existence, pages 287-298.

Now, whether Darkness be an attribute or a substance, it does no harm to our conclusion, as we hold the number of objects to be unlimited. We would, however, say that darkness is not non-existence.—56.

Bhâṣya:—Henceforward, up to the end of the Śâstra, the author establishes, in great detail, the Means of Avoidance which is the division (of the subject matter) next in order (of mention). In the course of it, he will also dilate upon the divisions discussed before.

'Niyata-kâraṇa,' the fixed and determinate cause, in question, is Viveka-sâkṣâtkâra, direct apprehension or realisation of the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, as established throughout the world in such cases as where a mother-of-pearl shell is mistaken for a piece of silver; from which follows eradication of A-viveka, as is the case with Darkness. As Darkness is dispelled by light alone as the fixed and determinate cause, and not by any other means, in like manner, A-viveka also is dispelled by Viveka alone, and not *directly* by Karma and the like. Such is the meaning. So has it been taught in the Yoga Aphorism (II. 26):

विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः ॥ २ । २६ ॥

The Means of Avoidance is undisturbed manifestation of Viveka.—S. B. H. Vol. IV. page 147.

***Note.*—The commentator explains the force of the word, directly, used above.**

Karma, religious and social observances, and the like, on the other hand, are the instruments of knowledge only, as we find that, by the Yoga Aphorism (II. 28):

योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिराविवेकख्यातेः ॥ २ । २८ ॥

According as the impurity (in the Self) wears away on the performance of the (several) members of (the eightfold) yoga, the light of knowledge shines brighter and brighter till the manifestation of Viveka.—*Ibid.* page 150.

it has been ascertained that all and sundry acts coming under the several members of Yoga, are instruments for the development of knowledge alone by means of the purification of the Sattva element (of Prakṛiti).

The older Vedântins, on the other hand, declare that in regard to Mokṣa or Release also, Karma is a subsidiary part of knowledge; because, in the Śruti:

विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह ।
अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययाऽमृतमश्नुते ॥ ईशोपनिषत् ॥ ११ ॥

Vidyâ, jñâna or knowledge, and A-vidyâ, karma, pious observances, who knows both of them together, he transcends mortality by the help of Karma, and attains immortality by the help of Jñâna.—Îśa Upanisat, Verse 11, S. B. H. Vol. I.

and in the Vedânta Aphorism (III. iv. 33):

सहकारित्वेन च ॥ ३।४।३३ ॥

(Karma is to be performed) also as contributory (towards knowledge)—S. B. H. Vol. V. page 646.

and also in the Smṛiti:

ज्ञानिनाऽज्ञानिना वापि यावद्देहस्य धारणम् ।
तावद्वर्णाश्रमप्रोक्तं कर्तव्यं कर्म मुक्तये ॥

Whether a man possesses knowledge or does not possess knowledge, so long as he remains saddled with the body, he ought, for the purpose of Release, to perform Karma, enjoined for the different stages of life (âśrama) and society (varṇa).

it has been ascertained that Jñâna and Karma are contributory to each other, in the relation of principal and subsidiary. There is, however, another Vedânta Aphorism, (III. iv. 16), which says :

उपमर्दं च ॥ ३।४।१६ ॥

(Jñâna is pre-eminent, because it causes) the destruction (of Karma) also.—*Ibid.* page 628.

But it merely recites the fact that one who has ascended on yoga, is rightly entitled to give up Karma, with the object of teaching, that Jñâna is principally the cause of Mokṣa. For, the author (of the Vedânta Aphorisms) intends to say that if Karma, by causing distraction, becomes a hindrance to the cultivation of Jñâna, then, relying on the maxim that, on the disappearance of a quality, the thing of which it is the quality, does not disappear, it is Karma which is merely a part, that is to be given up for the sake of the preservation of the principal object, as was done by Bharata the (deliberate) idiot and others. Therefore, on the theory of these older Vedântins also, the causality of Karma towards the destruction of A-viveka is surely not proved, without the intermediacy of Viveka. Hence our view does not conflict with theirs.

In this aphorism, darkness has been said to be destructible by light. Darkness also is, therefore, really a substance, and not non-existence of light. In the absence of any cause to the contrary, perceptions arise, for example, that darkness is deeply dark. To characterise them as erroneous, is unjustifiable. Nor can it be said that such perceptions being explained by known realities, the supposition of something additional is redundant, and that, therefore, the law of parsimony is a bar to the hypothesis of darkness being a substance. For, were this the case, then all the events of practical life being, like dreams, capable of explanation as pure ideas only, a similar redundancy of supposition would be entailed as an impediment to the intuition of external realities also, (which is not desirable). Hence, in the case of darkness, the hypothesis being supported by evidence, redundancy does not count as a fault.

It might be objected that, as even in the absence of the knowledge of Viveka or discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, individual instances of that knowledge which is called A-viveka or non-discrimination, must needs be destroyed of themselves at their respective third moments, there is no necessity for intending Jñâna to be the cause of their destruction. But it should be remembered that, in the previous

aphorism, the word, A-viveka, has been explained to mean, not individual acts of non-discrimination, but non-discrimination as a Vâsanâ, an instinct, a tendency, the resultant effect of all individual acts of non-discrimination in the past. We also maintain that A-viveka, in the state of not-yet-come, is capable of destruction.—56.

Discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti includes all discrimination.

प्रधानाविवेकादन्याविवेकस्य तद्धाने हानम् ॥१।५७॥

प्रधानाविवेकात् Pradhâna-avivekât, from non-discrimination of Pradhâna or Prakṛiti from Puruṣa. अन्याविवेकस्य Anya-avivekasya, of non-discrimination in respect of other things. तद्धाने Tat-hâne, on annihilation thereof. हानम् Hânam, annihilation.

57. Non-discrimination of Prakṛiti (from Puruṣa) (is the cause) of non-discrimination of other things (from Puruṣa); (therefore), on the annihilation of this, annihilation (of that will take place).—57.

Vṛitti.—It has been declared that Release comes through Viveka, Discrimination. Discriminative knowledge of a water-pot, a piece of cloth, and so forth, exists in such as ourselves also. Release of all, therefor, is entailed. (Thus argues the opponent.) To this the author replies:

The root of all is Pradhâna (Prakṛiti). From want of discrimination about Pradhâna, arises non-discrimination in respect of others. Whether there be want of discrimination, or discrimination, of objects amongst themselves, Bondage or Release does not result by it, but by discrimination and want of discrimination with regard to Pradhâna only. Hence, on the annihilation thereof, *i.e.*, on the annihilation of non-discrimination about Pradhâna, results annihilation of non-discrimination in respect of all.—57.

Bhâṣya.—Well, then, it is non-discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti that is the cause of Bondage in this way that it brings about conjunction (in the form of birth or embodiment), and it is discrimination between them that is the cause of Release. Release, therefore, will take place inspite of the misconception (abhimâna) that the body, etc. are the Self. And this is contrary to Śruti, Smṛiti, and reason. To this objection, the author replies:

'Anya-aviveka,' non-discrimination in respect of Buddhi and the like, is produced, in Puruṣa, from non-discrimination of Prakṛiti, as its cause. The non-discrimination which is thus produced, is an effect, and has its root in the non-discrimination which is its cause and is itself beginningless. Therefore, the annihilation of non-discrimination of

Prakṛiti (from Puruṣa) taking place, the annihilation of it must follow. Such is the meaning. Just as when the Self has been discriminated from the body, non-discrimination in respect of the form-colour (rûpa) and other properties, which are the products of the body, in other words, identification of the Self with any of these properties, is not possible, so, by parity of reasoning as well as from the disappearance of the cause, when Puruṣa has been discriminated from Prakṛiti by means of the characteristics of his immutability, etc., the misconception (abhimâna) cannot possibly arise that Puruṣa is any of the products of Prakṛiti, *e.g.*, Buddhi and the rest, which possess the characteristics of undergoing development (pariṇâma), etc. This is the import. So is it recorded in the Smṛiti:

चित्राधारपटत्यागे त्यक्तं तस्य हि चित्रकम् ।
प्रकृतेर्विरमे चेत्थं ध्यायिनां के स्मरादयः ॥

As on the abandonment of the canvas which serves as the ground for a picture painted thereon, the painting also is necessarily abandoned, similarly in the case of the abandonment of Prakṛiti. What are love and the rest to a contemplative man?

'Virama' in the śloka means virâma, cessation, *i.e*, abandonment. By the word, âdi, modifications in the form of substances are also included. Sometimes this also is said that Release takes place through discrimination between Puruṣa and Buddhi. Here Buddhi denotes both gross and subtle Buddhi, and thus includes Prakṛiti also (which is the subtle state, the cause, of Buddhi). Otherwise, notwithstanding the discrimination of Buddhi from Puruṣa, there will still remain the possibility of misconception (abhimâna) that Puruṣa is identical with Prakṛiti.

It cannot be objected that, because one and all misconceptions (abhimâna), such as, for example, 'I am ignorant,' etc., have Buddhi and the rest as their subject matter, there is, therefore, no proof of (the existence of such a thing as) misconception in regard to Prakṛiti over and above misconception (abhimâna) in regard to Buddhi and the rest. For, misconceptions (abhimâna) in such cases as—

मृत्वा मृत्वा पुनः सृष्टौ स्वर्गी स्यां मा च नारकी ।

Further each succeeding death, as I am born again, may I be a dweller in heaven, and not a dweller in hell.

cannot be accounted for, unless they refer to Prakṛiti as their subject matter. For, none of the manifold effects, *e. g.*, Buddhi, etc., after they are once past and gone, are created over again, and therefore, this birth or production after dissolution is of the Pradhâna (Prakṛiti), and it consists in modification in the form of other Buddhi, etc., by the giving up of previous modifications in the form of Buddhi, etc.

Neither can it be asserted that the birth and death of Puruṣa also, in the form of conjunction with, and disjunction from, the liṅga-śarîra or subtle body, are pâramârthika or ultimately true or transcendental (as opposed to phenomenal), and that, therefore, the consciousness of birth, etc., arising in the Self, cannot at all be a misconception (abhimâna). For,

न जायते म्रियते वा कदाचित्
नायं भूत्वा भविता वा न भूयः ।

(This, the Self) is never born nor does it ever die. Neither is it such that, once coming into being, it will pass away after a time and will come into being again.—Gîtâ, II. 20.

by sayings like the above, birth, etc., are disproved (in the Self). There was no need of such negations unless these events (birth, etc.,) were in some way connected with the Self. It follows, therefore, that the consciousness of birth, etc., arising in the Self, is of the form of abhimâna or assumption or transference to itself of the production and destruction (of something else *i. e.*, the body, the senses, etc.).

Moreover, it is not possible to say that the self-identification (abhimâna) of Puruṣas with Buddhi, etc., is beginningless; because Buddhi, etc., are effects, and therefore, perishable. There must exist, therefore, some determining cause to explain and regulate the multifold cases of self-identification with the effects. Hence it is proved that self-identification with the cause of those effects (*i. e.* with Prakṛiti), is alone the determining cause here desired; because so is it observed in the world, and because supposition (hypothesis) follows facts observed. *E. g.*, from the assumption (abhimâna) of ownership of the field, arises the assumption (abhimâna) of ownership of the paddy etc. yielded by it, and from the assumption (abhimâna) of ownership of a piece of gold, arises the assumption (abhimâna) of ownership of the bracelet, etc. made of it, and by means of the cessation of the former, follows the cessation of the latter.

(There is, however, no further necessity for a determining cause of the mistake-abhimâna-about Prakṛiti), on account of both the mistake about Prakṛiti and the vâsanâ or accumulating impression of it being beginningless, like seed and sprout.—57.

The Bondage of Puruṣa is merely verbal.

वाङ्मात्रं न तु तत्त्वं चित्तस्थितेः ॥१।५८॥

वाङ्मात्रं Vâk-mâtraṃ, more speech. न Na, not. तु Tu, and. तत्त्वं Tattvaṃ, reality. चित्तस्थितेः Chitta-sthiteḥ, because it resides in the chitta or mind.

58. The Bondage, etc. (of Puruṣa) are merely verbal, and not real, because they reside in the *mind*.—58.

Vṛitti.—Granted that Release comes through Viveka, Discrimination. Is it, Viveka, related (in the sense of inherence) to the Âtmâ, Self or Puruṣa, or is it not? If it is related to the Âtmâ, an impediment is thereby caused to the Kûṭastha, undisturbed, or immutable nature of the Âtmâ (as postulated in the Śaṃkhya Darśana). If it is not so related, then, the application (of Viveka, as cause, to Release, as consequence) is too wide, (because Viveka, although it does not exist in Puruṣa, is all the same said to be the means of his obtaining freedom). To these objections the author replies:

(Viveka is) 'related to the Âtmâ'—this is a mere verbal statement. There is no true or material relation between them. And although they are unrelated, still, inasmuch as Viveka resides in the Chitta (Buddhi-Ahaṃkâra-Manas collectively), the assumption of Viveka as its own takes place, we will submit, in the Âtmâ, owing to its close proximity to the Chitta.—58.

Bhâṣya.—Thus the four divisions of the subject-matter of the Śâstra are established. But there still remains this apprehension: Well, our opponent may say, if Bondage (at one time) and Release (at another time), Discrimination (at one time) and Non-discrimination (at another time) are admitted in Puruṣa, then, this is in contradiction to the assertion "Who is by nature, Eternal, and eternally Pure, Enlightened, and Unconfined" (*vide* aphorism 19 above), as well as to the Vedic declarations such as

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।
न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥

There is neither destruction, nor, again, production (of Puruṣa); (he is) neither bound, nor, is, again, active (in the pursuit of freedom); he is neither desirous of release nor is, in fact, ever released. Such is the absolute truth.—Gauḍapâda's Mâṇḍukya Kârikâ, II. 32, Brahma-Bindu Upa. 10.

The author removes this apprehension.

Because bondage and the rest reside in the chitta or mind alone, all of them are mere words in the case of, or as applied to, Puruṣa, being mere reflections like the redness (reflected) in the crystal (which is naturally white), and are not 'tattvam,' the natural state of Puruṣa, as is the unimputed redness of the China rose. Such is the meaning. Hence there is no contradiction to what has been stated before. This is the

import. On this point there is the authority of Vedic texts such as the following:

स समानः सन्नुभौ लोकावनुसंचरति ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव

He, being immutable, moves between the two worlds, as if thinks, as if desires, etc. —Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upanisat, IV. iii. 7.

Puruṣa is 'samâna' *i. e.*, possesses the same form in the two worlds. By the two words, 'iva,' as if, the manifoldness of form is declared to be due to upâdhis or adjuncts or extraneous causes.

So has it been said:

बन्धमोक्षौ सुखं दुःखं मोहापत्तिश्च मायया ।
स्वप्ने यथात्मनः ख्यातिः संसृतिर्न तु वास्तवी ॥

Bondage and Release, Pleasure, Pain, and the incidence of Bewilderment (Moha) by means of Mâyâ, are, like the manifestation of the Self in dream; Transmigration (Saṃsâra) is (due to Mâyâ and) not real.

"Mâyayâ," by means of Mâyâ, due to Mâyâ, in the above, means, caused by the upâdhi or external condition which is Prakṛiti called Mâyâ.

Our opponent may ask: How then can the removal of Bondage which thus appears to be of minor importance, be a Puruṣârtha, an object desired by Puruṣa? How, again, on the admission of Bondage and Release being caused to Puruṣa by the properties, namely, Discrimination and Non-discrimination, of another (*i.e.*, Buddhi), there does not follow an absence of regularity, or certainty as in the case of their being caused by Karma, and the like?

Therefore we explain more in detail what has been almost completely explained before. Although Bondage in the form of conjunction of pain, and Discrimination and Non-discrimination in the form of functions, are of the Chitta or mind alone, still Puruṣa's bhoga or suffering consists in the mere reflection of pain in him; hence, inspite of its non-reality, the removal thereof is a Puruṣârtha, an object desired by Puruṣa. So they pray: "Let me not suffer pain."

Similarly, under the influence of his vâsanâ or desire for her, Prakṛiti binds, by way of conjunction, that Puruṣa alone to whom she has exhibited herself in the aspect of non-discrimination, and none else. Again, she sets free, by way of disjunction from her, that Puruṣa alone to whom she has exhibited herself in the aspect of discrimination. (Release, then, depends) on the eradication of vâsanâ or desire; hence regularity is obtained. While, on the admission of Bondage by means of Karma and the like, such regularity is not obtained. Because Karma and the like cannot

directly throw their reflections in Puruṣa, inasmuch as they lack the characteristic of being revealed by him who witnesses (sâkṣi) them (*i. e.* Puruṣa).—58.

Bondage is not removeable by mere Learning or Reasoning but by Spiritual Intuition of the truth about Puruṣa and Prakṛiti.

युक्तितोऽपि न बाध्यते दिङ्मूढवदपरोक्षादृते ॥१।५९॥

युक्तितः Yuktitaḥ, by resoning. अपि Ąpi, also. न Na, not. बाध्यते Bâdhyate, counteracted, removed. दिङ्मूढवत् Dik-mûḍhá-vat, as of one perplexed about the points of the compass. अपरोक्षादृते Aprokṣât ṛite, without immediate cognition, direct vision.

59. (Bondage) is not to be removed by reasoning also, without direct vision of the truth, as is the case with one perplexed about the points of the compass.—59.

Vṛitti.—Let knowledge of Viveka, distinction of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, be obtained from Śravaṇa (hearing from Scriptures and preceptors) alone. What is the use of transcendental knowledge which can be realized only by the labour of successive births? To this the author replies:

The sense is clear.—59.

Bhâṣya :—But if Bondage etc, as applied to Puruṣa, are mere words, let their removal take place by śravaṇa, learning, or by manana, reasoning, (that such is the case). Why, then, in the Veda and the Smṛiti, is there enjoined, as the cause of Release, the discriminative knowledge (of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti) going the length of sâkṣâtkâra, or developed into, spiritual intuition of the truth?

To this the author replies:

'Yuktiḥ' means mananam, thinking or reasoning. The word, 'api,' also, is intended to include śravaṇa, hearing, *i.e.*, learning. Even the merely verbal Bondage, etc. of Puruṣa cannot be removed by mere learning and reasoning, without immediate cognition; as in the case of a person confused in regard to the points of the compass, the inversion of the directions in space, even though it is merely verbal, *i.e.*, apparent or illusory, is not removed by hearing or by reasoning, without his realizing for himself, how the points of the compass really lie. Such is the meaning. And in the case of the subject-matter of the discourse, removeability is nothing but the cessation or disappearance of the idea of Bondage, etc. in Puruṣa, and not the immediate cognition of a non-being, because there does not exist even the possibility of the production of such cognition by hearing and the like.

Or, the aphorism may be explained as follows: By the aphorism: The removal thereof takes place from a determinate cause (Aphorism 56), it, discriminative knowledge, has been declared to be the eradicator of non-discrimination. Now, is that knowledge commonly derived from hearing, etc. or is there any peculiarity in it? There being room for this further enquiry, the author enounces the present aphorism beginning with 'Yuktitaḥ api.' The meaning is that non-discrimination, 'na bâdhyate,' is not removed, 'yuktitaḥ,' by reasoning nor by learning, without direct vision of the discrimination (viveka) of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti; like the confusion about the points of the compass; because it is the perception of a particular intuition that alone can remove an error in respect of that intuition.—59.

Note:—For example, a man with the jaundice perceives white objects as if they were yellow. He may infer that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white; or he may believe the testimony of a friend that it is white: but still nothing will remove his erroneous perception of yellowness in the chalk except a direct perception of its whiteness.—Ballantyne.

Inference also is a pramâṇa or instrument of right knowledge.

अचाक्षुषाणामनुमानेन बोधो धूमादिभिरिव वह्नेः ॥१।६०॥

अचाक्षुषाणाम् A-châkṣuṣaṇam, of things imperceptible. अनुमानेन Anumânena, by inference. बोधः Bodhaḥ, knowledge. धूमादिभिः Dhuma-âdibhiḥ, by means of smoke and the like. इव Iva, as. वह्नेः Vahneḥ, of fire.

60. The knowledge of imperceptible things is by means of inference, as is that of fire by means of smoke, etc.—60.

Vṛitti.—If it be urged that, 'that Prakṛiti and the rest exist or that they evolve in the order of Mahat and so forth, is not seen, (and that they, therefore, neither exist nor evolve); so the author says:

It would have been so, were Pratyakṣa, Perception, the only pramâṇa, means or measure of knowledge, and not Anumâna, Inference, etc. For, although Prakṛiti and the rest are not objects of preception, their existence is nevertheless established by the form of inference known as Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa or generally seen (Vide I. 103. below).—60.

Bhâṣya:—Having thus, then, established that Release results from the direct vision of the discrimination (between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), the next thing to be demonstrated is viveka or discrimination. This being the topic, at the beginning thereof, Pramâṇas or Proofs are being recited, with a view to establish Prakṛiti, Puruṣa, and the rest as different entities.

'A-châkṣuṣâṇâm' means, of things not cognizable by the senses. There are many objects such as the gross elements, their products, *e. g.*, the body, and so forth, which are verily proved to exist by sense-perception. Of those that are not proved by sense-perception, namely, Prakṛiti, Puruṣa, etc., the knowledge, *i.e.*, cognitive proof, the fruit of which appertains to Puruṣa (Puruṣa-niṣṭha-phala-siddhi), is brought about by that form of Pramâṇa which is called anumâna or inference; as fire is proved to exist (where it is not directly perceptible) by the inference occasioned by the smoke and such other signs. Such is the meaning.

Moreover, it is to be understood that what is not established even by inference, is established by the Revelation or Scripture. It is because this Sâṃkhya-Śâstra is principally built on Inference, that Inference alone has been mentioned in this aphorism by way of pre-eminence only, and not that there is no need of Revelation in this Śâstra. For, thus says the Kârikâ :

सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानम् ।
तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ॥

The knowledge of super-sensible objects is obtained from Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa inference; what is not proved even by this and is imperceptable, is proved from Revelation.—Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, Verse VI.

From this aphorism it is found that this Śâstra is a Manana-śâstra or a rational system.—60.

The Twenty-five Principals: the order of their evolution and their inter-relation as cause and effect.

सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः, प्रकृतेर्महान्, महतोऽहंकारो, ऽहंकारात् पञ्च तन्मात्राण्युभयमिन्द्रियं, तन्मात्रेभ्यः स्थूलभूतानि, पुरुष इति पञ्चविंशतिर्गणः ॥ १ । ६१ ॥

सत्त्वरजस्तमसां Sattva-rajas-tamasâṃ, of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, the three essential constituents of Prakṛiti. साम्यावस्था Sâmya-avasthâ, the state of equilibrium or quiescence. प्रकृतिः Prakṛiti, Prakriti, the Prime Cause. प्रकृतेः Prakriteḥ, from Prakṛiti. महान् Mahân, Mahat, the Great One. महतः Mahataḥ, from Mahat. अहंकारः Ahaṃkâraḥ, Ahaṃkara, the *I*-maker, Egoity. अहंकारात् Ahaṃkârât, from Ahaṃkâra. पञ्च Pañcha, five. तन्मात्राणि Tan-mâtrâṇi, Tan-mâtras, Essences, Subtle elements. उभयम् Ubhayam, both. इन्द्रियं Indriyaṃ, sense, faculty, power. तन्मात्रेभ्यः Tan-mâtrebhyaḥ, from the Tan-mâtras. स्थूलभूतानि Sthûla-Bhûtâni, gross elements. पुरुषः Puruṣa, Puruṣa, Spirit, Self. इति Iti, such. पञ्चविंशतिः Pañcha-viṃśatiḥ, twenty-five. गणः Gaṇaḥ class, group.

61. Prakṛiti is the state of quiescence of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. From Prakṛiti, (evolves) Mahat; from Mahat, Ahaṃkâra; from Ahaṃkâra, the five Tan-mâtras and the two sets of Indriyas; from the five Tan-mâtras, the gross elements. (Then there is) Puruṣa. Such is the group of the twenty-five (Principles).—61.

Vṛitti.—The author sets forth the order of evolution of Prakṛiti and the rest:

Although Prakṛiti is the state of equipoise of the three, yet, it is conventional to apply the term Prakṛiti to every one of them also. Mahat denotes Buddhi Tattva, the Principle called Buddhi, the substance of Buddhi or Intelligence. Ahaṃkâra denotes Abhimâna, Self-assumption, Self-attribution, the I-maker, the substance of individual personality. The five Tan-mâtras (That-only), essences, or universals, are Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour, and Smell.

Two-fold Indriyas or Instruments are, externally, five Instruments of Action, called Voice, Hands, Feet, Anus and the Genitals, and five Instruments of Cognition, called Ear, Skin, Eye, Tongue, and Nose, and, internally, Manas or mind, of perception as well as of action.

The Sthûla-Bhûtas, gross elements, are Ether, Air, Fire, Water, and Earth. It should be understood that these also are evolved from the five Tan-mâtras. The word, Sthûla, is indicative, and includes Sûksma, fine or subtle, elements also. The mention of Puruṣa is for the purpose of completing the number (of the twenty-five Tattvas), and not for showing the order of evolution, seeing that the Âtmâ is eternal.—61.

Vedântin Mahâdeva: Sattva, etc are substances, as the qualities of lightness, etc. inhere in them. That the word, Guṇa (which ordinarily means quality), is still applied to them, is because they serve the purpose of Puruṣa. Prakṛiti is this triad of Guṇas, and not a different entity which is their substratum, as it will be declared later on (VI. 39) that Sattva, etc., are not the attributives of Prakṛiti but her very form. State of equipoise denotes absence of dissolution in the relation of more or less, *in other words, existence in the state of producing no effects.* So that, it comes to this that the triad of Guṇas, in so far as it stands apart from effects, is Prakṛiti. And this is the definition of Mûlâ Prakṛiti, Root Evolvent. The definition of Prakṛiti as a general term is that Prakṛiti is that which is the material cause of another Tattva (as Buddhi is of Ahaṃkâra).

Bhâṣya:—Now follows an aphorism enumerating together all the Predicables which are subversive of, and subservient to, (the immediate cognition of) the discrimination (between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti) established by the proofs stated above: wherein the author also exhibits the relation of cause and effect (amongst them) which will subserve the inference to be stated in the sequel.

Sattva, etc., (*i. e.* Rajas and Tamas) are substances, and not Guṇas in the Vaiśeṣika sense of the word, *i. e.*, are not qualities or attributes, because they admit of conjunction and disjunction, and also because they possess the properties of lightness, activity, weight etc., (whereas the Guṇas, attributes, of the Vaiśeṣikas do not themselves possess attributes, and are not independent causes of conjunctions and disjunctions, *vide* Kaṇâda-Sûtram I. i. 16, S. B. H. Vol. VI. page 28). In this, Sâṃkhya, Śâstra and in the Veda, etc., the word, Guṇa, is employed to denote them (Sattva, etc.), because they exist only to serve the ends of Puruṣa (and are, therefore, of secondary importance), and also because they form the cord, (as it were), namely Mahat, etc., which essentially consist of the three Guṇas, and which bind the brute-beast, (so to speak), Puruṣa.

Note.—The different meanings of the word, Guṇa, that are referred to here, are quality, A-pradhâna, not-principal, secondary, subordinate, and cord. It may also be that Sattva etc., are called Guṇas, not-principals, because that which is constituted by them, namely, Prakṛiti, is called Pradhâna, the Principal.—*Vide* Tattva-Samâsa, Aphorism 5, Commentary.

Of these, *i.e.*, the substances Sattva, etc.,(Prakṛiti is) "Sâmya-avasthâ", the state of being neither less nor more, (one than another), in other words, the state of not being combined together in the relation of less and more, that is to say, the state of not being developed into effects. Prakṛiti is the genus of the Guṇas characterised by the state of not becoming an effect. Such is the meaning. For, on the appearance of the state of inequilibrium in the genus of the Guṇas characterised by the state of not becoming an effect, there is entailed the disappearance of Prakṛiti. And, further, all the Guṇas individually are said to possess the nature of Prakṛiti in such texts of the Smṛiti as the following:—

सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति यथैव प्रकृतिः सदा ।
यथैव संसृतिर्जन्तोरस्याः पारे परं पदम् ॥

Sattva, Rajas, Tamas: it is every one of them that is Prakṛiti at every moment. It is every one of them that is the transmigration or worldly life of living beings. Beyond it lies the supreme abode.

The word, genus, in "Prakṛiti is the genus...effect" above, is intended to include Sattva, etc. The word, Guṇa, is used in order to exclude Puruṣa from the scope of the definition. And the phrase,

characterised etc., excludes Mahat, etc., for Mahat &c., which are forms of Sattva etc. modified into effects, also become Guṇas or subsidiaries, being subservient to Puruṣa.

Here, then, only the svarûpa, the essential form or intrinsic nature, of Prakṛiti has been declared. The specific forms of Prakṛiti will, however, be stated just now. The effect or product of Prakṛiti is 'Mahân,' *i.e.*, the Tattva, Reality or Principle, called Mahat.

The intrinsic nature and the specific forms of Mahat, etc. are being stated.

The product of Mahat is Ahaṃkâra. The product of Âhaṃkâra is two fold: the Tan-mâtras and the two sets of Indriyas. Of these, the two sets of Indriyas, being divided into external and internal ones, are of eleven kinds. The products of the Tan-mâtras are the five gross elements. By the use of the word, gross, it is admitted that the Tan-mâtras are the subtle elements. Puruṣa, on the other hand, is characterised neither as effect nor as cause.

Such, then, are the 'pañchaviṃśatiḥ gaṇaḥ,' the (twenty-five-fold) array of Predicables. The meaning is that, over and above these, there is no Predicable. Or, the word, gaṇa, declares the infiniteness of the individual manifestations of Sattva, etc.

And these twenty-five members of the class are of the form of substance and nothing else. Attribute, Action, Genus, etc. (*i.e.*, Species, and Combination, for instance, of the Vaiśeṣikas), however, are really included in these, there being no difference between a property and the thing of which it is a property. For, did there exist Predicables in addition to the above, it would have been necessary to discriminate Puruṣa from them also, and consequently the non-enumeration of them would have been a defect.

Hereby it is shown that the wild talk of the stupid that the Sâṃkhyas do admit an indefinite number of Predicables, is worth of no serious attention.

Dik, (direction in) Space, and Kâla, Time, again, are nothing but Âkâśa, Ether (?), as we shall find from a future aphorism (II. 12) that Space and Time are determinate forms of Âkâśa.

It follows herefrom that, by means of their inclusion and non-inclusion amongst themselves, the Predicables have been taught to be only one in number in some System (*e.g.*, the Vedânta), six in another System (*e.g.*, the Vaiśeṣika), sixteen in yet another System (*e.g.* the Nyâya), and by other numbers in other Systems. It should be remarked, however,

that their individual distinction consists merely in the possession of similar and dissimilar properties. Thus has it been declared in the Bhâgavatam:

एकस्मिन्नपि दृश्यन्ते प्रविष्टानीतराणि च ।
पूर्वस्मिन् वा परस्मिन् वा तत्त्वे तत्त्वानि सर्वशः ॥
इति नानाप्रसंख्यानं तत्त्वानामृषिभिः कृतम् ।
सर्वं न्याय्यं युक्तिमत्त्वाद्विदुषां किमशोभनम् ॥

Even in a single Tattva, Principle or Reality, be it anterior or posterior, all the other Tattvas are found to be included. For this reason, the Ṛiṣis have made various enumerations of the Tattvas. All are justified, being based on reason. What does not become a learned man?

And these Predicables have been enumerated in the Śrutis also: *e. g.*,

(*a*) in the Garbha Upaniṣat (Verse 3)

अष्टौ प्रकृतयः षोडश विकाराः ।

There are eight Prakṛitis and sixteen Vikâras or Transformations.

(*b*) in the Praśna Upaniṣat (IV, 8) also:

पृथिवी च पृथिवीमात्रा च ।

Earth and the fine part of Earth.

(*c*) and in the Maitreya Upaniṣat, etc.

Note:—The entire passage of the Praśna Upaniṣat, from which Vijñâna Bhikṣu has made the above quotation, may be transcribed here with advantage:

× × × कस्मिन्नु सर्वे सम्प्रतिष्ठिता भवन्ति ॥ १ ॥
× × × ×

स यथा सौम्य वयांसि वासो वृक्षं सम्प्रतिष्ठन्ते । एवं ह वै तत्सर्वं पर आत्मनि सम्प्रतिष्ठते ॥ ७ ॥ पृथिवी च पृथिवीमात्रा चापश्चापोमात्रा च तेजश्च तेजोमात्रा च वायुश्च वायुमात्रा चाकाशश्चाकाशमात्रा च चक्षुश्च द्रष्टव्यं च श्रोत्रं च श्रोतव्यं च घ्राणञ्च घ्रातव्यं च रसश्च रसितव्यं च त्वक् च स्पर्शयितव्यं च वाक् च वक्तव्यं च हस्तौ चादातव्यञ्चोपस्थश्चानन्दयितव्यं च पायुश्च विसर्जयितव्यं च पादौ च गन्तव्यं च मनश्च मन्तव्यं च बुद्धिश्च बोद्धव्यं चाहङ्कारश्चाहंकर्तव्यं च चित्तं च चेतयितव्यं च तेजश्च विद्योतयितव्यं च प्राणश्च विधारयितव्यं च ॥ ८ ॥

एष हि द्रष्टा स्प्रष्टा श्रोता घ्राता रसयिता मन्ता बोद्धा कर्ता विज्ञानात्मा पुरुषः । स परेऽक्षरे आत्मनि सम्प्रतिष्ठते ॥ ९ ॥

Question by Gârgya: In whom are all things firmly established?

Answer by Pippalâda: As the birds, O Calm One, rest secure on their dwelling tree, so does verily all that is existent, rest secure in the Higher Self: Earth and the fine parts (Mâtrâ) of Earth, Water and the fine parts of Water, Fire and the fine parts of Fire, Air and the fine parts of Air, Âkâśa and the fine parts of Âkâśa, the Eye and the object of seeing, the Ear and the object of hearing, the Nose and the object of smelling, the Tongue and the object of tasting, the Skin and the object of touching, the Voice and that which is

to be said, the Hands and that which is to be grasped, the Genitals and the pleasure of love, the Anus and that which is to be excreted, the Feet and the place to go to, Manas and the object of thinking, Buddhi and the object of ascertaining, Ahaṃkârâ and the object of Ahaṃkâra, Chitta and the object of consciousness, Light and the object of illumination, Prâṇa and that which is to be supported by it.

Verily this Puruṣa who is knowledge itself, is the seer, toucher, hearer, smeller, taster, thinker, ascertainer, doer. He stands firm on the Supreme, Immutable Self.

Moreover, the eight Prakṛitis have been explained by the Kârikâ (Verse 3):

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥

Prakṛiti, the Root, is not an evolute. Mahat and the seven following are both evolvents and evolutes. Evolute is sixteen fold. That which is neither an evolvent nor an evolute, is Puruṣa.

It is, however, a common saying in the Śrutis and the Smṛitis that reality is one and one only, without a second. But this unity is obtained by the absorption of all other realities in Puruṣa, on the principle of the identity of the energy and that which possesses the energy. Hence there is no conflict (between our teaching and the teaching of the Śruti and the Smṛiti).

Absorption (laya), moreover, means involution or existence in a subtle form, and not annihilation. So has it been said:

आसीज्ज्ञानमथोप्यर्थं एकमेवाविकल्पितम्

There were knowledge and object of knowledge, absolutely one and undivided.

'A-vikalpitam,' unelaborated, means undivided. And this has been established in detail in our Commentary on the Vedânta in connection with the doctrine of A-dvaita or Non-duality.

There is, however, a difference, and it is this: In the theistic theory, in consequence of the non-differentiation of all other realities therein (*i.e.* in Îśvara, the Lord), it is Isvara-chaitanyam, Divine Consciousness, that is the only reality. In the non-theistic (nir-Îśvara, God-less, *i.e.* which does not invoke divine intervention in the affairs of man and the world) theory, on the other hand, Mahat and the rest, remaining undivided like the confluence of three streams, are not differentiated in the Kûṭastha, the Immutable (*i.e.*, Puruṣa or Pure Consciousness in which nothing can enter from the outside), in the Sûkṣma or subtle form or state called Prakṛiti, just as the orb of light is not differentiated in the solar orb, and, consequently, it is the Self that is the only one reality. This the author will teach afterwards by the aphorism (I. 154):

नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात् ॥ १ । १५४ ॥

There is no conflict with the Śrutis declaring non-duality, because the reference is to the genus of Self.—61.

Proof of the existence of the Tan-mâtras.

स्थूलात् पञ्च तन्मात्रस्य ॥ २ । ६२ ॥

स्थूलात् Sthûlât, from the gross. पञ्च तन्मात्रस्य Pañcha-tan-mâtrasya, of the five Tan-mâtras, subtle elements.

62. (Knowledge of the existence) of the five Tan-mâtras is (by inference) from the Gross (Elements).—62.

Vritti.—For the purpose of the inference of cause from effect, the author takes them in the reverse order.

Knowledge of the five Tan-mâtras, is obtained from the gross, *i. e.*, the five gross elements as their effects, and as having the forms of being Śânta, pacific, Ghora, terrific, and Mûdha, stupid, according to the differences of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas.—62.

Bhâṣya:—The author, by a number of aphorisms, establishes the knowledge, by means of inference, of those amongst the above Predicables, which are not objects of direct observation.

The word, knowledge, comes down from the 60th aphorism above. 'Gross' denotes nothing but whatever is visible, *i. e.*, directly perceptible. And it has been declared to be the effect or product of the Tan-mâtras. By the inference of the Tan-mâtras as the cause thereof, from the Gross Elements as the effect, knowledge, discriminative of the Gross, arises. Such is the meaning.

In order that it may belong to Âkâśa, Ether, in common (with Earth, etc.), grossness here denotes the possession of an attribute cognisable by the external senses, or the possession of the Viśeṣa or distinctions of Śânta, pacific, etc.

And the Tan-mâtras are fine substances, the undifferentiated (a-viśeṣa) originals of the Gross Elements, which form the substratum of Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour, and Smell, belonging to that class (that is, in that stage of their evolution) in which the distinctions of Śânta etc., do not exist. So we find from the Viṣṇu-Purâṇa and other sources., *e.g.*,

तस्मिंस्तस्मिंस्तु तन्मात्रास्तेन तन्मात्रता स्मृता ।
न शान्ता नापि घोरास्ते न मूढाश्चाविशेषिणः ॥ १ । २ । २२ ॥

In them severally reside their parts (mâtrâ), wherefore the Smṛiti describes them as Tan (their)-mâtra (part). They are neither Śânta, pacific, nor Ghora, terrific, nor, again, Mûḍha, stupefying, but are Indistinguishables,—Viṣṇu Purâṇa, I. ii. 22.

The meaning of the above śloka is this: In all these elements, exist the parts thereof. This being the case, and there being no

distinction between a property and its subject, the Smṛiti speaks of the substances also as Tan-mâtras. And these Predicables are devoid of the distinctions of Sound, etc. belonging to the Gross, and called as Śânta Ghora, and Mûḍha, because they are all of one form. The import, therefore, is that when the Elements appear as the Tan-mâtras of Sound, etc. all that the expression means is that they possess Sound, etc. devoid of the distinction of Śânta, etc. Hence they are designated as Indistinguishables.

Śânta means pleasurable, Ghora, painful, and Mûḍha, stupefying. And the Tan-mâtras, being enjoyable to the gods and the like alone, are simply pleasurable, as the element of pleasure predominates in them.

Here the process of inference is as follows: The Gross Elements, arrived at the extreme limit of descent, must, on account of their grossness, have, as do a water-pot, a piece of cloth, etc., as their material cause, substances possessing the distinctive attributes of their own. The subject of inference is not at all pushed further than the Subtle, as, otherwise, the result would be non-finality.

An argument favourable to the above inference, is that, in the absence of any counteracting agent, the production of the attributes of the effect according to the attributes of the cause, is irresistible.

The Veda and the Smṛiti also confirm the above inference.

There is, on the other hand, objection to the possession of Sound, Touch, etc. by Prakṛiti; *e. g.*, numerous passages in Viṣṇu Purâṇa, etc., such as the following:

शब्दस्पर्शविहीनं तद्रूपादिभिरसंयुतम् ।
त्रिगुणं तज्जगद्योनिरनादिप्रभवाप्ययम् ॥

It (Prakṛiti) is devoid of Sound and Touch, and is unconnected with Form and the like. It is constituted by the three Guṇas, is the origin of the world, and is without production, development and destruction.

The impediments to the possession of Sound, Touch, etc. by Buddhi and Ahaṃkâra, again, are the texts of the Veda and Smṛiti which declare that they are the causes of the Bhûtas, gross and subtle elements. For the mark of an element is this, and nothing else, that it possesses a distinctive attribute belonging to the class cognizable by the external senses. Whence it would follow that if Buddhi and Ahaṃkâra possessed Sound, etc., they too would be elements, and consequently the causes of themselves, which is impossible.

In the absence of Form, etc. in the causal substances, what, it may be asked, is the cause of Form, etc. of the Tan-mâtras? We would reply

that it is nothing but specific conjunctions in different combinations amongst the causal substances themselves, as we find that the conjunction of turmeric and lime is the cause of redness, etc., appearing in the substance originated by them jointly.

When, in accordance with the facts of observation, it is quite possible for the conjunctions themselves amongst the causes of the substance which give support to them, to be the cause of Form, etc., the supposition of Form in the ultimate atoms made by the Logicians (*e.g.*, the Vaiśeṣikas), is not justifiable. Nor is it a rule with them also that only the attributes of homogeneous causes can originate attributes in the effects. For, we may point out, they also admit that the only cause of the increased volume of a triad of atoms is the plurality of their parts, etc.

The inference of the Indriyas (Powers of cognition and action), again, is, like the inference of Âkâśa, made by means of their functions, *e. g.*, sight, touch, speech, etc. which are directly perceptible. Hence it has not been stated here. The subject under treatment is only the inference of the Tattvas or Principles, one by means of another. Hence the exclusion of the Indriyas is not a defect.

In the matter of the production of the Tan-mâtras, the process described in the Commentary on Yoga should alone be accepted. Thus, the Tan-mâtra of Sound is produced from Ahaṃkâra; then, from the Tan-mâtra of Sound, accompanied by Ahaṃkâra, is produced the Tan-mâtra of Touch, possessing the attributes of Sound and Touch. In a similar order, the (other) Tan-mâtras are produced by the addition of one attribute at each step.

In the Viṣṇu Purâṇa (I. ii. 38), we, however, find:

आकाशस्तु विकुर्वाणः स्पर्शमात्रं ससर्ज ह ।
बलवानभवद्वायुस्तस्य स्पर्शो गुणो मतः ॥ १ । २ । ३८ ॥

While spreading out the modification of Âkâśa, He (the Creator) created pure Touch, (the Tan-mâtra of Touch). Vâyu, Air, became dominant, and it is held that Touch is its attribute.

So, it has been declared there that the creation of the Tan-mâtras of Touch, etc. proceeds from the four Gross elements of Âkâśa and the rest (excluding Earth). But this is not really the case. For, the creation mentioned there, should be understood in the sense of transformation (pariṇamana) by the form of the elements. For, the Gross elements beginning with Âkâśa and ending with Water transform the Tan-mâtras appertaining to them individually, by the form of their respective succeeding element, by means of their predominance over them.—62.

Proof of Ahaṃkâra.

बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां तैश्चाहंकारस्य ॥ १ । ६३ ॥

बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां—Bâhya (external)-âbhyantara (internal,)-bhyâṃ (by), by the external and internal ones, *i. e.*, Indriyas or Powers of cognition and action. तैः Taiḥ, by them, *i. e.*, the Tan-mâtras. च Cha, as well as. अहंकारस्य ahaṃkârasya, of Ahaṃkâra.

63. (The knowledge of the existence) of Ahaṃkâra is (by inference) by means of the external and internal ones as well as by them.—63.

Vṛitti :—Knowledge of Ahaṃkâra is derived by means of the external and the internal, that is, Indriyas or Instruments, as well as of those, that is, the five Tan-mâtras, as its effects.—63.

Bhâṣya :—The meaning is that the knowledge of Ahaṃkâra arises by inference of it as the cause, by means of the external and internal Indriyas as well as by means of the five Tan-mâtras, as its effects.

Now, Ahaṃkâra is a substance which serves as an antaḥ-karaṇa or internal instrument, and of which the function is abhimâna, thinking with reference to itself, assumption of everything to itself, conceit. It is not merely abhimâna, because, in the world, we find that it is substances only that can be the material cause of other substances. Moreover, in the state of dreamless sleep, etc., because the cessation of the function of Ahaṃkâra would entail the annihilation of the Elements, the existence, therefore, is proved of a substance called Ahaṃkâra simply as the seat of vâsanâ, desire or the resultant tendency of accumulated experience.

The process of inference here is as follows: The Tan-mâtras and the Indriyas have the substance, possessing abhimâna, as their material cause, because they are substances which are the products of Abhimâna; whatever is not thus (*i. e.* constituted by Ahaṃkâra), is not thus (*i. e.* a product of abhimâna), as, for instance, Puruṣa etc.

It cannot be said that a substance possessing abhimâna, self-assumption, is itself unproved; as there is proof of it by its being the material cause of such modifications as, *e.g.*, 'I am fair' etc., as is the case with the eye, etc., and, by the same inference, it can be proved that, that which is other than Manas, etc., is the cause of such modifications.

Here there is favourable argument also. *E. g.*

बहु स्यां प्रजायेय ।

I shall be many, I shall procreate.—Chhândogya Upaniṣat, VI. ii, 3.

From such texts of the Veda and Smṛiti, it appears that the creation of the Elements and all the rest is preceded by abhimâna or impersonation, and hence abhimâna is proved as the cause of creation which is preceded by acts of intelligence. And, for the sake of simplicity, the causality of abhimâna in creation is conceived as arising by means of mere proximity in the form of combination in one and the same object.

But, if this be the case, (*i.e.*, if objects are made of Ahaṃkâra), then, (suppose an objector), since the Ahaṃkâra of the potter would be the material cause of the water-pot, the water-pot made by him would disappear, when the potter obtains release, and, consequently, his Antaḥ-karaṇa disappears, and this is not reasonable, because, (after the death of the potter), another Puruṣa recognises that this is that same water-pot.

To this we reply that it is not so, because, on the release of the potter from his antaḥ-karaṇa, there is an end only of that particular transformation which could be the cause of the worldly experience of the released Puruṣa, but not an end of transformation in general, nor of antaḥ-karaṇa in its pure form or essence (svarûpa), because, in the Yoga aphorism (II. 22),

कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात् ॥ २ । २२ ॥

"Although destroyed in relation to him whose objects have been achieved, it is not destroyed, being common to others."—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. IV. page 188.

it has been proved that the equipment of an emancipated Puruṣa may also become the means of accomplishing the objects of other Puruṣas.

Or, let the Ahaṃkâra of Hiraṇya-Garbha (the one appearing in the Golden-Cosmic-Egg, *i. e.*, Brahmâ, the Creator) be the cause in the case of the water-pot etc., also, and not the Ahaṃkâra of the potter, etc. Even, then, the application of the general law being so extended, there would be no violation of any particular law, because it is collective Buddhi, etc., that has been established, in the Purâṇas and in the Sâṃkhya and Yoga, as being the material cause of Creation, and not distributed Buddhi, etc. which are their parts; as, for example, the characteristic of being the material cause of movable and immovable objects, belongs to the Great Earth (the Element of Earth as a whole) alone, and not to clods of earth, pebbles, etc. which are its parts—63.

Proof of Antaḥ-karaṇa.

तेनान्तःकरणस्य ॥ १ । ६४ ॥

तेन—Tena, thereby. अन्तःकरणस्य Antaḥ-karaṇasya, of the inner instrument.

64. The proof of Antaḥ-karaṇa is by means of Ahaṃkâra.—64.

Vritti :—Knowledge of the Antaḥ-karaṇa (the inner sense), that is, Buddhi, is derived (by inference) from that, that is, Ahaṃkâra, as its effect.—64.

Bhâṣya :—The meaning is that the knowledge of the Antaḥ-karaṇa, *i. e.*, the principal Antaḥ-karaṇa, namely Buddhi, called Mahat, as the cause thereof, is by inference by the mark of Ahaṃkâra, as its effect. The application of the process of inference here is as follows: The substance, Ahaṃkâra, must have, for its material cause, a substance possessing the function of niśchaya, ascertainment or certainty, because it is a substance which is the product of certainty; that which is not so, is not so, as Puruṣa, etc.

Here the following argument also should be understood. Every man, without exception, having first ascertained the essential nature of an object, after that, thinks with reference to himself by such forms as, "This is I," "This ought to be done by me," etc. So much is quite settled. Now, in the present instance, some cause of the substance called Ahaṃkâra being looked for, since the relation of cause and effect subsists between the two functions (of niśchaya and abhimâna), it is assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that the relation of cause and effect also subsist between the two substances which give support to them, because the occurrence of a function of the effect follows, as a matter of course, from the occurrence of a function of the cause.

In the Veda also there are texts, such as,

ईक्षांचक्रे

He looked round etc.—Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat, I. iv. 2.

तदैक्षत

This the same Deity saw etc.—Chhândogya Upaniṣat, VI. ii. 2.

from which we learn that it is from the Buddhi alone, produced at the beginning of Creation, that all subsequent Creation proceeds.

Although the Antaḥ-karaṇa is one and one only, still for simplicity's sake, it is treated as being threefold according to diversity of functions. Thus says the Liṅga Purâṇa:

गुणक्षोभे जायमाने महान् प्रादुर्बभूव ह ।
मनो महांश्च विज्ञेय एकं तद्वृत्तिभेदतः ॥

Disturbance of the Guṇas (Sattva, etc.) having been produced, Mahat came to light. Mahat should also be known as Manas. It is one, but possesses a variety of functions.

In the Vedânta Sûtras (II. iv. 12) also we find:

पञ्चवृत्तिर्मनोवद्व्यपदिश्यते ॥ २ । ४ । १२ ॥

"The chief Prâṇa is designated as having five functions like the Manas."—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V. page 405.

In a similar manner, by taking the case of Prâṇa as an example, the manifoldness of Manas also is proved according to the diversity of functions only.

(The phrase, for simplicity's sake, above, is now being explained.) Otherwise, as by means of the functions of ascertainment, etc., so also by means of the functions of error, doubt, sleep, anger, etc., etc., quite an infinite number of Antaḥ-karaṇas would have to be admitted, at the rate of one Antaḥ-karaṇa for each function.

Moreover, the use of the words, Manas, etc., irrespective of (the three-fold distinction herein recognised of) Buddhi, etc., cannot be justified on the System of Patañjali or on any other System of Thought. Still, as in the case of the knots in a bamboo, an order of succession as well as the relation of cause and effect have been declared amongst the threefold Antaḥ-karaṇas, by taking the minor distinctions in them into consideration, that is, it should be observed, following the terminology given in those texts of the Veda and Smṛiti which subserve the System of Yoga. Thus is it declared in the Yoga Vâśiṣṭha Râmâyaṇam :

अहमर्थोदयो योऽयं चित्तात्मा वेदनात्मकः ।
एतच्चित्तद्रुमस्यास्य बीजं विद्धि महामते ॥
एतस्मात् प्रथमोद्भिन्नादङ्कुरोऽभिनवाकृतिः ।
निश्चयात्मा निराकारो बुद्धिरित्यभिधीयते ॥
अस्य बुद्ध्यभिधानस्य याहुरस्य प्रपीनता ।
सङ्कल्परूपिणी तस्याश्चित्तचेतोमनोऽभिधा ॥

This, that which is called Chitta-âtmâ (the Self reduced to the form of Chitta), of which the nature is consciousness or to feel, wherein takes place the manifestation of the object, Aham, the "I", know it, O great thinker, to be the seed of this Tree of Chitta. From this, as it first breaks up, issues forth a sprout of quite a novel form ; certainty is its nature, and it is formless; it is designated as Buddhi. What appears as the fullness of this sprout of which the designation is Buddhi, which (fullness) possesses the form of saṃkalpa or thinking, of this the designations are Chitta, Chetas, and Manas.

The 'object, Aham,' is a general term for Antaḥ-karaṇa, (*i.e.*, does not denote Ahaṃkâra alone).

In the above extract it has been declared by the maxim of the seed and the sprout, that the different states called Chitta, etc., are, by the forms of functions merely, three successive transformations of the Tree of Antaḥ-karaṇa which is one and one only.

In the Sâṃkhya Śâstra, again, Chitta of which the function is thinking, is included in Buddhi itself. Whereas in the above passage Ahaṃkâra is included in Buddhi.—64.

Proof of Prakṛiti.

ततः प्रकृतेः ॥ १ । ६५ ॥

ततः: Tataḥ, thence, from Mahat. प्रकृतेः: Prakṛiteḥ, of Prakṛiti.

65. (The knowledge) of Prakṛiti is (by inference) from Mahat.—65.

Vṛitti:—Knowledge of Prakṛiti is obtained from that, that is, Mahat Tattva, as the effect.—65.

Bhâṣya:—The meaning is that knowledge of Prakṛiti is, by inference as the cause, from that, *i.e.*, Mahat Tattva, as the effect.

That Antaḥ-karaṇa in general is also an effect, is proved, according to the authority of the Veda and Smṛiti, in this way that, since cognitions belonging to all the five senses do not appear at one and the same time, therefore, it must be the required intermediate transformation, just like the body, etc.

The application of the process of inference that it is an effect of Prakṛiti, is as follows: Buddhi possessing the properties of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, must be the product of a substance which possesses the properties of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, because, whilst it is an effect, it is of the nature of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment; like lovely women.

The argument favourable to the above inference is this that the attributes of an effect can properly be accounted for only in accordance with the attributes of its cause. The Veda and Smṛiti also, it should be observed, support the above inference.

But, our opponent may say, there is no proof that Pleasure, etc. inhere in objects, the feeling being "*I* am happy" and the like. How then can objects such as a lovely woman, etc., be cited as examples?

Such, we say in reply, is not the case. By the fact that objects are the products of Buddhi the essence of which is Pleasure, etc. as well as by the feeling of "the pleasure of a garland", "the pleasure of sandal paste", etc., it is proved that objects also possess the properties of Pleasure, etc. There is besides the authority of the Veda and Smṛiti. Moreover, that thing alone is conceived as having Pleasure, etc., as its material cause, which is always found to be present or absent according as Pleasure, etc., are present or absent. To take them as instrumental causes, and then to suppose something else as the material cause, would involve two suppositions which would be superfluous.

Further, a permanent element of Pleasure, common to all Puruṣas, is proved to exist in all objects by means of their agreement with one another

and by the fact of recognition. For the apprehension of this Pleasure we have made an elaborate supposition of functions, their laws, and the like, which, however, conveys no fault in our System, having been made with reference to the results. Otherwise, a whole consisting of parts would not be proved by recognition, as the supposition of its cause (parts), etc., would be redundant.

The existence of Pleasure, etc., in objects also has been declared in the Mârkaṇḍeya Purâṇa:

तत् सन्तु चेतस्यथवापि देहे
सुखानि दुःखानि च किं ममात्र ॥

Let pleasures and pains exist in the mind or in the body; what is that to me?

The perception "I am happy", etc., again, like the perception "I am rich", etc., has for its subject matter the relation called the relation of the thing owned and the owner thereof (*i.e.*, an extrinsic relation and not an intrinsic one). For the purpose of dispelling the error that these perceptions have the relation of inherence for their subject matter, Puruṣa is differentiated in the Śâstras from the perceptions "I am happy," "I feel pain," and "I am bewildered."

Sound, etc., are treated as having the nature of pleasure, etc., because they combine in one and the same object (*e.g.*, Ether, etc.,) with them. Or, let Pleasure be present immediately in sound, etc., as would follow from the proofs cited above.

The theory that Pleasure, etc., appertaining to the objects, are capable of being apprehended by Buddhi alone, is made on the strength of what actually takes place. What, on the other hand, is manifested in dreamless sleep, etc., when there is no contact with objects, as the Sâttvic (consisting of Sattva) Pleasure of tranquillity or peacefulness, the very same is the property of Buddhi, the Pleasure of the Self.

Although the Vaiśeṣika and other Logicians formulate different theories regarding the order of the succession of causes and effects in the fabric of Creation, still the system inferred by us should alone be accepted by those who seek Release, because it is supported by a large number of the texts of the Veda and Smṛiti, and because the inferences of others are weak in consequence of the insecurity of their foundation. For this reason, mere reasoning, on account of the defect of non-finality, involved in it, has been refuted by the Vedânta Sûtra (II. i. 11):

तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात् ॥ २ । १ । ११ ॥

(If it be said that) there being no finality about reasoning, (it is always possible to infer the truth of the opposite; we say "no," for then the undesirable consequence

would follow that there would be no final release also).—Sacred Books of the Hindus. Vol. V., page 235.

So has it been declared by Manu also:

आर्षं धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना ।
यस्तर्केणानुसन्धत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः ॥ १२ । १०६ ॥

He knows Dharma (Right Conduct, in the widest sense), and none else, who can bring arguments, not in conflict with the Veda and the Śâstra, to bear upon the teachings of the Ṛiṣis (Seers) about Dharma.—Manu Saṃhitâ, Ch. XII., sl. 106.

It has been thus declared that it is reasoning which is not in conflict with the Veda, that alone can be the means of ascertaining objects. Therefore, it follows from passages like

श्रोतव्यः श्रुतिवाक्येभ्यो मन्तव्यश्चोपपत्तिभिः ।

(Truth about the Self) should be heard (*i.e.*, learnt) from the words of the Veda, and reasoned out by means of arguments. (And after having been reasoned out, it should be constantly meditated upon. These, hearing, reasoning, and meditation are the causes of the vision of truth.)

that it is manana, reasoning, the object of which is similar to that of śravana, hearing, (*i. e.*, is Vedic), is strong, whereas the reasoning of others in other forms is weak.

The hint is given here that the inference of the existence of Pleasure, Pain, etc., in Puruṣa also, by means of the (seeming) possession of Pleasure, Pain, etc., is, in like manner, weak, on account of its conflict with a large number of the texts of the Veda and Smṛiti.

The distinctive peculiarity (viśeṣa) appertaining to Prakṛiti, we shall expound in the sequel.—65.

Proof of Puruṣa.

संहतपरार्थत्वात् पुरुषस्य ॥ १ । ६६ ॥

संहतपरार्थत्वात् Saṃhata (structure)-para (other)-artha (purpose)-tvât, from the fact that a compage, a structure of many parts, exists to serve the purpose of another. पुरुषस्य Puruṣasya, of Puruṣa.

66. (The knowledge of the existence) of Puruṣa is (by inference) from the fact that a structure of many parts, (that is, Prakṛiti) exists for the sake of another.—66.

Vṛitti:—Knowledge of Puruṣa is not derived from Prakṛiti as the effect, because Prakṛiti is nitya or eternal (*i.e.*, uncaused), and Puruṣa is not a kâraṇa or cause. But because Prakṛiti is a saṃghâta (a whole in which parts combine and co-operate), that is, an embodiment of the three Guṇas, she exists para-artham, for the sake of another. And this "another" (other than a saṃghâta) is Puruṣa. Hence knowledge of him is obtained,

To avoid infinite regression, it should be stated that Puruṣa is not a combination of many parts.—66.

Bhâṣya:—Well, the discrimination of Puruṣa from everything that is Jaḍa or unintelligent or unconscious, is alone the cause of Release. For what purpose, then, has the discrimination of material objects from one another been shown here? To this our reply is that there is necessity for such discrimination also, for the purpose of purifying the Sattva element from the taint of Rajas and Tamas, by directing attention to Prakṛiti and the other Principles, one by one.

Having exhibited the proof of the Principles ending with Prakṛiti, as discriminated from one another, by inference by means of the mark of cause and effect, the author now declares a similar proof by inference, in a different way, of the existence of Puruṣa who is void of the relation of cause and effect that has been mentioned.

Saṃhanana is originative conjunction. And, since there is no difference between a whole and its parts, it is common to the products of Prakṛiti. Thus, the meaning is that the knowledge of Puruṣa is by inference from the fact that Prakṛiti and her products, being constituted by combination of parts, exist for the sake of another.

The inference is made in this wise: The subject in dispute, namely, Prakṛiti, Mahat, etc., is para-artham, serving-an-external-purpose, *i.e.*, has as its fruit or end the worldly experience and eventual emancipation of some one other than itself, because it is a structure of many parts, like a couch, a seat or the like.

By this inference is proved Puruṣa as other than Prakṛiti and only as a non-combination of parts, for, were he too a structure of many parts, the consequence would be infinite regression.

In the Yoga Darśana, the inference made by the aphorist, namely,

परार्थं संहत्यकारित्वात् ॥ ४ । २४ ॥

(And the mind) exists for another, (also because it is variegated by innumerable residua), inasmuch as it acts by combination.—Yoga Sûtras, IV. 24, S. B. H. Vol. IV. page 302.

is common only to the last member as heard (in *ibid* IV. 23) *i.e.* Chittam, mind, because the words "acting by combination" means simply this that it causes objects (artha) and acts (kriya), by association with others. Whereas Puruṣa, since he possesses the form of eternal light, does not depend upon anything else in causing his own objects in the form (*i.e.*, sense) of illuminating objects. For, it is only in the matter of connection with objects, that Puruṣa stands in need of the function of Buddhi. But this connection with object is not an uncommon act of causing objects.

And the favourable arguments (which confirm the above inference) are furnished by texts of the Veda and Smṛiti, such as,

न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवत्यात्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति ।

Nor does everything become dear for the sake of everything, but everything becomes dear for the sake of the Self.—Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat, II. iv. 5.

Another such argument is as follows: Were Prakṛiti, etc., possessing Pleasure, etc., for the sake of their own experience of Pleasure, etc., then, they would be immediately knowable by themselves, inasmuch as the manifestation of Pleasure is not possible without the manifestation of the subject in which it inheres; hence there would be the conflict of the subject and object. For, the manifestation of Pleasure is not possible without the manifestation of the subject of the properties, as would appear from the perception of Pleasure being of this form as "I am happy."

Moreover, it would be against the law of parsimony to suppose innumerable attributes in the form of consciousness for the manifold Guṇas and their products, *i. e.*, innumerable vikâras or transformations which enter into originative combination with one another. Hence, for the sake of simplicity, it is proper to make, (in each case), the supposition of a single Puruṣa only, in the form of the light of consciousness, as that which is other than all that is originated by combination of parts.

By the present aphorism, has been stated the inference of Puruṣa as the nimitta or occasional cause, inasmuch as it has been declared that the fulfilment of the object of Puruṣa is the nimitta or occasion for all combination of things. It is for this reason that, after having proposed Puruṣa produced at the beginning of Creation, it is remembered in the Viṣṇu and other Purâṇas.

निमित्तमात्रमेवासौ सृज्यानां सर्गकर्मणि ।
प्रधानकारणीभूता यतो वै सृज्यशक्तयः ॥ १ । ४ । ५१ ॥
गुणसाम्यात्ततस्तस्मात् क्षेत्रज्ञाधिष्ठिताग्मुने ।
गुणव्यञ्जनसंभूतिः सर्गकाले द्विजोत्तम ॥ १ । २ । ३३ ॥

He (Puruṣa) is merely the occasion in the matter of the act of creation of all things producible. Whence the powers of producible things come to have Prakṛiti as their cause. Then, from that equipoise of the Guṇas (Prakṛiti), under the superintendence of the Knower of the Field (Puruṣa), O Muni, takes place the production of the (first) manifestation of the Guṇas (Mahat) at the time of Creation, O excellent Brâhmaṇa.—Viṣṇu Purâṇa, I. iv. 51 and I. ii. 33.

"Superintendence of the Knower of the Field" means mere conjunction of the unfulfilled object of Puruṣa. "Manifestation of the Guṇas"

means the Principle of Mahat, because it manifests or reveals Pradhâna (Prakṛiti) constituted by the three Guṇas, as its cause.

Thus, then, it has been declared, in the above manner, that the proof of invisible (*i. e.*, super-sensible) objects is by means of inference.—66.

Prakṛiti is uncaused.

मूले मूलाभावादमूलं मूलम् ॥ १ । ६७ ॥

मूले Mûle, in the root. मूलाभावात् Mûla (root)-abhâvât (absence), on account of the absence of root. अमूलं Amûlaṃ, rootless. मूलम् Mûlam, root.

67. Since the root has no root, the root is rootless.—67.

Vṛitti :—Now, lest it be imagined that there may be a cause of Prakṛiti, so the author says :

There being no root, that is, no cause, of Mûla Prakṛiti, the Root Evolvent, the cause which is rootless, is the root (of all). The same is Prakṛiti.—67.

Bhâṣya :—Now, in order to establish that she is the cause of all, the eternality of Prakṛiti is being established, for the purpose of proving that Puruṣa is kûṭastha or immutable in all circumstances.

The root material cause of the twenty-three Principles, that is, Pradhâna, is rootless, because a further root cannot be possible, as in that case, there would be an infinite regression. Such is the meaning.—67.

Prakṛiti is a mere name.

पारम्पर्येऽप्येकत्र परिनिष्ठेति संज्ञामात्रम् ॥ १ । ६८ ॥

पारम्पर्ये Pâramparye, in the case of a succession. अपि Api, even. एकत्र Ekatra, at some one point. परिनिष्ठा Parinisṭhâ, rest, halt. इति Iti, so. संज्ञामात्रम् Saṃjñâ-mâtram, mere name.

68. Even in the case of a succession, there must be a stop at some one point, and so it (Prakṛiti, the root cause) is merely a name (that is given to such a point).—68.

Vṛitti :—The author states the argument in regard to the above :

There is a different cause of Prakṛiti, of that, again, there is a different cause, and so on and on. In view of the defect of non-finality which would, otherwise, be thus entailed, an uncaused something at the end should be stated to be the root. The very same is (called here) Prakṛiti. Moreover, the admission of more than twenty-five Principles would be redundant.—68.

Bhâṣya:—Well, it may be argued by our opponent, we learn from such texts as,—

तस्मादव्यक्तमुत्पन्नं त्रिगुणं द्विजसत्तम ।

Therefrom, O excellent Brâhmaṇa, was produced A-vyaktam, the Unmanifested, consisting of the three Guṇas.

that Pradhâna also is produced from Puruṣa. Let, then, Puruṣa himself be the root of Prakṛiti. There would, in this case, be no non-finality, since Puruṣa is eternal. Nor would any harm be caused to the immutability of Puruṣa, because the succession of Prakṛiti and her transformations would issue forth through the gateway of Avidyâ. So also is it remembered :

तस्मादज्ञानमूलोऽयं संसारः पुरुषस्य हि ।

Verily, therefore, the saṃsâra, or worldly experience of Puruṣa has Ignorance for its root.

Apprehending the above objection, the author says :

Even if Puruṣa be the root cause of the world by a succession of intermediate transformations through the gateway of A-vidyâ, etc., there must be a termination of the succession in some one or other of A-vidyâ, etc., *i. e.*, at some one or other eternal or permanent (nitya) gate, inasmuch as Puruṣa undergoes no transformation. Hence, where this termination or rest takes place, the same is eternal Prakṛiti. Here Prakṛiti is merely a name for the root cause. Such is the meaning.—68.

The Vedânta and the Sâṃkhya view of Prakṛiti are the same.

समानः प्रकृतेर्द्वयोः ॥ १। ६९ ॥

समानः Samânaḥ, same. प्रकृतेः Prakṛiteḥ, of Prakṛiti. द्वयोः Dvayoḥ, of both of us.

69. (In regard to the origin) of Prakṛiti, (the position) of both of us, is the same.—69.

Vṛitti:—But, Prakṛiti being supersensuous, how can it be known that she is a cause? To this the author replies.

Both, *i. e*, the asserter (Sâṃkhya) and the disputant (Naiyâyika) fare equally. For, as, notwithstanding that the ultimate atoms (paramâṇu) are supersensuous, the inference of ultimate atoms is made from the observation of their attributes in the water-pot and the like, similarly, here too, from the observation of the world as being made up of, or having the nature of, the three Guṇas, it is inferred that its cause, Prakṛiti, is constituted of the three Guṇas. Thus, to give an example, (showing that everything in the world possesses the nature of the three Guṇas), a woman is pleasurable to her husband, and thus partakes of

the nature of Sattva; through insubordination, she causes pain to him, and thus partakes of the nature of Rajas; she causes hallucination to him, in consequence of separation from her, and thus partakes of the nature of Tamas. All existences should be looked at similarly.—69.

Bhâṣya.—But, then, our opponent (a Vedântin) may object, the position that there are just twenty-five Principles is not made out, for, in addition to the A-vyakta, Unmanifested, which is the cause of the Principle of Mahat, another unintelligent Principle, called Ajñâna, Ignorance, presents itself. With this apprehension in his mind, the author states the final conclusion about the ultimate root (of Prakṛiti).

Really, however, in the discussion of the root cause of Prakṛiti, the Pakṣa or subject of proof is the same for both of us, *i.e.*, the asserter and the opponent. That is to say, as we hear of the production of Prakṛiti, so do we hear of that of A-vidyâ also, from such texts as—

अविद्या पञ्चपर्वैषा प्रादुर्भूता महात्मनः ।

This A-vidyâ which has five divisions, was produced from the Great Self.

Hence a secondary production must needs be asserted in respect of one or other of them, and, of these two, it is of Prakṛiti only that a secondary production in the form of a manifestation through conjunction with Puruṣa, etc., is reasonable, as there is a recollection of the secondary production of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti in the following passage of the Kûrma Purâṇa:

संयोगलक्षणोत्पत्तिः कथ्यते कर्मज्ञानयोः ।

Of action (Karma, Prakṛiti) and knowledge (Jñâna, Puruṣa) is said to be the production, the characteristic of which is conjunction.

while there is no mention, in any place whatever, of the secondary production of A-vidyâ. The texts about A-vidyâ having no beginning, should, however, be explained in the same way as the texts which declare that Vâsanâ or tendency, etc., are beginningless only in the form of a stream or unbroken succession of Vâsanâs or tendencies.

And it has been declared in an aphorism of Yoga that A-vidyâ which possesses the form of false knowledge, is a property of Buddhi. Hence the number (twenty-five) of the Principles is not exceeded.

Or, the meaning of the aphorism is that the reasoning in favour of both, *i.e.*, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, is the same. For, we hear of the production of Puruṣa also from such passages as—

यतः प्रधानपुरुषौ यतश्चैतच्चराचरम् ।
कारणं सकलस्यास्य स नो विष्णुः प्रसीदतु ॥

From whom are produced Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, and from whom proceeds this creation, movable and immovable, He, Viṣṇu, the cause of all this, may be pleased to us!

Thus, as of Puruṣa, so also of Prakṛiti, the production is purely

secondary. Again, both Puruṣa and Prakṛiti are declared to be eternal. Hence there is similarity on this point also.

It is proved, therefore, that Prakṛiti alone is the material cause of the world, and that A-vidyâ is the nimitta or occasional cause of the world, and that so also is Puruṣa.

In the Mokṣa-Dharma section of the Mahâbhârata, however, we find:

अविद्यामाहुरव्यक्तं सर्गप्रलयधर्मिणम् ।
सर्गप्रलयनिर्मुक्तं विद्यां वै पञ्चविंशकम् ॥

The sages declare the Unmanifested (Prakṛiti) possessing the property of creation and dissolution, to be A-vidyâ, and that which is free from creation and dissolution (Puruṣa), to be Vidyâ or knowledge. These make up the twenty-five Principles.

This, no doubt, is a declaration that Prakṛiti is A-vidyâ or Ignorance, and that Puruṣa is Vidyâ or knowledge. But the declaration has been made only from the practical point of view, in consequence of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa being the subjects of A-vidyâ and Vidyâ respectively. For, on account of undergoing transformation by nature, Prakṛiti, by comparison with Puruṣa, is a non-being: hence she is said to be the object of A-vidyâ or Ignorance. In the very same manner, in the same section of the Mahâbhârata, the whole range of effects ending with the Elements, have been declared to be A-vidyâ by comparison with their respective causes, and, by comparison with themselves, their respective causes have been declared to be Vidyâ.

But Puruṣa's being the material cause of the world in the form of transformation, is due only to the Upâdhi or investment of Prakṛiti. Like agency, etc., such causality has been translated in the Veda and Smṛiti only for the purpose of drawing greater attention to him through easy stages, as, otherwise (were Puruṣa in reality the material cause of the world), *it should be observed, there would be conflict with the texts of* the Veda such as the following:

अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वम् ।

Neither large nor small, neither short etc.—Bṛi. Âraṇ. Upa. III. viii. 8.

And by the word Mâyâ, Prakṛiti and nothing else is denoted, as will appear from the text of the Veda:

मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् ।

But one should know Mâyâ to be Prakṛiti. etc.—Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat, IV. 10.

Because there is the declaration in the following extract that Mâyâ which follows from the context, possesses the essential form of Prakṛiti:

अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत् ।
तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया सन्निरुद्धः ॥

From this, the Lord of Mâyâ (Parama-âtmâ) creates this universe, wherein the other (Jîva-âtmâ) is confined by Mâyâ.—*Ibid.* IV. 9.

And also from the texts of the Smṛiti such as,—

सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति प्राकृतं तु गुणत्रयम् ।
एतन्मयी च प्रकृतिर्माया या वैष्णवी श्रुता ॥
लोहितश्वेतकृष्णेति तस्यास्ताहृग्बहुप्रजाः ।

Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas,—these are the three Guṇas belonging to Prakṛiti. Prakṛiti is constituted by them. In the Veda, she is called Vaiṣṇavî Mâyâ, the Mâyâ of Lord Viṣṇu. She is red, white, and black. Many such progeny are born from her.

A-vidyâ which can be destroyed by Jñâna, cannot be the meaning of the word Mâyâ in the above passage of the Veda, as, in that case, the eternality of Mâyâ would not be established. Moreover, if A-vidyâ be a substance, the difference between A-vidyâ and Prakṛiti would be merely verbal; and, if it be an attribute, the existence of Prakṛiti as its substratum, is thereby proved, inasmuch as Puruṣa is devoid of attributes, etc.

Now, it cannot be asserted by our opponent that A-vidyâ is something different in characteristic from Substance, Attribute, and Action, because, as has been already pointed out by us (*vide* Aphorism 24 above), there is no knowledge of any such Predicable.—69.

Only the most competent people can know the truth.

अधिकारित्रैविध्यान्न नियमः ॥ १ । ७० ॥

अधिकारित्रैविध्यात् Adhikâri-traividhyât, persons competent to reason about the truth, being divided into three classes. न Na, no. नियमः Niyamaḥ, rule.

70. (It is) not a rule (that every one should be able to reason out the discrimination of Puruṣa from Prakṛiti), because persons entitled to reasoning, are of three descriptions.—70.

Vṛitti:—If Release comes through seeing the discrimination (of Puruṣa from Prakṛiti), then Release should result at once from only hearing (*i.e.* learning) that discrimination from the Śâstras. But this is not the case, as we see that some attain Release quickly, and that some, after a length of time. With such an objection in view, the author says:

Those who are adhikâri, *i.e.*, fit for engaging in an enquiry about the truth, fall into three classes, good, middling, and bad. These differences are due to the differences of the attendant causes in the shape of A-vidyâ, etc, which, again, arise from the difference of Adriṣṭam. Therefore, there is no hard and fast rule (niyama) that Release should result at once from learning the discrimination of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa.—70.

Bhâṣya :—But, then, if there is (as shown above) a mode of arriving, by inference, at a knowledge of Prakṛiti, Puruṣa, etc., how is it that manana or mental realisation of the discrimination (between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti) does not take place in the case of all men? In regard to this point, the author says :

As in hearing (*i.e.*, learning or receiving the truth from the Śâstras and other reliable sources), so in manana or assimilation thereof in thought also, the adhikâris or persons entitled to engage in the enquiry, are of three descriptions, *viz.*, dull, mediocre, and good. Hence there can be no universal rule that mental assimilation should take place in the case of all men, because it is possible for the dull and mediocre to be confronted with contradictory (bâdha, obstruction) and contrary (sat-pratipakṣa, equally valid argument to the contrary) views by means of misleading arguments, etc. Such is the meaning. For, by the dull, the (Sâṃkhya) arguments set forth above are opposed (and altogether set aside) by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the Bauddhas, etc. By the mediocre, again, these inferences are brought face to face with what appear to be equally valid conclusions to the contrary (and thereby rendered doubtful), by means of fallacious marks of inference, namely, the contradictory and the non-existent, (*vide* Vaiśeṣika Sûtram, III. i. 15, S. B. H. Vol. VI, page 116.). It is, therefore, the best of the adhikâris only in whose case such mental assimilation can take place. Such is the import.—70.

By Mahat is meant Manas.

महदाख्यमाद्यं कार्यं तन्मनः ॥ १ । ७१ ॥

महदाख्यम् Mahat-âkyham, called Mahat. आद्यं Âdyaṃ, taking place first of all. कार्यं Kâryaṃ, product, effect. तत् Tat, that. मनः Manaḥ Manas.

71. The first product of Prakṛiti is called Mahat; it is Manas.—71.

Vṛitti :—It may be thought that, in the previous aphorism (I. 61), "From Prakṛiti (evolves) Mahat," the relation of cause and effect has been established, but not the order (of the succession of the products of Prakṛiti). So the author removes this error:

That which is the *first* product of Prakṛiti, is the Principle of Mahat, that is Buddhi. It is called Manas or the thinking principle, because it thinks (manana).—71.

Bhâṣya :—It has been already declared that the svarûpa or essential or intrinsic form of Prakṛiti is the equipoise of the Guṇas. The Subtle

Elements, etc., again, are too well known for any special mention. Hence, by the next two aphorisms, the author declares the svarûpa of the remaining two Principles, *viz.*, Mahat and Ahaṃkâra.

The first product (of Prakṛiti), which is called Mahat, is Manas, that is, that which has the function of manana or thinking. Manana or thinking here means ascertainment or certainty. That of which this is the function, is Buddhi. Such is the meaning. For, from sayings like,

यदेतद्विस्तृतं बीजं प्रधानपुरुषात्मकम् ।
महत्तत्त्वमिति प्रोक्तं बुद्धितत्त्वं तदुच्यते ॥

This all-pervading seed which partakes of the Nature of Pradhâna and Puruṣa, the same is called the Principle of Mahat. It is said to be the Principle of Buddhi.

we know that it is Buddhi that is the first product of Prakṛiti.—71.

Note:—Mahat, Manas, and Buddhi are thus synonymous terms.

The next product is Ahaṃkara.

चरमोऽहंकारः ॥ १ । ७२ ॥

चरमः Charamaḥ, last. अहंकारः Ahaṃkâraḥ, Ahaṃkâra, the I-maker.

72. The next (product of Prakṛiti is) Ahaṃkâra.—72.

Vṛitti:—The product next to Buddhi, is Ahaṃkâra.—72.

Bhâṣya:—That which is next to it, is Ahaṃkâra, that is, that which egotises or creates the "I," of which the function is abhimâna or self-assumption. Such is the meaning.—72.

The subsequent ones are products of Ahaṃkâra.

तत्कार्यत्वमुत्तरेषाम् ॥ १ । ७३ ॥

तत्कार्यत्वम् Tat-kârya-tvam-to be the products thereof. उत्तरेषाम् Uttareṣâm, of the subsequent ones.

73. To the subsequent ones, it belongs to be the products of Ahaṃkâra.—73.

Vṛitti:—To be the products of Ahaṃkâra belongs to the others, *viz.*, to the eleven Indriyas and the five Tan-mâtras. Herein it is also declared that the (Gross) Elements which are the products of the Tan-mâtras, are also the products of Ahaṃkâra, through the chain of causation.—73.

Bhâṣya:—The author now says that, since Ahaṃkâra possesses the function of abhimâna or the making of the "I" (which by supplying the required antithesis, makes knowledge of objective existence possible), therefore, it is established that the subsequent ones are the products of Ahaṃkâra.

The meaning of the aphorism can be easily grasped.

By explaining this set of the three aphorisms in the above way, the apprehension or charge of useless repetition (*Cf.* "From Ahaṃkâra, etc.," aphorism 61) is prevented.—73.

The primary causality of Prakṛiti is not impaired.

आद्यहेतुता तद्द्वारा पारम्पर्येऽप्यणुवत् ॥ १ । ७४ ॥

आद्यहेतुता Âdya-hetutâ, causality of the Primordial, *i.e.* Prakṛiti. तद्द्वारा Tat-dvârâ, mediately through that, *i.e.*, Mahat. पारम्पर्ये Pâramparye, in succession. अपि Api, even. अणुवत् Aṇu-vat, like that of the atoms.

74. Even though the evolution is successive, Prakṛiti, through that, *i.e.*, Mahat, is still the cause (of all), as are the Atoms (the causes, though not immediate, of water-pots, etc.).—74.

Vṛitti:—Well, if this be the case, says the opponent, then you give up the conclusion that the world is the product of Prakṛiti. To meet him, the author says:

As the ultimate Atoms are, by a number of successive stages, the causes of a water-pot which is directly the product of a lump of clay, so also is Prakṛiti the root cause.—74.

Bhâṣya:—Well, if this be so, then there would be contradiction of those texts of the Veda and Smṛiti which declare that Prakṛiti is the cause of all. Apprehending such an objection, the author says:

'Pâramparye api,' although she is not immediately the cause, still, 'adyâyâḥ,' of Prakṛiti, 'hetutâ,' causality, in regard to Ahaṃkâra, etc., exists through Mahat, etc., in the same way, for example, as, in the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, the causality of the Atoms, in regard to water-pot, etc., exists through di-atoms, etc. Such is the meaning.—74.

Why Prakṛiti, and not Puruṣa, is the cause.

पूर्वभावित्वे द्वयोरेकतरस्य हानेऽन्यतरयोगः ॥ १ । ७५ ॥

पूर्वभावित्वे Pûrva-bhâvitve, being pre-existent. द्वयोः Dvayoḥ, of the two, *i.e.*, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. एकतरस्य Ekatarasya, of the one, *i.e.*, Puruṣa. हाने Hâne, on the loss. अन्यतरयोगः Anyatara-yogaḥ, application of the other, *i.e.*, Prakṛiti.

75. While both (Puruṣa and Prakṛiti) pre-exist (all products), on the loss of causality of the one, follows the application of the other as the cause.—75.

Vṛitti;—In consequence of the eternality of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa,

the question arises as to whom belongs the causality in creation, etc. The author removes this curiosity :

Causality does not arise by mere antecedence, but by (invariable) agreement (anvaya) and difference (vyatireka). Of the two, the fitness of the one, *i.e.*, Puruṣa, for association with causality, is gone, there being Vedic declarations that he undergoes no modification. Hence conjunction with causality is of the other, *i. e.* Pradhâna.—75.

Bhâṣya :—But, when Prakṛiti and Puruṣa are both of them eternal, what is there, it may be asked, to determine that Prakṛiti alone is the cause? So the author says :

Although both of them, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, are antecedent to all products, still, because the one, *i.e.*, Puruṣa, undergoes no transformation, and, therefore, lacks causality, causality appropriately belongs to the other (Prakṛiti). Such is the meaning.

Now, the argument in favour of Puruṣa's never undergoing any transformation. is, in a seed form, as follows : If Puruṣa act by entering into combination, his existence would be for the sake of another, and infinite regression would be the result. If he act not by entering into combination, the production of Mahat, etc. would take place every moment. If, on the other hand, it be supposed that Puruṣa undergoes transformation through (the intervention of) Prakṛiti, then, for the sake of simplicity, let transformation be of Prakriti alone.

Because Puruṣa is the lord (in the sense of ownership) of Creation, the characteristic of being the Creator is attributed to him, in the same way, for example, as victory and defeat, present in the soldiers, are attributed to the King, because he, being the owner of the army, experiences the pleasurable and painful consequences of victory and defeat.

Moreover, by the evidence (*i.e.* hypothesis, in the logical sense) [illegible]ognises the subject of proof as possessing a particular property, P[illegible] having been proved under the characteristic of causality alone, [illegible] no necessity for looking for any other cause, as, on the other h[illegible] by similar evidence, Puruṣa having been proved as the On-looker, there is no necessity for looking for any other on-looker.

Further, were the nature of Puruṣa to undergo transformation, he would at times commit failures, like the eye, Manas, etc. With the result that even actually existing Pleasure, Pain, etc. would not be cognised, and, consequently, doubts would arise such as "whether I be happy or not," etc. Hence it is proved, without detriment (and this is the reason for the inference) to his essential form of having the nature

of unfailing light, that Puruṣa is not by nature subject to transformation. Thus has it been declared by the Yoga Sûtra (IV. 18):

सदा ज्ञाताश्चित्तस्य वृत्तयस्तत्प्रभोः पुरुषस्यापरिणामित्वात् ॥ ४ । १८ ॥

"To its lord, the Puruṣa, the modifications of the mind are always known, on account of (his) unchangeability."—S. B. H. Vol. IV. page 294.

And also by the comment thereon:

सदा ज्ञानविषयत्वं तु पुरुषस्यापरिणामित्वं परिदीपयति

While their being always the object of knowledge clearly brings out the unchangeable nature of Puruṣa.

We shall later on show why Puruṣa does not at one time illuminate the world, although he is intrinsically of the form of ever shining light—75.

Prakṛiti is all-pervading.

परिच्छिन्नं न सर्वोपादानम् ॥ १ । ७६ ॥

परिच्छिन्नं Parichchinnam, circumscribed, limited. न Na, not. सर्वोपादानम् Sarva-upâdânam, material cause of all things.

76. What is limited cannot be the material cause of all things.—76.

Vṛitti:—But, then, (when there is so much dispute about the causality of Prakṛiti), let, (some one may say), the Ultimate Atoms be the causes, since there is no dispute about their causality. So the author says:

That which is limited, cannot be the material cause of all things, as, for example, threads cannot be the (material) causes of a water-pot. Consequently, separate causes would have to be asserted for all objects severally, whereas it would be simpler to assume one (universal) cause (namely, Prakṛiti).—76.

Bhâṣya:—In order to establish the simultaneous causality of Prakṛiti, the author demonstrates her universality also.

Pradhâna, the material cause of all things, is not limited, that is, is all-pervading. Such is the meaning. "The material cause of all things" is an adjective, containing the reason (for the inference of universality), namely, that this is not possible in the case of what is limited.

But the unlimitedness of Prakṛiti is not made out, objects our opponent; for, Prakṛiti is nothing more than the triad of the Guṇas, Sattva, etc., as would appear from the future aphorism (VI. 39):

सत्त्वादीनामतद्धर्मत्वं तद्रूपत्वात् ॥ ६ । ३९ ॥

Sattva, etc. are not the properties of Prakṛiti, being the very essence of her.

and as has been clearly and definitely declared by the Yoga Sûtra and the Comment thereon. Now, of these, Sattva, etc., lightness, mobility, weight, etc. are, you are going to say, the properties. But they would be contradicted by the (suggested) universality of Prakṛiti. Moreover, conjunction, disjunction, etc., which are causes in creation, would not also be established.

To this, our reply is as follows: Limitedness here denotes the characteristic of being confined to a part, which (characteristic) serves to determine the characteristic of being the counter-opposite of spatial non-existence (that is, in plainer language, the occupation of a portion of space which would have otherwise been empty); and the non-existence of this (limitedness) is universality. So that, it comes to this that the universality of Prakṛiti is nothing but the characteristic of not serving to determine the counter-oppositeness of spatial non-existence. As the characteristic of Prâṇa (the vital principle), namely, of being pervasive of all bodies, movable, immovable, etc., is denoted by the genus Prâṇa-tva (the generic characteristic of being Prâṇa), on account of the relation of the individual manifestations of Prâna to all bodies; similar is the universality of Prakṛiti.

The other characteristics of Prakṛiti, *e. g.*, inactivity (akriyâ), unity, etc., we shall demonstrate in connection with the aphorism on her resemblances and differences (Vide I. 124 below).—76.

The Veda also supports the Theory of Prakṛiti.

तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतेश्च ॥ १ । ७७ ॥

तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतेः : Tat-utpatti-śruteḥ, from the Vedic declaration of the production of limited things. च Cha, and also.

77. (Prakṛiti is the cause of all things, and not the Atoms), also because there are Vedic declarations of the production of limited things.—77.

Vṛitti:—The author shows that there is Vedic evidence also on this point:

Argument has already been stated. The Veda also declares that Pradhâna is the cause of the world. Thus,

प्रधानाज्जगज्जायते

The world is produced from Pradhâna.—77.

Bhâṣya :—Not only because she is the material cause of all things, but :

also because the Veda speaks of the production of limited things. Thus, we learn of the production of limited things, as we find that they are by nature perishable, as declared in such texts of the Veda as,

यदल्पं तन्मर्त्यम्

That which is finite, is perishable.—Chhândogya Upaniṣat, VII. xxiv. 1.

and in other texts. Such is the meaning.—77.

Ex nihilo nihil fit.

नावस्तुनो वस्तुसिद्धिः ॥ १ । ७८ ॥

न Na, not. अवस्तुनः A-vastunaḥ, from non-entity, non-existence. वस्तुसिद्धिः Vastu-siddhiḥ, production of entity or existence.

78. From a non-entity, an entity cannot be produced. —78.

Vṛitti :—Production of a water-pot which was non-existent before, is observed. Let antecedent non-existence, then, be the cause, since it is the invariable antecedent of all things. To this the author replies :

The production of an existence is not from non-existence. (If it were not so, then), as the effect is found to be of the same nature as the cause, the world also would be a non-entity.—78.

Bhâṣya :—Now, in order to establish the causality of Prakṛiti, the author sets aside the causality of Non-existence, etc.

'A-vastunaḥ,' from non-existence, is not 'vastu-siddhiḥ,' the production of an existence. Because (1) by deriving the world from the horns of a hare, Release, etc. cannot be established, and (2) such production is never observed. Such is the meaning.—78.

The world is not unreal.

अबाधाददुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाच्च नावस्तुत्वम् ॥ १ । ७९ ॥

अबाधात् A-bâdhât, from the absence of any contradiction to its reality. अदुष्टकारणजन्यत्वात्, A-duṣṭa-kâraṇa-janya-tvât, from its not being the product of depraved causes. च Cha, and. न Na, not. अवस्तुत्वम् A-vastutvam, unreality.

79. (The world is) not unreal, because there is no fact contradictory to its reality, and also because it is not the product of depraved causes.—79.

Vritti :—Let the world also be a non-entity, what harm is that to us? one may ask. So the author says :

The knowledge that it is not silver, is the contradiction of the silver in the (wrong) cognition, in regard to a shell of pearl-oyster, that it is silver. But, in the present instance, it has never been the cognition of any body that this world is not of the form of existence, whereby there would be contradiction of its having the form of existence.

Again, a thing is inferred to be unreal, if it is the product of depraved causes ; as some one's cognition of a conch-shell as yellow, through such a fault as jaundice, etc. But, in the present case, there is no such depravation of the senses, because all men at all times cognize the world as a reality. Hence it follows that the world is not a non-existence.—79.

Bhâṣya :—If it be said that the world also may be an unreality, like dreams and the like, so the author says :

There is no contradiction of the reality of the fabric of the world by means of Vedic and other proofs, as there is of the objects seen in a dream. Nor can it be said that the cognition of the reality of the world is the result of depraved senses, etc., as it is in the case of the yellowness of a conch-shell ; because there is no reason for the supposition of such depravation ; hence the effect, *i.e.*, world, is not unreal. Such is the meaning.

It cannot be said that there is contradiction of the reality of the fabric of Creation by such texts of the Veda as,—

वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्

Modification (*e. g.*, a water-pot) is a creation of speech, a mere name ; (while, "It is) clay," only this much is the truth.—Chh. Upa, VI. i. 4.

and that, there being this contradiction, the fault called A-vidyâ also exists in the cause of the world. For, such passages are directed to show the non-existence (of those modifications) in the form of duration dependent upon their cause, because it is not possible otherwise to prove the example of the clay. Also, if the import of those passages were otherwise, it would conflict with the passages on creation, etc. Moreover, the contradiction of the reality of the fabric of creation by the Veda would involve the fallacy of "âtma-âśraya," *i.e.*, would depend for its validity on the authority of the Veda itself (which is fallacious), and, again, the Veda also being included in the fabric of Creation, and its reality being consequently contradicted by itself, there would be room for doubt as to the truth of what is made known by it. For this very reason, on account of the characteristic differences of contradiction, non-contradiction, etc., and also

on account of our being aware of them as existent, the (imputed) resemblance of the world as seen in the waking state, to a dream, a flower in the sky, etc., has been refuted with great care and earnestness by the following two aphorisms of the Vedânta:

नाभाव उपलब्धेश्च ॥ २ । २ । २८ ॥

वैधर्म्याच्च स्वप्नादिवत् ॥ २ । २ । २९ ॥

"The external things are not non-existent, because our consciousness bears testimony to their existence."—II. ii. 28.

"The ideas of the waking state are not like those of the dream state, because they are of a different nature."—II. ii. 29.—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V., pages 308, 310.

Passages such as नेति नेति Neti Neti, "Not this," "Not this" (Bri. Âraṇ. Upa. II. iii. 6) are intended simply for the purpose of viveka or discriminative knowledge, and not as negations of the reality of the world in its ultimate and essential form, as would appear from the Vedânta Sûtra (III. ii. 22):

प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति

"(The Śruti, Neti Neti) denies the previously mentioned limitation (only with regard to Brâhman), for it declares (him to be) more than that."—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V, page 482.

We have similarly explained many other such passages in our Commentary on the Vedânta.—79.

Why nothing can come out of nothing.

भावे तद्योगेन तत्सिद्धिरभावे तदभावात् कुतस्तरां तत्सिद्धिः ॥ १ । ८० ॥

भावे Bhâve, being existent. तद्योगेन Tat-yogena, by union with that, *i.e.*, existence. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, production of that, *i. e.*, existent effect. अभावे Abhâve, being non-existent. तदभावात् Tat-abhâvât, on account of the absence of the effect. कुतस्तरां Kutas tarâṃ, how then. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, production of an effect in the form of an entity.

80. If the cause is existent, then, by union with existence, takes place the production of an existent effect; if it is non-existent, then, on account of the non-existence of any effect, how can there be the production of an effect in the form of an entity?—80.

Vritti:—Well, our opponent may say, let non-existence be the cause (of the world), still, the world will not (necessarily, therefore,) be a non-entity. In regard to this the author says:

"Bhâve," in the material cause, "tat-yogena," by union with existence, according to the principle कारणगुणः कार्ये "The attribute of the

cause passes into the effect," "tat-sidddiḥ," there is proof that the effect is an entity. "Abhâve," if the material cause of the world were a non-entity, "tat-abhâvât," then, since the non-existence of the world must necessarily follow, "kutas tat-siddiḥ," (whence can there be proof of the reality of the effect)? Since non-existence is of the form of non-existence.—80.

Note:—In translating the latter part of the *Vṛitti* we have followed the text of the edition (1808 Śaka Era) of Pandita Kâlîvara Vedânta-Vâgîśa. According to the reading of the Vṛitti edited by Dr. Garbe (Calcutta, 1888) abhâve jagato abhâvatve etc.—the translation would be, If the world were a non-entity, then, since the non-existence of the world must necessarily follow (by the law of its nature),—which apparently is not very clear nor quite correct.

Bhâṣya:—It has been stated above that an entity cannot come out of a non-entity. The author here gives the reason why this is so.

"Bhâve," the cause having the form of existence, "tat-yogena," by union with existence, the production of an (existent) effect takes place. "A-bhâve," the cause having the form of a non-existent thing, however, "tat-abhâvât," on account of the non-existence of the effect also, how can there be production or proof of an effect in the shape of an entity? As an effect can appropriately be only of the same essential form as the cause. Such is the meaning:—80.

Karma (Action) cannot be the material cause of the world.

न कर्मण उपादानत्वायोगात् ॥ १ । ८१ ॥

न. Na, not. कर्मणः Karmaṇaḥ, from Karma or Action. उपादानत्वायोगात् Upâdânatva-ayogât, on account of non-adaptation to material causality.

81. (Production of an entity can) not (take place from Karma also), because (Karma has) no fitness for material causality.—81.

Vṛitti:—Let Karma itself be the cause of the world, what need have we of the hypothesis of Pradhâna? (if it be asked), so the author declares:

Let Adṛiṣṭam be the nimitta or instrumental cause (in creation). But material causality is never found in Merit and Demerit. When it is established that Release results from seeing the distinction (Viveka) between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, the existence of Prakṛiti is admitted.—81.

Bhâṣya:—But still, when Karma is a necessary factor in creation, let Karma alone be the cause of the world, what is the use, it may be asked, of the hypothesis of Pardhâna? In regard to this the author says:

Production of entities is not possible from Karma even. Root causality does not belong to Karma, because the attributes have no fitness

for being the material causes of substances. For, a legitimate hypothesis is only that which is in accordance with the facts of observation. And it is nowhere found that material causality belongs to the attributes mentioned by the Vaiśeṣikas. Such is the meaning.

The word "Karma" is here indicative of A-vidyâ, etc. also. Since they equally possess the nature of attributes, they too are not adapted to be material causes. If it is said that like jaundice, etc. of the eye, A-vidyâ is a substance appertaining to the conscious principle, then its difference from Pradhâna is in name only.—81.

Ritual observances are not the cause of Release.

नानुश्रविकादपि तत्सिद्धिः साध्यत्वेनावृत्तियोगादपुरुषार्थत्वम् ॥ २ । ८२ ॥

न Na, not. आनुश्रविकात् Ânuśravikat, from (performance of) Vedic rites and ceremonies. अपि Api, even, also. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, accomplishment thereof, *i.e.*, of Release. साध्यत्वेन Sâdhyatvena, being a product. आवृत्तियोगात् Âvṛitti-yogât, on account of liability to recurrence. अपुरुषार्थत्वम्, A-puruṣa-artha-tvam, not the characteristic of being Puruṣa-artha or the chief end of man or the supreme purpose of life.

82. The accomplishment of Release is not from scriptual observances also, because, being the result of Karma, it would be liable to repetition, and would thus lose the character of the supreme purpose of Puraṣa—82.

Vṛitti :—Since Release can be obtained through the performance of the rites and ceremonies enjoined in the Veda, what, it may be asked, is the use of Prakṛiti? To this the author replies :

'Ânuśravika' is that which is heard from the Veda, through the mouth of the preceptor, that is, sacrifice, etc. From that also is not the accomplishment of Release, because the Release, so obtained, being a product of temporary causes, is not permanent, and hence the released person is liable to revert to transmigration. Therefore, such Release is not the supreme purpose of Puruṣa.—82.

Bhâṣya :—Thus, then, has been exhibited the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti by the characteristics of being liable to transformation and of not being liable to transformation, of existing for the sake of another and of not existing for the sake of another. Now, by the next five aphorisms, the author explains, at some length, what has been already stated by the aphorism—

अविशेषश्चोभयोः ॥ १ । ६ ॥

(As regards the temporary character of their effect, *i. e.*, cessation of pain), there is no distinction between the two (*i. e.*, visible means, on the one hand, and religious performances, prescribed in the Veda, on the other).—*Vide* page 23 *supra*.

namely, that it is only the knowledge of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti that, by causing of the destruction of A-viveka or non-discrimination, becomes the means for the attainment of the supreme purpose of Puruṣa; and that the Vedic performance have no immediate causality therein.

The word "Api" includes the visible means mentioned before, that is, in

न दृष्टात्तत् सिद्धिः ॥ १ । २ ॥

The realisation of that (*i. e.*, permanent cessation of the experience of pain) cannot take place by ordinary means, such as men and money.—*Vide* page 19 *supra*.

"Ânuśravika" karma means action such as sacrifice, etc., enjoined in that which is heard from the mouth of the preceptor, *i.e.*, the Veda. From that also, does not take place the accomplishment of the object of Puruṣa mentioned before (*vide* aphorism 1, above). Because, being the result of action, it has connection with repetition and is thus lacking in the characteristic of being the supreme purpose of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

That the result of Karma is not permanent, is proved by the Veda :

तद्यथेह कर्मचितोलोकः क्षीयते एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते

As here the world conquered by action wears away, so there too the world conquered by Merit wears away.—Chhândogya Upaniṣat. VII. 1. 6.

By the aphorism (I. 16).

नकर्मणान्यधर्मत्वात् ॥१।२६॥

Nor (is Puruṣa bound) by Karma, because Karma is the property of a different object. —*vide* page 34 *supra*.

Bondage by Karma has been refuted before. And now Release by Karma is refuted. Hence there is no tautology.

It cannot be said that by the reason given above, namely, that Karma is the property of a different object, the causality of Karma towards Release, as towards Bondage, has been practically refuted before, and that therefore, the very apprehension of any misconception in this respect does not arise again, (so that the refutation in the present aphorism is superfluous). For, A-viveka or non-discrimination having been established as the cause of Bondage, it is possible to regard Karma as being the property of Puruṣa, because it is the result of the A-viveka belonging to him while in bondage.—82.

The Vedic texts on non-reversion in regard to Karma refers to those who have attained to discriminative knowledge.

तत्र प्राप्तविवेकस्यानावृत्तिश्रुतिः ॥ १ । ८३ ॥

तत्र Tatra, in regard to Vedic Karmâ (Vijñâna), between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa (Aniruddha). प्राप्तविवेकस्य Prâpta-vivekasya, of one who has attained to discrimination. अनावृत्तिश्रुतिः An-âvṛitti-śrutiḥ, Vedic text on non-reversion or non-repetition of births and deaths.

83. The Veda declares the non-reversion of one who has attained to discriminative knowledge, from amongst those who have risen to higher worlds by virtue of the performance of Vedic Karma (Vijñâna) or, of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti (Aniruddha).—83.

Vṛitti.—The author shows what does constitute the supreme purpose of Puruṣa.

"Tatra", of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, "Prâpta-vivekasya", from knowledge of the discrimination, "an-âvṛitti-śrutiḥ", *e. g.*, the Vedic text.

न स पुनरावर्तते

He does not revert again.—Kâlâgni Rudra Upaniṣat, 2.—83.

Bhâṣya.—But, then, how do you account for the Vedic declarations on the non-reversion of one gone to the world of Brahmâ by virtue of action called worship in the form of Pañcha-Agni-Vidyâ or the penance of five fires, as well as by virtue of action in the form of death at a sacred place, etc. ? In regard to this the author says :

The Vedic text that there is, in connection with the Vedic Karma, about the non-reversion to this world of those who have gone to the world of Brahmâ, should be taken as referring to those who, while residing in the world of Brahmâ, have attained to discriminative knowledge. For, otherwise, there would be conflict with those other texts of the Veda which establish reversion to this world even from the world of Brahmâ. Such is the meaning. Still, it should be observed that non-reversion also is the result of discriminative knowledge alone, and not directly of Karma. And this point will be elaborately treated in the Sixth Book. In our Commentary on the Vedânta Sûtras, we have quoted and explained the passages relating to them.—83.

Freedom from Saṃsâra (transmigration) is not the result of Karma.

दुःखाद्दुःखं जलाभिषेकवन्न जाड्यविमोकः ॥ १ । ८४ ॥

दुःखात् Duḥkhât, from pain. दुःखं Duḥkham, pain. जलाभिषेकवत् Jala-abhiṣekavat, like the affusion of water. न Na, not. जाड्यविमोकः Jâḍya-vimokaḥ, relief from chilliness.

84. Pain (results) from pain; like the affusion of water which does not give relief from chilliness.—84.

Vritti.—The author points out the defect in the opposite view.

Were Release the result of Karma, then, since Karma involves a large element of pain, Release, the product thereof, would also involve a large element of pain. At any rate, it would cause pain by being, at least, perishable. For, relief from chilliness is not given to one afflicted with chilliness, by the affusion of water, but, on the contrary, additional chilliness is thereby caused to him.—84.

Bhâṣya.—If it be said that the non-reversion mentioned above is the result of Karma, so the author says:

From the pain which follows from the performance of Vedic Karma, by reason of its entailing the defects of killing, etc., and by means of the painful experiences consequent thereon, results nothing but an unbroken series of pains, and not "relief from chilliness", *i. e.*, the surcease of A-viveka or Non-discrimination; while freedom from pain lies at a great distance. As, for example, by the affusion of water, it is non-relief from chilliness that is caused to one distressed with chilliness, and not certainly relief from chilliness. Such is the meaning.

So has it been said:

यथा पङ्केन पङ्काम्भः सुरया वा सुराकृतम् ।
भूतहत्यां तथैवैकां न यज्ञैर्मार्ष्टुमर्हति ॥

As turbid water cannot be made pure by means of mud, and as sins due to drinking wine cannot be expiated by means of wine, in the very same way, a single sin of killing a living creature cannot be expiated by a hundred of sacrifices.—Bhâgavatam, I. viii. 52.

It is also heard that even Jaya, Vijaya, etc., the attendants of Viṣṇu, and residents of the worlds of Brahmâ, had to undergo a succession of painful existences in the race of the Râkṣasa (as Hiraṇyâkṣa, Hiraṇya-Kaśipu, etc).

And this has been said by the Kârikâ also:

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः

Like the visible, the scriptural performances also are affected with the defects of impurity, waste, excess.—Kârikâ, Verse II, 84.

The result of Niṣkâma Karma also is equally transitory.

काम्येऽकाम्येऽपि साध्यत्वाविशेषात् ॥ १ । ८५ ॥

काम्ये Kâmye, (karma) being performed with the object of securing desirable consequences thereby. अकाम्ये *A*-kâmye, not being so performed, being disinterested. अपि Api, even. साध्यत्वाविशेषात् Sâdhyatva-a-viśeṣât, on account of the absence of any difference in respect of Release being *producible* by Karma.

NOTE.—For kâmye' kâmye, Aniruddha reads kâmyâkâmye.

85. (Release cannot be attained even by disinterested Karma), for, whether Karma be interested or disinterested (Vijñâna), or, though in disinterested Karma there is some difference from interested Karma, (Aniruddha), it produces no corresponding difference in the characteristic of Release being something producible (and, therefore, perishable).—85.

Vritti:—The cause of the existence of a large element of pain in the Release accomplished by Karma is not, it may be argued, this that it is the product of Karma, but the cause is that it is the product of kâmya or interested Karma, because niṣkâma or disinterested Karma is capable of accomplishing Release, as the Veda declares:

कर्मभिर्मृत्युमृषयो निषेदुः प्रजावन्तो द्रविणमिच्छमानाः ।
अथापरे ऋषयो मनीषिणः परं कर्मभ्योऽमृत्वतमानशुः ॥

The sages endowed with progeny and greedy of wealth, entered into death by their Karmas. While other sages, possessing wisdom, obtained immortality through higher (disinterested) Karmas.

In regard to this the author says:

Granted that pain is not the consequence of niṣkâma or disinterested karma, but still, notwithstanding the difference of niskâma karma from the kâmya, the characteristic of release being the product of Karma remains undifferentiated. Because if it would be a product, it would be perishable, and, consequently, there would again be pain. The Vedic texts which declare that niṣkâma karma is the means for the attainment of Release, are for the purpose of knowledge, and Release comes through knowledge, so that niṣkâma karma is the means of Release through the intermediation of knowledge.—85.

Bhâṣya:—It it be said that, not Pain, but Release is heard to be the fruit of niskâma karma in the form of internal sacrifice, silent recitation of the mantra, etc., so the author declares:

In respect of karma, kâmya as well as akâmya, pain results from pain. Why? "Sâdhyatva-a-viśeṣât", *i.e.*, both being alike producible, because the knowledge which arises through the purification of the Sattva brought about by karma, is essentially of the form of pain, since the threefold Guṇas are its very essence. Such is the meaning. The import is that the Veda also bears testimony to the truth of the statement that Release is not directly the fruit of Karma. Thus,

न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैकेऽमृतत्वमानशुः

Neither by Karma, nor by progeny, nor by riches, but by renunciation, some attained to immortality.—Kaivalya Upaniṣat, I. 2,

"By renunciation," *i.e.*, by giving up abhimâna or self-assumption. "Some," *i.e.*, some only, "attained to" or obtained immortality, and not all, because the renunciation of abhimâna is a very rare thing, being the result of tattva-jñâna or knowledge of truth. Such is the meaning.—85.

Release producible by knowledge is not perishable.

निजमुक्तस्य बन्धध्वंसमात्रं परं न समानत्वम् ॥ १ । ८६ ॥

निजमुक्तस्य Nija-muktasaya, of one who is released (free) by himself. बन्धध्वंसमात्रं Dhvaṃsa-mâtraṃ, the mere annihilation of bondage. परं Paraṃ, sufficient, absolute, permanent. न Na, not. समानत्वम् Smânatvam, similarity, parity.

86. The mere annihilation of bondage is final in the case of one who is free by nature ; hence, there is no parity (between the theories of Release by Knowledge and Release by Karma).—86.

Vṛitti:—Supposing that Release may result from the knowledge of the discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, still, on account of its perishableness, saṃsâra or trasmigration may again take place. Thus, one may say, the (Sâṃkhya) asserter and his opponent are on an equality. To this the author replies :

"Nija-muktasya," of him who is released by nature ; "bandha-dhvaṃsaḥ": Bandha is A-viveka or Non-discrimination ; dhvaṃsa or destruction of A-viveka takes place by means of the opposite thereof (*i.e.*, Viveka or discrimination). And how can there be a return of saṃsâra when the destruction of A-viveka is (what is technically called) Pradhvaṃsa or non-existence after annihilation, that is, is final ? Hence there is no such similarity, (as is imagined, between the two cases).—86.

Bhâṣya :—But, even on your own theory, how is it, may ask our opponent, that painfulness does not belong to (release which is) the product of knowledge, when you do not claim any peculiarity in its producibility ? To this the author replies :

"Nija-muktasya," of him who is released by nature, the mere surcease of bondage, in the manner stated, by means of the annihilation of the cause thereof called A-vidyâ, is "paraṃ" final. The destruction (of bondage) which is the result of the knowledge of discrimination (of Puruṣa from Prakṛiti), is imperishable, and not, like the fruit of Karma, something in the form of an existence, *e.g.*, Pleasure, etc., whereby, on account of its perishableness, it might give pain. Karma, again, cannot become the immediate cause of the destruction of A-vidyâ, without the help of

Adṛiṣṭam as an intermediate cause. Hence, knowledge being imperishable, there is no parity between Knowledge and Karma. Such is the meaning.

And, on account of knowledge, return to transmigration is not possible, in consequence of the destruction of the cause (of such return) called A-vidyâ. This is proved.

Thus, then, is it declared that it is discriminative knowledge that alone is the immediate cause of the annihilation of pain.—86.

Definitions of Pramâ or right cognition and Pramâna or proof.

द्वयोरेकतरस्य वाप्यसन्निकृष्टार्थपरिच्छित्तिः प्रमा तत्साधकं यत् तत् त्रिविधं प्रमाणम् ॥ १ । ८७ ॥

द्वयोः : Dvayoḥ, of both, Buddhi and Puruṣa. एकतरस्य Ekatarasya, of one of the two. वा Vâ, or. *N. B*—Aniruddha reads cha instead of vâ. अपि Api, even, also. असन्निकृष्टार्थपरिच्छित्तिः : A (not)-sannikṛiṣṭâ-(drawn near to, adjacent)-artha (object)-parichhittiḥ (determination), determination or ascertainment of distant objects. प्रमा Pramâ, right knowledge. तत्साधकं Tat-sâdhakam, the instrument of that. यत् Yat, which. तत् Tat, that. त्रिविधं Trividham, threefold. प्रमाणम् Pramâṇam, proof, evidence. *N. B.*—Aniruddha omits the words, trividham pramânam, from this aphorism, and reads them at the beginning of the next aphorism.

87. By Pramâ we mean the ascertainment of objects which have not yet approximated both (*i.e.*, Buddhi and Puruṣa), or, even one or other of them; that which is the instrument thereof, is Pramâṇa which is threefold. (Vijñâna Bhikṣu).

Or, Pramâ, that is, the determination of distant objects, is (in the case of Perception), the result of both (*i.e.*, sense and objects), and, (in the case of Inference or Verbal Cognition), of one or other (*i.e.*, of the inferential mark or word, as the case may be). That which is the best instrument thereof is (Pramâṇa).—(Aniruddha).—87.

Vṛitti :—It has been mentioned that the group of Principles is twenty-five-fold. Their proof is not possible without Pramâṇa. Accordingly the author shows what Pramâṇa is.

"Dvayoḥ", of Sense and Object, which are existent; in the case of Perception. "Ekatarasya cha api," of existent mark or word; in the case of Inference or Verbal Cognition. "A-sannikṛiṣṭ-artha-parichchhittiḥ", determination of objects not previously determined. "Pramâ", right cognition,

the result. Hereby it is declared that Pramâṇa or proof is that which reaches to objects, not previously got at. That which is the best instrument of Pramâ, is Pramâṇa ;—such is the definition of Pramâṇa in general.—87.

Bhâṣya :—Now, the Pramâṇas which are the immediate means of discriminative knowledge, are going to be examined. Knowledge of the Self is acquired by means of the threefold Pramâṇa—this we learn verily from such texts of the Veda as,—

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः ।

Verily the Self is to be seen, to be heard about, to be reasoned about.—Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat, II. iv. 5, IV. v. 6.

Karma, etc., on the other hand, are the means of causing the purification of the other instruments such as Manas, etc.

" Asannikṛiṣṭa ", *i.e.*, not lodged in, that is to say, not got at by, the ascertainer (Pramâtari). Of such objects, *i.e.*, entities, ' parichchhittiḥ ' *i.e.*, ascertainment, is Pramâ. And it may be the property of both, *i.e.*, Buddhi and Puruṣa, or of only one or other of them in both ways. That which is the best instrument of that, *i.e.*, Pramâ,—" the best instrument ", *i.e.*, the cause which is never dissociated from connection with effect, in other words, is unfailing in its effect,—the same is Pramâṇa, and it is threefold under the forms presently to be mentioned. Such is the meaning.

In the above comment, the term " not got at " has been used for differentiating (Pramâṇa) from Smṛiti or Memory, " entities " for differentiating it from Error, and " ascertainment " for excluding Doubt.

Now, if it is said that the result in the form of Pramâ rests in Puruṣa alone, then, the modification of Buddhi is the only Pramâṇa ; if it is said to rest in Buddhi alone, then the contact of Buddhi and the Sense etc., is the only Pramâṇa, while Puruṣa is only the witness, and, not the maker, of Pramâ or Right Cognition. If, again, the cognition belonging to Puruṣa as well as the modification of Buddhi, both of them, are said to be Pramâ, then both of them are Pramâṇa, according to the differences of Pramâ, while the application of the word, Pramâṇa, to the eye, etc., is only secondary or in an intermediate sense in all cases. Such is the import.

In the Commentary on the Yoga Sûtras, on the other hand, the revered Vyâsa Deva has declared that Pramâ is the cognition resting in Puruṣa ; for, since the instruments (Senses) operate or become active only for accomplishing the object of Puruṣa, it is but proper that the result of

their activity should rest in Puruṣa. Hence here too the very same (cognition resting in Puruṣa) is the principal conclusion. Nor can it be asked that, since the cognition of Puruṣa is eternal in its intrinsic form, it cannot, therefore, be a result of causes; for, notwithstanding that it is eternal in its pure or absolute form, it can yet bear the character of being an effect, when tainted or coloured with the reflection of external objects, or, it may be that the result in question is nothing but the colouration or taint received from the chief end of Puruṣa.

Now, the process of knowing rightly is as follows: By means of the contact with objects, through the channels of the Senses, or by means of the knowledge of the (inferential) mark etc., is at first produced a modification of Buddhi in the form of the object (to be cognised.) Of these, the perceptual modification produced from the contact of the Senses, is dependent upon Buddhi together with or affected by the Senses, seeing that modifications in the form of the bile, etc., arise in consequence of the depravity of the bile, etc., appertaining to the eye, etc; this is the difference. And the same modification, tinged with the object, enters upon (the field of vision) of Puruṣa by the form of a reflection, and shines there, inasmuch as Puruṣa, since he is not liable and capable of transformation, cannot possibly be modified into the form of the object. And it is only modification into the form of the object that can apprehend objects; it is difficult to say this in respect of other things. This the author will declare later on by the aphorism (VI. 28):

जपास्फटिकयोरिव नोपरागः किन्त्वभिमानः ॥ ६ । २८ ॥

As between the China rose and crystal, (there is) no uparâga or actual transference of 'colour' (from Buddhi to Puruṣa), but (only) abhimâna or an assumption (of such transference).

There is also the Yoga Sûtra (I. 4);

वृत्तिसारूप्यमितरत्र ॥ १ । ४ ॥

"Identification with modifications elsewhere".—S. B. H. Vol. IV. p. 10.

Smṛiti too:

तस्मिंश्चिद्दर्पणे स्फारे समस्ता वस्तुदृष्टयः ।
इमास्ता प्रतिबिम्बन्ति सरसीव तटद्रुमाः ॥

All these same appearances of things are reflected in that large mirror of the mind, (as are reflected) in a lake, the trees that stand on the banks.—Yoga-Vâsiṣṭha-Râmâyaṇa.

Also the Commentary on Yoga:

बुद्धेः प्रतिसंवेदी पुरुषः ।

Puruṣa is the re-cogniser from Buddhi.—Yoga-Bhâṣya, I. 7, S. B. H. Vol. IV p. 15.

"Re-cogniser" (prati-saṃvedi), that is, the seat of prati-saṃveda or echo-like reflection of cognition. Such is the meaning.

Hereby it is shown that, although Puruṣas are immutable, universal, and of the form of consciousness, still, it does not follow that they will illumine (*i. e.* cognise) all things at all times, because while they are asaṅga, free from attachment, they cannot by themselves be modified into the form of the object, and, in the case of supersensuous objects, it has never been observed that there has been apprehension of objects by means of mere conjunction, without modification into the form of the object.

The supposition of the capacity in Puruṣas, of having thrown into them the reflections of the modifications of their respective Buddhis only, and not of others, is made from the force of the result (*i.e.*, from seing that this is actually the case). As only things possessing rûpa or form-and-colour, and not others, have the capacity of casting reflection in water, etc.

The possession of form-and-colour is not the underlying cause of reflection in all cases, as we observe the reflection of sound also in the form of echo. It cannot be said that echo is nothing but a sound produced from another sound; for, in that case, it would follow that the redness, etc. of the crystals also are produced from the proximity of the China rose, and, consequently, the conclusion of the unreality of reflections (which appear as, but are not, entities) would be lost. Reflection (pratibimba), again, is a particular transformation of Buddhi itself, while the form of the reflected (bimba) is what is seen in the water, etc.

Some thinkers, however, are of opinion that Chaitanya or Consciousness, being itself reflected in the modification (of Buddhi), illuminates the modification, and that, likewise, it is the very reflection appearing in the modification that is the object of consciousness in the modification, and that it is not the case that the reflection of the modification is thrown in consciousness. But this is an incorrect view of the case. For, by reason of its contradiction to the Śâstra (*e. g.*, Yoga-Vâśiṣṭha-Râmâyaṇa above) exhibited above as authority (for our view), their mere reasoning is perfectly useless. Secondly, without causing divorce from our conclusion, it is proved, by means of their having the form of the relation called the relation of being the object of each other, that the modification of Buddhi and Consciousness throw their reflections in each other. Thirdly, in the case of external perception, when it is established that it is modification in the form of the object that is the form of being the object of cognition, congruity requires that, in the interval also, modification into the form of those objects which appear in the interval, should also be the object of cognition. Those logicans, however, who do not desire that a cognition should be the object (of cognition), think that, since individual manifestations (*i. e*, acts) of

cognition do not have the property (Anugamaka* dharma) of being the form by which things are cognised, the use of language like "Cognition having a water-pot as its object," "Cognition having a piece of cloth as its object," etc., which proceeds from the assumption that they do possess such property, is improper.

Some other logicians, again, declare that by reason of the above impropriety or unjustifiability, it is an additional Predicable to be the object of Cognition. This view also is incorrect. Because there is redundancy in the supposition of a different objectivity (which is not perceived), leaving aside the modification into the form of the object, which is being perceived.

But still, it may be contended, let the mutual objectivity of the modification and of Consciousness consist only of the form of their respective Upâdhis or adjuncts, the Anugama or leading to the cognition of things being possible by means alone of its being of the form of the modification of their own Upâdhis or adjuncts; there is no use of having two reflections, called form of the object. The position, however, is not a tenable one. Because, without reflection, ownness (*i. e.* subjectivity) is hard to assert. For, ownness or subjectivity is the possession of the Vâsanâ or tendency or residual potency of the modification experienced by the subject itself. Experience is cognition. So that, the characteristic mark of objectivity being constituted by the substance of the object, there is involved the fallacy of Âtma-âśraya or dependence upon itself. Therefore, is proved the mutual reflection of the conscious and the unconscious, in each other, in the form of their being the object of each other. More on this point, we may give the hint, will be found in the Yoga Vârtika.

The division of the cogniser, etc., here is as follows:

The pure intelligent one is the Pramâtâ or the maker of right cognition. Pramâṇa is just the function (Vṛitti) of us. Pramâ or right cognition is the reflection in the intelligent one of the modifications in the form of the objects. Meya or the knowable is the subject matter of the reflected modifications. Sâkṣitva or the being the witness which is of the form of immediate vision, the author will himself declare. Hence, on account of the absence of the cause, the intelligent one will be merely the witness of the modifications. Of Viṣṇu, etc., the being the witness of all things, is secondary, as it lacks the characteristic mark etc. of being the witness.—87.

* The form by which takes place the apprehension of objects, the very same form, is, in the Nyâya System, the anugamaka or leader or the means of reaching those objects, Anugama or the leading or reaching is its action.

No more than the above three Proofs are required.

तत्सिद्धौ सर्वसिद्धेर्नाधिक्यासिद्धिः ॥ १ । ८८ ॥

तत्सिद्धौ Tat-siddhau, on the establishment of that, *i.e.*, the three Proofs. सर्वसिद्धेः Sarva-sidheḥ, on account of the proof of all objects. न Na, not. आधिक्यसिद्धिः Âdhikya-siddhiḥ, proof of more.

88. These three Pramâṇas being established, all can be established; hence no additional Pramâṇa is established,—88.

Vṛitti:—How many Pramâṇas are there? To this the author replies:

The Pramâṇas are Perception, Inference and Word. Should not Comparison, Presumption or Implication, Non-existence, Comprehension, and Tradition (for an account of which *vide* the Vaiśeṣika Sûtram IX. ii, 5, S. B. H. Vol. VI, pages 316-319) also be Pramâṇas? In reply to this, it is declared: "These three Pramâṇas being established etc." The admission of Pramâṇa is for the purpose of establishing the Prameya or provable. The three kinds of Pramâṇa being established, since the purpose of establishing the provables of all the Pramâṇas is served, there is, therefore, no establishment of anything as an additional, *i. e.*, separate Pramâṇa, because all these so-called additional Pramâṇas are included amongst the three kinds of Pramâṇa mentioned above. Inasmuch as the scholars include them in Perception, etc., as the case may be, according as they are based on the contact of the objects with the Senses, agreement and difference, etc., only additional differences of name have been created. Hence there is no establishment of additional Pramâṇa. —88.

Bhâṣya:—But our opponent may ask, in regard to the discrimination of Puruṣa from Prakṛiti, Comparison etc., have been given out as Pramâṇas, in such passages as,—

यथा प्रकाशयत्येकः कृत्स्नं लोकमिमं रविः ।
क्षेत्रं क्षेत्री तथा कृत्स्नं प्रकाशयति भारत ॥

As the single sun illuminates all this world, so does, O Bhârata, the Owner of the Field (Puruṣa) illumine all the Field (body).—Gîtâ, XIII. 33.

How, then can it be said that Pramâṇa is only threefold? To this the author replies.

As, the threefold Pramâṇas being established, there is the establishment of all objects whatever, more Pramâṇa is not established, as there

would then be redundancy. Such is the meaning. For this very reason Manu also has laid down the triad of Pramâṇas in—

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शास्त्रं च विषयागमम् ।
त्रयं सुविदितं कार्यं धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सता ॥

Perception, inference and Śâstra or word are the means of getting at objects. The triad should be made thoroughly known by one who intends purity of Dharma or Pious Conduct.—Manu Saṃhitâ, XII. 105.

Comparison, Tradition, etc. come under Inference and Word, and non-perception, etc., come under Perception. In the passage quoted from the Gîtâ, this Inference (which includes comparison, etc.,) is intended. The whole (Field), from the foot to the head, is to be illuminated by the one different from itself, as it is not illuminative of itself Illuminativeness is the Tejas or light common to consciousness. (The knower of the Field) of whom fullness is the Upâdhi or adjunct, is established as the regulator of the phenomena of illumination.—88.

Definition of Perception.

यत् सम्बद्धं सत् तदाकारोल्लेखि विज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ १ । ८९ ॥

यत् Yat, which. सम्बद्धं Sambaddhaṃ, connected. सत् Sat, being, *N. B.*—For, sambaddhaṃ sat, Aniruddha reads sambandha-siddhaṃ, meaning, proved, *i.e.*, produced by connection or relation. तदाकारोल्लेखि Tat-âkâra-ullekhi, portraying the form thereof, *i.e.*, of the thing cognised. विज्ञानं Vijñânaṃ, cognition. तत् Tat, that. प्रत्यक्षम् Pratyakṣam, sense-perception.

89. Perception is that cognition which, coming into relation to the thing cognised (Vijñâna Bhikṣu), or, being produced by means of relation to the thing cognised (Aniruddha), portrays the form thereof (*i.e.*, of the thing cognised) —89.

Vritti :—The author gives the particular definitions of the three Pramâṇas.

By the phrase, "That which is produced through relation," Inference and Word are excluded. "Tat-âkâra-ullekhi," that which portrays the form of (the thing cognised), *e.g.*, a water-pot. That is perception. Savikalpaka, discreet or sensuous perception also is herein included.

The Bauddhas, however, describe that perception should be nothing but nirvikalpaka, indiscreet or supersensuous cognition. But perception, they say, is kalpanâ or mental elaboration, which is free from doubt and free from error. "Kalpanâ" is the mental act, intuition, (Pratîti) consisting in the application of name, genus, etc. It is present in savikalpaka or discreet cognition

so. Hence, they argue, Perception is no Pramâṇa or Proof. But their argument is wrong. Perception is the cognition produced from the materials and conditions (sâmagrî) which cause Pramâ or right notion, obtaining direct vision of things, and not vitiated by any defect. It is both, *i.e.*, savikalpaka, discreet, and nirvikalpaka, indiscreet. The consciousness (samvit) of name, genus, etc. is, however, produced by memory by means of the revival of impressions or recepts (saṃskâra) through similarity. For this reason only, on account of the presence of an additional element in it, a special name, savikalpaka or discreet, has been created. Nor, by the presence of Memory, is any fault created, or any damage done to the materials of sensation.

Now, if it is maintained by them that, because it is accompanied by Memory, therefore, Perception is no Proof, we can only admire their argumentative skill which finds display in the proposition that a co-operative cause obstructs the validity of the principal instrument of proof. Thus,

संज्ञा हि स्मर्यमाणापि प्रत्यक्षत्वं न बाधते ।
संज्ञिनः सा तटस्था हि न रूपाच्छादनक्षमा ॥
ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जात्यादिभिर्यया ।
बुद्धावसीयते सापि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन संमता ॥

For, a name, even though it is supplied by Memory, does not oppose the authority of Perception. For, it is the accidental or secondary mark of the thing bearing the name, and is not capable of obscuring the intrinsic form of the thing. Besides this, again, that by which an entity is completed or perfected in Buddhi by means of the properties such as genus, etc., is also recognised as having the characteristic of perception.—89.

Bhâṣya :—Pramâ or right cognition is lodged in Puruṣa,—with the help of this principal conclusion, the author proceeds to state the specific definitions of the Pramâṇas.

That "cognition," *i.e.*, modification of Buddhi, which being related or connected, assumes the form of the thing with which it is connected, is perception. Such is the meaning. Here, the phrase ending with "being (sat)," is an adjective conveying the reason. So that the purport is that perception is the modification of Buddhi which is the support or seat of the (sensible) form produced from contact with its own object. As there is a future aphorism laying down that the modification of Buddhi moves to the object with which it is in relation, the being the product of contact does not belong to the modification; hence it has been taken as the seat of the form of object. While it is not impossible that the modification of Buddhi arising by means of the eye, etc., should, like the flame of the lamp, portray the form of the thing cognised immediately after the contact with the external objects—89.

The definition is not intended to apply to perception by the Yogins.

योगिनामबाह्यप्रत्यक्षत्वान्न दोषः ॥ १ । ९० ॥

योगिनाम् Yoginâm, of the Yogins or those practised in Yoga. अबाह्यप्रत्यक्षत्वात् A-bâhya-pratyakṣa-tvât, because it is not external perception. न Na, not. दोषः Doṣah, fault, defect.

90. (It is) no fault (in the definition in that it does not apply to the perception of the Yogins), because that of the Yogins is not an external perception.—90.

Vṛitti :—If it be said that this is not the definition of perception, because it does not cover the perception of the Yogins, so the author says :

The definition given above is that of ordinary (laukika, popular), external perception, whereas the perception by the Yogin is not-external and extraordinary (alaukika). Hence the fault of being too narrow is not present in the definition.—90.

Bhâṣya :—But, then, some one may object, on account of the absence of the form of the object connected or in contact, the definition does not extend to the perception by the Yogin of things past, future, and screened from view. Apprehending this, the author reconciles, by pointing out that the Yogic perception is not aimed at in this definition.

External sense-perception alone is the object of the definition here, and the Yogins do not perceive through the external senses. Hence the fault mentioned does not arise, that is, the definition is not too narrow for their perception.—90.

Or, the definition is intended to, and does, apply to the perception of the Yogins.

लीनवस्तुलब्धातिशयसम्बन्धाद्वादोषः ॥ १ ।९१ ॥

लीनवस्तुलब्धातिशयसम्बन्धात् Lîna (involute)-vastu (entity)-labdha (acquired)-atiśaya (excellence)-sambandhât, (relation), on account of contact of that (*i.e.*, the Yogin's mind) which has attained exaltation, with things enfolded in their causal state. वा Vâ, or. अदोषः A-doṣah, no fault *N. B.*—For "Adoṣah", Aniruddha reads Na-doṣah.

91. Or, (there is) no fault (in the definition), on account of the contact (of the Yogin's mind) which has attained exaltation (by the practice of Yoga), with things in their enfolded state.—91.

Vṛitti :—Or, by this definition, the perception of the Yogins also is included. The author sets forth this alternative view.

Effects remaining always existent (according to the Sâṃkhya Darśana), even that which is destroyed or has disappeared, exists enfolded in its own cause, by the characteristic of being past and gone, and that which is yet to be produced, also exists in its own cause, by the characteristic of being not-yet-come. The Yogin alone who has acquired excellence through favourable influence of the virtue born of Yoga, can have connection (*i.e.*, contact through mind) with Pradhâna (the root cause of all mundane existences), and thence, connection with all places, times, etc Hence the definition is not too narrow.—91.

Bhâṣya :—The author gives the true solution of the case.

Or, that (Yogic perception) also is the scope of the definition, still there is no fault in it, *i.e.*, it is not too narrow, inasmuch as connection of the Yogin's mind which has attained exaltation produced by the virtue born of Yoga, takes place with objects in their enfolded state. Such is the meaning.

The word, lîna, or enfolded, here denotes objects not in contact as intended by the opposite party. In the view of the sat-kârya-vâdins (the Sâṃkhyas who hold the Theory of Existent Effects), things past, etc. also verily exist in their essential forms. Contact with them is, therefore, possible. Hence the adjective, *viz.*, " that which has attained exaltation," has been used to point out the cause by means of which contact takes place with objects concealed and distant. " Atiśaya", excess or exaltation, is pervasiveness, and the surcease, etc. of the Tamas or obscurity hindering the modification (of Buddhi into the form of the object).

And, in this matter, the following should be attended to : From the statement " which being connected" in the previous (I. 89) aphorism, we have it that it is contact of Buddhi with the objects that is the cause of perception, and, consequently, that, in the case of Perception in general or commonly of all external objects, the contact of Buddhi and object is the cause. Contacts with the Senses, on the other hand, are the specific causes in the cases of visual and other perceptions. It would not, however, follow that, such being the case, perception of external objects would take place by means of Buddhi even in the absence of contact with the Senses, the virtue born of Yoga, etc. For, on account of the obstruction caused by Tamas, it is impossible that there should at that time be any modification of the Sattva element of Buddhi. And this Tamas or obscurity is removed, sometimes by the contact between the sense and the object, and sometimes by the virtue born of Yoga, in the same way that the dirtiness of the eye is removed by the eye-paint. It

cannot be said that, then, on the maxim: "Let that be the cause thereof." contact with the Senses, etc., should be the cause of the perception in general of external objects; because, in the states of dreamless sleep, etc., it is proved that Tamas does obstruct the modification or function of Buddhi. From passages of the Smriti, *e.g.*,

सत्वाज्जागरणं विद्याद्रजसः स्वप्नमादिशेत् ।
प्रस्वापनं तु तमसा तुरीयं त्रिषु सन्ततम् ॥

The waking state is, one should know, caused by Sattva; dreaming, one should refer to Rajas as its cause; dreamless sleep is caused by Tamas; the fourth state runs through the three.

it, moreover, appears to be impossible that there should be any other cause of obstruction of the modification of Buddhi in the states of dreamless sleep, etc. Besides, in the case of ocular modification also, it is found that Tamas causes obstruction. Hardened logicians, however, imagine that the cause of cognition in general is the conjunction of the skin and Manas, in order to account for the non-production of modification in the state of dreamless sleep. But this is wrong. For, it is heard that even prior to the evolution of the skin-sense, Svayam-bhû (*Causa sui*, Brahmâ) had perception of all things by the help of pure Buddhi. Besides, we intend to say that, in regard to the non-production of the conjunction of the skin and Manas also, Tamas itself is the instrumental cause. While mere reasoning (as that of the logicians) is attacked with the fault of having no secure foundation. Such is the line of our argument in reply to the above. —91.

The existence of Îśvara or a Lord is above proof.

ईश्वरासिद्धेः ॥ १ । ९२ ॥

ईश्वरासिद्धेः : Îśvara-a-siddheh, on account of non-proof of Îśvara or Lord.

92. (It is no fault in the definition of Perception that it does not extend to the perception of Îśvara), because Îśvara is not a subject of proof.—91.

Vritti: —The perception of Îśvara, some one may say, is not covered by the definition (given above.) So the author says:

If there were evidence or proof to establish (the existence of) Îśvara, then, the consideration of the perception of Him would properly arise. But no such proof exists. If it be urged that such proof does exist in the form, namely, that Earth, etc., must have a creator, because they are products, we enquire whether he be embodied or un-embodied. Either way even, agency is impossible, because in the theory of the particularists

(the upholders of special creation), effects are mere appearances. This point has been elaborately discussed elsewhere.—91.

Bhâṣya :—But still, an opponent may say, the definition does not extend to the perception of Îśvara, because, being eternal, the perception of Him is not produced through contact. To this the author replies.

On account of the absence of proof in regard to Îśvara, it is no fault, the last four words following from the 90th aphorism (as the complement of the present one). And this negation of Îśvara is, as has been already established, only in accordance with the prauḍa-vâda or proud assertion of certain partisans. For, if it were not so, the aphorism would have been worded thus: On account of the *non-existence* of Îśvara (and not, on account of the *non-existence of proof* of Îśvara, as we have it).

It is, however, desired by us that perceptual cognition does arise in regard to Îśvara. The characteristic of perception in the present case is constituted by homogeneity with what is produced through contact, and homogeneity is constituted by the jâti or class directly pervaded by the quality or characteristic of cognition. Such is the import.—92.

Why the existence of Îśvara cannot be proved by evidence.

मुक्तबद्धयोरन्यतराभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः ॥ १ । ९३ ॥

मुक्तबद्धयोः Mukta-baddhayoḥ, of the released and the confined. अन्यतराभावात् Anya-tara-abhâvât, owing to the non-existence of something different. न Na, not. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, proof thereof.

93. Proof of His existence is not possible, because He can be neither free, nor bound, nor something else.—93.

Vṛitti :—The author adduces a further reason.

Is He (Îśvara) bound or is He free? If bound, He cannot be Îśvara, owing to conjunction of Merit and Demerit. If free, He cannot be the agent or doer, on account of the absence of particular cognitions and desire to act and effort. Hence Îśvara is above proof. If, again, you say that your Îśvara is of a different description altogether, then, there being no example (*i.e.* nothing to compare with him), He would be something very extraordinary.—93.

Bhâṣya :—There is still room for the enquiry how the existence of Îśvara is not proved by the Veda and the Smṛiti. So the author points out that it is the popular conflict of arguments that is the impediment to such proof.

Is the desired Îśvara free from afflictions, or is He bound by them? (He can be neither). Nor is it possible that he should be of a different character. Hence there is no proof of Îśvara. Such is the meaning.—93.

Reasons for the above view.

उभयथाप्यसत्करत्वम् ॥ १ । ९४ ॥

उभयथा Ubhayathâ, either way. अपि Api, also. असत्करत्वम् A-sat-karatvam, incapacity to effect anything.

94. Either way also He would be inefficient.—94.

Vritti:—The author explains the very same position.

This aphorism has been already explained above—94.

Bhâṣya:—If He were free, He would be unequal to the task of creation, etc., as He would not possess the abhimâna or the will-to-be and the will-to-do, desires, etc. which instigate to creation, etc. And, again, if He were bound, He would be under delusion, and so, unequal to the task of creation: Such is the meaning.—94.

Texts which declare Îśvara, explained.

मुक्तात्मनः प्रशंसा उपासासिद्धस्य वा ॥ १ । ९५ ॥

मुक्तात्मनः Mukta-âtmanaḥ, of the free Self (Vijñâna Bhikṣu), of the released-like or *quasi*-free Self (Aniruddha). प्रशंसा Praśaṃsâ, laudation, glorification. उपासा Upâsâ, worship, homage. सिद्धस्य Siddhasya, of the perfected one. *N. B.*—Aniruddha reads Upâsâ-siddhasya as one word, meaning, accomplished by the cultivation of Yoga. वा Vâ, or.

95. (The sacred texts which speak of Îśvara, are) either glorification of the free Self or homages paid to the Perfect Ones (Vijñâna Bhikṣu), or, glorifications either of the free-like Self, or of one made perfect by Yoga.—95.

Vritti:—If this be the case, then, there would be contradiction to such texts of the Veda as,—

स हि सर्ववित् सर्वस्य कर्ता

He is verily the Knower of all, the Creator of all.

To this the author replies.

"Mukta-âtmanaḥ" means, of the Self resembling the released Self by not having attachment, etc., and not of the released (Self), as the released Self cannot have volition, agency, etc. (to which the texts refer). The texts are glorifications of such free-like Self made for the purpose of lending support to the injunctions (vidhis). "Upâsâ-siddhasya vâ": Of the Yogin who, by worship (*i.e.*, the practice of Yoga), has attained exaltation, and has acquired perfections in respect of aniṃâ or minuteness, etc., the glorification is for the purpose of making the practice of Yoga more attractive.—95.

Bhâṣya:—But, then, one may ask, what becomes of the Vedic texts which establish Îśvara? To this the author replies.

Accordingly as the case may be, some such texts of the Veda are, for the purpose of declaring the knowableness, "mukta-âtmanah," of the pure Self universal, intended in the form of glorifications to serve as incentives by means of its aiśvarya or lordliness which consists in mere proximity (to the knowing Puruṣa); while some other texts, demonstrative of creatorship, etc. preceded by volition, are intended as extolment of the (comparative) eternality, etc. of the perfected non-eternal Îśvaras, such as Brahmâ, Viṣṇu, Hara, etc. (the Lords of Creation, Preservation, and Destruction, etc.), inasmuch as they, although they possess abhimâna, etc. (and are therefore liable to perish), still possess eternality in a secondary sense (*i. e.* cyclic or æonic immortality). Such is the meaning.—95.

The superintendence of Puruṣa over Prakṛiti is through proximity.

तत्सन्निधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवत् ॥ १ । ९६ ॥

तत्सन्निधानात् Tat-sannidhânât, through proximity to that, *i. e.* Prakṛiti. अधिष्ठातृत्वं Adhiṣṭhâtṛitvam, governorship, superintendence. मणिवत् Maṇi-vat, as in the case of the gem, the loadstone.

96. The superintendence (of Îśvara or Puruṣa over Prakṛiti, etc.) is through proximity to Prakṛiti.—96.

Vṛitti:—Nor is proof of Îśvara, declares the author, from the argument that the non-intelligent cannot act without the superintendence of the intelligent.

As when a jewel containing the reflection of the body, moves, the abhimâna or self-assumption arises that the body moves, in respect of the body which does not really move; similarly "tat-sannidhânât," through the Self containing the reflection of Prakṛiti, the agency, experiencership, superintendence of Prakṛiti are attributed to, or assumed by, the Self. Therefore, it is an error to think that the intelligent Principle is the superintendent. Thus has it been declared (Gitâ, III. 27):

प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि सर्वशः ।
अहंकारविमूढात्मा कर्ताहमिति मन्यते ॥ गीता ।३।२७ ॥

While acts are everywhere being performed by Prakṛiti, by means of the Guṇas, the Self, being deluded by Ahaṃkâra, thinks "I am the doer."

Bhâṣya:—But still, our opponent, may say, the superintendence of Prakṛiti and all the rest, of which we hear in the sacred books, will not

be explained, because, in the world, we find the use of the word superintendence only in the case of transformation by means of resolution or volition, etc. To this the author replies.

If it were alleged that superintendence consists in creativeness by means of volition, then this would have been a fault in our theory. But it is, on the other hand, desired by us that superintendence in the form of creativeness, etc., is through proximity, as is the case with the loadstone. As the loadstone acts as the attracter of iron by mere proximity, and not by volition, etc., similarly, by the mere conjunction of the Original Puruṣa, takes place the modification of Prakṛiti into the form of Mahat. And it is this alone in which consists His being the creator of His own upâdhi or adjunct. And so has it been declared:

निरिच्छे संस्थिते रत्ने यथा लोहः प्रवर्तते ।
सत्तामात्रेण देवेन तथा चायं जगज्जनः ॥
अत आत्मनि कर्तृत्वमकर्तृत्वं च संस्थितम् ।
निरिच्छत्वादकर्तासौ कर्ता सन्निधिमात्रतः ॥

As the iron acts while the gem (loadstone) which is devoid of volition, stands near by; so does the world proceed under the influence of a Deva or deity who is mere existence. Thus, both agency and non-agency are lodged in the Self: being devoid of volition, it is not agent, and it is an agent through mere proximity.

Texts of the Veda, such as—

तदैक्षत बहु स्याम् ।

It looked up, "I shall be many."—Chhândyogya Upaniṣat VI ii. 3.

have, however, a secondary import, as when we say that a plum is *going* (lit., desiring) to fall down, owing to the fact that Prakṛiti has conjunction with a number of proximate attributes. Or, it may be that all such texts have the creation preceded by Buddhi as their subject, and do not refer to Original Creation, inasmuch as the Smṛiti speaks of it as being not preceded by Buddhi. Thus we find in the Kûrma Purâṇa (IV. 66):

इत्येष प्राकृतः सर्गः संक्षेपात् कथितो मया ।
अबुद्धिपूर्वकस्त्वेष ब्राह्मीं सृष्टिं निबोधत ॥ ४ । ६६ ॥

Such, then, is the Prâkṛita sarga or the creation of Prâkṛiti or Original Creation, as briefly related by me. It is not preceded by Buddhi. Now listen to the creation of Brahmâ,

It would be redundant to restrict the meaning of this passage by interpreting "abuddhi-pûrvaka" as meaning not produced by the Buddhi of the Âdi Puruṣa or Original Puruṣa.—96.

The Jîvas or Embodied Puruṣas also are agents only through proximity.

विशेषकार्येष्वपि जीवानाम् ॥ १ । ९७ ॥

विशेषकार्येषु Viśeṣa (Particular)-kâryeṣu, in particular or subsidiary effects. अपि pi, also. जीवानाम् Jîvânâm, of the Jîvâs or Embodied Selves.

97. (The superintendence) of the Jîvas, in the case of particular effects also, is through Proximity.—97.

Vṛitti:—If no intelligent superintendence were required, then a dead body would show the act of eating, etc. To this the author replies.

Buddhi, etc. (the Sûkṣma or subtle body), associated with Vâyu or Prâṇa, make up the Jîva, and not that the Âtmâ or Self is the Jîva. In particular acts, such as, for example, of eating, etc., the agency is of the Jîvas alone, and not of Âtmā, because Âtmâ does not undergo transformation.—97.

Bhâṣya:—Not only in creation, etc. alone there is creativeness of Puruṣa by mere proximity, but in other, *i.e.*, all sorts of particular effects, namely, the Elements, etc., the creation of which is preceded by volition, etc., there is a similar agency of all Puruṣas. This the author declares.

(The words) Superintendence through proximity (which form the complement of the aphorism) follow (from the preceding aphorism).

In the Sixth Book, the author will declare the denotation of the term, Jîva, to be that which is marked out by the possession of the Antaḥ-karaṇa or the internal instrument of cognition. (Vide VI. 63).

The aphorism, therefore, means that "Viśeṣa,-kârye," in regard to particular effect called Visarga or specific creation, *i.e.*, the creation of individual (Vyaṣṭi) things, also, "Jîvânâm," of the Intelligences reflected in the Antaḥ-karaṇa, the superintendence is through proximity alone, and and is not by means of any activity whatever on their part, inasmuch as they are of the form of the Immutable (Kûṭastha) Consciousness itself.—97.

The Great Saying of the Vedanta: "*Thou art That,*" *is not useless.*

सिद्धरूपबोद्धृत्वाद्वाक्यार्थोपदेशः ॥ १ । ९८ ॥

सिद्धरूपबोद्धृत्वात्, Siddha-rûpa-boddhṛitvât, because Brahmâ, etc. (Vijñâna Bhikṣu), or Puruṣa, through Mahat, (Aniruddha), knows the true forms of Realities, वाक्यार्थोपदेशः Vâkya-artha-upadeśaḥ, lesson conveyed by the Great Saying; the teaching of the Veda about knowledge.

98. The teachings of the Veda about cultivation of knowledge are not invalid, because they declare the true forms of the Realities.—98.

Vritti :—If knowledge does not exist in the Self, why, then, it may be asked, is instruction given for the cultivation of knowledge? To this the author replies.

The word "Antaḥ,-karaṇasya," of the Antaḥ-Karaṇa, appearing in the following aphorism, should be added on to this aphorism.

The meaning thereby is this: "Siddha-rûpa-boddhṛitvât," because the Antaḥ-Karaṇa Mahat is the knower of the true form of Reality, therefore, instructions have been given for learning the meaning of the sayings of the Veda. And because Puruṣa is reflected in the Mahat, the transference (Abhimâna) of the characteristic of being the knower takes place in him.—98.

Bhâṣya :—But, then, one may say, if an Eternal, Omniscient Îśvara did not exist, then the teaching of Discrimination which is the meaning of the Great Saying of the Vedânta, would become unauthoritative, through the apprehension of its coming down as a blind tradition. To this the author replies.

The teaching of the meaning of the Sayings of the Veda is authoritative, (and this is the complement of the aphorism), because Brahmâ, etc. are the knowers of the true forms, *i.e.*, of objects as they are; and because their authority is established beyond doubt by the authoritativeness of the Âyurveda or the Science of Life, etc., of which they are the speakers.—98.

Actual superintendence belongs to the Antaḥ-Karaṇa.

अन्तःकरणस्य तदुज्ज्वलितत्वाल्लोहवदधिष्ठातृत्वम् ॥ १ । ९९ ॥

अन्तःकरणस्य, Antaḥ-karaṇasya, of the Antaḥ-karaṇa, तदुज्ज्वलितत्वात् Tat-ujjvalitatvât, because it is lighted up by him. अधिष्ठातृत्वम् Adhiṣṭhâtṛitvam, superintendence. लोहवत् Loha-vat, as is the case with the iron.

99. (Actual) superintendence is of the Antaḥ-karaṇa, because it is lighted up by Puruṣa, as is the case with the iron.—99.

Vritti.—The author makes the very same point clear.

Superintendence belongs to the Antaḥ-karaṇa, because the apparent transference (Abhimâna) of the characteristic of being intelligent

kes place in it as it is lighted up by the intelligence of Puruṣa through he incidence of his shadow in Buddhi. "Lohavat": As the iron hich attracts, though it is inactive, still attracts through mere proxiity.—99.

Bhâṣya :—But, if the superintendence of Puruṣa, by mere proximity, s in a secondary sense of the term, then, it may be asked, to what does the rimary superintendence belong? The author removes this curiosity.

Unimputed (actual) superintendence by the way of volition, etc., should be held to belong to the Antaḥ-karaṇa.

But, if it be said that superintendence cannot properly belong to unintelligent things like a water-pot, etc., so he says: "Loha-vat tat-ujjvlitatvât:" For the Antaḥ-karaṇa is lighted up with the light of intelligence, as is the iron with fire. Hence, inasmuch as it is, in a manner, invested with intelligence, its superintendence, which, for the reason given, cannot be present in a water-pot, etc., is justified. Such is the meaning. But, if this be so, then, it may be objected, in the lightening up of the Antaḥ-karaṇa by Consciousness, the intelligent Principle would be associated with the Antaḥ-karaṇa, (which is not desired by the Sâṃkhyas), in the very same way as fire, in lightening up of the iron, becomes associated with it. This, however, is not the case, we reply. For, the illumination of the Antaḥ-karaṇa consists merely in a particular conjunction with Consciousness which is eternally shining, that is, in nothing but the reflection of Consciousness produced through a particular conjunction. And not that Consciousness passes into the Antaḥ-karaṇa, whereby associatedness would be the result. The light, etc., of the fire also do not pass into the iron. But it is only a particular conjunction with the fire that is the lightening up of the iron.

It cannot be said that even then Puruṣa would be transformable through conjunction; for, we speak of transformation only when properties in addition to the general attributes are produced.

And the particular conjunction mentioned above takes place through the transformation of the Antaḥ-karaṇa alone in the form of the predominance of the Sattva element present in it. This hypothesis is made for the explanation of actual facts, namely, a peculiarity in the conjunction of which it is impossible that Puruṣa should be the instrumental (nimitta) cause, inasmuch as he does not undergo transformation.

And this same particular conjunction is the cause of the mutual reflection of Buddhi and Âtmâ in each other.

But when a particular conjunction is required as the cause of reflection, our opponent may say, the reflection theory, then, is useless, for the results obtained through reflection, *e. g.*, cognition of objects, etc., can be had from the particular conjunction alone. We reply that such is not the case. The supposition of the reflection of Consciousness in Buddhi has been made for the purpose of seeing Consciousness, in the same manner as is seen the reflection of the face in the mirror. Otherwise, on account of the contradiction of the subject and the object (*i. e.*, that one and the same thing cannot be both subject and object at the same time), it would not be possible for consciousness to have immediate vision of itself.

And it is this reflection of Conscousness in Buddhi that is also called Chit-chhâyâ-âpatti or the falling of the shadow of Consciousness, Chaitanya-adhyâsa or the super-addition or super-imposition of Consciousness, and Chit-âvesa or the possession by Consciousness.

And that which is called the reflection of Buddhi in Consciousness, the same is desired for the manifestation of Buddhi together with the objects that have ascended to it. For, inasmuch as it is found that, in the case of Buddhi, the apprehension of objects takes place only by means of Buddhi assuming the forms of the objects, it is not reasonable to hold that, without the help of this, the manifestation of objects can appear in Puruṣa, by a mere particular conjunction. Moreover, the phrase, apprehension of objects, literally means assumption of the forms of the objects. And such transformation in the form of the objects is not possible in the case of Puruṣa. The meaning of the phrase, form of the object, therefore, comes to be the form of the object in the form of reflection. Such is the line of our argument.

And this theory of mutual reflection has been conclusively established by the revered Vyâsa in his Commentary on Yoga in the passage beginning with—

चितिशक्तिरपरिणामिन्यप्रतिसंक्रमा च परिणामिन्यर्थे प्रतिसंक्रान्तेव तद्वृत्तिमनुपतति। तस्याश्चाप्राप्तचैतन्योपग्रहरूपाया बुद्धिवृत्तेरनुकारिमात्रतया बुद्धिवृत्त्यविशिष्टा हि ज्ञानवृत्तिरित्याख्यायते ॥

The power of Consciousness which is unchangeable and does not pass into the objects, imitates the modifications of changeful objects, as if it had passed into them. And because the modification of Buddhi which is endowed with the form of the influence of Consciousness, is mere imitation, so it is said that the modifications of Jñâna or cognition or consciousness are those that are not qualified by the modifications of Buddhi.—*Vide* Yoga Sûtram, II. 20, IV. 22. S. B. H. Vol. IV. pp. 134 and 299.

In the Yoga Vârtika also this point has been elaborately made out by us.

Some one, however, thinks that Buddhi alone is the knower of all objects by means of the shadow of Consciousness reflected in it, inasmuch as it is perceived that cognition has the same substratum or place of inherence with desire etc., and, secondly, it is not reasonable that one should be moved to action by the cognition of another. But this view should be disregarded, as it is based on the assumption of the absence of cognition from Âtmâ. For, did the characteristic of being the knower belong to Buddhi alone, there would be contradiction of the two future aphorisms (I. 10 and I. 143), which declare that experience ends with discrimination and that the experiencer is Puruṣa; and there would also be an absence of proof of the existence of Puruṣa, on account of the inferential mark of Puruṣa, namely, experience, being taken as belonging to Buddhi alone.

Nor can it be said that, there being no other explanation of the reflection, Puruṣa will be proved to be the thing of which it is the reflection; because the argument involves the vicious circle: the proof of the consciousness lying in Buddhi as a reflection is dependent on the proof of a separate thing reflected, and, on the proof of it as a reflection, depends the proof of the thing reflected by way of the counter-opposite thereof. In our theory, on the other hand, when, after the proof of Puruṣa as the knower, we prove the reflection of him in Buddhi on the ground that his being knowable is not otherwise explainable, there is no such argument in a circle.

Now, if it be said that a conscious entity of the form of a thing reflected is proved by means of the characteristic of being the witness of the modifications of Buddhi; we reply that this is not proved, since, in that case, the witness itself should properly be the knower also, as the supposition of two knowers would be redundant, and, secondly, as we perceive that the cognition of the modification of Buddhi in the form of the water-pot and the cognition of the water-pot reside in one and the same substratum. Moreover, if this were the case, then, Buddhi itself being the experiencer, the proof of Puruṣa as the experiencer, by the subsequent aphorism (I. 143.): "Through experiencership," would be contradicted.

Now, if the import of the above proposition is described to be only this that cognition of a thing reflected takes place only through the relation in the form of the falling of shadow of the Consciousness in Buddhi, and not that the reflection of Buddhi is traced out in Consciousness; we reply that this view too is wrong. For it is not observed that the sun, etc., by the relation of the form of casting their own reflections, become the illuminators of the water, etc., as well as of

the things (reflection) lying in them. It is by the rays of the sun, etc. that both of them are illuminated. In the case of mirage in the desert, and other optical illusions, reflection of light has been verily found to be illuminative of the water, etc. super-imposed upon it. Pursuant to this observation, we have made the theory that it is the reflection of Buddhi in consciousness that is the relation which is the cause of the manifestation of all objects.

And, next, the statement that one is not moved to action by the cognition of another,—that also is wrong, *i. e.*, not a fact, inasmuch as it will be established by means of an illustration that cognition and activity may lie in different substrata, by the future aphorism (I. 105): Even who is not the agent, may be the enjoyer or experiencer of the fruit, as in the case of rice, etc. For, as Buddhi regulates the action of the body by means of resolution, so, here too, particular conjunctions, etc., alone regulate the relation of the sower and the reaper.—99.

Definition of Inference.

प्रतिबन्धदृशः प्रतिबद्धज्ञानमनुमानम् ॥ १ । १०० ॥

प्रतिबन्धदृशः Pratibandha-drisah, of one who sees the invariable accompaniment. प्रतिबद्धज्ञानम् Pratibaddha-jñânam, knowledge of the accompanied. अनुमानम् Anumânam, an inference.

100. An Inference is the knowledge of the accompanied by one who sees the accompaniment.—100.

Vritti :—The author states the definition of Inference.

Inference is the knowledge of the pervader (vyâpaka, the major term), following the knowledge of the pervaded (vyâpya, the middle term), on the part of one who sees the relation of a-vinâ-bhâva or of one not being without the other. Hereby all forms of Inference, Anvayi or by agreement, Vyatireki or by difference, Anvaya-vyatireki or by agreement and difference, Pûrva-vat or from cause to effect, Śeṣa-vat or from effect to cause, and Sâmânyato dṛiṣṭam or from the general to the general, are included. The inferential marks mentioned by the logicians are also included herein. Thus say they :

अनुमेयेन सम्बद्धं प्रसिद्धं च तदन्विते ।
तदभावे च नास्त्येव तल्लिंगमनुमापकम् ॥

A mark of inference is that which is connected with that which is to be inferred, is well-known in what is attended with it, and which is absent where it is absent.—100.

Bhâṣya :—Having defined the Proof called Perception, the author defines Inference.

"Pratibandha" means pervasion (vyâpti or invariable accompaniment of one thing, *e. g.*, fire, by another thing, *e. g.*, smoke). The knowledge of the pervader (vyâpaka) or what is so accompanied, which results from seeing the pervasion, is the Proof called Inference. Such is the meaning. While anumiti or the result of inference, *i. e.*, the knowledge produced by inference, is knowledge belonging to Puruṣa.—100.

Definition of Word or Verbal Testimony.

आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः ॥ १ । १०१ ॥

आप्तोपदेशः: Âpta-upadeśaḥ, appropriate (Vijñâna Bhikṣu) or received (Aniruddha) declaration. शब्दः: Śabdaḥ, Word or Testimony.

101. Word is an appropriate or received declaration.—101.

Vritti :—The author defines Word.

The received, *i. e.*, revealed, declaration is Word, and not one made by an âpta or trustworthy person, because the Veda is a-pauruṣeya or not composed by a Puruṣa. That the Veda is not the work of any Puruṣa, we shall establish in the Fifth Book in the aphorism (V. 46) which declares that it is not the work of any Puruṣa.

The word, śabda, in the aphorism, declares the cause or instrument of verbal cognition, while the result obtained from the use of the instrument, namely, cognition produced by Word as a Proof, is also called Śabda, through the transference of the nature of the cause to the effect.

The sayings of Buddha, etc., are mere appearances of truth, because, on account of their contradiction to the Veda, they are not supported by any authority.—101.

Bhâṣya :—The author defines the Proof called Word.

"Âpti" here means fitness, competence, intrinsic worth, inasmuch as it will be declared in the Fifth Book that the Veda is not the work of any Puruṣa. Thus, then, Word is that which possesses intrinsic worth, and cognition produced by it, called Word, is the Proof. And the result of this Proof is verbal knowledge belonging to Puruṣa.—101.

The object of setting forth the Proofs in this Śâstra.

उभयसिद्धिः प्रमाणात् तदुपदेशः ॥ १ । १०२ ॥

उभयसिद्धिः: Ubhaya-siddhiḥ, establishment of both, *i. e.*, the Self and the Not-Self. प्रमाणात् Pramâṇât, from Proof. तदुपदेशः: Tat-upadeśaḥ, declaration thereof.

102. The establishment of both (Puruṣa and Prakṛiti) is from Proof; (hence) the declaration thereof.—102.

Vritti:—The beginning of this Śâstra is for the purpose of discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. And there is no Proof to establish them. Apprehending such an objection, the author declares.

"Siddhi," knowledge, of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, is through the Proof presently to be mentioned (*vide* next aphorism). Therefore, instruction for the purpose of Discrimination is justified.—102.

Bhâṣya:—The author himself declares the object of establishing the above Proofs.

The establishment of both, *i. e.*, the Self and the Not-Self, by way of discrimination from each other, follows from Proof alone. Hence, declaration, for the purpose of instruction, has been made thereof, *i. e.*, of Proof. Such is the meaning.—102.

Proof of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti is by Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa Inference.

सामान्यतो दृष्टादुभयसिद्धिः ॥ १ । १०३ ॥

सामान्यतोदृष्टात् Sâmânyato dṛiṣṭât, from the inference called as such. उभयसिद्धिः Ubhaya-siddhiḥ, proof of both.

103. Proof of both (Puruṣa and Prakṛiti) is from the inference called Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa.—103.

Vritti:—What, then, is that Proof from which knowledge of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti is obtained? To this the author replies.

Prakṛiti being not an object of Perception, knowledge of Prakṛiti is obtained, in a general way (sâmânyena), as follows: That which is an effect, is preceded by the attributes of its cause; every effect in nature is essentially of the form of the three Guṇas; hence, something constituted by the three Guṇas, exists; and that is Prakṛiti.

Âtmâ or the Self also not being an object of Perception, it is proved as a different entity, not formed by combination of parts, by means of the argument that what is a structure of manifold parts (that is, Prakṛiti) must be for the sake of another. The author also will declare later on (I. 140): (Puruṣa is proved) from the fact that a combination of parts must exist for the benefit of another.—103.

Bhâṣya:—The author describes the particular form of inference by which, as Proof, amongst those mentioned above, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti should be established by being discriminated from each other.

All inference is of three kinds: Pûrva-vat, Śeṣa-vat, and Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa. Amongst these, Pûrva-vat is that which infers an object belonging to the class of objects perceived; as, *e. g.*, the inference

of fire by means of smoke, for, objects of the class of fire have been before perceived in the kitchen room and other places.

Śeṣa-vat is inference by the method of difference. "Śeṣa-vat" means that which has śeṣa or an object not known before as its subject matter (i. e., residual). In other words, it is inference in which the object to be inferred (sâdhya) does not belong to the class of any known objects. *E. g.* the inference of the difference of Earth from all other things by means of Earth-ness. For, the difference of Earth from all other things was not established before.

And Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa is inference which is neither Pûrva-vat nor Śeṣa-vat. It is where from the apprehension of the vyâpti or pervasion (or the general proposition which forms the major premise), by generalization (sâmânyataḥ) from the cases of object belonging to perceptible classes, etc., an object of a different class, *i.e.*, an imperceptible object, etc., is established by the force of the mark of inference being a property of the subject of the inference. *E.g.*, the inference of an instrument of cognition in the case of knowledge of form, etc, by means of its being an act. For here, after apprehending the vyâpti or invariable accompaniment of an act and its instrument, by taking into consideration, or by generalization from, the axe, etc., which belong to the class of Earthy objects, etc., as instruments of the acts effected by them, an object of a different kind from Earthy objects, etc., *i e.*, an imperceptible object, namely, Indriya or the Sense, is established as the instrument of knowledge of form, etc.

Amongst these kinds of inference, from the Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa inference is the proof of both Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. Such is the meaning.

Of these two (Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), the Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa inference is of Prakriti; *e.g.*, the Principle Mahat must have for its material cause a substance possessing the properties of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, for, while it is an effect, it possesses the properties of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, as is the case with the ear-ring, etc., made of gold, etc.

In the case of Puruṣa, on the other hand, although there is no need of inference to prove his existence, his existence being admitted on all hands, still, in the matter of his discrimination from Prakṛiti, etc., it is the Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa inference that is required. The inference is made thus: Pradhâna exists for the benefit of another, because it acts by combination of parts, as is the case with a house, etc. For, here, after apprehending the fact which is proved by Perception, namely, that a house, etc. exist for the benefit of the body etc., inference is made of Puruṣa who belongs to a class different from the class to which body, etc., belong, as one other than

Prakṛiti etc., for the benefit of whom the latter exists. Body, etc., were before taken to be the experiencer in consequence of Non-dicrimination. For this reason has it been said: "Proof of both."—103.

The end of Bhoga or experience is in Consciousness.

चिदवसानो भोगः ॥ १ । १०४ ॥

चिदवसान:—Chit-avasânaḥ, of which the end or completion, or cessation is in Consciousness. भोग: Bhogaḥ, experience of the joys and sorrows of the world (Aniruddha), attainment called Pramâ or Right Cognition (Vijñána Bhikṣu.)

104. Bhoga ends in Consciousness.—104.

Vṛitti:—Prakṛiti being eternal and by nature active, perpetual Bhoga or experience, one may say, will be the result, and, consequently, there will be no Release. To this the author replies.

"Chit" means Âtmâ. Bhoga ends with the discrimination of that. As antecedent non-existence, although it is from eternity, disappears, so does eternal Prakṛiti continue to procreate till discriminative knowledge arises.

If it be said that such is the case in regard to non-existence and not in regard to existence; we reply, no. Here the characteristic of Non-existence is not instrumental, inasmuch as it is not so observed in the case of consequent non-existence.

Now, if it is asserted that theories should be in accordance with observation, we say that this is so even in the present case.—104.

Bhâṣya:—Attainment (siddhi) called Pramâ or Right Cognition, has been declared to be the result of Proof. This, one may think, will entail the transformation of Puruṣa. To remove this apprehension the author declares the true nature (svarûpa) of that attainment.

("Chit-avasânaḥ" means) that of which the action is completed in consciousness which is the svarûpa or essential form of Puruṣa. Of this description is "Bhoga" or siddhi or perfection or attainment. Such is the meaning.

The word "chit-avasânaḥ" has been used to exclude Bhoga from Buddhi; the term "avasâna" for removing the apprehension that transformability, possession of properties, etc., may belong to Consciousness. Bhoga being reduced into its true form in Consciousness, there is no harm caused to the immutability, etc., of Puruṣa Such is the idea.

Thus, Puruṣa, Prakṛiti, and other provables, having risen into the modification of Buddhi called Proof, shine in Puruṣa, being reflected there along with the modification. Hence it is only Consciousness in itself,

determined in finite forms by the reflection of the modifications of Buddhi which is coloured by objects from the outside, that is what is called bhâna, illumination or manifestation of objects, the experience of Puruṣa and the fruit or result of Proof. And thence follows that the modifications are instruments, because they, by the form of reflection, serve as gateways through which connection with objects takes place. Accordingly it has been declared in the Viṣṇu Purâṇa:

गृहीतानिन्द्रियैरर्थानात्मने यः प्रयच्छति ।
अन्तःकरणरूपाय तस्मै विश्वात्मने नमः ॥

He who makes over the objects, taken in by the Senses, to the indwelling Self, I bow down to that Universal Self in the form of the Antaḥ-karaṇa.—Viṣṇu Purâṇa, I. xiv. 35.

For it is found that the instruments or agents of a king make over all enjoyables to their master.

The word "Bhoga" means eating, in other words, appropriation to oneself. It applies commonly to all things beginning with the body and ending with the Conscious One. There is, however, this difference. On account of his not being transformable, the experience of objects by Puruṣa means merely the reception of the reflections of objects; while, through their being transformable, growth, etc., takes place in the case of the rest.

And it is this absolute or primary (pâramârthika) bhoga in the form of transformation, that is denied in Puruṣa by the śloka:

बुद्धेर्भोग ईवात्मनि ॥

Like the experience of Buddhi transferred to the Self, etc.—Śiśupala-Vadham, II. 59.

In this aphorism it is proved that the fruit or consequence pervades or affects Puruṣa also, inasmuch as it is only of the ending in Consciousness that the being the proof of both is declared —104.

He who does not act, may still enjoy the fruit.

अकर्तुरपि फलोपभोग · अन्नाद्यवत् ॥ १ । १०५ ॥

अकर्तुः: Akartuḥ, non-agent's. अपि Api, even, also. फलोपभोगः Phala-upabhogaḥ, enjoyment of fruits, experience of consequences. अन्नाद्यवत् Anna-âdya-vat, as in the case of food, etc.

105. Experience of consequences may belong even to him who is not the agent, as in the case of food, etc.—105.

Vṛitti.—If Pradhâna be, as you say, the agent, and Puruṣa the experiencer, then, the result would be that another would be the experiencer of the fruits of the acts done by a different one. To this objection the author replies.

As the cook is the agent in the preparation of food, etc., and his master is the experiencer of the fruits of his action, so is the case here also. If it be said that the master also is an agent (*Cf.* the final cause of Aristotle), because the food is intended for him, we reply that even so is the production of Prakṛiti also intended for the Self.—105.

Bhâṣya:—But, our opponent may say, in the world, the agent alone is observed to experience the fruits of acts, *e.g.*, the experience of the Pleasure and Pain arising from movement is of him alone who moves. How is it, then, asks he, that the experience of the fruits, that is, the properties produced by Buddhi, namely the pleasurable, painful and deluding modifications of Buddhi coloured with the reflections of objects, takes place in Puruṣa? Such being the apprehension in his mind, the author declares.

Experience of the fruit of the action of Buddhi, namely the modification of Buddhi, by Puruṣa, although he is not the agent, is reasonable or possible. "Anna-âdya-vat," as the enjoyment of the food, etc., prepared by others, belongs to the King, similarly. Such is the meaning.

Having admitted that Pleasure, Pain, etc., are the fruits of action, it is declared that Puruṣa experiences the fruits of action inhering in Buddhi.—105.

The notion that Puruṣa is the experiencer, is due to A-viveka.

अविवेकाद्वा तत्सिद्धेः कर्तुः फलावगमः ॥ १ । १०६ ॥

अविवेकात् A-vivekât, through non-discrimination. वा Vâ, or. तत्सिद्धेः Tat-siddheḥ, from proof thereof, *i. e.*, of the notion of experiencership. कर्तुः Kartuḥ, of the agent. फलावगमः Phala-avagamaḥ, knowledge of fruit.

106. Or, the declaration made in the Śâstras that fruit belongs to the agent, is due to the non-discrimination of the production called experience. (Vijñâna Bhikṣu.) Or, the notion of experiencership in Puruṣa being derived from non-discrimination, it is known that fruit belongs to the agent. (Aniruddha.)—106.

Vṛitti.—Having stated the popular or practical conclusion, the author declares his own conclusion.

Neither is Puruṣa the agent nor the experiencer, but the abhimâna or assumption of experiencership arises in him through his being reflected in the Mahat Principle. "A-vivekât vâ": through non-apprehension of

the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. "Tat-sidheḥ" there being proof of the abhimâna on the part of the pseudo-agent that he is the experiencer of the fruit.—106.

Bhâṣya.—Now, admitting that it is only the experience belonging to Puruṣa that is the fruit of action, the author declares the principal conclusion that it is in Puruṣa himself that the fruit is produced by the action of Buddhi.

Or, it may be, that the fruit does not really accrue to the agent, inasmuch as, by such desires as "May I experience Pleasure", etc., it is indicated that it is experience alone that is the fruit of action. Hence it follows that the fruit is what inheres in the experiencer, and nothing else. On the other hand, the information that the fruit accrues to the agent, given in the Śâstras, in such passages as,

शास्त्रविहितं फलमनुष्ठातरि

The fruit laid down in the Śâstra accrues to the performer.

is due to non-discrimination, in the idea of the agent, "tat-siddheḥ," of the production called experience inhering in the non-agent. Such is the meaning. For, the popular belief is: "I who act, the very same I do experience".

And the prayer that there is, namely, "May Pleasure result unto me", etc., the same can be accounted for only as the means of securing the fruit, like the prayer, "May a son be born unto me". Bhoga or experience, on the other hand, is not the means of securing anything else. Hence it follows that it (experience) alone is the fruit. Such is the principal conclusion.

Although Bhoga is the svarûpa or very form of Puruṣa, still, according to the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, it should be understood that it is as much an effect as the ear, because they hold that it is nothing but consciousness determined or conditioned by Pleasure, etc, that constitutes Bhoga. In this theory, if Bhoga is admitted to be the fruit, then, it should be further understood that it is nothing but the non-existence of the experience of Pain that constitutes Apavarga, the Grand Fulfilment or Release. Or, let the non-existence of Pleasure and Pain alone be the fruit by means of the relation of ownership, in the form of the capability of being experienced, seeing that by means of that relation, Pleasure, etc., also, like Pain, etc., may possess the characteristic of being inherent in Puruṣa.—106.

Fruit of knowledge is absence of Pleasure and Pain.

नोभयञ्च तत्त्वाख्याने ॥ १ । १०७ ॥

न Na, not. उभयं Ubhayaṃ, both, Pleasure and Pain. च Cha, and. तत्त्वाख्याने Tattva-âkhyâne, on the manifestation of the Tattva or Principle.

107. And when the Tattva is made known, there is neither agency nor experiencership (Aniruddha), or, neither Pleasure nor Pain (Vijñâna Bhikṣu).—107.

Vṛitti.—The author declares the result of the absence of A-viveka.

The Tattva or Principle, *i. e.*, Puruṣa, being known, through Viveka or discrimination, "na ubhayam", (the wrong notion of) neither agency nor experiencership (exists).—107.

Bhâṣya.—Thus, having in the above manner established the Pramâṇas or proofs and the knowledge or proof of the Prameyas or Provables, which constitutes the fruit or result of Pramâṇa, the author declares also the fruit of the knowledge of the Provables.

"Tattva-âkhyâne": On the immediate vision of the truth about Puruṣa and Prakṛiti by means of Pramâṇa (*i. e.* Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa Inference), "ubhayaṃ," Pleasure and Pain, also do not arise again, as established by reasoning and the Veda, *e. g.*,

विद्वान् हर्षशोकौ जहाति

He who knows, escapes joy and grief.—Kaṭha Upaniṣat, II. 12.

Such is the meaning.—107.

Mere non-perception cannot prove non-existence, as it is due to other well-known causes.

विषयोऽविषयोप्यतिदूरादेर्हानोपादानाभ्यामिन्द्रियस्य ॥१ । १०८॥

विषयः Viṣayaḥ, an object of perception. अविषयः a-viṣayaḥ, no object of perception. अपि Api, even. अतिदूरादेः Ati dûra-âdeḥ, on account of long distance, and other causes. हानोपादानाभ्याम् Hâna-upâdânâbhyâm, through incapacity or capacity, through impairment or application. इन्द्रियस्य Indriyasya, of the Indriya or Sense.

108. What is an object of perception (at one time) may be (at another time) not an object of perception, because (there are conditions, such as) a great distance etc., which cause impairment or application, (as the case may be), of the Senses.—108.

Vritti.—Having stated the Pramâṇas, the author states the distribution of the Prameyas or the Provables.

A thing is "viṣaya" or an object perceptible, through "upâdâna" or connection, of the Sense. It is "a-viṣaya" or not an object perceptible, through "hâna" or absence of connection, of the Sense. And non-connection is due to unfitness for conjunction of objects lying at a long distance, etc.: *e. g.*, on account of extreme distance, a bird flying far away in the sky is not perceived; on account of extreme proximity, the collyrium applied to the eye is not perceived; on account of intervention of another thing, a thing placed inside a wall is not perceived; on account of mental distraction, a person afflicted with grief, etc., does not perceive the thing that lies at his side; on account of its extreme fineness, an Atom is not perceived; on account of suppression or overpowering, *e. g.*, by the sound of a drum, the sound produced from a conch shell is not perceived; and so on.—108.

Bhâṣya.—Puruṣa and Prakṛiti have been established by inference, briefly showing their discrimination from each other. There are minor differences in the manner of the inference of the two, *viz.*, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. These minor differences are the subject matter of discussion from this place upto the end of the Book. Amongst them, at the beginning of the discussion, the author removes the impediments which cause non-cognition in the case of the inferences of Prakṛiti, etc.

The Châr̥vâkas (lit. Sweet-sayers) or Sensationalists cannot prove, by means of perception, the non-existence of Prakṛiti etc., like the non-existence of a waterpot etc., from the mere fact of their not being apprehensible by the Senses; inasmuch as even an existent object may be an object, or may not be an object, of the Senses, according to difference of time, on account of the impairment and application of the Senses, in consequence of the fault of its lying at a great distance, etc. Such is the meaning. Where all the materials or causes of the sense-perception of an entity exist, the cause of perception of the non-existence thereof, is nothing but failure of the Senses to reach that object. In regard to the sense-apprehension of Prakṛiti, however, full attention to all the causes of such apprehension cannot be possible, owing to the presence of the counter-agents presently to be mentioned. Such is the import.

The faults, *viz.*, extreme distance, etc., have been specifically enumerated by the Kârikâ:

अतिदूरात् सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।
सौक्ष्म्याद्व्यवधानादभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥

(Non-apprehension of objects by the Senses arises) from extreme distance, extreme nearness, impairment of the Senses, non-presence of the mind, extreme fineness, intervention, suppression by others, and combination with likes.—Sâṃkhya Kârikâ of Îśvara Kṛiṣṇa, Verse VII.

"Samânâbhihâra" or combination with likes, in the above, means association with things of the same class; *e. g.*, through mixing the cow's milk with the milk of the buffalo, arises non-apprehension of the buffalo's milk as such.—108.

Non-apprehension of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti by the Senses is due to their extreme fineness.

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ १ । १०९ ॥

सौक्ष्म्यात् Sauksmyât, from subtlety. तदनुपलब्धिः Tat-anupalabdhiḥ, non-perception thereof, *i. e.*, of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti.

109. Non-perception of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti is due to their extreme subtlety.—109.

Vṛitti.—If it be asked, whence does arise the non-perception of Parkṛiti? So the author says.

"Subtlety" means difficulty of investigation, and not that Prakṛiti is of the size of an Atom, because Prakṛiti is all-pervasive or universal.—109.

Bhâṣya.—But, it may be asked, which of the faults mentioned above, *viz.*, extreme distance, etc., causes obstruction to the perception of Prakṛiti, etc.? To this the author replies.

The non-perception thereof, *i. e.*, of the two mentioned above, *viz.*, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, is, however, due to their subtlety. Such is the meaning.

"Subtlety" here does not denote atom-ness, because they pervade the whole universe; nor does it signify difficulty of investigation and the like, because it can be hardly predicated of them in that sense. But it denotes a class or general attribute which opposes the right cognition of them by means of Perception. The right notion about Puruṣa, Parkṛiti, etc., that is, however, derived, (in special cases), from Perception, is due to the excitation caused by the virtue born of Yoga. And the limitation thus put on the general attribute is not faulty. Or, it may be that subtlety here denotes only the characteristic of being partless substances.. And the virtue born of Yoga is the excitant to their perception.—109.

Proof of the subtlety of Prakriti, etc.,

कार्यदर्शनात्तदुपलब्धेः ॥ १ । ११० ॥

कार्यदर्शनात् Kârya-darśanât, from seeing the effect. तदुपलब्धेः Tat-upalabdheḥ, there being apprehension thereof, *i.e.*, of subtlety (Vijñâna Bhikṣu) or of Prakṛiti, etc., (Aniruddha).

110. Because the apprehension thereof arises from seeing the effect.—110.

Vṛitti.—How, then, it may be asked, is the existence of Prakṛiti established? To this the author replies.

As the knowledge of (the existence of) the Ultimate Atoms is derived from seeing the water pot (which is their product), similarly is derived the knowledge of the existence of Prakṛiti from seeing the products of the three Guṇas.—110.

Bhâṣya.—But, it may be asked, when their non-apprehension is quite likely to be due to their non-existence, what for is the supposition of subtlety made? Otherwise, again, why would not the non-apprehension of the horns of a hare, etc., be referred to subtlety as its cause? To this the author replies.

The existence of Prakṛiti, etc., having been already established by means of the fact that the effects which we observe in the world, cannot be explained otherwise than as produced from them, the supposition of their subtlety is made in order to account for their non-perception. And, prior to their inference, their non-existence cannot be ascertained, there being room for the doubt whether their non-perception may not be due to their subtlety, etc. Hence the inference is justified. Such is the meaning.—110.

Objection: Conflict of opinions is a bar to the existence of Prakṛiti.

वादिविप्रतिपत्तेस्तदसिद्धिरिति चेत् ॥ १ । १११ ॥

वादिविप्रतिपत्तेः Vâdi-vipratipatteḥ, on account of the contradictory views of thinkers of different schools. तदसिद्धिः Tat-asiddhiḥ, non-proof thereof, *i. e.* of the existence of Prakṛiti (Aniruddha), or, of the theory of existent effects (Vijñâna Bhikṣu). इति चेत् Iti chet, if this be said.

111. If it be said that this is not proved in consequence of the contradictory theories of different thinkers.—111.

Vritti.—Some—the Vedântins—say that the world has Brahma for its cause, while others, the Nyâya-Vaiśeṣikas, say that it has the Ultimate Atoms for its cause, and the elders (of the Sâṃkhya School) say that it has Prakṛiti for its cause. The author raises the doubt involved in these contrary theories.

" Tat-asiddhiḥ" means the non-proof of the existence of Prakṛiti. —111.

Bhâṣya.—In regard to the inference of Prakṛiti, the author apprehends an objection.

Well, if the effect existed prior to its production (as maintained by the Sâṃkhyas), then, of course, an eternal Prakṛiti would be proved to exist as its substratum, inasmuch as it will be declared afterwards (Vide I. 135, page 191) that the inference of the cause is made only as being always the accompanier of the effect. But, in consequence of the disagreement of different thinkers, an existent effect itself is not proved. If such be the objection.– 111.

Answer : Existence of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti proved independently of the Theory of Existent Effects.

तथाप्येकतरदृष्ट्या एकतरसिद्धेर्नापलापः ॥ १ । ११२ ॥

तथापि Tathâ api, still. एकतरदृष्ट्या Ekatara-dṛiṣṭyâ, by the observation of the one. एकतरसिद्धेः Ekatara-siddheḥ, on account of the proof of the other. न Na, no. अपलापः Apalâpaḥ, negation, denial.

112. (Admitting, for the sake of argument, that there is no proof of the theory of Existent Effects), still, when by the observation of the one (*i. e.* the effect), the existence of the other is proved, there can be no negation (of the existence of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti).—112.

Vritti.—The author states his conclusion with regard to the above objection.

If the subject of inference, on one side, were disproved by the mere disagreement of theorists, then, since such differences of opinion exist in regard to the alternative or opposite side, how could there be proof of what they propose to be the cause? If they reply that it would be proved by the cognition by inference of that which pervades, from the cognition of that which is pervaded, on the strength of their not ever being one without the other, then, it is the same with us also. Hence our inference of the cause from the effect is not to be contradicted.—112.

Bhâṣya.—Admitting the validity of the above objection, for the sake of argument, the author avoids it.

Granting that the effect is not eternally existent, still by the observation of the one, *i. e.*, the effect, the existence of the other, *i. e.*, the cause, being proved, there is really no contradiction of our inference. Hence an eternal cause (Prakṛiti) is verily established.

Herefrom also is made the deduction of Release by means of discrimination of Puruṣa as not undergoing transformation, from this very cause (Prakṛiti) which undergoes transformation. Such is the meaning.

On this very Abhyupagama-vâda or doctrine of admission of counter-theories for the sake of argument, proceed the positive or âstika Śâstras, *e.g.*, the Vaiśeṣika, etc. Hence, it should be remarked that although they are in (apparent) conflict with the declarations in the Veda and Smṛiti of the Theory of Existent Effects, yet they are not unauthoritative in their other portions.—112.

Proofs of the Theory of Existent Effects: (a) Its denial would entail contradiction of the threefold aspect of things.

त्रिविधविरोधापत्तेश्च ॥ १ । ११३ ॥

त्रिविधविरोधापत्तेः: Trividha-virodha-âpatteḥ, on account of the entailment of a contradiction to the threefold aspect of things. च Cha, and.

113. (Denial of the Theory of Existent Effects) would entail contradiction of the threefold aspect of things (Vijñâna Bhikṣu). Or, (the inference of any other cause than Prakṛiti), would etc. (Aniruddha.)—113.

Vṛitti.—Let a cause be inferred from the observation of the effect, but how can you say that the said cause is Prakṛiti? To this the author replies.

The Guṇas are threefold: Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. There would be contradiction thereof, (if Prakṛiti were not the cause), *i. e.*, the world would be devoid of them; but it is not found to be so.—113.

Vedântin Mahâdeva: Were Brahman or the Ultimate Atoms the cause of the world, it would lack the characteristic, but which, we perceive, it does possess, of having the nature, and thereby being the cause, of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment.

Bhâṣya.—The author states the true refutation of the objection. Now, all effect has, as admitted on all hands, a threefold aspect, *viz.*, past, future, and present. If the effect is not desired to be always

existent, then, its threefoldness would not be established. For, by the non-existence of the water pot, etc. in times past, etc., the possession of the properties of being past, etc., would not be established in the case of the water pot, etc., since there can subsist no connection between what is existent and what is non-existent.

Note:—A connection or relation involves two terms. When we say that a water pot lies on the ground, we assert a relation to exist between the ground and the water pot. The two terms of the relation are the ground and the water pot. Both of them are necessary to determine the relation, and, so, their general name is Nirûpaka or determinant. Specifically, the ground is called Anuyogi or that to which something is joined afterwards, and the water pot is called Pratiyogi or the counter-opposite which fills up and, thereby, destroys the blank caused by its non-existence until then.

Moreover, if counter-opposite-ness consist in being of the form of the counter-opposite, then, the same defect remains, because it would then be the same as the non-existence of the water pot. If it be the very form (svarûpa) of non-existence itself, then, the non-existence of the cloth, etc., would be the non-existence of the water pot, etc., because of the absence, on the supposition, of any distinctive peculiarity in non-existence. And, if any distinctive peculiarity is admitted to exist in the intrinsic form of non-existence, then, non-existence would lose its character as such, and be a mere technical name.

It cannot be said that the counter-opposite itself will be the distinctive peculiarity of the non-existence; since a non-existent counter-opposite cannot possibly be the distinction in the case of antecedent non-existence, etc.

It should, therefore, be said that the past, future and present are nothing but different states of the effect which is really eternal; since, it is but reasonable that the intuitions, *viz.*, "The water pot is past", "The water pot is present", and "The water pot is coming-to-be", should have similarity of forms; and not that one of them should have existence as its object, while the other two, non-existence as their object.

And it is these two states, *viz.*, the past and the not-yet-come-to-pass, that cause the use of the expressions, consequent non-existence and antecedent non-existence; since there is no proof of two more non-existences different from them. Such is the hint. More on this point may be found in the Yoga Sûtram of Patañjali.

Likewise, absolute non-existence and reciprocal non-existence also are nothing but the essential forms of their substrata. It cannot be said that, such being the case, even during the existence of the counter-opposite, since the essential form of the substratum does not depart from

it, there would, therefore, at that time, arise the intuition of absolute non-existence; because our opponents also admit the presence of absolute non-existence thereof in a place containing the counter-opposite, and, further, because it is in the case of the past and the not-yet-come-to-pass states only, that the connection of the counter-opposite can become the absolute non-existence for the time being. Therefore, in our conclusion, Non-existence is not an additional principle.

Moreover, some one thing being looked for, as determining or regulating such intuitions as, "The water pot is destroyed", "The water pot will come to be", "The water pot does not exist here," etc., it is just something having the form of existence, that is conceived by us, for the sake of simplicity; while, it should be observed, there would be redundancy and intricacy in the supposition of Non-existence which is nowhere observed.—113.

(b) *There can be no production of what did not exist before.*

नासदुत्पादो नृशृङ्गवत् ॥ १ । ११४ ॥

न Na, no. असदुत्पादः Asat-utpâdaḥ, production of what was non-existent. नृशृङ्गवत् Nṛi-śṛinga-vat, like the horn of man.

114. (There can be) no production of what did not exist before, as a man's horn.—114.

Vṛitti.—The author repels the doubt as to whether the production f an effect is that of what existed before or of what did not exist before.

Things of a purely non-existent nature are a man's horn, etc. Things of a purely existent nature are Âkâśa (Ether), etc. Things which partake of the nature of both the existent and the non-existent, are a water pot, etc. Hence, one may ask, how can there be comparison with a man's horn? We reply that there can be no such doubt. For, (according to the theory of the opponent), a water pot, etc., would be non-existent during the period of their antecedent non-existence (*i. e.*, so long as they were not produced), while the non-existence of a man's horn, and the like is perpetual; what is the difference between the two? If it be replied by the objector that the observation of the production of a water pot, etc., constitutes the difference; we can only admire his argumentative skill, for he puts forward in reply the very fact which is the subject of discussion.—114.

Bhâṣya.—The author states that the Theory of Existent Effects is established by the following argument also.

The very production of that which, like a man's horn, is a non-existence, is impossible. Such is the meaning.—114.

(c) *For every production, there must exist some material cause.*

उपादाननियमात् ॥ १ । ११५ ॥

उपादाननियमात् Upâdâna-niyamât, owing to the regulation of material causes.

115. Because there must be some determinate material cause for every product.—115.

Vritti.—The author sets forth an argument in support of the existence of effects even prior to their production.

The connection of the effect follows from the connection of the cause. And connection can take place only between things existent. Otherwise, production of effect would take place everywhere and at all times —115.

Bhâṣya.—The author gives the reason for the above conclusion.

A water pot can be produced from earth alone, a piece of cloth from threads only, etc. Thus it follows that there is a uniformity in regard to the material cause of effects. This would not be possible, (if effects were non-existent prior to their production). For, prior to production, the effects being non-existent in the cause, no such peculiarity or principle of differentiation is found to be present in the cause whereby it would produce some particular non-entity only, and not any other else. And if the existence of some such peculiarity is admitted, then, in consequence of the existence of an entity (in the shape of the peculiarity) thus entailed, the (theory of) non-existence is gone. And it is this very same peculiarity that is declared by us to be the not-yet-come or future or potential state of the effect.

Hereby is also refuted the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas that it is the antecedent non-existence or non-existence prior to production that determines the production of effects in particular forms. For, the supposition of an entity is simpler than the supposition of a non-entity. Further, entities are visible, and are independent of others. Moreover, on the existence, (if it is so asserted), of a distinctive peculiarity in non-entities themselves, the non-entities would no longer remain non-entities but would become entities; while a peculiarity in the form of the counter-opposite does not exist during the non-existence of the counter-opposite.

Hence non-entities having no distinctions of their own, it is not reasonable to hold that they can determine the production of effects —115.

(d) Else anything might occur any time anywhere.

सर्वत्र सर्वदा सर्वासम्भवात् ॥ १ । ११६ ॥

सर्वत्र Sarvatra, in all places. सर्वदा Sarvadâ, at all times. सर्वासम्भवात् Sarva-asambhavât, on account of non-production of all things.

116. Because all things are not produced in all places, at all times.—116.

Vritti.—The author continues the very same argument. The meaning is quite manifest.—116.

Bhâṣya.—The author lays down a proof of the uniformity of the material cause.

The meaning is easy to grasp. On the absence of uniformity of the material cause, on the other hand, everything would be possible everywhere, always. Such is the import.—116.

(e) Everything cannot be produced from everything else.

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् ॥ १ । ११७ ॥

शक्तस्य Śaktasya, of the capable or competent. शक्यकरणात् Śakya-karaṇât, because of the execution or production of what is possible.

117. Because the production of what is possible, can be only from what is competent to cause such production. —117.

Vritti.—But, even in the absence of any particularity in the material cause (for determining the production of particular effects), their production will be regulated, says our opponent, by this that what is capable of production from another thing, the same can be produced from that thing alone. For, the thread does not certainly become the (material) cause of a water pot. Whence, then, can there be production of all things (I. 116)? To this the author replies.

"Śaktasya," of the competent: Śakti or competency or potentiality: does it have the śakya or the possible as its subject or does it not? we ask. If it has the possible for its subject, then, the *existence* of the possible should be affirmed. If, on the other hand, it has not, then, there would be the production of a water pot from the thread, and the position would be the same (as discussed in I. 115 *supra*).—117.

Bhâṣya.—The author states that production of a non-entity cannot take place, for this reason also, namely:

Material causality is nothing but the possession of the power to become the effect. It can hardly be said to denote anything else. Besides, our interpretation is the simplest possible.

That power or potentiality is nothing but the not-yet-come-to-pass or undeveloped state of the effect. Hence, because that which is competent, can produce the effect that is capable of being produced from it, production of a non-entity cannot take place. Such is the meaning.—117.

(f) Cause and Effect are identical.

कारणभावाच्च ॥ १ । ११८ ॥

कारणभावात् Kâraṇa-bhâvât, from the effect having the nature of the cause च Cha, also.

118. And also because the effect possesses the same nature as the cause.—118.

Vṛitti.—The author states another argument.

Because the cause and the effect are one and the same. Even though modified into the form of the water pot, (it) does not cease to have the nature of earth. On the other hand, there can be no identity between what is existent and what is non-existent.

But, if they are identical, then, one may say, water should be carried by means of a lump of earth, as it is done in a pitcher. We reply that such would have been the case, were their identity atyanta or absolute. But it is not absolute.

In the case of their identity in difference, as maintained by us, there is, however, no fault. Thus

असत्त्वान्नास्ति संबन्धः कारणैः सत्त्वसंगिभिः ।
असंबद्धस्य चोत्पत्तिमिच्छतो न व्यवस्थितिः ॥
नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः ।
उभयोरपि दृष्टोऽन्तस्त्वनयोस्तत्त्वदर्शिभिः ॥

No connection takes place, from non-existence, with causes which attach themselves to existence. And with him who desires the production of what is not connected (with a cause), there is no regularity.

There is neither the production of what is non-existent, nor is there non-existence or destruction of what is existent. Those who have found out the Tattva or Reality, have seen the end of both of these.—Gitâ II. 16.—118.

Bhâṣya.—From this also (follows the non-production of the non-existent).

The Veda declares the non-difference of the effect from the cause, even prior to its production. From this too, (eternally) existent effects being proved, production of what is non-existent, cannot be maintained. Such is the meaning. For, were the effect non-existent (prior to production), identity of the existent and the non-existent, as declared in the Veda, would be disproved.

On the identity of the effects with the causes, prior to their production, the declarations of the Veda are:

तद्धेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत्

That the same as this, was, then, unmodified.—Bṛi. Âran Upa. I. iv. 7.

सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्

This (the world), O peaceful one, was verily existent at the beginning.—Chh. Upa. VI. ii. 1.

आत्मैवेदमग्र आसीत्

This, (the world), was verily the Self at the beginning.—Maitri Upa. V. 2.

आप एवेदमग्र आसुः

This, (the world), was verily waters at the beginning.—Bṛi. Araṇ. Upa. V. v. 1.—118.

Note:—In this connection (aphorisms 113-118), compare Kârikâ IX:

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसम्भवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत् कार्यम् ॥ कारिका ॥ ९ ॥

The effect is always existent; because that which is non-existent, can never be brought into existence; because there must be a determinate relation of the cause with the effect; because all things are not produced in all places, at all times; because a competent cause can do that only for which it is competent; and also because the effect possesses the nature of the cause.

A doubt:—How can that which exists, be said to be produced?

न भावे भावयोगश्चेत् ॥ १ । ११९ ॥

न Na, not, भावे Bhâve, in existence. भावयोगः Bhâva-yogaḥ, conjunction of existence. चेत् Chet ,if.

119. If (it be objected that there can be) no adjunction of existence (*i.e.*, production) to an existence, (we reply as in the next aphorism).—119.

Vritti—The author apprehends an objection.

If, "bhâva-yogaḥ" or production of the effect existent, "bhâve" be from the existent cause, then, there would be no such predication as "A water pot will be produced, is being produced, is destroyed."—119.

Bhâṣya.—The author apprehends an objection.

But, then, the effect being thus eternal, "bhâva-yogaḥ," adjunction of production, is not possible, in the case of the effect which is already of the form of an existence. Because we speak of the production of the non-

existent from the existent only. If this be the objection. Such is the meaning.—119.

Answer:—Production is only manifestation.

नाभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनौ व्यवहाराव्यवहारौ ॥१।१२०॥

न Na, not, nay. अभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनौ Abhivyakti-nibandhanau, occasioned by manifestation (and non-manifestation). व्यवहाराव्यवहारौ Vyavahâra-avyavahârau, use and non-use (of the term 'production').

120. Nay; the application and non-application of the term 'production' to an effect are occasioned by the manifestation (and non-manifestation of the effect as such).—120.

Vritti.—The author states the established tenet on the subject.

As the whiteness of a white cloth which had become dirty, is brought into manifestation by means of washing, etc., so is the water pot brought into manifestation through the operation of the potter; whereas through the impact or blow of a mallet, it is made to disappear.

And manifestation is a fact of daily observation; *e. g.*, of the oil, from the sesamum-seeds, by pressure; of milk, from the cow, by milking; of rice, from paddy, by thrashing; etc.

It is established, therefore, that the use of language (such as production, etc.,) as well as the difference in the denotation and function or use of the things are dependent on their manifestation.—120.

Bhâṣya.—The author repels the above doubt.

The employment or non-employment of the expression "production of an effect," has the manifestation (or non-manifestation) of the effect for its occasional cause. The predication of production depends on its manifestation, and the absence of the predication of production depends on the absence of manifestation; but not on the coming into existence of a non-existence Such is the meaning.

And manifestation is not a (subjective) cognition, but the present (actually existing) state of the effect. The operation of the cause also produces only that transformation of the effect which is characterised as being present (as distinguished from the past and the future). In the world also it is observed that it is only the manifestation of an effect which was existent from before, that takes place from the operation of the cause. As, for example, it is the manifestation only of the statue inherent in a block of marble, that takes place from the operation of the sculptor; of oil inherent in sesamum-seeds, by pressure; of rice grains in the paddy, by thrashing.

So has it been declared in the Yoga-Vâsiṣṭha Râmâyaṇa:

सुषुप्तावस्थया चक्रपद्मरेखा शिलोदरे ।
यथा स्थिता चितेरन्तस्तथेयं जगदावली ॥

As the outlines of the discus and the lotus lie dormant in a block of marble, so does the system of the world lie within the mind or consciousness in a dormant state.

"In a dormant state," *i.e.*, not the manifested world, but the world lies within the mind through Prakṛiti, *i.e.*, in the causal state.—120.

Destruction is disappearance in the cause.

नाशः कारणलयः ॥ १ । १२१ ॥

नाश: Nâśaḥ, disappearance, destruction. कारणलय: Kâraṇa-layaḥ, dissolution into the cause.

121. Destruction (of a thing means) the dissolution (of the thing) into its cause.—121.

Vṛitti.—But, (some one may say,) if production is due to the occasion of manifestation, to what occasion is due the predication of destruction? To this, the author replies.

From the blow of a club occurs the dissolution of the water pot into its cause (*i.e.*, the particles of earth from which it was produced); and this dissolution is the occasion for the predication of destruction about it. Thus arise the differences in the use of words (*e. g.*, production, destruction, etc.) and the object denoted (*e. g.*, water pot, etc.) and its use (for bringing water in, etc.)

But, (some one may say), if destruction is disappearance merely, re-appearance should be observed, but it is not observed. To this we reply that re-appearance is not observed by the stupid, but is observed by those who can discriminate. Thus, for example, when a thread is destroyed, it is changed into the form of earth; and the earth is changed into the form of the cotton-tree; and this transforms into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread. So is it with all existences.—121.

Bhâṣya.—Well, granted that the existent, (as supposed by you), somehow or other, may have an origin prior to its 'production' (as a manifested effect): but how can there be 'destruction' of an existence continuing from eternity? There being room for this enquiry, the author says.

"Laya," according to the teaching of its derivation from the root Lîñ in the sense of enfoldment, means absence of disjunction from the causes, in consequence of subtlety. This very same state, called the

past, is said to be destruction or disappearance. Such is the meaning. And the Laya that is called not-yet-come-to-pass (future) state, is said to be antecedent non-existence. Thus the answer is complete.

Of the (very same) effect which, having once been manifested, has passed into dissolution, there can be no re-manifestation, since it would entail the recognition, etc. (of the re-produced effect), which is never found to occur. On these grounds the suggestion of re-manifestation has been refuted in the Aphorisms of Patañjali. (*Vide* Yoga Sûtras.)

Besides, in common with our opponents, we too hold that the not-yet-come-to-pass or potential state, called antecedent non-existence, is the cause of the manifestation (of an effect).

But, where is the evidence, may ask our opponent, to show that what is past and gone, does also exist? For, the Veda, etc., are not found to declare in plain terms the existence of what is past, as they do in the case of the existence of what has not-yet-come-to-pass.

Such is not the case, we reply. For both the past and the not-yet-come-to-pass are the objects of perception by the Yogin, which they could not be unless they were existent; hence the existence of both of them is proved. For, it is the object that is the cause of perception in general; as, otherwise, the consequence would be that even a present or actually existing object also would not be proved by perception. Therefore, when it is established beyond doubt that cognitions or ideas or percepts are adventitious, *i. e.*, caused by transference of forms of objects from the outside, and when no obstruction or cause of aberration exists, it is proved, by the perception of the Yogin, that the past object also exists. And the evidence of the Veda, Smriti, Itihâsa, etc., on the perception by the Yogin of things past and not-yet-come-to-pass, has been set forth in detail by us in our Yoga-Vârtika. Such is the hint.

Thus, then, is made out the predication of production and destruction in respect of the effects in consequence of their manifestation and dissolution.

Well, our opponent may ask, is this manifestation also existent from before, or is it non-existent from before? If it be existent, then, by means of the manifestation of the effect even prior to the operation of the cause, it would by itself be the cause of production of the effect (which is not desired by you), and, consequently, the operation of the cause would be ineffectual (which also is not desirable). If, on the other hand, it be non-existent, then, in the very admission or fact of manifestation, your doctrine of Existent Effects is lost; inasmuch as you then admit the manifestation of a non-existent manifestation.

To this our reply is as follows: By the admission of the constant existence of all effects prior to the operation of the cause, no room is left for the raising of such a dilemma. As in the case of a water pot, manifestation of the manifestation of the effects, (so long as it, the first manifestation, is not actually manifested as the manifestation of the effect), in the state of antecedent non existence in its present or actual manifested form, and, therefore, for the termination of that antecedent non-existence, it depends upon the operation of the cause. While its non-existence by the not-yet-come-to-pass or potential state, causes no harm to the doctrine of Existent Effects.

Neither is in this view the contradiction of Existence and Non-existence involved; for, the difference between them has been declared to be in mode or manner of appearance only, and not real.

Nor can it be argued that, even so, by the non-admission of antecedent non-existence, the non-existence itself of the effects prior to the operation of the cause (*i. e.* the antecedent non-existence of effects) can hardly be asserted; for, it is the state of the effects past, future, and present, which constitute the forms by which one state is non-existent, in relation to the other states.—121.

The Theory of Manifestation does not entail infinite regression.

पारम्पर्यतोऽन्वेषणा वीजाङ्कुरवत् ॥१।१२२॥

पारम्पर्यतः: Pâramparyatah, of one from the other. अन्वेषणा Anveṣaṇâ, seeking, pursuit. वीजाङ्कुरवत् Vîja-aṅkura-vat, as is the case with the seed and the sprout or plant.

122. (There is no infinite regression), because they seek each other, as is the case with the seed and the plant. (Aniruddha.) Or, their reciprocal pursuit (is quite logical), like that of the seed and the plant. (Vijñâna Bhikṣu.)—122.

Vritti.—But, some one may ask, is this manifestation something existent, or is it something non-existent? If it be existent, then, apprehension of the effect should occur at every moment. If it be something non-existent, then, the theory of Existent Effects falls to the ground, because, of this also there would be another manifestation, of that also, again, yet another, and so on, and consequently, non-finality would be the result.

To this the author replies.

Let there be thousands of manifestations; still it is no fault, as the succession is coming down reciprocally, from eternity, without beginning, like the reciprocal succession of the seed and the plant.—122.

Bhâṣya.—But, then, the opponent may say, a manifestation also of the manifestation should be desired for the purpose of maintaining the tenet of Existent Effects, and, accordingly, infinite regression would be the consequence. Apprehending this, the author says.

Manifestation should be followed up, "pâramparyatah," only by the form of one after the other, and *vice versa*. And such eternal succession, or, rather, rotation, being, like that of the seed and the plant, quite logical (prâmâṇika or authoritative), is faultless. Such is the meaning.

And from the case of the seed and the plant, there is, in the present case, this difference that, in the case of the seed and the plant, the non-finality arises by means of *successive* reciprocality, while in the case of manifestation, it arises by means of *simultaneous* reciprocality. The validity of the inter-dependence is, however, the same in both the cases. The revered Vyâsa also has recognized this non-finality as valid or logical, while observing in his Commentary on the Yoga Sûtras of Patañjali:

सर्वकार्याणां स्वरूपतो नित्यत्वमवस्थाभिर्विनाशित्वं च ।

All effects are eternal in their intrinsic forms, and are perishable in their manifested states. *Vide* S. B. II. Vol. IV. page 283, Sûtra IV. 12.

And here the example of the seed and the plant has been adduced from the popular point of view. In reality, however, it stands for Janma-karmavat, like that of birth and action, and signifies that, as birth leads to karma and karma leads to birth, so does one manifestation lead to the other, and *vice versa*. Although, therefore, the succession of seed and the plant is terminated by the original creation, and consequently, cannot be said to be infinitely regressive, still there is no harm to the present illustration.

And it is well known in the Veda and the Smṛiti that at the time of the original creation, even in the absence of the plant, the seed is produced at the will of Hiraṇya-garbha or Brahmâ from his body, etc.; *e. g.* it is declared to be so in the following passage of the Viṣṇu Purâṇa, amongst others.

यथा हि पादपो मूलस्कन्धशाखादिसंयुतः ।

आदिबीजात् प्रभवति बीजान्यन्यानि वै ततः ॥

For, as the plant consisting of the root, the stem, the branches, etc., takes its rise from the original seed, so do many other seeds also from it.—Viṣṇu Purâṇa, II. vii. 32.—122.

Objection to the Theory of Manifestation retorted.

उत्पत्तिवद्वादोषः ॥१।१२३॥

उत्पत्तिवत् Utpatti-vat, like the Theory of Production or Creation (of the objectors). वा Vâ, or. अदोषः A-dosah, faultless, blameless.

123. Or, (at all events), (our Theory of Manifestation is) as faultless as that of production.—123.

Vritti.—The author states another argument.

Is 'production' produced, or is it not? If it be produced, then, of this (production) also there must be another production; and hence the result is non-finality, (the same as is alleged against our Theory of Manifestation). If it be not produced, then, is this because it is non-existent, or because it is eternal? If, because it is non-existent, then, production there is never at all, and, consequently, it would never be perceived, (a result which, of course, you do not desire). Again, if it be not produced because it is eternal, then, production of effects should take place at all times, (which, however, is not the case). Now, if you say: production itself being of the form of production, what need have we of supposing an ulterior production (of production)? then, in the same manner, we ask: since manifestation itself is of the form of manifestation, what need have we of supposing an ulterior manifestation (of manifestation)? So that the two theories are on a par with each other. What is your conclusion on this point, is ours also, (and thus all the objections alleged against our theory apply with equal force to yours also).—123.

Bhâsya:—In reality, however, non-finality also is not entailed. This the author declares.

As, on the ground of simplicity, it is desired by the Vaiśesika and others who hold the Theory of the Production of the Non-existent, that production of the production of a water pot, for example, is essentially of the same form as the very form of it (production of the water pot), (so that the two productions are really one and the same thing and hence there is no infinite regression); in like manner, on the ground of simplicity, should it also be desired by us, that manifestation is the essential form of the manifestation of a water pot, for example. Hence, as in the Theory of Production, so also in the Theory of Manifestation, the fault of non-finality does not lie. Such is the meaning.

Now, it cannot be said that, manifestation of the manifestation being thus not admitted, the Theory of Existent Effects would be lost in

consequence of the impossibility of the existence of the manifestation prior to the operation of the cause. For, the idea is that, in the view we now express, the Theory of Existent Effects does not go further than saying that it is of the existent alone that manifestation can take place. It does not, in consequence, come to be the same as the Theory of Non-existent Effects, even though there be the non-existence of the manifestation prior to the operation of the cause on account of the non-existence of the manifestation of the manifestation.

But, our opponent may say, in like manner, the antecedent non-existence of Mahat, and the rest themselves may be desired (instead of that of their manifestation); what need of supposing their existence in the state called fitness for manifestation or potentiality? We reply that the question does not at all arise; the manifestation of those effects only which do exist in the Avyakta or unmanifested state, being established by such texts of the Veda as

तदीदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत्

That, the same as this, was, then, unmodified.-Bṛi. Âraṇ. Upa I. iv 7.

But still, may continue our opponent, it (denial of manifestation of manifestation) would entail the admission of the antecedent non-existence etc. of the manifestation. We reply, it would not; because, as has been already pointed out, the three states, not-yet-come-to-pass, etc., are of the form of the non-existence of one another mutually and because it is by the termination of the non-existence of this kind only that the operation of the cause can be fruitful.

For, the difference of the authors of the Theory of Existent Effects from the authors of the Theory of Non-existent Effects consists in this only that what are declared by them to be the antecedent non-existence and consequent non-existence, are declared by the authors of the Theory of Existent Effects to be the states, not-yet-come-to-pass and past respectively, of the effects having the form of existence. And the state of manifestation called present existence, is desired to be other than the (effects, *e. g.*,) the water pot, etc. (of which it is the state), because it is seen that the water pot, etc., possess the three states. In other respects, however, the two theories are similar. Hence there is no room for greater doubt in regard to our theory. Such is the hint.—123.

Points of resemblance in all products or effects.

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ॥१।१२४॥

हेतुमत् Hetu-mat, having a cause, caused. अनित्यम् A-nityam, non-eternal, perishable. अव्यापि A-vyâpi, non-pervasive, finite. सक्रियम् Sakriyam, undergoing

change, mutable. अनेकम् Anekam, more than one, multitudinous. आश्रितम् Âśritam, supported by something else, dependent. लिङ्गम् Liṅgam, product, effect.

124. Effect (in general) is caused, non-eternal, non-pervasive, changeable, multitudinous, dependent.—124.

Vṛitti—The author states the similarity in property amongst the effects or products of Prakṛiti mutually.

"Hetu-mat," having a cause. "Anityam," perishable. "Sakriyam", giving up the body previously assumed; the earth and the bodies have internal molecular movements also. "Anekam", (multitudinous), in proportion to the multiplicity of different Puruṣas. "Âśritam," (dependent) on the cause. "Liṅgam" (mergent), that which sets or is dissolved into its own cause.—124.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—The word, Vyaktam, the manifested, *i. e.*, the products, should be supplied as the complement of the aphorism.

Bhâṣya.—By the aphorism (I. 110 *supra*), "Because the apprehension thereof arises from seeing the effect," it has been declared that the Root Cause should be inferred by means of the effect. Now, in regard to that, with a view to determine how far the range of effects extends, the author states the resemblance in property of all the effects, (in other words, gives the definition of the effect).

"Liṅgam," mark of inference, or that which undergoes dissolution, denotes the whole class of effects, because they serve as the marks of inference of their causes, or because they pass into dissolution. Here it is not intended to denote the Principle Mahat alone, inasmuch as the characteristics of having a cause, etc., are common to all effects whatever. For this very reason, in the Kârikâ also, all effect without exception, called the manifested, has been declared to be "Liṅgam". Thus,

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।
सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ कारिका ॥ २० ॥

The Manifested is producible, perishable, finite, mutable, multiform, dependent, serving as the mark of inference, a combination of parts, subordinate. The Unmanifested is the reverse of this.—Kârikâ, Verse X.

Thus, that (the Manifested), the "Liṅgam," possesses the properties of being caused, etc. Such is the meaning of the sentence.

Of these (properties), that of being "hetu-mat" denotes the having a cause; "anityam," destructibility; "a-vyâpi," the opposite of the pervasiveness previously mentioned as belonging to Prakṛiti; "sakriyam," the habit of constant activity, of the form of making ascertainment (in the

case of Mahat, for example), etc. ; while Prakṛiti, being the cause of all acts in general, cannot be said to act in merely a part of an effect. Nor can it be said that activity or acting is nothing but karma or act ; because in that case, activity would belong to her also, inasmuch as it follows, from the hearing from the Veda that Creation proceeds from the disturbance of Prakṛiti, that she too possesses acts (in the sense of giving birth to them).

"Manifoldness" consists in diversity according to the difference of creation, that is to say, that they are not the same in any two creation, and not the inclusion of, or extension to, many individuals of the same kind (jâti), as it would then be too wide and extend to Prakṛiti, because Prakṛiti also has many forms such Sattva, etc., as would appear from the subsequent aphorism (VI. 39): Sattva and the rest are not the properties of Prakṛiti, because they are the very form thereof.

And "dependence" is on the parts of which they are made of.—124.

Proof of existence of effects as separate from the cause.

आञ्जस्यादभेदतो वा गुणसामान्यादेस्तत्सिद्धिः प्रधानव्यपदेशाद् वा ॥१।१२५॥

आञ्जस्यात् Âñjasyât, essentially (Aniruddha), easily, by perception (Vijñâna Bhikṣu). अभेदतः A-bhedataḥ, from identity. वा Vâ, or. गुणसामान्यादेः Guṇa-sâmânya-âdeḥ, of the common attributes, *e. g.*, knowledge, pleasure, etc. of the Nyâya-Vaiśeṣikas (A), of the genera of Guṇas and karma or act, etc. (V). तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, proof of existence in them, *i. e.*, the twenty-four Principles (A), proof of the existence of the Liṅgam or effect as other than the cause (V). प्रधानव्यपदेशात् Pradhâna-vyapadeśât, from the use of the term pradhâna. वा Vâ, or.

125.—There is proof of the existence of these (common attributes of the Nyâya-Vaiśeṣika School which you mention, *e. g.*, cognition, pleasure, etc.,) in the twenty-four Principles, from the fact that they are essentially identical with them as well as from the use of the term Pradhâna (which mediately is the cause of them all).—Aniruddha.

Or, there is proof of the separate existence of the Liṅgam or effect, in some cases by preception, in some, from its identity with the genera of Guṇa, Karma, etc., and in some, from the very use of the term Pradhâna which necessarily implies a separate effect.—Vijñâna Bhikṣu.—125.

Vritti.—But, some one may say, if the principles be the twenty-five, then, are such common acts as cognition, pleasure, etc., absolutely non-existent? If you say that it is so, then you give up what you see.

To this the author replies.

"Âñjasyât," essentially. "A-bhedha," (non-difference), *i. e.*, from the twenty-four Principles, because the common attributes, etc., possess the character of these (twenty-four). "Tat-siddiḥ," proof of their existence through their inclusion just in these (twenty-four). The word "vâ" indicates an alternative reply. "Pradhâna-vyapadeśât vâ": the proof of the existence of these ordinary common attributes, knowledge, etc., is from the very use of the term Pradhâna, inasmuch as, since there is non-difference or identity between cause and effect, these attributes, etc., are not different from Pradhâna, being the effects thereof mediately through Mahat, etc. So that the non-enumeration of them by the author is not due to their non-existence.—125.

Bhâṣya.—The characteristics of being caused, etc., (mentioned in the preceding aphorism) can be established on the proof of the difference of the effect from the cause. For this reason the author sets forth the proofs which establish the existence of effects as contra-distinguished from the cause.

"Tat siddhiḥ," proof of the existence of the effect called Liṅgam, as other than the cause, is, in some cases, "âñjasyât," easily from Perception itself: *e. g.*, by means of the grossness, or bulkiness, and other properties, a piece of cloth, etc., are proved to be separate from their causes, the threads, etc. In some cases, it is by means of inference by the mark, "Guṇasâmâny-âdeḥ abhedataḥ," of their having the nature of the Guṇas, etc., in general: *e. g.*, that of Mahat, etc., by means of their difference in property from their causes, which difference is of the form of their having the nature of the attributes such as ascertainment, etc.: also that of the earth, etc., by means of their difference in property from the Tan-mâtras, which difference is of the form of the Tan-mâtras having the nature of such higher genera as the being the Great (Element of) Earth, etc. In some cases, again, it is by means of the difference in property constituted by having the nature of karma or action, etc., alluded to by the word "âdi": as *e. g.*, that of the one with the members of the body moving, as other than the one with the members of the body remaining still.

So, again, existence of the effect as other than the cause, is proved also, "Pradhâna-vyapadeśât," from the use of the term Pradhâna in the Veda. For, it is called Pradhâna because all effect whatever, pradhîyate, is

founded in it. And this cannot possibly take place without the relation of identity-and-difference between the cause and the effect, inasmuch as, if they were absolutely non-different, it would be the foundation or substratum of itself, which is impossible. Such is the meaning.—125.

The common properties of Prakṛiti and her products.

त्रिगुणाचेतनत्वादि द्वयोः ॥१।१२६॥

त्रिगुणाचेतनत्वादि Triguṇa-achetanatva-âdi, the being constituted by the three Guṇas, the being unconscious, etc. द्वयोः Dvayoḥ, of both, *i. e.*, the cause Prakṛiti and the effects, her products.

126. To both (Prakṛiti and her products) (belong) the characters of being constituted by the three Guṇas, being unconscious, etc.—126.

Vṛitti.—The author declares the resemblances between Prakṛiti and her effects or products.

Constituted by the three Guṇas. Unconscious. The word "âdi" denotes existence for the sake of another. "Dvayoḥ," of the cause and the effect.—126.

Bhâṣya.—By the two preceding aphorisms have been shown the character of the effects consisting of the community of properties amongst themselves and also the evidence to prove the existence of the effects as other than their cause. Now, for the purpose of the inference of the cause (Prakṛiti), by means of its having properties similar to those of the effects, the author displays the similarity of properties also between the cause and the effects.

Similarity of properties, *e. g.*, the being constituted by the three Guṇas, etc., "dvayoḥ," belong to the cause and the effect only. Such is the meaning.

And the other properties included by the word "âdi" have been declared in the Kârikâ, namely,

त्रिगुणमविवेकिविषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ।
व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ कारिका ॥ ११ ॥

The Manifested (*i. e.* the effect) is constituted by the three Guṇas, is non-discriminative, objective, common, unconscious or non-intelligent, prolific. So is also Pradhâna (Prakṛiti). Puruṣa is the reverse of them both in these respects, and yet is similar to Pradhâna in those other respects mentioned in Kârikâ X).—Kârikâ XI.

"Tri-guṇam," that in which the Guṇas consisting of the forms of the substances Sattva, etc., lie. Of these two, the inherence of Sattva,

etc., in Mahat, and the rest, is by the form of (being their cause, while the inherence of Sattva, etc., in Pradhâna is by the form of a collection of the three Guṇas, as that of the individual trees in a forest. Or, since the words Sattva, etc., also denote Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, the cause and the effect may be said to be constituted by the three Guṇas in one and the same sense.

"A-viveki-viṣayaḥ," visible or perceptible by the ignorant only. If the compound is split up into the two words "a-viveki" and "viṣayaḥ," then, the being "a-viveki" would mean co-operativeness or acting by combination for the sake of another, and the being "viṣayaḥ" would mean the being the object of experience.

"Sâmânyam" common to all Puruṣas, that is to say, undifferentiated even in the case of Puruṣas being different.

"Prasava-dharmi" undergoing transformation.

"Vyaktam" the effect or product.

"Pradhânaṃ" the cause.

Such is the meaning.

The mutual difference in properties of the cause and the effect has also been displayed by the Kârikâ.

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।
सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ कारिका ॥ १० ॥

The Manifested is producible, perishable, finite, mutable, multiform, dependent, serving as the mark of inference, a combination of parts, subordinate. The Unmanifested is the reverse of this.—Kârikâ X.

In this verse, ekatvam, oneness, in "anekam," more than one, denotes not-different-ness or identity even in different creations. Hence, although Prakṛiti covers lots of individuals, there is no harm caused thereby to her unity. That Pradhâna comprises a multitude of individuals is proved from the declaration of its innumerability in the following passage of the Viṣṇu Purâṇa (II. vii. 25-26).

महान्तं च समाकृत्य प्रधानं समवस्थितम् ।
अनन्तस्य न तस्यान्तः संख्यानं चापि विद्यते ॥ विष्णुपुराणम् ॥२।७।२५-२६॥

Pradhâna lies intact, enfolding Mahat. As it is infinite, there exists neither the end of it nor any enumeration.—126.

Points of dissimilarity amongst the Guṇas.

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादाद्यैर्गुणानामन्योऽन्यं वैधर्म्यम् ॥१।१२७॥

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादाद्यैः: Prîti-aprîti-viṣâda-âdyaiḥ, by means of pleasantness, unpleasantness, dullness, etc. गुणानाम् Guṇânâṃ, of the Guṇas. अन्योन्यं Anyonaṃ, from one another. वैधर्म्यम् Vaidharmyam, difference in properties.

127. The mutual difference in property of the Guṇas arises by means of their pleasantness, unpleasantness, and dullness, etc.—127.

Vṛitti.—The author states the mutual differences of character amongst the three Guṇas which are the constituent parts of Prakṛiti.

"Prîtiḥ" is Pleasure. By the word, âdi, is denoted the light and illuminating Sattva Guṇa. "Aprîtiḥ" is Pain. By the word, âdi, is denoted the exciting and restless Rajas Guṇa. "Viṣâdaḥ" is Bewilderment. By the word, âdi, is denoted the heavy and enveloping Tamas Guna.—127.

Bhâṣya.—For the purpose of the mutual discrimination of the Guṇas which are the causes of the world and are collectively called Pradhâna, the author establishes their minor differences of character also. An establishment of their dissimilarities is also necessary for the purpose of explaining how the three Guṇas can be the causes of this diversified world, inasmuch as variegated effects cannot possibly be produced from the same kind of causes.

"Guṇânâm," of the three Substances, *viz.*, Sattva, etc., mutual dissimilarity is caused by their being of the nature of Pleasure, Pain, etc., because those qualities are observed in their effects. Such is the meaning. And, it has been declared, Pleasure, etc., are the properties of also the water pot, etc., just as Form-Colour, etc., are their properties, since the other effects (those which come after the production of the Antaḥ-karaṇa), have the Antaḥ-karaṇa for their material cause.

The properties included in this aphorism by the word, âdi, have been thus declared by Âchârya Pañchaśikha :

सत्वं नाम प्रसादलाघवाभिष्वङ्गप्रीतितितिक्षासन्तोषादिरूपानन्तभेदं समासतः सुखात्मकम्। एवं रजोऽपि शोकादिनानाभेदं समासतः दुःखात्मकम्। एवं तमोऽपि निद्रादिनानाभेदं समासतो मोहात्मकम्॥

What is called Sattva, is of infinite variety under the forms of purity or clearness, lightness, love, agreeableness, renunciation, contentment, etc., which are summed up by the word Pleasant. Similarly, Rajas also possesses many varieties, such as, grief, etc., which are summed up by the word Painful. So, also, does Tamas possess many varieties, such as, sleep, etc., which are summed up by the word Bewildering.

Whereas in the present aphorism pleasantness etc., are declared to be the properties of the Guṇas, and whereas in the next aphorism lightness, etc., are going to be similarly declared, the substanceness of Sattva, etc., is thereby established. That the Guṇas partake of the nature of Pleasure, etc., is, however, justified according to the maxim that the

bject and its (essential) property are identical, as is the case with the anas partaking of the nature of volition; and not that it is Pleasure, etc., just the same as mentioned by the Vaiśeṣikas, that are the qualities of Sattva, etc.

The triad of Sattva, etc., again, are also infinite according to the diversity of individuals. For, the alternative tenet that while the Guṇas are universal merely, diversity of effects would follow from the diversity of their concourse with one another, would not be a reasonable one, since, in a case of concourse, there is no possibility of the appearance of minor or secondary differences.—127.

Assimilation and differentiation of the individual manifestations of the Guṇas.

लघ्वादिधर्मैः साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यं च गुणानाम् ॥१।१२८॥

लघ्वादिधर्मैः Laghu-âdi-dharmaiḥ, by the properties of lightness, etc. साधर्म्यं Sâdharmyaṃ, similarity. वैधर्म्यं Vaidharmyaṃ ,dissimilarity. च Cha, and. गुणानाम् Guṇânâm, of the Guṇas.

128. By means of the properties of Lightness, etc., arise the similarity and the dissimilarity of the Guṇas.—128.

Vritti.—In the course of describing their dissimilarity, the author states their similarity.

("Laghu-âdi-dharmaiḥ"), by (the properties or) of Lightness (Sattva), Restlessness (Rajas), and Heaviness (Tamas). Hereby their dissimilarity is declared. Similarity is indicated by the word "adi." And it consists of existence for the purpose of accomplishing the end of Puruṣa, and mutually predominating over one another, producing one another, and consorting together.—128.

Bhâṣya.—Were the Guṇas each a single manifestation only, their increase, decrease, and the like would not be reasonable. So, again, if, (for the purpose of accounting for the increase, decrease, and the like in the infinite number of individual manifestations—objects—in the world), they are said to be conditioned, determined or divided into parts by means of limiting conditions, then, in consequence thereof, their collective form, Pradhâna, would be similarly determined (which is not desirable), and, consequently, the simultaneous existence of innumerable worlds, etc., as proved in the Veda and the Smṛiti, would not be explained. Hence (the manifestations of) the Guṇas being proved to be innumerable, the author, for the purpose of accounting for the application of the number three to

them as well as for the purpose of their mutual discrimination, establishes their similarity and dissimilarity.

The meaning is this:—The expression "Laghu-âdi" points to the state (of being Light, *i. e.*, Lightness, etc.,) as the chief import. By means of the properties of Lightness, etc., arises the similarity of all individual manifestations of Sattva, as well as their dissimilarity from (those of) Rajas and Tamas. So that, as that of the individual manifestations or products of Earth, by means of the characteristic of their being of earth, earthy, likewise are justifiable the oneness of the individual manifestations of Sattva, by means of their being of one and the same kind, as well as their increase, decrease, and the like, by means of the excitation or motion caused by the predominance of their likes. Such is the import. Similarly, by means of the properties of Restlessness, etc., arise the similarity of all the individual manifestations of Rajas, as well as their dissimilarity from Sattva and Tamas. The rest is as before. Similarly, again, by means of the proprieties of Heaviness, etc., arise the similarity of all individual manifestations of Tamas, as well as their dissimilarity from Sattva and Rajas. The rest is as before.

Dissimilarity having been stated before, the repetition of it here is only incidental.

In this aphorism the reading "Vaidharmyam cha" is clearly erroneous.

In this aphorism, it is established that each of the *causal* substances, Sattva, etc., has manifold individual manifestations. Because, otherwise it would not be reasonable to say that Lightness, etc., are similarities, since it is the property of similars that alone constitutes their similarity. It cannot be said that Lightness, etc., would be the similarity in consequence of the manifoldness of Sattva, etc., as *effects*; because, in that case, since a water pot, (which is not light but is heavy), etc., also, being essentially made of the three Guṇas, are of the form of Sattva, etc., as effects, the similarity of Sattva, etc., in respect of Lightness etc., would not be proved. It follows, therefore, that it is of the Guṇas as *causes* only that similarity, etc., are declared here.

And the Lightness, etc., of Sattva, etc., have been declared by the Kârikâ.

सत्त्वं लघुप्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।
गुरु वरणकमेव तमः प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ कारिका ॥ १३ ॥

Sattva is considered to be Light and Illuminating, and Rajas, to be Exciting and Restless, and Tamas, Heavy and Enveloping. Like a lamp (consisting of oil, wick, and fire), they co-operate for a purpose (by union of contraries),—Kârikâ, Verse XIII.

"Arthataḥ", in the above verse, means: because the fulfilment of the end of Puruṣa is the nimitta or occasion or the instrumental cause of their action.

But, some one may ask, what is the difference (of the Sâṃkhya) from the Vaiśeṣika doctrine in regard to the innumerable conditioned or finite individual manifestations of the Root Cause? We would reply that it is just this that the Causal Substance (of the Sâṃkhya) is devoid of the attributes of Sound, Touch, etc., as taught in the Viṣṇu Purâṇa, etc. Thus,

शब्दस्पर्शविहीनं तु रूपादिभिरसंयुतम् ।
त्रिगुणं तज्जगद्योनिरनादिप्रभवाप्ययम् ॥ विष्णुपुराणम् २।२।२०-२१॥

The Combination of the three Guṇas (Prakṛiti) is devoid of Sound and Touch, and unconnected with Form, etc. That is the origin of the world, and is without beginning, production and destruction.—Viṣṇu Purâṇa I. ii. 20-21.

And this point has been elaborated by us in the Yoga Vârtika (on the Aphorisms of Patañjali.)—128.

Proof that Mahat, etc., are effects.

उभयान्यत्वात् कार्यत्वं महदादेर्घटादिवत् ॥१।१२९॥

उभयान्यत्वात् Ubhaya-anyatvât, being different from both, *i.e.*, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. कार्यत्वं Kâryatvam, effectness. महदादेः Mahat-âdeḥ, of Mahat, etc., घटादिवत् Ghaṭa-âdi-vat, like a water pot, etc.,

129. Since they are different from both (*i.e.*, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti—the only two uncaused entities), Mahat, etc., are effects, like a water pot, etc.—129.

Vṛitti.—By the aphorism "Hetumat etc.," (I. 124 *supra*), Mahat, etc., have been declared to be effects. The author now gives the proof of this.

("Ubhaya-anyatvât"): because they are other than Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, the eternal ones. The rest of the aphorism is clear.—129.

Bhâṣya.—But, some one may say, that, although Mahat, etc., may be said to be established (by what has been stated above), so far as their svarûpa or essential form (*i.e.*, subtle, causal or Prakṛitic state) is concerned, still, when their production is not seen by Perception, there is no proof that they become effects, whereby the being caused (hetumattva, I. 124 *supra*) would be their similarity in property. In regard to this, the author says.

The Principles beginning with Mahat and ending with the five (Gross Elements,) which form the subject of dispute, by no means, belong

to the category of Puruṣa, because they are the objects of experience (bhogya). Neither do they belong to the category of Prakṛiti, because, since they are perishable, Release would not result otherwise, (that is, if they belonged to the category of Prakṛiti, they would not be perishable, and, consequently, Release would not be possible. The fact that Release can be attained, is one of the reasons for the conclusion that Mahat, etc., are perishable. Hence it follows that everything other than Puruṣa and Prakṛiti is, in consequence of their very otherness, an effect, as is the case with a water pot, and the like. Such is the meaning.—129.

A second proof.

परिमाणात् ॥१।१३०॥

परिमाणात् Parimâṇât, from measure, delimitedness, finiteness.

130. Because of their limitedness.—130.

Vṛitti.—The author states another reason.

(Mahat, etc., are effects), because they are of a limited size.—130.

Bhâṣya.—But Release, etc., being possible by the very means of burning, etc., (*i. e.* counteracting, and not destroying) the powers of the Transformations, their perishableness also is not established. With this apprehension, the author gives other reasons to show that they are effects.

("Parimâṇât"): because they are conditioned or circumscribed, that is to say, because they possesses the jâti or class or general characteristic which serves to determine their being the counter-opposite of spatial non-existence or emptiness in space. Such is the meaning. Therefore, although some of the manifestations of the Guṇas are of a finite measure, still there is no violation of the rule in regard to them (that is, they are not imperishable).—130.

A third proof.

समन्वयात् ॥१।१३१॥

समन्वयात् Samanvayât, from conformity, agreement, correspondence.

131. Because of their correspondence (with Prakṛiti), (Anirudha). Or, because of their assimilation. (Vijñâna-Bhikṣu).—131.

Vṛitti.—The author states another argument.

Because of their complete correspondence with Pradhâna, as it is observed that the attributes of Pradhâna exist in all objects.—131.

Bhâṣya.—Moreover :

For, the principle Buddhi, etc., which had become weak on account of fast and the like, grows strong again by means of food, etc. "samanvayât," through the complete assimilation of the food with it. Hence from assimilation, it is inferred that they are effects. Such is the meaning. For, in the case of that which is eternal, and consequently partless, assimilation in the form of the entering of parts from the outside does not take place.

In regard to assimilation, there is the evidence of the Veda, with reference to Manas :

एवं ते सौम्य षोडशानां कलानामेका कलातिशिष्टाभूत् साऽन्नेनोपसमाहिता प्राज्वालीत्

Likewise, O peaceful one, only one kalâ (sixteenth part) among the sixteen kalâs of yours, was left in you. Being nourished with food (rice), it was kindled up again—Chh. Upa. VI. vii. 6, S. B. H. Vol. III.

There is also the testimony of the Yoga Sûtras (IV. 2) :

जात्यन्तरपरिणामः प्रकृत्यापूरात् ॥४।२॥

Transformation into other life-states, (*e. g.*, from man to god), takes place through assimilation of parts of the body and the senses taken from the all-pervading Prakṛiti. —S. B. H. Vol. IV. page 260.—131.

A fourth proof.

शक्तितश्चेति ॥१।१३२॥

शक्तितः—Śaktitaḥ, through the power of Prakṛiti (Aniruddha), through their being the instruments of Puruṣa (Vijñâna Bhikṣu). च Cha, and. इति Iti, finally.

132. And, finally, because they energise through the power of Prakṛiti (Aniruddha), or, because they are the instruments of Puruṣa (Vijñâna Bhikṣu).—132.

Vṛitti.—The author continues the same chain of arguments.

An effect energises through the power of the cause Accordingly, Mahat, etc., being powerless themselves, produce their effects by drawing upon the power of Prakṛiti or through being filled with power by Prakṛiti. Otherwise, since it is their habit to be active, they would at all times produce their effects, (which however is not the fact).—132.

Bhâṣya.--Furthermore :

Also because they are instruments. Such is the meaning. That which is a karaṇa or instrument of Puruṣa, is an effect, as is the case with the eye, etc. Such is the import.

It is not the case that Prakṛiti directly hands over objects to Puruṣa. Therefore, Prakṛiti is not the instrument of Puruṣa.

Hence the principle Mahat being established as an effect by means of its instrumentality, it necessarily follows that the rest also are effects.

The word "iti" indicates the end of the series of the arguments.—132.

Note:—With reference to these four aphorisms, (129-132), compare Kârikâ XV:—

भेदानां परिमाणात् समन्वयात् शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
कारणकार्यविभागाद् विभागाद्वैश्वरूपस्य ॥ कारिका ॥ १५ ॥

(The Unmanifested cause exists): since specific objects (Mahat, etc.) are finite; since they possess a certain similarity in form as a general characteristic; since they energise through power which they themselves do not possess; since there is the division of cause and effect; since there is undividedness or reunion of the universe at the time of dissolution.

Negative proof that Mahat, etc. are effects.

तद्धाने प्रकृतिः पुरुषो वा ॥१।१३३॥

तद्धाने Tat-hâne, on the quitting or elimination thereof, *i. e*, of the condition of the effect. प्रकृतिः Prakṛitiḥ, Prakṛiti. पुरुषः Puruṣaḥ, Puruṣa. वा Vâ, or.

133. On the elimination of the character of the effect, what remains must be either Puruṣa or Prakṛiti.—133.

Vṛitti.—The author gives a negative proof (by showing what becomes of Mahat, etc., when they pass away from the state of being effects).

Effect and not-effect, these are the two alternatives. So that when Mahat, etc. give up the condition of effect, they necessarily enter into the category of either Puruṣa or Prakṛiti.—133.

Bhâṣya.—And even if it be admitted that, among Mahat, etc., there may be some which are not effects, still then the same must be either Puruṣa or Prakṛiti, and thereby our object will be accomplished, because the whole scope of our philosophy is just this that, after establishing the existence of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, they should be discriminated from each other by means of their transformability and non-transformability. This the author declares.

"Tat-hâne," on the elimination of the condition of effect, if it is transformable, then it is Prakṛiti, and if, on the other hand, non-transformable experiencer, then, Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.—133.

What is not an effect, and, at the same time, is neither Puruṣa nor Prakṛiti, is a void.

तयोरन्यत्वे तुच्छत्वम् ॥१।१३४॥

तयोः Tayoḥ, from them. अन्यत्वे Anyatve, being different. तुच्छत्वम् Tuchchhatvam, nothingness, voidness.

134. If (a non-effect is) other than these two (Puruṣa and Prakṛiti,) it would be nothing.—134.

Vṛitti.—If it be said that Mahat, etc. may very well be quite outside the pair of alternatives mentioned above: so the author declares.

If Mahat, etc. be other than these, *i. e.*, effect and not-effect, they would be nothing, *i. e.*, of the form of non-existence.—134.

Bhâṣya.—But, it may be said, even an eternal entity may very well be different from both (Puruṣa and Prakṛiti). To this the author replies.

If a not-effect be other than Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, it would be void, like the horn of a hare, on account of absence of proof of its existence. For, a not-effect is proved either as the cause (Prakṛiti) or as the experiencer (Puruṣa), and not otherwise. Such is the meaning.—134.

Ground of inference of cause from effect.

कार्यात् कारणानुमानं तत्साहित्यात् ॥१।१३५॥

कार्यात् Kâryât, from effect. कारणानुमानं Kâraṇa-anumânam, inference of cause. तत्साहित्यात् Tat-sâhityat, through accompaniment thereof, *i. e.*, of the effect by the cause.

135. The inference of the cause from the effect is made through the accompaniment of the effect by the cause. —135.

Vṛitti.—But why should Mahat, etc., be the inferential marks of Prakṛiti, by means of the characteristic of being effects thereof, (*i.e.* through causation)? They will be the mark of inference, some one may say, merely through the relation of a-vinâ-bhâva or of one not being without the other (*i. e.* co-existence.) In regard to this the author says.

This may be the case, (that is, a-vinâ-bhâva may be the ground of inference), where the form or nature of the cause is not seen in the effect, as, *e. g.*, in the case of the inference of the swollenness of the ocean from the rising of the moon. In the present case, on the other hand, from seeing the form or nature of Pradhâna in Mahat, etc., it is the inference of the cause that is made from the effect.

"Tat-sâhityât": from seeing the form or nature of Prikṛiti in Mahat etc.—135.

Bhâṣya.—Thus, then, after establishing the character of effect as belonging to Mahat, etc., the author now points out a peculiarity, not mentioned before, in the inference of Prakṛiti by means of them as the inferential marks.

The inference, Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa, that has been stated above (*vide* aphorism I. 103 *supra*), of the cause (Prakṛiti) through the effects, Mahat Tattva, etc. as marks, that, in order to prevent its being of an external character as that of the inference of two independent things only externally related, should be made "tat-sâhityât", just by means of the relation of the cause accompanying the effect, in accordance with the teachings of the Veda, *e. g.*,

सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्

This, O peaceful one, was verily existent at the beginning.—Chh. Upa. VI. ii. 1.

तम एवेदमग्र आसीत्

This was verily Tamas or Darkness at the beginning.—Maitr. Upa. V. 2.

And that (process of inference) is as follows:

Mahat, etc. have for their material cause a substance constituted by the three Guṇas which are super-imposed upon them,

Because they are effects,

As is the case with the statue inherent in a block of marble,

As is also the case with the oil, etc. present in oil-seeds. etc.

Such is the meaning.

Argument favourable or in support of the above inference has been set forth before.—135.

The Manifested is the mark of inference of the Unmanifested.

अव्यक्तं त्रिगुणाल्लिङ्गात् ॥१।१३६॥

अव्यक्तं Avyaktaṃ, the Unmanifested, Prakṛiti. त्रिगुणात् Triguṇât, made of the three Guṇas. लिङ्गात् Liṅgât, from the effect.

136. The Unmanifested must be inferred from the Liṅgam or effect in which the three Guṇas are present.—136.

Vṛitti.—But, (it may be objected), if it be so (*i. e.*, that the nature of Prakṛiti is present in Mahat, etc.), then, let the Principle Mahat itself be the cause of the world; what need of Pradhâna? To this the author replies.

Pradhâna should be inferred from the Liṅgam, *etymologically* that which goes to dissolution, namely, the Principle Mahat, containing the three Guṇas. And it is established by Perception that the Principle Mahat which is of the form of ascertainment, is a manifested entity, and is perishable. By means of it is made the inference of that (*viz.*, Prakṛiti) of which it is the Liṅgam, effect or mark.—136.

Bhâṣya.—For the purpose of discriminating the difference in property of this Prakṛiti from the effects, the author says.

The Root Cause, the Unmanifested, is subtler than even the manifested Principle Mahat made of the three Guṇas; because the attributes of the Principle Mahat, *e. g.*, Pleasure, etc., are directly perceived, while no attribute of Prakṛiti is directly perceived. Prakṛiti is absolutely unmanifested, whereas, by comparison with her, the Principle Mahat is a manifested entity. Such is the meaning.—136.

The existence of Prakṛiti cannot be ignored.

तत्कार्यतस्तत्सिद्धेर्नापलापः ॥१।१३७॥

तत्कार्यतः Tat-kâryatah, from the effect thereof, *i. e.*, of Prakṛiti. तत्सिद्धेः Tat-siddheḥ, because there is proof thereof, *i. e.*, of Prakṛiti. न Na, no. अपलापः Apalâpah, denial, ignoring.

137. There can be no denial of Prakṛiti, because the existence of Prakṛiti is established through her products. —137.

Vṛitti—But, some one may say, something quite different may be the cause of the world; what need of Prakṛiti? To this the author replies.

The cause in question must be either an effect or a not-effect. If it be an effect itself, then the same being the case with its cause, there would be infinite regression. If it be the original or root or primordial effect, then, this itself is that, namely, Prakṛiti. "Tat-kâryatah", from the effects of Prakṛiti, existence of Prakṛiti being established, there can be no ignoring of Prakṛiti.—137.

Bhâṣya.—But, some one may say, if Prakṛiti were transcendentally subtle, then, it deserves to be ignored altogether. There being room for this doubt, the author reminds of what has been stated before.

The aphorism is easy to understand.—137.

Existence of Puruṣa requires no proof.

सामान्येन विवादाभावाद्धर्मवन्न साधनम् ॥१।१३८॥

सामान्येन Sâmânyena, in a general way, as to the existence of Puruṣa. विवादाभावात् Vivâda-abhâvât, there being no dispute. धर्मवत् Dharma-vat, as is the case with Dharma or Merit. न Na, no. साधनम् Sâdhanam, means of proof, ground of inference. Aniruddha reads tat, that, between 'na' and 'Sâdhanam.' This 'tat' refers to the relation of cause and effect which is the ground of inference in the case of Prakṛiti.

138. No means of establishing (the existence of Puruṣa is required), because there is no dispute on the general question (that Puruṣa exists), as is the case with Dharma.—138.

Vṛitti.—Granted, may say our opponent, that the existence of Prakṛiti is established; but the existence of Puruṣa cannot be established, because Puruṣa does not, according to your theory, produce any effect. In regard to this the author says.

There is no dispute whatever in regard to the Self on the general question (of its existence, for everybody is agreed that there exists such a thing as Self); for, the dispute is as to its particular character, that is, whether it be manifold or one, all-pervading or not all-pervading, etc. As, for example, in all systems of philosophy, there is no dispute that such a thing as Dharma exists, and opinions differ only as to its particular nature.

"Na tat-sâdhanam";: the relation of cause and effect is not the means of proof of the existence of Puruṣa. "I will mention some other means"—such is the intention.—138.

Bhâṣya.—The peculiarities belonging to the inference of Prakṛiti have been discussed in detail. Henceforth, until the end of the Book, the peculiarities belonging to the inference of Puruṣa are the subject of discussion. From among them, the author mentions one peculiarity which presents itself at the beginning.

The establishment of a thing in its essential form (svarûpa) or in the form of an existence merely, is not looked for, where there is no dispute in respect of the thing in its universal or general aspect of being existent: as of Dharma. Such is the meaning.

The idea is as follows: As the establishment of Prakṛiti was looked for even under the general aspect of her existence, because there was dispute as to the existence of something which might be taken to be the subject of properties (*viz.*, Pleasure, Pain and Bewilderment) actually observed, so is not looked for the establishment of Puruṣa, inasmuch as on the ignoring of the existence of a conscious being, the world would become dark, and also because even the Bauddhas do not dispute the existence in general of something of which the "I" may be predicated, as the experiencer. As is the case with Dharma: For Dharma is generally (though not in the particular characters given to it by thinkers of the orthodox schools) admitted by the Bauddhas also, when they admit

that the power of walking upon heated stones is due to Dharma or Merit. Hence, in respect of Puruṣa, should be made the inference only of his eternality, discrimination, etc.

Also, by the previous aphorism (I. 66 *supra*): "Saṃhata-para-artha-tvât", it is only the inference of the discrimination of Puruṣa, that is intended; and it is not intended there that Puruṣa is by no means an object of Perception.*—138.

Puruṣa is different from Prakṛiti and her products.

शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः पुमान् ॥१।१३९॥

शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः Śarîra-âdi-vyatiriktaḥ, different from, other than, the body, etc. पुमान् Pumân, Puruṣa.

139. Puruṣa is something other than the body, etc.—139.

Vṛitti.—But, it may be said, it is the body, the senses, and the like, that is the Self; what need of imagining anything else? In regard to this the author says.

The meaning is quite plain.—139.

Bhâṣya.—Of these, (eternality, discrimination, etc.), at the opening of the present discourse, the author lays down an aphorism enunciating the discrimination of Puruṣa.

Puruṣa, *i. e.*, the Experiencer, is other than the things, beginning with the body and ending with Prakṛiti, which are made of the twenty-four Principles. And experiencership consists in being the witness of the changes in the products of Prakṛiti.—139.

The discerptible is subservient to the indiscerptible.

संहतपरार्थत्वात् ॥१।१४०॥

संहतपरार्थत्वात् Saṃhata-para-artha-tvât, because a structure made up of parts exists to serve the purpose of another who is not so made.

140. Because a structure formed by a combination of parts, exists for the benefit of another not so formed.—140.

Vṛitti.—The author states an argument in support of the above proposition.

That which is formed by a combination of parts, exists to serve the purpose of some other not formed by a combination of parts. If it were

* Garbe, Hall, and Jivânanda all read this passage as part of the introduction to the next aphorism. This, however, is wrong, as the sense and context would at once show.

said to exist for the benefit of some other formed also by a combination of parts, the result would be infinite regression.

And the being formed by a combination of parts means the production of effects by the Guṇas by means of the relation of their consorting with one another. Or, the being formed by a combination of parts denotes the possession of fluidity (including liquidity) and solidity. And this (the being formed by a combination of parts) lies hidden in Prakṛiti, etc., as, otherwise, the consequence would be the non-observation of the condition of being formed by a combination of parts in their effects.—140.

Bhâṣya.—Now the author gives the reasons for the above proposition in the following aphorisms.

Inasmuch as all that is formed by a combination of parts, *e. g.*, Prakṛiti, etc., is for the benefit of some other not so formed, as is the case with a bed, etc; hence is established something other than the body, etc., which are formed by combinations of parts, that is, something not formed by a combination of parts, that is Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

And this argument has been explained under the aphorism: "Saṁhata-para-artha-tvât Puruṣasya" (I. 66 *supra*). The repetition of the argument which has been already stated before, is for the purpose of collecting all the arguments in one place.—140.

A second argument

त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् ॥१।१४१॥

त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् Triguṇa-âdi-viparyayât, from the absence of the properties of the three Guṇas, etc.

141. (Puruṣa is different from the body, etc., also) because there is in him the reverse (of the properties) of the three Guṇas, etc.—141.

Vṛitti.—The author elucidates the same point.

"Triguṇa-âdi-viparyayât": from the non-observation of the properties of the three Guṇas, etc., in Puruṣa. The word "âdi" implies the non-observation of the other properties also of Prakṛiti.—141.

Bhâṣya.—Moreover:

From (seeing in Puruṣa) the reverse of the characteristics of partaking of the nature of Pleasure, Pain and Bewilderment etc. Such is the meaning. For, the property of partaking of the nature of, and thereby being the cause of, Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, which belongs to the body, etc., cannot belong to the experiencer of Pleasure, etc., since, in that case, Pleasure, etc., being the experiencer of themselves, there would be the

ontradiction of the act and the agent; since the perception of Pleasure, tc. takes place only by seeing them reflected in the subject of the proper-les, *i. e.*, Buddhi in which Pleasure, etc. inhere.

But, our opponent may say, Pleasure, etc. (which according to him ould be the properties of Puruṣa), being reflected in the modifications of uddhi, may be received by Puruṣa, as is the case with himself (*i. e.*, cogni-ion of himself through reflection in Buddhi). We reply that it cannot be o; as, in that case, it would be but proper to suppose Pleasure, etc., to be roperties of Buddhi itself, because of redundancy in the supposition of he reflection in Buddhi of Pleasure, etc., belonging to Puruṣa.

Intuitions, again, such as "I feel pleasure," "I feel pain," "I am in olusion," etc., do not prove that Pleasure, etc., inhere in Puruṣa, because hey can be attributed to the fact that Pleasure, etc., belong to Puruṣa in he sense in which a thing belongs to its owner, as well as to the fact that Pleasure, etc. reside in Buddhi. For, Buddhi also must be the subject of he idea of the "I" current among the common people, because the faults n the shape of false knowledge, tendency or desire, etc., re-appear or enter nto it, and, further, because there would be redundancy in the supposition f these intuitions being only reflections in Buddhi.

By the word "âdi" here are to be included non-discriminativeness, tc. declared by the Kârikâ beginning with

त्रिगुणमविवेकि

The Manifested (*i. e.* the effect) is constituted by the three Guṇas, is non-discrimi-tive.—Kârikâ, verse X (*vide* page 182 *supra*, under aph. 126).

Similarly should also be included the properties of the body, etc., namely, Form (Rûpa), etc.—141.

A third argument.

अधिष्ठानाच्चेति ॥१।१४२॥

अधिष्ठानात् Adhiṣṭhânât, from superintendence or governership. च Cha, and, also. इति Iti, finally.

142. And, finally, (Puruṣa is different from the body, etc.), because of his superintendence (over them).—142.

Vṛitti.—The author states another argument.

For, a superintendent must be an intelligent being, while Prakṛiti is non-intelligent. Such is the meaning.—142.

Bhâṣya;—Furthermore:

From the fact that the experiencer is the superintendent, it follows that he is other than the entities that are superintended over, *viz.*, those ending with Prakṛiti. Such is the meaning.

For, superintendence consists in the conjunction of the experiencer. And this conjunction is the cause of the transformations of Prakṛiti, etc., which (transformations) cause experience, as will appear from the future aphorism (V. 114):

भोक्तुरधिष्ठानात् भोगायतननिर्माणम्॥५।११४॥

From the superintendence of the Experiencer, takes place the building of the house of experience (*i. e.*, the body).—Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram, V. 114 *infra*.

And conjunction is possible only where there is difference (of the things conjoined). Such is the import.

The word "iti" marks the end of the series of arguments.—142.

A fourth argument.

भोक्तृभावात् ॥१।१४३॥

भोक्तृभावात् Bhoktṛi-bhâvât, from being the experiencer.

143. (Puruṣa is other than the body, etc.), because of his being the Experiencer.—143.

Vṛitti.—The author states another argument.

The object of experience is Prakṛiti, the experiencer is Puruṣa. Although experiencership does not properly belong to the Self on account of its remaining immutable in all ages, still it is attributed to it, as has been already explained (*vide* aphorism 58), because of the fact that the reflection of Buddhi occurs to it or that it casts its reflection in Buddhi, and thereby comes in contact with the objects of experience.—143.

Bhâṣya.—By the next two aphorisms the author sets forth favourable arguments confirming the above inference of the discrimination of Puruṣa from Prakṛiti.

For, were the experiencer to be essentially of the same form as the body, etc., and nothing else, then experiencership itself would be contradicted and disproved, on account of the contradiction of the act and the agent; since there is so proof that a thing can directly be the experiencer of itself. Such is the meaning. The absence of proof just now alluded to has been already explained.

In the present aphorism, it should be remembered, it is admitted that experience belongs to Puruṣa. And the experience of Puruṣa who does not undergo transformation, has been explained in the aphorism (I. 104 *supra.*) "Chit-avasâno bhogah": The end of experience is in Consciousness.—143.

A fifth argument.

कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥१।१४४॥

कैवल्यार्थं Kaivalya-artham, for the purpose of the absolute independence or isolation of Puruṣa. प्रवृत्तेः Pravṛitteḥ, exertion or activity being. च Cha, and.

144. (Puruṣa is other than the body, etc.), because all activity is for the purpose of the isolation of Puruṣa.—144.

Vṛitti.—Activity is with a view to Release. Now, is this activity for the benefit of the Self or of Prakṛiti? To this the author replies.

Since she partakes of the nature of the three Guṇas, there can be no lapse or deviation of nature (as, for instance, by means of isolation) in the case of Prakṛiti. Futher, because that would entail her non-ternality. Isolation (kaivalya) is possible of that of which the attributes are adventitious and not constitutive; and that is the Self.—144.

Bhâṣya.—Still further:

If it be said that the experiencer is nothing but the body, etc., then, for the purpose of the isolation, *i. e.*, for the purpose of the absolute or permanent eradication of pain, activity on the part of any one whatever would not be reasonable or possible, seeing that the body, etc., are by nature perishable. In the case of Prakṛiti, again, isolation is not possible, because Prakṛiti is established as having Pain for its essence, by "dharmi-grâhaka-mâna" (*i. e.*, the evidence of observed but otherwise unexplained facts leading to the supposition of something as the subject, and thus the cause, of those unexplained properties, in other words, by hypothetical inference); and absolute eradication of nature never takes place. Such is the meaning.

The reading of the present aphorism as "Kaivalyârtham Prakṛiteḥ" is erroneous and, as such, should be discarded. The reading "Kaivalyârtham Pravṛitteścha" is obtained from the Kârikâ also:—

संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ कारिका ॥ १७ ॥

Puruṣa exists: since a structure of manifold parts (which the world is), is for the benefit of another of a different character; since the reverse of the nature of the three Guṇas must exist; since there must exist a superintendent; since there must be an experiencer; since activity is with a view to isolation.—Kârikâ, Verse 17.

The other reading should be rejected also because it is not in harmony with the sense intended to be expressed.—144.

Nature of Pu[illegible] [illegible]on.

जड़प्रकाशायोगात् प्रकाशः [illegible] ॥

जड़प्रकाशायोगात् Jaḍa-parkâśa-a-yogât, from the absence of connection of the unintelligent with the light. प्रकाशः Prakâśaḥ, light.

145. Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent, light (must be the nature of the intelligent, *i. e.*, Puruṣa).—145.

Vṛitti.—Of what form or nature is this Self? To this the author replies.

It is a settled point that the unintelligent does not throw light on, *i. e.*, manifest, objects. If the Self also were to be unintelligent, then there must exist something else to illuminate it. (And in this way the result would be non-finality.) And also, on the ground of simplicity, let the Self itself be of the form of light. The Veda also bears testimony to the Self being of the nature of light. Thus

येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात् ।
विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् ॥

Wherewith shall one cognize that wherewith one cognizes all this? Wherewith Lo, shall one cognize the cognizer?—Bṛi. Âraṇ. Upa. IV. iv. 14.—145.

Bhâṣya.—Puruṣa has been established as being other than the twenty-four Principles. Now, with a view to make this discrimination more manifest, the peculiarity appertaining to Puruṣa is going to be inferred.

The Vaiśeṣikas say: Through conjunction of Manas, is produced the light, called cognition, of the Self which was unintelligent and of the form of not-light before. But this is not the case, because connection of light cannot take place in what is unintelligent, as, in the world, we never observe the production of light or illuminativeness in a clod of earth, etc., which are unintelligent and non-illuminative. It follows, therefore, that Puruṣa is, like the sun and the like, truly and essentially of the form of light. Such is the meaning.

Thus says the Smṛiti:—

यथा प्रकाशतमसोः सम्बन्धो नोपपद्यते ।
तद्वदैक्यं न शंसध्वं प्रपञ्चपरमात्मनोः ॥

As no relation can take place between light and darkness, do not likewise suspect the unity of the fabric of the world and of the Supreme Self.—Kâlikâ Purâṇa, II. ii. 10.

And also

यथा दीपः प्रकाशात्मा ह्रस्वो वा यदि वा महान् ।
ज्ञानात्मानं तथा विद्यात् पुरुषं सर्वजन्तुषु ॥

As the lamp is of the nature of illumination, no matter whether it be large or small; likewise, one shall know Puruṣa, in all creatures, to be of the nature of cognition.

And lightn[illegible] penetrating all consciousnesses manifested in [illegible] as individual beings. The upâdhi of the adjunct that may be imposed on it is that it is one and undivided, because it is treated as penetrative.—145.

Consciousness is not an attribute, but the essence, of Puruṣa.

निर्गुणत्वान्न चिद्धर्मा ॥१।१४६॥

निर्गुणत्वात् Nir-guṇa-tvât, being devoid of attributes. न Na, not. चिद्धर्मा Chit-dharmâ, that which has consciousness or intelligence as a property.

146. Intelligence is not a property of Puruṣa, because he is free from attributes.—146.

Vṛitti.—But, our opponent, the Naiyâyikas, may say, let the Self be unintelligent, and although it is unintelligent, as they hold, still have intelligence as a property. Thereby it will illumine the world. But it cannot be of the form of intelligence. To this the author replies.

If the Self were to be connected with a property, then, it would be liable to transformation, and, consequently, would never obtain Release, (its transformation going on eternally).—146.

Bhaṣya.—But, it may still be asked, even though Puruṣa be essentially of the form of light, does the relation of the property and the subject of the property exist in the present case, as it does in the case of Tejas or 'fire,' or does it not? To this the author replies.

The meaning is quite plain.

When, it being established that Puruṣa is of the form of light, other uses of Puruṣa are made possible by means of this relation of identity with light, it would be redundant to imagine that Puruṣa possesses a property having the nature of light. This should also be understood.

Of Tejas or 'fire,' again, although a particular form called light is not perceived, still, since it is perceived through Touch, the difference of light and fire is established. Of the Self, on the other hand, there is no knowledge or apprehension at all during the non-apprehension of the light called cognition. Hence, on the ground of simplicity, the Self is conceived as a substance absolutely of the form of light and devoid of the relation of the property and the subject of the property.

And the Self is not an attribute, since it possesses conjunction, etc., and is not dependent upon anything else as a support. So is it recollected in the Smṛiti,

ज्ञानं नैवात्मनो धर्मो न सुखं वा कथञ्चन ।
ज्ञानस्वरूप एवात्मा नित्यः पूर्णः सदा शिवः ॥

Cognition is in no sense a property of the Self nor an attribute. The Self is just constituted by cognition as its essence, is eternal, entire, and blissful always.

But, what, it may be asked, is the reason for the statement itself that the Self is devoid of attributes? To this we reply as follows: It is not possible to say that the desire, etc., of Puruṣa should be eternal, because they are found by perception to be producible; and, if you admit a producible attribute in the case of Puruṣa, it would entail his liability to transformation. So that, redundancy would be the result on the supposition of both of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti as the cause of transformation. And since a blind transformation would sometimes entail Puruṣa not being the knower, the result would be the doubt as to whether cognition, desire, etc., be within the cognizance of Puruṣa. Similarly from what has been already stated, namely, that the unintelligent has no fitness for association with light, it is impossible to have cognition of the eternal as non-eternal.

Again, by the methods of agreement and difference, desire etc., are, on the ground of simplicity, established in Manas alone; since the supposition that the conjunction of Manas as well as the Self are the causes of desire, etc., would be redundant.

And the word "guṇa" in "nir-guṇa", it has been already stated, signifies particular attributes. (and not the universal guṇas, Sattva, etc.).

It follows, therefore, that the Self is devoid of attributes.

Moreover, with those Logicians who desire the agency of the Self, there can be no proof or possibility of Release, since it is this modification of Buddhi, namely, "I am the agent," that has been declared in the Gîtâ (*vide* III. 27 for instance), etc., as being the cause of the production of Adṛiṣṭam or Merit and Demerit. Again, as, in their opinion, such modification of Buddhi or idea does not possess the nature of false knowledge, it is impossible that it should be removed by knowledge of truth. Hence, seeing that the Release taught in the Veda is not possible on any other theory, it is desired by us that the Self is not the agent. And, from its not being the agent follows the non-existence of pleasure, etc., in the shape of Adṛiṣṭam. And thereafter Manas having to be conceived as the cause of deeds to be done, etc., the supposition is made within the limitations imposed by attributes internally or occultly visible.

It follows, therefore, that the Self is devoid of attributes.

In the Yoga-Vâsiṣṭha-Râmâyaṇa, the svarûpa or essential form of the absolutely subtle and pure Self, as shown above, has been described as

clearly as an Âmalaki (emblic myrobalan) in the hand, and established discriminatively. Thus

असम्भवति सर्वत्र दिग्भूम्याकाशरूपिणि ।
प्रकाश्ये यादृशं रूपं प्रकाशस्यामलं भवेत् ॥
त्रिजगत् त्वमहं वेति दृश्येऽसत्तामुपागते ।
द्रष्टुः स्यात् केवलीभावस्तादृशो विमलात्मनः ॥

That shall be the pure form of the Light (*i.e.*, the Self), which exists in the illuminable in the shape of Space, Earth, Ether, during their non-production.

When the three worlds, you and I,—all the illuminable vanishes out of existence, then would be the isolated state of the beholder; similar is the state of the Pure Self.—146.

The Veda is higher evidence than Perception.

श्रुत्या सिद्धस्य नापलापस्तत्प्रत्यक्षबाधात् ॥१।१४७॥

श्रुत्या Śrutyâ, by the Veda. सिद्धस्य Siddhasya, of that which is established. न Na, no. अपलापः Apalâpaḥ, negation, denial, ignoring. तत्प्रत्यक्षबाधात् Tat-pratyakṣa-bâdhât, from contradiction of the perception thereof, *i.e.*, of attributes, etc.

147. There can be no ignoring of what is established by the Veda, because of the contradiction by the Veda itself of the perception of attributes, etc., in the Self.—147.

Vritti.—The author points out that the theory of the Logicians is in contradiction to the Veda.

The text of the Veda in question is

असङ्गोह्ययं पुरुषः

For this Puruṣa is free from attachment.—Bṛi. Âraṇ. Upa, IV. iii. 15.

It would be contradicted if there were any association of attributes in the Self.—147.

Bhâṣya.—But, the Logician may urge, from the perception of the relation of the property and the subject of the property between Consciousness and Puruṣa in such cases as "I cognize," it is established that Consciousness belongs to Puruṣa as a property. If there is any redundancy here, it is no fault, being authoritative or valid. To this the author replies.

Your objection could stand, if we established that consciousness, etc., are not properties of Puruṣa, because, by *mere reasoning*, we find that he is free from attributes. But we do so by the help of Vedic texts also. Hence contradiction of Puruṣa's being devoid of attributes, etc., as established by the Veda, is not possible, because of the contradiction of the

perception thereof, *i.e.*, of attributes, etc., by the Vêda itself, as of the perceptions "I am fair," etc. Such is the meaning. For, otherwise, on the strength of the perception "I am fair," would be contradicted or obstructed also the arguments which establish the Self as other than the body; and triumphant would be the Nâstikas or Nihilists.

As to Puruṣa's being devoid of attributes, the texts of the Veda are, for example:

साक्षी चेताः केवलो निर्गुणश्च

The Self is the Witness, Intelligent, Pure, and Attributeless.—Śveta-Aśvatara Upaniṣat VI. 11.

As to Puruṣa's being mere or pure consciousness, the texts of the Veda are, for example:

अकर्त्ता चैतन्यं चिन्मात्रं सच्चिदेकरसो ह्ययमात्मा

For this Self is Non-agent, Consciousness, Pure Intelligence, of the form of the uniform and unmixed flow of Existence and Consciousness.—Vedânta-Sâra, 158.

The texts of the Veda, on the other hand, which declare Omniscience etc., in regard to the Self, are mere translations of the empty imaginations of the common people, which convey no more sense than that of "the head of Râhu" (Râhu being all head). For, these texts being in conflict with those cited above, authoritativeness belongs to the latter and not to the former, according to the accepted rule of interpretation that, among Vedic texts, prescriptive and prohibitive, it is the negative texts, that are the stronger of the two; there being such negative texts of the Veda as the following:

अथात आदेशो नेति नेति न ह्य तस्मादिति नेत्यन्यत् परमस्ति

Now, then, the direction "Neti" "Neti" Not, Not, for does *not* something other than, and beyond, this (visible world) *not* exist?—Bṛi. Âraṇ. Upa. II. iii. 6.

Moreover, the very supposition that the intuition of the ignorant in the form of "I cognize," is a valid or right cognition (pramâ), is redundant, since, when the fault of eternal Nescience or Ignorance pursues all mortals, to err is the ordinary rule. Hence, as it falls in the midst of hundreds of errors and is thereby attacked or affected with the apprehension of unauthoritativeness, inference (apart from the declaration of the Veda) supported by considerations of simplicity, etc., is alone sufficient as a confutation of such intuition as "I cognize."

But, it may be asked, what sort of simplicity there is in the conception of the Self as having eternal knowledge as its essence? To this we reply as follows: By the Naiyâyikas, etc., four Padârthas or Predicables are conceived, *viz.*, Antaḥ-karaṇa or the internal instrument, Vyavasâya,

r certainty, Anu-vyavasâya or pro-certainty (or subsidiary processes), and ıe substratum thereof; while, by us, three Padârthas or Predicables are onceived, *viz.*, Antaḥkaraṇa, the function or modification thereof in the lace of certainty as well as in the place of the infinite instances of pro-ertainty, and the Self in the form of eternal and uniform cognition.—147.

Puruṣa is merely the witness of the states, dreamless sleep, etc.

सुषुप्त्याद्यसाक्षित्वम् ॥१।१४८॥

सुषुप्त्याद्यसाक्षित्वम् Suṣupti-âdya-sâkṣitvam, the being the witness of the states of reamless sleep, etc., (Vijñâna Bhikṣu). सुषुप्त्यादिसाक्षित्वम् Suṣupti-âdi-a-sâkṣitvam, the ot being the witness etc., (Aniruddha).

148. (If Puruṣa were not intelligent, he would) not be he witness of the states of dreamless sleep, etc. (Anir-iddha.)

Or, Puruṣa is merely the witness of the states of lreamless sleep, etc., (hence Puruṣa's being of the nature of ight does not affect them).—(Vijñâna Bhikṣu).—148.

Vṛitti.—The author points out another defect in the opposite theory. If the Self were unintelligent, then, in dreamless sleep, etc., it would ot be the witness, *i.e.*, the knower, of those states. But this is not the ase, because of the recollection on awakening, in the form of "I slept leasantly."

By the word "âdi," dreaming is included.—148.

Bhâṣya.—But, it may be argued, if the Self be absolutely of the orm of light, then, the difference of the states of dreamless sleep, etc., ould not be justified, because of this that the light would never for a oment depart. In regard to this the author replies.

Puruṣa is merely the witness, and, nothing more, of the three tates of dreamless sleep, (dreaming and waking) which pertain to Buddhi. uch is the meaning. So has it been declared:

जाग्रत् स्वप्नं सुषुप्तं च गुणतो बुद्धिवृत्तयः ।
तासां विलक्षणो जीवः साक्षित्वेन व्यवस्थितः ॥

The states of waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep are modifications of Buddhi ccording to differences of the Guṇas. The Jiva or transmigratory Self which is of a ifferent character from them, is established as their witness.

The Jiva who is "Tat-vilakṣaṇa" *i.e.*, bereft of the waking and the ther states, has been ascertained as being the witness, "tâsâm" of these odifications of Buddhi. Such is the meaning.

Among these states, that is called the waking state in which takes place the modification of Buddhi into the form of the objects through the channel of the Senses; and dreaming is that state in which such modification is produced from saṃskâra or impressions merely. And dreamless sleep is twofold, according as the laya or passing into latency is partial or complete. Of these, in the state of half latency, modification of Buddhi into the form of objects does not occur, but Buddhi is modified into the shapes only of the Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment inhering in it; since, otherwise, it would not be possible for one rising from sleep to have remembrance of Pleasure, etc., experienced during dreamless sleep, in such forms as "I slept pleasantly," etc. Accordingly it has been declared by the aphorism of Vyâsa (Vedânta Sûtras, III. ii 10):

मुग्धेऽर्धसम्पत्तिः परिशेषात् ॥३।२।१०॥

In the swooning condition, the Jiva is in half combination with Brahman; because the rule of the remainder shows this.—S. B. H. Vol. V, page 465.

In the state of complete latency, on the other hand, there is absence of the modification in general of Buddhi, as in the case of death and the like; as, otherwise, there would be no justification for the future aphorism,

समाधिसुषुप्तिमोक्षेषु ब्रह्मरूपता ॥५।११६॥

Modification into the form of Brahman takes place in the states of Trance, Deep Sleep and Release.—V. 116 *infra*.

And since this complete deep sleep is of the form of the non-existence of the modifications of Buddhi, Puruṣa does not become the witness of it, because Puruṣa is the witness of the modifications merely. For, if it were not so, then Saṃskâra or impression and other properties of Buddhi also would be the objects to be illumined by the witness.

We will, however, say that the being the witness of the states of dreamless sleep, etc. consists in the illumination of similar transformations of Buddhi reflected in Puruṣa. Hence, for the purpose of cognition, the transformation of Puruṣa is not needed.

It might be so, says our opponent. If modification of Buddhi, cognizant of Pleasure, Pain, etc., is desired, in deep sleep, then, it is but proper to admit, that, in the waking and other states also, all the modifications are capable of being apprehended by the modifications themselves. And this being admitted, the supposition of Puruṣa as the wi[illegible] of these modifications is useless, since it is more easy generally to [illegible] that they are the cause of their own uses or phenomenal appear[illegible]nst by means of their being the modifications, which are within the[illegible]n cognizance.

We reply that the case is not thus. On the supposition that, as a rule, the modifications are the objects of cognition by themselves, the consequence would be non-finality and redundancy. Moreover, since pleasure, etc. are distinctive pecularities in such modifications as "I am pleased" etc., indiscrete or abstract or absolute congnition of these modifications is in the first instance looked for. And in regard to that, supposition is made by us of cognition which forms the essence of the Self and is eternal and absolutely one and undivided, since it is simpler and more natural than an infinite indiscrete modification. In order to account for such discrete or particular cognitions as, "I am pleased", etc., we hold that it is the modification of Buddhi that assumes similar forms; for, since the admission of even a nominal similarity in form of Puruṣa with the modification of Buddhi would amount to a non-admission of a form of Puruṣa other than the form of the modification, the consequence would be the transformation of Puruṣa by an independent form different from his own.—148.

Proof of Plurality of Puruṣas.

जन्मादिव्यवस्थातः पुरुषबहुत्वम् ॥१।१४९॥

जन्मादिव्यवस्थातः Janma-âdi-vyavasthâ-taḥ, from the several allotment or disposition or distribuion of birth, etc. पुरुषबहुत्वम् Puruṣa-bahutvam, multiplicity of Puruṣas.

149. Multiplicity of Puruṣas (is proved) from the several allotment of births, etc.—149.

Vritti.—The Self is one and one only, thus say the Vedântins. Thus

नित्यः सर्वगतः ह्यात्मा कूटस्थो दोषवर्जितः ।
एकः स भिद्यते शक्त्या मायया न स्वभावतः ॥

For, the Self is eternal, omnipresent, immutable, and free from blemish. Being one, it is divided (into a seeming multiplicity) by Mâyâ, its energy, but not through its own nature or essence.

In regard to this the author says.

Were the Self one only, then, one being born, all would be born.—149.

Bhâṣya.—Now, when the unity of Puruṣa is also thus made out by his being merely the witness of the states of deep sleep, etc., the doubt arises whether he be one or many. In this Adhikaraṇa, case or topic, the

Adhikaraṇa is the complete statement of a case, and consists of five members: viz. [illegible] or thesis, *e.g.*, Puruṣas are manifold; Saṃśaya or doubt, *e.g.*, whether Puruṣa be [illegible] many; Pûrva-pakṣa or antithesis, *e.g.*, Puruṣa is one; Siddhânta or synthesis or conclusion, *e.g.*, Puruṣas are manifold; and Saṅgati or connection or agreement of the Siddhânta with other parts of the system.

Pûrva-pakṣa, the objection or *prima facie* view, is this: From texts of the Veda declaring non-division or non-duality, which are supported by the argument that this is the simple and natural view of the case, the Self is established as being one and one only; while the dissimilarities or differences in the form of the states of waking, etc., may be atributed to Buddhi as its properties. Although this single Self thus comes to be the witness of all Buddhis, still, according as a modification takes place in a Buddhi, it is that Buddhi alone, that, by means of its being thus particularized with the possession of that modification, apprehends the witness by such forms as "I cognize the water pot," etc. Hence, while the modification, *viz.*, "This is a water pot,", appears in a particular Buddhi only, the intuition, *viz*, "I cognize a water pot" does not arise by means of the modifications of the other Buddhis.

In regard to this Pûrva-pakṣa, the author states the demonstrated conclusion or Siddhânta.

Since there is no other reason for the "Vyavasthâ," *i. e.*, distribution or differentiation of Puruṣas made in the Veda and the Smṛiti, namely, that a virtuous Puruṣa is born in heaven, that a vicious one in hell, that an ignorant Puruṣa is bound, that a knowing one is released, etc., it follows that Puruṣas are manifold. Such is the meaning.

Birth and death, however, do not here signify production and destruction, since they do not pertain to Puruṣa, but conjunction with, and disjunction from, a particular structure or combination of body, sense, etc., which determine Experience, and the absence thereof.

As regards the distribution of births, etc., the text of the Veda is

अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः ।
अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥

The one Unborn (Puruṣa), for enjoyment, consorts with the one Unborn (Prakṛiti) having the colours of red, white, and black, the procreatrix of manifold progeny like unto herself. The other Unborn deserts her, after she is enjoyed.—Śveta-Aśvatara-Upaniṣat, IV. 5.

ये तद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्त्यथेतरे दुःखमेवापियन्ति ॥

They who know this, become immortal, while others come in for a share of pain only. *Ibid.* III. 10.—149.

The Vedânta view: That the apparent multiplicity of Puruṣa is due to the multiplicity of upâdhis or investments.

उपाधिभेदेऽप्येकस्य नानायोग आकाशस्येव घटादिभिः ॥१।१५०॥

उपाधिभेदे Upâdhi-bhede, there being difference of upâdhi or investment; अपि Api, also, even. नानायोगः Nâna-yogaḥ, connection or appearance or production of

multiplicity. आकाशस्य Âkâśasya, of Akâsa or Ether. इव Iva, as. घटादिभिः Ghaṭa-âdibhiḥ, by reason of water pots, etc.

150. (The Vedântins maintain that) from difference of upâdhis or investments also arises the appearance of multiplicity of the one Self; as of Âkâśa, by reason of water pots, etc. (which divide it into many parts). (Aniruddha.)

Or, even in the case of differences of upâdhis or investments (as maintained by the Vedântin), the appearance of multiplicity will be of the one Self only; as of the Akâṣa, by reason of water pots, etc., (and consequently the same defects will remain, *e. g.*, when one is born all would be born). (Vijñâna Bhikṣu).—150.

Vritti.—The author apprehends the view of an opponent (the Vedântin) as an objection to his theory of multiplicity of Puruṣas.

Just as, in consequence of the difference of Upâdhis, *e. g.*, water pot, etc., it is predicated of the one Âkâśa that the water-pot-Âkaśa (*i e.* the portion confined within it) is destroyed, when the water pot is destroyed; similarly, in the case of the unity of the Self also, in consequence of the determination or delimitation caused by the body, it is a mere predication or form of speech to say, when the body is destroyed, that the Self is destroyed. In the case of the multiplicity of the Self, again, since the Self is otherwise eternal, (as the Sâṃkhyas hold), how can there be the allotment of births and deaths?—150.

Bhâṣya :—But, it may be said, even in the case of the unity of Puruṣa, distribution of births, etc., will be possible by means of the difference of the determining conditions in the form of the upâdhis. In regard to this the author says.

Even in the case of differences of upâdhis, connection with manifold upâdhis would be really of the one Puruṣa only; as, for example, connection with manifold upâdhis such as the water pot, walls, etc., is of the one Âkâśa only. Hence, by means of the difference of determining conditions, it is of the one Self only that diverse births, deaths, etc. would take place, as in the case of the physical organisms, etc. So that distribution of births, etc., such as one Puruṣa is born and not another, would not be possible. Such is the meaning. For, by means of the difference of determining conditions, in respect of one and the same tree possessing conjunction with a monkey and with the absence thereof, distribution

or differentiation is not possible, as it is in such cases as when we say that one tree possesses conjunction with a monkey, while another does not.

Moreover, since a portion of the Self which has been freed from one upâdhi, would be still liable to be confined by other upâdhis, the irregularity of Bondage and Release is also in the same state (of defectiveness); that is, as a portion of Âkâśa, freed from a water pot, is again established as the water-pot-Âkâśa through connection with another water pot, similarly.

It must not be said that the texts of the Veda on the distribution or allotment of Bondage and Release are also mere translations of popular errors; since Release (is not a subject for discussion by ordinary people, but) is alaukika or above the conception of the ordinary people. Besides, (if the Veda held up an error as the supreme object of life, then), by establishing a false object of desire to Puruṣa (Puruṣa-artha), the Veda would be guilty of deception, etc. (a charge, however, for which there does not exist the slightest justification).—150.

The Vedânta view further criticised.

उपाधिर्भिद्यते न तु तद्वान् ॥१।१५१॥

उपाधिः Upâdhiḥ, the adjunct, investment. भिद्यते Bhidyate, is different. न Na, not. तु Tu, but. तद्वान् Tat-vân, the possessor or holder thereof.

151. The Upâdhi is different, but not the holder thereof (*i.* e. Puruṣa)—151.

Vṛitti.—The author gives the solution of the difficulty created by the above view of the Vedântin.

"The upâdhi is different." Nor, from the destruction of one thing (upâdhi), can there be the predication of destruction in respect of another thing (Puruṣa), since the predication would be too remote. And, in the case of the unity of the Self (as held by the Vedântin), there is the imputation or attribution (adhyâsa) of contradictory properties, *e. g.* Bondage and Release (to the same Self), when he says that one man is bound and that another man is released, because Bondage and Release cannot simultaneously exist in one and the same Self. Of Âkâśa, on the other hand, conjunction and non-conjunction with smoke and the like, are not contradictory to each other, because conjunction does not reside in a thing by wholly pervading it, (while it would be absurd to say that Bondage affects one part of Puruṣa, while Release abides in another part).—151.

Bhâṣya :—But, the Vedântin may urge, even on the theory of the unity of Consciousness, distribution of Bondage and Release can be established by admitting (the popular conception of) the separate existences of the one Self, under the particular forms given to it by the several upâdhis. To this the author replies.

It is the upâdhi that is manifold; "but not the holder thereof," that is, that also which possesses the upâdhi as a distinctive peculiarity, should not be admitted to be manifold; since, were that which possesses a distinctive peculiarity, a separate existence, then, it is only the manifoldness of the Self that would have to be admitted in the other Śâstra (the Vedânta) also, (a result which the Vedântin would not certainly accept). Such is the meaning. There are also other defects in the theory: *e. g.*, if that which undergoes Bondage, were a Viśiṣṭa or thing particularized with a specific distinction, then, since, on the separation of the distinction from it, the thing particularized would also vanish, Release would not be established (as a positive state of the thing, but as a void, in which form Release is conceived by none).

But the Vedântin may interrupt by saying that the author of the (Sâṃkhya) aphorisms is himself going to declare in the Sixth Book that it is that alone which is particularized with Ahaṃkâra as a specific distinction, that constitutes the character of the Jîva or the mundane Puruṣa, by the aphorism (VI. 63):

विशिष्टस्य जीवत्वमन्वयव्यतिरेकात् ॥ ६ । ६३ ॥

The character of the Jîva belongs to that which is particularized, because Agreement and Difference prove this.

But this is not so, we would reply; because it is the character of the Jîva in the form of being the supporter of Prâna or Life, that only has been declared there to be inherent in that which is particularized. It will not be declared there that the distribution of Bondage and Release is dependent upon, and is regulated by, the thing particularized, inasmuch as the thing particularized has no existence at the time of Release.

And what a few moderns who pose as Vedântins, say, namely, that the Jîvas and Îśvaras are the reflections of the one and only one Self, thrown into the upâdhis in the form of effects and causes, and that through the mutual difference of the reflections, the distribution of births and all the rest is establised;—this too is erroneous, because it does not stand the test of the alternatives of difference and non-difference. If the reflected and the reflection were different in character from each other, then, since the reflection would be unintelligent, Experiencership,

Bondage, Release, etc., would not be established, and also the tenet, held by them, of the identity of the Jîva and Brahman would be impaired, and, further, the existence of a Self different from the Jîva and Brahman would be invalid. In the case of the non-difference or identity of the reflected and the reflection, on the other hand, promiscuity, *i.e.*, simultaneous presence of contradictory properties in one and the same thing, cannot be avoided. While, on the admission of their identity-and-difference, the above tenet would be lost, and, further, the contradiction inherent in the conception of the simultaneous identity and difference of two things, would be entailed. In our theory, on the other hand, non-difference or identity is characterized as non-division, and difference means reciprocal non-existence (as that of the nature of the cow in the horse, and *vice versa*), and hence there is no contradiction. And as regards the passages giving illustrations of the reflections, determinations or divisions, etc., we will explain them in the sequel.

It might be so, may say those so-called Vedântins, but what we say is only this, that, imagining the difference of the reflected and the reflection as if it were present in the case of the Jîva and Brahman, the Veda has imagined the distribution of Bondage and Release, and not that the condition of the reflected, the difference of the reflected and the reflection, Bondage, Release, etc., are desired as being transcendentally true. But this interpretation of the Vedic texts cannot be allowed. For, when matters stand thus, it is proper, for the sake of simplicity, to restrict the scope of the texts declaring pure identity or simply the non-difference of the Jîva and Brahman, by interpretating them as signifying the non-division or non-disjunction of the Jîva and Brahman, rather than to contradict, and thereby to render null and void, both those groups of texts which declare the distribution of Bondage, Release, etc., and also the difference of the Jîva and Brahman. There is also this further reason in support of the position we take up, that the non-division of the Jîva and Brahman has been established by other Vedic writings and the Smṛitis.—151.

Conclusion of the criticism of the Vedânta view.

एवमेकत्वेन परिवर्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः ॥१।१५२॥

एवम् Evam, thus. एकत्वेन Ekatvena, by unity. परिवर्तमानस्य Parivartamânasya, of (the Self) existing everywhere. न Na, no. विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः Viruddha-dharma-adhyâsah, imputation or imposition of contradictory properties.

152. Thus, (*i. e.* on the Theory of the Multiplicity of Puruṣas, as held by the Sâṃkhyas), (there is) no imputation

contradictory properties, (as is entailed in the case) of one universal Self (of the Vedântins). (Aniruddha.)

Or, the imputation of contradictory properties, in the way indicated above, to a Self present everywhere by its unity, (as imagined by the Vedântins), is not reasonable. (Vijñâna Bhikṣu).—152.

Vṛitti.—What is gained by this? To this the author replies.

Attribution of contradictory properties does not take place.—152.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—"Evam," it being thus, that is, there being multiplicity of Puruṣas.

Bhâṣya.—The author concludes the consideration of the defects alleged against those who hold the theory of the Unity of the Self.

In this way, it is found to be not reasonable to introduce the simultaneous presence of contradictory properties in the form of birth, death, etc., in the case of the Self present everywhere by reason of its unity. Such is the meaning.

Or, there may be a stop after "ekatve," (so that the letters e, k, a, t, v, e, n, a, would make up two words "ekatve" and "na," instead of one "ekatvena"). The unity of the Self being admitted, would not the imputation of contradictory properties to the Self, "paritaḥ" or everywhere, present, *i. e.*, penetrating all upâdhis, be not entailed? On the contrary, co-existence of contradictory properties would by no means be avoidable. Such is the meaning.

Our opponents may urge that, when Puruṣa possesses no attribute at all, and when we also admit that all properties inhere in the upâdhis, how do we bring it about that on their theory, there is, in Puruṣa, a promiscuous presence of contradictory properties such as birth, death, bondage, release, etc.? We would reply that the properties mentioned, are admitted as belonging to Puruṣa by reason of their being of the forms of conjunction, disjunction, experience, and non-experience; it having been already declared that only properties which possess the form or nature of transformation, and none else, are denied in regard to Puruṣa.—152.

Imputation proves nothing.

अन्यधर्मत्वेऽपि नारोपात् तत्सिद्धिरेकत्वात् ॥१।१५३॥

अन्यधर्मत्वे Anya-dharmatve, being the property of another. अपि Api, even. न Na, not. आरोपात् Âropât, from imputation or superimposition. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ,

establishment thereof, *i. e.*, of the distribution of birth, etc., as well as of pleasure, etc. एकत्वात् Ekatvât, from unity.

153. Even though the properties of other things be imputed to the Self, the imputation does not prove that it really possesses them, because of its being one and absolutely simple. (Aniruddha.)

Or, even though they be the properties of other things, the distribution of pleasure, etc., in regard to Puruṣa, cannot be established from the rule of imputation, in consequence of the unity of Puruṣa. (Vijñana Bhikṣu.)—153.

Vṛitti.—It may be contended by the Vedântin that the attribution of the property of a thing of quite a different nature, to another, is actually observed; as, for example, the agency of Prakṛiti is attributed to Puruṣa who is different from Prakṛiti. To this the author replies.

The agency of Puruṣa is erroneous. The truth in the matter is that Puruṣa is not the agent, the imputation not being objectively true. Nor can the connection between the true and the not-true be real. Being free from all association or attachment, the Self can have no possible connection with birth, death, etc., in a true sense.—153.

Bhâṣya.—As there is a well regulated distribution of the properties of redness, blueness, etc., appearing in the crystals, although these properties are only superimposed upon them, likewise, in the case of Puruṣas also, there is, in the Śâstras, a well regulated distribution of the properties of Buddhi, *viz.*, pleasure, pain, etc., as well as also of the properties of the body, etc., *viz.*, Brâhmaṇahood, Kṣatriyahood, etc., although these properties are only imputed to them. As, for example, in the Viṣṇu Purâṇa.

यथैकस्मिन् घटाकाशे रजोधूमादिभिर्वृते ।
न च सर्वे प्रयुज्यन्त एवं जीवाः सुखादिभिः ॥

As, in the case of a single Ghaṭa-Âkâśa or Âkâśa confined within a water-pot, which is covered with dust and smoke and the like, all these epithets are not applied; so are the Jîvas not possessed of Pleasure, etc.

And this distribution (of pleasure, etc.,) also, just like the distribution of birth, etc., is not established on the theory of the Unity of the Self.

This the author now declares.

Although they are the properties of other things, *e. g.*, Buddhi, etc., still, the distribution mentioned above would not be established in the case

Puruṣa, through the superimposition of the properties of pleasure, etc., upon him; because of the unity of Puruṣa (as supposed by the Vedântins) who is the subject or substratum of the superimposition. Such is the meaning. Inspite of the unity of Âkâśa, distribution of adventitious (coming from upâdhis) properties takes place in it by means of the differences of the portions of Âkâśa (Âkâśas) determined by (being confined within) water pots, according to the difference of the water pots. The characters of being the Self, of being the Jîva, etc., do not, however, belong to what are determined and conditioned by means of upâdhis or external investments; since, by the destruction of the Self, the Jîva, etc., which would necessarily follow, like the destruction of the Ghaṭa-Âkâśa, on the removal of the upâdhi, there would be contradiction to the texts of the Veda which declare that the Jîva does not perish, etc. But, as it has been already stated, these characters belong to Pure Consciousness.

It is simply without understanding this non-establishment of the distribution of bondage, release, etc., which is too nice a subject for them to comprehend, that the moderns who style themselves as Vedântins, say that the distribution of bondage and release is possible, even on the theory of the Unity of the Self, by means of the differences of upâdhis. They too are silenced by the present aphorism.

Those, again, forming a section of them, who having seen this very non-establishment of the distribution of pleasure, bondage, etc., say that it is only of the reflections of Consciousness fallen on the upâdhis, that bondage, etc., occur;—they are very greatly mistaken; because of the defect mentioned before (page 211), namely, that their theory does not stand the test of the alternatives of difference and non-difference, etc., and, further, because of the defect pointed out by the aphorism (I. 99, *q. v.*): "mutual superintendence is of the Antaḥ-karaṇa, because it is lighted up [illegible]; as is the case with iron."

Moreover, in the Vedânta Sûtram, (S. B. H. Vol. V), the absolute unity of all the Selves is nowhere found declared. On the contrary, their difference has, in fact, been declared by the aphorisms, for example:

भेदव्यपदेशाच्चान्यः ॥ १ । १ । २१ ॥

"The being above mentioned is other than Jîva. Because there is a declaration of its being separate from Jîva".—Vedânta Sûtram, I. i. 21.

अधिकन्तु भेदनिर्देशात् ॥ २ । १ । २२ ॥

"But Brahman is greater than Jîva, because the scriptures declare His difference from the Jîva".—*Ibid*, II. i. 22.

भेदो नानाव्यपदेशात् ॥ २ । ३ । ४१ ॥

"The soul is a part, because the Lord is described as having manifold relations with the soul etc."—*Ibid*, II. iii. 41.

—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V, pages 42, 251, 381.

Hence it is established that the doctrines of Avachchheda or partial limitation, (namely, that the Jîva is an undisjoined portion of the one, all-pervading Brahman, cabined, cribbed, and confined by the upâdhi), of Pratibimba or reflection, (namely, that the Jîva is only a reflection of Brahman into the upâdhi), and the like, are nothing but perverse conclusions. There is this further reason also that, in regard to objects about which doubt has arisen and which have not been dealt with in one's own Sâstra, it is the conclusion of a sister Sâstra that should be accepted as the established tenet. All this has been demonstrated by us in our Commentary on the Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ (the Vedânta Sûtram).—153.

The Sâṃkhya Theory is not in conflict with the Vedic declarations.

नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात् ॥१।१५४॥

न Na, no. अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधः Advaita-śruti-virodhaḥ, contradiction to the Vedic texts on non-duality. जातिपरत्वात् Jâti-paratvât, being directed to the genus or class.

154.—There is no contradiction, (by the Sâṃkhya Theory of the Multiplicity of Puruṣas), of the Vedic declarations of Non-duality (of Puruṣa), because the reference (in these declarations) is to the genus (of Puruṣa).—154.

Vritti.—But, this being so, the Vedântin may say, there would be contradiction of the Veda. For, says the Veda :

एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म ॥

Brahman is one only, without a second.—Chhândogya Upaniṣat, VI. ii. 1.

नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन,
मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ॥

There exists nothing diverse here. From death unto death he goes, who sees as if things were diverse here.—Kaṭha Upaniṣat, IV. 10, 11.

To this the author replies.

The sense is quite obvious.—154.

Bhâṣya.—But, then, the Vedântin may say, there being thus a multiplicity of Puruṣas, the declarations of the Veda and the Smriti which demonstrate the Unity of the Self, would not be established. Such declarations are, for example :

एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः ।
एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥

For, the mundane or creational Self, which is one and one only, is situated in every Bhûta or creature severally. Like the moon reflected in water, it is seen sometimes as one and sometimes as many.—Brahma-Bindu Upa., 12.

नित्यः सर्वगतो ह्यात्मा कूटस्थो दोषवर्जितः ।
एकः स भिद्यते शक्त्या मायया न स्वभावतः ॥

For, the Self is eternal, all—penetrating, immutable, blameless. Being one, it is diversified by means of Mâyâ which is its energy, and not from its own nature.

To this the author replies.

There is, however, no contradiction to the Vedic declarations on the Unity of the Self, because of their being directed to the genus, *i. e.*, because of the reference of the Vedic declarations on Non-duality being only to the genus (of Self) which consists of oneness of form in general, (in other words, of the general characteristic of being the Self), and not to its entireness, since there is no reason or necessity for reading such a reference in them. Such is the meaning.

And that the word "jâti" denotes oneness of form or uniformity, is obtained from the subsequent aphorisms.

If preference is given to (the meaning of) the word "jâti" as heard, (*i. e.* in the sense of genus), then, the aphorism should be explained just as corroborating or demonstrating the texts of the Veda on Non-duality, such as :

आत्मा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्

Verily, in the beginning, all this was a single Self.—Aitareya, I. i. 1.

सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत् ।
एकमेवाद्वितीयम् ॥

In the beginning, O peaceful one, this was verily existent; one and one only, without a second.—Chhândogya Upaniṣat, VI. ii. 1. S. B. H. Vol. III.

"Jâti-para-tvât" meaning, because (these texts of the Veda on Non-duality) are intended as negations of the duality that would be caused by the existence of something *heterogeneous* to the Self. Such is the meaning.

Of these, the import of the first interpretation (*i. e.* Non-duality of many Selves in the sense of their being non-different in form), is as follows: In the texts of the Veda and Smṛiti, on the unity of the Self, the words one and the like are intended to denote oneness of form or uniformity, and the words difference and the like to denote difference characterised by difference in property. Because the meaning or sense of oneness of form is unavoidable in such passages as

एक एवात्मा मन्तव्यो जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ।
जाग्रत्प्रत्यक्षतीतस्य पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥

The Self should be regarded as being one and one only in the states of waking, dreaming and sleeping. Who has passed beyond the three states, of him there is no rebirth.—Brahma-Bindu Upaniṣat, 11.

Otherwise, by means of the cognition of the mere unity of the Self even in all the three states, it is impossible that cessation of the fancy or assumption of the three states, declared by the phrase "which has passed beyond the three states," should result; while it is by means of the establishment of oneness of form or uniformity alone that it can be possible to elucidate the svarûpa or essential form of all the Selves by means of the discrimination and elimination of all upâdhis or external investments whatever. For, otherwise, it is not possible even for Brahmâ to demonstrate the svarûpa or essential form of the Self, as a particular entity possessing the distinction of freedom from properties, directly by means of words, since words can comprehend only the genus.

While, on the other hand, when the uniformity of the Self is established from Brahman down to a stalk, then, with a view to demonstrate the truth so taught, the disciple goes on discriminating till he arrives at the essential form of the Self devoid of all particular distinctions and within the comprehension of words, and, thereafter, becomes fulfilled by means of the cessation of abhimâna or self-assumption to its utmost end.

If, again, the declarations of Non-duality had reference to undividedness merely (of one entire self), then, the cessation of abhimâna would not be possible from them; because, as is the case with the various sounds produced in Âkâśa or Ether, so, in the undivided Self also, the production of Pleasure, Pain, and the absence thereof, and so forth, can be accounted for by means of the differences of determining conditions (which, in a manner, oppose undividedness and which keep up abhimâna as long as they remain).

And if one and the same text is said to refer to both undividedness and absence of difference in property, then, the text becomes ambiguous. And also the supposition of its reference to undividedness becomes fruitless, inasmuch as cessation of all abhimâna takes place from the cognition of the absence of difference in property alone.

Hence the declarations of Non-duality do not refer to undividedness (of one entire, all-pervading Self); further, because of their contradiction, (in that sense), by texts of the Veda and Smṛiti which comprehend multiplicity of the Self, and which are corroborated and strengthened by Reason. But their reference is simply to non-difference characterised as non-difference in property; since their import must be the same as that of the texts of the Veda and Smṛiti, teaching sameness or equality of Selves, and also because of the Vedânta Sûtra (III. ii. 33), *viz.*,

सामान्यात् तु ॥ ३ । २ । ३३ ॥

"But (the word bliss is applied to human joy, merely) on account of generic resemblance (and not because the two blisses are of the similar nature)".—S. B. H. Vol. V. page 495.

Of these texts on the point of similarity of Selves, the Vedic texts are, for example,

यथोदकं शुद्धे शुद्धमासिक्तं तादृगेव भवति ।
एवं मुनेर्विजानत आत्मा भवति गौतम ॥

As water sprinkled on a pure substance, becomes just as pure as that substance, likewise, O Gautama, becomes the Self of the Muni who knows the truth.—Kaṭha Upaniṣat, IV. 15.

निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति ।

The stainless Self attains to supreme equality.—Muṇḍaka Upaniṣat, III. I. 3.

And the texts of the Smṛiti are, for example,

ज्योतिरात्मनि नान्यत्र सर्वभूतेषु तत्समम् ।
स्वयं च शक्यते द्रष्टुं सुसमाहितचेतसा ॥
यावानात्मनि बोधात्मा तावानात्मा परात्मनि ।
य एवं सततं वेद जनस्थोऽपि न मुह्यति ॥

Light is in the Self, and nowhere else. It is the same in all beings. And it can be seen, by itself, by one whose mind has been steadied well by means of meditation.

As great a Self in the form of knowledge is in one's own Self, so great is it in another's Self. He who knows this constantly, is not bewildered, even if he be in the midst of the multitude.

In the Vedic texts quoted above, since there is the declaration of equality constituted by, or rising out of, diversity (of individuals), even in the state of Release, it is established that, among Selves, there is also difference of essential form (svarûpa). And the reference to non-difference in the form of non-difference in property, (*i. e.*, absolute indentity) is, in our opinion, to be observed of such sayings as "I am Viṣṇu", "I am Śiva", etc., but not also of sayings like "Thou art That", "I am Brahman", etc.; for, among such passages, the phrase, for instance, "Thou art That", as heard, expresses, in the theory of the Sâṃkhyas, the sense of a passage like this that thou art Eternal and eternally Pure and eternally Released, since, in the theory of the Sâṃkhyas, it is the Perfect Self existing at the time of Pralaya or Dissolution, that alone is the object denoted by the words "That" and the like.

But, if it is contended that it is the Puruṣa produced at the beginning of Creation and called Nârâyaṇa, that is the only object denoted by the word "That," then, let the reference of the sayings also, *e. g.*, "Thou art That," be to non-difference in property (from him).

It cannot be said that, since there is no need of it, therefore, the Vedic texts cannot possibly refer to difference or diversity; for, the establishment or explanation of Release itself is the need for such reference; for when Creation and Dissolution, by the form of ever flowing succession, never come to a termination, there could be no (meaning of) Release, if there were but one Self.

Now, don't say, please, that the diversity of Selves being thus known to the world, it cannot be that the Vedic texts should have reference to this matter; because (the fact is just the other way, that is), in the Veda, etc., has been made the negation of the unity of the Self, entailed in the popular mind, by inference from the example of Âkâśa, by reason of its being the simple and natural view of the Self, and because the difference between one's own Consciousness and that of another is not an object of perception (and therefore must be taught in, and learnt from, the Veda, etc.), and because the popular preception of the Self is in respect of the body, etc.

Diversity of Selves has, however, been condemned in such passages, as

य एतस्मिन्नुदरमन्तरं कुरुतेऽथ तस्य भयं भवति ।

He who creates a breach within this (Âkâsa), now, of him is the fear.—Taittiriya Upaniṣat, II. 7.

But it refers to the one or the other of difference in property and division, (*i. e.*, to heterogeneity of Selves or to division of one and the same Self into different parts, and not to the multiplicity of Selves essentially alike one another, but different as distinct complete individuals, as held by the Sâṃkhyas).

But, this being the case, what will be the fate of the Vedic texts which take the Selves as separations or reflections? If this be asked, we reply as under: As in the case of the solar sphere consisting of many Tejas or 'fires,' so, by making one mass, undivided and of the same quality in every part, of the sphere of the sun of Consciousness consisting of many Selves, it is innumerable divisions in innumerable upâdhis that alone is established, by the examples of the reflections, etc., by means of innumerable Puruṣas who, ray-like, form the parts, as it were, of the sphere, in order to teach that the otherness or separateness characterised or created by the divisions, is merely a creation or fabrication of speech; but not to teach the undividedness of one single Self, because there is more force, as they are supported by reason, in those other texts of the Veda which employ the example of parts (in relation to a whole

made up of them, in the case of the many Puruṣas forming a sphere of Consciousness) as in the following:

वायुर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो
रूप रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव ।

As the one Vayu (Air), penetrating into the world, became, in every form (of things) individually, their counterform—Kaṭha Upaniṣat, V. 10.

It is also recollected in the Smṛiti:

यस्य सर्वात्मकत्वेऽपि खण्ड्यते नैकपिण्डता ।

Of which, the character of forming one mass is not impaired, even though it is made up of all the Selves.

In the Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ (*i. e.*, Vedânta Sûtram), however, Non-duality has been declared also by way of non-division in the form of the laya or dissolution of all other Consciousness into the eternally manifested Consciousness of the Supreme Îśvara or Lord, by the aphorism (IV ii. 16):

अविभागो वचनात् ॥ ४ । २ । १६ । ॥

"(The merging of the permanent atoms of Prâṇa and the rest, is by way of identity, for) there is no separation, as is stated by an authoritative text."—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V. page 717.

More on this point has been said by us in our Commentary on the Vedânta Sûtram. Such is the hint.

On the second interpretation of the aphorism, again, the import is as follows: At the time of Pralaya or Dissolution, all that is different in kind (Jâti, genus) from the Self, is, without exception, non-existent; because of the non-existence in it of the character of an entity (such as what might be called a water pot or the like) and of the capability of being put to any use (such as bringing water in, etc.). Of Puruṣas, by reason of their being immutable, objectivity and use themselves are facts altogether unknown. Hence, as at the time of Creation, so, also, at the time of Dissolution, existence belongs to them. Hence, at that time, the Selves are free from the duality of Selves of a different kind from them. Similarly, at the time of creation also, since nothing else possesses transcendental or absolute existence in the form of immutability, and, consequently, the Selves are free from the duality of Selves of a different kind from them, the Vedic texts on Non-duality at the time of Creation are also explained. —154.

Multiplicity of Puruṣa further established.

विदितबन्धकारणस्य दृष्ट्या ऽतद्रूपम् ॥ १ । १५५ ॥

विदितबन्धकारणस्य Vidita-bandha-kâraṇasya, of one to whom the cause of Bondage has become known (A). Of one in whom the cause of bondage is manifestly present (V). दृष्ट्या Dṛiṣṭyâ, by seeing, in the sight. अतद्रूपम् A-tat-rûpam,

not being of the form thereof, *i. e.*, oneness or similarity of form. Aniruddha reads tat-rûpam, meaning, that form, instead of atat-rûpam.

155. One to whom the cause of Bondage (*i. e.*, Non-discrimination) has become known, attains to that form (*i. e.*, isolation), by seeing (the discrimination of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti).—Aniruddha.

Or, there is absence of oneness of form in the sight of only one in whom the cause of Bondage is manifest.—Vijñâna Bhikṣu—155.

Vṛitti.—But, the Vedântin may contend, even with the upholder of the theory of manifold Selves, the bondage and release of the same Self are quite contradictory. To this the author replies.

"Tat-rûpam," the form of isolation, "dṛiṣṭyâ," through knowledge of the discrimination (of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), is of him to whom the cause of Bondage, *i. e.*, non-realisation of the discrimination (between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), has become known.—155.

Bhâṣya.—But, the Vedântin may contend, as in the case of the Unity of the Self, Uniformity also is contradicted by the perception of the Self as having diversity of form: how, then, can it be said "because the reference is to the genus" (*vide* preceding aphorism)? To this the author replies.

(There is) "a-tat-rûpam," *i. e.*, diversity of form, in Puruṣas, only in the sight of one in whom the cause of Bondage, namely, Non-discrimination, is "viditam" or manifestly present. Such is the meaning. Hence, (the conclusion is), diversity of form is not established by erroneous seeing.—155.

Those who have eyes to see can see the Uniformity of the Self.

नान्धादृष्ट्या चक्षुष्मतामनुलम्भः ॥ १ । १५६ ॥

न Na, not. अन्धादृष्ट्या Andha-adriṣṭyâ, by reason of non-seeing by the blind. चक्षुष्मताम् Chakṣuṣmatâm, of those who have got eyes. अनुपलम्भः Anupalambhaḥ, non-perception.

156. Because the blind do not see, (it does) not (follow that) those who have got eyes, also cannot perceive.—156.

Vṛitti.—Bondage, (you say), rejoins the Vedântin, is occasioned by the non-perception of the discrimination (between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), and is not real. And it is a maxim that non-perception comes to cease through perception. Such being the case, we see it to be reasonable

only in the theory of the Unity of the Self, and not in the theory of the Plurality of Selves. In regard to this the author says.

The blind do not see:—Is this any reason that even he who has eyesight, cannot also see? There are many arguments in favour of the upholders of the Plurality of Selves. Such is the meaning.—156.

Bhâṣya:—But still, may rejoin the Vendântin, the Uniformity of Selves will be disproved from the non-perception thereof. So the author says.

Non-perception itself is not established; because of the seeing of Uniformity by the wise, although the ignorant fail to see it. Such is the meaning.—156.

Non-duality disproved by recorded cases of release.

वामदेवादिर्मुक्त नाद्वैतम् ॥ १ । १५७ ॥

वामदेवादिः Vâma-deva-âdiḥ, Vâmadeva, and others. मुक्तः Muktaḥ, released. न Na, not. अद्वैतम् A-dvaitam, Non-duality.

157. Vâmadeva, as well as others, has been released; (hence) Non-duality (is) not (a fact).—157.

Vṛitti.—The author declares that, for the following reason also, the Selves are many.

In the Purâṇas, etc., it is heard, "Vâmadeva has been released," "Suka has been released", etc. If the Self were one and one only, since on the release of one, there would be the release of all, the mention of diversity (as in the case of separate and successive releases) would be contradicted.—157.

Bhâṣya:—After showing that the Vedic texts on Non-duality are not established (in the sense attributed to them by the Vedântin), the author brings forward other impediments to the theory of undivided Non-duality.

Vâmadeva and others exist (in the condition of) being released; still, at the present moment, bondage is proved by perception in ourselves. Hence, non-duality of an undivided or entire Self is not a fact. Such is the meaning. Further, non-duality of this form is in contradiction to hundreds of such sayings as:

स चापि जातिस्मरत्वात्तबोध तत्रैव जन्मन्यपवर्गमाप

And he too, having recovered knowledge about the Self, through recollection of previous births, attained to release in that very birth.

Such is the complement of the aphorism.

Nor should such bondage and release be regarded as being only of the upâdhi or the external condition or investment of the Self, because of contradiction to the established tenets of the Veda and the Smriti; and because, when we see people make such prayers as "May I not suffer pain", it is quite clear that the release of Puruṣa alone constitutes the supreme purpose of Puruṣa, designated as Release.

And, as is the case with the son and the like, the removal of pain of the upâdhi becomes an object of desire to Puruṣa, only mediately, being subservient to the chief end of Puruṣa.

And what is contended by the present-day Mâyâ-vâdins, namely, that, through contradiction of the Vedic texts on Non-duality, the texts of the Veda on Bondage, Release, Creation, Dissolution, etc., are also contradicted: this too is an unfounded allegation. Because, when, at the very moment of the hearing (of absolute Non-duality as maintained by them) from the Veda, there must arise the certainty of the non-existence of the fruit or result also, called Release, their contention would entail the unauthoritativeness of the Veda, characterised by uselessness of the observance (as instructed therein) of the injunctions about Manana or reasoning, etc., subsequent to śravana or hearing. And, further, since there would be contradiction to the (reality of) the Vedânta also which is included within the fabric of Creation, by means of the Vedic texts on Non-duality, doubt would again arise in respect of Non-duality also as learnt from the Vedânta; in the same way as, when there is contradiction in the waking state of the words uttered in the state of sleep, doubt, in turn, arises in respect of the import of the words uttered in that state, (*i. e.*, of the contradiction itself).

Moreover, from the teaching,

मिथ्याबुद्धिर्नास्तिकता ॥

Belief in Unreality is Unbelief (Nâstikatâ).—Amara-kośa, I. i. 4. 13.

it is seen that those who see dream-like unreality in Dharma, etc., are merely a sect of the Bauddhas, because by the word "Sâmvṛittika" or caused by Samvṛiti or Concealment, they recognise that the fabric of the world is the creation of A-vidyâ or Nescience. Such is the hint.—157.

Release of Vâmadeva is not relative, but absolute.

अनादावद्य यावदभावाद्भविष्यदप्येवम् ॥ १ । १५८ ॥

अनादौ Anâdau, in the beginningless world (Aniruddha), time (Vijñâna Bhikṣu). अद्य Adya, to-day. यावत् Yâvat, uptil. अभावात् Abhâvât, because of non-existence. भविष्यत् Bhaviṣyat, the future. अपि Api, also. एवम् Evam, similar.

158. If, in the world which has been coming down from eternity, void has not been the result uptil to-day, the future also will not be so. (Aniruddha.)

Or, in the time, continuing from eternity, if no release has taken place uptil to-day, no release will take place in the future also. (Vijñâna Bhikṣu).—158.

Vṛitti.—On the theory of the plurality of Selves, since the world (Saṃsâra) is coming down from eternity, and since, at one time or another, one or another is released, gradually, in this wise, on the release of all, the whole (world) would become a void, while, on the theory of the unity of the Self, (such a contingency cannot arise), as release takes place only on the passing away of the upâdhi or adjunct (of which there is no end). (If this be the objection), so the author says.

In the world which has been from eternity, when, uptil to-day, void is not seen to have been the result, there is no proof that, in the future, release (of *all* would take place, and leave a universal void behind it).—158.

Bhâṣya.—But, the Vedântin may rejoin, it should be believed that, in the case of Vâmadeva and others also, absolute or permanent release has not been produced. To this the author replies.

In time eternal, if, uptil to-day, release has not been produced (as you say) in the case of anybody whatever, the time to come also would be the same, *i. e.*, absolutely without release taking place in it, since the thorough cultivation of the means for the attainment of release will be the same in the future as it has been in the past. Such is the meaning.—158.

As it has been, so will it be.

इदानीमिव सर्वत्र नात्यन्तोच्छेदः ॥ १ । १५९ ॥

इदानीम् Idânîm, now. इव Iva, as, सर्वत्र Sarvatra, at all times. न Na, not. अत्यन्तोच्छेदः Atyanta-uchchhedaḥ, absolute eradication or cutting short.

159. As now, so, for ever, (the course of transmigration will) not come to an end. (Aniruddha).

Or, (for, the inference is that), as now, so, for ever, there would be no final release. (Vijñana Bhikṣu.)—159.

Vṛitti.—The author states another solution of the case.

Because of the infinity of Selves, release will take place by degrees, and, at the same time, an end (of the course of the world will) also

not (be the consequence). As now, so "sarvatra", in time to come, also, release will take place; but, hence, absolute termination (of the course of transmigration) would not result, because of the eternality of its flow.

On the theory also, that release consists in the passing away of the upâdhi, there is the implication of universal voidness; hence the charge lies equally against it. Just as there would be an end of all things, on the successive release of manifold Selves, similarly the world would be a void in consequence of the destruction of all upâdhis on the exhaustion of all karma (which is the cause of the Self coming into contact with the upâdhi, *i. e.*, body, etc.).

Now, (if the Vedântin says), there will not be a void, because the upâdhis are infinite in number, then, it is the same on the theory of the multiplicity of Selves also. Thus.

अत एव हि विद्वत्सु मुच्यमानेषु संततम्।
ब्रह्माण्डजीवलोकानामनन्तत्वादशून्यता ॥

For this reason, therefore, while the knowing (Selves) got released, (the process of the (world runs) incessant; voidness does not result, because of the infinity of the Cosmic System and of the worlds in which the Jivas experience the consequences of their karma.—159.

Bhâṣya.—The author shows the process (by which the above inference has been arrived at).

At no time will absolute removal of bondage be possible in the case of any Puruṣa whatever, as is the case with the present time, (according to the rejoinder of the Vedântin mentioned in I. 158),—such an inference would be possible. Such is the meaning.—159.

Puruṣas are ever uniform.

व्यावृत्तोभयरूपः ॥ १ । १६० ।

व्यावृत्तोभयरूपः Vyâvṛitta-ubhaya-rûpaḥ, that from which double, *i. e.*, different (Vijñâna Bhikṣu), both, *i. e.*, bound and released, (Aniruddha), forms are excluded.

160. Puruṣas are never multiform.—160.

Vṛitti.—But, is the Self (essentially) bound or is it essentially released? If it is (essentially) bound, then, since, the essence cannot slip away, non-release (is the consequence); for, if it slipped away, (the Self would be) non-eternal, (as loss of essence amounts to annihilation of the thing itself, *vide* aphorisms 7 and 8 above). If, (on the other hand, it is said to be essentially) released, then, useless are meditation and all the rest (enjoined as means for the attainment of release). To this the author replies.

It is not bound, nor is it released, but it is eternally released. While destruction of Ignorance is effected by means of meditation, etc., (which are, therefore, not useless).—160.

Bhâṣya:—The uniformity of Puruṣas, that has been ascertained to be the import of the Vedic texts establishing their "unity,"—does this uniformity arise at the moment of release, or does it exist at all times? There being room for this enquiry, the author declares.

And that Puruṣa is ("vyâvṛitta-ubhaya-rûpaḥ, *i. e.*,) one from whom difference of form has departed; because of the establishment of constant uniformity from the testimony of the Veda, Smṛiti, and Reason. So is it said:—

बहुरूप इवाभाति मायया बहुरूपया ।
रममाणो गुणेष्वस्या ममाहमिति बध्यते ॥

By means of Mâyâ which shows a variety of forms, (Puruṣa) looks as if he were multiform. Revelling in its Guṇas, he is bound in such wise as "(This is) mine," "I (do, feel, etc.,)."

Further:

जगदाख्यमहास्वप्ने स्वप्नात् स्वप्नान्तरं व्रजत् ।
रूपं त्यजति नो शान्तं ब्रह्म शान्तत्वबृंहितम् ॥

In this long dream, designated the world, while passing on from dream to dream, the Peaceful Brahman which is the elaboration or expression of peacefulness, does not give up its own form.—160.

Character of witness is compatible with uniformity.

साक्षात्सम्बन्धात् साक्षित्वम् ॥ १ । १६१ ॥

साक्षात्सम्बन्धात् Sâkṣât-sambandhât, through immediate connection. For this, Aniruddha reads Akṣa-sambandhât, through connection with the Senses. साक्षित्वम् Sâkṣitvam, the being the witness.

161. Puruṣa is the witness through connection with the Senses (Aniruddha), or, through immediate connection (Vijñâna Bhikṣu).—161.

Vṛitti.—It has been declared that it belongs to the Self to be the witness. But if it belongs to be the witness, even to one who has attained to discrimination (of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), non-release would be the consequence. (If this be the doubt), so the author says.

"Akṣa" means the Senses. Through connection with that, Puruṣa is the witness. And where will be the connection with the Senses, when discrimination has been attained? (*i. e.*, it will be nowhere).—161.

Bhâṣya.—But, since the character of being the witness is not permanent, how, then, can there be constant uniformity of Puruṣa? To this the author replies.

The character of being the witness, that has been asserted of Puruṣa, is through immediate connection merely, but not through transformation. Such is the meaning.

It is found that, by immediate connection, Puruṣa is the witness of Buddhi alone, because the derivation of the word "sâkṣi" is साक्षाद्दृष्टरि संज्ञायाम् *i. e.*, as the name of one seeing immediately (Paṇini V. ii. 91.) And the character of seeing immediately means the character of seeing without intermediation. And immediate connection (in this sense) with a Puruṣa takes place only of the modification of the Buddhi pertaining to that Puruṣa. Hence, it is of Buddhi alone that Puruṣa is the sâkṣî or witness, while of others he is merely the Draṣṭâ or seer; such is the division, (*i. e.*, distinction made) in the Śâstras.

And the connection which determines the production of cognition, is of the form of reflection only, which takes the place of the modification into the form of the objects cognised: but not, in the least, of the form of conjunction, as we have submitted more than once, because, in that case, the supposition would not be warranted by the facts of the case.

In the case of Viṣṇu, etc., on the other hand, the character of being the witness of all things, belongs to them in a secondary sense, because of the very non-existence (in their case) of the intermediation of the Senses.

Where the reading is "Akṣa-sambandhât sākṣitvam," "akṣa" there means Buddhi, as it is equally an instrument of knowledge (like the Senses), and "Akṣa-sambandhât" means, through connection of Buddhi in the form of reflection as declared before. Such is the meaning.—161.

Puruṣa is for ever released.

नित्यमुक्तत्वम् ॥ १ । १६१ ॥

नित्यमुक्तत्वम् Nitya-mukta-tvam, constant freedom.

162. It belongs to Puruṣa to be released for ever.—162.

Vritti.—Constantly of what form is the Self? To this the author replies.

The meaning is quite plain.—162.

Bhâṣya.—For the purpose of establishing the absence of multiformity of Puruṣa, the author points out two other distinctions of Puruṣa, by the next two aphorisms.

It is, at all times, that freedom from bondage, called Pain, belongs to Puruṣa, since Pain, etc., are transformations of Buddhi. Such is the meaning. Puruṣa-artha or the supreme object of Puruṣa, on the other hand, is, as has been established before, the cessation of the experience of Pain, or, in other words, the cessation of Pain in the form of reflection.—162.

Puruṣa is indifferent.

औदासीन्यञ्चेति ॥ १ । १६३ ॥

औदासीन्य Audâsînyaṃ, indifference. च Cha, and. इति Iti, finally.

163. And, finally, Indifference also (belongs to Puruṣa.)—163.

Vṛitti.—The meaning is quite plain.—163.

Bhâṣya:—"Audâsînyaṃ," (indifference), is inactivity or non-agency. And hereby the being free from desire, *i. e.*, disinterestedness, and other distinctions also should be suggested, since there is the text of the Veda:

कामः सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाश्रद्धा
धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीरित्येतत् सर्वं मन एव

Desire, Volition, Curiosity, Faith, Unfaith, Retentiveness, Unretentiveness, Fear,—all this is verily Manas.—Bṛi. Âraṇ. Upa. I. v. 3.

The word "iti" marks the end of the establishment of the character of Puruṣa.—163.

Seeming agency of Puruṣa is due to influence of Buddhi.

उपरागात् कर्तृत्वं चित्सान्निध्याच्चित्सान्निध्यात् ॥१ । १६४॥

उपरागात् Uparâgât, from affection or influence. कर्तृत्व Kartṛitvaṃ, agency चित्सान्निध्यात् Chit-sânnidhyât, through proximity of consciousness.

164. (Seeming) agency (of Puruṣa) is from influence (of Prakṛiti), through proximity to Intelligence, through proximity to Intelligence.—164.

Vṛitti.—But, some one may say, we hear of the agency of the Self from the Scripture; how is this? To this the author replies.

"Agency" of the Self, *i.e.*, the fancy or assumption of agency, is from the influence of Prakṛiti by means of her proximity to Intelligence.

The repetition of the expression "through proximity to Intelligence" is meant to indicate the completion of the Book, the same practice having been observed in the Veda.—164.

Here ends the First Book, of Topics, in the Vṛitti on the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram of Kapila.

Bhâṣya.—But, some one may ask, the mutual discrimination of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti being thus established by means of their dissimilarity in property, how can the declarations made in the Veda and the Smṛiti, namely, that Puruṣa is the agent, and also that Buddhi is the knower, be justified? To this the author replies.

Here the syntactical connection of the words is according to their appropriateness.

The agency that is attributed to Puruṣa, arises from the influence of Buddhi, and the intelligence that is attributed to Buddhi, arises from the proximity of Puruṣa: neither of them is real. Such is the meaning. As in the case of fire and iron, the attribution of their properties to each other mutually, arises from particular conjunction between them, (*i. e.*, when an iron bar is heated to redness, it may be said that the iron burns, as well as that the fire is so much long and so much broad, etc.), and is, therefore, only accidental or caused by upâdhis: or, as in the case of water and the sun, the imputation of their properties to each other mutually, arises from the conjunction of water and the sun, and is, therefore, only accidental; the very similar is the case with Puruṣa and Buddhi. Such is the import.

And this has been stated by the Kârikâ also: *viz.*,

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ॥ कारिका २२ ॥

Therefore, through conjunction with that (Puruṣa), the unintelligent Liṅgam (Buddhi, etc.) looks as if it were intelligent; and, although agency is of the Guṇas, the indifferent (Puruṣa) appears, in the same way, as if he were verily the agent.—Kârikâ, Verse 22.

The repetition of the expression "through proximity to Intelligence" is for the purpose of indicating the close of the Book.—164.

The Avoidable, the Avoidance, the Cause of the Avoidable, and the Means of Avoidance,—the four principal objects of the Śâstra,—which form the four divisions of the System, have been successively discussed and elaborated in this Book.

And, because it gives an elaborate account of the contents of the condensed or abridged Sâṃkhya Sûtram (Kapila Sûtram), therefore, like the Yoga (Sûtram of Patañjali, which also is an exposition of the Sâṃkhya Thought, and is, on this account, similarly described), this Śâstra, is designated the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram.

Here ends the First Book of Topics, in the Commentary, composed by Vijñâna Âchârya, on the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram of Kapila.

Book II.

OF THE EVOLUTIONS OF PRAKRITI.

INTRODUCTION.

Vritti:—Now, after the ascertainment of the Topics, is made the composition of the Second Book for the purpose of the ascertainment of the products of the Pradhâna.

Bhâṣya:—The Topics of the Śâstra have been ascertained. Now, in order to prove that it belongs to Puruṣa not to undergo transformation, the author will, in the Second Book, explain, in very great detail, how the procession of Creation proceeds from Prakṛiti. Therein too the intrinsic nature of the products of Prakṛiti will be declared very fully, with a view to the very clear discrimination of Puruṣa from them also. It is for this reason that, in the verse :

विकारं प्रकृतिं चैव पुरुषं च सनातनम् ।
यो यथावद् विजानाति स विदुष्यो विमुच्यते ॥

Transformation as well as Prakṛiti and also Puruṣa the eternal,—whoso knoweth them as they are in themselves, he, thirsting no more, is released.—Mahâ-Bhârata, XII. 7879.

of the Mokṣa-Dharma Section of the Mahâbhârata, and in other places, it has been declared that *all* the three (things mentioned in the above verse) are objects which require to be known.

The Purpose of Creation.

विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं वा प्रधानस्य । २ । १ ।

विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं vimukta-mokṣa-artham, for the purpose of the release of the released. स्वार्थं sva-artham, for its own sake. वा vâ, or. प्रधानस्य pradhânasya, of Pradhâna or Prakṛiti.

1. Of Prakṛiti, (the agency or the becoming the procreatrix) is either for the release of the released or for her own sake.—165.

Vritti:—The Self is free by nature. Of the Pradhâna, the becoming the procreatrix of the world is for the purpose of the release of the Self from âbhimânika or assumed or imagined bondage.

In regard to creation which is painful, since Dispassion naturally grows towards it, Puruṣa at once strives to obtain release. And in regard

to creation which gives pleasure, since, it being tainted with painfulness, pleasure also is thrown on the side of pain, it is Dispassion only that ultimately is produced towards it.

This Dispassion is fourfold, being distinguished under the names of Yatamâna, Vyatireka, Ekendriya, and Vaśikâra.

Note :—These technical terms require explanation. "Dispassion, Vairâgya, is the extinction (or absence) of râga, (lit.) colour, or passion, which, like dyes of various hues, tinctures the soul." The various stages of its unfoldment have been described as Yatamâna or Striving, Vyatireki or Discriminating, Ekendriya or Longing, and Vaśikâra or Supreme. Vâchaspati Miśra has explained them in his commentary on the Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, Verse XXIII, and, in his gloss on Vyâsa's commentary on Patañjali's Yoga-Sûtram, I. 15. We give the following extract from the former:

रागादयः कषायाश्चित्तवर्तिनः, तैरिन्द्रियाणि यथास्वं विषयेषु प्रवर्त्यन्ते । तस्माऽत्र प्रवर्तिषत विषयेष्विन्द्रियाणीति तत्परिपाचनारम्भः प्रयत्नो यतमानसंज्ञा । परिपाचने चानुष्ठीयमाने केचित्कषायाः पक्वाः, पच्यन्ते च केचित् । तत्रैवं पूर्वापरीभावे सति पच्यमानेभ्यः कषायेभ्यः पक्वानां व्यतिरेकेणावधारणं व्यतिरेकसंज्ञा । इन्द्रियप्रवृत्त्यसमर्थतया पक्वानामौत्सुक्यमात्रेण मनसि व्यवस्थापनमेकेन्द्रियसंज्ञा । औत्सुक्यमात्रस्यापि निवृत्तिरुपस्थितेष्वपि दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयेषु या संज्ञात्रयात् पराचीना सा वशीकारसंज्ञा । यामत्रभगवान् पतञ्जलिर्वर्णयांचकार—दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम् ॥

Passion and the like, which act like dyes of different hues, reside in the Chitta or the Retentive Faculty. By them the Indriyas, the Powers of Cognition and Action, are employed on their respective objects. Now, the endeavour, *i.e.*, the putting forth of energy, for the purpose of boiling down and dissolving them, with the desire that the Indriyas may not go out to the objects, is designated as Yatamâna. And when the boiling is once begun, some passions will become boiled, while others will be in the course of being boiled. In that stage, the relation of before and after thus coming into existence, the ascertainment of the boiled by means of their discrimination from those that are in the course of being boiled, is designated as Vyatireki. They being thus disabled to excite the Indriyas to activity, the persistence of the boiled passions in the mind in the form of mere longing, is designated as Ekendriya. The surcease of even the mere longing in regard to sensible and scriptural objects of enjoyment, even though they be near at hand, which, in its appearance, is subsequent to the first three stages, is designated as Vaśikâra: which the terrestrial divinity, Patañjali has described as

दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम् ॥ योगसूत्रम् । १ । १५ ॥

Dispassion, designated as Vaśikâra, is of him who has no thirst for sensible as well as scriptural objects.—Yoga-Sûtram, I. 15.

"The Avoidable," *i.e.*, Pain not-yet-come, is of twenty-one varieties, *viz.*, the Body, the six Indriyas or Senses, the six Objects, the six Buddhis, Pleasure, and Pain. Among them, the Body is a form of Pain, because it is the seat of Pain. The Senses, Objects, and Ideas (are so), because they stand in the relation of being instrumental to its production. Pleasure (is a form of Pain), because of its close association with Pain. Pain is the Avoidable *par excellence*, because it contains affliction, uneasiness, and anguish as its very essence.

That which accomplishes it, that is, its uncommon or specific cause, is A-vidyâ, Triṣṇâ, Dharma and A-dharma. A-vidyâ consists in contrary cognition (*i.e.*, in knowing a thing to be different from what it really is). And the Saṃskâra or impression thereof has been declared, by those who know, to be the uncommon cause of Triṣṇâ or thirst, etc.

And "the Avoidance of Pain" (aimed at in this Śâstra) consists in that cessation of the production of Pain, which is absolute or final.

The means thereof is the knowledge of the truth in respect of the Self, inasmuch as the cessation of A-vidyâ or unreal Cognition takes place from it. Accordingly it has been declared :

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ।
श्रोतव्यः श्रुतिवाक्येभ्यो मन्तव्यश्चोपपत्तिभिः ॥
मत्वा च सततं ध्येय एते दर्शनहेतवः ।
तरति शोकमात्मवित् ॥

Lo! the Self verily requires to be seen, heard, thought, and contemplated.—Bṛihat-Âraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, IV. iv. 5.

(The Self) should be heard from the declarations in the Veda, thought by means of arguments, and, after being thought, should be constantly meditated. These are the ways of seeing.

The knower of the Self transcends grief.—Chhândogya-Upaniṣat, VII. i. 3.

It (*i.e.*, the Self) is twofold : Higher and Lower. Thus has it been declared :

द्वे ब्रह्मणी वेदितव्ये परं चापरमेव च ॥

Two Brahmans have to be known : the Higher as well as the Lower.

The Higher Self is the Lord Maheśvara, possessed of the power of Real Cognition and Lordliness; not in the least touched by, or associated with, the virtues which cause transmigration ; the All-knower, the Providence, as all creation proceeds from Him.

How is He to be known ? Either through Anumâna or inference, or through Śama or tranquility of mind.

Note :—In the place of "Anumânât vâ Śamât vâ" (either through inference or through tranquility of mind), as read by Dr. Garbe, which we have adopted, the text of Paṇḍita Kâlîvara Vedântavâgîśa, is "Anumânât vâ âgamât (through Revelation) vâ."

Thus, the subject of discussion, that is, the thing perceived, must have a cause, because it, being non-existent before, has come into existence, as is the case with a picture. This is inference. Thereafter of what is, (through inference), known in a general way, knowledge in particular is obtained by means of Yoga.

Of the lower (self), *i.e.*, the Jîva, the proof is from self-perception itself.

And the activity of Prakṛiti is for the purpose of the discriminative knowledge of these two, the Higher and the Lower Self. Herein she is declared to be altruistic.

And her selfishness consists in this that she keeps aloof from that Puruṣa to whom she has exhibited her form by means of discrimination.

(It may be asked), how activity can arise in Prakṛiti who (*ex hypothesi*) is non-intelligent? (To this our reply would be that) the activity of even non-intelligent things is seen, *e.g.* of trees, by way of producing fruits, etc.—1.

Bhâṣya :—The word "agency" is brought in from the last aphorism of the preceding book.

The Pradhâna becomes the maker of the world for the purpose of the release of Puruṣa who is by nature free from the bondage of pain, from pain in the form of reflection, or, in other words, for the purpose of release from pain which is connected with Puruṣa by the relation of a reflection.

Or, it is for her own sake, that is to say, for the purpose of her own release from pain which really belongs to her (*vide* Aphorism II. 7 *post*).

Although Bhoga or Experience (of Pleasure and Pain) is as much a purpose of Creation as Release, yet Release alone is mentioned (in this aphorism), inasmuch as it is the principal one.—1.

The Cause of Successive Creation.

विरक्तस्य तत्सिद्धेः ॥ २ । २ ॥

विरक्तस्य viraktasya, of the dispassionate. तत्सिद्धेः Tat-siddheḥ, because the accomplishment of this, *i.e.*, release, is.

2. (Successive Creation is necessary), because the accomplishment of Release is of him (only) who has become free from passion.—166.

Vṛitti :—Now, in regard to who are adhikârins or entitled to Release, the author declares.

So also says the Śruti :

पुत्रैषणायाश्च वित्तैषणायाश्च लोकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति ॥

Having put forth activity out of desire for son, desire for wealth, and desire for better worlds, men thereafter live the life of mendicants.—Bṛihat-Âraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, I II. v. 1.

शान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्यति ॥

Being tranquil in mind, controlling the external Senses, withdrawing from the world, being ready to renunciate everything, and being steady in meditation, one sees the Self within oneself.—Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat, IV. iv. 23.—2.

Bhâṣya :—But, if Creation were for the purpose of Release, then, Release being possible by means of one Creation only, there would be, one may say, no Creation again and again. To this the author replies :

Release does not take place (for all) through creation once only. But the production of Release occurs in the case of him who has been intensely tormented by the various pains of birth, death, sickness, etc., repeated many times, and has, in consequence, Higher Dispassion produced in him by means of the knowledge of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. Such is the meaning.—2.

Dispassion cannot grow in one creation.

न श्रवणमात्रात्तत्सिद्धिरनादिवासनाया बलवत्त्वात् ॥ २ । ३ ॥

न na, not. श्रवणमात्रात् śravaṇa-mâtrât, from mere hearing. तत्सिद्धिः tat-siddhiḥ, growth of Dispassion. अनादिवासनायाः anâdi-vâsanâyâḥ, of vâsanâ which has been coming down from eternity. "Vâsanâ" is the resultant impression of all the past experiences. It is that which inclines to re-birth. बलवत्त्वात् balavattvât, on account of the forcibleness. For "Anâdi-vâsanâyâḥ balavattvât," Aniruddha, Mahâdeva and Nâgeśa read "Anâdi-vâsanâpatutvât," which means the same thing.

3. It (Dispassion) does not arise from the mere *hearing* (*i.e.*, learning about it from the Śâstras), because of the forcibleness of the eternal Vâsanâ.—167.

Vṛitti :—If Release were to result through Dispassion immediately after the hearing, then, there would be, some one may say, the release of all immediately after they receive instructions from the Guru or preceptor, but such is not observed to be the case. To this the author replies :

Release does not take place immediately after the hearing. But, in the case of one whose eternal Vâsanâ has become weak, Release appears quickly, and, in the case of others, it is late in appearance.—3.

Bhâṣya :—The author tells the reason why Dispassion does not grow by means of one creation only :

Even the *hearing* takes place by means of the merits acquired in many births. Even then the occurrence of Dispassion is not from the mere hearing, but through immediate cognition (sâkṣâtkâra). And immediate cognition does not take place at once, because of the false Vâsanâ which has existed from eternity. But it takes place through steadiness in Yoga. And in Yoga there is an abundance of obstacles. (*Vide* Yoga-Sûtram

of Patañjali, Book II.) Hence, it is only after many births that Dispassion as well as Release take place, at rare intervals, in the case of a very few only.—3.

The Rule of Individuals.

बहुभृत्यवद्वा प्रत्येकम् ॥ २ । ४ ॥

बहुभृत्यवत् vahu-bhritya-vat, as is the case with many dependants (of one householder). वा vâ, or. प्रत्येकम् pratyekam, every one.

4. Or, as is the case with the many dependants (of a single householder), every individual (Puruṣa) (has his own lot, and hence the stream of creation flows on eternally.)—Aniruddha.

Or, as a single householder has many dependants under him, so every one of the Guṇas has innumerable Puruṣas to liberate, and hence the stream of creation, etc.—Vijñâna Bhikṣu.—168.

Vritti :—The author states another argument.

As a man may have many servants some of whom are released through faithful attendance, some share in his grace, while some are killed in consequence of their faults; so Prakṛiti is one, while Puraṣas are many. Among them, for those who have got clear knowledge of the discrimination of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, there is speedy release; for those who have risen up to the level of mere worship, it is gradual; and for others, there is none.—4.

Bhâṣya :—The author gives another reason in support of the theory of a stream of successive creations.

As, in the case of the householders, every one of them has to maintain a good many dependants in the persons of the wife, the son, and the like; likewise also, in the case of the Guṇas, Sattva and the rest, every one of them has to set free Puruṣas without number. Hence, even when a certain number of Puruṣas have obtained Release, the stream of creations must still continue for the purpose of securing Release to other Puruṣas, inasmuch as Puruṣas are infinite in number. Such is the meaning. Thus there is the Yoga-Sûtram :

कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात् ॥ २ । २२ ॥

"Although destroyed in relation to him whose objects have been achieved, it (the sensible world) is not destroyed, being common to others."—*Vide* Yoga Aphorisms of Patañjali, II, 22, S. B. H. Vol. IV, page 128.—4.

Proof of the Theory of Adhyâsa *or fictitious attribution (e.g., of bondage, release, creativeness, etc.) in regard to* Puruṣa.

प्रकृतिवास्तवे च पुरुषस्याध्यासिसिद्धिः ॥ २ । ५ ॥

प्रकृतिवास्तवे prakṛiti-vâstave, the reality (of bondage, creativeness, etc.) in the case of Prakṛiti being established. च cha, and. पुरुषस्य puruṣasya, of Puruṣa. अध्यासिसिद्धिः adhyâsa-siddhiḥ, proof of adhyâsa or fictitious attribution.

5. And when (it is established that bondage, creativeness, etc.) really belong to Prakṛiti, proof (is thereby obtained) of their being fictitious attributions to Puruṣa.—169.

Vṛitti:—The Self, being kûṭastha or immutable, one may say, Bondage (real or fictitious) does not verily belong to it, (and, therefore, the question of Release does not arise, and consequently there is no scope for this Śâstra). In regard to this, the author says:

Release consists in the inactivity of Prakṛiti towards that Puruṣa to whom she has fully exhibited herself. She catches the reflection of, and also casts her shadow in, that Puruṣa towards whom she becomes active. The change thus appearing in Puruṣa is merely an adhyâsa or superimposition, and is in no sense real. So has it been said:

यद्यात्मा मलिनोऽस्वच्छो विकारी स्यात् स्वभावतः ।
न हि तस्य भवेन्मुक्तिर्जन्मान्तरशतैरपि ॥

Were the Self impure, untransparent, and changeful, by nature, Release would not accrue to it even by hundreds of births.—Îśvara-Gîtâ—5.

Bhâṣya:—But how can it be asserted, it may be asked, that creativeness belongs to Prakṛiti alone? when the creativeness of Puruṣa also is proved from such Vedic texts as

एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः ॥

From this Self has Âkâśa been evolved.—Taittiriya-Upaniṣat, II. 1.

To this the author replies:

When, further, the reality of creativeness is established (*vide* II. 6 *post*) in the case of Prakṛiti, it follows that in the Vedas has been made only a fictitious attribution (adhyâsa) of creativeness to Puruṣa, for, upâsanâ or worship is the primary object of the Vedas, and nothing else. That creativeness belongs to Prakṛiti in a real sense is proved by such other texts of the Veda as the one beginning with Ajâm ekâm, the Unborn One, (Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat, IV. 5). Moreover, were the attributions of creativeness to Puruṣa, made in the Vedas, real, then these texts would contradict those other texts of the Veda which declare that Puruṣas are mere unchanging consciousnesses. Such is the meaning.

And this adhyâsa or attribution, in the form of transference of epithet, is, in fact, one of the current figures of speech amongst mankind. As, *e.g.*, victory and defeat, (really) present in the soldiers who make up the force of the king, are transferred or attributed to the king; in like manner, are creativeness, etc., (really) present in Prakṛiti, the Energy of Puruṣa, attributed to Puruṣas, the possessors of that Energy, on the strength of the maxim of the non-difference of energy and the possessor thereof. So has it been said in the Kûrma Purâṇa:

शक्तिशक्तिमतोर्भेदं पश्यन्ति परमार्थतः ।
अभेदं चानुपश्यन्ति योगिनस्तत्त्वचिन्तकाः ॥

The Yogins who contemplate the Tattvas (Prakṛiti, etc.), see the difference between the energy and the possessor thereof, and, again, they discern their ultimate non-difference.—Kûrma-Purâṇa, XII. 28.

"Bhedam," "difference," means anyonya-abhâvam or mutual non-existence (as, *e.g.*, in the case of the non-existence of the nature of the cow in the horse, and *vice versa*); "abhedam," "non-difference," means non-difference in the form of avibhâga or non-division. These are seen by the worshippers of Prakṛiti and the other Tattvas. Such is the meaning.

Examples of both these cases may be found in the following:—

अथात आदेशो नेति नेति ॥

Now, then, is the direction "It is not," "It is not," etc. Bṛihat-Âraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, II. iii. 6.

आत्मैवेदं सर्वम् ॥

Verily all this is the Self.—Chhândogya-Upaniṣat, VII. xxv. 2.

Such is the import.—5.

The reality of Prakṛiti's *creativeness is proved from the products.*

कार्यतस्तत्सिद्धेः ॥ २ । ६ ॥

कार्यतः kâryataḥ, from the products. तत्सिद्धेः tat-siddheḥ, because of the proof thereof.

6. Because it (the reality of Prakṛiti's creativeness) is proved from (the reality of) the products.—170.

Vṛitti:—The author adduces evidence to show that bondage really belongs to Prakṛiti, and not to Puruṣa.

From seeing the unbroken succession of Mahat and the rest, the products of Prakṛiti, there is proof of the bondage of Prakṛiti.—6.

Bhâṣya:—But how can it thus be taken for certain, rejoins our opponent, that creativeness is real even in the case of Prakṛiti, when we

also hear from the Vedas that creation is like a dream and so forth? In regard to this, the author says:

Because, the meaning is, whereas the reality of the products arises by means of their producing impressions and exhibiting acts, therefore, from the products themselves, there is establishment of the real creativeness of Prakṛiti, by means of dharmi-grâhaka-pramâṇa, *i.e.*, the kind of proof which cognises the subject of inference as possessing a particular property (as, here, for instance, Prakṛiti as the seat of the power which created those products).

The texts of the Veda, on the other hand, which declare the resemblance of creation to a dream and the like, should be understood to bear merely on the aspect of (unreality or) non-existence of creation in the form of its non-eternality, or, on that aspect of it in which it is (fictitiously) attributed to Puruṣa; for, otherwise, there would be contradiction of the texts demonstrating (the reality of) creation. Moreover, the things which we call dreams, are not absolutely non-existent, inasmuch as they are transformations of Manas.—6.

Knowledge and Ignorance are the sole determinants of Release and Bondage.

चेतनोद्देशान्नियमः कण्टकमोक्षवत् ॥ २ । ७ ॥

चेतनोद्देशात् chetana-uddeśât, with reference to one knowing. नियमः niyamaḥ, the rule, why some escape Prakṛiti while others do not. कण्टकमोक्षवत् kaṇṭaka-mokṣa-vat, as in the case of the release of (or escape from) a thorn.

7. The rule is with reference to one knowing, as in the case of the release of a thorn.—171.

Vṛitti:—It might be objected that, since activity is of the very nature of Prakṛiti, she will cause activity in all Puruṣas without distinction; what, then, is the use of seeing the discrimination and non-discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa? In regard to this, the author says:

Just as, on seeing a thorn, some one warns another by saying, "Do not come by this way," and does not warn all passers-by indiscriminately: so the rule is that, according to adhikâra or degree of excellence or stage of evolution, the activity of Prakṛiti takes place in regard to a particular conscious entity (*i.e.*, Puruṣa), and not in regard to all.—7.

Bhâṣya:—Now, on the alternative view (*vide* II. 1 *ante*) that the activity of Prakṛiti is for her own benefit, she, it may be said, would be active with reference to the released Puruṣa also. To this the author replies:

By reason of its derivation from the root "chiti" in the sense of full knowledge, "chetana" here means one who knows well. Just as one

and the same thorn is released only by one who is "chetana," *i.e.*, knowing, that is to say, does not become a cause of pain to him alone, but certainly becomes so to others; so too the "rule," *i.e.*, arrangement of things in the world, is that Prakṛiti is released by him only who is "chetana," *i.e.*, knowing, and having all his objects fulfilled, that is to say, she does not become a cause of pain to him alone, but certainly becomes a cause of pain to others who are not knowing. Such is the meaning.

Hereby takes place Prakṛiti's own release, although she is in bondage by nature. And hence she does not become active with reference to the released Puruṣa.—7.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—"Chetana" is one who knows, *i.e.*, one who possesses immediate vision of viveka or the discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa. "Uddeśât," with reference to him, *i.e.*, towards him. "Niyamaḥ," *i.e.*, (restraint, cessation, or) absence of the activity of Prakṛiti. As there is release (of the thorn from its own activity of causing pain) with reference to one who is aware of (the existence of) the thorn. For, it should be understood that the activity of Prakṛiti is for the purpose of her own release from the pain inhering in herself. And thus release is verily effected on her coming into contact with a Puruṣa possessing discriminative knowledge. Because Prakṛiti is of the form of pain in this sense and to this extent only that she is the efficient cause of the experience of pain, appertaining to Puruṣa, and consisting of the reflection of Buddhi which contains pain as its essence. And that (efficient causality) is certainly gone on the absence of the experience of pain for a Puruṣa who possesses discriminative knowledge. Owing to the absence of any particular purpose regarding herself, she does not become active towards the released Puruṣa, but does so towards the unreleased Puruṣa alone. Such is the idea.

The Theory of Adhyâsa *further argued.*

अन्ययोगेऽपि तत्सिद्धिर्नाञ्जस्येनायोदाहवत् ॥ २ । ८ ॥

अन्ययोगे anya-yoge, though there be conjunction with the other, *i.e.* Prakṛiti. अपि api, even. तत्सिद्धिः tat-siddhiḥ, proof of the existence thereof, *i.e.*, of bondage (Aniruddha), of creativeness (Vijñâna Bhikṣu). न na, not. आञ्जस्येन âñjasyena, immediately. अयोदाहवत् ayo-dâha-vat, as is the case with the burning action of iron.

8. Even though there is conjunction with the other (*i.e.*, Prakṛiti), this (bondage, creativeness, etc.) does not exist

(in Puruṣa) immediately, just as is the case with the burning action of iron.—172.

Vṛitti:—Bondage, it has been declared, does not belong to the Self. The author argues the point.

It is the characteristic of exciting to activity (or efficient causality) that makes for the bondage of Prakṛiti. Notwithstanding that there is conjunction of Prakṛiti (with Puruṣa), (it does not follow that the bondage of Puruṣa is real, but) that the abhimâna, conceit or misconception of bondage arises in Puruṣa by means of the falling of the shadow of Prakṛiti upon him.

"Na âñjasyena," not really. (That is, even the conjunction of Puruṣa with Prakṛiti is not real, but only reflectional.)

"Ayo-dâha-vat:" as, where conjunction takes place with a piece of hot iron, it is felt as if the iron causes burning, while, in fact, the power to cause burning does not belong to iron, but comes, through conjunction, from fire alone.—8.

Bhâṣya:—Well, one may say, what has been stated, namely, that, in the case of Puruṣa, the creative character is merely a fictitiously attributed one,—that is not reasonable, for it is but proper that, by the conjunction of Prakṛiti, Puruṣa also should be transformed as Mahat, etc., because it is observed, that by the conjunction of earth, etc., transformation of wood, etc., similar to, or resembling, earth, etc., takes place. In regard to the position thus taken up, the author says:

Even though there is the conjunction of Prakṛiti, still it is not proved that creativeness belongs to Puruṣa "Âñjasyena" or immediatly. An example of this is: "ayo-dahâ-vat." As the burning power does not directly belong to iron, but is merely fictitiously attributed to it, being borrowed from the fire conjoined with it; such is the meaning.

In the example just mentioned, however, transformation of both (the fire and iron) is admitted, it being proved by sense-perception; while in the instance in question, since the case is explained by the transformation of one only (*i.e.*, Prakṛiti), there would be cumbrousness in supposing the transformation of both; as, otherwise, transformation of the colour of the crystal would result from the conjunction of the China rose.—8.

The instrumental cause of Creation is Râga, *Passion or Desire*

रागविरागयोर्योगः सृष्टिः ॥ २ । ९ ॥

रागविरागयोः râga-virâgayoḥ, from passion and dispassion. योगः yogaḥ, concentration, Yoga. सृष्टिः sṛiṣṭiḥ, creation.

9. Creation (results) from Passion; Release, from Dispassion.—173.

Vritti:—What, it may be asked, is the object of creation? To this the author replies:

Bhoga or worldly experience proceeds from passion or desire; Release, from dispassion. In reality or ultimately, however, nothing but dispassion results from passion or attachment also, through seeing the defects of the object of the senses in the course of Bhoga or experience.—9.

Bhâṣya:—It has already (*vide* II. 1 *ante*) been stated that the fruit of creation is Release. Now the author states the chief occasional or instrumental cause of creation.

When there is Passion, there is creation; and when there is Dispassion, there is "yogaḥ," *i.e.*, the abiding of the Self in its own essence (svarûpa), that is to say, Release, or, in other words, the suppression of the modifications of the Chittam or the thinking principle (*vide* Yoga Aphorisms, I. 2). Such is the meaning. And thus it is proved, by the methods of agreement and difference, that Râga or Passion is the cause of creation. This is the import. And, thus, the Veda also, after declaring the goals in the form of Brahma-hood, etc., attainable by the performance of the various Karmas or actions, declares:

इति तु कामयमानो योऽकामो न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति ॥

Thus, however, (fare) those who desire. Of him who is desireless, the Prâṇas or life-breaths do not go out (into other living forms).—Bṛihat-Âraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, IV, iv. 6.

Passion and Dispassion also are but properties of Prakṛiti.—9.

The order of creation.

महदादिक्रमेण पञ्चभूतानाम् ॥ २ । १० ॥

महदादिक्रमेण mahat-âdi-krameṇa, by the series of Mahat and the rest. पञ्चभूतानाम् pañcha-bhûtânâm, of the five Bhûtas or gross elements.

10. The creation of the five Bhûtas is in the order of Mahat and the rest.—174.

Vritti:—The twenty-five Principles have been declared by the aphorism beginning with "Sattva, Rajas, Tamas" of the first book (*vide* I. 61, page 93). Now the author declares the order of their evolution along with all other details.

The word "creation" completes the sentence. The order will be stated in the sequel.—10.

Bhâṣya:—After this the author begins to describe the process of creation.

"Creation"—this follows from the preceding aphorism. Although from the texts of the Veda such as

एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः ॥

From this, Self, was evolved Âkâśa.—Taittiriya-Upaniṣat, II. 1.

it is heard that the creation of the five Bhûtas took place at the very beginning, still the creation of the five Bhûtas, just in the order of Mahat and the rest, is desired. Such is the meaning.

As in the Vedic texts on the creation of Fire, etc., the creation of Âkâśa and Air has to be supplied, or is pre-supposed, so too, in the Vedic texts quoted above, the creation of Mahat and the rest, previously to that of the five Bhûtas, has to be supplied. Such is the idea.

And in this matter, as in the case of the creation of the water-pot, the proof (of the aforesaid order of succession) consists in the inference that the creation of all the rest, other than the Antaḥ-karaṇa or the Inner Sense, must have been preceded by the function or modification of the Antaḥ-karaṇa. Moreover, the creation of Mahat and the rest, prior to the creation of the five Bhûtas, is known for certain by having regard to the order of their mention appearing in another Vedic text, *viz.*,

एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च ।
खं वायुर्ज्योतिरापश्च पृथ्वी विश्वस्य धारिणी ॥

From this (the Self) was produced Prâṇa; Manas and all the Indriyas; Ether, Air, Fire, Water, and Earth, the supporter of the Universe.—Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣat, II. i. 3.

and also by means of the other Vedic text beginning with

स प्राणमसृजत् प्राणाच्छ्रद्धां खं वायुमित्यादि ॥

He created Prâṇa; from Prâṇa, Śraddhâ or Faith, Ether, Air, etc.—Praśna-Upaniṣat, VI. 4.

And Prâṇa is, as the author will later on (*vide* II. 31) declare, a particular modification of the Antaḥ-karaṇa. Hence, in this text of the Veda, "Prâṇa" itself is the Principle of Mahat.

Likewise does the Vedânta-Sûtram also describe creation just in the order of Mahat and the rest. Thus

अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी क्रमेण तल्लिङ्गात् ॥

In the interval, Vijñâna and Manas,—in this order; because of the inferential mark thereof.—Vedânta-Sûtram, II. iii. 14, S. B. H. Vol. V, page 345.

("In the interval," *i.e.*,) between the existent (Self) and Ether, should

be produced Buddhi and Manas,—in this order; such is the meaning. Ahaṃkâra is included in Manas.—10.

Note :—*Vide* the Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V, page 345. The full translation of the Vedânta-Sûtram in question from which Vijñâna Bhikṣu has quoted the Pûrva-pakṣa only, as given there according to the Govinda Bhâṣyam, is as follows: "If it be objected that the organs of cognition and mind, occurring between Prâṇa and the elements, in the Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣat, are mentioned in their order of succession, owing to an inferential mark of this; we say, no, because on account of non-difference." It will at once be seen from this that the Vedânta-Sûtrakâra reads a separate purpose altogether in the Muṇḍaka text (II. i. 3), also cited by Vijñâna Bhikṣu in his support, and throws away the pûrva-pakṣa on which the latter apparently relies. It need not be feared, however, that there is, therefore, necessarily a conflict and contradiction of views between the two high authorities such as Vyâsa and Vijñâna are. "The order of the origin of the various Tattvas held authoritative in this (Vedânta as also in the Sâmkhya) system is that which is laid down in the Scriptures like those of Subâla, etc., namely, Pradhâna, Mahat, Ahaṃkâra, Tan-mâtras, Senses, and the Gross Elements beginning with Ether." The origination of all these Tattvas has been shown in the third Pâda of the second Adhyâya of the Vedânta-Sûtras, and the order of succession, as we find laid down in the Taittirîya-Upaniṣat and the rest, has also been discussed there, in order to show that there is no real conflict between these texts of the Subâlas and the Taittirîyas and others.

But it would appear that there is a real conflict between the teachings of the Sâṃkhya and the Vedânta as to the immediate source of the origin of the Tattvas severally. For, according to the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram, I. 61, etc., Mahat, etc., take their rise, the succeeding from the preceding one; while, according to the Govinda-Bhâṣyam, "all the various Tattvas mentioned in the Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣat, beginning with Prâṇa and ending with earth, are taught as coming out directly from the Lord,... In fact, the word "Etasmât" of that text is to be read along with every one of these Prâṇa, Manas, etc. Thus, from Him is born Prâṇa, from Him is born Manas, from Him are born the Indriyas, etc." The idea seems to be, as elsewhere (under Vedânta-Sûtram, II. iii. 13) observed in the Govinda-Bhâṣyam, that "the Tattvas like the Pradhâna and the rest being insentient, cannot modify themselves into their succeeding Tattva, without the co-operation of an intelligent cause," namely Brahman. If this be so, then, there would be no real conflict, and the two theories can be easily reconciled.

The origination of Mahat, *etc., is not for their own sake.*

आत्मार्थत्वात् सृष्टेर्नैषामात्मार्थ आरम्भः ॥ २ । ११ ॥

आत्मार्थत्वात् Âtmâ-artha-tvât, being for the sake of the Self. सृष्टेः sṛiṣṭeḥ, of creation. न na, not. एषाम् eṣâm, of these, Mahat, etc. आत्मार्थे Âtmâ-arthe, for the sake of themselves. आरम्भः Ârambhaḥ, origination.

11. Since creation is for the benefit (*i.e.*, deliverance) of the Self, the origination of these (*i.e.*, Mahat, etc.) is not for their own sake.—175.

Vṛitti :—Is their origination for their own sake, or is it for the sake of another? To this the author replies.

Since creation is for the sake of Puruṣa, the origination of these, *viz.*, Mahat and the following, is not "âtmâ-arthe," for the sake of themselves.

Prakṛiti being eternal, creative activity, for a self-regarding object, is justified in her case. But, since Mahat, etc., perish by being dissolved into their cause, in their case, it is mere creation (without reference to any self-regarding object).—11.

Bhâṣya:—Of Prakṛiti alone, the creativeness is for the purpose of her release (*vide* II. 1 *supra*), she being eternal. But of Mahat, etc., the being the creators of their respective modifications, is not for their own release, they being non-eternal. This difference (between the creative character of Prakṛiti and that of her products), the author points out.

"Eṣâm," of Mahat, etc., the creative character "âtmâ-artha-tvât," being for the purpose of the release of Puruṣa, their "ârambhaḥ," creative character, is not for their own sake, on account of their unfitness for release in consequence of their perishableness. Such is the meaning.

(But why is it asserted that their creative activity is for the benefit of Puruṣa instead of for that of Prakṛiti? This question the Bhâṣya-kâra next answers.)

And when the release of another must be the end, it is but proper that the release of Puruṣa should alone be the end in question and not that the release of Prakṛiti should be the end, inasmuch as she is "guṇa" or subservient to Puruṣa.—11.

Theory of Space and Time.

दिक्कालावाकाशादिभ्यः ॥ २ । १२ ॥

दिक्काल dik-kâlau, space and time. आकाशादिभ्यः âkâśa-âdi-bhyaḥ, from Âkâśa, etc.

12. Space and Time come from Âkâśa and the Upâdhis.—176.

Vṛitti:—Space and Time are well-known entities. How is it, then, that they are not heard of in the enumeration (of the Tattvas, I. 61, p. 93)? To this the author replies.

It is Âkâśa itself that, according to the distinction of this and that Upâdhi or external condition, is denoted by the terms Space and Time. They are, therefore, included in Âkâśa.

The word "âdi" in the aphorism has come by sampâta or accident.

The use of the fifth case-ending in "âkâśa-âdi-bhyaḥ" is in the sense of the locative.—12.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—By the word "âdi" the Upâdhis are comprised. (*Vide* Bhâṣya below.)

Bhâṣya :—The author describes the creation of limited space and time.

Those space and time which are eternal, are of the form of the Prakṛiti or root-cause of Âkâśa, and are nothing but particular Guṇas or modifications of Prakṛiti. Hence, the universality of space and time is established. The universality of Âkâśa also, as alluded to by such Śrutis as

आकाशवत् सर्वगतश्च नित्यः ॥

Like Akâśa, all-penetrating and eternal.

is hereby explained.

But those space and time which are limited, are produced from Âkâśa through the conjunction of this or that Upâdhi or limiting object. Such is the meaning ; as the word "âdi" comprises the Upâdhis.

Although limited space and time are (in reality, not the products of Âkâśa, but) Âkâśa itself as particularised by this or that limiting object, still they have been stated here to be the effects of Âkâśa, similarly as, in the Vaiśeṣika System, the sense of hearing has been stated to be the effect of Âkâśa, following the custom admitting the thing particularised as a separate and additional entity.—12

Definition of Buddhi.

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः ॥ २ । १३ ॥

अध्यवसायः adhyavasâyaḥ, judgment, ascertainment, determination of a thing in its true form. बुद्धिः buddhiḥ, Buddhi, understanding.

13. Buddhi is ascertainment.—177.

Vṛitti :—The author states the characteristic mark of Buddhi called Mahat.

"In this way only and in no other way,"—certainty or ascertainment in this form is "adhyavasâyaḥ."—13.

Bhâṣya :—Now the author exhibits the Tattvas alluded to by the phrase "in the order of Mahat and the rest" (in II. 10 above), one by one, with reference to their svarûpa or intrinsic form as well as with reference to their properties (dharma).

"Buddhiḥ," this is a synonym of the Mahat Tattva. And "adhyavasâyaḥ," called ascertainment, is its general function. Such is the meaning.

The mention (of the function and the functionary) in the relation of non-difference (made in the aphorism in which adhyavasâya and buddhi stand in apposition to each other), is according to the maxim of the non-difference of the property and the thing of which it is the property.

And this Buddhi possesses "greatness" (and is called Mahat, Great), because, it should be understood, it pervades all effects whatever other than itself and because it is of great aiśvarya or power. On this point, says the Smṛiti :—

सविकारात् प्रधानात्तु महत्तत्वमजायत ।
महानिति यतः ख्यातिर्लोकानां जायते सदा ॥

From the Pradhâna, undergoing modification, was produced the principle of Mahat; wherefrom is always produced in the minds of men the illumination that "(it is) great."

There are, again, texts of the Veda and the Smṛiti such as

अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतदृग्वेदः ॥

Of this Great Being, is the breathing, this, the Ṛig Veda.—Bṛihat-Âraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, II. iv. 10.

But in them the application of the term "Great" to Hiraṇya-garbha (the Golden-Egged Brahmâ whose breathing the Ṛig-Veda is), even though he is chetana or sentient, has been made only on account of his conceit (abhimâna) of, or of his identifying himself with, Buddhi; in the same way as is made the application of the term "Earth" to the sentient entity (the deity presiding over earth) which has the mistaken belief (abhimâna) that it is earth. In the very same way also should be understood the application of the terms Ahaṃkâra, etc., to Rudra and others. And of one and all the deities without exception, commencing from the one possessing the abhimâna of (*i.e.*, the belief of identity with) Prakṛiti and ending with those possessing the abhimâna of (*i.e.*, the belief of identity with) the Bhûtas or Elements, the regular and constant Upâdhis in the forms of their respective Buddhis, are nothing but parts of the Principle of Mahat itself.—13.

Products of Mahat.

तत्कार्यं धर्मादि ॥ २ । १४ ॥

तत्कार्यं tat-kâryam, its product. धर्मादि dharma-âdi, dharma or virtue, etc.

14. Virtue, etc., are its products.—178.

Vṛitti :—Wherein are Virtue, etc., included? To this the author replies.

Virtue, Knowledge, Dispassion, and Power,—by their being the products of Mahat, is refuted the theory that they are the properties of the Self.

Since there is non-difference between effect and cause, the place of their inclusion (in Mahat) has hereby been shown.—14.

Bhâṣya :—The author states the other properties also of the Principle of Mahat.

Virtue, Knowledge, Dispassion, and Power also have Buddhi as their material cause, and do not have Ahaṃkâra, etc., as their material cause ; because Buddhi alone is the product of transcendental Sattva (*i.e.*, the purest form of Sattva, absolutely free from the admixture of Rajas and Tamas).—14.

How the same Mahat *is modified into the form of Demerit, etc., also.*

महदुपरागाद्विपरीतम् ॥ २ । १५ ॥

महत् mahat, Mahat. उपरागात् uparâgât, through adjacent tincture; through the influence or interpenetration. विपरीतम् viparîtam, the reverse.

15. The (same) Mahat (gives rise to) the opposite (products) through the adjacent tincture (of Rajas and Tamas).—179.

Vṛitti :—The author states the (other) particular modifications of Buddhi.

These are Demerit, Ignorance, Passion, and Impotence. For, difference of products, according to difference of contributory causes, is seen. Just as the calamus seed (by itself) produces the calamus shoot, and, in co-operation with the conjunction of fire, produces the plantain stem, so does Mahat, in co-operation with Sattva, produce Virtue, etc., and, in co-operation with Tamas, produce Demerit, etc.—15.

Bhâṣya :—But, then, it may be asked, how can the predominance of Demerit in the parts of Buddhi inhering in man, beasts, etc., be accounted for ? To this the author replies.

The very same "Mahat," the Principle of Mahat, through the tincture received from the adjacent Rajas and Tamas, becomes also "the reverse," *i.e.*, small (the opposite of great), *i.e.*, endowed with the properties of Demerit, Ignorance, Passion, and Impotence. Such is the meaning.

Hereby is explained also the tradition current in the Veda and the Smṛiti that all Puruṣas are, without exception, Îśvaras or Lords ; inasmuch as it shows that the innate lordliness of their Upâdhis (*i.e.*, of the Buddhic parts appertaining to them) suffers obscuration by Rajas and Tamas, (whereby they appear to be less and lower than Îśvaras).

But, then, it may be urged, for the purpose of the inherence of virtue, etc., Buddhi also must be eternal ; how, then, can it be a product (of

Prakṛiti, as declared before)? The author replies by saying that such is *not the case; because, seeing that the residue or aroma of Karma, and the like resides in the Principle of Mahat in the seed-state,* which is then only a particular modification of Sattva, still forming a part of Prakṛiti, we admit the production only of this seed of Mahat as a sprout during the causal state of knowledge. So that, just like Âkâśa, Buddhi is of the form of both the eternal and the non-eternal. And just as Âkâśa, in its causal state, is spoken of as Prakṛiti, and is not spoken of as Âkâśa, on account of the non-existence, in that state, of Sound which is the distinctive mark of Âkâśa, similarly also is Buddhi in the causal state spoken of only as Prakṛiti, and is not treated as Buddhi on account of the non-existence, in that state, of adhyavasâya or ascertainment, etc., which is the distinctive mark of Buddhi.—15.

Definition of Ahaṃkâra.

अभिमानोऽहंकारः ॥ २ । १६ ॥

अभिमानः abhimânaḥ, self-assumption, conceit. अहंकारः ahaṃ-kâraḥ, Ahaṃkâra, the I-maker.

16. Ahaṃkâra is self-conceit.—180.

Vṛitti:—The author states the definition of Ahaṃkâra, etc., which are the next in order.

"I am,"—such is abhimâna or self-consciousness.—16.

Bhâṣya:—Having defined the Principle of Mahat, the author defines its product, Ahaṃkâra.

"Ahaṃkâra" is that which makes the "I," just as, for instance, "Kumbhakâra" jar-maker, is one who makes the jar. It is the substance called the Antaḥ-karaṇa, the Inner Sense. And this, inasmuch as a property and the thing of which it is the property are indivisible, has been spoken of as abhimâna or self-consciousness, in order to give the hint that self-consciousness is its uncommon or specific function or modification.

It is only in regard to an object which has previously been ascertained by Buddhi to be this or that, that the making of the "I" and the making of the "Mine" take place. Hence, by following the relation of effect and cause between the functions or modifications (*viz.*, abhimâna, self-conciousness, and adhyavasâya, ascertainment), the existence of the relation of effect and cause also between those of which they are the modifications, (*viz.*, Ahaṃkâra and Buddhi), is inferred;—this has been stated long before. It has also been stated long before that the Antaḥ-karaṇa is one and one only, and that, according to the three-fold distinction of mere

states, as in the case of the seed, the sprout, and the huge tree, etc., it falls under the relation of effect and cause. It is for this reason that Manas and Buddhi have been spoken of as synonymous terms in such passages of the Vâyu and the Matsya Purâṇa as

मनो महान् मतिर्ब्रह्मा पूर्बुद्धी ख्यातिरीश्वरः ॥

Manas, Mahat, Mati (Intelligence), Brahmâ, Pûr (the City), Buddhi, Khyâti (Illumination), Îśvara (are synonymous).—Vâyu-Purâṇa, IV. 25.—16.

Products of Ahaṃkâra.

एकादश पञ्चतन्मात्रं तत्कार्यम् ॥ २ । १७ ॥

एकादश ekâdaśa, eleven. पञ्चतन्मात्रं pañcha-tan-mâtraṃ, the five Tan-mâtras. तत्कार्यम् tat-kâryam, its product.

17. The eleven (Indriyas) and the five Tan-mâtras are its products.—181.

Vritti :—The author states its product.

The eleven Indriyas, the five Tan-mâtras—these sixteen are its products.—17.

Bhâṣya :—The author mentions the product of Ahaṃkâra, which has arrived in order.

The eleven Indriyas as well as the five Tan-mâtras are the products of Ahaṃkâra. Such is the meaning.

"By this Indriya this Rûpa (Colour and Form), etc., should be enjoyed by me; it is this that is the means of accomplishing pleasure,"—it is from abhimâna or self-affirmation such as this, that, in the primary creations, were produced the Senses and their Objects; hence Ahaṃkâra is the hetu or the instrumental cause of the production of the Senses, etc.; inasmuch as it is seen in the world that only by persons having abhimâna for, *i.e*, given to, enjoyment, there is, by means of their Râga, attachment, desire, or passion, the making of the materials of their enjoyment; and inasmuch, moreover, as it is recollected in the Mokṣa-Dharma Section of the Mahâ-Bhârata, by such passages as

रूपरागादभूच्चक्षुः ॥

From Râga or passion for Rûpa or Colour-cum-Form, was produced the Eye.—Mahâ-Bhârata, XII. 7758.

that only from the Râga or passion of Hiraṇya-Garbha (the Golden-Egged Brahmâ) was produced the samaṣṭi, collective or universal, Eye or the Sense of Vision. Such is the idea.

And from this the difference of the Sâṃkhya teaching is this that, amongst the Bhûtas and the Indriyas, it is Manas of which Râga or passion

is the property, that is, according to it, first of all, produced from Ahaṃkâra; inasmuch as the Tan-mâtras, etc., are the effects of Râga.—17.

Origin of Manas

सात्त्विकमेकादशकं प्रवर्त्तते वैकृतादहंकारात् ॥ २ । १८ ॥

सात्त्विकं sâttvikaṃ, consisting of Sattva; sâttvic. एकादशकं ekâdaśakaṃ, the eleventh. प्रवर्त्तते pravartate, proceeds. वैकृतात् vaikṛitât, from the vaikṛita (modificational), *i.e.* Sâttvic (Ahaṃkâra). अहंकारात् ahaṃkârât, from Ahaṃkâra.

18. The Sâttvic eleventh (Indriya, *i.e.*, Manas) proceeds from the Vaikṛita Ahaṃkâra.—182.

Vṛitti :—But do the insentient and the illuminating both come from one and the same cause? To this the author replies.

From Ahaṃkâra which is (vaikṛita) a modification of Mahat, proceed "ekâdaśaka," the eleven senses, "sâttvikaṃ," being attended with Sattva, and the Tan-mâtras, being attended with Tamas.—18.

Bhâṣya :—Even in this (*i.e.*, the manner of their evolution), the author points out a distinction.

"Ekâdaśakaṃ," the completer of the eleven, (the eleventh, *i.e.*) Manas, is, amongst the sixteen-fold group, the "sâttvikaṃ" (Sâttvic or Sattva-relating). Hence it is produced "vaikṛitât ahaṃkârât," from the Sâttvic Ahaṃkâra. Such is the meaning.

From this it should also be understood that the ten (remaining) Indriyas are produced from the Râjasa Ahaṃkâra, and the Tan-mâtras, from the Tâmasa Ahaṃkâra; as is ascertained from the Smṛitis themselves, such as:

वैकारिकस्तैजसश्च तामसश्चेत्यहं त्रिधा ।
महत्तत्त्वाद्विकुर्वाणान्मनो वैकारिकादभूत् ॥
वैकारिकाश्च ये देवा अर्थाभिव्यञ्जनं यतः ।
तैजसादिन्द्रियाण्येव ज्ञानकर्ममयानि च ॥
तामसो भूतसूक्ष्मादिर्यतः खं लिङ्गमात्मनः ।

Vaikârika, and Taijasa, and Tâmasa,—thus is Ahaṃkâra threefold. From the Vaikârika Aham-Principle, undergoing modification, was Manas; as also the Devas Vaikârika, from whom is the manifestation of Objects. And from the Taijasa (Ahaṃkâra) (sprang) the Indriyas themselves, constituted by Jñâna, Cognition, and Karma, Action. Tâmasa are the Bhûta-sûkṣmas or Subtile Elements (the Tan-mâtras), etc., from which is Âkâśa, its own inferential mark.—Śrî-mad-Bhâgavatam, III. v. 20—31.

Hence verily, following the Purâṇa, etc., it has been stated in the Kârikâ also:

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्त्तते वैकृतादहंकारात् ।
भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसस्तैजसादुभयम् ॥

The Sâttvic Eleventh proceeds from the Vaikṛita Ahaṃkâra; the Tan-mâtra of the first of the Elements,—it is Tâmasa: both (the Indriyas of Cognition and Action), from the Râjasa.—Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, XXV.

"Taijasa" means Râjasa. "Both" denotes the Indriyas of Cognition and Action.

But, then, it may be asked, in the future aphorism (II. 21) beginning with Devatâlayaśrutiḥ, the author will speak of the Devas (the presiding Deities) of the Indriyas; why, then, by the Kârikâ also, has it not been stated that the Devas are the products of the Sâttvic Ahaṃkâra? In reply to this, we say: Of the Being possessing the Collective Eye, etc., as the body, it is the chetanâ or sentiency of Sûrya, etc., says the Śruti, that is the Deva of the Eye, etc. And from this it results that of the discrete or individual Indriyas, the Devas are the concrete or collective Indriyas. So that, intending to draw attention to the unity of the discrete and the concrete, the Devas have not, in this Sâstra (the Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ) been mentioned separately from the Indriyas. Hence the concrete Indriyas, containing, as they do, less Sattva than Manas, have been mentioned just as being the products of the Râjasa Ahaṃkâra; while in the Smṛitis, they have been stated as being the products of the Sâttvic Ahaṃkâra on account of their containing greater Sattva as compared with the discrete Indriyas; thus, it should be found, there is no contradiction.

Thus, from this threefoldness of Ahaṃkâra, should be understood the threefoldness of Mahat also, the cause thereof; as there is the Smṛiti:

सात्त्विको राजसश्चैव तामसश्च त्रिधा महान्।

Sâttvic, Râjasa, and Tâmasa,—thus is Mahat threefold.—Mârkaṇḍeya-Purâṇa, 45. 38.—18.

Of the Eleven Indriyas.

कर्मेन्द्रियबुद्धीन्द्रियैरान्तरमेकादशकम् ॥ २ । १९ ॥

कर्मेन्द्रियबुद्धीन्द्रियैः karma-indriya-buddhi-indriyaiḥ, together with the Indriya of Action and the Indriya of Cognition. आन्तरम् ântaram, the inner. एकादशकम् ekâdaśakam, the eleventh.

19. Together with the Indriyas of Action and the Indriyas of Cognition, the Inner (Indriya, Manas) is the eleventh.—183.

Vṛitti:—The author mentions the threefold division of the Indriyas.

"Ântaram," Manas, along with the five Indriyas of Action, *viz.*, Speech, etc., and the five Indriyas of Cognition, *viz.*, Smell, etc.,—these are the eleven Indriyas.—19.

Bhâṣya:—The author shows the eleven Indriyas.

The Indriyas of Action, namely the Organ of Speech, Hand, Foot, Anus, and the Genital, are five in number; and the Indriyas of Cognition, namely the Eye, the Ear, the Skin, the Nose, and the Tongue, are five in number; along with these ten, "ântaram," Manas, is "ekâdaśakam," the elevenfold Indriya. Such is the meaning.

"Indriyam" is that which is the karaṇa or instrument of Indra, the Lord of the Body. Thus, the characteristic mark of the Indriya is that, while it is a product of Ahaṃkâra, it is, at the same time, an instrument (of Action or Cognition).—19.

The Indriyas *are not formed out of the* Bhûtas *or Elements.*

आहंकारिकत्वश्रुतेर्न भौतिकानि ॥ २ । २० ॥

आहंकारिकत्वश्रुतेः Ahaṃkârika-tva-śruteḥ, there being the Śruti that they are formed of Ahaṃkâra. न na, not. भौतिकानि bhautikâni, formed of the Bhûtas.

20. (The Indriyas are) not formed of the Bhûtas, as there is the Śruti that they are formed of Ahaṃkâra.—184.

Vṛitti:—With a view to refute the theory (held by the Nyâya-Vaiśeṣikas) that the Indriyas are formed of the Bhûtas, the author says:

In that theory there is contradiction of the Veda. Such is the meaning.—20.

Bhâṣya:—The author rejects the theory that the Indriyas are formed of the Bhûtas or Gross Elements. (Cf. Kaṇâda-Sûtram, VIII. ii. 5-6, S. B. H. Vol. vi, p. 285).

"The Indriyas," such is the complement of the aphorism.

The Śruti which is the evidence for the theory that the Indriyas are formed of Ahaṃkâra, although it has been lost in course of time, can yet be inferred from the statement of the Âchâryas or renowned Teachers, as recorded in the Smṛitis of Manu and all the rest. The Śruti which can be immediately cited in evidence, is:

अहं बहु स्याम् इत्यादि ।

I will be many, etc.—Chhândogya-Upaniṣat, VI. ii. 3.

Well, it may be urged, there is Vedic evidence also for the theory that the Indriyas are formed of the Bhûtas; *e.g.*

अन्नमयं हि सौम्य मन इत्यादि ।

Verily, O Calm One, is Manas formed of food, etc.—Chh. Upa. VI. v. 4.

But such, we say, is not the case. Inasmuch as it is but proper and necessary that the material cause of the Antaḥ-karaṇa should bear resemblance to that which possesses the power to cause illumination (*i.e.*,

manifestation of objects), the Śruti that the Indriyas are formed of Ahaṃkâra, is alone the principal one (between this and the contrary Śruti). And, further, since the Bhûtas also are produced by the will (saṃkalpa) of Hiraṇya-Garbha (the Golden-Egged Brahmâ), food itself is a product of Manas. The Śruti, on the other hand, that the Indriyas are formed of the Bhûtas, is of less authority, and speaks of the formation of the Indriyas in a figurative sense, pointing, as it does, to the mere manifestation (abhivyakti) (as contradistinguished from formation or creation) from out of the Bhûtas, of the discrete Manas, etc., which, until then, were lying only as associated with the Bhûtas (and had no separate, manifest existence of their own).—20.

A doubtful Śruti *explained.*

देवतालयश्रुतिर्नारम्भकस्य ॥ २ । २१ ॥

देवतालयश्रुतिः devatâ-laya-śrutiḥ, the Śruti on the dissolution or absorption into the Devas. This is the reading of Vijñâna-Bhikṣu. Aniruddha reads देवतालयश्रुतेः devatâ-laya-śruteḥ, since there is the Śruti on the dissolution into the Devas. न na, not. आरम्भकस्य ârambhakasya, of the originator.

21. Since there is the Śruti declaring the dissolution (of the Indriyas) into the Devas, of the (supposed) originator (*i.e.*, the Bhûtas) is not (the causality).—Aniruddha.

The Śruti declaring the dissolution (of the Indriyas) into the Devas, does not (refer to the Devas as their) originator.—Vijñâna-Bhikṣu.—185.

Vritti :—The author gives a further reason.

Dissolution of the effect is in the cause ; this is established.

Dissolution into the Deva is heard from such texts as

आदित्यं वै चक्षुर्गच्छति

Verily the Eye goes (back) to Âditya.—Maitri-Upaniṣat, VI. 6.

It follows, therefore, that the causality in question is not "ârambhakasya," *i.e.*, of the Bhûta supposed to be the originator.—21.

Bhâṣya :—But, still, it may be argued, the ascertainment of their being formed of Ahaṃkâra is not possible; because by means of the declaration, made in the Śrutis such as

अस्य पुरुषस्याग्निं वागप्येति वातं प्राणश्चक्षुरादित्यमित्यादि

Of this Puruṣa, the Speech returns to Agni, Prâṇa to Vâyu, the Eye to Âditya.—Bṛihat-Âraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, III. ii. 13.

of the dissolution of the Indriyas into the Devas, it is possible also to hold that the Devas are the material causes of the Indriyas; inasmuch as it is in the cause only that the dissolution of the effect takes place.

Pondering over this doubt, the author says:

The Śruti that there is, regarding the dissolution into the Devas,—the same is not "ârambhakasya," *i.e.*, does not refer to the originator as its subject; such is the meaning; because we see the disappearance of a drop of water into what notwithstanding is not its originator, namely, the ground; and also because we hear of the disappearance of the Self into the Bhûtas, notwithstanding that they are not its originators, from such Śrutis as

विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानु विनश्यति

Vijñâna-Ghana itself (the Cloud of Pure Knowledge, *i.e.*, the Self), after having sprung up from these Bhûtas, disappears into those very Bhûtas again.—Bṛihat-Âraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, II. iv. 12.

Such is the import.—21.

The Indriyas *are not eternal.*

तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतेर्विनाशदर्शनाच्च ॥ २ । २२ ॥

तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतेः tat-utpatti-śruteḥ, there being the Śruti about their production. This is the reading of Vijñâna-Bhikṣu. Aniruddha reads tat-utpattiḥ śrûyate, we hear of their production. विनाशदर्शनात् vinâśa-darśanât, from seeing their destruction. च cha, and, also.

22. (The Indriyas are not eternal), because, in the Śruti, we hear of their production, and also because their destruction is seen.—186.

Vritti:—The Indriyas are eternal, such is the view of some. In order to reject this, the author says:

We hear of their production from Ahaṃkâra. And destruction of what is produced is also inevitable.—22.

Bhâṣya:—Manas, included amongst the Indriyas, is eternal, such is the opinion held by some. (Cf. Kaṇâda-Sûtram, III. ii. 2, S. B. H. Vol. vi, p. 126.) The author rejects it.

Of these, *i.e.*, of every one of the Indriyas, there is production, as we learn from the Śrutis such as

एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च ॥

From Him are produced Prâṇa, Manas, and all the (other) Indriyas.—Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣat, II. i. 3.

Moreover, by means of the fact that, in old age and like other conditions, Manas also, like the eye, and the rest, undergoes decay, etc., it is ascertained that there is also destruction of Manas. Such is the meaning. So also has it been said :—

दशकेन निवर्तन्ते मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च ॥

Manas together with the ten,—that is, all the Indriyas come to cease.

The declarations (made in the Śruti and elsewhere) about the eternality of Manas, are, however, directed (not to Manas manifested as such, but) to the seed (of Manas) called Prakṛiti.—22.

The Indriyas *are not the same as their physiological counterparts.*

अतीन्द्रियमिन्द्रियं भ्रान्तानामधिष्ठाने ॥ २ । २३ ॥

अतीन्द्रियं ati-indriyaṃ, supersensuous. इन्द्रियं indriyaṃ, sense, Indriya. भ्रान्तानाम् bhrântânâm, of mistaken persons. अधिष्ठाने adhiṣṭhâne, in the site.

23. The Indriya is supersensuous; of mistaken persons, (the notion of the Indriya is) in respect of (its physiological) site.—187.

Vṛitti :—From seeing the difference of the powers belonging severally to the Eye, etc., it might be concluded that the Indriyas are sensuous. This the author prevents.

Of mistaken persons, the notion of the Indriya is in respect of its site, for instance, the eye-balls, etc. Were the notion not a mistaken one, then, hearing would not be possible for one whose ears have been cut off, while, on the other hand, apprehension of Rûpa (Colour-*cum*-Form) would be possible for one whose eyes are jaundiced.—23.

Bhâṣya :—The author repels the Nâstika or heretical opinion that the Indriya is, for example, just the sets of eye-balls.

The Indriya is, in all the cases, supersensuous, and not an object of sense-perception; it is, on the other hand, with mistaken persons only that the Indriya exists in the condition of identity with its site, for example, the eye-ball. Such is the meaning. The more correct reading, therefore, will be "adhiṣṭhânam," (that the Indriya is the site, instead of that it is in the site).—23.

There is not one, but many, Indriyas.

शक्तिभेदेऽपि भेदसिद्धौ नैकत्वम् ॥ २ । २४ ॥

शक्तिभेदे śakti-bhede, in the case of a difference of powers. अपि api, even. भेदसिद्धौ bheda-siddhau, difference being established. न na, not. एकत्वम् ekatvam, oneness.

24. A difference being established, even if a difference of power (be admitted), there is not a oneness (of the Indriyas).—188.

Vritti:—The Indriya is only one in number; plurality attaches to it from a difference of Upâdhis or extrinsic limitations;—in regard to this opinion, the author says:

Let there be a difference of Upâdhis; still a difference of powers must be affirmed; and this difference is genuine; hence, plurality also is genuine.—24.

Bhâṣya:—The author rebuts the opinion that one single Indriya performs different functions through diversity of powers.

Even by the admission of a difference of powers of one single Indriya, a difference of Indriyas is established, inasmuch as the powers also possess the character of the Indriyas; hence there is not a oneness of the Indriya. Such is the meaning.—24.

Rules of Thought must not be allowed to stand against the Evidence of the Senses.

न कल्पनाविरोधः प्रमाणदृष्टस्य ॥ २ । २५ ॥

न na, not. कल्पनाविरोधः kalpanâ-virodhaḥ, contradiction to thought. प्रमाणदृष्टस्य pramâṇa-dṛiṣṭasya, of that which is "seen" or known or ascertained by means of evidence.

25. There can be no contradiction to thought, of that which is established by evidence.—189.

Vritti:—Lest it be said that the case being explained by a oneness only (of the Indriyas), the supposition of (their) plurality is redundant; so the author says:

(The meaning) is clear.—25.

Bhâṣya:—But, then, it may be urged, in the supposition of the production of diverse Indriyas from one and the same Ahaṃkâra, there is a contradiction of the Rules of Thought (Nyâya). To this the author replies.

This is simple.—25.

Definition of Manas.

उभयात्मकं मनः ॥ २ । २६ ॥

उभयात्मकं ubhaya—âtmakaṃ-possessing the character of both. मनः manas, Manas. Vairuddha reads a "cha" between "ubhaya-âtmakaṃ" and "manas."

26. Manas (partakes) of the character of both (Cognition and Action).—190.

Vritti:—The author states the difinition of Manas:

Manas possesses the character of the Indriya of Cognition and the character of the Indriya of Action, because its operation is in both directions, according to site.—26.

Bhâṣya:—The author declares that of Manas, the one leading Indriya, the other ten are the different powers.

Manas possesses the character of the Indriyas of Cognition and Action. Such is the meaning.—26.

Vedântin Mahâdeva.—Inasmuch as, without the application of Manas, the Indriyas are incapable of performing their respective offices, Manas itself is, therefore, designated as the Indriya of Cognition and as the Indriya of Action.

Diversity of Manas *explained.*

गुणपरिणामभेदान्नानात्वमवस्थावत् ॥ २ । २७ ॥

गुणपरिणामभेदात् guṇa-pariṇâma-bhedât, owing to a difference of the transformations of the Guṇas, Sattva, etc. नानात्वम् nânâtvam, diversity. अवस्थावत् avasthâ-vat, like conditions.

27. The diversity (of Manas) is owing to the difference of the transformations of the Guṇas; as is the case with the (diverse) conditions (of one single man).—191.

Vritti:—But how can more than one Indriyas come from one and the same Ahaṃkâra? To this the author replies:

By reason of the differences of the transformations of the Guṇas, Sattva, etc., acting in co-operation with Dharma, Merit, and A-dharma, Demerit, (there is the production of) more than one; "Avasthâ-vat:" as, of one single body, are caused infancy, youth, and old age.—27.

Bhâṣya:—"Of the character of both" (*vide* II. 26 above),—of this phrase the author himself explains the meaning:

Just as one self-same man puts on a variety of characters according to the influence of association: being, through association with his beloved, a lover; through association with one indifferent to the world, dispassionate; and through association with some other, something else; so Manas also, through association with the Eye, etc., becomes manifold, by being particularised (or specifically differentiated) with the function of seeing, etc., by reason of its becoming one with the Eye, etc. The cause

of this diverse modification is "Guṇa, etc.," that is, that the Guṇas, Sattva, etc., are capable of various transformations. Such is the meaning.

And this is inferred from the incapability of the Eye, etc., to perform their functions without the conjunction of Manas,—a fact established by such Śrutis as

अन्यमना अभूवं नाश्रौषम्

I was with my Manas diverted elsewhere; I did not hear.—Bṛihat-Âraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, I. v. 3.—27.

What are the Objects of the Indriyas.

रूपादिरसमलान्त उभयोः ॥ २ । २८ ॥

रूपादिरसमलान्तः rûpa-âdi-rasa-mala-antaḥ, beginning with Colour and ending with the dirt of the juices. उभयोः ubhayoḥ, of both.

28. Of both, (the object is) that beginning with Colour and ending with the dirt of the juices.—192.

Vṛitti :—The author mentions the object of both the Indriyas.

"Ubhayoḥ," of the Indriya of Cognition and the Indriya of Action.

The objects of the Indriya of Cognition are Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, and Sound. The objects of the Indriya of Action are Speech, Prehension, Movement, Pleasurable Excitement, and the dirt of the juices.

"Rasa-mala" is the name of a particular kind of dirt. The number of objects ends with it.—28.

Bhâṣya :—The author mentions the object of the Indriyas of Cognition and of Action.

The dirt of the juices of food is the ordure, etc.

Thus, the ten objects of both, namely, the Indriyas of Cognition and of Action, are (respectively) Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Sound, the Speakable, the Prehensible, the Approachable, the Excitable, and the Excretable.

"The Excitable" which is the object of the Genitals, is something within the Genitals.—28.

Puruṣa *is different from the* Indriya.

द्रष्टृत्वाद्यात्मनः करणत्वमिन्द्रियाणाम् ॥ २ । २९ ॥

द्रष्टृत्वादिः draṣṭṛi-tva-âdi, the being the seer, etc. आत्मनः âtmanaḥ, of the Self. करणत्वम् karaṇa-tvam, the being the instrument. इन्द्रियाणाम् indriyâṇâm, of the Indriyas.

29. The being the seer, etc., is of the Self; the being the instrument is of the Indriyas.—193.

Vritti:—The author points out the characteristic difference between the Self and the Indriya.

This is clear.—29.

Bhâṣya:—Of what Indra (Saṃghâta-Îśvara, Embodied Consciousness, *vide* II. 19, Bhâṣya), by what service, these are termed the Indriyas, Instruments,—both these things the author declares.

The pentad beginning with the being the seer, the pentad beginning with the being the speaker, and the being the thinker are "âtmanaḥ," of Puruṣa; while, in the operations of seeing, etc., the instrumentality is of the Indriyas. Such is the meaning.

But, it may be urged, when the being the seer, the being the hearer, etc., may sometimes develop into anubhava or immediate cognition, it is just possible that they should belong to Puruṣa, notwithstanding that he is unchanging; but the being the speaker, etc., is merely an act (which is nothing but a change); how can it be possible in the case of the Immutable (Puruṣa)? We reply that such is not the case; because here the meaning of the terms the being the seer, etc., is nothing more than this that it belongs to Puruṣa to cause the performance of the functions of seeing, etc., (by the Indriyas), by his mere proximity (to them); as is the case with the loadstone. For, as an emperor, even without himself actively operating, becomes a warrior through his instrument, the army, inasmuch as, by his orders simply, he incites them into action; so Puruṣa, though immutable, through the instruments of the Eye, and all the rest, becomes the seer, the speaker, the thinker, and such like, inasmuch as he incites them to action simply by his mere proximity (to them) which is called "Saṃyoga" or Conjunction; as is the case with the loadstone (which moves the iron by mere proximity to it, without actively exerting any force itself).

And here "kartṛitva," agency, (in "to cause the performance of the functions of seeing, etc." above) consists in being that which sets in motion (kâraka-chakra) the wheel of all that helps towards the accomplishment of the action; and "karaṇatva," instrumentality, in the possession of the operation which is the cause of the action, or in being the most efficient means of accomplishing it; as is the case with the axe, etc.

The agency in seeing, etc., which is prohibited in the Śâstras in the case of Puruṣa,—that consists in the possession of action favourable to those acts (*i.e.*, seeing, etc.), or in the possession of those acts themselves. So has it been said:

यत्तं आत्मनि कर्तृत्वमकर्तृत्वं च संश्रितम् ।
निरिच्छत्वादकर्तासौ कर्ता सन्निधिमात्रतः ॥

Hence agency as well as non-agency is established in the Self: being free from desire, it is a non-agent; (it is) an agent through mere proximity.

For the very same reason, since the power to set in motion the "kâraka-chakra" or all that helps towards the accomplishment of an action, is of the svarûpa or intrinsic form of the Self, the being the seer, the being the speaker, etc., eternally belongs to the Self,—this is heard from such Śrutis as

न द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते न वक्तुर्वक्तेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते ॥

Of the Seer, there is no absolute loss of vision; of the Speaker, there is no absolute loss of speech, etc.—Bṛihat-Âraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, IV. iii. 23, 26.

But, it may be urged, in the division of Pramâṇa (*vide* I. 87 *ante*), instrumentality has been mentioned only of the functions or modifications of sense-perception, etc.; how is it, then, that the same is here predicated of the Indriya? To this we reply that such is not the case; because here instrumentality is ascribed to the Indriyas only in respect of the modifications that, in the form of vision, etc., take place in Buddhi through the gateways of the Eye, etc.; while there the instrumentality of the functions (of sense-perception, etc.) has been declared in respect of the result (lit. fruit) called Bodha or Knowledge, appertaining to Puruṣa.—29.

The Internal Indriyas *distinguished.*

त्रयाणां स्वालक्षण्यम् ॥ २ । ३० ॥

त्रयाणां trayâṇâṃ, of the three Internal Indriyas. स्वालक्षण्यम् svâlakṣaṇyam, possession of distinctive characteristics of their own.

30. The three (Internal Indriyas) have their own function as their distinguishing characteristics.—194.

Vṛitti:—The author points out the difference in character of the three Internal Indriyas mutually.

Of Mahat, Ahaṃkâra, and Manas, there is "svâlakṣaṇyam," individual or specific characteristic: of Mahat, there is adhyavasâya or ascertainment; of Ahaṃkâra, abhimâna or self-consciousness; of Manas, saṃkalpa or deliberation.—30.

Bhâṣya:—Now the author mentions the distinctive functions of the three Internal Indriyas.

"Trayâṇâṃ," of Mahat, Ahaṃkâra, and Manas, there is "svâlakṣaṇyam," that is, the condition or state of being 'svalakṣaṇa' which is a compound word with the middle term elided, meaning things of which the respective definitions are their uncommon or distinguishing functions. Such is the meaning.

In the popular view also the mark of a *great* man is the possession of *adhyavasâya* or certain knowledge and other higher qualities; of a *conceited* man, the *attribution* to himself of the qualities which do not exist in him; and of (a strong) *mind*, the *resolution*, "This must be."

And so it follows that the modification of Buddhi is adhyavasâya or ascertainment; that of Ahaṃkâra is abhimâna or self-conceit; that of Manas, is saṃkalpa or deliberation and vikalpa or doubt. Saṃkalpa is the will to do, as follows from the teaching:

संकल्पः कर्म मानसम् ॥

Saṃkalpa is an action of Manas.—Amara-kośa, I. 1. 4. 11.

And Vikalpa is doubt, or the so-called particular kind of error mentioned in the Yoga-Darśana (*vide* Yoga-Aphorisms of Patañjali, I. 6, S. B. H. Vol. IV, page 21), but not the cognition of a thing as possessing a particular property, because that is a function or modification of Buddhi.—30.

The Resemblance amongst the Internal Indriyas.

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २ । ३१ ॥

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः sâmânya-karaṇa-vṛittiḥ, the common modification of the Internal Instruments. प्राणाद्याः prâṇa-âdyâḥ, Prâṇa and the rest. वायवः vâyavaḥ, airs, Vâyus. पञ्च pañcha, five.

31. The five beginning with Prâṇa, (familiarly known as) Airs, are the common modifications of the (three Internal) Instruments.—195.

Vṛitti:—The author points out the similarity in character of these (Internal Indriyas).

The five "Airs" beginning with Prâṇa, are supported by the three (Internal) Instruments.—31.

Bhâṣya:—The author mentions the common modification also of the three (Internal Instruments).

The five in the form of Prâṇa, etc., which, from their air-like movements, are familiarly known as airs,—these are "sâmânya," common "vṛitti" kind of transformation, "karaṇasya," of the three Internal Instruments. Such is the meaning.

Accordingly, has this been declared by the Kârikâ:

[illegible]
सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥

Of the three, the modifications are their respective characteristics; these are uncommon; the common modification of the (Internal) Instruments is the five, beginning with Prâṇa, known as the Airs.—Sâṃkhya-Kârika, XXIX.

Some think that Prâṇa, etc., are nothing but particular kinds of Air, and that they are made to operate (as they do) by the modification of the Internal Instrument in the form of volition, the source of vitality, and so they say that, in the present aphorism, there is the statement of their non-difference in the form that Prâṇa, etc., are the modifications of the (Internal) Instrument. But it is not so; for, by the Vedânta Aphorism:

वायुक्रिये पृथगुपदेशात् ॥

(The chief Prâṇa is) neither air, nor any function of air, because the text enunciates it separately (from air)—Vedânta-Sûtram, II. iv. 9, S. B. H. Vol. V, page 401.

the characteristic of being air and the characteristic of being a transformation of air have expressly been denied to Prâṇa, and it is but proper that the present aphorism also should have the same import as the one in question of the Vedânta-Sûtram. Moreover, since the property of Manas, *e.g.* cupidity, etc., becomes the cause of disturbance in Prâṇa, it must needs be that they have a common substratum.

The Śrutis, however, in which there is separate enunciation of Air and Prâṇa, are, for instance:

एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च ।
खं वायुर्ज्योतिरापश्च पृथ्वी विश्वस्य धारिणी ॥

From Him is produced Prâṇa; Manas and all the Indriyas; Ether, Air, Fire, Water, and Earth, the supporter of the universe.—Muṇḍ. Upa., II. i. 3.

(But, it may be asked, when Prâṇa, etc., are thus a modification of the Internal Instrument, how is it that they have not been counted among the component parts of the Liṅga-Śarîra or Subtle Body? To this the Commentator next replies.)

It is for this reason that, notwithstanding the non-enumeration of the [illegible]as within the Liṅga-Śarîra (*vide* III. 9 *post*), there is no defect, be- [illegible] Buddhi itself, by reason of its power of action, takes the names of [illegible]-âtmâ, Prâṇa, etc.

(But, again, when Prâṇa is a modification of the Internal Instrument what is the justification for speaking of it as air? To this the Commentator now replies.)

Although it is a modification of the Internal Instrument, still the use of the term, air, is accounted for by the fact of its having peculiar movements like those of air, and also of its being presided over by the Deva, Vâyu.—31.

The modifications of the Indriyas *are simultaneous as well as successive.*

क्रमशोऽक्रमशश्चेन्द्रियवृत्तिः ॥ २ । ३२ ॥

क्रमशः kramaśaḥ, successive. अक्रमशः a-kramaśaḥ, not successive. च cha, and, also. इन्द्रियवृत्तिः indriya-vṛittiḥ modification of the Indriyas.

32. The modifications of the Indriyas (take place) successively as well as simultaneously.—196.

Vṛitti :—The author mentions the modifications of the Indriyas.

" Kramaśas cha," and successively : after seeing a thief in dim light, a man first judges of the thing by the help of the Indriyas, then with the help of the mind forms the judgment, " It is a thief," next, by means of Ahaṃkâra, becomes self-conscious, reflecting " He steals money," and then, with the help of Buddhi, makes certain in the form of " I will catch the thief."

" A-kramaśas cha," and also simultaneously : after seeing a tiger at night under the flash of a lightning, a man instantly runs away. In this case there is the simultaneous modification of all the four (*viz.*, Indriyas, Manas, Ahaṃkâra, and Buddhi). Although it being impossible for the modifications to arise all at one and the same moment, here also their appearance is really successive, still it has been stated to be not-successive on account of their non-manifestation as successive, according to the maxim of utpala-śata-patra-vyatibheda or the piercing through of one hundred petals of the water-lily, (in which case the petals are, in fact, pierced successively, one after another, but the whole thing seems to take place in a single moment of time).—32.

Bhâṣya :—It is not a fixed rule with us, as it is with the Vaiśeṣikas (*vide* Kaṇâda-Sûtram, III. ii. 3, S. B. II. Vol. VI, page 126), that the modifications of the Indriyas take place only successively, and not simultaneously. This the author declares :

This is easy to understand.

Inasmuch as promiscuity of classes is not a fault in our view, given the required collocation of materials, there is nothing of an obstruction to the production of modifications at one and the same time by more than one Indriyas. Such is the idea.

The division of the modifications of the Indriyas have also been explained by the Kârikâ :

शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।
वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥

In respect of Sound, and the rest, the modification of the five (Indriyas of Cognition is desired to the âlochana or simple awareness or observation of particular kinds. Of the five (Indriyas of Action, the modifications are) speech, prehension, movement, excretion and excitation.—Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, XXVIII.

"Âlochana" also has been explained by the ancient teachers, thus:

अस्ति ह्यालोचनं ज्ञानं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पकम् ।
परं पुनस्तथा वस्तुधर्मैर्जात्यादिभिस्तथा ॥

For, first, there arises "âlochana," that is, nirvikalpaka or objectless cognition afterwards, again, it is made discrete by means of the properties of the object as well as by means of its class, etc.—Sâṃkhya-Tattva Kaumudî on Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, XXVII.

And "Param," the subsequent cognition, again, which is savikalpaka or discrete "vastu-dharmaiḥ" or by reason of the properties of the thing as also "jâti-âdi-bhiḥ" or by reason of the class, etc., is "tathâ," called by the name "âlochana." Such is the meaning.

So that, it is obtained that sensuous cognition in the form of nirvikalpaka or indiscrete and savikalpaka or discrete, is, in both of its forms, designated by the name of "âlochana."

According to some, however, the above verse means that nirvikalpaka cognition alone is âlochana and is the product of the Indriya, while savikalpaka cognition is the product of Manas only. But such is not the meaning of the verse; because, in the Commentary on Yoga, it has been established by the revered Vyâsa that viśiṣṭa-jñâna or the cognition of a thing as possessing a particular character is also a product of the Indriyas; and, further, because there is nothing of an obstruction to the cognition, by the Indriyas, of a thing as possessing a particular character.

The same authority (cf. Aniruddha also) explains the meaning of the aphorism also in this way: The modification of these, beginning with the external Indriyas and ending with Buddhi, ordinarily takes place by succession; but occasionally, for instance, at the moment of seeing a tiger and the like, on account of special fear, modification takes place simultaneously in all the Instruments (*Vide* II, 38), like the flash of a streak of lightning; such is the meaning. This too is incorrect; because in the aphorism there is mention of the successive and simultaneous appearance of the modifications of the Indriyas only; there is not the remotest allusion to the modification of Buddhi and Ahaṃkâra. Moreover, since a divergent opinion is held by our opponent only in respect to the simultaneity of the modifications of the several Indriyas, it is but proper that the aphorism should be directed only to the establishment of such simultaneity, with a view to repel the atomicity of Manas (*vide* Vaiśeṣika-Sûtram, S. B. H. Vol. VI, page 230), but not that it should be directed to make search for the tooth of a crow.—32.

Note.—Aniruddha, however, accepts the Vaiśeṣika theory of the atomicity of Manas. *Vide* Vṛitti on III, 14.

Number and Character of the Modifications.

वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः ॥ २ । ३३ ॥

वृत्तयः: vrittayaḥ, modifications. पञ्चतय्यः: pañchatayyaḥ, fivefold. क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः: kliṣṭâ-a-kliṣṭâḥ, painful and non-painful.

33. The modifications are fivefold, and are painful and non-painful (cf. Yoga Aphorisms, I. 5).—197.

Vritti :—How many are the modifications? To remove this curiosity, the author says :

(The fivefold modifications are) Pramâṇa, Viparyaya, Vikalpa, Nidrâ, and Smṛiti. Sense-perception, Inference, and Word, are the Pramâṇas or Proofs, *i.e.*, Sources of Knowledge. (*Vide* Yoga Aphorisms, I. 6, and 7, S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 14). Viparyaya is unreal cognition, resting on a form not possessed by that which is its object (*vide* Yoga Aphorisms, I. 8, S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 18). Vikalpa is cognition swinging between both the alternatives (cf. Yoga Aphorisms, I. 9, S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 20). Nidrâ (Sleep) is cognition supporting on Tamas (cf. Yoga Aphorisms, I. 10, S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 22). Smṛiti (Memory or Reminiscence) is cognition of the past.(Cf. Yoga Aphorisms, I. 11, S. B. H., Vol. IV, p. 24).

"Kliṣṭâḥ" means attended with pain, that is, constituted by Rajas and Tamas; "A-kliṣṭâḥ" means having the painful in it burnt up, that is, constituted by Sattva.—33.

Bhâṣya :—Lumping together the modifications of Buddhi, the author, in the first place, exhibits them, with the object of showing that they are the cause of Saṃsâra or worldly existence.

Whether they be painful or non-painful, the modifications are "pañchatayyaḥ," of five kinds only, and not more. Such is the meaning. "Kliṣṭâḥ," that is, pain-giving, are the worldly modifications; "a-kliṣṭâḥ," that is, the opposite thereof, are the modifications taking place at the time of Yoga.

The fivefoldness of the modifications has been declared by the (Yoga) Aphorism of Patañjali :

प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतयः ॥

Pramâṇa, Viparyaya, Vikalpa, Nidrâ, and Smṛiti (are the modifications).—Yoga-Sûtram, I. 6.

Amongst these, the modification called Pramâṇa has also been similarly described in this (Sâṃkhya-Śâstra, *vide* I. 87 *ante*). But Viparyaya, in our view, consists only in the non-apprehension of viveka

or the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, because we reject the theory of anyathâ-khyâti, that is, that a thing can be seen in a light different from its own. Vikalpa, again, is cognition such as "The head of Râhu" (when Râhu is all head), "The consciousness of Puruṣa" (when Puruṣa is nothing but consciousness), even at the time of the observation of the peculiarity. And Nidrâ is the modification of Buddhi taking place during the state of dreamless sleep. And Smṛiti is cognition produced from Saṃskâra or previous impressions. All this has been aphorised in the System of Patañjali.—33.

The svarûpa *of* Puruṣa *indicated.*

तन्निवृत्तावुपशान्तोपरागः स्वस्थः ॥ २ । ३४ ॥

तन्निवृत्तौ tat-nivṛittau, on the cessation of these (modifications). उपशान्तोपरागः upaśânta-uparâgaḥ, having the tincture subsided. स्वस्थः sva-sthaḥ, self-seated.

34. On the cessation of these (modifications), as the colour reflected (on him by them) disappears, (Puruṣa remains) self-seated.—198.

Vṛitti :—The author says that, on the cessation of the modifications, there results Release.

On the cessation of the modifications, Ignorance, Egoity, Desire, Aversion, and Love of Life (*vide* Yoga Aphorisms, II. 3, S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 91) having been exhausted, (Puruṣa) "sva-sthaḥ," recovers his svarûpa or intrinsic form.—34.

Bhâṣya :—These modifications of Buddhi that have just been mentioned—it is entirely due to them as Upâdhis, and not to himself, that Puruṣa seems to have a form other than his own; and on the cessation of these, Puruṣa becomes fixed in his svarûpa. From this side (of the question) also the author makes us acquainted with the svarûpa of Puruṣa.

In the state of repose of these modifications, their reflections having subsided, Puruṣa becomes self-seated, just as he is, at other times also, in the state of aloneness. So also say the three Yoga Aphorisms :

योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः ॥
तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम् ॥
वृत्तिसारूप्यमितरत्र ॥

Yoga is the suppression of the modifications of the Chitta.
Then is the resting of the on-looker in his own form.
Elsewhere there is identity of form with the modifications.—Yoga-Aphorisms of Patañjali, I, 2, 3, 4, S. B. H. Vol. iv, pp. 5, 9, 10.

And the being self-seated, in the case of Puruṣa, denotes nothing else than the cessation of the reflection of the modifications of his Upâdhi (*i.e.*, Buddhi).

A similar condition of Puruṣa has been shown by means of an illustration, in the Yoga-Vâśiṣṭha-Râmâyaṇam :

अनाप्ताखिलशैलादिप्रतिबिम्बे हि यादृशी ।
स्याद्दर्पणे दर्पणता केवलात्मस्वरूपिणी ॥
अहं त्वं जगदित्यादौ प्रशान्ते दृश्यसम्भ्रमे ।
स्यात्तादृशी केवलता स्थिते द्रष्टर्यवीक्षणे ॥

For, in a mirror which has not received the reflections of the hills and hundred other objects, the single nature that there is, of being a mirror, consisting of its own intrinsic form alone, the same aloneness there will be in the on-looker, when he stands not seeing, the panorama of scenes showing the "I," the "You," and the "World," etc., having gone down.—34.

Above illustrated.

कुसुमवच्च मणिः ॥ २ । ३५ ॥

कुसुमवत् kusuma-vat, like the flower. च cha, and. मणिः maniḥ, the jewel.

35. And as (is the case with) the jewel, in relation to the flower.—199.

Vṛitti :—The author gives an illustration.

As redness appears in the crystal (which is naturally of a white colour), through its association with a China-rose flower, and, after its removal, the crystal stands by its own intrinsic form; so does he also.—35.

Bhâṣya :—The author elucidates this by an illustration.

The word "cha" denotes the cause; so that the meaning is that as the jewel is *by means of* the flower.

As the crystal, by reason of the China-rose flower, becomes red, *i.e.*, not standing by itself, and, on the removal thereof, becomes red-less, *i.e.*, standing by itself; similarly does Puruṣa. So has it been stated in the Kûrma-Purâṇa :

यथा संलक्ष्यते रक्तः केवलः स्फटिको जनैः ।
रञ्जकाद्युपधानेन तद्वत् परम पूरुषः ॥

As the pure crystal is seen by men to be red by reason of something which makes it look red, lying near about it, so is the case with the Great Puruṣa.—Kûrma-Purâṇa, II. 11, 28.—35.

What moves the Indriyas *to operate.*

पुरुषार्थं करणोद्भवोऽप्यदृष्टोल्लासात् ॥ २ । ३६ ॥

पुरुषार्थं puruṣa-artham, for the accomplishment of the object of Puruṣa. करणोद्भवः karaṇa-udbhavaḥ, awakening or activity of the Instruments. अपि api, also. अदृष्टोल्लासात् adṛiṣṭa-ullâsât, from the development of Adṛiṣṭam, the unseen Merit and Demerit.

36. The Instruments also rise into activity, for the sake of Puruṣa, from the development of Adṛiṣṭam.—200.

Vṛitti:—Lest it be thought that, the Instruments being on a par with one another, they will always have similarity of forms; so the author says:

There can be no such similarity, on account of the difference of the development and non-development of the Instruments into activity. And this difference comes from the development of Adṛiṣṭam which is the stronger factor in the case.—36.

Bhâṣya:—But, it may be asked, by whose effort or volition the aggregate of the Instruments come into operation, when Puruṣa is immutable, and when (the intervention of) Îśvara is denied? To this the author replies:

Like the activity of Prakṛiti, "karaṇa-udbhavaḥ," the activity of the Instruments, which also is for the sake of Puruṣa, proceeds only from the manifestation of the Adṛiṣṭam of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

And Adṛiṣṭam is (really) of the Upâdhi itself (of Puruṣa) (*vide* II. 46, Bhâṣya).—36.

Above illustrated.

धेनुवद्वत्साय ॥ २ । ३७ ॥

धेनुवत् dhenu-vat, like cow. वत्साय vatsâya, for the sake of the calf.

37. As does the cow for the calf.—201.

Vṛitti:—The author gives an illustration.

As, although cows resemble one another in being cows, the milch one nourishes the calf.—37.

Bhâṣya:—The author gives an illustration of spontaneous activity for another's sake.

As the cow, for the sake of the calf, quite spontaneously distils milk, and awaits no other effort, in the very same way do the Instruments come

into operation quite spontaneously for the sake of Puruṣa, their lord. Such is the meaning. And it is also seen that, from deep sleep, Buddhi quite spontaneously wakes up.

The very same thing has been stated by the Kârikâ also:

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूतहेतुकां वृत्तिम् ।
पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित् कार्यते करणम् ॥

(The instruments) go into their respective modifications, occasioned by mutual sympathy; the purpose of Puruṣa is the only cause (of it); by none is an Instrument moved to action.—Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, XXXI.—37.

The number of the Instruments.

करणं त्रयोदशविधमवान्तरभेदात् ॥ २ । ३८ ॥

करणं karaṇam, Instrument. त्रयोदशविधम् trayodaśa-vidham, thirteen-fold. अवान्तरभेदात् avântara-bhedât, through subsidiary division:

38. The Instrument is of thirteen kinds, according to subsidiary differences.—202.

Vṛitti:—Through external and internal division, how many are the Instruments? To this the author replies:

The internal (Instruments) are Buddhi, Ahaṃkâra, and Manas; the external ones are the ten Indriyas.—38.

Bhâṣya:—There being room for the enquiry as to how many the Instruments are, with the external and the internal ones combined; the author says:

The three internal Instruments and the ten external Instruments, being combined, are thirteen. The word "vidham," kinds, has been used in order to show that amongst these (thirteen), again, there is an infinity through the difference of individuals. The expression "according to subsidiary differences" has been used with this in mind that Buddhi alone is the principal Instrument; the meaning being that the Instruments of the one single Instrument called Buddhi, are more than one.—38.

Why the Indriyas *are called Instruments.*

इन्द्रियेषु साधकतमत्वगुणयोगात् कुठारवत् ॥ २ । ३९ ॥

इन्द्रियेषु indriyeṣu, in the Indriyas. साधकतमत्वगुणयोगात् sâdhakatama-tva-guṇa-yogât, from conjunction of the quality of the most efficient means of accomplishing the object of Puruṣa. कुठारवत् kuṭhâra-vat, like an axe.

39. (There are thirteen kinds of Instruments), because, in the Indriyas (excepting Buddhi), there is conjunction of

the quality of the most efficient Instrument (*viz.*, Buddhi) as in the case of the axe.—203.

Vritti :—How does instrumentality belong to the Indriyas? To this the author replies:

As instrumentality arises in the axe, it being the most efficient means of accomplishing the act; so also in the case of the Indriyas.—39.

Bhâṣya :—But Buddhi itself, because it makes over objects to Puruṣa, is the principal Instrument, while the instrumentality of the others is due to their possessing the quality of the former; what, then, it may be asked, is that quality (here required?) There being room for such an enquiry, the author says:

In the Indriyas, there exists, mediately, the quality of the Instrument, Buddhi, in the form of being the most efficient means of accomplishing the purpose of Puruṣa; hence thirteen kinds of Instruments are made out; such is the connection with the preceding aphorism.

"As in the case of the axe:" As, although the principal instrumentality, in the act of cutting, is of the blow alone, since it cuts off our non-connection with the fruit or result, yet instrumentality belongs to the axe also, through its conjunction with the quality of being an excellent means; similarly. Such is the meaning.

Bearing in mind the oneness of the internal Instruments, it is not declared here that instrumentality in a secondary sense belongs to Ahaṃkâra.—39.

Pre-eminence of Buddhi *illustrated.*

द्वयोः प्रधानं मनो लोकवद्भृत्यवर्गेषु ॥ २ । ४० ॥

द्वयोः dvayoḥ, of the two. प्रधानं pradhânam, principal. मनः manaḥ, Manas. लोकवत् loka-vat, as some one person (Vijñâna), as in the world (Aniruddha). भृत्यवर्गेषु bhṛitya-varge-ṣu, among a troop of servants.

40. Of the two, the principal is Manas, as is some one person, among a troop of servants.—204.

Vritti :—The author describes the action of the thirteen Instruments.

"Dvayoḥ," of the Indriyas of Cognition and the Indriyas of Action, the principal is Manas, because the activity of the others proceeds only from its superintendence over them; as, in the world, is the master among the servants.—40.

Bhâṣya :—Specifying how the case stands in regard to the relation of the secondary and the principal, the author says :

"Dvayoḥ," among the external and the internal, "manas," Buddhi alone is "pradhânam," the principal, in other words, the immediate Instrument, because it is that which makes over the object to Puruṣa. Just as, among a host of servants, some one person alone becomes the prime minister of the king, while the others are, as his subordinates, the governors of villages, and the like ; similarly. Such is the meaning.

Here the word "manas" does not denote the third internal Instrument (*vide* II. 30) ; because it is impossible for anything other than Buddhi to be, as will later on (*vide* II. 42) be declared, the receptacle of all the numerous Saṃskâras or past impressions, or, even if it were possible, because, (in that case), the supposition or conception of Buddhi would be futile.—40.

Why Buddhi *is the principal.*

अव्यभिचारात् ॥ २ । ४१ ॥

अव्यभिचारात् a-vyabhichârât, from not wandering away.

41. (Buddhi is the principal), because it never wanders away.—205.

Vṛitti :—The author gives the reason for the above.

This is clear.—41.

Bhâṣya :—The author gives, in three aphorisms, reasons why Buddhi is principal.

Because it pervades all the Instruments, or because it never fails to produce the fruit (in the shape of knowledge).—41.

A second reason.

तथाऽशेषसंस्काराधारत्वात् ॥ २ । ४२ ॥

तथा tathâ, so too. अशेषसंस्काराधारत्वात् aśeṣa-saṃskâra-âdhâra-tvât, from being the depository or receptacle of infinite saṃskâras or past impressions.

42. So, too, because it is the receptacle of infinite Saṃskâras.—206.

Vṛitti :—The author gives another reason.

Because there are seen to survive the saṃskâras, recepts or impressions of even lost Indriyas.—42.

Bhâṣya :—It belongs to Buddhi alone to be the receptacle of all the saṃskâras, and not to the Eye, etc., nor to Ahaṃkâra, nor to Manas, inasmuch as the recollection, by the blind, the deaf, etc., of objects previously seen, heard, etc., cannot otherwise be explained or be possible. Moreover, it is seen that, even after the dissolution of Ahaṃkâra and Manas by means of Tattva-Jñâna or Knowlege of Truth, there remains recollection. Hence, by reason also of its being the depository of infinite saṃskâras, Buddhi alone possesses pre-eminence over all. Such is the meaning.—42.

A third reason.

स्मृत्याऽनुमानाच्च ॥ २ । ४३ ॥

स्मृत्या smṛitiyâ, by memory, reminiscence, or recollection. अनुमानात् anumânât, from inference. च cha, and, also.

43. And also because (there is) inference (of its pre-eminence) by means of reminiscence.—207.

Vṛitti :—The author shows the reasoning.

From seeing that recollection takes place even in the absence of the Indriya, Manas is inferred.—43.

Bhâṣya :— Also because, "Smṛityâ," by means of the modification in the form of chintana or thinking, there is inference of the pre-eminence (of Buddhi). Such is the meaning. For, the modification of the chintâ or thinking, called dhyâna or contemplation, is the noblest of all the modifications; and, by being the seat thereof, Buddhi itself, otherwise named chitta or the thinking principle, is nobler than the Indriyas possessing modifications other than this. Such is the meaning.—43.

Recollection is not spontaneous to Puruṣa.

सम्भवेन्न स्वतः ॥ २ । ४४ ॥

सम्भवेत् sambhavet, is possible. न na, not. स्वतः svataḥ, from Puruṣa.

44. (Recollection) cannot come from Puruṣa.—208.

Vṛitti :—Lest it be thought that Saṃskâra has its receptacle in the Self; so the author says :

"Svataḥ," from the Self, it cannot be possible, owing to the fact that the Self is immutable and has no direct relation to the Guṇas.—44.

Bhâṣya :—But, it may be said, let the modification called thinking or contemplation belong to Puruṣa himself. To this the author replies :

"Svataḥ," of Puruṣa, recollection cannot be possible, on account of his being immutable. Such is the meaning.

Or, the aphorism can be explained in the following manner:

Well, then, it may be objected, let Buddhi alone be the Indriya, and do away with the subsidiary Indriyas. Apprehending this, the author says: Sambhavet na svataḥ; the meaning being that, without the intervention of the Eye, etc., the instrumentality of Buddhi in all its operations, cannot arise spontaneously, since, in that case, it would happen that the blind, etc., also would see Colour, etc.—44.

Relativity of the Condition of Principal and Secondary.

आपेक्षिको गुणप्रधानभावः क्रियाविशेषात् ॥ २ । ४५ ॥

आपेक्षिकः Âpekṣikaḥ, relative, mutually respective. गुणप्रधानभावः guṇa-pradhânabhâvaḥ, the relation or condition of secondary and principal. क्रियाविशेषात् kriyâviśeṣât, owing to distinction of function.

45. The condition of secondary and principal is relative to the distinction of function.—209.

Vṛitti:—But when they are all equally instruments, to what cause, it may be asked, is due the condition of their being secondary and principal? To this the author replies:

This is clear.—45.

Bhâṣya:—But, then, it may be asked, Buddhi alone thus being the principal, how has it been declared before (*vide* II. 26) that Manas partakes of the character of both (the Indriya of Cognition and the Indriya of Action)? To this the author replies.

The condition of being secondary and principal among the Instruments is relative towards (the performance of) particular acts. *E.g.*, in the operations of the Eye, etc., Manas is principal; in the operation of Manas, again, Ahaṃkâra is principal; and in the operation of Ahaṃkâra, Buddhi is principal.—45.

Why one particular Buddhi, *and not another, acts for the benefit of one particular* Puruṣa, *and not another.*

तत्कर्मार्जितत्वात्तदर्थमभिचेष्टा लोकवत् ॥ २ । ४६ ॥

तत्कर्मार्जितत्वात् tat-karma-arjitatvât, having been acquired or purchased by the Karma or deeds of that (particular Puruṣa). तदर्थम् tat-artham, for his purpose. अभिचेष्टा abhicheṣṭâ, activity towards another. लोकवत् loka-vat, as in the world.

46. The other-regarding activity (of one particular

Buddhi), for the benefit of one particular Puruṣa, is due to its having been purchased by the Karma of that particular Puruṣa ;—just as in the world.—210.

Vṛitti :—When there is the absence of any adjustment of aim, why does not, it may be asked, a different one act or energise for the sake of another ? To this the author replies :

Having been acquired by the Karma of Puruṣa as reflected in Buddhi, the other-regarding activity of Buddhi, etc., is for the benefit of Puruṣa ; as, in the world, a servant does the work of the person by whom he has been purchased.—46.

Bhâṣya :—Well, it may be asked, what is the cause of the arrangement that of this Puruṣa is this Buddhi alone the Instrument, and not another ? To this the author replies :

Because the Instrument is originated from the Karma of a particular Puruṣa, "abhiceṣṭâ," all its operations are for the sake of that Puruṣa, just as in the world. Such is the meaning. Just as, in the world, whatever axe, etc., has been acquired, by the act of buying, etc., by whatever man,—the operation (of that axe, etc.) such as cutting, etc., is only for the sake of that man ; such is the meaning. Hence is the specific distribution of the Instruments. Such is the idea.

(But how can it be said : "Karma of Puruṣa," when Puruṣa is incapable of action ? This point is next considered in the Bhâṣya.)

Although, by reason of his being immobile or immutable, there is no Karma in Puruṣa, still, inasmuch as it, being the means of bhoga or experience, is related to Puruṣa as its owner, therefore Karma is said to belong to Puruṣa, in the same way, for example, as victory, etc. (really achieved by the army, is said to belong) to the king (because he is the owner of the army.)

But what is there to determine the particular adjustment of Karma itself to particular Puruṣas ? To this we reply that it is nothing but other Karmas similarly related. In saying this we do not commit the fault of anavasthâ or nothing-to-stand-upon (*i.e.*, non-finality), because Karma is without beginning.

What, on the other hand, some one (Aniruddha, *vide* Vṛitti), not possessing discrimination, says, namely that Karma is of Puruṣa reflected in Buddhi ; that is not so ; because, the very same relation (of Karma to Puruṣa), as has been mentioned by us, having been mentioned in the Commentary on Yoga, no other relationship is creditable ; and also because, by reason of the fact that a reflection is not a Vastu or independent

objective existence, Karma, and the like are impossible for it, for; otherwise, on the admission of Karma and the experience thereof as appertaining to the reflection, the supposition or conception of Puruṣa, admitted by him also to be the substance casting reflection into Buddhi, would, as has already been established by us, be futile.—46.

The topic of the pre-eminence of Buddhi *concluded.*

समानकर्मयोगे बुद्धेः प्राधान्यं लोकवल्लोकवत् ॥ २ । ४७ ॥

समानकर्मयोगे samâna-karma-yoge, performance of like acts notwithstanding. बुद्धेः buddheḥ, of Buddhi. प्राधान्यं prâdhânyaṃ, principalship. लोकवत् loka-vat, as in the world.

47. Although they perform like offices, principalship belongs to Buddhi, just as in the world, just as in the world.—211.

Vṛitti:—The author declares that everywhere principalship belongs to Buddhi.

Just as in the world, the governor of the state is superior to the governor of the village, and superior to him, again, is the king, so, because Manas operates for the sake of Buddhi, Buddhi is the principal of all; "samânak-arma-yoge," although all of them perform acts equally for the purpose of Puruṣa.

The repetition of the expression "just as in the world" is to indicate the close of the book.—47.

Here ends the Second Book, of the Evolutions of Prakṛiti, in the Vṛitti on the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram of Kapila.

Bhâṣya :—In order to bring out prominently the principalship of Buddhi, the author concludes:

Although, the function of all the Instruments is just the same, in being for the purpose of Puruṣa, still principalship belongs to Buddhi alone, just as in the world. For, in the world, as pre-eminence belongs to the primeminister alone among the governors of villages and the rest, even although there is no particular distinction in their being (workers) for the benefit of the king; similarly. Such is the meaning.

Hence is it that in all Śâstras, Buddhi alone is celebrated as Mahat or the Great One.

The repetition (*viz.* "just as in the world," "just as in the world") marks the end of the Book.—47.

The components of the Liṅga-Deha, the subtle body, which are seventeen in number,—these subtle products of Prakṛiti have been examined in this Book.

Note:—The components of the Liṅga-Deha are "Mahat-âdi sûkṣma-paryantam" (Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, XL. *q. v.*): Mahat, Ahaṃkâra, Manas, the five Indriyas of Cognition, the five Indriyas of Action, and the five Tan-mâtras, which would be eighteen in number. Vijñâna-Bhikṣu follows Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram, III. 9, which reduces the number to seventeen, by taking Buddhi and Ahaṃkâra as one

Here ends the Second Book, of the Evolutions of Prakṛiti, in the Commentary composed by Vijñâna Âchârya, on the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram of Kapila.

Book III.

OF DISPASSION.

INTRODUCTION.

Vritti :—Now, after the ascertainment of the Evolutions of Prakriti, is made the beginning of the Third Book, for the purpose of discussing Vairâgya or Dispassion.

Bhâṣya :—From here forward the gross products of Prakriti, *viz.*, the Mahâ-Bhûtas or Great Elements and the duad of bodies, are to be described, and after this, the going into the various wombs, and the like; with the object of evoking that lower dispassion which is the motive to the performance of acts which are the means of knowledge; and, thereafter, with a view to higher dispassion, all the means of knowledge are to be told. So the Third Book commences :

Origin of the Gross Elements.

अविशेषाद्विशेषारम्भः ॥ ३ । १ ॥

अविशेषात् a-viśeṣât, from the indefinite homogeneity. विशेषारम्भः viśeṣa-ârambhaḥ, origination of the definite heterogeneity.

1. From the indefinite homogeneity (there is) the origination of the definite heterogeneity.—212.

Vritti :—"A-viśeṣât" from the subtle elements, there is the origination "viśeṣasya", of the Great Elements.—1.

Bhâṣya:—In which do not exist the distinctions in the form of calmness, fierceness, dulness, and the like,—such is "a-viśeṣa" (indiscernible or indistinguishable), the subtle (parts) of the Elements, called the five Tanmâtras or mere somethings or the measures thereof; from them there is the origination of the gross Great Elements, which are "viśeṣas" (discernible or distinguishable), inasmuch as they possess the distinctions in the form of the calm and the like. Such is the meaning. For it is only in the Gross Elements that the character of having pleasure, etc., in their essence, in the from of the calm and the like, is manifested by the degrees of more and less, and not in the Subtle Elements, because their manifestation in the mind of the Yogins (where alone, if anywhere, they are ever manifested) is only by the one single form of the calm.—1.

Origin of the Body.

तस्माच्छरीरस्य ॥ ३ । २ ॥

तस्मात् tasmât, therefrom. शरीरस्य śarîrasya, of the body.

2. Therefrom, of the Body.—213.

Vṛitti:– One grows dispassionate to the body through a consideration of its being composed of the flesh and the like.—2.

Bhâṣya :—Thus, then, commencing from the first book, up to this place, having described the production of the twenty-three principles, the author declares therefrom the production of the duad of bodies.

"Tasmât," from the twenty-three principles, is the origination of the pair of bodies, gross and subtle. Such is the meaning.—2.

Origin of Saṃsâra.

तद्बीजात् संसृतिः ॥ ३ । ३ ॥

तद्बीजात् tat-vîjât, from the seed thereof. संसृतिः saṃsṛitiḥ, transmigratory or worldly existence ; Saṃsâra.

3. From the seed thereof, is Saṃsâra.—214.

Vṛitti :—Production has been shown ; wherefrom is disappearance ? To this the author replies :

From the cause thereof, *i.e.*, of the origination of the Elements, namely Dharma and A-dharma, is going out, *i.e.*, disappearance or destruction.—3.

Bhâṣya :—Now the author proves that Saṃsâra or worldly existence (of Puruṣa) cannot be accounted for otherwise than by means of the twenty-three principles.

From the seed, *i.e.*, the subtle causes in the form of the twenty-three principles, of it, *i.e.* the body, takes place "saṃsṛiti," *i.e.*, the going and coming, of Puruṣa, inasmuch as spontaneous going, etc., is impossible for the immutable on account of his universality. Such is the meaning. For, (only) Puruṣa, residing in the twenty-three principles, by means of that [illegible] or investment alone, moves from body to body, for the purpose of ex[illegible]ncing the Karmas previously done ; because, by such Smṛitis as

मानसं मनसैवायमुपभुंक्ते शुभाशुभम् ।
वाचा वाचा कृतं कर्म कायेनैव तु कायिकम् ॥

Verily with the Manas, does Puruṣa experience the Karma, good and bad, done with the Manas ; with the Speech, the Karma done with the Speech ; and with the body only, the Karma done with the body.—Manu-Saṃhitâ, XII, 8.

it has been established that experience in other lives takes place quite naturally, by means of the materials consisting of the Karmas performed in the previous lives. For this very reason, the Brahma-Sûtram concludes :

सम्परिष्वक्त इति

"(In order to obtain another body, the soul goes) accompanied (by permanent atoms; as appears from the question and answer in the Chhândogya text.')—Vedânta-Sûtram, III. i. 1; S. B. H. Vol. v., page 426.—3.

Limit of Saṃsâra.

आ विवेकाच्च प्रवर्तनमविशेषाणाम् ॥ ३ । ४ ॥

आ विवेकात् â vivekât, till Viveka or discriminative knowledge. च cha, and. प्रवर्तनम् pravartanam, activity, operation. अविशेषाणाम् a-viśeṣâṇâm, of the Indistinguishables or Indiscernibles; of the A-viśeṣas, Tan-mâtras (Aniruddha); of Puruṣas (Vijñâna).

4. And till there is Viveka, there is the operation of the Indiscernibles.—215.

Vṛitti :—Lest it might be thought that, since the originators of the Gross Elements are existences, there would be origination at all times, and, that, consequently, there would be no Release; so the author says :

Till the development of the Knowledge of the distinction between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, the characteristic of being of the nature of originators belongs to the Tan-mâtras and the Bhûtas.—4.

Bhâṣya :—The author states the limit of Saṃsâra.

Of all Puruṣas whatever, devoid of the distinction of being an Îśvara, not being an Îśvara, and the like, "Pravartanam," saṃsâra or transmigratory existence, is inevitable or necessary, till only the appearance of Viveka, and after the appearance of Viveka, it is not. Such is the meaning.—4.

The reason for the above.

उपभोगादितरस्य ॥ ३ । ५ ॥

उपभोगात् upabhogât, on account of the experience. इतरस्य itarasya, of the other, *viz.*, who has not Viveka.

5. On account of the experience of the other.—216.

Vṛitti :—When the characteristic of being the originators is in respect to one not possessing Viveka or Discrimination, this characteristic of being the originators will persist, one may say, even at the time of Mahâ Pralaya or the Great Dissolution;—this is what the author denies.

After (the undergoing of) experience by one not possessing Viveka or Discrimination, his body does not exist during Mahâ Pralaya, and, consequently, how can there be experience in that state? Hence in respect to him, the Subtle Elements do not possess the characteristic of being the originators.—5.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—"Itarsya," of the one not possessing Viveka, "upabhogât," after the completion of Experience, there being the destruction of the previous Karma causing Experience, Pralaya takes place. Hence in the absence of Experience, for what purpose will there be a Body? Such is the import.

Bhâṣya :—The author states the reason of this:

Because of the inevitableness of the experience of the fruits of his own karma, "itarasya," only in the case of the one not possessing Viveka or Discrimination. Such is the meaning.—5.

Puruṣa *is ever free from experience.*

सम्प्रति परिमुक्तो द्वाभ्याम् ॥ ३ । ६ ॥

सम्प्रति samprati, now; during Pralaya or Dissolution (Aniruddha); at the time of creation (Mahâdeva); at the time of transmigration (Vijñâna). परिमुक्तः pari-muktaḥ, entirely free (Vijñâna); bound (Mahâdeva). Aniruddha reads "pariṣvaktaḥ" meaning overpowered, enveloped, instead of "parimuktaḥ." द्वाभ्याम् dvâbhyâm, by the pair (Aniruddha and Mahâdeva); from the pairs of contraries (Vijñâna).

6. Now (Puruṣa is) entirely free from the pairs.—217.

Vṛitti :—But when, as a general rule, they cease to be the originators during Mahâ Pralaya, from what particular cause, again, they become the originators in regard to one not possessing Viveka? To this the author replies:

("Dvâbhyâm," *i.e.*) by Dharma, Merit, and A-dharma, Demerit. Embracing going and coming, the Self remains bound, even in Pralaya, in as far as it drags behind it the load of Dharma and A-dharma; hence is origination over again in respect to it. Not so in the state of Release.—6.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—At the time of creation, again, how do they come to possess the characteristic of being the originators? In reply to this, the author says:

"Samprati," at the time of creation. "Dvâbhyâm," by Dharma and A-dharma. "Pari-muktaḥ," that is, bound; because the root *much* (from which, joined to the prefix *pari*, the word, parimukta, is derived), joined to the prefix *pari* also, as when joined to the prefix *â*, conveys the sense of

binding. When Dharma and A-dharma, lying dormant in Pralaya, are, at the time of creation, about to bear fruits, the body is originated. In the state of Release, on the other hand, there is verily the destruction of Dharma and A-dharma. Such is the import.

Bhâṣya :– The author states that, even while there is a Body, at the time of transmigrating, there is no experience.

"Samprati," at the time of transmigration, Puruṣa becomes entirely freed, "Dvâbhyâm," from the pairs of contraries such as cold and hot, pleasure and pain, etc. Such is the meaning.

So has it been stated by the Kârikâ.

(पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।)
संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥

[(Puruṣa, residing in) the Liṅga-Śarîra the one primodially produced, unconnected continuant, composed of the principles beginning with Mahat and ending with the Subtle Elements], transmigrates, free from Experience, and tinged with the Bhâvas or Dispositions (of Dharma and A-dharma, and the like.–Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, XL.

"Bhâvas" are Dharma and A-dharma, Vâsanâ or Desire or Inclination, and the like.—6.

The Gross and the Subtle Body distinguished.

मातापितृजं स्थूलं प्रायश इतरन्न तथा ॥ ३ । ७ ॥

मातापितृजं mâtâ-pitṛi-jaṃ, produced from father and mother. स्थूलं sthûlaṃ, gross body. प्रायशः prâyaśaḥ, for the most part, usually. इतरत् itrarat, the other, *i.e.*, the subtle body. न na, not. तथा tathâ, so.

7. The Gross (Body) is the one usually produced from the father and mother; the other is the one not so produced.—218.

Vṛitti :—But, the Self being eternally free,* how is it said to be dependent, for its release, on the destruction of Dharma and A-dharma? To this the author replies:

"Prâyaśaḥ," usually: because so is it seen to be the case. "Itarat," the Subtle Body, is not so, because of the difficulty of its conception.—7.

Bhâṣya :—Hereafter the author proceeds to describe the duad of bodies with reference to their specific nature.

* We adopt the reading of Paṇḍita Kâlivara Vedântavâgîśa's edition of 1808 Śaka Era Calcutta. Dr. Garbe's reading, *viz.*, Nityatve tu mukteḥ katham pâratantryam,– the Self being eternal, how there can be dependence of Release upon something else,– does not seem to be quite satisfactory.

The Gross (Body) is the one produced from the father and mother, "Prâyaśaḥ," for the most part, because there is recollection (recorded in the Smṛitis) also of a Gross Body not born of a womb. (cf. Vaiśeṣika-Sûtram, IV. ii. 5-10, S. B. H. Vol. VI, pages 159-162). And "itarat," the Subtle Body, "na tathâ," is not one produced from the father and mother, because of its having been produced at the beginning of creation. Such is the meaning.

So has it been stated by the Kârikâ :

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादि सूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ॥
संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥

The Liṅga or Mergent Body, the one primordially produced, unconnected, continuant, composed of the Principles beginning with Mahat and ending with the Subtle (Elements), transmigrates, free from Experience, tinged with the Bhâvas or Dispositions.—Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, XL.

"Niyataṃ," "continuant," means eternal, lasting for a period of two parârdhas,* that is, secondarily or relatively eternal; because of the redundancy in the supposition of the production of a Liṅga Body for every Gross Body. Its destruction at the time of Pralaya is, however, admitted, following the authoritative declarations of the Veda and Smṛiti.

Mention of the absence of Experience at the time of transmigrating has been made (in the above Kârikâ), intending to lay down the general proposition. Occasionally, however, through entrance into an ærial body, Experience takes place even at the time of transmigrating. Herefrom are explained the declarations about the Experience of pain on the way to the Judgment Seat of Yama, the Controller.—7.

The Subtle, and not the Gross, Body causes Experience to Puruṣa.

पूर्वोत्पत्तेस्तत्कार्यत्वं भोगादेकस्य नेतरस्य ॥ ३ । ८ ॥

पूर्वोत्पत्तेः pûrva-utpatteḥ, of that of which the production is primordial. तत्कार्यत्वं tat-kârya-tvaṃ, the characteristic of having that, *i.e.*, experience, as the

* A Parârdha stands, in mathematics, for the number, lakṣa-lakṣa-koṭi, that is, for 1,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,000. But here it has a different meaning. For, from the text :

निजेन तस्य मानेन चायुर्वर्षशतं स्मृतम् ।
तत्पराख्यं तदर्धं च परार्धमभिधीयते ॥

And His (*i.e.*, of Brahmâ) life-time is recollected to be one hundred years by His own measure. That is called (पर) Para ; and the half of it is designated as Parârdha (Para-half). --Kârma-Purâṇa, Ch. V.

It appears that the life-time of Brahmâ makes the measure of two Parârdhas. This is the period of one Great Cycle of Creation and Dissolution, throughout which the Liṅga-śarîra persists.

Now, the one hundred years of Brahmâ is equal to 31,10,40,00,00,00,000 human years. A Parârdha, therefore, indicates 15,55,20,00,00,00,000 human years.

effect. भोगात् *bhogât, owing to experience.* एकस्य *ekasya, of the one.* न *na, not.* इतरस्य *itarasya, of the other, i.e., the Gross Body.*

8. To that of which the production is primordial, it belongs to have this (pleasure and pain) as its effect, because the experience of pleasure and pain is of the one, and not of the other.—219.

Vritti:—Between the two Bodies, to which does Bhoga or Experience belong? To this the author replies.

"Pûrva-utpatteḥ," of the Subtle Body; "ekasya," of this, being the Experience, and not "itarasya," of the Gross (Body); is the characteristic of having that, Experience, as its effect. Experience, in a secondary sense, belongs to the Gross Body, because of the non-observation of experience in a dead body.—8.

Bhâṣya :—Among the Bodies, Gross and Subtle, due to which as the Upâdhi or the external investment, is the conjunction of Puruṣa with the pairs (of contraries)? This the author ascertains.

Of which the production is "pûrvam," at the beginning of creation, *i.e.*, the Subtle Body, of this alone is "tat-kârya-tvaṃ," the characteristic of having pleasure and pain as its effects. Why? Because the experience called pleasure and pain, belongs, "ekasya," only to the Subtle Body, but not "itarasya," to the Gross Body, because all are agreed that pleasure, pain, and the like do not exist in a dead body. Such is the meaning.—8.

Constitution of the Subtle Body.

सप्तदशैकं लिङ्गम् ॥ ३ । ९ ॥

सप्तदश *sapta-daśa, seventeen.* एकं *ekaṃ, and one (Aniruddha); made into, combined as, one (Vijñâna).* लिङ्गम् *liṅgam, mergent, Liṅga; Subtle.*

9. The seventeen, as one, are the Subtle Body.—220.

Vritti :—By means of how many principles is the origination of the Subtle Body? To this the author replies:

Seventeen and one more, that is, eighteen; by these, the Subtle Body is produced. (They are) Buddhi, Ahaṃkâra, and Manas, the five Subtle Elements, and the ten Indriyas.—9.

Bhâṣya :—The author describes the svarûpa or the intrinsic form of the Subtle Body mentioned above.

The Subtle Body, again, by being the container and the contained, is two-fold. Among them, the seventeen, combining together, are the

Liṅga-Śarîra, and that, at the beginning of creation, is, in the form of an aggregate, but one. Such is the meaning.

The seventeen are the eleven Indriyas, the five Tan-mâtras, and Buddhi. Ahaṃkâra is really included in Buddhi.

Because of the proof to be mentioned under the third following aphorism (III. 12), it is these seventeen only that should be understood to be the Liṅgam ; and the present aphorism should not be construed so as to make their number eighteen, by taking "saptadaśaikam" to mean seventeen and one more (as has been done by Aniruddha); also because, since the distinction of individuals is the subject of demonstration by the next aphorism (III. 10), it is thereby ascertained that, in the present aphorism, the significance of the word, Eka, is to declare the oneness of the Liṅgam; and because, moreover, that the Liṅga-Śarîra is made up of seventeen elements only has been established in such passages of the Mokṣa-Dharma Section of the Mahâbhârata, etc., as

कर्मात्मा पुरुषो योऽसौ बन्धमोक्षैः प्रयुज्यते ।
स सप्तदशकेनापि राशिना युज्यते च सः ॥

He who is the Karma-âtmâ Puruṣa, that is, Puruṣa enveloped by Karma,—the same is predicated of with Bondage and Release ; he is also attended by the seventeen-membered mass.—Mahâbhârata, XII. 13755b-13756a.

Seventeen parts or members exists in it,—such is what has been called "the seventeen-membered mass." Such is the meaning. By the use of the word "râśi," mass, has this been excluded that, like the Gross Body, the Liṅga-Deha is a system containing distinct organs ; because, (when we have got such a system in the shape of the Gross Body), there would be redundancy in the supposition or postulation of another substance under the form of a system containing distinct organs. And, in the case of the Gross Body, the supposition that it is a system containing distinct organs, is made in conformity with the sense-perception (of the several parts) as one, two, etc.

And with the idea that in this, the Liṅga-Deha, it is Buddhi that is principal, Experience was stated before (*vide* III. 8) to be of the Liṅga-Deha.

Prâṇa, again, is a kind of modification of the Antaḥ-karaṇa or Internal Instrument itself (*vide* II. 31). Hence, in the Liṅga-Deha, there is inclusion of the pentad of Prâṇa also.

That this seventeen-membered thing is a Body, the author will himself declare by the aphorism : Liṅga-śarîra-nimittaka iti Sanandanâchâryaḥ (VI. 69). Hence, that it is the House of Experience,—this only

is the principal or primary definition of a Body; while, by reason of being its container, the other (*i.e.*, the Gross) is, as will, later on (*vide* III. 11), become clear, treated as a Body. It is of this that the definition has been made in the aphorism of Nyâya:

चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयः शरीरम् ॥

"Body is the site of gesture, senses, and sentiments."—Nyâya-Sûtram, I. i. 11, S. B. H. Vol. viii, page 5.—9.

How from one single Liṅgam, *manifold Individuals arise.*

व्यक्तिभेदः कर्मविशेषात् ॥ ३ । १० ॥

व्यक्तिभेदः vyakti-bhedaḥ, distinction of individuals. कर्मविशेषात् karma-viśeṣât, from distinction of Karma.

10. Differenciation of Individuals (proceeds) from distinction of Karma.—221.

Vṛitti:—The Subtle Body being alike in all cases, how can, it may be asked, the production take place therefrom of the vastly dissimilar bodies, *e.g.*, of the honey-bee and of the elephant? To this the author replies:

This is clear.—10.

Bhâṣyâ:—But, then, if the Liṅga-Śarîra be one, then, how could there be experiences of different characters according to difference of individuals? In regard to this the author says:

Even although, at the beginning of creation, the Liṅga exists as one and one only, in the form of the Upâdhi or external investment of Hiraṇya-Garbha or the Golden-Egged Brahmâ, yet afterwards takes place "vyakti-bhedaḥ," manifold division into parts by the forms of individuals; just as at present there is of the one single Liṅga-Deha of the father, a manifold division into parts in the forms of the Liṅga-Deha of a son, a daughter, and so on.

He states the cause of this: "karma-viśeṣât;" meaning, owing to the karma, the cause of experience, of other Jîvas or Incarnate Puruṣas.

From the mention here of "viśeṣa," distinction, that is, distinctive peculiarity, of Karma, it is obtained that the samaṣṭi-sṛiṣṭi or collective creation of the Jîvas takes place by reason of the common Karmas of the Jîvas.

And this differenciation of Individuals has also been declared in the Smṛitis of Manu and others. For example, in Manu's work, after the

description of the production of the six Indriyas of the samaṣṭi-puruṣa or Collective Puruṣa, we find :

तेषां त्ववयवान् सूक्ष्मान् षण्णामप्यमितौजसाम् ।
सन्निवेश्यात्ममात्रासु सर्वभूतानि निर्ममे ॥

Engrafting the subtle parts of those six, again, of immeasurable energy, into portions of the Self, He made all the beings.—Manu, I. 16.

The word "ṣaṇṇâm," of the six, is indicative of the entire Liṅga-Śarîra. "Âtma-mâtrâsu," into portions of consciousness; conjoining. Such is the meaning.

Similarly, there is, again, in the same Śâstra, another passage, *viz.*,

तच्छरीरसमुत्पन्नैः कार्यैस्तैः करणैः सह ।
क्षेत्रज्ञाः समजायन्त गात्रेभ्यस्तस्य धीमतः ॥

From the Body of that Intelligent Being, were born the Kṣetra-jñas (the Knowers of the Fields, that is, the Incarnate Puruṣas), by means of the effects produced from His Body, together with those Instruments.—10.

Why the Gross Organism is called a Body.

तदधिष्ठानाश्रये देहे तद्वादात् तद्वादः ॥ ३ । ११ ॥

तदधिष्ठानाश्रये tat-adhiṣṭhâna-âśraye, in respect of the tabernacle of the abiding thereof, *i.e.*, of the Liṅga-Śarîra. देहे dehe, in respect of the Gross Body. तद्वादात् tat-vâdât, from the predication thereof, *i.e.*, of the term Body (Vijñâna), Self (Aniruddha). तद्वादः tat-vâdaḥ, the predication thereof.

11. From its being predicated of it, it is predicated of the (Gross) Body which is the tabernacle of the abode thereof.—222.

Vṛitti :—If the Self be the other, how does, then, the abhimâna or self-conceit arise in respect to the Body, that this is "I"? To this the author replies :

From the attribution of the term Self to the Body, the tabernacle of the abiding of the Self, on account of Experience taking place in it, there arises the application of the abhimâna or self-conceit, *viz.*, that this is "I," to the Body.—11.

Bhâṣya :—But, then, since the characteristic of being a Body would thus belong to the Liṅga alone by reason of its being the House of Experience, why is the Gross (Organism) regarded as though it were a Body? To this the author replies :

To the receptacle of the pentad of Bhûtas or Elements presently to be mentioned, which are the adhiṣṭhâna, *i.e.*, vehicle, of that, *i.e.*, the

Liṅgam, that is, to the (Gross) Body consisting of six sheaths,* "tat-vâdaḥ," the application of the term Body, "tat-vâdât," is due to the application of the term Body to "tat," *i.e.*, to what is denoted by the word adhiṣṭhâna, *i.e.*, vehicle (of the Liṅgam, *viz.*, the pentad of Elements presently to be mentioned). Such is the meaning.

It comes to this, therefore, that, through relation to the Liṅgam, the vehicle thereof is treated as a Body, and that, through its being the receptacle of that vehicle, the Gross also is treated as a Body.

Adhiṣṭhâna-Śarîra, again, the author will declare (*vide* III. 12), is constituted by subtler forms of the five Elements. So, then, the threefoldness of the Body is established.

What, on the other hand, we hear from the Śâstras, such as:

आतिवाहिक एकोऽस्ति देहोऽन्यस्त्वाधिभौतिकः ।
सर्वासां भूतजातीनां ब्रह्मणस्त्वेक एव किम् ॥

Of the whole hosts of beings, there is the one Body, the Âti-vâhika, the Vehicular, while the other is the Âdhi-Bhautika, the Gross-Elemental; but how is it that only one Body belongs to Brahmâ?

namely, that there are only two kinds of Body,—that statement is intended to show the oneness of the Liṅga-Śarîra and the Adhiṣṭhâna-Śarîra, by reason of their constantly accompanying each other, and also by reason of their alike being subtle.—11.

Proof of the Adhiṣṭhâna *or Vehicular Body.*

न स्वातन्त्र्यात् तदृते छायावच्चित्रवच्च ॥ ३ । १२ ॥

न na, not. स्वातन्त्र्यात् svâtnatryât, by the rule of its own nature; of itself; independently. तत् tat, that, the Adhiṣṭhâna-Body. ऋते ṛite, without. छायावत् chhâyâ-vat, like a shadow. चित्रवत् chitra-vat, like a picture. च cha, and.

12. (The Liṅga-Śarîra stands) not, by itself, without it (the Adhiṣṭhâna Śarîra), just like a shadow and like a picture.—223.

Vṛitti:—On this point, the author gives an illustration.

Did the intuition, *viz.*, "This is I," take place in reference to the Body, irrespectively of the Self, then, the intuition, *viz*, "This is I," would arise in respect of a dead Body; and such is not the case. Just as

* Six Sheaths:- *vide* Tattva-Kaumudî on Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, XXIX, where Vâchaspati [illegible] elements: "(Bodies) produced from father and mother" are the six-sheathed (ones). [illegible] from the mother (are produced) the hair, blood, and flesh; while from the father, [illegible], bone, and marrow:—these are the six Sheaths.

a shadow does not stand without something to obstruct light, a picture without a wall, so is the case here also.—12.

Bhâṣya :—But what proof there is of the existence of another Body as the adhiṣṭhâna, seat or vehicle of the Liṅga-Śarîra, other than the one of six sheaths? There being room for such an enquiry, the author says:

That Liṅga-Śarîra, "tat rite," without adhiṣṭhâna or something to stand upon, *i.e.*, independently, does not exist; just as a shadow or a picture does not stand without a support. Such is the meaning. So that, the existence is established of another Body to serve as the vehicle of the Liṅga-Deha for the purpose of its going to another world, after leaving the Gross Body. Such is the import.

And its svarûpa or intrinsic form has been described in the Kârikâ:

सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सह प्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।
सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥

The Subtle (Bodies), (Bodies) produced from father and mother, together with the Great Elements, will be the Viśeṣas (Distinguishables, or Discernibles, *vide* III. 1 *ante*); amongst them, the Subtle (Bodies) are continuant, or, in a sense, eternal (*vide* Bhâṣya under III. 7); (Bodies) produced from father and mother cease (to entangle after death).—Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, XXIX.

In this verse, the product of the Tan-mâtras (*i.e.*, the adhiṣṭhâna-śarîra, and not the Liṅga-Śarîra) is (the designate of the word) "Subtle," by comparison with the Body produced from father and mother. (But in this view of the matter the doubt may arise whether the above Kârikâ really says that it is this Tânmâtric Adhiṣṭhâna-Śarîra that is co-existent with the Liṅga-Śarîra. Vijñâna proceeds to remove such a doubt.)

The same aggregate of Elements that has been declared to endure as long as the Liṅga lasts,—the very same is the Body which is the adhiṣṭhâna of the Liṅga. This is obtained from another Kârikâ, *viz.*,

चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो विना यथा छाया ।
तद्वद्विना विशेषै र्न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥

As a painting stands not without a support, nor a shadow without a stake, etc., so neither does the Liṅga stand supportless, without the Viśeṣas.—Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, XLI.

"Viśeṣa" in the above Kârikâ means the Gross Elements which may be called subtle, (*i.e.*, the subtler forms of the Gross Elements), that is to say, a sub-species, a subordinate variety, of the Gross.

By reason of the knowledge in this Kârikâ of the difference of the Gross Elements denominated as subtle from the Liṅga-Śarîra, it cannot be the sense of the Kârikâ, cited before (*vide* under III. 7), beginning with

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।

(The Body), primordially produced, unconnected, continuant, beginning with Mahat, ending with the Subtle (Elements).

that the characteristic of being the Liṅga belongs to the Principles ending with the Subtle (Elements), but that, that which is the Liṅga in the form of Mahat, etc., transmigrates, extending up to its own receptacle, the Subtle (form of the Gross Elements), that is, (the meaning is), along with them.

Well, if this be so, how can it be ascertained, it may be asked, how many the Padârthas or Nameables are which go to form the Liṅga? To this we reply that it can be ascertained from passages in the Yoga-Vâsiṣṭha-Râmâyaṇam, etc., such as:

वासना भूतसूक्ष्मं च कर्मविद्ये तथैव च ।
दशेन्द्रियं मनो बुद्धिरेतल्लिङ्गं विदुर्बुधाः ॥

Vâsanâ or Desire, the Tan-mâtras, and so also Karma and Knowledge, the ten Indriyas, Manas, Buddhi,—these the wise know to be the Liṅga.

In this verse, by reason of the intention that by the very establishment of the Liṅga-Śarîra, the eight Cities (of Puruṣa) should also be explained, there has been made separate mention or introduction of even the properties of Buddhi, *viz.*, Desire, Karma, and Knowledge. And "the Subtle of the Elements" here denotes the Tan-mâtras. The ten Indriyas, further, according to their division into the Indriyas of Cognition and the Indriyas of Action, make up two Cities. Such is the idea.

Note.—That is to say, in the above verse, have been declared both the components of the Liṅga-Śarîra and the eight Cities of Puruṣa. Thus, the former are Buddhi, Manas, the ten Indriyas, and the five Tan-mâtras; while the latter are Buddhi, Manas, the Indriya of Cognition, the Indriya of Action, Desire, Karma, Knowledge, and the Tan-mâtras.

The Mâyâ-vâdins, on the other hand, interpolate the pentad of Prâṇa, and the rest, in the place of the Tan-mâtras of the Liṅga-Śarîra, and imagine the eight Cities in a different way. But this is unworthy of credit.—12.

An objection considered.

मूर्तत्वेऽपि न संघातयोगात् तरणिवत् ॥ ३ । १३ ॥

मूर्तत्वे mûrtatve, though it is mûrta, *i.e.*, possessing a definite shape of its own, or corporate, or ponderable. अपि api, even. न na, not. संघातयोगात् saṃghâta-yogât, on account of association with a mass or body. तरणिवत् taraṇi-vat, like the sun.

13. Even though (the Liṅga-Śarîra) is a corporate or ponderable substance, (it does not stand independently), on account of (the necessity of) association with a mass, as in the case of the sun.—224.

Vritti:—Lest it be imagined that the Subtle Body itself will be the Self; so the author says:

Being a mass, it is corporate; being corporate, it is for the sake of another (*Vide* I. 140). "Taraṇi-vat," just as, notwithstanding that it causes illumination, on account of its being corporate or ponderable, the sun cannot be the Self.—13.

Bhâṣya :—But since it is a ponderable substance, let the Liṅga, it might be said, have Âkâśa itself as its (not inseparable) substratum, without association with it, as is the case with Air, and the rest; useless is the supposition of its association elsewhere. In regard to this the author says:

Even though it is a ponderable substance, it cannot stand independently, by being free from association; because of the inference of its, just as of the sun's, association with masses by reason of its being of the form of light or that which illuminates. Such is the meaning.

All Tejas or Lights, such as the sun and the rest, are seen as standing only by association with earthy substances. The Liṅga, again, is constituted by Sattva which is Light; hence it must be associated with the Bhûtas or Gross Elements.—13.

Size of the Liṅga-Śarîra *is atomic.*

अणुपरिमाणं तत् कृतिश्रुतेः ॥ ३ । १४ ॥

अणुपरिमाणं anu-parimâṇam, of the measure of an atom. तत् tat, that, the Liṅga-Śarîra (Vijñâna); Manas (Aniruddha). कृतिश्रुतेः kṛiti-śruteḥ, because of the Śruti about its acting. Aniruddha reads "tat" and "kṛiti-śruteḥ" as one word.

14. It is of atomic size, because of the Śruti that it acts.—225.

Vṛitti :—If it be thought that Manas will be the Self; so the author says:

Manas is of the size of an atom, because, we see, there is a Śruti that it acts. The characteristic of being an Indriya does not belong to that which is all-pervading and without an Upâdhi or external investment; (but Manas is an Indriya); hence an Upâdhi or external investment must be affirmed of it. (What is then the Upâdhi of Manas?) If a fixed and permanent organ only were to be its Upâdhi, as is the cavity of the ear in the case of Hearing, then its function would be confined to that much only, and would not extend elsewhere, as is the case with Hearing. And, therefore, it should be affirmed that the Body as such is the Upâdhi of Manas. So that it being obtained that the function or modification of Manas takes place under the local limitations imposed upon it by the Body, there arises, by reason of the intuitions such as "There is pain in my head,"

"There is pleasure in my body,"* the (apparent) contradiction of its being (all-pervading and) not-all-pervading.

From the simultaneous non-production of cognitions also, they (*e.g.*, the Vaiśeṣikas, cf. Kaṇâda-Sûtram, VII. i. 23, Ṣ. B. H. Vol. VI, page 230) infer the atomic magnitude of Manas. The reasoning for this inference has been shown in detail in another place.—14.

Bhâṣya :—The author determines the magnitude of the Liṅga.

"Tat," the Liṅga, "anu-parimâṇam," that is, finite or limited, but not absolutely an atom merely, because its being made up of parts has already (by III. 9) been declared. Wherefore (is it finite) ? "Kṛiti-śruteḥ," because we hear of its acting, that is to say, because from Śrutis such as :

विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते कर्माणि तनुतेऽपि च ॥

The Liṅga propagates Sacrifice, and propagates Karmas also.—Taittirîya-Upaniṣat, II. 5.

we hear that all Karmas belong to the Liṅga which is called there Vijñâna, because of its having Buddhi, called Vijñâna, as principal (among its components). Where there is all-pervadingness, action cannot be possible, (for action is motion). The reading "tat-gati-śruteḥ," meaning, from the hearing of its motion, however, is more in accordance with the sense desired. And the Śruti on the movement of the Liṅga-Śarîra is :

तमुत्क्रामन्तं प्राणोऽनूत्क्रामति प्राणमनूत्क्रामन्तं सविज्ञानो भवति सविज्ञानमेवावक्रामति

Following it going out, Prâṇa goes out ; following Prâṇa going after, (it) becomes attended with Buddhi (Savijñâna) ; (it) comes down just as attended with Buddhi.—Bṛihat-Âraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, IV. iv. 2.

"Savijñânaḥ :" is born verily being attended with Buddhi, and migrates also in such a manner as to be attended with Buddhi. Such is the meaning.—14.

*Body : We have adopted the reading of Paṇḍita Kâlîvara Vedânta-Vâgîśa. Dr. Garbe reads Pâde, meaning, in the leg, instead of Dehe, meaning, in the body. Dr. Garbe's reading, of course, falls in a line with the theory of the atomic size of Manas based on the localisation of its functions in different parts of the Body ; but it does not help us, at the same time, to understand the force or import of the phrase "A-vyâpya-vṛitti-tva-pratîti-virodha," meaning, contradiction to the intuition of Manas being of not-all-pervading function ; for, instead of contradiction, there is only confirmation, of such intuition, by the intuition, *viz.*, "There is pleasure in my leg." Aniruddha, on the other hand, clearly mentions a contradiction, among the different modifications or functions of Manas, such as, for example, "There is pain in my head" (which is local), and "There is pleasure in my body" (which is all-pervading, and as such is in contradiction to the not-all-pervading character of the function of Manas),—a contradiction which, as he would say, but unfortunately has not said, (and Dr. Garbe very well knows that Aniruddha has left many things unsaid, *vide* his preface to The Sâṃkhya-Sûtra-Vṛitti), can be explained and reconciled by the atomic magnitude, implying and including swift movement also, of Manas, which the aphorism puts forward as an argument against the theory of Manas being the Self which is all-pervading.

Another proof of the finiteness of the Liṅga-Śarîra.

तदन्नमयत्वश्रुतेश्च ॥ ३ । १५ ॥

तदन्नमयत्वश्रुतेः tat-anna-maya-tva-śruteḥ, from the Śruti about its being formed of food. च cha, and.

15. And because there is the Śruti declaring that it is formed of food.—226.

Vṛitti :—The author gives a further reasoning.

There is Śruti that that, *i.e.*, Manas, is formed of food. And by means of its being constituted by food, has been shown its Saumyatva. And Saumyatva consists in being of the form of the Moon. And neither is the Self the Moon.

And the Śruti in question is:

अन्नं वै प्राणाः

The food verily is the Prâṇas.

Prâṇa, again, should be known to be formed of the Moon. The Moon is produced from Manas. Therefore, Manas is atomic, and not (Âtmâ, the Self which is) all-pervading.—15.

Bhâṣya :—The author states another argument for the finiteness of the Liṅga-Śarîra.

There being the Śruti that it, *i.e.*, the Liṅga, is, partially, formed of food, all-pervadingness cannot possibly belong to it; because if it were all-pervading, it would thereby be eternal. Such is the meaning.

And that Śruti is:

अन्नमयं हि सौम्य मन आपोमयः प्राणस्तेजोमयी वागित्यादि ।

Verily, O Calm One, is Manas constituted by food, Prâṇa constituted by Water, the Voice constituted by Fire, etc.—Chhândogya-Upaniṣat, VI. v. 4.

Although Manas and the rest are not formed of the Elements, still it should be understood that they are considered as being constituted by food and the rest, because they are nourished with their homogeneous particles lying associated with, or attached to, food and the rest.—15.

Cause of Migration of the Liṅga-Śarîra.

पुरुषार्थं संसृतिर्लिङ्गानां सूपकारवद्राज्ञः ॥ ३ । १६ ॥

पुरुषार्थं puruṣa-artham, for the sake of Puruṣa. संसृतिः saṃsṛitiḥ, migration. लिङ्गानां liṅgânâm, of the Liṅgas. सूपकारवत् sûpa-kâra-vat, like the cook. राज्ञः râjñaḥ, of the king.

16. Of the Liṅgas, the migration is for the sake of Puruṣa ; just as is that of the king's cook.—227.

Vṛitti :-- Of Mahat and the rest, the activity is for the sake of Puruṣa ; but, it may be asked, for what purpose is their migration ? To this the author replies :

As is the case with activity, so is it with migration. In migration also there is the pain of death ;—so thinking, one gets dispassionate.

"Sûpa-kâra-vat:" that is, the activity (of the cook) is only for the sake of another (*i.e.*, the king).—16.

Bhâṣya :—Wherefore, it may be asked, is the migration, *i.e.*, the going from one body to another, of the Liṅgas, when they are insentient ? The author removes this curiosity.

Just as the movement of the king's cooks among the kitchens is for the sake of the king, so is the migration of the Liṅga-Sarîras for the sake of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.—16

Origin of the Gross Body.

पाञ्चभौतिको देहः ॥ ३ । १७ ॥

पाञ्चभौतिकः pâñcha-bhautikaḥ, formed of the five Elements. देहः dehaḥ, Body.

17. The (Gross) Body is formed of the five Elements. —228.

Vṛitti :—There being differences of opinion as to the composition of the Gross Body, the author first states his side.

This is clear.—17.

Bhâṣya : —The Liṅga-Śarîra has been considered in reference to all its details ; now the author similarly considers the Gross Body also.

The (Gross) Body is the transformation of the five Elements combined together. Such is the meaning.—17.

A Different Opinion stated.

चातुर्भौतिकमित्येके ॥ ३ । १८ ॥

चातुर्भौतिकम् châtur-bhautikam, formed of four Elements. इति iti, thus. एके eke, some. For "eke," Aniruddha reads "anye," meaning, others.

18. Some say that the Gross Body is formed of four Elements.—229.

Vṛitti :—What is the difference of opinion ? This the author mentions.

By the giving up of Âkâśa, the Body is formed of the other four Elements ;—thus think others.—18.

Bhâṣya :—The author states another opinion.

This view is held, intending to imply that Âkâśa is not an originator (of anything).—18.

Another Opinion stated.

एकभौतिकमित्यपरे ॥ ३ । १९ ॥

एकभौतिकम् eka-bhautikam, formed of one Element. इति iti, thus. अपरे apare, others.

19. Others say that the Gross Body is formed of one Element.—230.

Vṛitti :—The author mentions another opinion.

Of Earth (alone) is the Body.—19.

Bhâṣya :—The Body is of Earth only, while the other Elements are mere sustainers. Such is the import. (Cf. Vaiśeṣika-Sûtram, IV. ii. 2-3, S. B. H. Vol. VI, pages 157-158.)

Or, the meaning of "eka-bhautikam" is, formed of one or other of the Elements. By reason of the predominance of the particles of Earth in the Body of Man, etc., and by reason of the predominance of Tejas, etc., in the worlds of the Sun, etc., Bodies are said to be of Earth, of Tejas, etc., just as it is the case with gold, etc. ;—it is this very theory that the author will take up as an established tenet in the fifth book (*vide* V. 102 and 110).—19.

Chaitanya *or Consciousness is not a natural product of the Body.*

न सांसिद्धिकं चैतन्यं प्रत्येकादृष्टेः ॥ ३ । २० ॥

न na, not. सांसिद्धिकं sâṃsiddhikaṃ, innate ; natural product; necessary result of the organisation of the Body. चैतन्यं chaitanyaṃ, Chaitanya ; Consciousness ; Sentiency ; Intelligence. प्रत्येकादृष्टेः prati-eka-a-dṛiṣṭeḥ, owing to not being seen in each apart.

20. Chaitanya is not a natural product (of the Elements), because it is not seen in each separately.—231.

Vṛitti :—The author repels the Theory of the Chaitanya of the Body.

Because, after the Elements have been separated from one another, Consciousness is not found, therefore, Consciousness is not natural to

them. For the same reason also, it need not be apprehended that they will give rise to Consciousness, when combined together (*vide* III. 22 *post*). For, animals, each possessing strength enough to subdue smaller animals, subdue the elephant also, when united together; but not so the Elements. Hence there is no (natural) Consciousness in the Body.—20.

Bhâṣya :—The author mentions what is proved by the fact of the Body being formed of the Elements.

The Elements having been separated from one another, since Consciousness is not found in them, therefore Consciousness is not natural to the Body formed of the Elements, but is due to Upâdhi or external influence. Such is the meaning.—20.

Theory of Consciousness Innate in the Body further refuted.

प्रपञ्चमरणाद्यभावश्च ॥ ३ । २१ ॥

प्रपञ्चमरणाद्यभावः prapañcha-maraṇa-âdi-abhâvaḥ, non-existence or non-occurrence of death, etc., of anything in the world. Aniruddha reads Prapañchatva-adi-abhâvaḥ, meaning, the absence of the character of being a production. च cha, and.

21. (Were Consciousness innate in the Body), there would, further, not be the death, etc., of anything in the world.—232.

Vṛitti :—The author mentions another defect in the theory that Consciousness is innate in the Body.

Were Consciousness a property of the Body, there would be non-existence of the being a prapañcha or an elaboration or phenomenon, that is, of death, because of the eternality of that which is chetana, *i.e.*, has Consciousness as its property.

Now, if it is asserted that even of the conscious Body there would be death, then, we rejoin that the same is Release.—21.

Bhâṣya :—The author mentions another impediment to the theory of Consciousness being innate in the Body.

Were Consciousness to be natural to the Body, then there would not be the death, dreamless sleep, and the like of anything whatever in the whole of creation. Such is the meaning. For, death, dreamless sleep, and the like constitute the non-consciousness of the Body; and these would not be possible, if Consciousness were natural to it, because the nature of a thing remains as long as the thing endures (cf. I. 8).—21.

An objection to III. 20 disposed of.

मदशक्तिवच्चेत् प्रत्येकपरिदृष्टे सांहत्ये तदुद्भवः ॥ ३ । २२ ॥

मदशक्तिवत् mada-śakti-vat, like the power of something intoxicating. चेत् chet, if it is said. प्रत्येकपरिदृष्टे pratyeka-paridṛiṣṭe, being closely seen in each. (सौक्ष्म्यात् saukṣmyât, from subtilty or minuteness.—Aniruddha) सांहत्ये sâṁhatye, on being united together. तदुद्भवः tat-udbhavaḥ, development or manifestation thereof.

22. If it is said that (the production of Consciousness in the elemental Body) is like (that of) the power in an intoxicating mixture; (we reply that, in the mixture in question), there is the development thereof (*i.e.*, of the power to intoxicate), on the combination (of the several ingredients) in each of which it is seen, by close observation, to exist (in a subtle or minute form).—233.

Vritti:—The author points out yet another defect in the above theory.

Just as the power of physical vigour is found in every man in a minute form; but, on their combination, owing to the development of vast strength, men carry even the hugest block of stone. But neither is, in the Elements severally, subtle Consciousness seen; whereby, on combination, Consciousness would appear in the Body.

In the aphorism, *viz.*, "Chaitanya is not a natural result of the organisation of the Body" (III 20), the thing denied has been shown from the negative point of view (*i.e.*, from the side of how it cannot be), and in this aphorism, from the positive point of view *i.e.*, from the side of how it could have been); hence there has been no useless repetition. —22.

Bhâṣya:—Apprehending an objection to what has been stated, *viz.*, "because it is not seen in each separately" (III. 20), the author removes it.

Well, it may be objected, as the power to cause intoxication, although it may not be present in a manifested form in each of the several ingredients, yet is present in the mixture compounded of them; similarly will it be with Consciousness also. We reply, no. The development thereof, (*i.e.*, of the power to intoxicate), on the combination (of the ingredients), would be possible, were it found to exist, in a subtle form, in each of them. In the case under consideration, on the other hand, the characteristic of being observed in each does not exist. Therefore, in the

illustration, the power to cause intoxication being proved, by the Śâstras and the like, to exist, in a subtle form in each of the ingredients, it follows that, in the state of their combination, there takes place only a manifestation of the power to cause intoxication; while in the case illustrated, by no kind of evidence whatever has Consciousness been proved to exist in a subtle form in each of the Elements severally. Such is the meaning.

But, by means of the observation of Consciousness in the collected whole (*i.e.*, the Body), should be inferred, may rejoin our objector, the existence of a subtle power of Consciousness in each separate Element. No, we reply; because, by reason of the redundancy or cumbrousness entailed in the supposition of manifold powers of consciousness existing in the manifold Elements, it is proper, for the sake of simplicity, to make the supposition of one and only one entity having the svarûpa or essential form of eternal Consciousness.

Well, then, may still contend our objector, as the effect such as the (greater) magnitude, usefulness for carrying water in it, etc., although such effect is absent in its constituent parts, is yet seen in the case of the water-pot and the like; even so will there be Consciousness in the Body. We reply that it cannot be so; because, since the particular attributes belonging to the Elements, are produced from the attributes of their homogeneous causes, the appearance of Consciousness in the Body is impossible, when there is no Consciousness in those causes (*i.e.*, the Tan-mâtras which are produced from the Insentient Prakṛiti).—22.

Why the Liṅga-Śarîra *takes a Gross Body: the cause of Release.*

ज्ञानान्मुक्तिः ॥ ३ । २३ ॥

ज्ञानात् jñânât, from knowledge. मुक्तिः muktiḥ, release.

23. Through Knowledge (comes) Release.—234.

Vṛitti:—It has been described above how Dispassion and the like serve, through one another, to be the means of Release. The author (now) mentions the direct means of Release.

This is obvious.—23.

Bhâṣya:—It has been stated that the migration of the Liṅgas is for the sake of Puruṣa (III. 16). In reference to that, the author shows, by (the next) two aphorisms, what objects of Puruṣa are accomplished, by what operations, from the birth of the Liṅgas which, namely, is their going into Gross Bodies.

By means of birth, due to the transmigration of the Liṅga, takes place (or, rather, is made possible) viveka-sâkṣâtkâra or the immediate

cognition of the discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa; and thence, the object of Purûṣa in the form of Release.

And Knowledge, etc., have been technically termed as Pratyaya-sarga or emanations of Buddhi in the Kâríkâ:

एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः ॥

This is Pratyaya-sarga, called Viparyaya or Fallacy or Mistake or Doubt, A-śakti or Incapacity, Tuṣṭi or Complacency, and Siddhi or Perfection.—Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, XLVI.

Viparyaya and the rest will be explained hereafter.

And, in this Śâstra (Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram), it is the very same Emanation of Buddhi that is described, along with its purpose, by a number of aphorisms (*vide* below). Such is the distinction.—23.

Cause of Bondage.

बन्धो विपर्ययात् ॥ ३ । २४ ॥

बन्धः bandhaḥ, Bondage. विपर्ययात् viparyayât, from Viparyaya or the reverse of knowledge, that is to say, error or doubt.

24. Bondage is from Mistake.—235.

Vṛitti:—The author mentions what happens in the absence of knowledge.

("Viparyayât" means), from ignorance (ajñâna).—24.

Bhâṣya:—Through transmigration of the Liṅga, caused by Mistake, takes place the object of Puruṣa, in the form of Bondage, containing pleasure and pain as its essence. Such is the meaning.—24.

Knowledge is the sole and independent cause of Release.

नियतकारणत्वान्न समुच्चयविकल्पौ ॥ ३ । २५ ॥

नियतकारणत्वात् niyata-kâraṇa-tvât, from the being the precise or determinate cause. न. na, no. समुच्चयविकल्पौ samuchchaya-vikalpau, co-operation and alternation.

25. Since (Knowledge) is the precise cause, there is no contributiveness, nor alternativeness.—236.

Vṛitti:—Release does not, it might be thought, come from knowledge alone, because Karma also is a means of Release; as, for instance, the Śruti says:

तं विद्याकर्मणी समन्वारभेते पूर्वप्रज्ञा च ॥

In pursuit of it (Release), Vidyâ, Knowledge, and Karma, Action, are undertaken, Previous Knowledge also (is a means of attaining it).—Bṛihat-Âraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, IV. iv. 2.

In regard to this the author says :

The cause is the determinate only : *viz*, from Knowledge, Release; from Action, Experience. Where, too, contribution of unselfish (akâma) karma is heard, there, too, it is for the sake of knowledge (and not of Release immediately); hence there is no co-operation (really). Neither is there such alternation as that Release takes place sometimes from knowledge and sometimes from action. The Śruti also says the same thing. Thus,

वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तमादित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तात् ।
तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ॥

I know Him, the Great Puruṣa, of the colour of the Sun, (standing) beyond Tamas or Darkness. By knowing Him alone, one passes over Death. No other path there exists for going.—Śvetâśvatara-Upaniṣat, III. 8.—25.

Bhâṣya :—Release and Bondage have been stated to be caused by Knowledge and Action. Among them, the author first discusses the subject of Release from Knowledge.

Although we hear

विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह ।
(अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययाऽमृतमश्नुते ॥)

Knowledge and Action,—who knows both of them together, (i e, passing Death by the help of Action, enjoys immortality by the help of Knowledge).—Îśa-Upaniṣat, XI.

yet, since Knowledge is established in the world as being the determinate and sufficient cause for the termination of non-discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, there is neither co-operation nor alternation, with Knowledge, of Action, called (in the above Śruti) A-vidyâ, towards the production of Release. Such is the meaning.

It follows also from the Śrutis such as :

तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ॥

By knowing Him alone, one passes over Death ; no other path there exists for going. —Śvetâśvatara-Upaniṣat, III. 8.

न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैकेऽमृतत्वमानशुः ।

Neither by Action, nor by progeny, nor by wealth, (but) by renunciation, some attained immortality.—Mahânârâyaṇa Upaniṣat, X. 5.

that Karma or Action is not the direct cause of Release.

The performance of Action, in co-operation with Knowledge, has been admitted into the Śrutis under the relation of principal (Knowledge) and subsidiary (Action), and the like.*—25.

* Dr. Garbe's reading of this sentence is somewhat different. It is as follows : Samuchchaya-anuṣṭhâna-śrutis tu aṅga-aṅgi-bhâva-âdi-bhir api upapadyate ; meaning, the [illegible]ti on the institution (of Knowledge and Action) in co-operation, is, on the other hand,

An Illustration of the above.

स्वप्नजागराभ्यामिव मायिकामायिकाभ्यां नोभयोर्मुक्तिः पुरुषस्य ॥ ३ । २६ ॥

स्वप्नजागराभ्यां svapna-jâgara-âbhyâm, by sleep and the waking state. इव iva, like. मायिकामायिकाभ्यां mâyika-a-mâyika-âbhyâm, by illusory and not-illusory. न na, not. उभयोः ubhayoḥ, from both, knowledge and action. मुक्तिः muktiḥ, release. पुरुषस्य puruṣasya, of Puruṣa.

26. Just as (the same object is not fulfilled) through sleep and the waking state, (whether in co-operation or in alternation), (which are respectively) illusory and not-illusory, similarly the Release of Puruṣa (does) not (come) from both (Knowledge and Action).—237.

Vṛitti :—The author points out one more defect in the above theory.

Dream is illusory; the waking state is not-illusory. Action is comparable to dream; Knowledge is comparable to the waking state. Now, co-operation is of things belonging to the same time. But dream and the waking state cannot be referred to the same time. Hence there is no co-operation of Knowledge and Action.—26.

Bhâṣya :—On the absence of their co-operation or alternation, the author states an illustration :

Just as the accomplishment of one and the same end of Puruṣa cannot be possible by means of the mutually contributive operation of what are designated by the terms, dream, and, the waking state, respectively illusory and not-illusory; in like manner also Release of Puruṣa cannot properly come from the joint performance of both Action and Knowledge which are respectively illusory and not-illusory. Such is the meaning.

explained also by their being related as, for instance, principal and subsidiary. But the reading of Mr. F. E. Hall, which we have adopted, seems to be preferable. For, in the first place, the word "also" in Dr. Garbe's reading is obviously out of place, having no reference anywhere else in the other portion of the Bhâṣya. Secondly, the reading of Mr. F. E. Hall makes out a case of abhyupagama-vâda, *i.e.*, of admission of, or concession to, a popular belief; which seems to be the natural view of the case in question, by making the sense to be that the Śruti on the institution (of Knowledge and Action) in co-operation, is a concession to the popular belief that Action which, in fact, becomes a means of Release, mediately through the production of Knowledge by means of purification of the Chitta or the thinking principle, is itself a direct means of Release,—a belief which is due to the failure of the common people to catch the nice distinction of mediatness and immediateness.

And illusoriness consists in being unreal, that is to say, unstable; and this characteristic exists in an object seen in a dream. What is designated as the waking state is, by comparison with dream, certainly real; the unreality that is sometimes predicated of it, consists in its unstableness only by comparison with the immutable Puruṣa; and it is that which is the doer of such acts as bathing, etc., whereby it is distinguished from dream. In like manner, Action also, not being durable, and also being the product of Prakṛiti, is illusory. The Self, on the other hand, being stable, and not being a product, is not-illusory. Hence it is unreasonable that they, *i.e.*, Action and Knowledge, being undertaken, would yield similar fruits; hence dissimilar effect alone is consistent.—26.

An objection considered: Our Conception of the Object of Worship is faulty.

इतरस्यापि नात्यन्तिकम् ॥ ३ । २७ ॥

इतरस्य itarasya, of the other; of dream (Aniruddha); of the other Self which is the object of Worship (Vijñâna). अपि api, also. न na, not. आत्यन्तिकम् âtyantikam, absolute.

27. Of the other also, (the not-illusoriness is) not absolute.—238.

Vṛitti :—It might be said that, both being alike intuitions, like the intuition of dream, the intuition of the waking state also may be unreal. In regard to this the author says :

Even the intuition of dream is not absolutely unreal, like a flower in the air. Neither is there unreality in one's own Self also; otherwise, "This is a dream,"—this itself would not be possible. Neither can there be dream of an object absolutely unseen, but, on the contrary, of an object seen in the waking state.—27.

Bhâṣya :—Well, even if this be so, it may be urged, there may still be association and alternativeness of the Knowledge of the Tattvas or Principles discriminatively, with the knowledge called the Worship of the Self, since there can be no illusoriness in the Object of Worship. In reference to this, the author says :

"Itarasya api," of the Object of Worship; "na âtyantikam," (not absolute) not illusoriness, because superimposed ideas also enter into (our conception of) the Self which is the Object of Worship. Such is the meaning.—27.

Wherein the Conception of the Object of Worship is faulty.

संकल्पितेऽप्येवम् ॥ ३ । २८ ॥

संकल्पिते-saṃkalpite, in the part conceived or imagined by Manas (Vijñâna); in the case of objects which are the mental creations of the Yogins (Aniruddha). अपि api, also. एवम् evam, the same.

28. Similarly, moreover, what is conceived by Manas is (not absolutely unreal,—Aniruddha ; not absolutely real,—Vijñâna).—239.

Vṛitti :—(It has been stated that "neither can there be dream of an object absolutely unseen." If this be so, then, one may say), since there are no visible causes at work here, there would be no* production of objects, in the case of the Yogins, by the force of the mere mental conception of those objects, (which, however, is contrary to fact). To this the author replies:

Production through the mental conception of men like ourselves and others, does not take place. But that is no reason why it should not take place in the case of the Siddhas or Perfected Ones also, who are endowed with the power born of Yoga. Hence, (their mental creations are) not unreal.—28.

Bhâṣya :—The author states in which part of the act of Worship, the unreality lies.

"(Manas) saṃkalpite," in the part containing the object to be meditated upon, "evam api," there is unreality also. Such is the meaning.

* We have adopted the reading of Pandita Kâlivara Vedânta-vâgîśa. Dr. Garbe's reading is "sarva-asiddhiḥ," meaning, non-production of all things, instead of "sarva-siddhiḥ," meaning, production of all things. Now, the matter stands thus: The doubt set at rest in the previous aphorism (III. 27), was whether, like the intuition of dream, the intuition of the waking state also was not unreal. It was there pointed out that the objects seen in a dream were not absolutely unreal, inasmuch as they had their prototypes in the objects seen in the waking state. The doubt that is, therefore, next raised in the present aphorism, is as to whether, "dṛiṣṭa-kâraṇa-abhavât," on account of the non-existence (in mental creation) of causes seen in the waking state, "saṃkalpa-mâtreṇa," by the mere mental conception, "Yoginâm," of the Yogins, (there does) "na," not, (take place), "sarva-siddhiḥ," the production of all things. "Atra," in regard to this pûrva-pakṣa, "âha," (the author) says (as in the aphorism, III. 28). It would clearly appear from this that the reading, not-production of all things, for the reading, production of all things, is altogether beside the mark, unless, of course, the sentence is read with a tone of interrogativeness, in which case the two negatives, not, and non-production, would imply the affirmative required by the context.

For, in the Object of Worship as declared, for instance, by such Śrutis as :

सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म

All this verily is Brahman.—Chhândogya-Upaniṣat, III. XIV. 1.

unreality certainly belongs to the part consisting of the "All," *i.e.*, the web of the world.—28.

Fruit of Worship.

भावनोपचयाच्छुद्धस्य सर्वं प्रकृतिवत् ॥ ३ । २९ ॥

भावनोपचयात् bhâvana-upachayât, through the accumulation or accession of meditation or thought. शुद्धस्य śuddhasya, of the pure or sinless. सर्वं sarvam, accomplishment of all things. प्रकृतिवत् Prakṛiti-vat, as in the case of prakṛiti.

29. Through accession of meditation, all (power) comes to the pure, as in the case of Prakṛiti.—240.

Vṛitti :—The author continues the same subject.

As Mahat and the rest are, in the production of their effects, dependent upon those that precede them ; while, in the case of Prakṛiti, there is, in the production of the effects, dependence upon nothing else whatever ; so, even though there is no cause previously known, yet, for the Yogins, through accession of meditation, all is achieved.—29.

Bhâṣya :—What, then, is the fruit of Worship ? There being room for such an enquiry, the author says :

"Śuddhasya," of Puruṣa rendered sinless by the performance of Worship called Bhâvanâ or spiritual re-formation, just as of Prakṛiti, there is all power. Such is the meaning. Just as Prakṛiti causes creation, preservation, and destruction ; so does the Sattva of the Buddhi of the Worshipper also cause creation and the like.—29.

The Means of Knowledge. (*1*) Dhyâna *or Meditation.*

रागोपहतिर्ध्यानम् ॥ ३ । ३० ॥

रागोपहतिः râga-upahatiḥ, removal of (adventitious) "redness" (Vijñâna), cessation of the action of Rajas. ध्यानम् dhyânam, meditation ; dhyâna.

30. Cessation of Râga, is Dhyâna.—241.

Vṛitti :—The author says that Dhyâna is for the sake of Bhâvanâ or spiritual re-formation.

"Râgât," that is, from the Guṇa called Rajas, comes restlessness ; the cessation thereof, that is, steadiness, is Dhyâna.—30.

Bhâṣya:—It is settled that Knowledge alone is the means for the accomplishment of Release. Now the author mentions the means towards the accomplishment of Knowledge.

Dhyâna is the cause of the removal of that taint of the Chitta caused by the external objects, which is an obstruction to Knowledge. Such is the meaning. The mention of the effect (cessation of taint) and of the cause thereof (Dhyâna), by way of identity, has been made by a process of transference, because it is impossible that the cessation of taint should itself be Dhyâna.

Here, by the word Dhyâna, should be comprehended all the three, (means) mentioned in the Yoga-Śâstra, *viz.*, Dhâranâ, Concentration, Dhyâna, Meditation, and Samâdhi, Contemplation, because we hear in the Yoga-Sûtras of Patañjali that every one of the eight Aṅgas or limbs of Yoga is a cause of the immediate intuition of Viveka or Discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa. And, of these (three), the subsidiary differences should be looked for in that work also. (*Vide* S. B. H. Vol. IV.) The remaining five Aṅgas or limbs, the author will himself explain.—30.

How consummation of Dhyâna *is reached.*

वृत्तिनिरोधात् तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ३ । ३१ ॥

वृत्तिनिरोधात् vṛitti-nirodhât, through inhibition of modifications. तत्सिद्धिः tat-siddhiḥ, the production or perfection thereof.

31. Through inhibition of modification, is the production or perfection thereof.—242.

Vṛitti:—How does the production of Dhyâna take place? To this the author replies:

The modifications are the five, *viz.*, Pramâṇa, and the rest. (*Vide* II. 33 and Yoga-Sûtram, I. 6). Through the restraint of these, is "tat-siddhiḥ," that is, the accomplishment of Dhyâna.—31.

Bhâṣya:—Only by means of the perfection of Dhyâna, can there be the production of Knowledge, and not by means of its mere commencement. Intending to show this, the author mentions the distinguishing mark of the perfection of Dhyâna.

By means of the Cognitive (Samprajñâta*) Yoga, in the form of the

*Samprajñâta Yoga: The two primary divisions of Yoga have been distinguished by Vyâsa in his Commentary on Yoga-Sûtram, I. 1, as follows:

योगः समाधिः । स च सार्वभौमश्चित्तस्य धर्मः । क्षिप्तं मूढं विक्षिप्तमेकाग्रं निरुद्धमिति चित्तभूमयः । तत्र विक्षिप्ते चेतसि विक्षेपोपसर्जनीभूतः समाधिर्न योगपक्षे वर्तते ।

inhibition of modifications other than the object of meditation, (takes place) "tat-siddhiḥ," that is, the consummation of Dhyâna in the form of conferment of the fruit called Knowledge. Such is the meaning. Hence what the author wishes to teach is that the course of Dhyâna should be followed only up to that point.

It is only when there is restraint of the other modifications, that, on account of the passing away of the obstruction, called the movement of the mind into other objects, there takes place the immediate intuition of the object of meditation. And as it effects this, Yoga also should be understood to be a cause of Knowledge, just like Dhyâna and the other Aṅgas or limbs of Yoga; because we know that this is so from texts of the Śruti and Smṛiti such as :

अध्यात्मयोगाधिगमेन देवं मत्वा धीरो हर्षशोकौ जहाति ॥

Having known the Deva by the acquirement of Yoga relating to the Embodied Self, the wise abandon joy and grief.—Kaṭha-Upaniṣat, II. 12.—81.

Practices conducive to Dhyâna.

धारणासनस्वकर्मणा तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ३ । ३२ ॥

धारणासनस्वकर्मणा dhâraṇâ-âsana-svakarmaṇâ, by means of Dhâraṇâ, retention, Âsana, posture, and Sva-karma, one's own Karma or duty. तत्सिद्धिः tat-siddhiḥ, the accomplishment thereof, *i.e.*, of Dhyâna.

32. By means of Dhâraṇâ, Âsana, and Sva-karma, is the accomplishment of Dhyâna.—243.

यदत्रैकाग्रे चेतसि सद्भूतमर्थं प्रद्योतयति क्षिणोति च क्लेशान्कर्मबन्धनानि शिथिलयति निरोधमभिमुखं करोति स संप्रज्ञातो योग इत्याख्यायते । स च वितर्कानुगतो विचारानुगत आनन्दानुगतोऽस्मितानुगत इत्युपरिष्टाद्विवेदयिष्यामः । सर्ववृत्तिनिरोधे त्वसंप्रज्ञातः समाधिः ॥

Yoga is Samâdhi or Contemplation. And it is a dharma or property of the Chitta or the thinking principle, penetrating all its planes. The planes of the Chitta are : the Kṣipta or unsteady, the Mûdha or dull, the Vikṣipta or steady-and-unsteady, the Ekâgra or one-pointed, and the Niruddha or restrained. Among these, in the steady-and-unsteady Chitta, the Samâdhi or occasional contemplative mood, which but serves to support the character of steadiness-in-unsteadiness, does not lie within the category of Yoga. What, on the other hand, in the one-pointed Chitta, directly illuminates the whole essence of the object as existing by itself, takes away the power of the Afflictions, loosens the bonds of Karma, and brings Restraint within the aim,—that is called Saṃprajñâta Yoga or cognitive contemplation. And this, we will afterwards submit, follows Vitarka or doubt, Vichâra or deliberation, Ânanda or bliss, and Asmitâ or egoity (lit. I-am-ness). But when there takes place the restraint or suppression of all the modifications (of the Chitta), the Samâdhi is (called) A-saṃprajñâta or non-(i.e., ultra)-cognitive.

Vritti :—How is the restraint thereof (*i.e.*, of the modifications) effected? To this the author replies :

Dhâraṇâ is the holding the Chitta in a particular part such as the navel. Âsana, that is, Posture, is such as the Svastika,* etc. (*Vide* S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 170). Hereby Yama, Restraint; Niyama, Observances; Prâṇa-âyâma, Prolongation of Breath; and Pratyâhara, Abstraction are implied. Sva-karma is the performance of acts prescribed for one's own caste. From these, results the accomplishment of the restraint of the modifications.—32.

Bhâṣya :—The author mentions the various means of Dhyâna also.

Dhyâna is effected by means of the triad beginning with Dhâraṇâ, which will be presently described. Such is the meaning.—32.

Dhâraṇâ *described.*

निरोधश्छर्दिविधारणाभ्याम् ॥ ३ । ३३ ॥

निरोध: nirodhaḥ, restraint of Prâṇa, Prâṇa-âyâma (Vijñâna); restraint of modifications (Aniruddha). छर्दिविधारणाभ्याम् chhardi-vidhâraṇa-âbhyâm, by means of expiration and retention of breath.

33. Restraint (of Prâṇa), by means of expiration and retention of breath, (is Dhâraṇâ).—Vijñâna.

Restraint (of the modifications is effected also) by means of expiration and retention of breath.—Aniruddha.—244.

Vritti :—The author mentions another means of restraint.

"Chhardi" means expiration, the breathing out. "Vidhâraṇa" means the retention of breath. The term "Chhardi-vidhâraṇa-âbhyâm" is illustrative. Pûraka or inhalation or the breathing in, should also be understood.—33.

Note :—In Dr. Garbe's edition, Aniruddha transposes this and the next aphorism.

Bhâṣya :—By means of a triad of aphorisms, the author characterises, in order, the triad beginning with Dhâraṇâ.

"Of Prâṇa," this is obtained by means of its notoriety in this context, because it is Prâṇa-âyâma that has been explained by the Commentator in the Yoga aphorism, *viz.*,

प्रच्छर्दनविधारणाभ्यां वा प्राणस्य ॥

* "The Svastika is that in which the left foot is placed, a little downward inclined, between the right thigh and shank, and the right foot is placed, in a similar position, between the left thigh and shank."

Or, by means of expiration and retention of Prâṇa (breath), (steadiness of the mind is to be effected).—Yoga-Sûtram, I. 34, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 60.

"Chhardhi," again, is throwing out, that is to say, the expulsion of the retained (air). Hereby both inspiration and expiration are obtained. And "vidhâraṇâ" is retention of breath. So that, the meaning is that what is the "Nirodhaḥ," that is, the bringing under control or regulation, of Prâṇa or the life-breath, by means of inspiration, expiration, and retention,—the same is what is called Dhâraṇâ.

(But, it may be asked, if the aphorism was intended to be a characterisation of Dhâraṇâ, why has not the word Dhâraṇâ been specifically mentioned in it? And, further, when there is no such mention, why should it be taken to refer to Dhâraṇâ only and not, at the same time, to Âsana and Sva-karma also? In order to remove any such curiosity, the Commentator proceeds.)

Âsana and Sva-karma will afterwards be the subject of characterisation, being referred to by their own words; hence, Dhâraṇâ alone is left; because, from this very reason, Dhâraṇâ is gathered as being the subject of characterisation in the present aphorism, the term Dhâraṇâ has not been incorporated in it.

The Dhâraṇâ of the Chitta, that is, the holding the mind in a particular locality, has, on the other hand, already been stated to be comprehended, like Samâdhi or Contemplation, by the very word Dhyâna (in III. 30 q. v.)—33.

N.B.—In this aphorism, Vijñâna takes "Dhâraṇâ" to be another word for "Prâṇa-âyâma."

Âsana *described.*

स्थिरसुखमासनम् ॥ ३ । ३४ ॥

स्थिरसुखम् sthira-sukham, steady and easeful. आसनम् Âsanam, posture.

34. What is steady and easeful,—that is Âsana.—245.

Vṛitti:—Among diverse Âsanas, the author states the Âsana approved by himself.

Whereby steadiness as well as ease will be obtained, that Âsana should be undertaken.—34.

Bhâṣya:—The author characterises Âsana which comes next in order. Which, being steady, at the same time, is a promoter of ease, such as, *e.g.*, the Svastika, etc., that is Âsana. Such is the meaning.—34.

Note:—Compare Yoga-Sûtram, II. 46, S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 169 and also Śiva Saṃhitâ, III. 94-97, S. B. H. Vol. XV, part I, pages 37-40.

Svakarma *described.*

स्वकर्म स्वाश्रमविहितकर्मानुष्ठानम् ॥ ३ । ३५ ॥

स्वकर्म sva-karma, one's own duty. स्वाश्रमविहितकर्मानुष्ठानम् sva-âśrama-vihita-karma-anuṣṭhânam, performance of acts prescribed for one's own âśrama or stage of life.

35. Sva-karma is the performance of acts prescribed for one's own Stage of Life.—246.

Vṛitti :—What that Sva-karma is? To this the author replies.

This is clear.—35.

Bhâṣya :—The author characterises Sva-karma.

This is easy.

Here, by the word Karma, there is apprehension of Yama, Restraints, and Niyama, Observances. Pratyâhâra, Abstraction, in the form of having the Indriyas under subjugation, since it is commonly prescribed for all the Stages of Life, should also be included within Karma. So that we obtain here (in the Sâṃkhya-Śâstra) also the eight Aṅgas or limbs of Yoga mentioned in the aphorism of Patañjali as being the means of accomplishing Knowledge. That aphorism, namely, is :

यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टावङ्गानि ॥

Yama, Restraint ; Niyama, Observance ; Âsana, Posture ; Prâṇâyâma, Regulation of Breath ; Pratyâhâra, Abstraction ; Dhâraṇâ, Concentration ; Dhyâna, Meditation ; and Samâdhi, Contemplation ; are the eight Aṅgas.—II. 29, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 154.

And the svarûpa or essential form of these should be looked for in that Sâstra itself.—35.

Other Means of Dhyâna.

वैराग्यादभ्यासाच्च ॥ ३ । ३६ ॥

वैराग्यात् vairâgyât, from Dispassion. अभ्यासात् abhyâsât, from constant practice or habituation. च cha, and.

36. And also through Dispassion and constant practice (is Dhyâna produced).—247.

Vṛitti :—The author states other means of the inhibition of modifications.

"Vairâgyât;" *i.e.*, from the two kinds of Dispassion ; namely, from the lower, that is, from the sense (of satisfaction) that "this is enough," and from the higher, that is, from the mere clearness of Knowledge.

"Abhyâsât," that is, from meditation over and over again. The word "cha" is in the sense of collection or co-operation (of the two means).—36.

Bhâṣya :—For the principal Adhikârins or Initiates, there is no need of, or dependence upon, the external Aṅgas, *viz.*, the pentad of Yama and the rest. In their case, Knowledge as well as Yoga are accomplished from Saṃyama alone, *i.e.* from complete self-control in the form of the triad merely of Dhâraṇâ, Dhyâna, and Samâdhi. This is the conclusion established in the System of Patañjali. In the case of Jaḍa Bharata, and others, such is also seen to have been the case. Hence, in accordance to those facts, the Âchârya (Kapila) also says :

Through the mere practice alone in the form of meditation, accompanied by Dispassion, Knowledge and its means Yoga also take place in the case of the best Adhikârins. Such is the meaning. So has it been said in the Garuḍa-Purâṇa also :

आसनस्थानविधयो न योगस्य प्रसाधकाः ।
विघ्नव्यञ्जनगाः सर्वे विस्तराः परिकीर्त्तिताः ॥
शिशुपालः सिद्धिमाप स्मरणाभ्यासगौरवात् ।

The rules about posture and place are not the instruments of Yoga. All these details have been said to be causes of delay. Śiśupâla attained success or perfection through the accession of the constant practice of Smaraṇa or remembrance (of the Lord).

Or, here Dispassion and the practice of Dhyâna have been stated as being the causes of Dhyâna itself, and the word, cha, has been used for the purpose of adding Dhâraṇâ to them.

Thus, then, is explained that Release comes through Knowledge.—36.

Nature of Viparyaya *described.*

विपर्ययभेदाः पञ्च ॥ ३ । ३७ ॥

विपर्ययभेदाः viparyaya-bhedâḥ, the divisions of Viparyaya or Mistake. पञ्च pañcha, five.

37. The divisions of Mistake are five.—248.

Vṛitti :—The author states the subsidiary differences of the modifications.

"A-vidyâ," Unreal Cognition ; "Asmitâ" (Egoity), Self-Conceit (abhimâna) ; "Râga," Desire ; "Dveṣa," Anger ; "Abhiniveśa," Fear ; —these are the cognitions called Viparyaya or Mistake ; and so, by them, have been indicated the cognitions of which they are the objects.—37.

Bhâṣya :—After this, will be explained Viparyaya stated to be the cause of Bondage by the aphorism, "Bondage is from Mistake" (III. 24). At the opening of this discussion, the author mentions the svarûpa or essential nature of Viparyaya.

A-vidyâ, Asmitâ, Râga, Dveṣa, and Abhiniveśa,—these five, mentioned in the Yoga, (*vide* Yoga-Sûtram, II. 3, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 91 *q. v.*), are the subsidiary divisions of Viparyaya or Mistake, which is the cause of Bondage. Such is the meaning. There is no harm even in the non-inclusion hereby of the mistakes in the form of the cognition of silvernness in respect of a mother-of-pearl shell, and the like.

Amongst the above, A-vidyâ, Unreal Cognition, consists, as has been declared in the Yoga (*vide* Yoga-Sûtram, II. 5, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 95), in the manifestation or illumination of the non-eternal, the impure, the painful, and the Not-Self, as the eternal, the pure, the pleasurable, and the Self. Similarly, Asmitâ also is the intuition of the identity of the Self and the Not-Self; that is, it is of this form, namely, that there is no Self other than the Body, etc. A-vidyâ, on the other hand, is not of this form; because, even when the Self is of both the forms of the Body and the not-Body, the idea of the "I" in respect of the Body can be accounted for. Râga and Dveṣa, again, are too well-known. And Abhiniveśa is the fear of death and the like. Râga and the rest, being the effects of Mistake, are called Mistakes.—37.

The cause of Mistake is Incapacity.

अशक्तिरष्टाविंशतिधा तु ॥ ३ । ३८ ॥

अशक्तिः aśaktiḥ, incapacity. अष्टाविंशतिधा aṣṭâviṃśati-dhâ, of twenty-eight kinds. तु tu, as is well-known.

38. Incapacity, as is well-known, is of twenty-eight kinds.—249.

Vṛitti :—The author states Incapacity.—38.

Bhâṣya :—Having stated the essential nature of Mistake, the author states the essential nature of Incapacity also which is the cause of it.

This is easy.

This too has been explained by the Kârikâ :

एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुदिता ।
सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात् तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥

Injuries of the eleven Indriyas, together with injuries of Buddhi, are pronounced to be Incapacity. The injuries of Buddhi are seventeen, through inversion of Complacencies and Perfections.—Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, XLIX.

The eleven Incapacities of the eleven Indriyas are:

बाधिर्यं कुष्ठितान्धत्वं जडताजिह्वता तथा ।
मूकता कौण्यपङ्गुत्वे क्लैब्योदावर्तमुग्धताः ॥

Deafness, Leprosy, Blindness, Paralysis of the Tongue, Loss of Smell, and Dumbness, Contraction of the Hand, Lameness, Impotence, Constipation and Dulness.

And of Buddhi itself there are seventeen Incapacities. For example, as there are nine (Incapacities of Buddhi itself in the form of the) counteractives of the nine Complacencies presently to be mentioned, so there are eight (other Incapacities of Buddhi itself in the form of the) counteractives of the eight Perfections presently to be mentioned. And, by combining, these, coming from within itself and from others, form the twenty-eight Incapacities of Buddhi. Such is the meaning.

The word "Tu" has been used to declare their special notoriety.—38.

Note.—**"Tu" is not read by Aniruddha. Vedântin Mahâdeva reads it.**

Complacency is ninefold.

तुष्टिर्नवधा ॥ ३ । ३९ ॥

तुष्टिः tuṣṭiḥ, Complacency. नवधा nava-dhâ, of nine kinds.

39. Complacency is of nine kinds.—250.

Vṛitti:—The author mentions Tuṣṭi or Complacency.—39

Bhâṣya:—By a couple of aphorisms, the author mentions those two, Complacency and Perfection, on the prevention or impairment of which arise the two kinds of Incapacities of Buddhi.

The author will himself explain their ninefoldness (*vide* III. 43).—39.

Perfecton is eightfold

सिद्धिरष्टधा ॥ ३ । ४० ॥

सिद्धिः siddhiḥ, perfection अष्टधा aṣṭa-dhâ, of eight kinds.

40. Perfection is of eight kinds.—251.

Vṛitti:—The author mentions Siddhi or Perfection.—40.

Bhâṣya:—This too the author will himself explain (*vide* III. 44).—40.

Further sub-division of Mistake.

अवान्तरभेदाः पूर्ववत् ॥३।४१॥

अवान्तरभेदाः avântara-bhedâḥ, minor differences. पूर्ववत् pûrva-vat, as of old.

41. The minor divisions of Mistake are as of old.—252.

***Vṛitti*:—The author mentions the differences of Mistake, among the our (*viz.*, Mistake, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection).**

"Pûrva-vat:" mentioned by the ancient teachers; that is, the divisions of Mistake are sixty-two in number.

A-Vidyâ, *viz.*, the idea of the Self in respect of Prakṛiti, Mahat, Ahaṃkâra, and the five Tan-mâtras, which is technically called Tamas,—is, since its objects are eight, of eight kinds.

The Devas, verily, look, through self-conceit, upon Aṇimâ or Attenuation and the rest (of the eight kinds of lordliness, *viz.*, Laghimâ or Lightness; Mahimâ or Magnification; Garimâ or Heaviness; Prâpti or Attainment of all objects; Prâkâmya or Unrestrained Desire; Îśitva or Supremacy; and Vaśitva or Commanding Position), as their permanent belongings; this is Asmitâ; and it, which is technically called Moha, is, since its objects are eight, of eight kinds.

In respect of the five Tan-mâtras, *viz.*, Sound and the rest, divided or characterised as heavenly and not-heavenly, Râga or Desire, which is technically called Mahâmoha, is, since its objects are ten, of ten kinds.

The ten, *viz.*, Sound and the rest, are accompanied by the superimposition of the eight "powers," *viz.*, Aṇimâ and the rest, and these are met in opposition by another; wherefrom arises Dveṣa, technically called Tâmisra, which is, since its objects are eighteen, of eighteen kinds.

The Devas, verily, while enjoying them (*viz.*, the ten of Sound, etc., and the eight "powers"), are met in opposition by the Asuras; wherefrom arises Abhiniveśa or fear, technically called Andha-Tâmisra, which is since its objects are eighteen, of eighteen kinds.

Thus there are sixty-two (minor varieties of the five kinds of Mistake mentioned before).—41.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—(Dveṣa:) The ten beginning with Sound, and the eight beginning with Aṇimâ,—these, by coming into collision with one another, become irritable; they, then, come to be the objects of Dveṣa or Aversion, technically called Tâmisra, which is, since its objects are eighteen, of eighteen kinds.

Bhâṣya:—Since there is room for an enquiry into the particulars or distinctions of Mistake, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection, mentioned above, there proceed, in order, a quaternion of aphorisms.

The subsidiary divisions of Mistake which generally has been stated (III. 37) to be five, should be taken distinctively to be "pûrva-vat," that is, the same as have been stated by the ancient teachers; for fear of prolixity, they are not mentioned (in the aphorism). Such is the meaning.

And the same, A-vidyâ and the rest, have been explained by me also

in a general way, as being only five. But, in respect of their peculiarities, they are of sixty-two varieties. So has it been stated in the Kârikâ :

भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च दशविधो महामोहः ।
तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥

The distinctions of Tamas (A-vidyâ) are eightfold, as also of Moha (Asmitâ); Mahâmoha (Râga) is tenfold; Tâmisra (Dveṣa) is eighteenfold, so also is Andha-Tâmisra, (Abhiniveṣa).—Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, XLVIII.

Of this, the meaning is as follows :

In respect of the eight Prakṛitis, *viz.*, the Avyakta (Unmanifested), Mahat, Ahaṃkâra, and the five Tan-mâtras, that is, in respect of the not-Self, the idea of the Self, that is, A-vidyâ, technically called Tamas, is eightfold. By reason of the non-difference of the effect and the cause, there is inclusion herein also of the idea of the Self in respect of the mere Vikṛitis or Transformations.

Similarly, as there is eightfoldness of A-vidyâ according to the distinction of its objects, so there is eightfoldness of Asmitâ, technically called Moha, which has the same number of objects.

Because sensible objects, *viz.*, Sound and the rest, are, being divided as heavenly and not-heavenly, ten in number, Râga, technically called Mahâ-moha, of which they are the objects, is tenfold.

What are the eight objects of A-vidyâ and Asmitâ, and what are the ten objects of Râga, in respect of the eighteen counter-actives of these arises eighteenfold Dveṣa, technically called Tâmisra.

Similarly, from seeing the destruction, etc., of the above eighteen, arises eighteenfold Abhiniveśa, fear, technically called Andha-Tâmisra.

Of these, again, the designations, Tamas and the rest, are because they are the causes of Tamas and the rest.—41.

Further sub-division of Incapacity.

एवमितरस्याः ॥ ३ । ४२ ।

एवम् evam, similarly. इतरस्याः itarasyâḥ, of the other, *i.e.*, Incapacity.

42. Similarly, (there are further sub-divisions) of the other.—253.

Vritti :— The author states the distinctions of Incapacity.

"Itarasyâḥ" that is, of Incapacity, there is similar manifoldness, *i.e.*, twenty-eight-foldness.

Thus, there are injuries of the eleven Indriyas ; *viz.*,

बाधिर्यं कुष्ठितान्धत्वं जडताजिह्मता तथा ।
मूकताकौण्यपङ्गुत्वक्लैब्योदावर्तमुग्धताः ॥

Deafness, Leprosy, Blindness, Rigidity of the Tongue, Loss of Smell, and Dumbness, Contraction of the Hand, Lameness, Impotence, Constipation and Dulness.

Having these as objects, there are eleven (Incapacities) of Buddhi.

Complacencies are nine, and Perfections, eight ; by the inversion thereof there are seventeen (other Incapacities) of Buddhi.

Thus there are twenty-eight (Incapacities of Buddhi).—42.

Bhâṣya :—" Evam " that is, just according to the statement of the ancient teachers, of Incapacity also, the minor divisions should be understood distinctively to be twenty-eight in number. Such is the meaning.

" Incapacity, as is well-known, is of twenty-eight kinds " (III. 38)—in this very aphorism has been explained by me the twenty-eight-foldness of Incapacity.—42.

Divisions of Complacency explained.

आध्यात्मिकादिभेदान्नवधा तुष्टिः ॥ ३ । ४३ ॥

आध्यात्मिकादिभेदात् âdhyâtmika-âdi-bhedât, through the distinction of the Âdhyâtmika or internal and the like. नवधा nava-dhâ, ninefold. तुष्टिः tuṣṭiḥ, complacency.

43. Through the distinction of the internal and the like, Complacency is ninefold.—254.

Vṛitti :—The author states the distinctions of Complacency.

Those that are active under the idea of the Self in respect of the Not-Self, are " âdhyâtmika ;" there are four of them. From the word, âdi, come the external five.

If Release comes through the seeing the discrimination of Prakṛiti (from Puruṣa), then, she alone is to be worshipped ; what is the need of the Self ?—this is one kind of Complacency, deriving its name (Complacency) from its reference to Prakṛiti ; it is called Ambhas.

Even through the Knowledge of the Discrimination, Release cannot come directly, because it has never been seen to be the case, but it will come through the observance of a vow ;—such is the second kind of Complacency, deriving its name from its reference to the Upâdâna or the means and materials employed ; it is called Salila.

Even through a vow, Release cannot come directly, but it comes through time ;—such is the third kind of Complacency, deriving its name from its reference to time ; it is called Ogha.

Even through the influence of time, Release cannot come in all cases but it does, through luck alone ;—such is the Complacency, deriving its name from its reference to luck ; it is called Vṛiṣṭi.

These Complacencies are "âdhyâtmika," that is, with reference to the Self.

The (other) five, because they arise from, or relate to, abstinence from external objects, are called external.

In abstinence, in view of the pain or trouble of acquiring objects, there is one kind of Complacency, which is called Pâra.

In abstinence, in view of the pain or trouble of preserving objects of enjoyment, there is a second kind of Complacency, which is called Supâra.

In abstinence, in view of the pain arising from the thought of waste, there is a third kind of Complacency, which is called Pâra-pâra.

In abstinence, in view of the pain arising from the thought of the defects in enjoyment, there is a fourth kind of Complacency, which is called An-uttama-ambhas.

In abstinence, in view of the pain arising from the thought that the enjoyment cannot be complete without killing animals, there is a fifth Complacency, which is called Uttama-ambhas.

Thus is Complacency ninefold.—43.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—Complacencies are two fold : âdhyâtmika and bâhya. Among them, the Âdhyâtmikas, that is, those that proceed by referring to the Self, as differentiated from Prakṛiti, are four in number, having the names of Prakṛiti, Upâdâna, Kâla, and Bhâgya. Among them, Prakṛiti Tuṣṭi is, for example : When the Self, as differentiated from Prakṛiti, has been known, in that stage, from the instruction of some one, such as, "Immediate intuition of the discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa is verily a transformation of Prakṛiti, and this Prakṛiti herself will produce ; to this end, useless is the practice of Dhyâna by you ; therefore, remain just where you are," there is Complacency of the disciple ; it is this that is called Ambhas. Upâdâna Tuṣṭi is, for example : "Even though the manifestation of discrimination be a product of Prakṛiti, it does not result from Prakṛiti only, because there is no distinction in the relation of mere Prakṛiti to all beings. But that manifestation has renunciation of the world for its cause. Therefore, you should resort to renunciation ; enough of your practice of Dhyâna,"—from such instruction, there is Complacency ; and it is called Salila. Kâla Tuṣṭi is, for example : "Renunciation does not then and there give Release, but, by abiding time.

Therefore, success will come to you through time ; you need not be agitated about it,"—from such instruction there is Complacency called Ogha. Bhâgya Tuṣṭi is, for example: "Even through time, Release does not come to all, but, on the contrary, to some, through luck alone. Hence it was that, even in their boyhood, the sons of Madâlasâ attained Release, by means of the acquisition of the manifestation of discrimination, through the mere instruction only of their mother. Therefore, luck is the sole cause and nothing else,"—from such instruction there is Complacency called Vṛiṣṭi

The external five take place on the abstinence from the objects of enjoyment, just as in the case of one who, through abhimâna or self-conceit, regards the Not-Self, *viz.* Prakṛiti, Mahat, Ahaṃkâra, etc., as the Self. For, thus there are five kinds of abstinence having their origin in the seeing the defects in the acquisition, preservation, waste, enjoyment, and killing, in respect of all the five objects, *viz.*, Sound and the rest. And in them there are five Complacencies. One is the Complacency found in abstinence, by means of Knowledge, by one who enquires into the manifold pains or troubles in the acquisition of the objects of enjoyment, such as a garland, sandal paste, woman, etc. A second is the Complacency found in abstinence from objects by one who thinks that there is great trouble in the preservation of even the acquired riches and the like which are liable to be lost through the cupidity of the king and the like. A third is the Complacency found in abstinence from objects by one who thinks of waste, in this way, namely, that even what is acquired and preserved with great effort, will waste away in the course of enjoyment. A fourth is the Complacency found in abstinence from objects by one who thinks of the defect in enjoyment itself, namely, that on the unattaining of their objects, desires cause pain to the desirer,—desires which increase through habitual enjoyment, according to the saying :

न जातु कामः कामानामुपभोगेन शाम्यति ।
हविषा कृष्णवर्त्मेव भूय एवाभिवर्धते ॥

Never does Desire cease through the enjoyment of the objects desired. Like fire, by means of clarified butter, it most assuredly increases—Manu-Saṃhitâ.

A fifth is the Complacency found in abstinence from objects by one who sees the defect of killing, namely, that there is no enjoyment without killing or causing pain to other beings. And these Complacencies are respectively called Pâra, Supâra, Pâra-pâra, An-uttama-ambhas, and Ambhas.

These are the nine Complacencies.

Bhâṣya : —This aphorism has been explained by the Kârikâ, namely :

आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः ।
बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च नव तुष्टयोऽभिहिताः ॥

The nine Complacencies are propounded : the four internal ones called after Prakṛiti, Upâdâna, Kâla, and Bhâgya ; the external five, through abstinence from objects.—Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, L.

The meaning of this is as follows:

"Âdhyâtmikâḥ," that is, which exist or take place by relating to Âtmâ or the Embodied State (Saṃghâta) of one who possesses the Complacencies. These Complacencies are four in number.

Among them, the Complacency which is called after Prakṛiti is, for example: All transformation whatsoever, up to the direct vision of the difference between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, is of Prakṛiti alone; and it is Prakṛiti that produces that direct vision; whereas I am immutable and all-full;—from such contemplation of the Self, there arises contentment or satisfaction; this Complacency is called Ambhas.

Thereafter, the Complacency that arises by means of the upâdâna or material cause in the shape of retirement from the world, the same, named after Upâdâna, is called Salila.

Thereafter, the Complacency that arises by means of the performance of Samâdhi or spiritual contemplation for a long time in the state of retirement,—that Complacency, named after or relative to Kâla, is called Ogha.

Thereafter, the Complacency that arises on the accomplishment of the Samâdhi known as the Cloud of Virtue (*vide* Yoga-Sutram, IV. 29), —that, named after Bhâgya, is called Vṛiṣṭi.

These are the four Âdhyâtmika Complacencies.

The five external Complacencies are produced from abstinence from the five external objects of enjoyment beginning with Sound, caused or occasioned by the defects involved in acquisition, preservation, waste, enjoyment, killing, etc. And these Complacencies have respectively been given the technical names of Pâra, Supâra, Pâra-pâra, An-uttama-ambhas, and Uttama-ambhas.

Some one (cf. Vedântin Mahâdeva), on the other hand, has explained this Kârikâ in a different manner. It is thus: That is called after Prakṛiti, which is the Complacency found in the abandonment of Dhyâna, etc., in some such view as that the direct vision of Discrimination is nothing but a transformation of Prakṛiti, and that, therefore, there is no need of the practice of Dhyâna. That is called after Upâdâna, which is the Complacency

consisting in the attitude of mind, namely, that by the extraneous means of retirement alone there will be Release, and that, therefore, there is no need of Dhyâna, etc. That is called after Kâla, which is the Complacency consisting in the attitude of mind, namely, that even of one who has done renunciation, Release will take place by means of time alone, and that, therefore, there is no need of anxiety. That is called after Bhâgya, which is the Complacency found in some such misleading argument as that Release will take place by means of luck alone, and not by the help of the means laid down in the Śâstras on Release. Such is the meaning. But it is not so; because, since the non-existences of the Complacencies expounded by him, would be favourable to knowledge, it is improper or not right to give them the technical name of Incapacity (*vide* III. 38 and 42).—43.

Divisions of Perfection explained:

ऊहादिभिः सिद्धिः ॥ ३ । ४४ ॥

ऊहादिभिः ûha-âdi-bhiḥ, by means of reasoning and the rest. सिद्धिः siddhiḥ, perfection. (अष्टधा aṣṭ-dhâ, eightfold.—Aniruddha only.)

44. By means of *reasoning* and the rest, Perfection (is of eight kinds).—255.

Vritti :—The author states the distinctions of Perfection.

"Chalḥ," argumentation, thinking (manana),—this is one Perfection, called Târa. Verbal Cognition is the second Perfection, called Sutâra. Study is the third Perfection, called Târa-târa. Acquisition of or companionship of the Guru or spiritual teacher, Brahmachârins or student celebates, and the like, is the fourth Perfection, called Ramyaka. External and internal purity is the fifth perfection, called Sadâ-muditâ. Prevention of pain âdhyâtmika or attendant upon the embodied state of the Self, is the sixth Perfection, called Pramodâ. Prevention of pain adhibhautika or caused by the Elements and the elemental creations, is the seventh Perfection, called Muditâ. Prevention of pain âdhidaivika or caused by the Devas and like other Beings, is the eighth Perfection, called Modamânâ. Thus they are eightfold.

Principally, Mistake, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection,—these are the four varieties (of modifications of Buddhi). Through minor distinctions, there are fifty (of them).—44.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—*****And they—the eight Perfections—are Ûha, Śabda, Adhyayana, the three Preventions, Companionship of Friends,

and Dâna. Now, intending to show that the order of things is stronger than the traditional or scriptural order of their mention, they are being explained in a different order.

Among them, the first Perfection is what is called Adhyayana; that is, the receiving, according to prescribed rules, from the mouth of the teacher, of the inner sense of the letters of the vidyâs or truths about the adhyâtma or the Incarnate Self; this is called Târa. The second Perfection is Śabda or Sound; that is, cognition of the sense or object produced by it; this is called Sutâra. The third is Ûha, reasoning, that is, the examination of the meaning of the Âgama or Veda by means of arguments not conflicting with the Âgama; it is what they say is Manana or thinking; this is called Târa-târa. Companionship of friends is the fourth. One pays no respect even to the object examined by arguments, so long as one has not discussed it with the Guru, his disciples, and other student celebates; hence companionship of friends is necessary. This is called Ramyaka. The fifth Perfection is Dâna, and dâna is the purity of the Knowledge of the discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, because the word, Dâna, is derived from the root, *daip*, meaning purification. As Patañjali has said, *viz.*,

विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः ॥

Undisturbed manifestation of Viveka, is the means of avoidance.--Yoga-Sûtram, II. 26, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 147.

"A-viplava" means purity, and this consists in the existence of the immediate intuition of discrimination, in the shape of a transparent stream, by means of the avoidance of doubt and mistake together with desire. But this cannot be possible except through the maturity of abhyâsa or constant practice, for a long time, without interruption, and, with ardour. Hence, by the act called Dâna, that, abhyâsa, also is included. This is called Sadâ-muditâ.

And these five are secondary Perfections, because they are the means; while the principal Perfections, principal, because they are the fruits, are prevention of Âdhyâtmika pain, prevention of Âdhibhautika pain, and prevention of Âdhidaivika pain, of which the names are respectively Pramodâ, Muditâ, and Modamânâ.

Thus, the divisions of Mistake are five, Incapacity is twenty-eightfold, Complacency is ninefold, and Perfection is eightfold;—these are the fifty Padârthas or Nameables or Predicables.

Bhâṣya:—By the divisions of Ûha and the rest, Perfection is eightfold. Such is the meaning.

This aphorism too has been explained by the Kârikâ ; *viz.*,

ऊहःशब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःखविघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।
दानं च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः ॥

Argumentation, Word, Study, the triad of Prevention of Pain, Acquisition of Friends, Charity or Purity, are the eight Perfections. The three mentioned before Perfection (*viz.*, Mistake, Incapacity, and Complacency) are the goads (to Ignorance and Suffering).—Sâṃkhya-kârikâ, LI.

The meaning of this is as follows:—

Here the three preventions of pain are the principal perfections, because they are the counter-opposites of the threefold pains, Âdhyâtmika and the rest; while the others, because they are the means towards their accomplishment, are secondary Perfections.

Amongst these, Ûha is, for example, the finding out, or the guessing at, the truth, for oneself, through the force of the abhyâsa or practice done in a previous state of existence (in other words, the instinctive guess at the truth), even without the help of instructions and the like. While Word is, for example, the knowledge that is produced from hearing the reading of another or from reading the Sâstras for oneself. And Study is, for example, the Knowledge derived from the study of the Śâstra as a student sitting at the feet of a teacher. Acquisition of Friends is, for example, the Acquisition of Knowledge from a person so exceedingly compassionate as to have come to one's house for the purpose of imparting Knowledge. And Charity is, for example, the acquisition of Knowledge from another) through satisfaction caused (to him) by the gift of money and the like.

And, amongst these, the first threefold, *viz.*, of the form of Instinct, Word, and Study, are the "aṅkuśa," that is, the attractors, of the principal Perfections. This has been said with a view to show that Acquisition of Friends and Charity are inferior means as compared with the triad beginning with Instinct. Some one, however, explains (the passage as meaning) that, of these eight Perfections, "aṅkuśa," that is, the curb or impeder, is the first threefold, *viz.*, of the form of Mistake, Incapacity, and Complacency, inasmuch as these cause obstruction (to the attainment of Perfection). But this explanation is not a correct one; for, since the characteristic of the non-existence of Complacency to be the contradictory of Perfection, is obtained through its being an Incapacity like deafness and the rest, it is impossible that both Complacency and Non-complacency should be the contradictory of Perfection.—44.

***Note.*—The some one alluded to by Vijñâna is no other than Gauḍapada, the famous Commentator of the Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ.**

The other so-called Perfections are not real.

नेतरादितरहानेन विना ॥ ३ । ४५ ॥

न na, not. इतरात् itarât, from the other, *i.e.*, austerity and the like (Vijñâna), Incapacity and Complacency (Aniruddha) इतरहानेन itar-hânena, by the abandonment or removal of the other, *i.e.*, Mistake (Vijñâna), Mistake and Incapacity (Aniruddha). विना vinâ, without.

45. (There can be) no (Perfection), without the removal of the one by the other.—Aniruddha.

(There can be) no (real Perfection), through any other (means), without the removal of the other (*i.e.*, Mistake, which those other means fail to effect). Vijñâna.—256.

Vṛitti:—The author states that Perfection comes through the abandonment of the preceding by means of the succeeding (among Mistake, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection).

There is no Perfection without "itara-hânena," the removal of Mistake, "itarât," through Incapacity. Similarly, there is no Perfection without the removal of Incapacity through Complacency. Similarly, without the removal thereof.—45.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—The author says that Mistake, Incapacity and Çomplacency are to be avoided.

Without the avoidance of the others, *viz.*, Mistake, Incapacity and Complacency; "itarât," through the other, *viz.*, non-avoidance (*i.e.*, employment of the other prescribed means herein laid down); Perfections do not result,—such is the complement of the aphorism; because those are obstacles in the path of Perfection,—such is the import.

Bhâṣya:—But, pray, why is it said that Perfections are attained by means only of Instinct and the rest, when it is established in all the Çâstras that the eight Perfections beginning with Aṇimâ, are obtained by means also of the force of Mantras, austerity, contemplation, and the like? In regard to this the author says:

"Itarât," that is, through the means different from the pentad beginning with Instinct, that is to say, through austerity, etc., does not result *real* Perfection. Why? "Itara-hânena vinâ;" because that Perfection results even without the removal of the "other," namely, Mistake; therefore, not being an antagonist to saṃsâra or worldly existence, that is merely a semblance of Perfection, and not a real Perfection. Such is the meaning.

So has it been stated by the Yoga aphorism ; *viz.*,

ते समाधावुपसर्गा व्युत्थाने सिद्धयः ॥

They are obstacles in the state of Contemplation, and Perfections during (the stage of) worldly activity.—Yoga-Sûtram, III. 36, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 236.

Thus, then, beginning with this that, through Knowlegde comes Release, (III. 23) (and ending with the present aphorism), has been mentioned, in detail, the pratyaya-sarga, that is, the intuitional creation, having the form of the Guṇa or subsidiary states of Buddhi, including its effect, *viz.*, Bondage, together with the purpose of Puruṣa in the form of Release.

And these two creations, that is, of the form of Buddhi and of its subsidiary states or modifications, are, by the form of continuous succession, the causes of one another, just like the seed and the sprout. So there is also the Kârikâ :

न विना भावैर्लिङ्गं न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः ।
लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यस्तस्माद्द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ॥

Without Bhâvas or dispositions, there would be no Liṅga ; without Liṅga, there would be no surcease of Bhâvas ; wherefrom a twofold creation proceeds ; the one called after the Liṅga, the other called after the Bhâvas.- Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, LII.

"Bhâva" is Buddhi, having the form of Vâsanâ or tendency, of which the Guṇas or subsidiary modifications are Knowledge and the rest. "Liṅga" is the Principle of Mahat, that is, Buddhi.

The samaṣṭi or collective creation as well as the pratyaya or intuitional creation are completed.- 45.

Individual or Specific Creations divided.

दैवादिप्रभेदा ॥ ३ ।, ४६ ॥

दैवादिप्रभेदा daiva-âdi-prabhedâ, of which the fixed or marked divisions are the Daiva or Divine and the rest.

46. (Vyaṣṭi or Specific Creation is that) of which the marked divisions are the Divine and the rest.—257.

Vritti :—If there be Creation, there would be Dispassion. How many, then, are the divisions of Creation ? To this the author replies.

From the word âdi, six divisions are obtained. Thus, they are :

दैवादौ षड्विधश्च स्यात् संसारः कर्मसंभवः ।
सुरोऽसुरो नरः प्रेतो नारकस्तिर्यकस्तथा ॥

And among the Divine and the other Creations, there would be a sixfold saṃsâra or worldly existence, arising from Karma ; *viz.*, as a god, a demon, a man, a departed spirit, a denizen of hell, as well as a grovelling creature.

The immovables are included among the denizens of hell.—46.

Bhâṣya :—Now the vyaṣṭi or specific or individual creation, which was briefly mentioned as "Division into Individuals is through distinctions of Karma" (III. 10), is shown in detail.

Such as that of which the "prabheda" or sub-divisions are the Daiva or Divine and the rest; is Creation,—such is the complement of the aphorism.

So has it been explained by the Kârikâ :

अष्ट विकल्पो दैवस्तैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति ।
मानुष्यश्चैकविधः समासतो भौतिकः सर्गः ॥

The Daiva is of eight kinds; and the Grovelling Species is of five kinds; and the Human is of a single kind;—this, briefly, is the Bhautika Sarga or the creation of beings or elemental creation.—Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, LIII.

The eightfold Daiva Sarga is the Brâhma, Prajâpatya, Aindra, Paitra, Gândharva, Yâkṣa, Râkṣasa, and Paiśâcha. The fivefold Grovelling Species are the beasts, domestic animals, birds, reptiles, and immovables. The human creation is of a single kind. "Bhautika," that is, the creation or emanation of the Bhûtas or the individual beings from the side of the Virât. Such is the meaning.—46.

Note: —Virât is, as explained in the Vedânta-Sâra, the Consciousness superimposed upon, that is to say, the Conscious Being presiding over, the Gross Bodies collectively :

(स्थूलशरीरसमष्ट्युपहितं चैतन्यम् ॥)

Bhautika Sarga *also is for the sake of* Puruṣa.

आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्तं तत्कृते सृष्टिरा विवेकात् ॥ ३ । ४७ ॥

आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्तं â-brahmastamba-paryantaṃ, from Brahmâ down to a stock. तत्कृते tat-kṛite, for the sake of him, *i.e.*, Puruṣa. सृष्टिः sṛiṣṭiḥ, creation. आ विवेकात् âvivekât, till there be Discrimination.

47. From Brahmâ down to a stock, the creation is for the sake of Puruṣa, till there be Discrimination (between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa).—258.

Vṛitti :—Since activity is the very nature of Prakṛiti, there would be creation at every moment, and, consequently, no Release. In regard to this, the author says :

"Tat-kṛite," for the sake of Puruṣa, that is to say, for the purpose of Release, is creation. "Till there be Discrimination," that is, because the essential nature of a thing does not depart from it, this (to create) is the habit of Prakṛiti so long as Discrimination does not arise.—47.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—It is the nature of Prakṛiti to energise only till there be Discrimination.

Bhâṣya:—The author says that the subsidiary creation, just mentioned, is also for the sake of Puruṣa.

Vyaṣṭi or individual creation, beginning with the Four-Faced (Brahmâ) and ending with the immovables, is also, just like the collective creation of Virât or Mahat, for the sake of Puruṣa, that is to say, till there be manifestation of the Discrimination (between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa) to the several Puruṣas concerned or affected. Such is the meaning.—47.

The Higher World described.

ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशाला ॥ ३ । ४८ ॥

ऊर्ध्वं ûrdhvaṃ, aloft, above. सत्त्वविशाला sattva-viśâlâ, abundant in Sattva.

48. Aloft, (it is) abundant in Sattva.—259.

Vṛitti:—In which region, how is Creation made? To this the author replies.

("Ûrdhvaṃ," *i.e.*) in the Deva-Loka or the World of the Devas.—48.

Bhâṣya:—The author mentions the divisions in Individual Creation also, in the following three aphorisms.

"Ûrdhvaṃ," that is, above the world of the earth, the creation has a prevalence of Sattva in it. Such is the meaning.—48.

The Lower World described.

तमोविशाला मूलतः ॥ ३ । ४९ ॥

तमोविशाला tamas-viśâlâ, abundant in Tamas. मूलतः mla-taḥ, towards the foot.

49. Towards the foot, (it is) abundant in Tamas.—260.

Vṛitti:—The author describes the creation in the world of the Nâgas.

(Mûlataḥ," *i.e.*) in the Pâtâla.—49.

Bhâṣya:—"Mûlataḥ," *i.e.*, below the world of the earth. Such is the meaning.—49.

The Middle World described.

मध्ये रजोविशाला ॥ ३ । ५० ॥

मध्ये madhye, in the middle. रजोविशाला rajas-viśâlâ, abundant in Rajas.

50. In the middle, (it is) abundant in Rajas.—261.

Vṛitti:—The author describes the creation in the world of the mortals.

"Viśâlâ" means, developed or predominant.—50.

Bhâṣya :—" Madhye," that is, in the world of the earth. Such is the meaning.—50.

Note:—Compare Kârikâ :

ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालस्तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः ।
मध्ये रजोविशालो ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तम् ॥

Above, the creation is abundant in Sattva ; below, it is abundant in Tamas ; and, in the middle, it is abundant in Rajas ;—(such is the creation) from Brahmâ down to a stock. —Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, LIV.

Cause of the differences of the above creations.

कर्मवैचित्र्यात्प्रधानचेष्टा गर्भदासवत् ॥ ३ । ५१ ॥

कर्मवैचित्र्यात् karma-vaichitryât, through diversity of Karma. प्रधानचेष्टा pradhâna-cheṣṭâ, operation or behaviour of Prakṛiti. गर्भदासवत् garbha-dâsa-vat, just like a born slave.

51. Through diversity of Karma, is the (diverse) operation of Prakṛiti, just like a born slave.—262.

Vṛitti :—But, then, it may be asked, when her own several Guṇas or subsidiary states do consort with one another, how does diversity appear in the creation of Prakṛiti ? To this the author replies.

Just as a born slave, if he is skilful or smart enough, performs a variety of works, for the sake of his master, so does Prakṛiti produce diverse creation, for the sake of Puruṣa, through diversity of Karma, that is, through getting diverse works to do according to the different lots of individual Puruṣas.—51.

Bhâṣya :—But, then, for what reason, are there, from one single Prakṛiti, creations diversified as being abundant in Sattva, etc.? There being room for such an enquiry, the author says :

It is only by reason of a diversity of Karma, that there is the operation of Prakṛiti, as aforesaid, in the form of a variety of products. An illustration of this diversity (is afforded by the example :) "just like a born slave :" Just as of a person who is a slave from the embryo state upwards, there is, through smartness or maturity of the vâsanâ or instinctive tendency to serve, a variety of operation, that is, service, in the interests of his master ; similarly. Such is the meaning.—51.

The Higher Worlds cannot be the Summum Bonum.

आवृत्तिस्तत्राप्युत्तरोत्तरयोनियोगाद्धेयः ॥ ३ । ५२ ॥

आवृत्तिः Avṛittiḥ, reversion, return. तत्र tatra, in the going to the higher regions. अपि api, even. उत्तरोत्तरयोनियोगात् uttara-uttara-yoni-yogât, on account of connection with successive lower births. हेयः heyaḥ, to be avoided or shunned.

52. Even there, there is return, and, therefore, on account of connection (even after that) with successive lower births, (the higher world also) is to be shunned.—263.

Vritti:—But what will Release do for him, **it may be asked,** whose objects have been achieved through successively reaching the higher worlds? To this the author replies:

Even after the attainment of successive superior births, there is return to Saṃsâra or transmigratory existence. Therefore, Saṃsâra has to be avoided.—52.

Bhâṣya:—But, then, if there be aloft creation abundant in Sattva, then, since the purpose of Puruṣa would be fulfilled from (the attainment of) that alone, what, it may be asked, is the need of Release? To this the author replies:

"Tatra api," that is, even where there is the going to the higher world, there is a return; hence "uttara-uttara-yoni-yogât," that is, on account of birth in the successive lower wombs, that (higher) world also is to be shunned. Such is the meaning.—52.

There is Pain in the Higher Worlds also.

समानं जरामरणादिजं दुःखम् ॥ ३ । ५३ ॥

समानं samânam, the same; alike. जरामरणादिजं jarâ-maraṇa-âdi-jam, produced by decay, death, and the like. दुःखम् duḥkham, pain.

53. The pain produced by decay, death, and the like is the same (in the higher as in the lower world).—264.

Vritti:—The author says the very same thing.

(The pain produced by decay, death, and the like is the same everywhere) from Brahmâ down to a stock.—53.

Bhâṣya:—Moreover:

Common alike to all, without exception, those that are gone aloft and those that are gone beneath, beginning with Brahmâ and ending with a stock, is the pain produced by decay, death, and the like. For this reason also it (the higher world) is to be shunned. Such is the meaning.—53.

Even Dissolution into Prakṛiti *is not the* Summum Bonum.

न कारणलयात् कृतकृत्यता मग्नवदुत्थानात् ॥ ३ । ५४ ॥

न na, not. कारणलयात् kâraṇa-layât, through dissolution or absorption into the cause, *i.e.*, Prakṛiti. कृतकृत्यता kṛita-kṛitya-tâ, accomplishment of the end. मग्नवत् magna-vat, as in the case of one who has dived. *N. B.*—Some read कारणलयात्

for मज्जवत् meaning, as in the case of bathing. उत्थानात् utthânât, on account of rising.

54. Not through dissolution into the cause, is there the accomplishment of the end; because, just as in the case of one who has dived, there is a rising again.—265.

Vritti :—But what will Release do for him, it may be asked, whose object has been fulfilled through dissolution into the cause, *viz.*, Prakriti? To this the author replies :

It would have been so, had there been no return to saṃsâra of the one absorbed into Prakriti. But such is not the case, as we hear of the return to saṃsâra. Thus, then :

दश मन्वन्तराणीह तिष्ठन्तीन्द्रियचिन्तकाः ।
भौतिकास्तु शतं पूर्णं सहस्रं त्वाभिमानिकाः ॥
बौद्धा दशसहस्राणि तिष्ठन्ति विगतज्वराः ।
पूर्णं शतसहस्रं तु तिष्ठन्त्यव्यक्तचिन्तकाः ॥
निर्गुणं पुरुषं प्राप्य कालसंख्या न विद्यते ॥

Here remain, for ten Manvantras, those that are the contemplators of the Indriyas; the worshippers of the Elements, for full one hundred Manvantaras; those that are self-conceited, for one thousand Manvantaras; the worshippers of Buddhi remain, for ten thousand Manvantaras, being freed from all feverishness; for full one hundred thousand Manvantaras, stay the contemplators of the Unmanifested. On attaining to the Nirguṇa or Immutable Puruṣa, one transcends the number of time.

Note:—A *Manvantara* is equal to 30,67,20,000 years.

Just as in the case of one who has dived for the purpose of bathing, there is a rising again, so is it in the case of one absorbed into Prakriti. Such is the meaning.—54

Bhâshya :—What need of more? There is no accomplishment of the end even through dissolution into the cause. This the author declares.

In the absence of the knowledge of the discrimination between Prakriti and Puruṣa, when, by means of the worship of Prakriti, Dispassion arises in respect of Mahat and the rest, then, absorption into Prakriti takes place, as will be seen from the declaration :

वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः

Through Dispassion is absorption into Prakriti.—Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, XLV.

Even from that, *i.e.*, absorption into the cause, there is "no accomplishment of the end." "Because there is a rising again of one who has dived;" just as a person who has dived into water, rises up again, in the very same manner, do Puruṣas absorbed into Prakriti, re-appear in the condition of Îśvaras or Lords, because it is impossible that one's Faults should be consumed without the manifestation of the

discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa,—impossible, in consequence of the fresh evolution of Passion by reason of the non-destruction of the samskâras or tendencies previously acquired. Such is the meaning.—54.

Re-birth after Absorption into Prakṛiti *accounted for.*

अकार्यत्वेऽपि तद्योगः पारवश्यात् ॥ ३ । ५५ ॥

अकार्यत्वे a-kârya-tve, not being directed by another to act; not being an effect: अपि pi, even. तद्योगः tat-yogaḥ, connection with bondage (Aniruddha), with rising again (Vijñâna). पारवश्यात् pâra-vaśyât, through subordinateness.

55. Although (Prakṛiti is) not an effect, yet (her) connection with Bondage (takes place) through (her) being subordinate. (Aniruddha). Although (Prakṛiti is) not directed by another to act, yet the rising again takes place through (her) being subordinate (Vijñâna).—266.

Vṛitti:—As, on account of its eternality, there is no Bondage of the Self, so, it may be said, of Prakṛiti also. In regard to this the author says:

The not being a product is inoperative, but the being under the rule of another is operative; and this characteristic exists in Prakṛiti. And through association with that, there is her association with Bondage.—55.

Bhâṣya:—But the (root) cause (*i.e.*, Prakṛiti) is not, by any one whatever, made to act. How does she, who is thus self-governed, one may ask, cause again the rising, which is the source of pain, of her own worshipper? To this the author replies:

Although Prakṛiti is not made to act, that is, is not directed to act, in other words, although she is independent of the will of another, yet there is "tat-yogaḥ," that is, the necessity of the rising again of one absorbed into her. Whence? "Pâra-vaśyât," that is, through her being under the rule of the object of Puruṣa. Under the influence of the object of Puruṣa in the form of the manifestation of the discrimination (between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa), one absorbed into Prakṛiti is raised up again by her. Such is the meaning.

The object of Puruṣa and the like are, however, not the active instigators of Prakṛiti, but are (merely) the nimittas or occasions for the activity of her, whose nature it is to be active. Hence her independence remains unimpaired. So also there is the Yoga aphorism, *viz.*,

[illegible] तत्स्वभावत्वात् ॥

The occasional cause does not actually move the Prakṛitis or creative causes into action, but merely pierces through the obstacles (to their operation);—just like a husbandman.—Yoga-Sûtram, IV. 3, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 270.

"Varaṇa-bhedaḥ" means the removal of obstacles.—55.

Proof of Re-appearance after Absorption into Prakṛiti.

स हि सर्ववित् सर्वकर्ता ॥ ३ । ५६ ॥

स saḥ, he, one absorbed into Prakṛiti in a previous creation (Vijñâna); the Supreme Self (Aniruddha). हि hi, for. सर्ववित् sarva-vit, the all-knower. सर्वकर्ता sarva-kartâ, the doer of all.

56. For He becomes the all-knower and the all-doer.—267.

Vṛitti:—Of what form, one may ask, is the Supreme Self? To this the author replies:

Such abhimâna or self-conceit (as, *e.g.*, "I am the knower and the doer of all things") arises (in the Supreme Self) through its being reflected in Prakṛiti (that is, in that modification of her which is called the Internal Instrument and which is the true agent in all knowledge and in all action).—56.

Bhâṣya:—The author gives the proof also of the rising again (*vide* III. 54 above) of Puruṣa after his absorption into Prakṛiti.

For, he who was, in a previous Creation, absorbed into the Cause, (*i.e.*, Prakṛiti), becomes, in another Creation, the Âdi or Original Puruṣa, (bearing the character of) Îśvara or the Lord, all-knowing and all-doing; because, by reason of his absorption into Prakṛiti, it is but fitting that he alone should reach the status of Prakṛiti (the Primal Evolvent); [illegible] clared in the Śrutis such as:

तदेव सक्तः सह कर्मणैति लिङ्गं मनो यत्र निषक्तमस्य ।
(प्राप्यान्तं कर्मणस्तस्य यत्किञ्चेह करोत्ययम् ॥)

Being attached to Karma, the Self gets at that very Liṅga Śarira on which its Manas is fixed. (And, reaching the end of that Karma, it performs whatever is here done by it).—Bṛihat-Âraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, IV. iv. 6.

Such is the meaning.—56.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—(In the present aphorism) the author discredits the view that there must exist some Intelligent Being as the superintendent of the Non-Intelligent Prakṛiti, and that He must be all-knowing and all-doing.

"Saḥ hi," that is, the thing called Prakṛiti, and that alone. Such is the meaning.

Because, as it belongs to Prakṛiti to undergo transformation, it is quite possible for her to transform as the modification of knowledge. Such is the idea.

In what sense, the Sâṃkhya *denies* Îśvara.

ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा ॥ ३ । ५७ ॥

ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः idṛiśa-iśvara-siddhiḥ, proof of such an Îśvara. सिद्धा siddhâ, proved.

57. Knowledge of such an Îśvara is proved (Aniruddha).

Such proof of an Îśvara is admitted (Vijñâna).--268.

Vṛitti :—Let the agency (of the Supreme Self) be just real (instead of being reflectional): what need, one may ask, of the supposition of (its being a) reflection? It follows, therefore, that the very Îśvara that is conceived in the Nyâya Darśana, exists.

In regard to this, the author says:

If (you mean to say that) the Self, as conceived by us, is the Îśvara, let it be so. But there is no evidence in favour of (the existence of an Îśvara as) conceived in the Nyâya Darśana. And this has been declared in the aphorism (I. 92): "Because Îśvara is not a subject of proof", of the first book, *and also in the Aphorism (II. 1): "(Of Prakṛiti, the agency or the becoming the procreatrix is either) for the release of the released (or for her own sake)," of the Second Book.--57.

* The reading in Dr. Garbe's edition is: Dvitiya-adhyâye 'vimukta-vimokṣa-artham'-iti sûtre sva artham para-artham cha pradhâna-pravṛittiḥ iti uktam; atra sva-artha-sya gauṇa-tvam. Para-artha-tvam eva âha. It may be translated thus: "In the second book, in the aphorism, "* * * for the release of the released * * *," for her own sake as well as for the sake of the other is the activity of Prakṛiti,—this has been stated; here her own sake is secondary or subservient. (Now the author) declares her acting solely for the sake of the other". This last sentence Dr. Garbe makes to be the introduction to the aphorism III. 58, and he includes the rest of the above in the Vṛitti to the aphorism III. 57. Now, there can be but little doubt that the Doctor has made a sad mistake. For, since, (in the above reading), there is no connection of thought or of language between them, the passage in question cannot, without violence to reason, be tagged on to the Vṛitti to III. 57. The correct reading of the text is, however, found in Paṇḍita Kâlivara Vedânta-Vâgîśa's edition of the Vṛitti. It runs thus: Dvitiya-adhyâye 'pi mukta-vimokṣa-artham iti sûtre. Sva-artham para-artham cha pradhâna-pravṛittiḥ iti uktam. Atra tu sva-artha-sya gauṇa-tvam. Para-artha-tvam eva âha. It may be thus rendered into English: "and *also* in the second book, in the aphorism "*** for the release of the released ***". For her own sake as well as for the sake of the other is the activity of Prakṛiti,—this has been stated. *But* here (out of these two) her own sake is secondary or subservient. (The author) declares her acting solely for the sake of the other." According to this reading, the first sentence completes the Vṛitti to III. 57, and the rest of the passage forms the introduction to III. 58. Dr. Garbe found this correct reading in

Bhâṣya :—But, then, one may object, if that be so, the denial of Îśvara is not established. To this the author replies :

It is verily agreed on all hands that, of the existence of an *emergent* Îśvara previously absorbed into Prakṛiti, there is proof from the Śrutis such as

यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद्यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः ।

He who is all-knower, all-wise, whose penance consists in knowledge.—Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣat, I. i. 9.

for the subject of dispute (between the Sâṃkhyas and the others) is the existence of an *eternal* Îśvara. Such is the meaning.

Or, the two aphorisms (III 56 and 57) may be interpreted in the following way:

(Prakṛiti's) subserviency also the author establishes by the aphorism "Sa hi etc." (III. 56 which means :) for, he, the Supreme, that is, the generic, universal or collective Puruṣa, possesses the power of knowing all, and also possesses the power of being the doer of all, being, like the load-stone, the mover to activity by means of mere proximity. Such is the meaning. So that, although she is not subordinate to the will of another, still, through the proximity of a Puruṣa, whose objects have not yet been fulfilled, the activity of Prakṛiti becomes necessary for his sake.

But, if that be so, one may say, then there is a contradiction to the denial of Îśvara. To this the author replies :

"Such a proof of Îśvara is admitted," that is, the proof of Îśvara by means of proximity is, on the other hand, universally admitted in the Śruti and the Smṛiti. Such is the meaning.

And to the existence of such an Îśvara the proof is such Śrutis and Smṛitis as :

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो मध्य आत्मनि तिष्ठति ।
ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य न ततो विजुगुप्सते ॥
सृजते च गुणान् सर्वान् क्षेत्रज्ञस्त्वनुपश्यति ।
गुणान् विक्रियते सर्वानुदासीनवदीश्वरः ॥

Puruṣa, of the size of the thumb, dwells in the cavity of the body, the lord of the past and the future ;—(he who knows Him) does not thenceforth fear.—*Kaṭha Upaniṣat*, IV. 12.

(Prakṛiti) creates all the Guṇas, while the Knower of the Field (Puruṣa) looks on ; Îśvara, as if indifferent, causes all the Guṇas to be transformed.—*Source not traced.*—57.

"A MS. in the library of the Government College, Benares, on 46 leaves and apparently about 100 years old", and deliberately rejected it. He has been more careful to select between the words Mukta and Vimukta (both of which mean the same thing—released) than to try to understand the force and necessity of the little word 'Api', and has thereby made a mess of the whole thing. And this is the less excusable in an editor whose "edition claims to be a perfectly correct one" and who does not even hesitate to ridicule a Paṇḍita like the late Jñânânda Vidyâsâgara of Calcutta by surnaming him as Vidyâbindu for his "worthless reprint" of the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Bhâṣyam.

Creation by Prakṛiti *is for the Release of* Puruṣa.

प्रधानसृष्टिः परार्थं स्वतोऽप्यभोक्तृत्वादुष्ट्रकुङ्कुमवहनवत्
॥ ३ । ५८ ॥

प्रधानसृष्टिः Pradhâna-sṛiṣṭiḥ, creation by the Pradhâna, *i.e.*, Prakṛiti. परार्थं para-artham, for the sake of the other, *i.e.*, Puruṣa. स्वतः svataḥ, spontaneous. अपि api, even though. अभोक्तृत्वात् a-bhoktṛi-tvât, not being the experiencer. उष्ट्रकुङ्कुमवहनवत् uṣṭra-kuṅkuma-vahana-vat, like the carrying of saffron by the camel.

58. Creation by Prakṛiti, even though it be spontaneous, is for the sake of Puruṣa, because she is not the experiencer,- as is the case with the carrying of saffron by the camel (for the enjoyment of its master).—269.

Vṛitti:—For her own sake as well as for the sake of the other (*i.e.*, Puruṣa) is the activity of Prakṛiti,—this has been stated (by II. 1). But herein her own sake is secondary or subservient. (The author now) declares her acting solely for the sake of the other.

Activity for the sake of another is seen even in the case of an intelligent being; for example, the camel carries saffron (for its master). But the energising of Prakṛiti who is non-intelligent, is indeed for the sake of another (*i.e.*, Puruṣa), because she is not the experiencer.—58.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—The word "api" has the sense of "eva," the meaning being, for the very reason that she does not herself suffer experience.

Bhâṣya:—By the array of aphorisms beginning with the first aphorism of the Second Book and ending with the preceding one, the topic of creation by Prakṛiti has been completed. Hereafter, for the purpose of the proof of Release, is to be declared the absolute cessation, designated as atyanta-laya or final dissolution, of the creation by Prakṛiti, in regard to the wise or knowing Puruṣa. For the purpose of the demonstration thereof (*i.e.*, of the final dissolution of the creation by Prakṛiti), the author, at the outset, establishes, in a detailed manner, the purpose of the creation by Prakṛiti, which was briefly hinted at in the first aphorism of the Second Book.

Although the creation by Prakṛiti proceeds from herself alone, still it is "for the sake of the other," *i.e.*, for the sake of the Bhogn or experience and Apavarga or release of the other; just as the carrying of saffron by the camel is for the sake of its owner; why? "not being the

experiencer," *i.e.*, because, since she is non-intelligent, experience and release are impossible to her. Such is the meaning.

But one may urge that, by the declaration: "for the release of the released or for her own sake" (II. 1), creation has been stated to be also for the sake of Prakṛiti herself. To this we reply that that is true. Still, but for her acting for the sake of Puruṣa, her activity for her own sake is not established. For the one purpose or object of Prakṛiti is the release of herself from the Puruṣa whose Bhoga or experience and Apavarga or attainment of the final end have been accomplished.

Well, it may be objected, if Prakṛiti is just like a servant, how is it that she proceeds to act also for the purpose of causing the experience of pain to her lord? (We reply that the objection is) not (effectual), because, either, by the very fact that her activity is for the sake of Puruṣa's pleasure, no room is left for the appearance of intervening pain, or because she behaves like a wicked servant.—58.

Prakṛiti *acts Spontaneously for the Benefit of* Puruṣa.

अचेतनत्वेऽपि क्षीरवच्चेष्टितं प्रधानस्य ॥ ३ । ५९ ॥

अचेतनत्वे a-chetana-tve, being non-intelligent. अपि api, even. क्षीरवत्, kṣîravat, as in the case of milk. चेष्टितं cheṣṭitam, activity. प्रधानस्य pradhânasya, of the Pradhâna or Prakṛiti.

59. Even though she be non-intelligent, the activity of Prakṛiti is (quite spontaneous),—just like that of milk.—270.

Vṛitti :—Activity is seen, it may be objected, (only) of what is intelligent, (and) not of what is non-intelligent. In regard to this the author says:

Just as milk which is non-intelligent, oozes out for the sake of the calf, even so does Prakṛiti operate for the sake of Puruṣa.—59.

Bhâṣya :—Well, spontaneous creativeness itself, one may object, is not possible in the case of Prakṛiti who is non-intelligent, because the operation of a cart and the like is seen to take place only through the exertion of something quite different (*i.e.*, intelligent.) To this the author replies:

Just as milk transforms into curd, quite spontaneously, without depending upon human efforts; in like manner takes place the transformation of Prakṛiti, in the shape of Mahat and the rest, even without the effort of an intelligent being, notwithstanding that she be non-intelligent. Such is the meaning.

There is no tautology of this aphorism with the aphorism (II, 37): "As does the cow for the calf," because, in that aphorism, it is the operation of the Instrument that has been discussed (whereas here it is that of the principal agent), and also because cows are intelligent, (whereas milk is non-intelligent).—59.

Note.—On the subject of Prakṛiti's acting for the sake of Puruṣa and of her spontaneity, compare Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, Verses LVI, LVII, and LVIII;

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।
प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थ इव परार्थ आरम्भः ॥ ५६ ॥
वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।
पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥
औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥ ५८ ॥

This creation, beginning with Mahat and ending with the discrete Elements, performed by Prakṛiti, for the sake of the other, as though for her own sake, is for the purpose of the release of each Puruṣa respectively.—56.

Just as is the activity (*i.e.*, the oozing) of the milk, an unintelligent (substance), due to (the final cause of) the nourishment of the calf, so is the activity (*i.e.*, creation) of Prakṛiti due to (the final cause of) the release of Puruṣa.—57.

Just as people engage in acts to relieve anxiety or wish, so does the Unmanifested (*i.e.*, Prakṛiti) energise for the purpose of the release of Puruṣa.—58.

Spontaneous Activity further illustrated.

कर्मवद्दृष्टेर्वा कालादेः ॥ ३ । ६० ॥

कर्मवत् Karma-vat, like the acts. दृष्टेः dṛiṣṭeḥ, from seeing. वा vâ, or. कालादेः kâla-âdeḥ, of time and the like.

60. Or, (the spontaneous activity of Prakṛiti is proved), because (spontaneous) acts of time and the like are seen.—271.

Vṛitti :—The author applies another illustration :

Just as the act done by an agriculturist, *e.g.*, transplantation of paddy, etc., bears fruit in course of time only, nor are the plants intelligent.

From the word "âdi," "and the like," is to be understood Adṛiṣṭam or the unseen result of past karma.—60.

Bhâṣya :—By the exhibition of another illustration the author explains the reason for the statement made above.

Or, like the action of time, etc., spontaneous operation of Prakṛiti is established, because it is seen. Now, one season passes away, another sets in,—action of time, etc., in such form, takes place quite spontaneously; in like manner, let there be the operation of Prakṛiti also; because supposition or inference follows observation. Such is the meaning.—60.

Activity of Prakṛiti is natural, and not the result of deliberation.

स्वभावाच्चेष्टितमनभिसन्धानाद् भृत्यवत् ॥ ३ । ६१ ॥

स्वभावात् sva-bhâvât, from necessity or nature. चेष्टितम्-cheṣṭitam, exertion. अनभिसन्धानात an-abhisandhânât, in the absence of conscious adjustment of means to an end. भृत्यवत्-bhṛitya-vat, as is the case with the servant.

61. The activity of Prakṛiti is from nature, because there is no conscious adjustment of means to an end,—as is the case with the servant.—272.

Vṛitti :—The camel (*vide* III. 58) also, one may say, is seen to act from thinking of the fear of being beaten, etc.; nor can the non-intelligent Prakṛiti have such intention. In regard to this the author says :

Just as a dependent who has been a slave from the womb, being devoid of any conscious regard for his master, does his appointed acts from nature alone; so does Prakṛiti.—61.

Bhâṣya :—But still, may say the objector, in the absence of such deliberation as "This is the means of accomplishing my enjoyment, etc.," the stupid Prakṛiti can never possess activity even, or will possess activity in the wrong way. To this the author replies :

Just as, of a perfect servant, 'from nature,' *i.e.*, from Saṃskâra or habit or instinct alone, proceeds the thoroughly regulated and necessary service to the master, and not with a view to his own enjoyment; very similarly (does) the operation of Prakṛiti (proceed) from Saṃskâra or habit or instinct alone. Such is the meaning.—61.

Spontaneity of Prakṛiti *is necessary.*

कर्माकृष्टेर्वानादितः ॥ ३ । ६२ ॥

कर्माकृष्टेः karma-âkṛiṣṭeḥ, from the attraction of karma. वा vâ, and. अनादितः an-âdi-taḥ, from time without beginning, from eternity.

62. (The activity of Prakṛiti is necessary), because of attraction by Karma from eternity.—273.

Vṛitti :—The author states another view :

Owing to the beginninglessness of Saṃsâra or transmigratory existence, through attraction by Dharma or Merit and Adharma or Demerit, Prakṛiti operates; just as, under the influence of men's Karma, even insentient trees yield fruits.—62.

Bhâṣya :—Here the word "Vâ" has been used in the sense of adding together.

Since Karma is beginningless, hence, also through attraction by Karma, the activity of Prakṛiti is necessary and pre-determined. Such is the meaning.—62.

Cessation of the activity of Prakṛiti *is also spontaneous.*

विविक्तबोधात् सृष्टिनिवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य सूदवत् पाके ॥ ३।६३ ॥

विविक्तबोधात् vivikta-bodhât, through discriminative knowledge. सृष्टिनिवृत्तिः sṛiṣṭi-nivṛittiḥ, cessation of creation. प्रधानस्य pradhânasya, of the Pradhâna, *i.e.*, Prakṛiti. सूदवत् sûda-vat, as in the case of the cook. पाके pâke, in the matter of cooking.

63. Through discriminative knowledge, is there (spontaneously) cessation of Prakṛiti's creation,—just as is the case with the cook when the cooking has been performed.—274.

Vṛitti :—Since it is full of reasonableness, its repetition does not count as the fault of tautology ;—hence the author says :

Creation is for the end of Puruṣa. But the cessation thereof is from the knowledge of the discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa ;—just as the cook ceases to act after performing cooking.—63.

Bhâṣya :—Thus, then, it being established that Prakṛiti is creative with reference to the end of the other, *i.e.*, Puruṣa, it follows that Release is capable of accomplishment, because there must be cessation (of the activity) of Prakṛiti, quite spontaneously, on the fulfilment of the purpose of the other ;—this the author declares by the following section.

On the fulfilment of the purpose of Puruṣa, by means of Higher Dispassion (which results) from the knowledge of the discriminated Puruṣa (*i.e.*, of Puruṣa discriminated from Prakṛiti), there ceases the creation of Prakṛiti ; just as, when the cooking has been performed, the operation of the cook ceases. Such is the meaning.

It is this which is called Âtyantika Pralaya or Final Dissolution. Thus there is the Śruti :

(क्षरं प्रधानममृताक्षरं हरः
क्षरात्मानावीशते देव एकः ।)
तस्याभिध्यानाद्योजनात्तत्त्वभावात्
भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः ॥

(The perishable is Prakṛiti, the Immortal and Imperishable is Hara ; one Deva rules the Perishable and the Self). From contemplation of Him, from joining oneself to Him, from constantly realising the state or condition of Him, there is, at the end, the cessation of the all-pervading Mâyâ.—Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat, I. 10.—63.

Release of one does not involve release of all.

इतर इतरवत् तद्दोषात् ॥ ३ । ६४ ॥

इतरः itaraḥ, another, *i.e.*, one bereft of discriminative knowledge. (Vijñâna); the other than the Indriya, *i.e*, Puruṣa (Aniruddha). इतरवत् itara-vat, like another, *i.e.*, one in bondage (Vijñâna). Aniruddha reads "itarat jahâti": itarat, the other, *i.e.*, Prakṛiti; jahâti, separates, abandons. This reading is peculiar to Aniruddha. तद्दोषात् tat-doṣât, through her fault.

64. The Self shuns Prakṛiti from seeing her faults. (Anriuddha). One devoid of discriminative knowledge remains just like one in bondage, (even when another is released), through the fault of Prakṛiti (Vijñâna).—275.

Vṛitti:—Even when there is discriminative knowledge, through instruction, Release, one may say, is not seen (to result). In regard to this the author says:

It is not that Release takes place through mere knowledge anyhow. But "itaraḥ", the other than the Indriya, *i.e.*, the Self, by means of meditation and the like, "jahâti," abandons "itarat", *i.e.*, Prakṛiti, "tat-doṣât", from seeing the faults of Prakṛiti, such as fickleness, etc.—64.

Bhâṣya:—But, if that be so, then, one may object, when there is cessation of Prakṛiti's creation, by means of discriminative knowledge in respect of the Upâdhi or investment of one single Puruṣa, it would entail the Release of all (Puruṣas). To this the author replies:

"Itaraḥ", one devoid of discriminative knowledge, "itara-vat", just as one bound by Prakṛiti, remains. Whence? "Tat-doṣât," through the fault of Prakṛiti herself, namely, the fault of non-fulfilment of the object of that (*i.e.*, non-discriminative) Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

So has it been declared in the Yoga Sûtram:

नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात् ॥ २ । २२ ॥

"Although destroyed in relation to him whose objects have been achieved, it (the sensible world) is not destroyed, being common to others."—Yoga Aphorisms, II. 22, S. B. R. Vol. IV, page 138.

So that the cessation (of the activity) of Prakṛiti that has been declared in the preceding aphorism, that is only towards the Puruṣa possessing discriminative knowledge. Such is the import.

The Śruti (Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat, I. 10 quoted above, under the preceding aphorism) too, about the "all-pervading Mâyâ," should be understood with reference only to one who knows, because it is identical in thought with the Śruti "Ajâm" (Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat, IV. 5, quoted under I. 149 *ante q.v.*)—64.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—"Itaraḥ", one merely possessing discriminative knowledge, is also "itara-vat", like one devoid of discriminative knowledge, on account of the fault, in the form of doubt and mistake, of discriminative knowledge. So that, the import is, for the purification of discriminative knowledge, pains should be taken by one for the cultivation of the Tattvas or Principles.

Release consists in what.

द्वयोरेकतरस्य वौदासीन्यमपवर्गः ॥ ३ । ६५ ॥

द्वयोः dvayoḥ, of both, Prakṛiti and Puruṣa. एकतरस्य ekatarasya, of either. वा vâ, or. औदासीन्यम् audâsînyam, aloofness. अपवर्गः apavargaḥ, attainment of final end; Release.

65. The aloofness of both (Prakṛiti and Puruṣa) or of either, is Release.—276.

Vṛitti:—The author declares the essential form of Release.

"Dvayoḥ", of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa: the aloofness of Prakṛiti is her non-activity towards one who possesses discriminative knowledge; the aloofness of Puruṣa is his non-attachment to Prakṛiti. "Ekatarasya", of the Self, because it alone is the principal.—65.

Bhâṣya:—The author declares the result of the cessation of (Prakṛiti's) creation.

"Dvayoḥ", of both Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, "audâsînyam", aloneness, that is to say, separation from each other,—the same is Release. Or, (it is) the kaivalya or solitariness of Puruṣa alone, because, "I may be released",—such only is seen to be the object desired by Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.—65.

How Prakṛiti *affects one and not another.*

अन्यसृष्ट्युपरागेऽपि न विरज्यते प्रबुद्धरज्जुतत्त्वस्यैवोरगः ॥ ३ । ६६ ॥

अन्यसृष्ट्युपरागे anya-sṛiṣṭi-uparâge, in creative influence or activity towards another. अपि api, even, also. न na, not. विरज्यते virajyate, desists, is disinclined. प्रबुद्धरज्जुतत्त्वस्य prabuddha-rajju-tattvasya, of one awakened to the truth in regard to the rope. एव eva, only. उरगः ura-gaḥ, the snake.

66. (Prakṛiti) does not desist from creative activity towards others also,—(just as is the case with the mistaken) snake (which ceases to affect) only one awakened to the truth in regard to the rope.—277.

Vritti:—On (the theory of) the aloofness of Prakṛiti whose nature is activity, Release of all, one may say, will be the consequence. In regard to this the author says:

Aloofness there cannot be of (Prakṛiti) whose nature is activity, as there would then be the fault of giving up nature. But while she does not operate towards one possessing discriminative knowledge, she does not, "virajyate", not engage in creation, "sṛiṣṭi-uparâge'pi", also in performing creation in regard to the non-knowing or ignorant. Just as, where a rope has been mistaken for a snake, "uragaḥ", the mistake of snake ceases only in the case of one awakened to the truth in regard to the rope, and not in the case of one to whom the truth in regard to the rope is not known.—66.

Bhâṣya:—But, when immediately on the Release of a single Puruṣa, Prakṛiti becomes indifferent by reason of her modification in the form of Discrimination, how can she, it may be objected, re-engage in creation for serving the purpose of another Puruṣa? Nor can you say that this is no fault on account of the division or differentiation of the parts of Prakṛiti, because it is seen that the creation of the objects of experience of another (*i.e.* Puruṣa in bondage) is made also out of the same earth, etc. which were before the ingredients of experience to the Puruṣa who is now released.

To this the author replies:

Prakṛiti, even though, in respect of one Puruṣa, she has become indifferent, in consequence of discriminative knowledge, does not remain indifferent as regards her creative activity towards another Puruṣa, but does verily create in respect to him; just as the (mistaken) snake does not cause fear, etc., only in the case of one awakened to the truth in regard to the rope, but verily does produce it in respect of one who is ignorant of the truth. Such is the meaning.

Note.—Garbe's reading of the above portion of the Bhâṣya is not only entirely different from, but is contradictory to, the reading of F. E. Hall, adopted by us in our translation. In the aphorism also, instead of "na virajyate prabuddha-rajju tattvasya," Garbe reads "na virato prabuddha-rajju-tattvasya." He has probably given his own reasons in his German translation of the Bhâṣya, but these, if any, are not known to us. We therefore reserve criticism for the present.

The following is a translation of Garbe's reading of the Bhâṣya:

Even though withdrawn from one Puruṣa, Prakṛiti verily energises towards another Puruṣa;—in regard to this, (the author) exhibits an illustration.

As the snake, even though withdrawn in respect of the knowing (Puruṣa), does not desist from the operation of creating fear, etc., in the case of one who has not awakened to the truth regarding the rope, in the very same way does not Prakṛiti, even though

withdrawn in respect of the knowing (Puruṣa), desist from the operation of creating Buddhi, etc., in the case of another, non-knowing (Puruṣa). Such is the meaning.

Where the reading is 'Virajyáte,' there also "virâga" means supineness.

And the likeness to a snake is here of Prakṛiti, because of its attribution to, or super-imposition upon, Puruṣa who is likened to a rope.

Certain unintelligent persons, calling themselves Vedântins, having altogether failed to grasp that such is the drift of the illustrations of the rope, snake, etc., draw from the comparison the absolute nothingness or the mere imaginary or mental existence of Prakṛiti.

By the help of the above illustration offered by the Sâṃkhyas who maintain the reality of Prakṛiti, are to be understood the matters declared in the Śruti and the Smṛiti.—66.

Note:—The Rope-Snake Theory: Suppose a man, walking about in dim moon—light, is suddenly seen to run away from the place where he had been, crying out "Snake," "Snake". His neighbours come out to him and enquire what the matter is. He tells them that he was almost bitten by a snake. He then takes his friends to the spot where he had seen the snake, so that they may kill it. But when they look at it more closely, they find that there is no snake there and that what was supposed to be a snake, is only a piece of rope.

Now, in this story, the rope is the reality and the snake is the unreality,—a figment of the imagination. And some so-called Vedântins make use of the example in the following manner: Just as the rope is the reality, so is Brahman or Puruṣa the reality, and just as the snake is an unreality, so is the world or Prakṛiti an unreality,—a figment of the imagination. Vijñâna Bhiksu, on the other hand, explains the metaphor in another light. He looks not so much at the objects, rope, snake, Puruṣa, Prakṛiti, etc., themselves, as at their operation or influence. This is also the Sâṃkhya view of the matter. In creation the snake is as much a reality as is the rope. So is the case with Prakṛiti. And while this is so, mistake may occur at every moment: the mistake of rope for snake, the mistake of Puruṣa for Prakṛiti, the mistake of Brahman for the world. So that, when Puruṣa is compared to a piece of rope and Prakṛiti to a snake, the comparison does not show that Puruṣa is the reality, and Prakṛiti is the unreality, but it shows that just as, when the rope which had been so long mistaken for a snake, is known to be a rope as distinguished from a snake, the snake ceases to frighten a man, so does Prakṛiti cease to bind Puruṣa, when the latter who had so long been mistaken for her, is known to be Puruṣa as distinguished from Prakṛiti.

Dual character of Prakṛiti *supported.*

कर्मनिमित्तयोगाच्च ॥ ३ । ६७ ॥

कर्मनिमित्तयोगात् Karma-nimitta-yogât, from connection or association with, or presence of, Karma which is the efficient cause. *N.B.*—For 'Yogât,' Aniruddha reads 'a-yogât,' meaning from non-connection. च Cha, and.

67. And (Prakṛiti does not cease to act) also because of connection with Karma which is the efficient cause.—278.

Vṛitti:—The author gives the reason for the above (that Prakṛiti does not cease to act in respect of others).

Because, in respect of one possessing discriminative knowledge, there is the absence of Karma which is the efficient cause (of activity on the part of Prakṛiti). There can be no sprout without a seed.

Says the Śruti also :

भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे ॥

The knot of the heart is pierced, all doubts are cut down, and his Karmas also wear away, when that Supreme is beheld.—Muṇḍaka Upaniṣat, II. ii. 8.—67.

Bhâṣya :—Not* only is this sense (that Prakṛiti ceases to act in respect of some, and continues to act in respect of others) established by means of its having an example parallel to it, (as adduced in V. 66), but also :

Prakṛiti creates objects for other Puruṣas also through association with that Karma which is an efficient cause in creation. Such is the meaning.—67.

Prakṛiti's *selection how determined.*

नैरपेक्ष्येऽपि प्रकृत्युपकारेऽविवेको निमित्तम् ॥ ३ । ६८ ॥

नैरपेक्ष्ये Nair-apekṣye, there being indifference (Vijñâna) or independence (Aniruddha). अपि Api, even. प्रकृत्युपकारे Prakṛiti-upakâre, in respect of Prakṛiti's service. अविवेकः A-vivekaḥ, non-discrimination, want of discrimination. निमित्तम् Nimittam, the efficient cause.

68. Though there is (equal) indifference (on the part of all Puruṣas), Non-discrimination is the efficient cause of Prakṛiti's service.—279.

Vṛitti :—Since Adṛiṣṭam or Karma is a product of Buddhi, let there be the contribution of Adṛiṣṭam in the production of Ahaṃ-kâra and the rest ; but where is the contributoriness of Adṛiṣṭam, may ask our opponent, in the performance of her own act by Prakṛiti ? In regard to this the author says :

Even though there is this non-dependence on Adṛiṣṭam, Non-discrimination is the auxiliary of Prakṛiti.—68.

Bhâṣya :—But then, even though Puruṣas are equally indifferent, being all alike unsolicitous, what is, it may be asked, the principle of determination here whereby Prakṛiti proceeds to act in regard to one, and ceases to act in regard to another? Nor can Karma or Adṛiṣṭam be

* This introduction to the present aphorism, F. E. Hall reads, of course, wrongly, as the concluding portion of the Bhâṣya on the preceding aphorism.

the required principle of determination, because there is nothing to determine what Karma belongs to which Puruṣa.

To this the author replies:

Even though there is this indifference of Puruṣas, yet Prakṛiti, simply through the Non-discrimination, namely, "He is my lord, I am verily he," serves Puruṣas by creation, etc. Such is the meaning. So that, to what Puruṣa there exists her Vâsanâ or the tendency to exhibit herself without discriminating, just in respect of that Puruṣa only, Prakṛiti proceeds to act. It is this which is the principle of determination. Such is the import.—68.

Note.—Here the question is as to how Prakṛiti, at the very beginning of a Creation, that is, prior to her transformation as Mahat, is enabled to exercise her creative activity or to perform "her own act," as Aniruddha would say, in which consists her service to the unreleased Puruṣas, and which is essential for their ultimate release. Activity, of course, is her very nature. But an occasion or efficient cause is wanted. Now, Puruṣas, by their very nature, are unsolicitors of Prakṛiti, so that the latter cannot approach them that way. Adṛiṣṭam is yet unproduced, because, being a product of Mahat, it appears subsequent to the initial action of Prakṛiti. Adṛiṣṭam, acquired in the previous Creation, is of no help; since it is different for each individual Puruṣa and because, moreover, it cannot, at the time, be determined what Adṛiṣṭam, belongs to which Puruṣa. Therefore, the spring of action in Prakṛiti is just the Vâsanâ or tendency of her nature to exhibit herself, in every detail, to those Puruṣas who do not yet recognise their difference from her and with whom she is consequently identified.

How Prakṛiti *ceases to act.*

नर्तकीवत् प्रवृत्तस्यापि निवृत्तिश्चारितार्थ्यात् ॥ ३ । ६९ ॥

नर्तकीवत् Nartakî-vat, like a dancer. प्रवृत्तस्य Pravṛittasya, of one engaged in activity. अपि Api, even. निवृत्तिः Nivṛittiḥ, cessation to act. चारितार्थ्यात्, Chârit-ârthyât, on account of the end having been attained.

69. Just as is the case with a dancer, (there is) cessation of the activity (of Prakṛiti), though (she had been) engaged in activity, through the end having been attained. —280.

Vṛitti:—The author explains the cessation of the activity of Prakṛiti by means of an example.

Just as a dancer, after the end of entertaining an assembly has been accomplished, desists, so too does Prakṛiti, after the end of Puruṣa, namely, discriminative knowledge, has been attained, desists from creation.—69.

Bhâṣya:—But, since activity is her nature, how can, it may be asked, cessation of activity be possible even when Discrimination has taken place? To this the author replies:

Prakṛiti's nature to energise is only with reference to the purpose of Puruṣa, and not universally. Hence is explained the cessation of the

activity of Prakṛiti, even though she had been engaged in activity, when the end of her activity has been attained in the form of the accomplishment of the object of Puruṣa. Just as, there is the cessation of the activity of a dancer, engaged in activity for the purpose of showing her dance to an assembly, when that end has been attained. Such is the meaning.—69.

Note.—Cf. *Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ*, Verse LIX :—

रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।
पुरुषस्य तथात्मानं प्रकाश्य निवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥

As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectators, desists from the dance, so does Prakṛiti desist, having exhibited herself to Puruṣa.

Above continued.

दोषबोधेऽपि नोपसर्पणं प्रधानस्य कुलवधूवत् ॥ ३ । ७० ॥

दोषबोधे Doṣa-bodhe, there being knowledge of faults. अपि Api, also. न Na, not. उपसर्पणं Upasarpaṇam, approach. प्रधानस्य Pradhânasya, of Prakṛitti. कुलवधूवत् Kula-vadhû-vat, like a woman of noble family.

70. Moreover, on the knowledge of her faults (by Puruṣa), there is no approach of Prakṛiti (to him),—just as in the case of a woman of noble family.—281.

Vṛitti :—It may be said that Prakṛiti, even though she has desisted, will yet proceed to act again from some cause or other. In regard to this the author says :

Because of the clear knowledge of her own faults by means of Discrimination, there is no more approach of Prakṛiti (to Puruṣa); just as a woman in a noble family, having been seen by a third person, shrinks within herself, saying, "May I not be seen by him again."—70.

Bhâṣya :—The author gives another reason for the discontinuance of the activity of Prakṛiti.

Being ashamed, moreover, at Puruṣa's having seen her faults such as to undergo transformation, to be essentially painful, etc., Prakṛiti does not again venture near Puruṣa. Just like the woman of family : just as a woman of family, being ashamed at ascertaining that her faults have been seen by her husband, does not approach her husband ; similarly. Such is the meaning.

So has it been declared in the *Nâradîya* :—

सविकारापि मौढ्येन चिरं भुक्त्वा गुणात्मना ।
प्रकृतिर्ज्ञातदोषेयं लज्जयेव निवर्तते ॥

Even though attended with modifications, after having, by reason of non-discrimination, long experienced objects by means of her Guṇa-body, this Prakṛiti, when her faults have been known, desists through sheer modesty.—Nârada-Purâṇa (?)

The very same thing has been declared by the Kârikâ also:

प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।
या दृष्टास्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥

My opinion is that nothing exists which is more delicate than Prakṛiti who, knowing that "I have been seen", comes no more within the sight of Puruṣa.—*Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ*, Verse LXI.—70.

Relation of Bondage and Release to Puruṣa.

नैकान्ततो बन्धमोक्षौ पुरुषस्याविवेकादृते ॥ ३ । ७१ ॥

न Na, not. एकान्ततः Ekântataḥ, absolutely, really. बन्धमोक्षौ Bandha-mokṣau, Bondage and Release. पुरुषस्य Puruṣasya, of Puruṣa. अविवेकात् A-vivekât, from Non-discrimination. ऋते Rite, except.

71. Bondage and Release do not absolutely belong to Puruṣa,—(and would not be), except through Non-discrimination.—282.

Vṛitti:—Whose is Bondage, his is Release; and they, one may say, do not belong to Puruṣa. In regard to this the author says:

From the non-discrimination of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, arises the mere abhimâna or conceit of Bondage and Release.—71.

Bhâṣya:—But then, if the activity of Prakṛiti be for the purpose of Puruṣa, the consequence, therefore, one may say, would be the transformation of Puruṣa by means of Bondage and Release (which is not desired.) To this the author replies:

Bondage and Release, in the form respectively of conjunction and disjunction of pain, do not belong to Puruṣa, "absolutely", *i.e.*, really, but result from non-discrimination only, in the manner mentioned in the fourth following aphorism (III. 74.) Such is the meaning.—71.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—"Ekântataḥ" means natural.

Bondage and Release really belong to Prakṛiti.

प्रकृतेराञ्जस्यात् ससङ्गत्वात् पशुवत् ॥ ३ । ७२ ॥

प्रकृतेः Prakṛiteḥ, of Prakṛiti. आञ्जस्यात् Âñjasyât, really. सङ्गत्वात् Sa-saṅgatvât, through being consociated. पशुवत् Paśuvat, like the beast.

72. (Bondage and Release are) really of Prakṛiti, because of her being consociated (with Adṛiṣṭam),—just as is the case with the beast.—283.

Vṛitti :—But since unreality must be preceded by reality, of whom are Bondage and Release real? To this the author replies :

"*Âñjasyât*", *really*. "*Sa-saṅga-tvât*" *through connection with Guṇa*. As a beast, *saṅgât*, *i.e.*, through connection with rope, is bound. Therefore, Prakṛiti's Bondage and Release are real. Bondage is nothing but activity towards one not possessing discriminative knowledge; Release is non-activity towards one possessing discriminative knowledge. And hence the fault of deviation from nature (*vide* Vṛitti on III. 66) does not arise.—72.

Bhâṣya :—The author declares that Bondage and Release, as described above, belong, in a real sense, to Prakṛiti herself.

Bondage and Release are, by reason of her really suffering pain, (really) of Prakṛiti herself, "through being consociated", through her being attached to Dharma or Merit, etc., which are the causes of pain. Just as a beast, because of its being attached to a rope, undergoes Bondage and Release; similarly. Such is the meaning.

This has been declared by the Kârikâ :

तस्मान्न बध्यतेऽद्धा न मुच्यते नापि संसरति पुरुषः ।
संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥

Wherefore, verily, no Puruṣa is ever bound, nor is released, nor transmigrates; Prakṛiti, the support of manifold creations, is bound, is released, and transmigrates.—*Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ*, Verse LXII—72.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—Of Bondage and Release, even though inhering in Prakṛiti, there is connection with Puruṣa, through non-apprehension of the discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa.

How Prakṛiti *binds and releases herself*

रूपैः सप्तभिरात्मानं बध्नाति प्रधानं कोशकारवद्विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ३ । ७३ ॥

रूपैः rûpaiḥ, by means of forms. सप्तभिः : saptabhiḥ, seven. आत्मानं âtmânam, herself. बध्नाति badhnâti, binds. प्रधानं pradhânam, Prakṛiti. कोशकारवत् kośa-kâravat, like the maker of cocoons, *i.e.*, the silk-worm. विमोचयति vimochayati, releases. एकरूपेण eka-rûpeṇa, by one form.

73. By seven forms does Prakṛiti bind herself, like the silk-worm,—by one form does she release herself.—284.

Vṛitti :—By what form does Prakṛiti bind herself, and by what form does she release herself? To this the author replies :

By seven forms, *viz.*, Dharma or Merit, Vairâgya or Dispassion, Aiśvarya or Lordliness, A-Dharma or Demerit, A-Jñâna or Ignorance,

A-Vairâgya or Non-Dispassion, and An-Aiśvarya or Non-Lordliness, she binds; she releases by one form, *viz.*, Jñâna or Knowledge.—73.

Bhâṣya:—Here, by what means is there Bondage, and by what means, again, is there Release? There being room for such an enquiry, the author says:

By Dharma, Vairâgya, Aiśvarya, A-Dharma, A-Jñâna, A-Vairâgya, and An-Aiśvarya,—by these seven "forms", *i.e.*, properties which are the causes of pain, Prakṛiti binds herself with pain. "Like the silk-worm"; just as the worm which makes the cocoon, binds itself by means of the dwelling which it itself constructs; similarly.

And that same Prakṛiti releases herself "by one form", *i.e.*, by means of Jñâna alone, releases herself from pain. Such is the meaning. —73.

Non-discrimination itself is not Bondage nor Release.

निमित्तत्वमविवेकस्य न दृष्टहानिः ॥ ३ । ७४ ॥

निमित्तत्वम् nimittatvam, occasional or efficient causality. अविवेकस्य a-vivekasya, of A-viveka or Non-discrimination. After "A-vivekasaya" Aniruddha reads "Iti," meaning Hence. न na, no. दृष्टहानिः dṛiṣṭa-hâniḥ, loss of "visible", results or fruits.

74. Non-discrimination is the Nimitta or efficient cause,—(so that) there is no loss of the "visible".—285.

Vṛitti:—By means of karma or acts, performed for the attainment of a specific object of desire, and not so performed but performed from a sense of duty only, are attained respectively Enjoyment and Release; on the giving up thereof, there will be, one may say, loss of "visible" fruits. In regard to this the author says:

Of Adṛiṣṭam or Merit and Demerit produced by acts,——through Jñâna or Knowledge,—therefore, intermediately,—is the causality in the production of Release; but, of Saṃsâra or worldly existence, the cause is A-viveka or Non-discrimination. Therefore, there is no loss of "visible" fruits.—74.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—Of Saṃsâra, the cause is A-viveka. With a view to its cessation, endeavour should be made only in respect of the manifestation of Discrimination. Thereby there will not be the loss of the fruit, namely, Release, of the "visible". From karma, however, through the purification of the Chitta or thinking principle, there results Release as the fruit; wherefore it (karma) is called the "visible".

Bhâṣya:—But then, that which has been asserted, namely, that Bondage and Release result from Non-discrimination, is, one may object,

improper; because Non-discrimination is (with men) neither a "heya," a thing to be avoided, nor an "upâdeya," a thing to be secured, that is, is not an object of volition at all; for, in the world, only pain, and the absence thereof, *i.e.*, pleasure, etc., are, in themselves, the objects of aversion and desire. Otherwise, there will be loss or repudiation of what is (actually) seen.

Apprehending such an objection, the author himself explains what was asserted in the fourth preceding aphorism (III. 71).

What was asserted before was this, that Non-discrimination was only the occasion or efficient cause of Bondage and Release in Puruṣas, and not that Non-discrimination itself was these; hence there is no repudiation of what is (actually) seen.

And this is clear in the aphorisms of the First Book. Due to the occasion of Non-discrimination is the conjunction of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa: and while from that conjunction, pain relating to Prakṛiti is being produced, it casts its reflection in Puruṣa; the very same (reflection) is the experience of pain, that is, (Puruṣa's) connection with pain; and it is its cessation that is the end desired by Puruṣa (Puruṣa-artha), which is called Mokṣa or Release.—74.

How development of Viveka *or Discrimination is possible.*

तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नेति नेतीति त्यागाद्विवेकसिद्धिः ॥ ३ । ७५ ॥

तत्त्वाभ्यासात् tattva-abhyâsât, from habitual cultivation of the Tattvas or principles, *e.g.*, Prakṛiti, Mahat, etc. नेति नेति na iti na iti, "not", "not"; thus. इति iti, in this way. त्यागात् tyâgât, from abandonment. विवेकसिद्धिः viveka-siddhiḥ, development of Viveka or Discrimination.

75. Through habitual cultivation of the Principles, in the form of the abandonment (of abhimâna or conceit), expressed as (that the Self is) not (Prakṛiti), (that it is) not (Mahat, etc.), (there takes place) the perfect development of Viveka or Discrimination.—286.

Vṛitti:—And how can there be Viveka? it may be asked. To this the author replies:

It is clear.

Says the Śruti also:

स एष नेति नेत्यात्माऽगृह्यो न हि गृह्यतेऽशीर्यो न हि शीर्यते इत्यादि

This, the same, is not (this), is not (that); the Self, therefore, is not apprehensible,

for it is not apprehended ; it is not-decaying, for it is not decayed, etc.-*Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat*, III. ix. 26.—75.

Note :—The section of the Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat here referred to is transcribed below :—

कस्मिन्नु त्वञ्चात्मा च प्रतिष्ठितौ स्थ इति प्राण इति कस्मिन्नु प्राणः प्रतिष्ठित इत्यपान इति कस्मिन्न्वपानः प्रतिष्ठित इति व्यान इति कस्मिन्नु व्यानः प्रतिष्ठित इत्युदान इति कस्मिन्नूदानः प्रतिष्ठित इति समान इति स एष नेति नेत्यात्माऽगृह्यो न हि गृह्यतेऽशीर्यो न हि शीर्यतेऽसङ्गो न हि सज्ज्यतेऽसितो न व्यथते न रिष्यत्येतान्यष्टावायतनान्यष्टौ लोका अष्टौ देवा अष्टौ पुरुषाः स यस्तान् पुरुषानिरुह्यात्यक्रामत्तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि तं चेन्मे न विवक्ष्यसि मूर्धा ते विपतिष्यतीति तं ह न मेने शाकल्यस्तस्य ह मूर्धा विपपाताति हास्य परिमोषिणोऽस्थीन्यपजह्रुरन्यन्मन्यमानाः ।

(Śâkalya to Yâjñavalkya :) Wherein, O, do you as well as the Self stand grounded ?
(Yâjñavalkya to Śâkalya :) In Prâṇa.
(Śâkalya :) Wherein, O, is Prâṇa grounded?
(Yâjñavalkya:) In Apâna.
(Ś.) Wherein, O, is Apâna grounded ?
(Y.) In Vyâna.
(Ś.) Wherein, O, is Vyâna grounded ?
(Y.) In Udâna.
(Ś.) Wherein, O, is Udâna grounded ?
(Y.) In Samâna.

It, the same,—(the Self)—is not (this), is not (that). Therefore, the Self is not apprehensible, for it is not apprehended ; is not-decaying, for it is not decayed; it is free-from-attachment, for it cannot be attached ; it is black; it does not suffer ; it is not killed. The eight abodes (mentioned before, *viz.*, Earth, Will, Beauty, Âkâśa, Tamas, Form, Waters, and Seed), the eight worlds (*viz.*, Agni, Heart, Eye, Ear, Heart, Eye, Heart, and Heart), the eight Devas (*viz.*, Âditya, Yama, Varuṇa, Soma, Agni, Food, Prâṇa, and Vâyu), the eight Puruṣas (residing in the eight abodes)—he who by obstructing and prevailing over these Puruṣas, transcends,—about him, the Upaniṣadic Puruṣa, I ask. If thou dost not wish to tell me of him, thy head will drop down.

Śâkalya did not heed him, and his head dropped down. And thieves stole away the bones, thinking that those were something else.

Bhâṣya :—So then it has been elaborately discriminated, by means of two Books, that, commencing with the primeval creation and ending with the final dissolution, all transformation whatever is of Prakṛiti and of her modifications only, and that Puruṣa, on the other hand, is simply pure Consciousness, full and immutable Now, among the various means conducive to the development of that Discrimination, the author mentions that which is the essence of them all, namely, Abhyâsa or practice or habitual cultivation.

Development of Discrimination takes place through the habitual cultivation of the Tattvas or Principles, in the form of the abandonment of abhimâna or conceit or self-identification, expressed as (It is) not (this), (it is) not (that), in respect of all jaḍa or non-intelligent things ending

with *Prakṛiti*. All other means are merely (*lit.* limbs) auxiliaries to Abhyâsa or habitual cultivation (of the Tattvas.) Such is the meaning.

Thus, says the Śruti :

अथात आदेशो नेति नेति नह्येतस्मादिति नेत्यन्यत् परमस्ति

Now, then, the direction "Neti" "Neti"—Not, Not,--for does not something other than, and beyond, this (visible world) not exist ?-*Br. Ar. Up.* II. iii.6.

स एष आत्मा नेति नेतीत्यादिः ।

It, the same, Self, "Neti" "Neti".-*Br. Âr. Up.* III. ix. 26.

Note :—We give below the whole (third) Brâhmaṇa to make the meaning of the above extracts appear more clearly.

द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणो रूपे मूर्तञ्चैवामूर्तञ्च मर्त्यञ्चामृतञ्च स्थितञ्च यच्च सच्च त्यच्च ॥ १ ॥ तदेतन्मूर्तं यदन्यद्वायोश्चान्तरिक्षाच्चैतन्मर्त्यमेतत्स्थितमेतत्स तस्यैतस्य मूर्त-स्यैतस्य मर्त्यस्यैतस्य स्थितस्यैतस्य सत एष रसो य एष तपति सतो ह्येष रसः ॥ २ ॥ अथामूर्तं वायुश्चान्तरिक्षं चैतदमृतमेतद्यदेतत्त्यत्तस्यैतस्यामूर्तस्यैतस्यामृतस्यैतस्य यत एतस्य त्यस्यैष रसो य एष एतस्मिन्मण्डले पुरुषस्त्यस्य ह्येष रस इत्यधिदैवतम् ॥ ३ ॥ अथाध्यात्ममिदमेव मूर्तं यदन्यत्प्राणाच्च यश्चायमन्तरात्मन्नाकाश एतन्मर्त्यमेतत्स्थितमेत-त्सत्तस्यैतस्य मूर्तस्यैतस्य मर्त्यस्यैतस्य स्थितस्यैतस्य सत एष रसो यच्चक्षुः सतो ह्येष रसः ॥ ४ ॥ अथामूर्तं प्राणश्च यश्चायमन्तरात्मन्नाकाश एतदमृतमेतद्यदेतत्त्यं तस्यैतस्या-मूर्तस्यैतस्यामृतस्यैतस्य यत एतस्य त्यस्यैष रसो योऽयं दक्षिणेऽक्षन्पुरुषस्त्यस्य ह्येष रसः ॥ ५ ॥ तस्य हैतस्य पुरुषस्य रूपं यथा महारजनं वासो यथा पाण्ड्वाविकं यथेन्द्र-गोपो यथाऽग्न्यर्चिर्यथा पुण्डरीकं यथासकृद्विद्युतं सकृद्विद्युतेव ह वा अस्य श्रीर्भवति य एवं वेदाथात आदेशो नेति नेति न ह्येतस्मादिति नेत्यन्यत्परमस्त्यथ नामधेयं सत्यस्य सत्यमिति प्राणा वै सत्यं तेषामेष सत्यम् ॥ ६ ॥

Two, my child, are the forms of Brahman: ponderable or finite and imponderable or infinite, mortal and immortal, immobile and mobile, Sat (Earth, Water, and Fire) and Tyat (Air and Ether).—1.

It is this (which is) finite,—that which is other than Air and Ether. This is mortal. It is immobile. It is "Sat". Of this, the same, the finite,—of this, the same, the mortal,—of this, the same, the immobile,—of this, the same, the "Sat",—he is the Rasa or Chief,—the same who heats,—of the "Sat" verily is he the Chief.—2.

Now, the infinite is Air and Ether. It is immortal. It is mobile. It is the "Tyat". Of this, the same, the infinite,—of this, the immortal,—of this, the mobile,—of this, the "Tyat",--he is the Chief,—the same Puruṣa, who is in this Sphere,—of the "Tyat" verily is he the Chief.—Thus (is finished) the Adhi-Daivatam.—3.

Now, Adhi-Âtmam : It is it that is finite, that which is other than Prâna, he who is in the heaven (Âkâśa) of the microcosm. It is mortal. It is immobile. It is the "Sat". Of this, the same, the finite,—of this, the mortal,—of this, the immobile,—of this, the "Sat",—he is the Chief, who is Chakṣus (the Deity presiding over the Eye),—of the "Sat" verily is he the Chief.—4.

Now, the infinite is Prâṇa,—he, the same, who is in the heaven of the microcosm. It is immortal. It is mobile. It is the "Tyat". Of this, the same, the infinite,—of this, the immortal,—of this, the mobile,—of this, the "Tyat",—he is the Chief,—he who is the Puruṣa (presiding) over the right Eye,—of the "Tyat" verily is he the Chief.—5.

Of this, the same, Puruṣa, the Rûpa or form :—as the Kusumbha flower dying a piece of cloth, as the blue dying a piece of blanket, as the worm called Indra-Gopa, as the flame of fire, as the white lotus, as a series of lightning flashes compared with a single flash of lightning,—even so is its beauty,—(he) who knows thus (knows).

Now, then, the direction "Neti," "Neti"—Not, Not,—for does not something other than, and beyond, this, not exist ? Now, its name : Truth of Truth. Prâṇas verily are the Truth. Of them is He the Truth.—6.

That is called knowledge which is the knowledge of the difference of the intelligent and the non-intelligent among the modifications that have been described here, beginning with the A-vyakta or Unmanifested (Prakṛiti), and ending with the Viśeṣas or the discrete products.*

For example :

अस्थिस्थूणं स्नायुयुतं मांसशोणितलेपनम् ।
चर्मावनद्धं दुर्गन्धि पूर्णं मूत्रपुरीषयोः ॥
जराशोकसमाविष्टं रोगायतनमातुरम् ।
रजस्वलमसन्निष्ठं भूतावासमिमं त्यजेत् ॥
नदीकूलं यथा वृक्षो वृक्षं वा शकुनिर्यथा ।
तथा त्यजन्निमं देहं कृच्छ्राद् प्राहाद्विमुच्यते ॥

Framed with bones, united with sinews, overlaid with flesh and blood, covered over with skin, emitting bad smell, full of urine and excreta, a prey to decay and grief, the home of disease, incapable, dirty, resting on what is not-permanent, the abode of the elements,—it (the body) one must abandon. As a tree (removing itself) from the bank of the river, or as a bird (flying away) from the tree, so is he who forsakes this body, saved from a painful fate.—*Manu Saṃhitâ, VI.*

This very thing has been declared by the Kârikâ also :

एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्ति न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।
अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलं उत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥

So, through the cultivation of the Principles, is produced the final, pure, because free from doubt, and the one single knowledge that neither does agency belong to me, nor is attachment mine, nor am I (identical with the body, etc.).—*Sâṃkhya Kârikâ*, Verse LXIV.

"Na asti" negates the agency of the Self. "Na me" negates attachment. "Na aham" negates identity. "A-viparyayât viśuddham" is the description of "Kevalam". (Kevala, *i.e.*, pure, *i.e.*, Viśuddham or purified, A-viparyayât, *i.e.* because of the absence of doubt). Hence (knowledge) in the intermediate stage is affected with doubt. Such is the meaning.

* In the text this passage appears in verse. Dr. Garbe takes it to be a quotation, probably from the Mateya Purâṇa. We suspect, however, that this is a portion of the Bhâṣya, only written in verse. For there is nothing in the Bhâṣya itself to indicate that the passage in question is a quotation. The drift of the Bhâṣya rather goes to show that it is not a quotation.

It is this pureness that has, in the aphorism, been declared by the word "siddhi" or development. For it is knowledge of this description that has been established as being the cause of Release, by the Yoga aphorism:

विवेकख्याति रविप्लवा हानोपायः ॥ २ ॥ २६ ॥

Discriminative knowledge undisturbed is the means of avoidance.—*Yoga Sûtram*, II. 26, S. B. H., Vol. IV, page 147.—75.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—"*Neti Neti iti Tattva-abhyâsât*": through constant contemplation of the Self by means of its characteristic difference from the body, the Indriya, etc.; "Tyâgât": through renunciation; (is reached) "Viveka-siddhiḥ": the direct vision of the Discrimination.

An exception to the above rule pointed out

अधिकारिप्रभेदान्न नियमः ॥ ३ । ७६ ॥

अधिकारिप्रभेदात् Adhikâri-prabhedât, owing to the difference (of excellence) in the Adhikârins or persons who are eligible for the cultivation of the Principles. न Na, no. नियमः Niyamaḥ, rule.

76. Owing to the division of the eligibles (into classes), (it is) not a (general) rule.—287.

Vritti:—If Release is attained by means of the cultivation of the Principles, and the like, then, one may object, there will be Release in the case of *all* the disciples after they have once received instructions about these things, because the cultivation (of the Principles) will be the same in every case. To this the author replies:

Because of the differences of 'power' or competence, good, middling, and bad, it cannot be a rule that Release (of all the disciples will take place) at one and the same time.—76.

Bhâṣya:—In respect of the development of Discrimination, the author points out a distinction.

Since there exist differences among the Adhikârins or eligibles for the cultivation of the Principles, such as bad, etc., even though cultivation of the Principles be pursued, there is no rule that, in this very birth, perfect development of Discrimination will be accomplished (in all cases). Such is the meaning. Therefore, one should, by skill in the cultivation of the Principles, carry one's competency to the highest degree of excellence. Such is the import.—76.

'Pure' Discrimination alone is the cause of Release.

बाधितानुवृत्त्या मध्यविवेकतोऽप्युपभोगः ॥ ३ । ७७ ॥

बाधितानुवृत्त्या Bâdhita-anuvrittyâ, by reason of the return of what has been repelled. Aniruddha reads the word with the fifth case-ending, पञ्चमीत्वा

madhya-vivekatah, in the stage of medium (and still imperfect) Discrimination. **अपि Api**, even. **उपभोगः Upa-bhogah**, experience.

77. By reason of the return of what has been repelled, even in the stage of medium (and still imperfect) Discrimination, there is Experience.—288.

Vritti :—If Release results through Discrimination, how is it seen, one may ask, that Experience occurs to one possessing Discrimination? To this the author replies:

Of one possessing strong Discrimination, there is no Experience. Of one of medium Discrimination also, the Experience is a mere return of Vâsanâ or the previous tendency to experience, since, in his case, there being an absence of desire for experience, it is repelled by means of the knowledge expressed as "Enough of it". One undergoes experience, thinking "Let me through experience wear away the Karma which is about to yield fruits".—77.

Bhâṣya :—The author declares that, only by the perfect development of Discrimination, there can be Release, and not otherwise.

One attains to the state of medium Discrimination immediately after the immediate cognition of the Self by means of Samprajñâta* Yoga or Cognitive Trance on a single occasion. Even when medium Discrimination has taken place in Puruṣa, Experience still occurs by the return into Purusa, in the form of reflections, through the influence of Prârabdha or Karma which has commenced to operate, of pain, etc., even though these had been previously repelled. Such is the meaning.

Perfect development of Discrimination, on the other hand, takes place only through the A-Samprajñâta Yoga or Ultra-Cognitive Trance from which there is no rising (into waking consciousness) again. Hence, in order to establish that when that has taken place, there is no more Experience, the expression "Madhya-vivekatah," in the stage of *medium* Discrimination, has been used (in the aphorism).

While bad or sluggish Discrimination, prior to direct cognition, is merely of the form of Hearing, Thinking, and Meditating.

Such is the division (of Discrimination into bad, middling, and good).—77.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—Madhya-tvam or mediumness indeed is the containing of the residuum of the Prârabdha or the Karma which has been in operation, which is an obstruction to the attainment of Videha-Mukti or Release in the disembodied state. Of the Puruṣa who possesses

* *Vide* pp. 305-306, foot-note, where the term has been fully explained.

this (*i.e.*, mediumness), after Discrimination, Experience still takes place,—such is the (syntactical) connection. Owing to the non-existence of Desire and Aversion; "Of what has been repelled," *i.e.*, of what does not lead to joy and sorrow, that is to say, of even what is not the cause of the production of desire for objects of enjoyment; "by the return," *i.e.*, by its being rendered necessary by reason of its being the fruit of Prârabdha or Karma which has been in operation. So that, the idea is, there is a very great difference between the Discriminating and the Non-discriminating.

Case of Jîvan-Mukta *considered.*

जीवन्मुक्तश्च ॥ ३ । ७८ ॥

जीवन्मुक्तः Jîvan-muktaḥ, released during life. च Cha, also.

78. (So) too is the Jîvan-mukta.—279.

Vṛitti:—The author states the essential character of one possessing medium Discrimination.

The word "Cha" has been used in the sense of "Iva," *i.e.*, of similarity.* (The Jîvan-mukta or living-yet-released is), like the released, released, in consequence of the non-existence of Desire and also in consequence of the non-production of Dharma or Adṛiṣṭam.

Says the Śruti also:

आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयादयमस्मीति पुरुषः ॥
किमर्थं कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत् ।

Should Puruṣa realise the Self in this way that "I am it," then, wishing for what, for desire for what, will he decay along with the body?—Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat, IV. iv. 12—78.

Bhâṣya:—The Jîvan-Mukta also is just in the condition of one of medium Discrimination. Such is the meaning.—78.

Proof of Release during life.

उपदेश्योपदेष्टृत्वात्तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ३ । ७९ ॥

उपदेश्योपदेष्टृत्वात् Upadeśya-upadeṣṭṛi-tvât, from the relation of the instructed and the instructor. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, proof thereof, *i.e.*, of the existence of the Jîvan-mukta.

79. From the relation of the instructed and the instructor, is the proof of the Jîvan-Mukta.—290.

* This sentence is not found in Dr. Garbe's edition of Aniruddha Vṛitti.

Vritti :—There is no proof, it may be said, that there can be Release of one while one is living. So the author says :

Of one possessing strong Discrimination (and, therefore,) not cognisant of external affairs, the very character of being the instructor does not exist. To one, again, possessing sluggish Discrimination, the character of being the instructor does not belong, because of his ignorance; on the contrary, he himself is the person to be instructed. The instructor (therefore) must be the person possessing medium Discrimination. Hence is "tat-siddhiḥ," *i.e*, the proof (of the existence) of the Jîvan-mukta.—79.

Bhâṣya : —The author states the proof in regard to the Jîvan-mukta.

From the mention, in the Śâstras, on the subject of Discrimination, of the relation of the preceptor and the disciple, there is proof of the Jîvan-mukta. Such is the meaning. Because to be the instructor is possible only for one released during life.—79.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—Because of the non-existence in him of Desire, etc., the Jîvan-mukta cannot be the person to be instructed ; but the person of sluggish Discrimination is the one to be instructed. Therefore, there is proof of the Jîvan-mukta as being the instructor of the person of sluggish Discrimination.

Another proof.

श्रुतिश्च ॥ ३ । ८० ॥

श्रुतिः Śrutiḥ, Śruti, Veda. च Cha, also.

80. There is, moreover, Śruti, (on the subject).—291.

Vritti :—The author shows the evidence on this point.

Said :

जीवन्नेव हि विद्वान् हर्षायासाभ्यां विमुच्यते ॥

For the wise, even while living, is released from joy and pain.—80.

Bhâṣya :—There is also Śruti in respect of the Jîvan-Mukta.

दीक्षयैव नरो मुच्येत् तिष्ठन्मुक्तोऽपि विग्रहे ।
कुलालचक्रमध्यस्थो विच्छिन्नोऽपि भ्रमेद् घटः ॥

Man can be released by means of initiation (Dikṣâ) only ; even the released can stay in the figure or body. Lying within the wheel of the potter, the jar may still revolve, even though disjoined from it.—(Source not traced).

ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति

Being Brahman itself, (he) reaches even Brahman.—Bṛ. Âr. Up. IV. iv. 6.

Says the Nâradîya Smṛiti also:

पूर्वाभ्यासबलात् कार्यं न लोको न च वैदिकः ।
अपुण्यपापः सर्वात्मा जीवन्मुक्तः स उच्यते ॥

He is called the Jîvan-mukta who looks upon all things as the Self, who is above virtue and vice, and who, through the force of previous practice, follows, in his acts, neither the Society nor the Scripture.--80.

Sluggish Discrimination cannot qualify for preceptorship.

इतरथान्धपरम्परा ॥ ३ ॥ ८१ ॥

इतरथा Itara-thâ, otherwise. अन्धपरम्परा Andha-paramparâ, a procession of blind persons, blind tradition.

81. Otherwise, (there would be) the blind leading the blind.—292.

Vṛitti :--Even a man of sluggish Discrimination, it may be said, may be an instructor. In regard to this, the author says:

Were the ignorant to be the preceptor, the disciple, *a fortiori*, would remain ignorant.--81.

Bhâṣya :--But, then, by means even of mere Hearing, it may be said, the qualification of being an instructor may be acquired. To this the author replies:

"Itara-thâ," otherwise, *i.e.*, on the supposition that the character of being an instructor may belong even to a man of sluggish Discrimination, there would be the consequence of "Andha-paramparâ," *i.e.*, of the blind leading the blind. Such is the meaning. Not knowing the truth about the Self in all its entirety, were one to instruct, then, by reason of one's own error in some portion of the subject matter, one would make the disciple also commit the same error; he, in his turn, will again mislead another; the latter, yet another; and, in this way, there would be a tradition or procession of blind persons.—81.

Worldly existence even after Release, explained.

चक्रभ्रमणवद्धृतशरीरः ॥ ३ । ८२ ॥

चक्रभ्रमणवत् chakra-bhramaṇa-vat, like the whirling of the (potter's) wheel. धृतशरीरः dhṛita-śarîraḥ, having the body supported.

82. Having the body (still) supported, (the Jîvan-mukta continues living),—just like the whirling of the (potter's) wheel.—293.

Vritti :—As regards instruction, because Release results through Knowledge, one, it may be said, should be released immediately after instruction ; what need of delay ? In regard to this the author says :

Just as, after the removal of the whirling rod, through the force of Saṃskâra or momentum the wheel revolves, in like manner, even in the case of those who possess Discrimination, because of the Karma or Adṛiṣṭam which supports, creates as well as preserves their bodies, not having been worn out or exhausted, there is no immediate Release ; but their Release takes place after the exhaustion of their Karma by means of Experience and the like.

So also says the Śruti :—

दीक्षयैव नरो मुच्येत्तिष्ठेन्मुक्तोऽपि विग्रहे ।
कुलालचक्रमध्यस्थो विच्छिन्नोऽपि भ्रमेद् घटः ॥

Man can be released by means of initiation only ; even the released can stay in the figure or body. Lying within the wheel of the potter, the jar may still revolve, even though disjoined from it.—82.

Bhâṣya :—But then, when Karma has been exhausted by means of knowledge, how, it may be asked, can there be life ? To this the author replies :

Even after the cessation of the act of the potter, through the momentum imparted by the previous act, just of itself, for some time, the wheel revolves. Similarly, does the Jîvan-mukta remain, carrying the body which performs its functions by virtue of the force of the Prârabdha Karma or former Karma which has been in operation, even though no fresh Karma has been produced after the growth of Knowledge. Such is the meaning.—82.

How retention of body, even after Release, is rendered unavoidable.

संस्कारलेशतस्तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ३ । ८३ ॥

संस्कारलेशतः saṃskâra-leśataḥ, through the merest trace of Saṃskâra or previous impressions which originate the body. तत्सिद्धिः : tat-siddhiḥ, effectuation thereof, *i.e.*, of the retention of the body.

83. Through the least trace of Saṃskâras (takes place) the retention of the body.—294.

Vritti :—Therefore, there is the Jîvan-mukta ;—this the author states.

("Tat-siddhiḥ" means) the proof of the Jîvan-mukta.—83.

Bhâṣya :—But then, it may be objected, when there has been the exhaustion of the Vâsanâ or tendency towards Experience, etc., by means of the Cognitive Trance (Samprajñâta Yoga) which is the cause of Knowledge, how can there be the retention of the body ? Neither can it be contended that there is no evidence to show that Yoga can overpower the Saṃskâras, because that is proved from the Yoga aphorism :

व्युत्थाननिरोधसंस्कारयोरभिभवप्रादुर्भावौ निरोधक्षणचित्तान्वयो निरोधपरिणामः ॥३।९॥

The modification or transformation of the Chittam or the thinking Principle, known as Nirodha or Inhibition of all other modifications, is the conjunction of the Chittam with the moment of inhibition when take place respectively the disappearance and appearance of the Saṃskâras or impressions of outgoing modification and of inhibition.—*Yoga Sûtram*, III. 9, S. B. H., Vol. IV., p. 185.

and also because everybody knows that the influence of a different object, coming after a long interval of time, is able to overpower the impressions of other objects.

To this the author replies :

Of those impressions of objects which are the cause of the carrying of the body, because a small remnant is left, there is the effectuation of the retention of the body. Such is the meaning.

Now, here the existence of a trace of the impression of A-vidyâ or false knowledge is not required. Because A-vidyâ is the cause of just the origination of the outcomes of Karma in the form of birth, etc. In the Commentary on Yoga, moreover, it has been similarly explained by the revered Vyâsa. There is, furthermore, the argument in the Nyâya Darśana :

वीतरागजन्मादर्शनात् ॥ ३ । २५ ॥

Because the birth of one from whom all Passion has fled away, is not seen.—*Nyâya Sûtram*, III. i. 25, S. B. H., Vol. VIII., p. 69.

Nor, again, is the existence of A-vidyâ necessary even in the experience of Karma which has the Prârabdha or Karma which has begun to operate, as its fruit.

Where, on the other hand, there is, as a rule, dependence upon A-vidyâ,—that Experience, which is of the form of a particular exertion, occurs to the stupid only; while, in the case of the Jîvan-muktas, there is, as has been stated before, just the semblance of Experience.

Some one, however, has said that, in the case of the Jîvan-mukta, there remains also a trace of the impression of A-vidyâ. But that is not so, since it would entail the production of Dharma or Merit and A-dharma or Demerit. It would, moreover entail a "procession of blind persons." And, further, there is no necessity for the supposition of the existence of a trace of the impression of A-vidyâ.

And all this has been elaborately discussed in the Commentary on Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ (the Vedânta-Sûtram).—83.

Vedântin Mahîdeva:—"Saṃskâra," impression, is of Desire, etc. The very same is "Leśa," a trace, that is, the semblance of Desire, etc. Such is the meaning. Therefrom is "Tat-siddhiḥ," the establishment of Experience. It is hence that even when Desire, etc. are seen in those who possess Discrimination, they are not really Desire, etc., but are merely the semblances of Desire, etc. Such is the import.

Conclusion: Discrimination is the only means of Release.

विवेकान्निःशेषदुःखनिवृत्तौ कृतकृत्यता नेतरान्नेतरात् ॥ ३ । ८४ ॥

विवेकात् Vivekât, through discrimination. निःशेषदुःखनिवृत्तौ Niḥ-śeṣa-duḥkha-nivṛittau, on entire cessation of pain. कृतकृत्यता Kṛita-kṛitya-tâ, the condition of one for whom what was to be done, has been done, न Na, not. इतरात् Itarât, from anything else.

84. On the entire cessation of pain, through Discrimination, (is reached) the condition of one for whom what was to be done, has been done, and not through anything else,—not through anything else.—295.

Vṛitti.—When, it may be asked, is the supreme Release attained? To this the author replies:

When there is absolute cessation of the threefold pain,--cessation so as to leave no remainder,—one becomes "Kṛita-kṛityaḥ," fulfilled, because of the attainment of supreme or ultimate Release. "Na itarât," not from any other, Karma or act—such is the complement.

The repetition of the phrase "Na itarât" is to indicate the close of the Book.—84.

Here ends the Third Book, of Dispassion, in the Vṛitti on the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram of Kapila.

Bhâṣya:—The author recapitulates the sense of the declarations in the Śâstra.

When all pain, whether it be obstructed or unobstructed, ceases, so as to leave no remainder, by reason of the inhibition of all the modifications (of the mind), by means of the Higher Dispassion, resulting from the above-described development of Discrimination, it is then only that Puruṣa becomes fulfilled; and "not through anything else," *i.e.*, not even through Release during life. Such is the meaning.

The repetition of "Na itarât" is to indicate the close of the Book.—84.

It has, in this Book, been declared that all effect, ending with the final dissolution, is of the A-vyakta, the Unmanifested, *i.e.*, Prakṛiti, and not of the Self. Similarly, it has here been declared that Discrimination is the means of accomplishing Higher Dispassion.

Here ends the Third Book, of Dispassion, in the Commentary composed by Vijñâna Bhikṣu on the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram of Kapila.

Book IV.

OF FABLES.

INTRODUCTION.

Vṛitti :—Next to (the Book of) Dispassion, is made the origination of the Fourth Book, for the purpose of telling stories for the awakening of the disciple.

Bhâṣya :—The means of accomplishing the knowledge of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti should now be exhibited through a number of fables well-known to the Śâstras:—for this purpose is commenced the Fourth Book.

Instruction of the Truth : Story of the Abandoned Prince.

राजपुत्रवत् तत्त्वोपदेशात् ॥ ४ । १ ॥

राजपुत्रवत् Râja-putra-vat, as in the case of the king's son. तत्त्वोपदेशात् Tattva-upadeśât, through instruction of truth.

1. (Discrimination-Viveka-arises) through instruction of the truth,—as in the case of the king's son.—296.

Vṛitti :—A certain prince was born under an inauspicious conjunction of stars. So he was removed from the palace. A hunter chief adopted him as his son, and he acquired merely the manners and customs of his adoptive father. Now, when the king died sonless, the ministers brought him back to the palace, and enlightened him by saying : "You are not a hunter, but the son of a king." So told, he forthwith recovered the manners and customs of a prince through the force of previous Saṃskâras or impressions.

(Moral): Similarly, instruction is to be given for the enlightenment of even those who are dull.—1.

Bhâṣya:—Here follows the word, Viveka or Discrimination, which appears in the last aphorism of the preceding Book.

The meaning, then, is that, as in the case of the king's son, Discrimination is produced through instruction of the truth.

Here the story is as follows : A certain king's son, by reason of his being born under the conjunction of stars known as Gaṇḍa,* is expelled

* Birth under the asterism, Gaṇḍa, results in the death either of the child or of one or both of the parents.

from the city and reared by a hunter. So he remains under the conceit that "I am a hunter." Having learned that he is alive, a certain minister enlightens him by saying "You are not a hunter, but a king's son." Just as he then and there abandons the conceit that he is a Chaṇḍâla or outcaste, and adopts his true royal state, thinking "I am a king", in the very same way, through the instruction of some kind person who informs him by saying: "Produced as you are from the Âdi or Original Puruṣa,—the All-Full, Pure Consciousness manifested,—you are a part thereof," the Incarnate Puruṣa abandons the conceit of his being a product of Prakṛiti, and re-assumes his own intrinsic form, realising "Being the son of Brahman, I also am Brahman itself; by no means am I different in characteristic from Brahman, nor am I subject to transmigration." Such is the meaning.

Thus we find in the Garuḍa-Purâna:

यथैकहेममणिना सर्वं हेममयं जगत् ।
तथैव ज्ञातमीशेन ज्ञातमप्यखिलं भवेत् ॥
ग्रहाविष्टो द्विजः कश्चिच्छूद्रोऽहमिति मन्यते ।
ग्रहनाशात्पुनः स्वीयं ब्राह्मण्यं मन्यते यथा ॥
मायाविष्टस्तथाजीवो देहोऽहमिति मन्यते ।
मायानाशात् पुनः स्वीयं रूपं ब्रह्मास्मि मन्यते ॥

Just as, by means of a single golden gem, all the world looks golden, exactly so, by means of the Lord being known, all is known. As some twice-born, being possessed by a planetary power, thinks that "I am a Śudra," and after the expulsion of that power, becomes conscious again of his Brâhmaṇa-hood, similarly does the Jîva, being possessed by Mâyâ, thinks that "I am the body," and after the destruction of Mâyâ, becomes conscious again of his own true form, realising that "I am Brahman."—1.

Instruction need not be direct: Story of the Piśâcha.

पिशाचवदन्यार्थोपदेशेऽपि ॥ ४ । २ ॥

पिशाचवत् piśâcha-vat, like the piśâcha or goblin. अन्यार्थोपदेशे anya-artha-upadeśe, the instruction being for the sake of another. अपि api, even.

2. (Discrimination results), as in the case of the Piśâcha, even though the instruction was for the sake of another.—297.

Vṛitti:—The author relates another story.

A certain preceptor, remembering (the injunction): "Receive instruction in a lonely place," took his disciple out with him, entered a forest, and imparted instruction to him. It was overheard by a Piśâcha concealed behind a bush. He too attained Release.

The moral, therefore, is that, from knowledge about the Self, even though it be casually received, there is Release.—2.

Bhâṣya :—Even women, Śûdras, and the like may attain their end by hearing the instruction of one Brâhmaṇa by another Brâhmaṇa ;—with a view to show this the author exhibits another story.

Although the instruction in regard to the Tattvas or Principles was being delivered by Śri Kṛiṣṇa for the benefit of Arjuna, discriminative knowledge was produced in a Piśâcha standing near by. Similarly, it may be in the case of others also. Such is the meaning.—2.

Inculcation also is necessary.

आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात् ॥ ४ । ३ ॥

आवृत्तिः âvṛittiḥ, repetition. असकृदुपदेशात् a-sakṛit-upadeśât, through frequent instruction.

3. (In some cases there is necessity of) inculcation (of the truth) through frequent instruction.—298.

Vṛitti :—Herein the author mentions a distinction.

Of those in whom Dispassion is very strong, let there be Release through the mere hearing (of the truth). But, in the case of the sluggish, inculcation should be done through unremitting instruction.—3.

Bhâṣya :—In case knowledge is not produced through a single instruction, then also a repetition of the instruction has to be made ;—this the author declares by means of another story.

Also a repetition of the instruction should be made, since there is the history of the frequent instruction of Śvetaketu, etc., by Âruṇi and others, recorded in the Chhândogya Upaniṣat, etc.—3.

Dispassion : All is fleeting.

पितापुत्रवदुभयोर्दृष्टत्वात् ॥ ४ । ४ ॥

पितापुत्रवत् pitâ-putra vat, as of father and son. उभयोः ubhayoḥ, of both. दृष्टत्वात् driṣṭa-tvât, it having been seen.

4. Since, as of father and son, (so of oneself also), both (death and birth) are seen (and inferred), (there arises Dispassion).—299.

Vṛitti :—The author relates another story.

A certain Brâhmaṇa, on account of poverty, left his pregnant wife in the house of her father, and went to another country for the purpose of receiving alms and charities. After a long interval of time, he returned

home, and, on seeing his son, could not know him. The son's mother informed her husband and son. Then there was knowledge of both of them.

The meaning, therefore, is that, even without the help of a preceptor, knowledge of the Tattvas or Principles may be acquired even through instruction by a friend.—4.

Bhâṣya :—For the purpose of Dispassion, the author establishes, by putting forward an example, the fragility, etc. of the frame of the Self.

As of one's own father and son, so of oneself also, because death and birth are seen and inferred, there arises Dispassion, and, by means thereof, Discrimination. So has it been declared :

आत्मनः पितृपुत्राभ्यामनुमेयौ भवाप्ययौ

Of oneself, the birth and death can be inferred from the case of one's father and son.—4.

All worldly pleasure is alloyed with pain : Story of the Hawk.

श्येनवत् सुखदुःखी त्यागवियोगाभ्याम् ॥ ४ । ५ ॥

श्येनवत् śyena-vat, like a hawk. सुखदुःखी sukha-duḥkhi, pleased-and-pained. त्यागवियोगाभ्यां tyâga-viyoga-âbhyâṃ by reason of abandonment and separation.

5. From abandonment and (consequent) separation, (one becomes) both pleased and pained at the same time, —just like a hawk.—300.

Vṛitti :—The author relates another story.

By a certain person, a young hawk was picked up, and reared, with uniform care, by means of such food as cakes, sugar, etc. In course of time, it attained its youth. It was then abandoned in a forest by the man, thinking "Why do I make it suffer pain"? The hawk also was pleased owing to the abandonment of its bondage, but, at the same time, was sorry owing to its separation from the man.

(The moral, therefore, is that), because pleasure is alloyed with pain, both of them are equally objects which are fit to be avoided.—5.

Bhâṣya :—Hereafter, the author exhibits, by means of the examples given in the stories, the subservients to the development of Knowledge in the case of one in whom knowledge has (just) been produced and who has become dispassionate.

Acquirement of things should not be made, since, by voluntary abandonment of things, a man becomes pleased, while, by (forcible) separation (from them), becomes pained,—just like a hawk. Such is the meaning. For a hawk, carrying a bit of flesh, is made painful if some one else suddenly falls upon it and forcibly separates it from the flesh, while, if it

voluntarily abandons the flesh, it is freed from the pain. So has it been declared :—

सामिषं कुररं जघ्नुर्बलिनोऽन्ये निरामिषाः ।
तदामिषं परित्यज्य स सुखं समविन्दत ॥

Other and more powerful hawks, possessing no flesh, attacked one hawk possessed of flesh. Abandoning that flesh, he gained pleasure.—*Śrîmad Bhâgavatam*, XI. ix. 2.

So has it been declared by Manu also :—

नदीकूलं यथा वृक्षो वृक्षं वा शकुनिर्यथा ।
तथा त्यजन्निमं देहं कृच्छ्राद्ग्राहाद्विमुच्यते ॥

Like a tree (removing itself) from the bank of the river, or like a bird (flying away) from the tree, he who forsakes this body, is saved from a painful fate.—*Manu-Saṃhitâ*, VI. 78.—5.

Abandonment of that which is fit to be abandoned : Story of the Snake and the Slough.

अहिनिर्लयनीवत् ॥ ४ । ६ ॥

अहिनिर्लयनीवत् Ahi-nirlvayanî-vat, like the serpent's skin.

6. Like the serpent's skin, (things avoidable, should be abandoned).—301.

Vṛitti :—The author relates another story.

"Nirlvayanî" means the slough.

A certain snake, having cast off its coat, at the door of its hole, is grieved to see it besmeared with dust and clay, thinking "It is mine," and, through affection, does not throw it away. It is afterwards seized by a certain snake-charmer following the skin.

The meaning, then, is that the feeling of mine-ness, affection, etc., should not be cherished.—6.

Bhâṣhya :—Just as a snake quite easily abandons its old skin from a sense that it ought to be shaken off, even so should a person desirous of Release, abandon Prakṛiti, enjoyed for long and effete, from a sense that she ought to be abandoned. Such is the meaning. So has it been said :

जीर्णां त्वचमिवोरगः

Like a serpent, its old skin.—*Râmâyaṇam*, III. ix. 32.—6.

Prakṛiti, once abandoned should not be taken back again : Story of the Amputation of the Hand.

छिन्नहस्तवद्वा ॥ ४ । ७ ॥

छिन्नहस्तवत् Chhinna-hasta-vat, like an amputated hand. वा VÂ, and.

7. And, moreover, like an amputated hand, (she should not be taken back again).—302.

Vṛitti :—The author relates another story.

A certain Muni, entering the hermitage of his brother, gathered fruits, etc. And he was told by his brother, "Thou art a thief." He said, "Tell me what the penance is". His brother also said, "There exists no other penance except the amputation of thy hand." And he, informing the king, cut off his own hands.

Therefore, (the moral is), prohibited acts should not be done, and, if done through inadvertence, steps must be taken for obtaining freedom from the consequences thereof.—7.

Bhâṣya :—The author declares that Prakṛiti, etc., once abandoned, should not be espoused again.

Just as no one whatever takes back an amputated hand, even so, once it (Prakṛiti, etc.) has been abandoned, one should not espouse it again. Such is the meaning.

The word "vâ" has been used in the sense of "api" or moreover.—7.

Thoughts uncongenial to Release to be avoided : Story of Bharata.

असाधनानुचिन्तनं बन्धाय भरतवत् ॥ ४ । ८ ॥

असाधनानुचिन्तनं A-sâdhana-anu-chintanam, devotion of the chittam or mind to that which is not a means of Release. बन्धाय Bandhâya, for bondage. भरतवत् Bharata-vat, as in the case of the celebrated Bharata.

8. Contemplation of that which is not a means, (works) for Bondage,—as in the case of Bharata.—303.

Vṛitti :—The author relates another story.

The King, by name Bharata, though Release was almost at his hand, seeing a female deer die as soon as delivered, began to rear up the young deer. Leaving it, he never directed his mind to any other thing. At the moment of death, he gave up the vital airs, having his mind resting on it. In consequence of attachment to it, he did not attain Release.

The meaning is that thought which is uncongenial to Release, should not be cherished.—8.

Bhâṣya :—What is not an internal (or direct) means of Discrimination, though it be an act of duty,—(this is a description of A-sâdhana)—its "anu-chintanam", *i.e.*, the devotion of the mind towards its performance, should not be made; because it leads to Bondage by means of its being the cause of making one forget Discrimination; as in the case of Bharata: *i.e.*, as did the royal sage Bharata's rearing a poor and orphan fawn, even though this was in accordance with duty. Thus, then, on the

subject of Jaḍa Bharata or Bharata the Inert or Stupid, we find in the Viṣṇu Purâṇa:

चपलं चपले तस्मिन् दूरगं दूरगामिनि ।
आसीच्चेतः समासक्तं तस्मिन् हरिणपोतके ॥

Restless when it was restless, far-going when it went afar,—in such wise was his mind attached wholly to that young deer.—*Viṣṇu Purâṇa*, II. xiii. 30a and 22b.—8.

Company is to be avoided : Story of the Girl and her Bracelets.

बहुभिर्योगे विरोधो रागादिभिः कुमारीशङ्खवत् ॥ ४ । ९ ॥

बहुभिः Bahubhiḥ, with many. योगे Yoge, in association. विरोधः Virodhaḥ, conflict, quarrel. रागादिभिः Râga-âdi-bhiḥ, by means of desire or passion and the like. कुमारीशङ्खवत् Kumârî-saṅkha-vat, as in the case of the shell-bracelets of a girl.

9. In association with many, there is wrangling, by means of the manifestation of passion, etc.,—as in the case of a girl's shell-bracelets.—304.

Vṛitti :—The author tells us that one should not make company with many.

With many, conflict is inevitable,—just as a jingling is produced by the mutual contact of a girl's shell-bracelets.—9.

Bhâṣya :—Association should not be made with many. For in association with many, by the manifestation of passion and the like, there arises quarrel which is destructive of Yoga or concentration ; just as, by the mutual contact of a girl's shell-bracelets, a jingling is produced. Such is the meaning.—9.

Company even of two is equally bad.

द्वाभ्यामपि तथैव ॥ ४ । १० ॥

द्वाभ्याम् dvâbhyâm, of two. अपि api, even. तथा tathâ, the same. एव eva, verily.

10. In association of two even, (it is) the very same.—305.

Vṛitti :—The author tells us that company of two even should not be made.

Because of the fault of conversation, etc., (which draws the mind away from Concentration).—10.

Bhâṣya :—In association of two even, the very same, *i.e.*, conflict or wrangling, takes place. Hence one should remain by oneself alone. Such is the meaning.

So has it been said :

वासे बहूनां कलहो भवेद् वार्ता द्वयोरपि ।
एक एव चरेत्तस्मात् कुमार्या इव कङ्कणम् ॥

In the residence of many together, there would be quarrel. In that of two even, there would be conversation. One is, therefore, to go about alone ;—just like the bracelet of the girl.—10.

Hope is to be abandoned : Story of Piṅgalâ.

निराशः सुखी पिङ्गलावत् ॥ ४ । ११ ॥

निराशः nirâśaḥ, hopeless. सुखी sukhî, happy. पिङ्गलावत् piṅgalâ-vat, like Piṅgalâ.

11. He who has no hope, is happy; just like Piṅgalâ. —306.

Vṛitti :—The author relates another story.

The courtesan, named Piṅgalâ, being sleepless through waiting, for an embrace, for the arrival of Bhujaṅga (her lover), experienced pain. Once, however, she, being disappointed through extreme suffering, gave up all expectation, making up her mind that "I will not do so again". Thus, no more having any expectation, she sleeps happy.—11.

Bhâṣya :—There being the saying :

आशापैवश्यविरसे चित्ते सन्तोषवर्जिते ।
म्लाने वक्त्रमिवादर्शे न ज्ञानं प्रतिबिम्बति ॥

In a mind rendered dry through overpowering hope and devoid of contentment, Knowledge does not cast its reflection, just as does not the face in a dirty mirror,

the author declares that the habit of having no hope should be cultivated by the Yogin.

By giving up hope, let a Puruṣa be possessed of the pleasure called contentment, just like Piṅgalâ ; that is to say, in the same way as the courtesan, Piṅgalâ by name, wishing for a lover, not obtaining a lover, being despondent, became happy when she had left off hoping.

So has it been said :

आशा हि परमं दुःखं नैराश्यं परमं सुखम् ।
यथा संछिद्य कान्ताशां सुखं सुष्वाप पिङ्गला ॥

For, hoping is a great pain, not-hoping is a great pleasure. *E.g.*, having cut down all hope for a lover, Piṅgalâ slept happy.—*Mahâ-Bhâratam*, XII., 6520, 6647.

But granting, it may be objected, that, by the cessation of hope, there may be cessation of pain ; but how can there be pleasure, when the causes of it do not exist ? To this it is replied : The pleasure, natural to the Chittam or mind by reason of the predominance of Sattva in it,

which remains obscured by means of hope,—the very same pleasure, on the departure of hope, of itself resumes its own function, just like the natural coolness of water which had been obstructed in its manifestation by the action of heat. Hence there is no need of a positive cause or means of its production. It is this very same that is also called the pleasure of the Self.—11.

Exertion is needless : Example of Snake dwelling in another's house.

अनारम्भेऽपि परगृहे सुखी सर्पवत् ॥ ४ । १२ ॥

अनारम्भे an-ârambhe, where no exertion has been made. अपि api, even. परगृहे para-grihe, in another's house. सुखी sukhî, happy. सर्पवत् sarpa-vat, like a snake.

12. Even without exertion, (one may be) happy, just like a snake, in another's house.—307.

Vritti :—The author tells us that the building of a house is a source of pain.

(The sense is) clear.—12.

Bhâṣya :—The author declares that, since it is a hindrance to Concentration, no exertion whatever, for the purpose of enjoyment, should be made, as this can be effected just otherwise.

"Let one be happy",—such is the complement of the aphorism. The rest is easy.

So has it been declared :

गृहारम्भो हि दुःखाय न सुखाय कथञ्चन ।
सर्पः परकृतं वेश्म प्रविश्य सुखमेधते ॥

The building of a house is for pain, and is, by no means, for pleasure. Entering a house made by another, a snake enjoys pleasure.—*Mahâ-Bhârata*, XII. 6640.—12.

In study, discrimination : example of the bee.

बहुशास्त्रगुरूपासनेऽपि सारादानं षट्पदवत् ॥ ४ । १३ ॥

बहुशास्त्रगुरूपासने bahu-śâstra-guru-upâsane, in the case of application to many Śâstras and many preceptors. अपि api, even ; though. सारादानं sâra-âdânam, a taking of the essence. षट्पदवत् ṣaṭ-pada-vat, like the six-footed insect or bee.

13. Though one apply to many Śâstras and many preceptors, a taking of the essence (is to be made),—as is the case with the bee.—308.

Vritti :—In the Śâstra, there are "expositions," "overthrow of opponents," etc., which are not essential. These, the author says, are to be rejected.

As the bee, leaving aside the flowers, gathers the honey only, similarly should one, wishing for Release, reject A-vidyâ or false knowledge.—13.

Bhâṣya :—From the Sâstras as well as from the preceptors, only the essence is to be accepted ; since, otherwise, it will be impossible to fix the attention on one point only, through there being, by reason of "admission of foreign doctrines for the sake of argument," and the like, mutual contradiction among unessential parts, and also multiplicity of meanings. So the author says :

"Is to be made",—such is the complement of the aphorism. The rest is easy.

So has it been declared :

अणुभ्यश्च महद्भ्यश्च शास्त्रेभ्यः कुशलो नरः ।
सर्वतः सारमादद्यात् पुष्पेभ्य इव षट्पदः ॥

From Sâstras, small as well as great, the skilful man should take the essence from all quarters, as does the bee from the flowers.

Also in the Mârkaṇḍeya Purâna.

सारभूतमुपासीत ज्ञानं यत् स्वार्थसाधकम् ।
ज्ञानानां बहुता यैषा योगविघ्नकरी हि सा ॥
इदं ज्ञेयमिदं ज्ञेयमिति यस्तृषितश्चरेत् ।
असौ कल्पसहस्रेषु नैव ज्ञानमवाप्नुयात् ।

A man should devote himself to knowledge reduced to the form of the essence; it is that which is the means of accomplishing one's end. The manifoldness of knowledges that there is,—that is a cause of hindrance to Concentration. "This is to be known", "That is to be known,"—he who goes about thirsting in this way, will never attain knowledge even in a thousand of Kalpas.—*Mârkaṇḍeya Purâṇa*, , XII. 18, 19.—13.

Vedântin Mahâdeva.—In pursuance of the maxim :

सर्वतः सारमादद्यादश्मभ्य इव काञ्चनम् ।

One should pick out the essence from all quarters, as one does the gold from the ores,

even from the Sâstras, only the essence is to be accepted, but no particular effort should be made with a view to gain a victory over opponents. Moreover, Śama or Control of the Internal Instruments and the like, inhering in the preceptor, are to be welcomed, but not, however, the rare defects of desire, aversion, etc.—13.

One-pointed-ness of the mind necessary : example of the arrow-maker.

इषुकारवन्नैकचित्तस्य समाधिहानिः ॥ ४ । १४ ॥

इषुकारवत् iṣu-kâra-vat, as in the case of the arrow-maker. न na, not. एकाग्रचित्तस्य eka-agra-chittasya, of one whose mind is one-pointed. समाधिहानिः samâdhi-hânih, failure or interruption of Samâdhi or Meditation.

14. Of one whose mind is one-pointed, there can be no interruption of Samâdhi or Meditation,—as in the case of the arrow-maker.—309.

Vritti :—The author mentions for whom there is Samâdhi.

Just as an arrow-maker, having his mind wholly absorbed in the arrow, did not know that the king had passed near by, even so, in the case of a man whose mind is one-pointed, ther is no failure of Samâdhi.—14.

Bhâṣya :—Be the other means what they may, by means of maintaining Samâdhi through one-pointed-ness of mind alone, direct intuition of Discrimination should be accomplished. So the author says :

Just as in the case of a maker of arrows, with his mind concentrated, for the purpose of making an arrow, the suppression of the other modifications of the mind is not interrupted even by the passing of a king at his side, in like manner, in the case of a man, with his mind one-pointed, there is, by no means, "Samâdhi-hânih," or failure of the suppression of all other modifications of the mind. In consequence whereof, in the absence of the mind's straying into other matters, direct intuition of the object of meditation necessarily takes place. Hence one-pointed-ness of mind is to be sought. Such is the meaning.

Thus has it been declared :

तदैवमात्मन्यवरुद्धचित्तो न वेद किञ्चिद्बहिरन्तरं वा ।
यथेषुकारो नृपतिं व्रजन्तम् इषौ गतात्मा न ददर्श पार्श्वे ॥

So, then, with his mind confined to the Self, he did not know anything, either external or internal ; just as the arrow-maker, with his soul wholly gone into an arrow, did not see the king passing at his side.—14.

Rules are not to be transgressed.

कृतनियमलङ्घनादानर्थक्यं लोकवत् ॥ ४ । १५ ॥

कृतनियमलङ्घनात् krita-niyama-laṅghanât, through transgression of enjoined rules. N. B. For "Krita," Aniruddha reads "Brata," a vow. अनर्थक्यं ânartha-kyam, failure of the object. लोकवत् loka-vat, as in the world.

15. Through transgression of enjoined rules, (there is) failure of the object,—just as in the world.—310.

Vritti :—The author declares that transgression of Vratas or austerities for the attainment of particular objects of desire, etc., which are intended for the purification of the Sattva, should not be made.

Just as in the world, every one abandons him who has broken the engagements made by him with most of them, so, through transgression

of Vratas, etc., a man becomes (lit. outside) incompetent to grasp the sense of the Veda.—15.

Bhâṣya :—So long there is ability, if a Yogin, relying upon the power of knowledge, needlessly transgresses the rules enjoined in the Sâstras, then, in his case, there is failure of the object in the shape of the perfect development of Knowledge ;—this the author states.

The rule that has been made in the Sâstras for the Yogins,—if there is a violation of it, then the object, called the perfect development of Knowledge, does not appear. "As in the world": just as in the world, where there is a transgression of the dietetics, etc., prescribed in medical treatises, etc., the respective objects aimed at are not produced ; similarily. Such is the meaning.

In the case of transgression, on the other hand, on account of inability or for the purpose of preserving knowledge, there is no obstruction to knowledge ; as is learnt from the Mokṣa-Dharma Section of the Mahâ-Bhârata, etc. For example :

अपेतव्रतकर्मा तु केवलं ब्रह्मणि स्थितः ।
ब्रह्मभूतश्चरन् लोके ब्रह्मचारीति कथ्यते ॥

But he who, leaving off the performance of austerities and pious acts, resting purely in Brahman, being like Brahman, moves in the world—he is called Brahma-Chârin (one living, moving, and having one's being in Brahman).—*Mahâ-Bhâratam.*

Note :—As to the sources of this and the following quotation, the readings of F. E. Hall and of Dr. Garbe are different. The former does not read the verse "Neither did he etc." at all, and reads Iti Mokṣa-Dharmâdibhyaḥ. Iti Vâsiṣṭhâdismṛitibhayḥ cha. The latter reads the two quoted verses together, and reads Ityâdi Anugîtâdivâkyebhyaḥ. We have, however, tried to reconcile these readings in the translation in what seemed to us to be the most reasonable manner.

There are, moreover, similar declarations in the Smṛiti of Vasiṣṭha, etc. ; for example :

न पपाठ गुरुप्रोक्तां कृतोपनयनः श्रुतिम् ।
न ददर्श च कर्माणि शास्त्राणि जगृहे न च ॥

Neither did he, after being invested with the sacred thread, read the Veda (as it was) recited by the preceptor, nor did he "see" the acts prescribed, nor did he receive the Sâstras.—Viṣṇu Purṇâ, II. xiii. 39.

It is for this reason that, in the Viṣṇu-Purâṇa, etc., only those who abandon karma or prescribed acts quite needlessly, that have been denounced as being Pâṣaṇḍas or heretics, by such expressions as:

पुंसां जटाधारणमौण्ड्यवतां वृथैव
मोघाशिनामविकशौचवहिष्कृतानाम् ।
पिण्डप्रदानपितृतोयविवर्जितानाम्
सम्भाषणादपि नरा नरकं प्रयान्ति ॥

Even through addressing men who needlessly carry matted locks on their heads, whose hopes are fruitless, who are excluded from all acts of purification, who have abandoned the offering of obsequial cakes and water to their deceased ancestors, men go to hell,—*Viṣṇu Purâṇa*,, III. xviii. 103.—15.

Forgetfulness of rules also is harmful : Story of the She-Frog.

तद्विस्मरणेऽपि भेकीवत् ॥ ४।१६ ॥

तद्विस्मरणे, tat-vismaraṇe, in the forgetting thereof, *i.e.*, of the rules. अपि api, also. भेकीवत् bhekî-vat, as in the story of the she-frog.

16. In the forgetting also of the rules, (there is the same harm),—as (in the story of) the she-frog.—311.

Vṛitti :—The author tells us that by reason of the forgetting of the knowledge of the Principles, pain necessarily takes place.

A certain king, going out on a hunting excursion, saw a beautiful maid in the woods. He asked her, "Who are you?" "I am a king's daughter," replied she. The king said, "Marry me:" "Very well," said she, "but make this rule that water must not be shown to me by you." "Let it be so,"—so saying, he took her hand. In this manner, as time went on, one day, she, being fatigued with sport, asked the king, "Where can I get water from?" The king, too, forgetting his promise, through haste, showed her water. And she, who was the daughter of the king of frogs, was, through touch of water, transformed as a she-frog. The king, on the other hand, searching for her by means of nets, etc., and, not regaining her, experienced much pain.

Therefore, interruption of the cultivation of the Principles should not be made.—16.

Bhâṣya :—The author tells us that there is failure of the object even in the forgetting of the rules,

This is easy.

Here the story of the she-frog is this : A certain king, who was out a-hunting, met with a fair damsel in the forest. And she, being sought by the king to be his wife, made this engagement : "Whenever water will be shown to me by you, I must go." But, on one occasion, being wearied with sport, she asked the king, "Where is water"? The king, too, forgetting the engagement, showed her water. Thereupon she, who was the daughter of the king of frogs and who could assume forms at will, becoming a she-frog, entered the water. Then the king, though he sought her by nets, etc., could not regain her.—16.

Vedântin Mahâdeva;—"Tat" (in the aphorism)—by this word is denoted knowledge of the Principles, because that was in the mind of the author.

Instruction is to be supplemented by reflection: Story of Indra and Virochana.

नोपदेशश्रवणेऽपि कृतकृत्यता परामर्शादृते विरोचनवत् ॥४।१७॥

न na, not. उपदेशश्रवणे upadeśa-śravaṇe, in the hearing of instruction. अपि api, even. कृतकृत्यता kṛita-kṛitya-tâ, the state of having what was to be done, done. परामर्शात् ऋते parâmarśât ṛite, without reflection or consideration. विरोचनवत् Virochana-vat, as in the case of Virochana.

17. Not even in the hearing of instruction (is there) fulfilment of the end, without reflection,—as in the case of Virochana.—312.

Vṛitti:—The author relates another story.

Not through mere hearing is there Release, but only through reflection. As, for example, Indra and Virochana went to the world of Brahmâ for the purpose of knowledge of the Principles, and were both instructed by Brahmâ. Virochana, after hearing the knowledge of the Principles, came back to his home and did no reflection, etc. Hence he was not released. While Indra, showing devotion to Brahmâ for a long time, did reflection.—17.

Note:—For an account of the student life of Indra and Virochana, see the eighth Prapâṭhaka of the Chhândogya Upaniṣat.

Bhâṣya:—The author mentions a historical instance, showing the necessity of an intelligent consideration also of the sayings of the preceptor, like that of their hearing.

"Parâmarśa" is a consideration determinative of the significance or import of the sayings of the preceptor. Without it, even from the hearing of the sayings of the preceptor, there is no certainty that knowledge of the Principles will result; since it is heard that, even though there was the hearing of instructions from Prajâpati (Lord of Creation, Brahmâ), Virochana, out of Indra and Virochana, erred by reason of the absence of reflection. Such is the meaning.

Hence reflection also is to be made of what is instructed by the preceptor.

It is, moreover, seen that, even now, of the self-same instruction:

तत्त्वमसि

Thou art that,

there is the possibility of being so interpreted as to convey manifold meanings, such as undivided-ness, non-difference characterised by non-possession of divergent properties, and non-division. (*Vide* Introduction.) —17.

Reflection also is seen.

दृष्टस्तयोरिन्द्रस्य ॥ ४ । १८ ॥

दृष्टः dṛiṣṭaḥ, seen. तयोः tayoḥ, of those two. इन्द्रस्य indrasya, of Indra.

18. Of those two, (reflection was) seen (in the case) of Indra.—313.

Vṛitti:—What happened to Indra?—it may be enquired. So the author says:

Out of those two, in the case of Indra, knowledge was seen, that is to say, through his pleasing Brahmâ, by means of long-continued cultivation, his was the success, through reflection, meditation and immediate intuition.—18.

Bhâṣya:—Hence is it that reflection also is seen;—this the author states:

By the word "tat" in "Tayoḥ" there is reference to the one mentioned (in aphorism 17) and the one now mentioned. Of those two, *i.e.*, out of Indra and Virochana, reflection was seen in the case of Indra. Such is the meaning.—18.

Time also is a factor in attaining Release.

प्रणतिब्रह्मचर्योपसर्पणानि कृत्वा सिद्धिर्बहुकालात्तद्वत् ॥४।१९॥

प्रणतिब्रह्मचर्योपसर्पणानि pranati-brahmacharya-upasarpanâṇi, obeisance, duties of a student-celibate, and attendance upon the preceptor. कृत्वा kṛit vâ, performing. सिद्धिः siddhiḥ, success. बहुकालात् bahu-kâlât, through a long period of time. तद्वत् tat-vat, as in his, *i.e.*, Indra's, case.

19. By performing obeisance, duties of a student-celibate, and attendance upon the preceptor, success (comes) after a long interval of time,—as in the case of Indra.—314.

Vṛitti:—And how, it may be asked, does the attainment of knowledge take place? To this the auther replies.

Of a person who is not obedient and not a student-celibate, there is unfitness (for knowledge of the Principles). "Tat-vat", as in the case of Indra: As by means of devotion to Brahmâ, knowledge was attained by Indra, so, by means of devotion to the preceptor, it may be by others also. —19.

Bhâṣya :—And by one who wishes to have complete knowledge, attendance upon the preceptor, for a long time, has, says the author, to be performed.

"Tat-vat", as in the case of Indra, so of another also, only by performing obeisance to the preceptor, study of the Veda, service to the preceptor, etc., "Siddhiḥ", manifestation of the truth about the Principles, takes place, and not otherwise. Such is the meaning.

And thus says the Śruti :

यस्य देवे परा भक्तिर्यथा देवे तथा गुरौ ।
तस्यैते कथिता ह्यर्थाः प्रकाशन्ते महात्मनः ॥

Who has supreme devotion to the deity, and, as to the deity, so to the preceptor, to him, of high soul, do these objects or realities, just now mentioned, manifest themselves.—*Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat, VI.* 23.—19.

There is no rule as to the limit of the time required.

न कालनियमो वामदेववत् ॥ ४ । २० ॥

न na, no. कालनियमः kâla-niyamaḥ, rule or limit of time. वामदेववत् vâmadeva-vat, as in the case of Vâmadeva.

20. (There is) no limitation of time,—as in the case of Vâmadeva.—315.

Vṛitti :—Is it that Release depends upon a rule of time and place? If that were so, then, there would not be, one may say, the relation of late and prompt release. In regard to this the author says :

The rule of time is for the sake of attendance upon the preceptor, and not for the sake of Release, because Release was seen to take place promptly in the case of Vâmadeva through the knowledge of the Principles (without any preliminary practice).—20.

Bhâṣya :—In respect of the arising of knowledge, there is no such rule of time as that it must take place through the means pertaining to the present existence only. "As in the case of Vâmadeva" : as, in the case of Vâmadeva, through the means pertaining to a previous existence, there was the arising of knowledge, even while he was still in the womb, so it may be in the case of another also. Such is the meaning.

So, then, there is the Śruti :

तद्धैतत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदेऽहं मनुरभवम् सूर्यश्चेति ।
तदिदमप्येतर्हि य एवं वेदाहं ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वं भवति ।

And seeing this the Seer Vâmadeva recovered memory that "I had been Manu and Sûrya also". So, then, therefore, he who knows sudhwise that "I am Brahman", becomes all this, etc.—*Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat*, I. iv. 10.

Expressions such as "I had been Manu" are directed to establish non-difference characterised by non-possession of divergent properties, or are directed to establish Brahma-hood called the character of being the pervader of all things, as it is remembered in the Smṛiti :

सर्वं समाप्नोषि ततोऽसि सर्वः

Thou reachest up to all things ; so art Thou the All.—Gîtâ, XI. 40.

While the expression "He becomes all this" is directed to show the absolute eradication of limitation caused by the Upâdhi or adjuncts.—20.

Note :—A fuller account of the history of Vâmadeva will be found in the fourth part of the fifth chapter of the Aitareya Upaniṣat.

Inferior means also are useful in their own way.

अध्यस्तरूपोपासनात् पारम्पर्येण यज्ञोपासकानामिव ॥ ४ । २१ ॥

अध्यस्तरूपोपासनात् adhyasta-rupa-upâsanât, through devotion to attributed or superimposed forms. पारम्पर्येण pâram-paryeṇa, by degrees ; intermediately. यज्ञोपासकानाम् yajna-upâsakânâm, in the case of those who devote themselves to sacrifices. इव iva, like.

21. Through devotion to attributed forms (of the deity, success may result) intermediately, as in the case of those who devote themselves to sacrifices.—316.

Vṛitti :—But certainly one can reflect upon a thing only if it is known ; whereas the Self has been seen by none whatever. And if it were seen, what need of reflection ?

Apprehending such an objection, the author says :

But by whom has Dharma or Merit been seen ? Yet, with a view to the acquisition of Merit, people undertake devotion to sacrifices, since they pour out clarified butter, "Pâram-paryeṇa", *i.e*, by reference to the deities. In our case also, through devotion to forms, similar to those that are attributed, these forms gradually manifest themselves. It is seen, also that recollection of similars takes place when there is a thought upon similar objects. Thus has it been said :

सदृशादृष्टचिन्ताद्याः स्मृतिबीजस्य बोधकाः।
अतो नातिप्रसङ्गोऽस्ति स्वप्नादौ भावनाबलात् ॥

Similars, Adṛiṣṭam, thinking, etc., are the germinators of the seed of memory. Hence, in dream and the like, there is no going too far, since there is the force of latent thought.—21.

Bhâṣya :—But, then, one may object, when it is heard that the worship of Saguṇa Brahman or Brahman as endowed with attributes or Brahman in manifestation, also is a cause of the development of knowledge, knowledge will result just from that ; what is the necessity, then,

of the practice of a hard and subtle process of Yoga? To this the author replies:

The word "Siddhiḥ" or success is understood from what has gone before. Through devotion to such Puruṣas as Brahmâ, Viṣṇu, Hara, etc., by means of the forms attributed to them, "Pâram-paryeṇa", *i.e.*, in the order of the attainment of the world of Brahmâ, etc., or, by means of the purification of the Sattva, there arises the perfect development of knowledge, and not immediately; as in the case of those who devote themselves to the sacrifices. Such is the meaning.—21.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—In Dhyâna or Meditation, the seeing or immediate cognition of truth is not required, but ony knowledge. And that is easy to gain gradually through the preceptor. Such is the import.

Other means fail to secure permanent Release.

इतरलाभेऽप्यावृत्तिः पञ्चाग्नियोगतो जन्मश्रुतेः ॥ ४ । २२ ॥

इतरलाभे Itara-lâbhe, when there is attainment of other ends. अपि api, even also. आवृत्तिः âvṛittiḥ, return. पञ्चाग्नियोगतः Pañcha-agni-yogataḥ, through the Five-Fire Yoga. जन्मश्रुतेः Janma-śruteḥ, because there is the Śruti about birth.

22. Moreover, after the attainment of other ends, there is a return to birth, (as we hear) from the Śruti of birth after the performance of the Five-Fire sacrifice.—317.

Vṛitti:—What is the need of knowledge of Self, it may be asked, for one whose end has been fulfilled through the attainment of the world of Brahmâ, etc.? To this the author replies:

Attainment of the world of Brahmâ is by means of the sacrifice of Agni-Hotra, etc. And what is produced by performance, decays. Hence there is Śruti on re-birth; *e.g.*,

यथेह कर्मजितो लोकः क्षीयते एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यजितो लोकः क्षीयते

As here the world conquered by action, is exhausted, so there too the world conquered by virtue, is exhausted.

न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन
त्यागे नैके अमृतत्वमानशुः

Neither by action, nor by progeny, nor by riches, but by renunciation, some attained immortality.—*Mahânârâyana Upanisat*. X. 5.—22.

Bhâṣya:—By means of the successive attainment, moreover, of the worlds of Brahmâ, etc., there is no certainty as to the perfect development of Knowledge. So the author says:

Even after the attainment of what is other than the attributeless Self, *i.e.*, of the attributed forms, ending with the world of Brahmâ, there

is a return. Whence? Since, even in the case of one gone to the world of Brahmâ by the Devayâna path, there is Śruti on re-birth from making five invocations or offerings to the five fires in the form of Heaven, Cloud, Earth, Man and Woman. Thus in the fifth Prapâṭhaka of the Chhândogya Upaniṣat:

असौ वाव लोको गौतमाग्निरित्यादि

That world, my child, O Gautama, is, the fire etc, -*Chhândogya Upaniṣat* V. iv. 1.

Such is the meaning.

Note:—The five fires are thus described in the fifth Prapâṭhaka of the Chhândogya Upaniṣat:

असौ वाव लोको गौतमाग्निस्तस्यादित्य एव समिद्रश्मयो धूमोऽहरर्चिश्चन्द्रमा अङ्गारा नक्षत्राणि विस्फुलिङ्गाः ॥ १ ॥ तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन्नग्नौ देवाः श्रद्धां जुह्वति तस्या आहुतेः सोमो राजा सम्भवति ॥ २ ॥ इति चतुर्थः खण्डः ॥

पर्जन्यो वाव गौतमाग्निस्तस्य वायुरेव समिदभ्रं धूमो विद्युदर्चिरशनिरङ्गाराह्रादुनयो विस्फुलिङ्गाः ॥ १ ॥ तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन्नग्नौ देवाः सोमं राजानं जुह्वति तस्या आहुतेर्वर्षं सम्भवति ॥ २ ॥ इति पञ्चमः खण्डः ॥

पृथिवी वाव गौतमाग्निस्तस्याः संवत्सर एव समिदाकाशो धूमोरात्रिरर्चिर्दिशोऽङ्गारा अवान्तरदिशो विस्फुलिङ्गाः ॥ १ ॥ तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन्नग्नौ देवा वर्षं जुह्वति तस्या आहुतेरन्नं सम्भवति ॥ २ ॥ इति षष्ठः खण्डः ॥

पुरुषो वाव गौतमाग्निस्तस्य वागेव समित्प्राणो धूमो जिह्वाऽर्चिश्चक्षुरङ्गाराः श्रोत्रं विस्फुलिङ्गाः ॥ १ ॥ तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन्नग्नौ देवा अन्नं जुह्वति तस्या आहुते रेतः सम्भवति ॥ २ ॥ इति सप्तमः खण्डः ॥

योषा वाव गौतमाग्निस्तस्या उपस्थ एव समिद्यदुपमन्त्रयते स धूमो योनिरर्चिर्यदन्तः करोति तेऽङ्गारा अभिनन्दा विस्फुलिङ्गाः ॥ १ ॥ तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन्नग्नौ देवा रेतो जुह्वति तस्या आहुतेर्गर्भः सम्भवति ॥ २ ॥ इत्यष्टमः खण्डः ॥

That world, my child, O Gautama, is the fire,—it is the Sun that is its fuel; the rays, the smoke; the daylight, the flame; the Moon, the embers; the stars, the sparks. 1.

In this, the same, fire, the Devas invoke Śraddhâ; from that invocation arises the King Soma. 2.—*Here ends the fourth Khaṇḍa.*

The Cloud, my child, O Gautama, is the fire,—it is the Air that is its fuel; the vapour, the smoke; the lightning, the flame; the thunder, the embers; the thunder-flashes, the sparks. 1.

In this, the same, fire, the Devas invoke the King Soma; from that invocation arises the rain. 2.—*Here ends the fifth Khaṇḍa.*

The Earth, my child, O Gautama, is the fire,—it is the full year that is its fuel; the night, the smoke; the night, the flame; the quarters, the embers; the intermediate quarters, the sparks. 1.

In this, the same, fire, the Devas invoke the rain; from that invocation arises the food. 2.—*Here ends the sixth Khaṇḍa.*

Man, my child, O Gautama, is the fire,—it is the Speech that is its fuel; the life-breath, the smoke; the tongue, the flame; the eye, the embers; the ear, the sparks. 1.

In this, the same, fire, the Devas invoke the food; from that invocation arises the genital fluid. 2.—*Here ends the seventh Khaṇḍa.*

Woman, my child, O Gautama, is the fire,—it is the.....1.

In this, the same, fire, the Devas invoke the genital fluid; from that invocation arises the embryo. 2.—*Here ends the eighth Khaṇḍa.*

The saying, again, about the non-return from the world of Brahmâ, has reference to such Puruṣas as have, in that very world, knowledge produced in them almost perfectly.—22.

Dispassion is the only means of knowledge: Story of the Swan and Milk.

विरक्तस्य हेयहानमुपादेयोपादानं हंसक्षीरवत् ॥ ४ । २३ ॥

विरक्तस्य Viraktasya, of the dispassionate. हेयहानम् Heya-hânam, avoidance of the avoidable. उपादेयोपादानं Upâdeya-upâdânam, acquirement of the acceptable. हंसक्षीरवत् Haṃsa-kśîra-vat, like the swan and milk.

23. In the case of the dispassionate, there is avoidance of what is to be avoided and acceptance of what is fit to be acquired,—as in the case of the swan and milk.—318.

Vṛitti:—What is the characteristic of the dispassionate?—one may ask. So the author says:

Although there is, with everybody, the avoidance of the avoidable and the acceptance of the acceptable, yet, it is to be observed that, according to the subject under consideration, Saṃsâra is the thing to be avoided, and Release is the thing to be accepted.—23.

Bhâṣya:—Perfect development of knowledge takes place in the case only of the dispassionate. In regard to this the author mentions an illustration.

Of the dispassionate only, there is the avoidance of things to be avoided, such as Prakriti, etc., and the acceptance of that which is to be accepted, *i.e.*, the Self. Just as, out of milk and water, formed into a mixture, by giving up the unessential water, the taking of the essential milk is possible for the swan only, but not for the crow, etc. Such is the meaning.—23.

Benefit of excellent company.

लब्धातिशययोगाद्वा तद्वत् ॥ ४ । २४ ॥

लब्धातिशययोगात् labdha-atiśaya-yogât, through association with one who has attained excellence. वा vâ, or. तद्वत् tat-vat, like that.

24. Or (this results) through association with those who have attained excellence,—as in the case thereof.—319.

Vṛitti:—The author gives the reason for this.

As in the case of the swan, —only to the swan belongs the exceeding power whereby it drinks the milk, though it is mixed with water, and gives up the water. So by a man who has attained excellence, Saṃsâra is avoided and Release can be acquired.—24.

Bhâṣya :—Both these (*i. e.* avoidance of the avoidable and acceptance of the acceptable) may also, says the author, take place through association with those who have attained excellence.

Also through association with him by whom "atiśaya" or the extreme limit of knowledge has been attained, the above-mentioned may take place, just in the same way as in the case of the swan. Such is the meaning. For example, in the case of Alarka, Discrimination of itself appeared in him, simply through his association with Dattâtreya.—24.

Association with worldly-minded people is not to be made:
Story of the Parrot.

न कामचारित्वं रागोपहते शुकवत् ॥ ४ । २५ ।

न na, not. कामचारित्वं kâma-châritvam, conduct springing from desire. रागोपहते râga-upahate, in respect of one overpowered with desire. शुकवत् Śuka-vat, like the parrot.

25. Wanton association with those who are overpowered with passion, is not to be made,—as is the case with the parrot.—320.

Vṛitti :—It may be thought that, even of one struck with Desire, there will be Release. So the author says:

Of one struck with Desire or Attachment there is not even (such a lower yogic perfection as) the power of free movement ; how, then, can there be Release ? For example, of Vyâsa, who had Attachment in him, there was no Release ; while, in the case of his son, Śuka, because he was dispassionate, Release took place. So will it be in other cases.—25.

Note:—"Kâma-châritvam": Aniruddha takes the word in its technical sense of the power of free movement which is one of the eight Siddhis or supernatural powers one may acquire by the practice of Yoga. "Śuka" according to Aniruddha does not mean the parrot here, but denotes the celebrated Śuka, the son of Vyâsa, and narrator of the *Śrîmad-Bhâgvatam.*

Bhâṣya :—The author tells us that association with those who possess Attachment is not to be made.

With a person influenced by Attachment, association out of desire should not be made. As is the case with the parrot : Just as the parrot, thinking "I possess a beautiful form", does not move about at random out of the fear of confinement by those who are covetous of beautiful objects, similarly. Such is the meaning.—25.

Metaphor of the parrot further continued.

गुणयोगाद्बद्धः शुकवत् ॥ ४ । २६ ॥

गुणयोगात् guṇa-yogât, through connection with Guṇa. N. B. Here there is a pun on the word Guṇa, which means the Guṇas, Sattva, etc., and also a rope. बद्धः baddhaḥ, bound. शुकवत् Śuka-vat, like the parrot.

26. Through connection with Guṇa, (one is) bound, like the parrot.—321.

Vritti:—Wherefore is Bondage?—in regard to this, the author says:

Just as the bird, parrot, obtains bondage through connection with a cord, so too does man obtain bondage through connection with the Guṇas, Sattva, etc.—26.

Bhâṣya:—In association with those who have Attachment in them, there is, on the contrary, harm, as the author says:

In association with them, on the contrary, "Guṇa-yogât", through connection with Attachment, etc., belonging to them, one will be bound. Just "like the parrot": As the parrot becomes bound by the Guṇas or cords of the hunter, similarly. Such is the meaning.

Or, the meaning may be that, by reason of his possessing qualities, he may be bound by those who are covetous of qualities.

On this very subject has it been said by Saubhari:

स मे समाधिर्जलवासमित्र-
मत्सस्य सङ्गात् सहसैव नष्टः ।
परिग्रहः सङ्गकृतो ममाऽयम्
परिग्रहोत्थाश्च महाविचित्साः ॥

That Meditation of mine, through association with the fish whom I met as a friend during my residence under water, has, all of a sudden, deserted me. This acquisition (of a family) by me was caused by association. And all great exertions of mine sprang from acquisition.—*Viṣṇu Purâṇa*, IV. ii. 48.—26.

Means of appeasing Passion: not through experience.

न भोगाद्रागशान्तिर्मुनिवत् ॥ ४ । २७ ॥

न na, not. भोगात् bhogât, through Experience or enjoyment. रागशान्तिः râga-śântiḥ, appeasement of Passion or Attachment. मुनिवत् muni-vat, as in the case of the Muni Saubhari.

27. Not through Bhoga is the appeasement of Passion, as (it was not) in the case of the Muni.—322.

Vritti :—Through Bhoga itself, it may be said, there will be Dispassion under the influence of time: what need of knowledge? In regard to this the author says:

Not, even in the case of a Muni, is there appeasement of Passion, through Bhoga; not to speak of others. The cases of Kaṇva, Saubhari, etc., are instances in point.—27.

Bhâsya :—The author determines the means also of Dispassion by the two aphorisms:

Just as in the case of the Muni, Saubhari, there was no appeasement of Passion through Bhoga, so in the case of others also, it is not. Such is the meaning.

So has it been said by Saubhari himself:

आ मृत्युतो नैव मनोरथाना-
मन्तोऽस्ति विज्ञातमिदं मयाऽद्य।
मनोरथासक्तिपरस्य चित्तम्
न जायते वै परमार्थसक्ति॥

It has been learnt by me to-day that, even unto death, there verily is no end of desires. Verily does not the mind of one absorbed in attachment to desires, grow associated with transcendental objects.—*Viṣṇu Purâṇa*, IV. ii. 47—27.

But through seeing the faults of Prakṛiti.

दोषदर्शनादुभयोः ॥ ४ । २८ ॥

दोषदर्शनात् doṣa-darśanât, through seeing the faults. उभयोः ubhayoḥ, of both Prakṛiti and her products.

28. (Appeasement of Passion takes place) through seeing the faults of both (Prakṛiti and her products).—323.

Vritti :—In the case of worldly people (who are attached to the things of the world), how, it may be asked, will Dispassion arise? To this the author replies:

"Ubhayoḥ," of the Self as well as of the Object The fault of the Self is such as falling into hell through association, dwelling in the womb, etc. Fault of the Object is such as transformation, dryness, etc.—28.

Bhâṣya :—Moreover:

Only through seeing the faults such as of being transformable, of being essentially painful, etc., "Ubhayoḥ", *i.e.*, of Prakṛiti and her products, does the appeasement of Passion take place, as in the case of the Muni. Such is the meaning. For, in the case of Saubhari, it is

heard, dispassion towards association took place only through his seeing the faults of association. Thus:

दुःखं यदेवैकशरीरजन्म
शताद्धसंख्यं तदिदं प्रसूतम् ।
परिग्रहेण क्षितिपात्मजानां
सूतैरनेकैर्बहुलीकृतं तत् ॥

What was in itself a single pain, namely, birth in a body, that has now given birth to one hundred and fifty pains, by means of (Saubhari's) marrying the (same number of) girls of the fish-king, and that, again, has been multiplied by means of innumerable sons.—*Vishṇu Purâṇa*, IV. ii. 49.—28.

Faults disqualify even for instruction: Story of King Aja.

न मलिनचेतस्युपदेशबीजप्ररोहोऽजवत् ॥ ४ । २९ ॥

न na, not. मलिनचेतसि malina-chetasi, in a man of impure mind. उपदेशबीजप्ररोहः upadeśa-bîja-prarohaḥ, sprouting of the seed of instruction. अजवत् aja-vat, as in the case of Aja.

29. Neither does the seed of instruction sprout in a man of impure mind,—as in the case of Aja.—324.

Vṛitti:—The author declares the man who is incompetent to receive instruction.

Just as, in an undressed field, the seed does not sprout, so, in a mind rendered impure by means of Passion, etc., the seed of instruction does not sprout. "Aja-vat": just as in the king, named Aja, while he was afflicted with grief at the loss of his wife, the instruction given by Vasiṣṭha, did not stay.—29.

Bhâṣya:—The author tells us that one who is influenced by Passion and other faults, is unfit even to receive instruction.

What is, in the form of instruction, the seed of the tree of knowledge, of that, even the sprout is not produced in a mind rendered impure by Passion and the like. "Aja-vat": Just as in the case of the king, Aja by name, whose mind was rendered impure by grief at the loss of his wife, the sprout was not produced of the seed of instruction even when it was given by Vasiṣṭha. Such is the meaning.—29.

Faults further condemned.

नाभासमात्रमपि मलिनदर्पणवत् ॥ ४ । ३० ॥

न Na, not. आभासमात्रं Âbhâsa-mâtram, mere reflection. अपि Api, even. मलिनदर्पणवत् Malina-darpana-vat, as in the case of a rusty mirror.

30. Not even a mere reflection (of the instruction is produced in an impure mind)—just as in the case of a rusty mirror.—325.

Vritti :—The author states that in a mind rendered impure by Passion and the like, not even a reflection of knowledge appears.

Just as, in a dirty mirror, not even a semblance of the face is reflected ; so, because the Self is reflected in Prakriti, knowledge of the Self is an effect of Prakriti.—30.

Bhâṣya :—What need of more ?

Even a superficial knowledge is not produced, through instruction, in an impure mind, on account of the obstruction arising from its wandering into other objects, etc. Just as, on account of the obstruction caused by means of dirts, an object is not reflected in a dirty mirror, similarly. Such is the meaning.—30.

Knowledge is not necessarily perfect knowledge.

न तज्जस्यापि तद्रूपता पङ्कजवत् ॥ ४ । ३१ ॥

न Na, not. तज्जस्य Tat-ja-sya, of what is produced therefrom. अपि Api, even. तद्रूपता Tat-rupa-tâ, similarity of form therewith. पङ्कजवत् Paṇkaja-vat, as in the case of the clay-born lotus.

31. Moreover, what is produced from another thing, may not have similarity of form with that thing,—as in the case of the clay-born (lotus).—326.

Vritti:—But, then, let Mahat itself, it may be said, because it is of the form of the cause, be the Self. In regard to this the author says :

An effect itself cannot be the same as the cause, because there is a difference. For, the clay-born (lotus) itself is not the clay.—31.

Vedântin Mahâdeva —Just as the characteristics, *e.g.*, of being the creator of the elements and the elementals, belonging to the products of Prakṛiti, constitute Saṃsâra or mundane existence, so, it may be said, will it be the case with Release also which too is a product of Prakṛiti. In regard to this the author says :

Just as the lotus, though it is produced from the clay, is not of the same form as clay, so Release, though it is a product of Prakṛiti, is not of the form of Saṃsâra, because there is a distinction by means of the touch of pain being absent from it.

Bhâṣya :—Or, if, by some means or other, knowledge be produced (in an impure mind), yet it may not be, says the author, in accordance with the instruction.

Though produced therefrom, *i.e.*, from the instruction, knowledge does not (necessarily) possess similarity of form with the instruction, because (of the possibility) of its not being understood in its entirety.

"Pankaja-vat": Just as, in spite of the excellence of the seed, on account of the fault of the clay, the lotus which springs from the clay, does not possess the form in exact accordance with the seed, similarly. Such is the meaning.

Here the mind of the disciple is compared to the lotus-bed or clay.—31.

Release is above Lordliness.

न भूतियोगेऽपि कृतकृत्यतोपास्यसिद्धिवदुपास्यसिद्धिवत् ॥४।३२॥

न Na, not. भूतियोगे Bhûti-yoge, in connection with, or attainment of, lordliness or power. अपि Api, even. कृतकृत्यता Kṛita-kritya-tâ, the state or condition of one by whom what was to be done, has been done. उपास्यसिद्धिवत् Upâsya-siddhi-vat, like the success or attainment of the objects of worship.

32. Not, even on the attainment of lordliness, is the fulfilment of the end,—as is the case with the success of the objects of worship, as is the case with the success of the obejcts of worship.—327.

Vṛitti:—Even in the case of those who have been successful in the attainment of the supernatural powers of Attenuation, etc., there is, says the author, no ultimate success.

As there is the ultimate success on account of non-return to the world, in the case of one who has become successful (siddha) by reason of the attainment of the knowledge of the Principles by means of attendance upon the preceptor, so is it not the case by reason of connection with, or attainment of, supernatural powers, because of coming back again to the world.

The repetition of "As is the case with the success of the objects of worship" is to indicate the close of the Book.—32.

Here ends the Fourth Book, of Fables, in the Vṛitti on the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram of Kapila.

Bhâṣya:—But, then, since the object desired by Puruṣa is accomplished just by the attainment of lordliness in the world of Brahmâ, etc., to what purpose, it may be asked, is the development of knowledge, with so much toil, for the sake of Release? To this the author replies:

Though there is the attainment of lordliness or power, yet there is not "Kṛita-kṛitya-tâ," the state or condition of having the object fulfilled, since it (the attainment of power) is affected by waste, excess, and pain. "Upâsya-siddhi-vat": Just as in the case of the objects of worship,

namely, Brahmâ and others, though there is attainment of success or perfection, yet there is not the condition of having the object accomplished, because it is heard that they too, in the state of the sleep of Yoga, etc., continue the practice of Yoga; even so is it the case also with those who, by worshipping them, have attained the lordliness or power appertaining to them (and which was consequently all that they could bestow on their devotees).

The repetition of "As is the case with the success of the objects of worship" is to mark the close of the Book.—32.

In the present Book has been briefly mentioned, by means of fables, the intimate associates of Discrimination which has been declared in the (first) three Books.

Here ends the Fourth Book, of Fables, in the Commentary composed by Vijñaña Bhikṣu on the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram of Kapila.

Book V.

OF THE DEMOLITION OF COUNTER-THEORIES.

INTRODUCTION.

Vritti:—After the Fables, for the purpose of the refutation of opposite doctrines, is made the origination of the Fifth Book.

Bhâṣya:—The doctrines of the author's own system or Śâstra have been completely established. After this, with a view to refute the Pûrva-Pakṣas or *primâ facie* objections thrown by others into his own Sâstra, the Fifth Book is commenced. Therein, at the outset, he meets the allegation that the Maṅgala or auspicious observance that has been performed by means of the word "Atha" in the first aphorism (I. 1, q. v.), is useless.

Performance of Maṇgala *is necessary.*

मङ्गलाचरणं शिष्टाचारात् फलदर्शनाच्छ्रुतितश्चेति ॥ ५ । १ ॥

मङ्गलाचरणं Maṅgala-âcharaṇam, performance of the Maṅgala or auspicious observance. शिष्टाचारात् Śiṣṭa-âchârât, according to the practice of the cultured. फलदर्शनात् Phala-darśanât, from seeing the fruit. श्रुतितः Śruti-taḥ, from the Śruti. च Cha, also. इति Iti, the end.

1. Performance of Maṅgala (is established) from the practice of the cultured, from seeing the fruit, and also from the Śruti.—328.

Vritti:—Hereby is discarded what is maintained by those by whom it is said that Maṅgala is perfectly useless when it is seen that, (in some cases) though the Maṅgala was performed, the book is not completed and that, (in other cases) though no Maṅgala was performed, the book is completed.—1.

Note.—For a fuller statement of what is here briefly hinted at, see Vaiśeṣika Sûtram, I. i. 1, *Upaskâra.*

Bhâṣya:—Performance of Maṅgala that has been made—of that the necessity of being performed is proved by means of these evidences. Such is the meaning.

The word "Iti" has been used with the object of removing expectation of any other reason for it.—1.

Îśvara as the Creator of the World, is not proved.

नेश्वराधिष्ठिते फलनिष्पत्तिः कर्मणा तत्सिद्धेः ॥ ५ । २ ॥

न Na, not. ईश्वराधिष्ठिते Îśvara-adhiṣṭhite, in that which is superintended or presided over by Îśvara. फलनिष्पत्तिः Phala-niṣpattiḥ, production or resulting of fruits or consequences of acts. कर्मणा Karmaṇâ, by means of Karma or Adriṣṭam. तत्सिद्धेः Tat-siddheḥ, because of the proof of it.

2. Not because (the cause is) directed by Îśvara, (that there is) the resulting of fruits, because the production thereof (takes place) by means of Karma.—329.

Vṛitti :—The non-existence (a-sattvam) of Îśvara has been established before. The author now states the argument (nyâya):

Were Îśvara an independent creator, he would create even without (the aid of) Karma, (but that is not so). If you say that he creates, having Karma as an auxiliary; then let Karma itself be (the cause), what need of Îśvara? Nor can an auxiliary obstruct the power of the principal agent, since, in that case, there would be a contradiction of its independence.

Moreover, activity is seen to proceed from egoistic and altruistic motives. Neither can any egoistic motive belong to Îśvara. And were his motives altruistic, then, he being compassionate, there would be no justification for a creation which is full of pain. Nor is there any activity which is purely altruistic, because such activity proceeds from a desire for selfish gain even by means of doing good to others, etc.

Therefore, let Karma alone be the cause of the world.—2.

Bhâṣya :—There are Pûrva-pakṣins or opponents who maintain that what has been declared before, namely,

ईश्वरासिद्धेः

Because Îśvara is not a subject of proof.—*S. P. S. I. 92.*

—that is not justified, because there *is* proof of Îśvara by means of his being the giver of the fruits of acts.

The author refutes them.

When the cause is superintended by Îśvara, there is the resulting of the transformation in the shape of the fruit of acts,—this is not proper, because of the possibility of the resulting of fruits by means alone of the necessary Karma. Such is the meaning.—2.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—When the cause is superintended by Îśvara, there is the production of the effect, since it is seen that in clay, etc., superintended by the potter, etc., there is the production of the jar, etc.

This view the author discredits.

Does Îśvara create by depending upon Karma or does he create by not depending upon it? In the former case, let Karma alone be the cause, and not Îśvara. In the latter case, there will be contradiction to his independence. Further, is the activity of Îśvara egoistic or is it altruistic? It is not the former, because it is postulated (in the very conception of Îśvara) that all his desires have been fulfilled. It is not the latter, since there is no reason for his activity in a painful creation, when he is compassionate.

Îśvara, *as the Moral Governor of the World, is not proved.*

स्वोपकारादधिष्ठानं लोकवत् ॥ ५ । ३ ॥

स्वोपकारात् Sva-upakârât, because of his own benefit. अधिष्ठानं Adhiṣṭhânam, superintendence. लोकवत् Loka-vat, as in the world, like that of man.

3. Because of his own benefit, (Îśvara's) superintendence (will be) like that of man.—330.

Vṛitti:—The author shows this (that all activity is ultimately selfish).

Nor does personal benefit exist consistently with him who is eternal. —3.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—The author, moreover, shows that whoever superintends the cause, does so only for his own benefit, and that, similarly, it will be so also in the case of Îśvara.

In "Sva-upakârât" which is the fruit (of superintendence), the fifth case-ending has been used in the sense of cause or reason.

Bhâṣya:—By a number of aphorisms the author shows that even to be the giver of fruits is not possible in the case of Îśvara.

Were Îśavra to be the superintendent, since it would be only for the sake of subserving his own end, the superintendence will be like that of man. Such is the meaning.—3.

Above continued.

लौकिकेश्वरवदितरथा ॥ ५ । ४ ॥

लौकिकेश्वरवत् Laukika-îśvara-vat, like the human lord. इतरथा Itara-thâ, otherwise.

4. Otherwise, (Îśvara will be) like the human lord. —331.

Vṛitti:—But the opponent may say that there will be no harm if (Îśvara's) own benefit be the motive of his superintendence. In regard to this the author says:

(Îśvara, in that case, will be) non-omniscient (which is not desirable). Such is the meaning.—4.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—"Itara-thâ," on the admission of his own benefit, "Laukika-îśvara-vat," as in the case of the human lord, there will be the implication of his not having attained all his desires.

Bhâṣya:—Let there be the benefit of Îśvara also, it may be said; what is the harm?

Apprehending such a rejoinder, the author says:

On the admission of the benefit of Îśvara also, he too, like the human lord, will be Saṁsârî, *i.e.*, revolving on the wheel of the world, because, by reason of his desires not having been fulfilled, there will be the implication of pain, etc. Such is the meaning.—4.

Above continued.

पारिभाषिको वा ॥ ५ । ५ ॥

पारिभाषिकः Pâribhâṣikaḥ, technical, nominal. वा Vâ, or.

5. (Otherwise, Îśvara will be like the human lord), or nominal.—332.

Vṛitti:—The author points out another defect in the opponent's view.

By reason of the falling of the shadow of Prakṛiti, through her being the doer, arises the idea: It is the Self that is the doer. Hence is its name of Îśvara. This is a form of nomenclature.—5.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—Were Îśvara different in character from the human lord, then he will be just the technical Îśvara of the Sâṁkhya System;—this is what the author says.

"Vâ" has been used in the sense of "Eva" or certainty.

Bhâṣya:—Just so let it be, it may be said. Apprehending this the author says:

Inspite of the existence of worldly life, were he still to be Îśvara, then "Îśvara" will, as with us, so with you also, be a mere technical name to denote the Puruṣa who is produced at the beginning of Creation; because, owing to the contradiction of being worldly and of having unobstructed will, eternal Îśvara-hood will not be proved. Such is the meaning.—5.

Above continued.

न रागादृते तत्सिद्धिः प्रतिनियतकारणत्वात् ॥ ५ । ६ ॥

न Na, not. रागादृते RAgâtrite, without passion or attachment. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, accomplishment of it, *i.e.*, superintendence. प्रतिनियतकारणत्वात् Prati-niyata-kâraṇa-tvât, being the invariable and unconditional cause.

6. Without Râga or passion, superintendence is not established, because Râga is the invariable and unconditional cause in all activity.—333.

Vritti:—The author adduces another reason.

In the case of the wandering away or failure of the cause which never exists without relation to the effect, there will be the negation of expectation everywhere. And Râga is the efficient cause of activity. Hence, without it, how (can it be possible for Îśvara) to be the maker of the world? Nor does Râga belong to one who is released (such as the supposed Îśvara must be).—6.

Bhâṣya:—The author mentions another hindrance to Îśvara's being the superintendent.

Moreover, without Râga, to be the superintendent is not established, because Râga is the invariable cause in the case of activity. Such is the meaning.

"Upakâra" (in V. 3) is the accomplishment of the object desired. Whereas "Râga" is intense desire. Thus there is no tautology.—6.

Râga *cannot exist in* Îśvara.

तद्योगेऽपि न नित्यमुक्तः ॥ ५ । ७ ॥

तद्योगे Tat-yoge, in the case of connection with that, *i. e.*, Râga. अपि Api, even, again. न Na, not. नित्यमुक्तः Nitya-muktaḥ, eternally released or free.

7. On (the admission), again, (of) connection with Râga, (he will) not (be) eternally free.—334.

Vritti:—Certainly Râga will exist (in Îśvara), it may be said. In regard to this the author says:

("Tat-yoge'pi"), on the connection of Râga, again.—7.

Bhâṣya:—Well, that being so, let, it may be said, there be Râga also in Îśvara. To this, the author replies:

While, again, the connection of Râga is admitted, he will not be eternally free; and thence also is your doctrine injured. Such is the meaning.—7.

The condition of Îśvara *cannot arise through connection with the power of* Prakṛiti.

प्रधानशक्तियोगाच्चेत् सङ्गापत्तिः ॥ ५ । ८ ॥

प्रधानशक्तियोगात् Pradhâna-śakti-yogât, through connection with the power of Prakṛiti. चेत् Chet, if. सङ्गापत्तिः Saṅga-âpattiḥ, implication of association or attachment.

8. If (you say that the condition of being Îśvara arises) through connection with the powers of Prakṛiti, (then there will be) the implication of (his) attachment.—335.

Vṛitti:—Through connection with the powers of Prakṛiti, it may be said, there will be the agency (of the Self). In regard to this, the author says:

(Says the Śruti).

असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः

Verily is this Puruṣa free from attachment.—*Bṛihat Araṇyaka Upaniṣat*, IV, iii. 16.

Of this there will be the implication of contradiction.—8.

Bhâṣya:—Moreover, the condition of being Îśvara, in regard to Prakṛiti, cannot be possible by means of desire, etc., which are just the transformations of Prakṛiti; since, in that case, there will be the fault of mutual dependence: the energising of Prakṛiti after the production of desire, and desire, etc., after the activity of Prakṛiti. Eternal desire, etc., on the other hand, are not appropriate in the case of Prakṛiti, as, on that supposition, there will not be established her state of equilibrium, as proved in the Śruti and the Smṛiti. Hence two other modes (in which the condition of being Îśvara may appear in the Self) are left. They are: (1) Does the condition of being Îśvara arise just through direct connection with the Chetana or the intelligent principle, of desire, etc., which are admitted by us as being the attributes or properties of Prakṛiti? Or, (2) does it arise through her being the mover to activity merely by means of her proximate existence, as in the case of the loadstone?*

Of these two, the author discredits the first alternative.

Through connection, with Puruṣa, of the powers of Prakṛiti, *viz.*, desire, etc., there will be the implication of attachment of attributes in Puruṣa also; and so there will be contradiction of such declarations in the Śruti as:

स यदत्र पश्यत्यनन्वागतस्तेन भवति ।
असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः ॥

Whatever he sees here, cannot enter into him, for he, Puruṣa, is free from all attachment.—*Bṛihat Araṇyaka Upaniṣat*, IV. iii. 16.

Such is the meaning.—8.

* F. E. Hall reads the whole of this paragraph as forming the concluding portion of the Commentary on the preceding aphorism. Garbe reads half of it there, that is, "Moreover,..... Smṛiti", and the remaining half at the beginning of the Commentary on the present aphorism. None of these readings is correct. The passage "Moreover,..... Smṛiti" has no more textual relevancy under the preceding aphorism than has the other passage beginning with "hence".

The condition of being Îśvara cannot arise through vicinity of Prakṛiti.

सत्तामात्राच्चेत् सर्वैश्वर्यम् ॥ ५ । ९ ॥

सत्तामात्रात् Sattâ-mâtrât, through mere existence. चेत् Chet, if. सर्वैश्वर्यम् Sarva-aiśva-ryam, condition of being Îśvara in all cases.

9. If (it be said that the condition of being Îśvara may arise) through the mere existence (of Prakṛiti by the side of Puruṣa), (then) the condition of being Îśvara (will belong) to all (Puruṣas).--336.

Vṛitti:—Not that association with Prakṛiti (is desired), it may be said; but by the mere existence of Prakṛiti there will appear agency in Puruṣa. In regard to this the author says:

Since there is no distinction in the existence of Prakṛiti in relation to all Selves, all Selves will be Îśvaras.—9.

Bhâṣya:—In regard to the second alternative, the author says:

Were the condition of being Îśvara to arise by the mere existence of Prakṛiti in the vicinity, just as in the case of the loadstone, then, is established exactly what is intended by us, namely, the condition of being Îśvara belonging, without distinction, to all whatever, that is to say, to Puruṣas who are the experiencers in respective creations; because it is only through conjunction with the whole lot of experiencers that Prakṛiti creates things beginning with Mahat. And thence, "There is but one Îśvara"—this tenet of yours is lost. Such is the meaning.—9.

There is no proof of an eternal Îśvara.

प्रमाणाभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ५ । १० ॥

प्रमाणाभावात् Pramâṇa-abhâvât, on account of non-existence of proof. न Na, no. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, establishment thereof, *i.e.*, of an eternal Îśvara.

10. On account of the non-existence of evidence, (there is) no proof of an eternal Îśvara.—337.

Vṛitti:—But, then, there are means (of proving the existence) of (one eternal) Îśvara. How, then, it may be asked, can this be so (that all Selves are Îśvaras)? In regard to this the author says:

On account of the non-existence of perceptual proof or evidence of sense-perception.—10.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—"Tat-siddiḥ", proof of the existence of Îśvara. Because the non-existence of the evidence of sense-perception is well-known.

Bhâṣya :—It might be so, rejoins our opponent; but, by reason of their conflict with the proofs demonstrative of Îśvara, these are nothing but invalid arguments; otherwise, the existence of Prakṛiti also is capable of being obstructed by means of thousands of similar invalid reasonings.

To this the author replies:

"Tat-siddhiḥ", the establishment of an eternal Îśvara. In respect of Îśvara, to be sure, there is no evidence of sense-perception. Hence Inference and Testimony must be intended to be the proofs supposed here, and they are not possible. Such is the meaning.—10.

Inference of Îśvara *is impossible.*

सम्बन्धाभावान्नानुमानम् ॥ ५ । ११ ॥

सम्बन्धाभावात् Sambandha-abhâvât, owing to the non-existence of the relation, *i.e.*, the pervasion (vyâpti) of one thing by another, that is to say, the general proposition. न Na, no. अनुमानम् Anumânam, inference.

11. Owing to the non-existence of the Vyâpti or pervasion, (there is) no inference (of Îśvara).—338.

Vṛitti:—It may be said that there will be inference (of the existence of Îśvara). In regard to this, the author says:

Since Vyâpti or the general proposition as to the pervasion of one thing by another or their universal going together, must have sense-perception to precede it, in the absence thereof (as stated in the preceding aphorism), how can there be the apprehension of the universal relation? Neither can there be the apprehension of the universal relation in the case of an uncommon thing—11.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—"Sambandha-abhâvât": on account of the non-existence of vyâpti.

Bhâṣya:—By means of two aphorisms the author demonstrates their impossibility.

"Sambandhaḥ" is Vyâpti or pervasion; "Abhâvaḥ" is non-establishment. So that, by reason of the fact that Îśvara's being the thing to be pervaded, (that is, the middle term of the syllogism), is not established, inasmuch as he (*i.e.*, knowledge of him) is not required to cause inference in such cases as "Mahat and the rest must-have-a-cause, because they are effects", etc., there can be no inference in respect of Îśvara. Such is the meaning.—11.

Note.—Vyâpti is the principle of inference. Its operation may be seen from the following illustration:

Pratijñâ :—The mountain contains fire;

Hetu :—Because there is smoke in it;

Udâharaṇa :—Whatever possesses smoke, possesses fire, *e.g.*, such as the kitchen hearth;

Upanaya :—The mountain also possesses smoke which is pervaded by fire;

Nigamana :—Therefore, it contains fire.

Now let us put the ontological argument in favour of the existence of Îśvara into the form of the above syllogism, and see what is wanting.

Thus,

Pratijñâ :—The Creation must have Îśvara as its cause;

Hetu :—Because it is an effect;

Udâharaṇa :—Whatever is an effect, has Îśvara as its cause;

Upanaya :—The Creation also is an effect which is pervaded by a cause;

Nigamana :—Therefore, it must have Îśvara as its cause;

It will at once be seen that the argument is defective. The Vyâpti which is the principle of inference in the present case, is that whatever is an effect has Îśvara as its cause But such a principle can never be established, because an instance of it (*i. e.*, an effect being actually created by Îśvara) has never been observed. And if the principle of inference fails, the whole argument, of course, necessarily falls to the ground.

There is no Śabda *in regard to* Îśvara *as Creator.*

श्रुतिरपि प्रधानकार्यत्वस्य ॥ ५ । १२ ॥

श्रुतिः Śrutiḥ, Śruti, Vedic declarations. अपि Api, also. प्रधानकार्यत्वस्य Pradhâna-kârya-tva-sya, of being the product of Prakṛiti. N. B. Aniruddha does not read "tva," "being."

12. The Śruti also (speaks of the web of creation) being the product of Prakṛiti.—339.

Vṛitti :—It may be said that there will be Śabda or Word proof (of the existence of Îśvara). In regard to this, the author says :

There is the Śruti :

प्रधानाज्जगदुत्पद्यते ।

From Prakṛiti is the world produced.— *Source not traced.*

Therefore, the proofs demonstrative of the existence of Îśvara are apparent and not real.—12.

Bhâṣya :—Nor is there Śabda or Verbal Testimony, also, says the author.

In respect of the web of creation, there exists Śruti or Vedic declaration of its being the product of Prakṛiti, but not of its having an intelligent being as its cause. For example :

अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः ।
(कृष्णोऽसेको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः) ॥

(One Unborn (Puruṣa), for enjoyment, consorts with) One Unborn (Prakṛiti), having the colours of red, white, and black, the procreatrix of manifold progeny like unto herself. (The other Unborn deserts her, after she has been enjoyed).—*Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat*, IV. 5.

तद्धेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत् तन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याक्रियते

Verily, that, the same, was then undifferentiated; it is differentiated by means of name and form.—*Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat*, I. iv. 7.

Such is the meaning.

What Śruti, on the other hand, exists about an intelligent entity's being the cause; *viz.*

तदैक्षत बहु स्याम्

It looked up, "I shall be many."—*Chhândogya Upaniṣat*, VI. ii. 3,

that has reference (not to the innate and eternal knowledge of an eternal Îśvara, but) to the knowledge which is capable of being produced in the Mahâ Puruṣa or Great Puruṣa produced at the beginning of creation and having the Principle Mahat as his Upâdhi or external investment. Or, having regard to the being many, the Śruti may be said to have a secondary reference to Prakṛiti herself; as is the case with "The banks of the river are *desiring* (about) to fall down"; since, otherwise, will not be proved in Puruṣa that character of not undergoing transformation which is declared by such Śrutis as:

साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च ॥

(Puruṣa is) the witness, intelligent, alone, and devoid of attributes—*Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat*, VI. 11.

And it has been already explained (*vide* pages 6 and 143 *ante*) that this denial of Îśvara is a mere Praudi Vâda or bold assertion made with the object of evoking dispassion in respect of the condition of being Îśvara, and also with the object of demonstrating that there can be Release even without the knowledge of Îśvara. Otherwise, there would be redundancy in the supposition of the secondariness of the eternality, etc., of Îśvara, as differentiated from those of the Jîva or Incarnate Puruṣa; because Puruṣa's characteristics of being immutable, etc., are proved by the admission of the eternal knowledge, desire, etc., caused by the Upâdhis or external investments, as well as of the transformations beginning with Mahat. All this should be looked for in the Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ or Vedânta-Sûtram.—12.

Note:—The last portion of the Bhâṣya would seem to require an explanation. In order to maintain the character of immutability, etc., in regard to the Jîva, you have got to admit that eternal knowledge, will, etc., do not in reality belong to the Jîva, but are only adventitious to him, and are, in reality, the transformations of Mahat, etc. Now, were the disputed denial of Îśvara, a real one, then with Îśvara must also go eternal knowledge, will, etc., which would be contrary to fact as well as to theory. Therefore, you will have to distinguish between Îśvara and Jîva as regards the characteristics of eternal knowledge, will, etc., and to suppose that, while these are primary in the case of the Jîva, they are secondary in the case of the supposed Îśvara. &c.

Bondage is not due to A-vidyâ.

नाविद्याशक्तियोगो निःसङ्गस्य ॥ ५ । १३ ॥

न Na, not. अविद्याशक्तियोगः A-vidyâ-śakti-yogaḥ, connection with the power of A-vidyâ or False Knowledge. निःसङ्गस्य Niḥ-saṅga-sya, of him who is devoid of attachment.

13. No connection with the power A-vidyâ (there is) of him who is devoid of attachment.—340.

Vṛitti :—Some say that the agency of the Self arises through the connection of A-vidyâ. In regard to that, the author says :

It is clear.—13.

Bhâṣya :—It has been established, as a tenet, in the first Book, that Bondage does not result from A-vidyâ (*Vide* aphorism I. 20). Now, by a section, the author discredits the opposite view in the matter, in a detailed manner.

Others say : Pradhâna or Prakṛiti does not exist, but in the intelligent principle rests a power called the beginningless A-vidyâ, which is destructible by Knowledge. From this alone is the bondage of the intelligent, and, on the destruction of it, is Release.

In regard to this it is said : By reason of his being devoid of attachment, connection of the intelligent with the power of A-vidyâ directly is not possible. For A-vidyâ consists in being of the form of that in respect of what is not it ; and this is a particular modification (of the mind) and so, cannot possibly take place without attachment or association in the form of the conjunction which is the cause of modification. Such is the meaning.—13.

Above continued.

तद्योगे तत्सिद्धावन्योन्याश्रयत्वम् ॥ ५ । १४ ॥

तद्योगे Tat-yoge, on connection with that, *i.e.*, A-vidyâ. तत्सिद्धौ Tat-siddhau, there being establishment of that, *i.e.*, A-vidyâ. अन्योन्याश्रयत्वम् Anyonya-âśraya-tvam, the characteristic of being mutually dependent

14. In (the supposition of) the establishment of A-vidyâ through connection with A-vidyâ, (there will be the fault of) mutual dependence.—341.

Vṛitti :—The author mentions another defect.

Without A-vidyâ, there is no creation, without creation, no A-vidyâ ; hence is the characteristic of being mutually dependent.—14.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—Moreover, when connection with A-vidyâ is established, there will be the characteristic of being mutually dependent, "Tat-yoge," in connection with agency, because the establishment of connection with agency is through connection with A-vidyâ. Such is the meaning.

Bhâṣya:—But then, it may be said, just through the influence of A-vidyâ, should connection of A-vidyâ be stated to arise; so that, A-vidyâ not being ultimately or absolutely real, there can be no attachment to it.

In regard to this, the author says:

Were A-vidyâ to be established through connection of A-vidyâ, there will be the fault of mutual dependence or self-dependence, that is to say, non-finality, such is the complement.—14.

Above continued.

न बीजाङ्कुरवत सादिसंसारश्रुतेः ॥ ५ । १५ ॥

न Na, not. बीजाङ्कुरवत् Bîja-aṅkura-vat, as in the case of the seed and the sprout. सादिसंसारश्रुतेः Sâdi-saṃsâra-śruteḥ, because of the Śruti on Saṃsâra or mundane existence being limited at the beginning.

15. (Non-finality here is not not-a-fault) as in the case of the seed and the sprout, because there is the Śruti on Saṃsâra being limited at the beginning.—342.

Vṛitti:—(Saṃsâra) being beginningless, as in the case of the seed and the sprout, there can be, it may be urged, no mutal dependence. In regard to this, the author says:

It would be so, were Saṃsâra beginningless. But Saṃsâra is with a beginning. Also says the Śruti:—

विश्वतश्चक्षुरुत विश्वतोमुखो
विश्वतोबाहुरुत विश्वतस्पात् ।
सं बाहुभ्यां धमति सं पतत्रै-
र्द्यावाभूमी जनयन्देव एकः ।

One Deva, of universal eyes, of universal mouth, of universal arms, of universal feet, producing the heaven and the earth, sets fire to them with the arms and wings.—*Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat*, III. 3.

Whence it follows that there is a breach of continuity in the stream of Saṃsâra during Pralaya.—15.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—Nor is it the case, says the author, that agency and A-vidyâ are without beginning.

That Saṃsâra has a beginning is proved from knowing the non-existence of Saṃsâra during Pralaya, from such Śrutis as :

सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्

Only this, the existent, there was, O Calm One, at the beginning,—one, without a second.—*Chhânndogya Upaniṣat* VI. ii. 1.

Bhâṣya :—Well, as in the case of the seed and the sprout, non-finality, it may be contended, does not count as a fault here.

Apprehending this, the author says :

Non-finality, as in the case of the seed and the sprout, is not possible (in the present case), because of the Śruti on the limitedness at the beginning of Puruṣas' Saṃsâra which consists of the form of all the evils beginning with A-vidyâ ; that is, because we hear of its non-existence in the state of dissolution, deep sleep, and the like. Such is the meaning. For, by Śrutis such as :

विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानुविनश्यति ॥

Vijñâna-Ghana itself (the Cloud of Pure Knowledge, *i.e.*, the Self), after having sprung up from these Bhûtas or Elements, disappears into those Bhûtas again.—*Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat*, II. iv. 12.,

it is established that, because in the states of Pralaya or dissolution, etc., there is non-existence of Buddhi and all the other modifications, therefore, belongs to Puruṣas the characteristic of being mere intelligences, devoid of all Saṃsâra or worldly traits, such as A-vidyâ, Vidyâ, etc., which are caused by, and so depend for their existence upon, the modifications as their external conditions (Upâdhis). Therefore, it is a mere empty phrase to say that " A-vidyâ also is caused by A-vidyâ".—15.

The nature of A-vidyâ *discussed.*

विद्यातोऽन्यत्वे ब्रह्मबाधप्रसङ्गः ॥ ५ । १६ ॥

विद्यातः Vidyâtah, from Vidyâ or Right Knowledge. अन्यत्वे Anyatve, being other. ब्रह्मबाधप्रसङ्गः Brahma-bâdha-prasaṅgah, the implication of obstruction to, or contradiction of, Brahman.

16. In (the supposition of A-vidyâ) being what is other than Vidyâ, (there is) the implication of the contradiction of Brahman.—343.

Vṛitti **:—The author declares the essential form of A-vidyâ.**

(If A-vidyâ be) what is different from Vidyâ, (that is, not-Vidyâ), then Brahman, too, which is different from Vidyâ, will be affected by the characteristic of A-vidyâ. And thence will be contradiction to its being Brahman.—16.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—The author mentions the fault in supposing that A-vidyâ is what is different from Brahman.

"Vidyâtaḥ," from Brahman of which Knowledge is the essential form, A-vidyâ being different, there is the implication of the contradiction of Brahman, because of the admission by you that Brahman is devoid of the three-fold limitation, (*i.e.*, limitation by time, place, and thing). When A-vidyâ is different from Brahman, Brahman also will be different from A-vidyâ; so that the consequence will be limitation, by thing, in the form of being favourable and unfavourable to such difference.

Bhâṣya :—But, then, may contend the opponent, our A-vidyâ has a special definition of our own, and is not of the form declared in the Yoga, namely, that of the cognition or idea of the Self in respect of the Not-Self, etc. So that, just as in the case of your Prakṛiti, so also in the case of our A-vidyâ, even though it, being undivided and without beginning, be attached to Puruṣa, still there is no impairment of his being free from attachment.

There being room for such an apprehension, the author, by bringing forward an alternative meaning of the word A-vidyâ as previously interpreted by him, proceeds to point out its defect.

If the meaning of the word A-vidyâ be just that it is other than Vidyâ, then, because A-vidyâ is capable of being destroyed by Knowledge, the "bâdha" or destruction, "Brahmaṇaḥ", of the Self also is entailed, inasmuch as Brahman also is other than Vidyâ (*i.e.*, not-Vidyâ). Such is the meaning.—16.

Above continued.

अबाधे नैष्फल्यम् ॥ ५ । १७ ॥

अबाधे A-bâdhe, in the case of non-obstruction. नैष्फल्यम् Naiṣphalyam, fruitlessness, futility.

17. (While), in the case of non-obstruction (of A-vidyâ by Vidyâ) (there is) fruitlessness (of Vidyâ).—344.

Vṛitti :—The author adduces another reason.

If, by Vidyâ, A-vidyâ is not obstructed, then, it will not be Vidyâ at all.—17.

Bhâṣya :—If, on the other hand, the from of A-vidyâ also is not to be obstructed by Vidyâ, then Vidyâ will be useless, on account of the non-existence of the characteristic of being the preventor of A-vidyâ. Such is the meaning.—17.

Above continued.

विद्याबाध्यत्वे जगतोऽप्येवम् ॥ ५ । १८ ॥

विद्याबाध्यत्वे Vidyâ-bâdhyatve, in the case of its being what is preventible by Vidyâ. जगतः Jagataḥ, of the world. अपि Api, also. एवम् Evam, the same.

18. (On the alternative theory of A-vidyâ) being what is preventible by Vidyâ, the world also (will be) the same (*i.e.*, A-vidyâ).—345.

Vṛitti :—But, it may be said, A-vidyâ is certainly obstructed by Vidyâ. In regard to this, the author says:

The characteristic of A-vidyâ will belong to the world also.—18.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—Moreover, is there non-obstruction, or is there obstruction, of A-vidyâ by Vidyâ? In the first case, the result will be that Vidyâ is fruitless. In the second case, as of A-vidyâ, so of the world also, there will be obstruction; so that the world will not be perceived. Such is the import.

Bhâṣya :—The author discredits the alternative theory.

If, again, it be said that the characteristic of being A-vidyâ is nothing but the characteristic of being obstructed, in the intelligent principle, by means of Vidyâ; then, that being so, "Jagataḥ", of the whole panorama of Prakṛiti, Mahat, and all the rest, also will be "Evam", the nature of being A-vidyâ; because, just like Wrong Cognition, Prakṛiti, etc., also have been excluded from the Self by such Śrutis as:

अथात आदेशो नेति नेति

Now, then, the direction "Neti" "Neti".

अस्थूलमनणु

Not large, not small, etc.—*Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat*, III. viii. 8.

Such is the meaning.

So that, the whole panorama of creation being, without exception, of the nature of A-vidyâ, after the destruction of A-vidyâ, by means of knowledge, in the case of one person, by others too the panorama would not be seen. Such is the import.

Neither can it be said that to be A-vidyâ is to be destructible by Vidyâ, because, on account of the fallacy of self-dependence or reasoning in a circle, it is not possible to infer what is destructible by Vidyâ by means of the characteristic of its being destructible by Vidyâ.—18.

In any case, A-vidyâ *cannot be without beginning.*

तद्रूपत्वे सादित्वम् ॥ ५ । १९ ॥

तद्रूपत्वे Tat-rûpatve, in being of that form. सादित्वम् Sâditvam, the nature or state of having a beginning.

19. If (A-vidyâ) be of the form thereof, it must have a beginning.—346.

Vritti:—The nature of A-vidyâ, it may be said, belongs to the world also. In regard to this, the author says:

Beginningless is this A-vidyâ."Tat-rûpa-tve", in the case of the world being of the form thereof (*i.e.*, of A-vidyâ), A-vidyâ will be limited at the beginning (like the world).—19.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—In the case of its being, again, of the form thereof, that is to say, on the admission that the world, (after it has once been destroyed by Vidyâ), will be produced anew, the production of a new A-vidyâ also must be affirmed. So that A-vidyâ will be limited at the beginning. And that being so, no absolute Release will be the result. Such is the import.

Bhâṣya:—Or, granted that to be A-vidyâ is just the characteristic of somehow or other being preventible by Vidyâ; still it is the characteristic of being finite at the beginning, that will, in regard to Puruṣas, belong to a thing of this description, but it will not be possible for it to be without beginning, because by the Srutis, already cited, such as:

विज्ञानघन एव इत्यादि

Vijñâna-Ghana itself etc.,

it has been established that, in the states of Pralaya or dissolution, etc., Puruṣa exists as mere intelligence. Such is the meaning.

While, in our theory, though, in the state of Pralaya or dissolution, Puruṣa does not undergo Saṃsâra, yet subsequent bondage is established through conjunction with Prakṛiti, who has an independent existence and is eternal. Similarly, though there is conjunction with Prakṛiti, it is the A-viveka or Non-discrimination belonging to a previous state of worldly existence, that, as has also been already stated, by means of Vâsanâ or tendency, Adṛiṣṭam, and the like, becomes the efficient (nimitta) cause (of bondage). Therefore, other than the one mentioned in the Yoga Darśana, there does not exist A-vidyâ, which is destructible by Knowledge. And that, it has been established, is only an attribute of Buddhi, and is not an attribute of Puruṣa.—19.

Karma *is the efficient cause of Creation.*

न धर्मापलापः प्रकृतिकार्यवैचित्र्यात् ॥ ५ । २० ॥

न Na, not. धर्मापलापः Dharma-apalâpaḥ, repudiation of Dharma or Merit. प्रकृतिकार्यवैचित्र्यात् Prakṛiti-kârya-vaichitryât, owing to the diversity of the effects of Prakṛiti.

20. Repudiation of Dharma (is) not (involved), owing to the diversity of the effects of Prakṛiti.—347.

Vṛitti :—It does not belong to Karma, it may be said, to be the cause of the world ; the world is produced through Svabhâva or (the necessity of its own) nature. In regard to this, the author says :

Since Prakṛiti is eternal, and since Svabhâva is one only, diverse effects will not be produced in the absence of Dharma. Therefore, by reason of the difference of Dharma, there is diversity of effects ; and hence there is no repudiation or failure of Dharma.—20.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—Now the author discusses the causality of Dharma in creation.

Diversity of effects cannot possibly arise by means of mere Prakṛiti, since she is of a uniform nature. But it arises by means of diversity of Dharma. And by the word, Dharma, is here denoted Adriṣṭam (which includes A-Dharma or Demerit as well).

Bhâṣya :—In this very Book, what has been declared, namely, that the activity of Prakṛiti is due to the efficient cause of Karma,—in regard to that, the Pûrva Pakṣa or *primâ facie* objection of the opponent, the author reconciles by means of a section.

Repudiation of Dharma, by means of its not being perceptible by the senses, is not possible, because of the inference of it by means of the fact that diversity in the effects of Prakṛiti cannot otherwise be accounted for. Such is the meaning.—20.

Dharma *is proved by* Śruti *also.*

श्रुतिलिङ्गादिभिस्तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ५ । २१ ॥

श्रुतिलिङ्गादिभिः Śruti-liṅga-Âdi-bhiḥ, by means of the Śruti, marks (of inference etc. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, proof of it, *i.e.*, Dharma.

21. By means of the Śruti, marks of inference, etc. there is proof of it.—348.

Vṛitti :—The author mentions the proof in regard to the establishment of Dharma.

By "Śruti", is exibited the Verbal Proof; by "Liṅga", Inference. Through the word, "Adi", is shown the perception of the Yogin. By means of these is the establishment of Dharma.—21.

Bhâṣya :—The author mentions other proofs also.

From Śruti, such as:

पुण्यो वै पुण्येन भवति पापः पापेन

(In a subsequent birth, one) becomes virtuous by means of virtuous Karma, and vicious by means of vicious Karma.—*Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat*, III. ii. 13.,

and from mark of inference in the form of injunctions, such as

स्वर्गकामोऽश्वमेधेन यजेत

One desirous of heaven shall perform the Aśvamedha sacrifice,

and also by means of the perception of the Yogins, etc., there is proof of it, *i.e.*, Dharma. Such is the meaning.—21.

An objection answered.

न नियमः प्रमाणान्तरावकाशात् ॥ ५ । २२ ॥

न Na, no. नियमः Niyamaḥ, rule. प्रमाणान्तरावकाशात् Pramâṇa-antara-avakâśât, there being scope for other proofs.

22. (There is) no rule (that a thing must be non-existent, because it is not perceived), since there is scope for other proofs.—349.

Vṛitti :—If place and time have no causality, how is it, then, it may be asked, that saffron grows in Kâśmîra (only) and that mango flowers appear in the spring (only)? To this, the author replies.

Adṛiṣṭam alone is the cause,—such is not the rule. But Adṛiṣṭam is an auxiliary cause. Causality belongs to others also, since there exists proof of this.—22.

Bhâṣya :—The author shows that the reason advanced by the opponent, namely, that there is non-establishment of Dharma, on account of the non-existence of its perception, is fallacious.

Because there is no popular perception of a thing, therefore the thing does not exist,—such a rule does not exist, because, by means of other proofs also, things can be made the objects of cognition. Such is the meaning.—22.

Proof of A-Dharma.

उभयत्राप्येवम् ॥ ५ । २३ ॥

उभयत्र Ubhaya-tra, in both cases. अपि Api, also. एवम् Evam, similarly.

23. In the case of both also (the proofs are) the same.—350.

Vritti:—From seeing Saṃsâra to be full of pain, let, it may be said, there be only evil Adṛiṣṭam. In regard to this, the author says:

Since pleasure also is seen, there must be Adṛiṣṭam which is good. —23.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—"Ubhaya-tra": in this world and in the other world. "Evam": pleasure produced by Adṛiṣṭam is pain, that is to say, is alloyed pleasure.

Bhâṣya:—The author proves the existence of A-Dharma or Demerit also, like that of Dharma or Merit.

As in the case of Dharma, so in the case of A-Dharma also, there are similar proofs. Such is the meaning.—23.

An objection answered.

अर्थात् सिद्धिश्चेत् समानमुभयोः ॥ ५ । २४ ॥

अर्थात् Arthât, from explication of the sense. सिद्धिः Siddhiḥ, proof. चेत् Chet, if. समानम् Samânam, same. उभयोः Ubhayoḥ, of both.

24. If (you say that the proof of Dharma is) through Explication of the Sense, (we reply that it is) the same in the case of both.—351.

Vritti:—Because of the conceit (abhimâna) of pleasure in respect of the non-existence of pain, the application of the word 'Adṛiṣṭam' there is primary, and in the case of the cause of pleasure, it is secondary. In regard to this, the author says:

On account of the possibility of the reverse of it, both are equal.—24.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—"Arthât": from supra-mundane object, in the form of celestial girls, etc., "siddhiḥ", production, of pleasure,—in the other world, such is the complement of the sentence. So that, if it is the case that pleasure is alloyed with pain, then this applies equally "ubhayoḥ", *i.e.*, in the case of this world and of the other world. For, in this world also, there do exist objects which serve as the cause of pleasure. But towards the production of pleasure Dharma is the cause. And that, being mixed with killing, etc., does not prevail to produce pleasure unalloyed with pain, but, on the contrary, produces only pleasure alloyed with pain. Such is the import.

Bhâṣya:—Well, the proof of Dharma is by means of Artha-âpatti* or Implication or presumption in the form that the injunctions cannot be otherwise explained; but this does not exist in the case of A-Dharma;

* For a full account of Artha-âpatti and various other methods of proof, see Vaiśeṣika Sutram, S. B. H Vol VI, pages 317-318.

hence how can there be an extension of the Vedic mark to the case of A-Dharma?

If it is thus objected, we reply that such is not the case. Because "Samânam ubhayoḥ", that is, proof in the form of Artha-âpatti exists equally in the case of both Dharma and A-Dharma; as, otherwise, prohibitive injunctions such as:

परदाराञ्च गच्छेत्

One shall not approach other people's wives,

will remain unexplained. Such is the meaning.—24.

Dharma *etc., are attributes of the* Antaḥ-Karaṇa.

अन्तःकरणधर्मत्वं धर्मादीनाम् ॥ ५ । २५ ॥

अन्तःकरणधर्मत्वं Antaḥ-karaṇa-dharma-tvam, to be the attributes of the Antaḥ-Karaṇa or the Inner Instrument. धर्मादीनाम् Dharma-âdînâm, of Dharma, etc.

25. It belongs to Dharma, etc., to be the attributes of the Antaḥ-Karaṇa.—352.

Vṛitti.—The author denies that Dharma, etc., are the attributes of the Self.

They are attributes of Buddhi. If they were attributes of the Self, there would be contradiction of the Śruti on the freedom of the Self from attachment.—25.

Bhâṣya:—Well, then, if Dharma, etc., are admitted, then the result will be, may contend our opponent, that Puruṣas will undergo transformation by reason of their possessing Dharma, etc.

This apprehension of an objection, the author avoids.

By the word "Âdi" are included all the special attributes of the Self mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika Śâstra. (*Vide* S. B. II., Vol. VI, *Introduction*, pages xxiv-xxv).

Neither can it be asked: If this be so, then, in the state of Pralaya or dissolution, when the Antaḥ-Karaṇa no longer exists, where should Dharma, etc., rest? For, as in the case of Âkâśa, there is no absolute destruction of the Antaḥ-Karaṇa. For, the Antaḥ-Karaṇa is, as has already been explained, of the form of both a cause and an effect. Hence, in the Antaḥ-Karaṇa, existing in a causal state, as a particular portion of Prakṛiti, will rest the impressions of Dharma, and A-Dharma.—25.

An objection answered.

गुणादीनां च नात्यन्तबाधः ॥ ५ । २६ ॥

गुणादीनां Guṇa-âdînâm, of the Guṇas, etc. च Cha, and. न Na, not. अत्यन्तबाधः atyanta-bâdhaḥ, absolute exclusion or obstruction.

26. And of the Guṇas, etc., there is not absolute exclusion.—353.

Vritti:—When it is seen that the attributes of one thing do not produce effects in another thing, it would be more reasonable, one may say, to assert just the non-existence of Dharma, etc. In regard to this, the author says:

Just as of the earth, etc., because of their being seen, there is not absolute exclusion, so is it the case also with the Guṇas, etc., and also with Dharma, etc.

And the causing of effect by the attributes of one thing in another takes place, as has been stated before, by means of the falling of the shadow of Consciousness.—26.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—Do the Guṇas exist in what possesses the Guṇas, (*i.e.* in a substance), or do they exist in what does not possess the Guṇas? (*i.e.*, is not a substance). In the former case, there is self-dependence; in the latter, the implication of the Guṇas possessing the Guṇas. Therefore, the existence of the Guṇas is obstructed in any case. So is it the case also with Karma, etc.—thus hold some.

The author discredits their view.

N.B.—Mahâdeva clearly refers to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the Guṇas, *Vide* S. B. H. Vol. VI, page 28, aphorism I. i. 16.

Bhâṣya:—It might have been the case, as you say, may rejoin our opponent; but what has been declared, *viz.*, that the existence of Dharma, etc., is proved from the diversity of the products of Prakṛiti as well as from the Śruti, etc.,—that does not stand to reason; because to the very existence of Prakṛiti constituted by the three Guṇas, as well as of the products thereof, there is obstruction by means of the very Śrutis on which you rely, *e.g.*,

साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च

(Puruṣa is) the witness, intelligent, alone, and devoid of the Guṇas.

अथात आदेशो नेति नेति

Now, then, the direction: "Not this," "Not that."

अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययम्
तथाऽरसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत् ।
(अनाद्यनन्तं महतः परं ध्रुवं
निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात्प्रमुच्यते ॥)

(Having developed) that which is sound-less, touch-less, form-less, un-declinable, so also is taste-less, eternal, not possessing smell, (not having a beginning, not having an

end, beyond Mahat, and fixed,—one is released from the mouth of death).—*Kaṭha Upaniṣat*, II.15.,

and also by means of such Śrutis as :

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिः

Neither destruction nor production.—*Brahmabindu Upaniṣat*, 10.

वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ।

Modification is a creation of speech,—a mere name, while the truth is that it is only clay.—*Chhândogya Upaniṣat*, VI. i. 4.

Now the author repels such an objection.

"Guṇânâm," *i.e.*, of Sattva, etc., and of their attributes, pleasure, etc., and also of their products, Mahat, etc., there is no denial, so far as their (svarûpa) essential form is concerned; but there is denial of them with reference to their (saṃsarga) association with the intelligent principle, just as is the case with the denial of hotness in the iron.

Note:—That is, when it is denied that hotness is a quality of iron, it is not meant that hotness as a quality nowhere exists, but all that is meant is that hotness is not a quality of iron, but sometimes appears in it only when it is placed in conjunction with fire of which it is a quality. Similarly, when it is denied that pleasure, etc., exist in the Self, it is not thereby implied that pleasure, etc., as such nowhere exist, but only that they have no permanent connection with the Self, but are occasionally superimposed upon it by the Guṇas, Sattva, etc., of which they are the properties, and thus appear to be connected with the Self; in other words, that their association with the Self is not real, just as the association of hotness with iron is not real.

Similarly, it is only with reference to time that there is, by means of states or conditions, etc., denial of (the reality of) the Guṇas and all the rest of those that undergo transformation. Such is the meaning.—26.

Note:—Compare the well-known doctrine of Spinoza: *Omnes determinatio negatio est*, that all determination is so much negation. *E.g.*, a seed is, in course of time, transformed into a tree. In the state of a tree, the seed becomes more limited or determined than it was before. In other words, the tiny atom of reality in the shape of the seed puts on a huge phenomenal form which it would be wrong wholly to identify with the seed. If you attribute the character of the tree to the seed, that is, say, for example, that the seed is of such and such dimensions, you thereby deny the reality of the seed as seed. Similarly, a transformation such as a Tan-mâtra or an element, *e.g.*, earth, is a temporary and passing phase of the realities which are the Guṇas. If you wholly identify the two together, you thereby deny the reality of the Guṇas as Guṇas.

Reality of Objective Existence is established by proof.

पञ्चावयवयोगात् सुखसंवित्तिः ॥ ५ । २७ ॥

पञ्चावयवयोगात् Pañcha-avayava,-yogât, through the application of the five-membered (process of reasoning, *i.e.*, inference). सुखसंवित्तिः Sukha-saṃvittiḥ, cognition of pleasure.

27. Through the application of inference (takes place) the cognition of pleasure.—354.

Vritti :—Non-existence of pain is, according to some, pleasure. For the refutation thereof, the author says:

"Though pleasure is ascertained to be of the form of (a positive) existence by means of mental perception, still, for the purpose of the knowledge of others, proof also has been stated.

By the phrase, "Through the application of the five-membered (process of reasoning)," the view that inference is two-membered, is rejected. (The five members of an inference are) Pratijñâ, Enunciation, Hetu, Reason, Driṣṭânta, Illustration, Upanaya, Application, and Nigamana Conclusion.

Hereby it is established that pleasure is a property of the subject of the inference, that it exists in things of the same class as the subject, that it does not exist in things of a different class, that it is not opposed by an equally valid argument to the contrary, and that the existence of the thing in which it inheres, is not obstructed.--27.

N.B.—For an account of the logical processes alluded to in the above, *vide* the Vaiśeṣika Sûtram of Kaṇâda, S. B. H., Vol. VI.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—The author mentions the proof of pleasure.

"Sukha-saṃvittiḥ," cognition of pleasure, is "Yogât," through the proximity, of that, *i.e.*, the mind, to which the five Indriyas or Senses belong, as though these were its limbs. So that, the import is that pleasure is an object of mental perception.

Bhâṣya :—But why cannot there be obstruction to their existence, even in respect of their essential form, as in the case of dreams, desires, and similar objects (padârthas)? There being room for such an enquiry, the author says:

Here the mention of "pleasure" only which forms a portion of the objects under discussion, is indicative of all objects, because its mention has been made with the intention of making a specific object to be the subject of inference. The reading "Sukha-*âdi*-saṃvittiḥ," cognition of pleasure, *etc.*, (as in Nâgeśa Bhaṭṭa's MS.), is, however, more in accordance with the sense desired.

And the five members of a Nyâya or Syllogism are: Pratijñâ, Hetu, Udâharaṇa, Upanaya and Nigamana. "Yogât", through their application, is the establishment of all objects, pleasure, etc. Such is the meaning.

And the application of the Nyâya is as follows:

Pratijñâ :—Pleasure is existent,

Hetu :—Because it causes the idea of an object and causes action,

Udâharaṇa :—Whatever causes the idea of an object and causes action, is existent, e.g. ,the intelligent principle.

Upanaya :—Pleasure is the cause of object and action such as the standing of the hair on end, etc.

Nigamana :—Therefore, it is existent.

Although the intelligent principles do not undergo modification, yet, in their case, it is the manifestation or illumination of objects that constitutes object and action. In regard to the Nâstikas or Nihilists, on the other hand, should be applied the negative form of inference, and, in that inference, the illustrations will be the hare's horn and the like.—27.

Note :—The negative form of inference mentioned in the *Bhâṣya* may be exhibited thus :

Pratijñâ :—Pleasure is not not-existent ;

Hetu :—Because it causes the idea of an object and causes action ;

Udâharaṇa :—Whatever does not cause the idea of object and does not cause action is not-existent, *e.g.*, a hare's horn ;

Upanaya :—Pleasure is the cause of object and action, such as the standing of the hair on end, etc., which characteristic is pervaded by the characteristic of being existent ;

Nigamana :—Therefore, it is not not-existent.

By such negative arguments are to be met the Nâstikas, who deny the existence of the Guṇas and of their attributes and products.

Note :—The test of reality is "artha-kriyâ-kâritvam," that is, to produce impression or idea and to serve some use. E. g., an ink-pot: it produces an impression in the Buddhi of something outside it, and also serves to hold ink in it; in other words, it is in correspondence with the passive and active states of the mind. Whatever lacks in these characteristics, is not a reality ; *e. g.*, a hare's horn.

Vyâpti *or Logical Pervasion cannot be grasped from a single instance.*

न सकृद्ग्रहणात् सम्बन्धसिद्धिः ॥ ५ । २८ ॥

न na, not. सकृद्ग्रहणात् sakṛit-grahaṇât, from a single apprehension. सम्बन्धसिद्धिः sambandha-siddhiḥ, establishment of the relation.

28. Not from a single (act of) apprehension (is) the establishment of the relation (of pervasion).—355.

Vṛitti :—The author declares that, from seeing once only, there can be no (certainty of) Vyâpti.

Because of contradiction (of an inference so made), by one's own perception. Thus, from seeing fire and the ass together on a single occasion, there would be an inference; but such inferential cognition is not known.—28.

Vednântin Mahâdeva :—Now, is Vyâpti cognisable through seeing concomitance once only, or more than once? In the former case, the

Vyâpti of fire and the ass would also be cognised, and thus the inference of fire even from the ass (as a mark) would be the implication. It cannot be the latter, because the characteristics of being of the earth, earthy, and of being impressible with steel, though these have accompanied each other a hundred times and over, fail to accompany each other in the case of diamond. Therefore, it is not easy to assert the proof, named inference. Such is the view of some.

The observation of accompaniment attended with the non-observation of non-accompaniment, is the cause of the apprehension of Vyâpti or Pervasion. Whether it be once or more than once, does not matter. Such is the import.

"Sambandha-siddhiḥ" means the apprehension of Vyâpti.

Bhâṣya :—The author next apprehends an objection from the Chârvâka, who maintains that there can be no other means of proof at all besides sense-perception, because the conditions of being pervaded and the like are not established.

Through the apprehension of a single concomitance "Sambandhaḥ", *i.e.*, Vyâpti, is not established, while multiplicity of instances is uncertain, (as nobody can be quite certain that a contrary instance will never be found). Hence, on account of the impossibility of the apprehension of Vyâpti, there can be no proof of the reality of objects by means of inference. Such is the meaning.—28.

N.B.—It will be observed that Aniruddha and Vijñâna read different purposes altogether in this aphorism. This, however, makes no material change in the line of argument.

Vyâpti *or Logical Pervasion explained.*

नियतधर्मसाहित्यमुभयोरेकतरस्य वा व्याप्तिः ॥ ५ । २९ ॥

नियतधर्मसाहित्यम् Niyata-dharma-sâhityam, constant concomitance as attributes of one and the same thing. उभयोः Ubhayoḥ, of both, *i.e.*, of the sâdhya or the thing to be proved and the sâdhana or the means of proving it. एकतरस्य Eka-tara-sya, of one of the two, *i.e.*, of the Sâdhana only. वा Vâ, or. व्याप्तिः Vyâptiḥ, pervasion, that is, of one characteristic by another, *e.g.* of humanity by mortality.

29. Constant co-existence of both (the Sâdhya and the Sâdhana), or of one, is Vyâpti.—356.

Vṛitti :—What is this Vyâpti ?—it may be asked. In regard to this, the author says :

"Ubhayoḥ" : Of two things of equal pervasion ; *e.g.*, of producibility and non-eternality. "Eka-tarasya" : Of a thing of unequal pervasion ; *e.g.*, of smoke.

And so has it been declared :

यावद्व्यावृत्तिरेकित्वं शतांशेनापि शङ्क्यते ।
विपक्षस्य कुतस्तावद्धेतोर्गमनिकाबलम् ।

So long as the non-divergence of the Vipakṣa or the thing different from the subject of the inference is suspected even by a one-hundredth part, how can the Hetu or Reason derive its power of leading to the inference ?--29.

Note :—That is, the strength and validity of inference depends not only on the inclusion of all possible similar instances, but, and much more, on the exclusion of all possible contrary instances, which go to establish the general proposition underlying it. And so long there remains the slightest doubt as to the possibility of a single contrary instance turning up, the mark of inference is powerless to lead to a valid inference.

Bhâṣya :—The author solves the difficulty.

"Dharma-sâhityam" means association or concomitance in being properties, in other words, going together or co-existence. So that, "Ubhayoḥ", of the Sâdhya and the Sâdhana, or "Eka-tara-sya", of the Sâdhana only, what is "Niyataḥ," unfailing or inviolable, co-existence or concomitance, that is Vyâpti. Such is the meaning.

"Ubhayoḥ".—this has been stated in respect of the case of equal pervasion (of Sâdhya and Sâdhana).

And regularity (in "Niyata", constant, *i.e.*, Vyâpti) is cognisable by means of favourable arguments.

Hence, there is no impossibility of the apprehension of Vyâpti. Such is the import.—29.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—"Dharma" is what is contained. The relation of Vyâpti is the constant co-existence of the contained.

Vyâpti *is not a separate principle.*

न तत्त्वान्तरं वस्तुकल्पनाप्रसक्तेः ॥ ५ । ३० ॥

न Na, not. तत्त्वान्तरं Tattva-antaraṃ, a separate Tattva or Principle. वस्तुकल्पनाप्रसक्तेः Vastu-kalpanâ-prasakteḥ, because of the implication of the supposition of an entity.

30. (Vyâpti) cannot (be) a separate principle, because of the necessity for the supposition of an entity (being entailed thereby).—357.

Vritti :—Vyâpti, say some, is a separate Tattva. The author refutes this view.

Even on the admission of (its being) a separate Tattva, non-divergence or unfailing consociation must be asserted. Let that alone be Vyâpti ; what is the use of the supposition of an (additional) entity ?—30.

Bhâṣya :—The author declares that Vyâpti is not a separate object having the form of the power, etc., desired to be predicated of it (*i.e.*, of the required nature).

Vyâpti is not something other than constant concomitance (*i.e.*, of attributes) as attributes ; as, otherwise, it would be necessary to make the supposition of an entity as being the substratum of the quality of Vyâpti. By us, on the other hand, has been made the supposition of the mere characteristic of Vyâpti in the case only of objects, the existence of which has been established. Such is the meaning.—30.

Other views of Vyâpti : *Of the* Âchâryas.

निजशक्त्युद्भवमित्याचार्याः ॥ ५ । ३१ ॥

निजशक्त्युद्भवम् Nija-śakti-udbhavam, production or development of own power. इति Iti, thus. आचार्याः : Âchâryâḥ, the Âchâryas or teachers.

31. Development of own power (is Vyâpti),—thus (say) the Âchâryas.—358.

Vṛitti :—The author states his own view of Vyâpti.

Fire and smoke possess a power (of inferential suggestion) which is all their own. It is grasped by means of the observation of both. It is the same, that is Vyâpti.—31.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—The power which is "nija", *i.e.*, natural or inborn ; the development of it, *i.e.*, its constant accompaniment, *e.g.*, in the case of smoke, of fire. Thus the Âchâryas. By means of the plural number in "Âchâryas", the fact is signified that it is approved by the author.

Bhâṣya : —The author states the view of others.

Others, however, that is, the Âchâryas, say that Vyâpti is verily a separate Tattva or Principle, having the form of a particular power producible by the power belonging to the Vyâpya or the thing to be pervaded. But mere own power cannot be Vyâpti, because it lasts as long as the substance lasts ; (also) because, (*e.g.*,) smoke, passing away to a different place, does not retain the characteristic of being pervaded by fire. By means of passing away to a different place, that power is lost ; hence the definition given is not too wide. In the author's own view, however, smoke has to be qualified with the characteristic of being limited to the time of its production. Such is the import.—31.

Note—The words, "Udbhavam" or development, in the aphorism, and "mere" and "lost" in the *Bhâṣya* are significant. "*Nija-śakti-udbhavam*" means development or product of the power of the thing to be pervaded which is denoted by the other terms,

"Hetu" or Reason or mark of inference, and "Sâdhana" or means of inference. The Âchâryas maintain that Vyâpti is a power which is the product of the power of the thing to be pervaded. This production of power, of course, requires certain collocation. Thus, smoke, after it rises from fire, produces, within certain limitations of time and place, the power, called Vyâpti, which serves as the basis for the inference of fire from the smoke. But when it is carried away by wind to a distant place, that power is lost. In other words, it loses its character of serving as a mark of valid inference. It follows, therefore, that the *mere* power of smoke as the thing to be pervaded does not constitute its character of serving as a mark of inference, for that power would still belong to it, even when it fails to serve as a mark of inference. Something more then is required. And this is what, in plainer terms, may be described as a certain correlation between it and the fire, arising and persisting within certain limitations of time and place.

The view of Pañchaśikha.

आधेयशक्तियोग इति पञ्चशिखः ॥ ५ । ३२ ॥

आधेयशक्तियोगः Âdheya-śakti-yogaḥ, connection with the power of that-which-is-contained. इति Iti, thus. पञ्चशिखः Pañchaśikhaḥ Pañchaśikha, a celebrated Sâṃkhya professor *Vide* Introduction.

32. (Vyâpti is) connection with the power of that-which-is-contained,—thus (declares) Pañchaśikha.—359.

Vritti :—The author states the view of the Ekadeśin (*i.e.*, a branch of the Sâṃkhya School.)

Were the power natural, then, from seeing the thing, even when it was not fully developed, the cognition would arise that "it is capable in this matter". But such is not the case. Therefore, the power should be asserted to be of a thing in its relation as being that which is contained in another thing.—32.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—There being "Yoga," *i.e.*, connection, with the power of that-which-is-contained, concomitance (is possible),—such is the complement of the aphorism. So that, concomitance is the development of the power of that-which-is-contained. By the singular number in "Pañchaśikhaḥ", the author indicates that this is the view of one of an opposite way of thinking.

Bhâṣya :- Since it is customary to predicate the characteristic of being pervaded by Prakṛiti, etc., in respect of Buddhi, etc., therefore, pervasiveness consists in the power of being the container, and pervadedness, is the possession of the power of being the contained ; such is the view of Pañchaśikha. Such is the meaning.—32.

An objection considered.

न स्वरूपशक्तिर्नियमः पुनर्वादप्रसक्तेः ॥ ५ । ३३ ॥

न Na, not. स्वरूपशक्तिः Sva-rupa-śaktiḥ, power which constitutes or belongs to the own or essential form of the thing. नियमः Niyamaḥ, rule. पुनर्वादप्रसक्तेः Punar-vâda-prasakteḥ, because of the implication of tautology.

33. The power constituting the own-form of the thing is not the rule, because of the implication of tautology (in it).—360.

Vritti:—The author gives the reason for the above.

Were the own-form the power, it would be tautology to say, "The pugilist is able".—33.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—"Svarûpa-śaktiḥ": what is the essential form of the thing,—the same is its power. Thereby "Niyamaḥ", *i.e.*, Vyâpti, is not produced, but by a power other than the essential form. The author mentions the fault in the case of the power not being different from the essential form: "because of the implication of tautology", *i.e.*, because in such cases as "The Mantra is powerful", etc., there would be tautology. Such is the meaning.

Bhâṣya:—But, for what purpose, it may be asked, is the power of the thing as the contained imagined? Let the power constituting the essential form of the thing to be pervaded, be itself Vyâpti. In regard to this, the author says:

But the power constituting the essential form of the thing cannot be "Niyamaḥ", *i.e.*, Vyâpti; because of the implication of tautology, that is, as in the case of "The jar is a pitcher", so in the case of "Buddhi is the thing to be pervaded", (there would be tautology) by reason of the non-difference of meaning. Such is the meaning.

The addition of the word "śakti", power, to the word "Śvarûpa", *i.e.*, essential form, which only was required to be mentioned, is for the purpose of showing that Vyâpti is an attribute of the thing to be pervaded.—33.

Above continued.

विशेषणानर्थक्यप्रसक्तेः ॥ ५ । ३४ ॥

विशेषणानर्थक्यप्रसक्तेः: Viśeṣana-ânarthakya-prasakteḥ, because of the implication of the futility of the qulification or adjective.

34. (Power of the essential form cannot be Vyâpti), beause of the implication of the futility of the qulification.—361.

Vritti:—The author adduces another reason.

There would be no such intuition as "Devadatta is powerful", but (only) "Devadatta is Devadatta".—34.

Bhâṣya:—The author himself explains the tautology.

This has been almost fully explained in the previous aphorism.—34.

Above continued.

पल्लवादिष्वनुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ५ । ३५ ॥

पल्लवादिषु Pallava-âdi-ṣu, in respect of the twigs, etc. अनुपपत्तेः:—An-upapatteḥ, because of non-explanation. च Cha, and also.

35. (Power of the essential form is not Vyâpti), also because, in the case of the twigs, etc., (the absence of Vyâpti is) not explained.—362.

Vṛitti :—The author adduces yet another reason.

Because, when the essential form continues in the same state in the twig, etc., there would be removal of poison, even though the Mantra is not applied.—35.

Note :—It will be observed that from the consideration of the power of leading to an inference, Aniruddha passes into a consideration of power in general. Thus, a twig, charged with a certain Mantra, has the power of counteracting the effect of poison when applied to the affected part of the body. And if this power of counteracting the effect of poison is inherent in the twig, as is supposed by the Ekadeśin in the 33rd aphorism, then it would act even without the application of the Mantra; but such is not the case. Therefore, the power is not sva-rûpa-śakti or power belonging to the essential form of the twig, but is something super-added to it. Such is the meaning, read into the present aphorism by Aniruddha.

Bhâṣya :—The author mentions another defect.

In the twig, etc., there exists the characteristic of being pervaded by the tree, etc. But the mere power of the essential form cannot possibly be its definition or characteristic mark. Because, by reason of the non-departure of the power of the essential form even from the lopped off twig, even in that state also the characteristic of being pervaded would be involved. Such is the meaning. While the power of its being the thing contained is destroyed at the moment of cutting. Hence there can be no Vyâpti at that time. Such is the import.—35.

Conclusion of the argument.

आधेयशक्तिसिद्धौ निजशक्तियोगः समानन्यायात् ॥ ५ । ३६ ॥

आधेयशक्तिसिद्धौ Âdheya-śakti-siddhau, power of the thing as the contained being established. निजशक्तियोगः Nija-śakti-yogaḥ, connection with its own power. समानन्यायात् Samâna-nyâyât, owing to the identity of the argument.

36. On the establishment of the power of the (thing in the relation of being the thing) contained (depends) the

connection of the own power (of the thing), because the argument is the same (in both the cases).—363.

Vritti:—The author states the conclusion.

It is its own and it is also a power,—such is the meaning of "Own-power"; but not that it is the own or essential form that is the power. So that, on the establishment of the power of the thing as the contained, there is connection of its own power, because of the identity of the argument. Thus, there being no distinction in the power (as such), the argument, *viz.*, Connection of the power of the thing as the contained (is Vyâpti), or Connection of the own power of the thing (is Vyâpti), is the same.

And in the case of the apprehension of objects, it is not at first apprehended on account of the variety of the powers of objects, *e.g.*, though the relation of father and son is subsisting, it is not cognised without instruction (*Vide* IV. 4, page 363 *ante*).

Hence has it been declared: "Development of own power" (*Vide* V. 31 above).—36.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—Let, then, there be only the power of the thing as the contained; what need, it may be asked, of the innate or natural power? In regard to this, the author says:

Just as, by means of Agreement and Difference, and by means of Śâstra, the power of the thing as the contained is proved to exist in the twig, etc., and also in the paddy, etc., even so, by Agreement and Difference, in respect of those respective entities or objects, and by means of Sâstra, in respect of the several classes of Karma, is the power established.

Bhâṣya:—But, is it not, it may be asked, said by Pañchaśikha that development of own power is Vyâpti and nothing else? If not, then the result will be that, since smoke is not contained in fire, therefore, it cannot be pervaded by fire.

In regard to this, the author says:

It having been proved that the power of the thing as the contained, is Vyâpti, development of the own power also is certainly established as being Vyâpti, "Samâna-nyâyât", *i.e.*, because of the sameness of the argument. Such is the meaning.

Want of assimilation of (of the two theories), on the other hand, is no fault,—as is the case with words conveying different meanings.

Similarly, in the author's own view also, it is concomitances of diverse kinds that are to be understood to be Vyâptis. Neither should it be

said that, that being so, Vyâptis will have no admittance or inclusion into being the cause of inferential cognition; for, as is the case with the grass, an igniting stick, a gem, etc., heterogeneity, etc., inhering in the effects, is also quite reasonable.—36.

Note :—"Vyâpya," "Vyâpaka" and "Vyâpti" are the three technical terms of Hindu Logic which summarise practically the whole of the theory of inference. "Vyâpya" means that which is pervaded; "Vyâpaka" means that which pervades; and "Vyâpti" means the pervasion. The import of these terms is from the denotative point of view. Thus, to take the familiar example of fire and smoke, the denotation of smoke is wholly contained within the denotation of fire. Therefore, smoke is the thing pervaded; fire is the thing pervading; and the subsumption of the denotation of smoke under the denotation of fire is the pervasion of smoke by fire. Similarly, again, the denotation of humanity is contained wholly within the denotation of mortality. Therefore, humanity is the Vyâpya; mortality is the Vyâpaka; and the pervasion of humanity by mortality is Vyâpti.

It is this Vyâpti which forms the basis or principle of all inference. It is different in different cases, and the number of Vyâptis is manifold, according to the manifold combination of objects. In fact, these are so many Uniformities of Nature. But they are not altogether un-correlated, nor are they un-related to a General Law governing them all. That General Law has been laid down, for example, in the fifth aphorism, in the second chapter of the ninth book of the Vaiśeṣika Sûtram of Kaṇâda, *Vide* the sixth volume of the Sacred Books of the Hindus, page 316 and the *Introduction* to it, page xviii. That General Law is: तस्य इदम्. "It is its." This is Vyâpti *par excellence*, and consists in the invariable and unconditional accompaniment of two things, whether it be under the laws of causation or under the laws of co-existence.

The ascertainment of Vyâptis is dependent upon the observation of concomitance, together with the non-observation of non-concomitance.

Now, the question has been raised whether Vyâptí is a mere relation of two things, or is also a thing itself. Vyâpti is not a thing itself, as the supposition would offend against the law of parsimony (*vide* S. P. S., V. 30.) It is, therefore, nothing but a relation of things. But how does this relation become possible? Does it arise from the essential form or a primary property of the Vyâpya, or from a secondary quality of the Vyâpya, as asserted by the Âchâryas, or from an accidental characteristic of the Vyâpya, as maintained by Pañchaśikha? The first cannot be the case, for the faults in the theory are tautology and futility. (*Vide* Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram, V. 33-35). The third is really included in, or implied by, the second, and both of them are not altogether free from the suggestion that Vyâpti is something more than a mere relation, the fault of which has just been pointed out (*vide* S. P. S., V. 31, 32, and 36). The relation of Vyâpti, therefore, arises from the co-existence or co-inherence of attributes as attributes (*vide* S. P. S., V. 29), in the widest senses of the terms, "Co-existence" and "Attributes."

Relation of Word and Object.

वाच्यवाचकभावः सम्बन्धः शब्दार्थयोः ॥ ५ । ३७ ॥

वाच्यवाचकभावः: Vâchya-vâchaka-bhâvaḥ, relation of the thing to be signified and that which signifies. सम्बन्धः Sambandhaḥ, relation. शब्दार्थयोः Śabda-arthayoḥ, of word or sound and object.

37. The relation of Word and Object is the relation of the thing to be signified and that which signifies.—364.

Vritti:—The author forbids the identity of word and object.

In the case of identity, even a jar would be cognisable by the Ear; even sound would be cognisable by the Eye; on the pronunciation of the words, "fire," etc., there would be the possibility of burning the mouth, etc.—37.

Bhâṣya:—What has been declared above, *viz.*, that through the application of the five members (of Inference) is the proof of Guṇa, etc., (*Vide* V. 27),—with a view to establish that, has been removed by means of the ascertainment of Vyâpti, the obstruction to the probative force of Inference. Now, with a view to establish that words of the form of the five members is capable of producing cognition, is being removed, by means of the ascertainment of the power or force, etc., of words, the obstruction, raised by opponents, to the probative force of words, in the form that the power to produce cognition, is not possible in the case of words.

In the object (Artha) lies the power called signifiability, and in the word (Śabda), significativeness. It is that (power) which constitutes their relation, as is the case with the adaptability of one thing to another. And through the cognition thereof becomes possbile the presentation of objects by means of words. Such is the meaning.—37.

Proofs of the relation of Word and Object.

त्रिभिः सम्बन्धसिद्धिः ॥ ५ । ३८ ॥

त्रिभिः Tribhiḥ, by means of the three. सम्बन्धसिद्धिः Sambandha-siddhiḥ, proof of the relation. Aniruddha reads "Siddheḥ" instead of "Siddhiḥ," meaning, because of the proof, etc.

38. By means of the three, is the proof of the relation.—365.

Vritti.—The author gives the reason for the above.

Because, by means of the "three," *i.e.*, methods, is the cognition of the denotation. *Viz.*, from the instruction of the Âpta or trustworthy; *e.g.*, "It is a jar." From the usage of the old, *e.g.*, "Bring the white cow with the help of the goad." Here, from seeing the activity (*i.e.*, in the act of bringing the white cow) of the grown-up emyloyee, after hearing the words of the grown-up employer, there is knowledge of the boy as to the object denoted by the word 'cow'. From having the same denotation, as some well-known word, *e.g.*, "The bird is eating the mango". On hearing this, one cognises that the object denoted is what eats mango, and, then, the cognition of the object—bird—is established.—38.

Bhâṣya :—The author mentions the means of apprehending the power of Word.

Instruction of the Âpta, usage of grown-up people, and possession of the same denotation as well-known words—by means of these three, the relation stated above, is cognised. Such is the meaning.—38.

An objection refuted.

न कार्ये नियम उभयथा दर्शनात् ॥ ५ । ३९ ॥

न Na, not. कार्ये Kârye, in respect of an act. नियमः Niyamaḥ, rule, cognisance of the power of word. उभयथा Ubhaya-thâ, both ways. दर्शनात् Darsanât, from observation or seeing.

39. Not in respect of acts (is) the rule, because it is seen in both cases.—366.

Vritti:—The author altogether discards the rule (that the significance of word is) in respect of acts only.

Significance in respect of acts is seen ; *e.g.*, " One shall worship the Sandhyâ day after day". It is also seen in respect of proved objects ; (Siddha artha) *e.g.*, " Hari is the sovereign Deva among the Devas".

For, thus, the Vedas contain Vidhis or Injunctions, Arthavâdas or Recommendations exhortations, and Mantras or Helps to meditation. In a Vidhi there is probative force in regard to the characteristic of the act being the means of attaining the end desired, which characteristic inheres in the same object with the characteristic of its being an act to be performed.

Note:—That is to say, a Vidhi, by itself, proves two things, namely, that the act enjoined ought to be performed, and that the performance of the act is the means of attaining the object desired.

An Arthavâda also, because, by reason of its being the promoter of the power of the Vidhi, is an indirect means of causing activity, is authoritative.

A Mantra also possesses authoritativeness by reason of its being the means of causing the remembrance of the act enjoined.

What (is asserted by some), namely, that authoritativeness, and not probativeness, belongs to Mantra and Arthavâda, because these are the nimitta or occasional or efficient cause of activity,—that is not so. In the matter of *production* (of results, *e.g.*, Merit and Demerit, etc.) they are for the purpose of activity, but, in the matter of *cognition* or making things known, they are simply directed to denote established objects. Therefore, authoritativeness belongs also to those Mantras and Arthavâdas which are demonstrative of established objects.—39.

Bhâṣya :—And this cognisance of power takes place in regard to acts only,—such a rule does not exist ; because in the world, as in the case of acts, so in the case of what are not acts also, the usage of grown-up people, etc. are seen. Such is the meaning. For, just as, from hearing sentences which are (kârya-para) directed to (the performance of) an act, such as, "Bring the cow", conduct such as the bringing of the cow, etc., is seen on the part of a grown-up man, so also, from hearing sentences which are (a-kârya-para) directed to an established fact, such as "A son has been born to you", conduct expressed by the hair standing on end, etc., is seen.

And on the proof of the authoritativeness of the words referring to established objects, depends the proof of the authoritativeness of the Vedânta, in regard to Viveka or Discrimination. Such is the intention of the author.—39.

Note :—(a) Here is a bit of Grammar which may be shortly explained. "Kârya-para" and "A-kârya-para" denote the modes or manners in which a statement is made by the verb. Grammar calls them Moods and enumerates four of them. But here we are concerned with the principal two only ; viz., the Indicative and the Imperative. "In the Indicative mood we *assert* or *indicate* an action as a *fact*" : as, 'A son has been born to you." "In the Imperative mood we *command* or *advise* an *action*" ; as "Bring the cow."

Now, the opponent's contention was that statements could be made by verbs in the imperative mood only. The author shows that statements can be made by verbs in the indicative mood as well. In other words, statements are not only sâdhya-para, *i.e.* directed to the performance of an action which has not yet been performed, but are also siddha-para *i.e.*, directed to convey information about accomplished facts.

(b) The commentator next shows why it is important to establish that statements are not only sâdhya-para, but are also siddha-para. As we all know, the Veda has two primary divisions ; *viz.*, the Karma-kâṇḍa and the Jñâna-kâṇḍa, that is, the portion dealing with the injunctions and prohibitions, in regard to the performance of meritorious acts, for the attainment of desired ends, and the portion dealing with knowledge of Brahman, the Self, etc., with a view to teach Discrimination between the Self and the Not-Self. Now, obviously the Karma-kâṇḍa statements will be in the imperative mood of the verbs, *i.e.*, will be sâdhya-para, directed to the performance of some action, in other words, will be directed to the production of results by means of acts ; and the Jnâna-kâṇḍa statements will be in the indicative mood of the verbs, *i.e.*, will be siddha-para, directed to the making known of established or accomplished facts, in other words, will be directed to the cognition of matters of fact, such as that "the Self is the witness, intelligent, alone, devoid of the Guṇas" etc.

Now, if statements were sâdhya-para only, as maintained by the opponent, the Jñâna-kâṇḍa portion of the Veda would be perfectly meaningless, and, therefore, unreliable, unauthoritative and useless. Therefore, the author shows that statements are not only sâdhya-para, but are also siddha-para ; so that the Jñâna-kâṇḍa of the Veda is authoritative, and the revelations made in it convey perfect transcendental knowledge about the Discrimination of the Self from the Not-Self, which is an established fact, and which, by means of the cessation of Avidyâ, leads to Release.

An objection answered : As above, so below.

लोके व्युत्पन्नस्य वेदार्थप्रतीतिः ॥ ५ । ४० ॥

लोके Loke, about the world. व्युत्पन्नस्य Vyutpannasya, of one who is conversant. N.B. Aniruddha reads the two words together as a compound. वेदार्थप्रतीतिः Veda-artha-pratîtih, intuition of Vedic objects.

40. Intuition of Vedic objects (is possible for) one who is conversant about the world.--367.

Vritti :– When the objects mentioned in the Vedas are supra-sensuous, how, it may be asked, can there be cognition "in both cases" ? In regard to this, the author says :

Whatever objects are the worldly, the very same are the Vedic,—such being their community, cognition takes place in the present case also.—40.

Bhâṣya :—Well, let there be cognisance of the power of words in the case of, or with reference to, established wordly objects, since intuition, etc., of such objects is seen ; but how, it may be asked, will it take place in the case of, or with reference to, Vedic objects ; since the making known of things which are not acts, is futile (and, consequently, the Veda will be charged with the fault of futility) ? In regard to this, the author says :

In the case of a person conversant about the power of words in respect of worldly objects, it is just by following that that there takes place the intuition of objects revealed by the Vedas ; for, the power of words is not different in the world, and different in the Veda ; because there is the maxim : Whatever is the worldly, the same is Vedic. Hence, when the power of denoting, or referring to, established objects is proved in the world, the same is proved in the Veda also. Such is the meaning.

And, of the making known of Viveka or Discrimination which is an established thing, the fruit is Release, by means of the cessation of A-vidyâ ; just as, in the world, of the making known of established facts, such as in the case of "A son has been born to you", the fruit is joy, etc. Hence, there is no futility of that (*i.e.*, of the power of making known things other than acts).—40.

Note :—But how is it proved that in the Veda the statements are siddha-para as well as sâdhya-para ? The reply is that they are so in the Veda, because they are found to be so among mankind, and because the moods of verbs are the same in the Vedic literature as they are in secular literature.

An objection apprehended.

न त्रिभिरपौरुषेयत्वाद्वेदस्य तदर्थस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात् ॥ ५ । ४१ ॥

न Na, not. त्रिभिः Tribhih, by means of the three, *viz.*, instruction by trustworthy persons, etc., *vide* V. 38 above. अपौरुषेयत्वात् A-pauruṣeya-tvât, not being the

work of a person. वेदस्य Vedasya, of the Veda. तदर्थस्य Tat-arthasya, of the objects revealed in it. अतीन्द्रियत्वात् Âti-indriya-tvât, being supra-sensuous.

41. Not by means of the three (is the relation of Word and Object established in the Veda), because the Veda is not the work of a person, and because the objects (revealed) in it are supra-sensuous. —368.

Vritti :—It might be so, says an opponent, were the Veda the work of a person, but that is not the case. This the author notes.

Since Îśvara has been excluded, since it is not possible for any one else (to be the author of the Veda), and since, by reason of error being a characteristic of puruṣa or man, there can be no certainty about trustworthiness, therefore, the unauthoritativeness of the Veda is the result. And the Veda being unauthoritative, there can be no faith in, or reliance upon, Sacrifice, etc. (taught in the Veda).—41.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—The author declares the authoritativeness of the Veda.

Unauthoritativeness does not attach to the Veda, because it is a-pauruṣeya, *i.e.*, not of personal origin. And that, (*i.e.*, that it is not of personal origin, is established) "tribhiḥ", by means of three reasons; *viz.*, by the exclusion of Îśvara, by the impossibility of any one else (being the author of the Veda), and by the uncertainty about its trustworthiness, (were it the work of man, which it is not), on account of error being the characteristic of man. But if it is urged that some specially qualified Jîva may be the author of the Veda, the author replies that (that is not possible), because "tat-artha," the objects treated of in the Veda, *viz.*, heaven and sacrifice, related to each other in the form of the object to be achieved and that which is the means of achievement, are not within the cognisance of the senses, etc.

Bhâṣya :—Here the author apprehends (an objection).

But, then, by means of the three, *i.e.*, instruction by an âpta, etc., it is not possible to grasp the power of words in the case of the Veda; because, by reason of the fact that the Veda is not of a personal origin, there does not exist in it any instruction by an âpta in regard to the objects treated of in it; and, further, because, the objects of the Veda being supra-sensuous, it is not possible to grasp, in regard to them, the usage of the old and also the fact of their having the same place of inherence (*i.e.* denotation) as other well-known words. Such is the meaning.—41.

Answer: Vedic *objects are not absolutely supra-sensuous.*

न यज्ञादेः स्वरूपतो धर्मत्वं वैशिष्ट्यात् ॥ ५ । ४२ ॥

न Na, not. यज्ञादेः Yajña-âdeḥ, of sacrifice, etc. स्वरूपतः Sva-rûpa-taḥ, in respect of their essential form. धर्मत्वं Dharma-tvam, to be dharma or merit; meritoriousness. वैशिष्ट्यात् Vaiśiṣṭyât, on account of qualifiedness, or of excellence, or connection with something visible.

42. Sacrifices, etc., are not in themselves meritorious, because of the (existence of) special conditions (of their being so).—Aniruddha. Not (so); sacrifices, etc., are in themselves the duties enjoined, on account of their excellence.—Vijñâna.—369.

Vritti:—With a view to establish the authoritativeness of the Veda, the author says:

"Vaiśiṣṭyam," qualifiedness, arises by means of dependence upon time, place, and person. Were (sacrifices, etc.) to be independent of these, they would not, in themselves, be acts of merit. Otherwise, sacrifices, etc., performed at an impure or inauspicious time, in a *mlechchha* or barbarous country, by the greatest sinners, would be causes of Merit. But such is not the case.—42.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—But Dharma or act of merit, it may be argued, is a Vedic object, and this, in the form of sacrifice, curd, white, etc., is not supra-sensuous. In regard to this the author says:

Mere sacrifice, etc., is not an act of merit, as, in that case, sacrifice, etc., performed by a Śûdra, would also be an act of merit. On the contrary, (sacrifice, etc., which is an act of merit, is) conditioned by the characteristic of being the means for the attainment of heaven, and that certainly is supra-sensuous. How? "Vaiśiṣṭyât." For excellence or qualification as regards the adhikârin or person entitled to the performance of the acts, place, time, and the like, is appropriate or contributory only to that part of the act which serves as the means of attaining heaven, but not to the essential form of sacrifice, etc., or to sacrifice, etc., in themselves.

Bhâṣya:—Out of these (*i.e.*, that the Veda is not of a personal origin and that the Vedic objects are supra-sensuous), the author first refutes that the Veda treats of objects which are supra sensuous.

What has been stated (by the objector, *i.e.*, in the preceding aphorism), that is not so; because sacrifice, gift, and the like, in the form of the offering, etc., of substances or things in the name of a Devatâ or Deity, possess in themselves, indeed, "dharmatvam," *i.e.*, the characteristic of

being enjoined in the Veda, "Vaiśiṣṭyât," *i.e.*, as they are attended with excellent fruits. Sacrifices, etc., again, being of the form of desire, etc., are not supra-sensuous, but, on the other hand, it is not the case that the apûrva or adṛiṣṭam, *i.e.*, merit, which has sacrifice, etc., as its subject, is the dharma, whereby what is enjoined in the Veda might be supra-sensuous. Such is the meaning.

But, still, may rejoin our opponent, it remains that sacrifices, etc., are constituted by, *i.e.*, by reference to, supra-sensuous objects such as a Devatâ or deity, and the like. We reply that there is nothing to object to in this; because, as will be declared in the sequel (v. 44), there can be (sensuous) intuition, even in the case of supra-sensuous objects, by means of the universal forms (Sâmânya rûpa) which determine the character of being a padârtha or an object denoted by a pada or word.—42.

Power to denote objects is inherent in Vedic *words.*

निजशक्तिर्व्युत्पत्त्या व्यवच्छिद्यते ॥ ५ । ४३ ॥

निजशक्तिः Nija-śaktiḥ, natural or inherent power. व्युत्पत्त्या Vyutpattyâ, by means of conversancy, specific knowledge or instruction. व्यवच्छिद्यते Vyavachchhidyate, is determined or differentiated.

43. The inherent power (of Vedic words) is (discriminatively) determined by means of specific knowledge (of their meanings).—370.

Vṛitti:—When it is seen that fruits are reaped by the ignorant (from the performance of acts enjoined in the Veda), the authoritativeness of the Veda (is established.) What is achieved by Vyutpatti? it may be asked. In regard to this, the author says:

This word is here, by being denotative, primary, and is here secondary,—in this way (the uses of the word) are distinguished or differentiated (by means of Vyutpatti).—43.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—The author states the helpfulness or contributoriness of Vyutpatti.

The natural power of the word, called denotativeness, is "Vyutpattyâ," *i.e.*, by the cognisance of its power, "vyavachchhidyate," *i.e.*, is established in usage under the characteristics of being primary and secondary. For primary denotativeness belongs to that which causes intuition of the object directly, while secondary denotativeness belongs to that which causes such intuition through a śakya or object capable of being denoted. And this is applicable in such cases of ascertainment as "Of a Mantra the application in respect of the object is certainly primary, and not secondary."

Bhâṣya:—What has also been stated, namely, that, the Veda not being of a personal origin, the instruction of an âpta does not exist in it,—that also the author refutes.

Though the Vedas are not of a personal origin, yet it is the natural power to denote objects, which exists (in the Vedic words), that, by the âptas, by means of successive traditions of old people, "Vyavachchhidyate," *i.e.*, is instructed to the disciples, discriminatively from other objects, by means of Vyutpatti in such form as that, of this word, this is the object. But it is not the case that, like modern words, (the Vedic words) are themselves applied as so many arbitrary signs (to signify things), whereby there would be need of (the Veda's) having a personal origin. Such is the meaning.—43.

How the power of words to denote imperceptible objects, is possible.

योग्यायोग्येषु प्रतीतिजनकत्वात्तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ५ । ४४ ॥

योग्यायोग्येषु Yogya-ayogyeṣu, in respect of objects which are capable of perception and of objects which are incapable of perception. प्रतीतिजनकत्वात् pratîti-janakatvât, because it produces intuition or knowledge. तत्सिद्धिः tat-siddhiḥ, the proof thereof, *i.e.*, of vyutpatti or cognisance of the power of words.

44. Through its producing knowledge in respect of perceptible and imperceptible objects, there is proof of the power of words.—371.

Vṛitti:—But how is the perfection or development of vyutpatti known? To this the author replies:

Because it produces knowledge in respect of secular and Vedic objects, known and unknown, there is proof of vyutpatti.—44.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—The author tells us that proof of the power under discussion is known from inference by means of its effect in the form of (causing) cognition of objects.

Bhâṣya:—But still, how can there be, it may be asked, in the case of Vedic words, cognisance of the power to denote the supra-sensuous Devatâ, fruit, etc.? To this the author replies:

In regard to objects perceptible or imperceptible by the senses, "tat-siddhiḥ," *i.e.*, cognisance of the power (to denote objects) takes place by bringing forward the generic properties (of the objects); because, the power of words to produce cognition, by reference to the common properties, is proved by perception or consciousness. The difference, however, is this that it is the supra-sensuous, *i.e.*, the apûrva or adṛiṣṭam, alone that is the object denoted by the (vedic) statement, and that the cognition or apprehension of it is not required before. Such is the meaning.—44.

Note.—Words denote objects through concepts. This is true of Vedic as well as o secular words. A "waterpot," *e.g*, denotes all waterpots whether they be present before the eyes or not. In the vedic statements, however, the fruits of acts enjoined, such as Merit, are all super-sensuous. This is the difference.

The Veda *is not eternal.*

न नित्यत्वं वेदानां कार्यत्वश्रुतेः ॥ ५ । ४५ ॥

न Na, not. नित्यत्वं Nitya-tvam, eternality. वेदानां Vedânâm, of the Vedas. कार्यत्वश्रुतेः Kârya-tva-śruteḥ, because of the hearing of their being effects or products.

45. Eternality does not belong to the Vedas, because it is heard that they are effects.—372.

Vṛitti:—The author refutes the (alleged) eternality of the Vedas. The Śrutis, for instance, (declaring that the Vedas are effects), are.

नाहरासीन्न रात्रिरासीत्

Neither was day nor was night.

स तपोऽतप्यत, तस्मात्तपस्तप्तात्त्रयो वेदा अजायन्त ।

He practised penance; from that penance having been practised, the three Vedas were produced.

And the inference (of the non-eternality of the Vedas) is from their being products.

Also, by means of sense-perception, it is known that the Varṇas or letters are perishable after having been pronounced. (Recognitive) intuition such as "It is that same letter *ka*, क," however, takes place; but the object of it is (not a particular *ka*, but) the genus *ka*.—45.

Bhâṣya:—Just in connection with (the discussion of) the authoritativeness of Śabda or Verbal Testimony, the author ascertains a peculiarity appertaining to the Śabda.

Since there are such Śrutis as:

स तपोऽतप्यत तस्मात्तपस्तप्तात्त्रयो वेदा अजायन्त

He practised penance; from that penance having been practised, the three Vedas were produced.

therefore, the Vedas do not possess eternality. Such is the meaning.

And the statements (that may be found here and there) about the eternality of the Vedas, (should be understood to) have reference to the non-cessation of succession to something homogeneous which existed before.—45.

The Vedas *are not of a personal origin.*

न पौरुषेयत्वं तत्कर्तुः पुरुषस्याभावात् ॥ ५ । ४६ ॥

न Na, not. पौरुषेयत्वं Pauruṣeya-tvam, the being of a personal origin. तत्कर्तुः Tat-kartuḥ, of the author thereof, *i.e.*, of the Vedas. अभावात् A-bhâvât, owing to non-existence.

46. The Vedas are not of a personal origin, since there does not exist a person who can be their author.—373.

Vṛitti:—The Vedas being non-eternal, they are, it may be thought, originated by a person. In regard to this, the author says:

The intention is that already has been excluded Îśvara (who, if any, could be the author of the Vedas).—46.

Bhâṣya:—Are, then, the Vedas originated by a person? it may be asked. The author replies, No, and says:

Because of the exclusion or denial of Îśvara—such is the complement (of the aphorism.)

It is easy.—46.

The Vedas *cannot be the creation of* Puruṣa.

मुक्तामुक्तयोरयोग्यत्वात् ॥ ५ । ४७ ॥

मुक्तामुक्तयोः Mukta-a-muktayoḥ, of the released and the unreleased, अयोग्यत्वात् A-yogya-tvât, because of the unfitness.

47. Because of the unfitness of the released as well as of the unreleased (Puruṣas to be the author of the Vedas, they are not of a personal origin.)—374.

Vṛitti:—Some one else, and not Îśvara, will, it may be said, be the author of the Vedas. In regard to this the author says:

Because the released, since he is free from attachment (of all sorts, desire, motive, etc.), cannot be the author, and because the unreleased (cannot be the author), since he is incapable of knowing all the materials (such as Dharma, etc.) simultaneously.—47.

Bhâṣya:—Let some one else be the author (of the Vedas),—there being room for such an enquiry, the author says:

Viṣṇu, who is in the forefront of the Jîvan-muktas, although, by means of his having the Sattva-element in him in the purest form, is the all-knower *par excellence*, yet he is unfit for the composition of the Veda with its one thousand branches, since he is perfectly free from Râga or Passion. While the unreleased Puruṣa, just by reason of his not being all-knower, is unfit. Such is the meaning.

Neither should it be contended that, just like the activity or function of preserving, etc., of innumerable living beings, the composition of the numerously-branched Veda also may be possible (in the case of Viṣṇu); because it is only by means of the intuition of objects from the self-revealed Vedas that there is activity (on the part of Viṣṇu) in the preservation, etc. (of living beings.)—47.

An Objection Answered.

नापौरुषेयत्वान्नित्यत्वमङ्कुरादिवत् ॥ ५ । ४८ ॥

न Na, not, अपौरुषेयत्वात् A-pauruṣeya-tvât, through not being of a personal origin. नित्यत्वं Nitya-tvaṃ, eternality. अंकुरादिवत् Aṅkura-âdi-vat, like the sprout, etc.

48. Through (the Vedas) not being of a personal origin, their eternality (does) not (result),—just as in the case of the sprout, etc.—375.

Vṛitti:—Since they are not personally originated, they are then, it may be said, eternal. In regard to this the author says:

It is clear.—48.

Bhâṣya:—But, then, that being so, from their not being of a personal origin, it is, one may say, their eternality that results. In regard to this, the author says:

It is clear.—48.

Vedântin Mahâdeva.—(The apprehension is groundless), for to be not of a personal origin and to be eternal are not co-extensive terms, since there is a failure of their co-extension in the case of the sprout, etc.

A further objection answered.

तेषामपि तद्योगे दृष्टबाधादिप्रसक्तिः ॥ ५ । ४९ ॥

तेषाम् Teṣâm, of these, *i e.*, sprout, etc. अपि Api, also. तद्योगे Tat-yoge, if there is connection with that, *i.e.*, the being of a personal origin. दृष्टबाधादिप्रसक्तिः Dṛiṣṭa-bâdha-âdi-prasaktiḥ, implication of contradiction of what is seen, etc.

49. Were these also to have connection with that, (there would be) the implication of contradiction of what is seen, and the like.—376.

Vṛitti:—But if one were to argue that the sprout, etc., also must have a creator because they are effects, then, it may be said, agency would belong to the released. In regard to this, the author says:

Since the creator of the sprout, etc. is not visible, there is exclusion of Perception. And it has already been declared (*vide* V. 47) that their creator does not exist, because of the unfitness (of both the released and the unreleased Puruṣa to be their creator).

By the word "âdi" is exhibited that the characteristic (of the sprout, etc.) of being the thing pervaded (*vide* Bhâṣya below), is not established.—49.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—The author replies to those who maintain that the sprout, etc., also must have a creator, because they are effects.

"Tat-yoge", *i.e.*, on their connection with a creator, there will be contradiction of things observed which have no creator. The word "Adi" suggests the supposition of things unobserved having their creator. The idea is that the fact that something is an effect is here, as a mark of inference, inoperative.

Bhâṣya :—But in the case of the sprout, etc., also, as in the case of the jar, etc, it should be inferred, one may say, that they are originated by a person. In regard to this, the author says:

The Vyâpti or pervasion is seen in the world that whatever is originated by a person, is produced through or by means of the body. If the case were as is asserted by the objector, then there would be contradiction, etc., of such pervasion. Such is the meaning.—49.

Note :—An important distinction is here made between Kritam, created, *i.e.*, originated *de novo* by an intelligent person, and Utpannam, produced or grown, *i.e.*, developed according to the law of the nature of a thing. *Vide* the next aphorism.

Meaning of "Pauruṣeya," *originated by person.*

यस्मिन्नदृष्टेऽपि कृतबुद्धिरुपजायते तत्पौरुषेयम् ॥ ५ । ५० ॥

यस्मिन् Yasmin, in respect of which. अदृष्टे A-driṣṭe, remaining unseen or unobserved. अपि Api, even. कृतबुद्धिः Krita-buddhiḥ, the idea as of something created. उपजायते Upajâyate, grows or arises. तत् Tat, that. पौरुषेयम् Pauruṣeyam, originated by a person.

50. In respect whereof, though the (creator) remains unobserved (Aniruddha), or though it be something invisible (Vijñâna), the idea arises that it is something created, that is (called) Pauruṣeya.—377.

Vritti :—The author tells us that logical pervasion, vyâpti, does not subsist between the characteristics of being non-eternal and of being Pauruṣeya.

As, *e.g.*, the jar, etc., but not in the case of the tree, etc, "Adriṣṭe api": that is, though the creator be not observed

Effect as such does not necessarily have a creator, but only particular classes of effects have.—50.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—What, then, proceeds from a creator? it may be asked. To this the author replies:

In the case of the sprout and the like, on the other hand, the idea does not arise that it has been *created*, but that it has been *produced* or has *grown* or *developed*.

"Paurûṣeyam" means that which has a creator.

Bhâṣya :—But, it may be argued, the Vedas also, since they have been spoken by the Âdi or Original Puruṣa, are certainly Pauruṣeya or originated by a person. Hence the author says :

As in the case of things observed, so also in the case of things unobserved, in respect whereof arises "kṛitabuddhiḥ," *i.e.*, the idea that it (*i.e.*, its origination) has been preceded by intelligence, that alone is treated as being Pauruṣeya. Such is the meaning.

Hereby it is said that the characteristic of being pauruṣeya does not arise by reason merely of the characteristic or fact of having been pronounced or breathed by a Puruṣa, inasmuch as inhalations and exhalations of breath, taking place in the state of deep sleep (suṣupti), are not treated as being Pauruṣeya or originated by the Puruṣa; but it arises by reason of (the origination of the thing) being preceded by intelligence.

Now, the Vedas, just like the breath, verily not being preceded by intelligence, appear, of themselves, from the atmosphere of the Svayambhû or self-born (Brahmâ) under the influence of Adṛiṣṭam. Hence they are not Pauruṣeya or originated by Puruṣa.

And, thus, there is the Śruti :—

तस्यैतस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद्यदृग्वेद इत्यादिः

Of that, the same, great being, it is the breathing – that which is (called) the Rigveda, etc.—*Bṛihat Âraṇyka Upaniṣat*, II. iv. 10; IV. v. 11.—50.

The Vedas *themselves are proof of their own authority.*

निजशक्त्यभिव्यक्तेः स्वतः प्रामाण्यम् ॥ ५ । ५१ ॥

निजशक्त्यभिव्यक्तेः: Nija-śakti-abhivyakteḥ, through manifestation of the power inherent in the Vedas. स्वतः: Svataḥ, of or from themselves. प्रामाण्यम् prâmâṇyam, authoritativeness.

51. From (seeing) the manifestation of the power inherent (in the Vedas), (their) authoritativeness (follows) from themselves.—378.

Vṛitti :—The author condemns (the view that) the authoritativeness (of the Vedas depends) on something other (than themselves).

The authoritativeness (of the Vedas) is dependent merely on the materials which produce cognition of the power inherent (in them), but does not, so far as the *production* (of fruits by means of the acts enjoined in them) is concerned, stand in need of any other additional quality. So far also as (the appearance or development of) knowledge (by means of

the truths revealed in them) is concerned, natural is the power of (the truths) which communicate the knowledge, to bring out, or to impress one with, their authoritativeness. Through the manifestation thereof, is their authoritativeness, of itself, manifested, as well as from seeing, on the part of men), instant application to them.

Where, again, for the purpose of setting on apprehension at rest, there is pursuit of evidence or proof with a view to an enquiry into their authoritativeness, there also the enquiry or pursuit is for the purpose of finding out and removing the fault in the cause, and not for the purpose of (discovering) a quality or excellence (in the Vedas). It is for this reason that, if their authority depends upon something other than the Vedas, there will be unauthoritativeness, inasmuch as, in the case of that, "fault" also is a cause.—51.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—Just by means of their own inherent power of producing knowledge, since there takes place the manifestation,—of their being pramâ or right knowledge—such is the complement of the sentence.

Their authoritativeness, *i.e.*, the characteristic of being producer delimited by the characteristic of right knowledge, is of their own, and is not dependent upon an adventitious quality, wherefore the Vedas should, for their authoritativeness, stand in need of being created by an âpta. And to be created by one who is not an âpta, will, on the other hand, lead to the inference of their unauthoritativeness.

Bhâṣya:—But, if that be so, then, may rejoin our opponent, since the Vedas are not preceded by cognition of the imports of the statements as corresponding to objective realities, authoritativeness will not belong to the Vedic statements also, just as in the case of the words uttered by a parrot. In regard to this, the author says:

Of the Vedas what is "Nijâ" or natural or innate "Śakti" or power of producing cognition corresponding to objective realities, of that, since there is observation of manifestation in the case of *mantras*, the Âyurveda, etc.; therefore, of all the Vedic declarations, without exception, is proved the authoritativeness just by themselves, and not by means of their having their origin in cognition corresponding to objective realities on the part of their speaker. Such is the meaning.

Thus is there the Nyâya-Sûtram:—

मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवच्च तत्प्रामाण्यम् ॥ २।१।६७ ॥

And the authoritativeness thereof (is established), just like the authoritativeness of mantras and the Âyurveda.—*Nyâya Sûtram* II, 1.67.—51.

Reality of the Objective World further established.

नासतः ख्यानं नृशृङ्गवत् ॥ ५ । ५२ ॥

न Na, no. असतः A-satah, of the non-existent. ख्यानं Khyânam, manifestation. नृशृङ्गवत् Nri-sringa-vat, like man's horn.

52. (There can be) no manifestation of what is non-existent,—just as of the horns of man.—379.

Vritti:—The author condemns the Bauddha theory (of the Void).

(Where a shining mother-of-pearl shell is mistaken for a piece of silver), "It is silver"—this identity of the mother-of-pearl shell and silver, which is really non-existent, manifests itself, (says the Bauddha). But that is not so; because, since it lacks in producing (the impression of) an object and serving any action, it is impossible for the non-existent to be the producer of cognition, just as is the case with the horns of man.—52.

Bhâṣya:—To establish the proposition, namely, that "and of the Guṇas, etc., there is not absolute exclusion" (V. 26), has been, by way of argument, put forward and discussed one reason in the form: Because of the proof or reality of pleasure, etc. (V. 27). Now, in respect of the very same proposition, the author adduces another reason.

Let alone, by all means, the proof of pleasure, etc., by means of the five-membered (syllogism); through mere cognition or knowledge also will there be proof thereof. If they were absolutely non-existent, knowledge itself of pleasure, etc., would not be possible, since there is no manifestation to consciousness of non-entities, such as the horns of man, etc. Such is the meaning.

Thus, there is the Brahma-Sûtram:

नाभाव उपलब्धेः ॥ २।२।२८ ॥

Not non-existence, because of perception.—*Vedânta Sûtras*, II. ii. 28.

And in the case of a mother-of-pearl shell appearing as silver, dreams, (imaginary) desires, etc., it is the object just in the form of a transformation of Manas, that is intuited; and those, as the author will declare, are, therefore, not absolutely non-existent.—52.

The Objective World is not absolutely real.

न सतो बाधदर्शनात् ॥ ५ । ५३ ॥

न Na, no. सतः Satah, of the existent. बाधदर्शनात् Bâdha-darśanât, because of the observation of the obstruction or contradiction, *i.e.*, non-existence.

53. No, because of the observation of the non-existence of what is existent.—380.

Vṛitti:—The author condemns the theory of the followers of Prabhâkara a celebrated Mîmâṃsist.

In "It is silver," "it" is the object present before the eyes, and "silver" is the thing remembered;—these two are cognitions, and their application to each other is, (say the followers of Prabhâkara), due to the non-cognisance of their difference.

No, (says the author); because such application is seen to take place through cognisance of non-difference, and also because there are contrary instances in the form of "It is not silver."

Neither is there any contradiction or exception to perfect knowledge or knowledge corresponding to reality. Were there any, then, knowledge having arisen such as "It is a jar," there would be knowledge that "It is not a jar."—53.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—"It" and "Silver" are two cognitions one of which is perception, and the other, recollection. Their application to each other is due to non-cognisance of the difference, and not due to cognisance of the difference, say the followers of Prabhâkara. But that is not so, because, "It is not silver"—such contradiction or exception is seen.

Bhâṣya:—But, if this be so, then let the Guṇas, etc., be verily existent, (may say our opponent), and, in that case, the word atyanta or absolute in "not absolute exclusion" (*vide* V. 26), would be meaningless. In regard to this the author says:

The manifestation of the Guṇas, etc., as though they were absolutely existent or real, would not also be reasonable; because of the observation of their non-existence at the time of their destruction, etc., and also because of the observation of the non-existence, even in consciousness, of the world previously shining in consciousness, and further, (because of the contradiction of their absolute reality) by means of the arguments furnished by such Śrutis as:—

अथातो आदेशो नेति नेति

Now then the direction: Not this, not that.—*Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat*, II, iii, 6.

नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन

Here exists nothing whatever which is manifold.—*Ibidem*, IV, iv, 19.

यत्र देवा न देवा माता न माता

Where the Devas are not Devas, the mother is not mother.—*Ibidem*, IV, iii, 22.

Such is the meaning.—53.

The World cannot be something else than real and unreal.

नानिर्वचनीयस्य तदभावात् ॥ ५ । ५४ ॥

न Na, not. अनिर्वचनीय A-nirvachanîya-sya, of that which is indescribable by

the words, real and unreal. तदभावात् Tat-abhâvât, because of the non-existence or absence thereof, *i.e.*, of manifestation to consciousness.

54. No, because of the absence of the manifestation (to consciousness) of that which is indescribable (by the words real and unreal).—381.

Vritti :—The author condemns the theory of the Vedântin.

"It is silver,"—in this case, were (the identity of the mother-of-pearl shell with silver) unreal, sensuous cognition would not take place, (but it does); were it real, no obstruction (to its reality) would exist, (but it exists): hence it must be something indescribable, quite different from being real and unreal. Accordingly (has it been said):

न सत्त्वे बाधसंविस्तिर्न भानमसतोऽपि च ।
न द्वयात्म विरुद्धत्वादतस्तत्त्वान्तरं कुतः ॥
मायामयत्वसिद्धौ तु प्रपञ्चस्य प्रमाणतः ।
प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यं व्यवहारिकम् ॥
अद्वैतागमवाक्यं तु तत्त्वावेदनलक्षणम् ।
प्रमाणभावं भजते बाधवैधुर्यहेतुतः ॥
तस्मान्मायामयत्वेऽपि युक्ता ब्रह्मणि मानता ।
अद्वैतागमवाक्यानामिति तावद् व्यवस्थितम् ॥

In the case of reality, there can be no knowledge of an obstruction, neither can there be manifestation of what is unreal. It cannot be of the nature of both, because of their being opposed to each other; hence how can it be a different Tattva or principle?

When, on the other hand, the web of Creation is proved, by means of evidence, to be constituted by Mâyâ, the evidentiary value of the Proofs, Perception, etc., is for practical purposes only.

While the Vedic declaration on Non-Duality, characterised by being the communication of the truth, acquires the character of Proof through the weakness of its opposite.

Therefore, though they be constituted by Mâyâ, it is reasonable that the Vedic declarations on Non-Duality should be proof of Brahman. So much is, no doubt, established.

(So argues the Vedântin), but that is not so, because, by the very statement, "It is silver," the thing is capable of being described, and also because, by means of its indescribability expressed by "Neither existent nor non-existent," is furnished a description of it.—54.

Bhâṣya :—Well, even if this be so, let the world, it may be said, be just what is different from the existent and the non-existent; and still the negation of its absolute non-existence is not justified.

In regard to this the author says:

Of that which is indescribable by the terms existence as well as non-existence, manifestation cannot take place; "tat-abhâvât," that is, on

account of an object which is different from the existent and the non-existent, not being known. Such is the meaning. Because it is proper that supposition should be made in accordance with the facts of observation. Such is the idea.

What, on the other hand, the Smṛiti says, namely,

नासद्रूपा न सद्रूपा माया नैवोभयात्मिका ।
सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वाच्या मिथ्याभूता सनातनी ॥

Neither of the form of the non-existent, nor of the form of the existent, is Mâyâ, nor does it verily partake of the character of both. Indescribable by the terms, existent and non-existent, is it,—a pure Falsity, everlasting.

Of that the meaning is this: "Mâyâ," that is, Prakṛiti, together with her products, does not possess the forms of the three kinds (existent, non-existent, and other than existent and non-existent) refuted by the three aphorisms (V. 52—54), but is "sat-asat-bhyâm anirvâchyâ," that is, unascertainable, in other words, incapable of being spoken of, with certainty, either as that "it is just existent" or that "it is just non-existent"; because "mithyâ-bhûtâ," that is, every moment it passes into a different mode (of existence). Hence also is it "sanâtanî," that is, eternal as regards its own or essential form, that is to say, is of an existent-non-existent form.

Very similarly has been declared, in the Yoga Bhâṣya, the non-existence-*cum*-existence of Prakṛiti attended with her products.—54.

Nor is the world a reflection of what it is not.

नान्यथाख्यातिः स्ववचोव्याघातात् ॥ ५ । ५५ ॥

न Na, not. अन्यथाख्यातिः Anyathâ-khyâtiḥ, manifestation otherwise; cognition of one thing as another. स्ववचोव्याघातात् Sva-vachaḥ-vyâghâtât, because of contradiction of their own statement.

55. (The cognition of a mother-of-pearl shell, for example, as silver, can) not (be said to be) an anyathâ-khyâti, because of the contradiction (thereby) of their own statement.—382.

Vṛitti:—The author condemns the view of the Nyâya Darśana.

"It is silver,"—in this case, it is not the fact that the mother-of-pearl shell itself manifests by the nature of silver. One thing manifests by the nature of another thing,—this is contrary to consciousness. In the case in question, it is the attributed or super-imposed (âropita) silver that manifests in the shell.*—55.

* This last sentence is read by Garbe in the introduction to the next aphorism.

Bhâṣya:—Well, then, if this be so, is it anyathâ-khyâti, it may be asked, that is desired? The author replies, No.

One thing manifests by the form of another thing, but not that there is manifestation of what is non-existent,—this too is not reasonable; "svavacho-vyâghâtât," that is, because the opponent's own tenet that the non-existent does not manifest in consequence of the absence of contact with the senses, etc., is contradicted, on account of the admission of the manifestation of a non-existent connection (in the case of anyathâ-khyâti). Such is the meaning.

And if it is said that the connection also, being verily existent in another place, manifests; still there would be manifestation of the non-existent involved in the cognisance of things having the object and the attribute as the auxiliary and the antagonist; while, in the non-cognisance thereof, by reason of the implication of the manifestation of the irregular combinations themselves of silverness in the mother-of-pearl shell, since it comes to be nothing but the very non-cognisance of the discrimination as is intended by us, there is certainly contradiction of the assertion of anyathâ-khyâti, inasmuch as the meaning of the term "anyathâ-khyâti" is nothing but a particular form of error.

Moreover, in the case of cognition wandering away from the object, their own statement that the proof of objects is by means of cognition, would be contradicted. Accordingly has it been said:

ज्ञानस्य व्यभिचारित्वे विश्वासो किंनिबन्धनः ॥

Did cognition wander away, on what would belief rest?

But for the purpose of the establishment thereof, by reason of the redundancy in making a thousand suppositions, it is proper to make the supposition of the non-cognisance of the non-connection, which is established both ways, as being the cause of the use of anyathâ-khyâti.

Furthermore, by reason of there being no distinction between cognitions as such, there is a want of a principle of determination in regard to their relation as the obstructed and the obstructor. Such is the hint.—55.*

* The translation given above is of the reading of the Bhâṣya adopted by Garbe. F. E. Hall's reading is altogether different from this. In the absence of the original sources from which these editors have made their selections, it is not possible for us to say which of these contradictory versions is the genuine one. The divergence between them is almost astounding. We give below a translation of the Bhâṣya according to the reading of F. E. Hall:

One thing manifests by the form of another,—this too is not reasonable, "sva-vacho-vyâghâtât," that is, because, by the word anyathâ or otherwise, is declared that the form of one thing is, in the case of another thing, like the horns of man, and, of that is asserted

The World is both existent and non-existent.

सदसद्ख्यातिर्बाधाबाधात् ॥ ५ । ५६ ॥

सदसद्ख्यातिः Sat-asat-khyâtiḥ, manifestation of the existent and the non-existent. बाधाबाधात् Bâdha-abâdhât, owing to obstruction and non-obstruction.

56. (Of the Guṇas, etc. there is) manifestation of existence as well as of non-existence, according to obstruction and non-obstruction.—383.

Vṛitti :—The author states his own view.

"It is silver,"—here, as the object (mother-of-pearl shell) present before the eyes, it is existent, since there is no obstruction (to its existence); but, as silver, it is non-existent, since there is obstruction (to its being silver). Therefore, manifestation of existence-*cum*-non-existence is the truth.—56.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—"It is silver,"—this embraces existence and non-existence. "It is not silver,"—this is the negation of silver, but not of the thing present before the eyes.

Bhâṣya :—Elaborating what has been stated before, namely, that "(Of the Guṇas, etc., there is) not absolute exclusion or obstruction" (V. 26), the author deduces his own conclusion.

It is the manifestation of existence and non-existence (that takes place) in the case of all, the Guṇas, etc. How? "Owing to obstruction and non-obstruction." Therein there is non-obstruction of all entities as regards their own or essential form, because of their being eternal (in that respect), but, as regards their associations, there exists obstruction of all entities in Chaitanya or consciousness. Just as, *e.g.*, of the silver, etc., residing in Buddhi, in the case of the mother-of-pearl shell; of redness, etc., in the case of the crystal, etc.: similarly.

Likewise, by means of states also, there exists, in time, etc., obstruction of all those that undergo transformation. Such is the meaning.

And "obstruction" is to be the object of the idea of negation in respect of something of an ascertained or established nature; while

the manifestation in a different way,—hence the opponents's own statement itself is contradicted, inasmuch as it is declared also by the upholders of the theory of anyathâkhyâti that the manifestation of the non-existent is impossible. Such is the meaning. A non-entity, present before one, cannot be the exciting cause of the manifestation of its existence in another place. Such is the idea.

Neither can it be said that collocation of materials for the manifestation of the non-existent, in all cases, is not possible, and, that hence sometimes mere existence is required. Because it is quite possible for the very stream of vâsanâ or tendencies, continuing from eternity, to be the cause of error.

non-existence is non-being, and this too is of the own or essential form of the receptacle (adhikaraṇa).

Neither can it be said that there would be mutual contradiction between existence and non-existence; since there can be no such contradiction by reason of the difference of modes. For, just as, *e.g.*, it is seen that redness in the form of the reflecting body, (the China rose), is existent, and, in the form of the reflection penetrating into the crystal, is non-existent, or just as silver in the form resting on the shelf of the jeweller's shop, is existent, and in the form superimposed upon the mother-of-pearl shell, is non-existent, very similarly is the whole world existent, as regards its essential form, and, in the form superimposed upon Consciousness, etc., is non-existent.

So has it been said :

अर्थे ह्यविद्यमानेऽपि संसृतिर्न निवर्तते ।
ध्यायतो विषयानस्य स्वप्नेऽनर्थागमो यथा ॥

For even though the object do not exist, the rounds of existences do not come to a stop. Just as through contemplating objects, non-objects present themselves to one in dream.

In the very same way, again, by reason of the difference of states also, existence and non-existence are unopposed to each other. For, just as trees, etc., though existent by their grown up and like states, are non-existent by the states of the sprout, etc., very similarly do Prakṛiti, etc., possess the double nature of the existent and the non-existent.

So has it been said :

नित्यदा ह्यङ्ग भूतानि भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ।
कालेनालक्ष्यवेगेन सूक्ष्मत्वात्तन्न दृश्यते ॥

For, constantly, my child, entities exist and exist not in course of time, of which the motion is imperceptible. On account of subtlety it is not observed.

This existence-*cum*-non-existence of the web of Creation, as is mentioned in the aphorism, is recorded in the Smṛiti :

अव्यक्तं कारणं यत्तन्नित्यं सदसदात्मकम् ।
प्रधानं प्रकृतिश्चेति यदाहुस्तत्त्वचिन्तकाः ॥

What is the Unmanifested Cause, that is eternal and of the nature of the existent and the non-existent,—which the contemplators of the Tattvas or Principles describe as Pradhâna and as Prakṛiti.—Viṣṇu Purana, I. ii., 19.

Note :—The words, "Pradhâna" and "Prakṛiti," represent two distinct aspects of the Root cause. Pradhâna, derived as pra $+\sqrt{\text{dhâ}}$+anat, denotes that in which all things are contained. Prakṛiti, derived as pra$+\sqrt{\text{kṛi}}$+kti, denotes that by which all actions, creation, sustentation, and re-construction, are achieved.

And this has been elaborated by us in the Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ-Bhâṣya and Yoga-Vârtika. Such is the hint.—56.

Theory of Sphoṭa *refuted.*

प्रतीत्यप्रतीतिभ्यां न स्फोटात्मकः शब्दः ॥ ५ । ५७ ॥

प्रतीत्यप्रतीतिभ्यां Pratîti-apratîti-bhyâm, by reason of intuition and of non-intuition. न Na, not. स्फोटात्मकः Sphoṭa-âtmakaḥ, of the nature of Sphoṭa (*vide* Bhâṣya below). शब्दः Śabdaḥ, Sound, Word.

57. By reason of intuition and of non-intuition, Word is not of the nature of Sphoṭa.—381.

Vritti :—The author discards Sphoṭa.

"Intuition" is in the case of the letters, "non-intuition," in the case of Sphoṭa. Therefore, Word is not of the nature of Sphoṭa.

If the letters do not establish anything at all, how can there be the establishment of Sphoṭa even? Now, if they do establish objects, what need of a useless Sphoṭa? Let the letters themselves be the means of the establishment of objects.

On account of manifoldness also there can be no proof of Sphoṭa.—57.

Bhâṣya :—The above discussion (on the reality and unreality of the Guṇas, etc.) is sufficient. Now a consideration of Śabda or Word which has come up incidentally, is proposed,—because it is an adventitious matter,—at the end.

Over and above the letters individually, in the form of "waterpot," etc., a single indivisible word is recognised by the Yoga philosophers to bet he Sphoṭa,—just like the wholes such as a water-pot, etc., over and above the parts, such as the conch-shaped neck, etc.; because, just like "one water-pot," there is intuition of "one word", and also because, since the letters are of speedy destruction, it is impossible that they should, by combining together, cause the intuition of objects. And that particular form of Sound, called the word (pada), is described as Sphoṭa, inasmuch as it serves to make the object manifest.

That Sound (Sphoṭa) is not supported by evidence and is, therefore, unworthy of belief. Why? "By reason of intuition and non-intuition": Is that Sound intuited, or is it not? In the first alternative, by what collection of letters, arranged in a particular manner, one after another, that is manifested, of that alone let the power be of causing the intuition of objects; what is the necessity for that (*i.e.*, Sphoṭa) which is useless? While, in the latter alternative, an unknown Sphoṭa cannot have the power of causing the manifestation of objects, and hence the supposition of Sphoṭa is futile. Such is the meaning.

If it be thought that the intuition of unity will somehow or other be the means of establishing objects, then the result would be that a forest and the like will be something over and above the individual trees composing it, because of the identity of the intuition of unity in such cases as "one forest," etc.—57.

Varṇas *or Letters are not eternal.*

न शब्दनित्यत्वं कार्यताप्रतीतेः ॥ ५ । ५८ ॥

न Na, not. शब्दनित्यत्वं Śabda-nitya-tvaṃ, eternality of Sound or Word. कार्यताप्रतीतेः Kâryatâ-pratîteḥ, because of the intuition of its being an effect.

58. Sound is not eternal, because it is seen to be an effect.—385.

Vṛitti :—On account of contradiction by Perception, the Vedas have been stated to be non-eternal. (*Vide* V. 45). The author now demonstrates the non-eternality of the Varṇas or letters.

Because, immediately after the hearing of Sound (in the form of the letters), arises the intuition that "it is not." Otherwise, eternality will belong to the water-pot also.—58.

Bhâṣya :—Previously (V. 45) the eternality of the Vedas has been refuted. Now the author refutes the eternality of the letters also.

On the strength of recognition such as "This is that same letter *Ga*," is maintained the eternality of letters, but that is not reasonable; because, by means of such intuitions as "The letter *Ga* is produced," there is proof of their non-eternality. And their recognition has their belonging to their classes as its object, since, otherwise, the eternality of the water-pot and the like also would result by means of their recognition.—58.

An objection apprehended.

पूर्वसिद्धसत्त्वस्याभिव्यक्तिर्दीपेनेव घटस्य ॥ ५ । ५९ ॥

पूर्वसिद्धसत्त्वस्य Pûrva-siddha-sattva-sya, of the previously established existence. अभिव्यक्तिः Abhivyaktiḥ, illumination. दीपेन Dîpena, by lamp. इव Iva, as. घटस्य Ghaṭasya, of the water-pot.

59. (What you call production, may rejoin our opponent, is) the manifestation of the previously-established existence,—just as (is that) of the water-pot by the lamp.—386.

Vritti :—For the purpose of establishing that, except Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, all else is effect, the author apprehends :

Just as a water-pot, lying in the dark, is illuminated by the lamp, so are Varṇas or letters illuminated by Dhvani or Sound. When there is an absence thereof, there takes place the reflex cognition or manifestation that "they do not exist," but not because they are non-existent.—59.

Bhâṣya :—The author apprehends an objection.

Well, what is the manifestation, by means of Dhvani or Sound, etc., of the Word of which the existence has verily been previously established, that alone is the object of the intuition of production An example of such manifestation (*i.e.*, of a previously existing thing) is that "of the water-pot by the lamp."—59.

The objection answered.

सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तश्चेत् सिद्धसाधनम् ॥ ५ । ६० ॥

सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तः Sat-kârya-siddhântaḥ, tenet of Existent Effect. *Vide* I. 114-120. चेत् Chet, if. सिद्धसाधनम् Siddha-sâdhanam, establishment of the established.

60. If (it is) the tenet of Existent Effect, there is establishment of what is already established.—387.

Vritti :—The author gives the solution :

By depending upon illumination or manifestation, eternality is asserted. If thence follows the tenet of Existent Effect, there would be establishment of what is already established.—60.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—What is the purport of the assertion of eternality based on the doctrine of manifestation ? Is it that the Effect is existent, and not non-existent, (in the Cause even prior to its production) ? or, is it that, just as in the case of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, eternality belongs to the letters ? In the first alternative, the implication is as is here mentioned. In the other, the defect will be shown afterwards.

Bhâṣya :—The author repels the objection apprehended.

If it is asserted that manifestation consists in attaining the present state by the abandonment of the state past and gone, then there is the tenet of Existent Effect. And such eternality belongs to all effects whatever. Hence there is establishment of what is already established (which is fallacious). Such is the meaning.

If, again, it is maintained that manifestation is of the form of the mere cognition of just the effects which are existent only by their present states, then the eternality of water-pot, etc., also will be entailed ; for, just as in the case of sounds, so in the case of the water-pot,

etc., also, it is but proper to hold that it is cognition alone that is the object of the intuition of its production by reason of the operation of the cause.—60.

Refutation of the Non-Duality (A-Dvaita) *of the Self.*

नाद्वैतमात्मनो लिङ्गात्तद्भेदप्रतीतेः ॥ ५ । ६१ ॥

न Na, not. अद्वैतम् A-dvaitam, non-duality. आत्मनः Âtmanaḥ, of the self. लिङ्गात् Liṅgât, through inferential marks. तद्भेदप्रतीतेः Tat-bheda-pratîteḥ, because of the intuition of the division or difference thereof.

61. (There is) not non-duality of the Self, because there is knowledge of its difference, through marks.—388.

Vṛitti :—The Self is one and one only, say some. Thus,

सितनीलादिभेदेन यथैकं दृश्यते नभः ।
भ्रान्तदृष्टिभिरेवात्मा तथैकः सन् पृथक् पृथक् ॥

Just as one single sky is seen separately, being divided as white, blue, etc., so is the Self, though it is one and one only, seen separately, only by those whose vision is erroneous.

The author refutes this theory.

Because of the law or uniformity of the marks of decay, death, etc.

In the preceding (*vide* I. 154-159), (denial of non-duality) was stated to be as good as established : now it is being established. Hence there is no tautology.—61.

Bhâṣya :—The objections, not previously mentioned, to the non-duality of the Self, should also be brought forward,—for this purpose the refutation of the non-duality of the Self is commenced again.

Even though, like the statements declaring the mutual differences (bheda) of the selves among themselves, there be also statements declaring their non-difference, still " Na advaitam," that is, absolute non-difference would not belong to them; inasmuch as it is their mutual difference that is established by means of the characteristic marks such as the abandonment (by one person) and non-abandonment (by another person) of Prakṛiti, mentioned in such declarations as Ajâ, etc. (Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat, IV. 5). Such is the meaning. For, those marks could not be explained in the case of absolute non-difference, since, as has been already shown, it is impossible to explain those declarations by the help of superimposed or Upâdhi-caused differences. The declarations on the subject of non-duality, on the other hand, by reason of their being of the same import as the Vedic declarations of equality (sâmya), etc., can be explained

as having reference to non-difference characterised by non-difference of essential properties; and also because that they bear such a reference is ascertained by means also of the fact that the cessation of Abhimâna, etc., cannot otherwise be possible.—61.

Evidence of Sense-Perception is against Non-Duality.

नानात्मनाऽपि प्रत्यक्षबाधात् ॥ ५ । ६२ ॥

न Na, not. अनात्मना An-âtmanâ, with the Not-Self. अपि Api, also. प्रत्यक्षबाधात् Pratyakṣa-bâdhât, because of contradiction by perception.

62. Nor (can there be unity of the self) with the Not-Self, because of contradiction by Perception.—389.

Vṛitti :—Let there be not homogeneous non-duality (*i.e.*, non-duality of Self with Self); but the not-selves such as the water-pot, etc., will be, may say our opponent, of the form of the Self, and hence there will be heterogeneous non-duality (*i. e.*, non-duality of the Self with the Not-Self). In regard to this the author says:

There is not unity of the Self with the Not-Self, *e.g.*, the water pot, etc., because of the seeing of the difference of the water-pot, etc., by reason of their being external. Were the Self and the Not-Self to be one, then the character of the Self would belong to the water-pot, etc., and it would belong to the Self also to undergo transformation.—62.

Bhâṣya :—It has been stated that the marks mentioned above, in other word, difference, is an obstruction to the non-duality of Selves. To the non-duality of the Self with the Not-Selves, as declared by the Śrutis, such as

आत्मैवेदं सर्वम्

All this is verily the Self.—Chhândogya Upaniṣat, VII. XXV. 2.

ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वम्

All this verily is Brahman.—Muṇḍaka Upaniṣat, II. ii. 11.

there is, on the other hand, Perception also as an obstruction, says the author.

With the Not-Self, that is, the world of the objects of experience (Bhoga) also, there is not non-duality of the Self, because of obstruction by Perception. In the case of the non-difference of the Self from all objects of experience, there would be non-difference also between a water-pot and a piece of cloth, because of the non-difference of a water-pot, etc., from the Self which is non-different from a piece of cloth, etc. And such

non-difference is contradicted by Perception which is cognisant of their difference. Such is the meaning.—62.

The same repeated.

नोभाभ्यां तेनैव ॥ ५ । ६३ ॥

न Na, not. उभाभ्यां Ubhâbhyâm, with both the Self and the Not-Self तेन Tena, by the same, *i.e.*, Perception. एव Eva, very.

63. Nor (is there non-duality of the Self) with both (taken together), (because of contradiction) by the very same.—390.

Vritti :—But there will be, it may be said, non-duality which is at once homogeneous and heterogeneous (Viśiṣṭa Advaita). In regard to this, the author says :

Because of the observation of difference by the very means of unobstructed intuition.—63.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—"Tena eva," by reason of the very contradiction by Perception, "Ubhâbhyâm", with the Self and the Not-Self, unity is not possible. "You are happy, I am pained, this is a water-pot",—such unobstructed perceptions themselves are the obstructors to the unity of the Self. Such is the import.

Bhâṣya:—With the object of clearing the Buddhi of the disciple, the author makes the object or sense, even though it has been obtained, plainer still.

"Ubhâbhyâm", that is, with the Self and the Not-Self taken together, there is not absolute non-difference: "tena eva", that is, by reason of the very same two causes (*i.e.*, obstructions by Inference and by Perception). Such is the meaning.—63.

Śrutis *on Non-Duality explained.*

अन्यपरत्वमविवेकानां तत्र ॥ ५ । ६४ ॥

अन्यपरत्वम् Anya-para-tvam, significance or reference to something else. अविवेकानां A-vivekânâm, of the non-discriminating. तत्र Tatra, therein; in the so-called Śrutis on Non-Duality.

64. In those (Śrutis) of the non-discriminating, there is reference to something else. (Aniruddha). There is in it (*i.e.*, Non-Duality) reference to something else in regard to the non-discriminating. (Vijñâna).—391.

Vritti :—But, if this be so, then, one may say, there is conflict with the Vedic declarations of Non-Duality. In regard to this, the author says :

Of those Śrutis of the blind, the reference is to something else, that is, the reference is to the genus (of the Self).—64.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—"Tatra," in the Śruti on the unity of the Self, which is demonstrative of the unity of Self-hood, "A-vivekânâm", in the case of the dull, "Anya-paratvam," significance of the unity of the Self, manifests,—such is the complement. So that, there is no conflict with the Śruti. Such is the idea.

Bhâṣya :—But, then, if this be so, what, it may be asked, will be the fate of the Śrutis such as

आत्मैवेदं

The Self verily is this.—Chhândogya Upaniṣat, VII. xxv. 2.

In regard to this the author says :

"A-vivekânâm," that is, with reference to the non-discriminating Puruṣas, "tatra," that is, in (the teaching of) Non-Duality, (there is) a translation or reinculcation of that which has worship for its purpose or object. Such is the meaning. For, men fail to discriminate between the body and the owner of the body and also between the objects of experience and the experiencer, and treat them by way of non-difference ; *e.g.*, "I am fair," "My self is Bhadrasena," etc. Hence, by transcribing that very (popular) usage (vyavahâra), with reference to them alone, worship in that form the Veda enjoins, for the purpose of the purification of the Sattva element in their nature. It is for the same reason that in worship in the state of (the realisation of) the absolute reality, the Veda refutes that there is worship of the Self. Thus

यन्मनसा न मनुते येनाहुर्मनो मतम् ।
तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते ॥

Which man cannot comprehend by the mind, by which, they say, the mind is comprehended, that very same is Brahman, know thou, not this,—that which man worships.—Kena Upaniṣat, I. 5.—64.

Non-Dual Self cannot be the material cause of the world.

नात्मा नाविद्या नोभयं जगदुपादानकारणं निःसङ्गत्वात् ॥ ५।६५ ॥

न Na, not. आत्मा Âtmâ, Self. न Na, not. अविद्या A-vidyâ, A-vidyâ. न Na, not. उभयं Ubhayam, both. जगदुपादानकारणं Jagat-upâdâna-kâraṇam, material cause of the world. निःसङ्गत्वात् Niḥ-saṅga-tvât, on account of being free or devoid of attachment.

65. Neither the Self, nor A-vidyâ, nor both together are the material cause of the world, because the Self is devoid of attachment.—392.

Vritti.—The upholders of the doctrine of One Self have not also, says the author, a material cause of the world.

Being Kûṭastha or immutable, the Self cannot be the (material) cause. A-vidyâ, because it is an unreality, cannot have the causality. In the case of its reality, there would be loss of Non-Duality. On account of the absence of relation (between them), both (jointly) cannot be the cause.—65.

Bhâṣya :—With the upholders of Non-Duality, a material cause of the world, says the author, is not possible.

Neither the pure Self, nor A-vidyâ resting in the Self, nor the two put together, as in the case of two potsherds, can become the material cause of the world, because the Self is devoid of attachment. For, what is a particular form of Saṃyoga or conjunction, called Saṅga or attachment,—by means of that alone takes place the modification or transformation (Vikâra) of substances (Dravya). Hence, on account of its being devoid of attachment, it is not possible for the pure unseconded Self to be the material cause of the world ; nor even through A-vidyâ, because connection of A-vidyâ (with the Self) has already been refuted by means of the Self's being free from attachment. Moreover, A-vidyâ being not-a-substance, it is unfit to be the material cause of substances. And if it is said to be a substance, then, by the very means of its being a substance, Duality will be entailed. Furthermore, nowhere has A-vidyâ been seen to have become the material cause of anything. For, in the case of the appearance of silver in a mother-of-pearl shell, etc., A-vidyâ is intended to be the Nimitta or efficient cause, and it is Manas that is intended to be the material cause, inasmuch as the Saṃskâra or impression springing therefrom is a property (Dharma) of Manas.

And just as it is not possible for them singly to be the materia cause, so also, on the very same account of the Self's being devoid o attachment, is it impossible for them jointly to be the material cause Such is the meaning.

In the Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ (Vedânta), on the other hand, A-vidyâ, i the form of a non-substance, resting in Puruṣa, like air in the sky, i desired, and by means of such A-vidyâ, it can belong to Brahman to b only the Adhiṣṭhâna Kâraṇa or the Supporting Cause. And that i approved also by us. Because it is Prakṛiti, as conceived by us, tha

has been given by them the technical name of A-vidyâ, and because, by reason of the web of Creation being for the sake of the Self, it is in the Self alone, as the Adhiṣṭhâna or receptacle, that there is admission, equally on both sides, of Creation having Prakṛiti as its material cause.

The difference, however, is this only that, while it is desired by them that the activity of Prakṛiti also should be preceded by Saṃkalpa or Will, it is not by us. And also Non-Duality by means of A-vibhâga or non-division, as is affirmed by them, is verily desired by us also.

Moreover, by the Śrutis such as

सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्

Verily existent, O Calm One, was this at the beginning,—One without a second.—Chhândogya Upaniṣat, VI. ii. 1.

it is Non-Duality, just in the form of non-division (a-vibhâga), that is established ; inasmuch as there are such other Śrutis as

न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यत् पश्येत्

That second exists not,—other than this, divided,—which it may see.—Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat, IV. iii. 23.

And so has it been declared :

आसीज्ज्ञानमथोऽप्यर्थं एकमेवाविकल्पितम् ।
तयोरेकतरो ह्यर्थः प्रकृतिश्चोभयात्मिका ।
ज्ञानं त्वन्यतमो भावः पुरुषः सोऽभिधीयते ॥

Knowledge and Object were one and undifferentiated. Object is one of the two, while Prakṛiti is of the nature of both. But Knowledge is a third entity : it is designated as Puruṣa.

"Undifferentiated" means undivided.

Therefore, Non-Duality of one whole (a-khaṇḍa) Self is not the meaning of the followers of the Vedânta. And yet the modern Vedântins imagine just the group of Pûrva-pakṣas or contrary views in the matter as being the conclusion or established tenet of the Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ. We have, however, demolished this interpretation in the very same place (Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ), by showing that these contrary views are not only not mentioned in the Brahma-Sûtras, but are really in conflict with them. Here also the established tenet of the Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ is not, it should be remembered, condemned, but, on the other hand, is refuted only the meaning that may, at the first blush, be found to be possible in the Vedânta Sûtras. So also in the case of the subsequent aphorisms.—65.

The Self is not Ânanda *or Bliss.*

नैकस्यानन्दचिद्रूपत्वे द्वयोर्भेदात् ॥ ५ । ६६ ॥

न Na, not. एकस्य Ekasya, of one and indivisible. आनन्दचिद्रूपत्वे Ânanda-chit-rûpa-tve, the characters of being of the form of Bliss and of being of the form

of Intelligence. द्वयोः Dvayoḥ, of the two. भेदात् Bhedât, on account of difference.

66. Not to one (and indivisible entity can belong) the characteristics of being of the form of Bliss as well as of Intelligence, on account of the difference between them.—393.

Vritti:—The Self, according to some, is of the form of Chit or Intelligence and Ânanda or Bliss. In regard to this, the author says:

"Ânanda" is Sukha or pleasure or happiness. "Chit" is Jñâna or knowledge.

In the case of the Self being of the form of Ânanda and Chit, there is the implication of Duality.

Neither can it be said that Ânanda is not the pleasure derived from the objects of experience, nor is Chit knowledge of the modifications of the mind, but that both denote something quite different and supramundane or transcendental; because, by reason of their (supposed) transcendental character, they would be beyond the scope of proof. Were they to be subject to proof, then by means of the very existence of proof, there would arise Duality.

Moreover, does the Self possess the characteristic of being of the form of Ânanda or the characteristic of having Ânanda as a property? In the alternative of Ânanda being a property of the Self, there is the implication of there being a duality as well as conflict with the Śruti on the Self's being free from attributes, etc. As regards the alternative of Ânanda being the very form of the Self, in the state of Saṃsâra or worldly existence, Ânanda is nowise experienced. If it is said that it will be experienced after the disappearance of Avidyâ, (we reply that this cannot be, because), since A-vidyâ is incorporeal, it is not possible for it to disappear just like a screen, a wall or a plastering. If it is said that the meaning of the word "disappearance" is to be overpowered, (we reply that) what is eternal and universal, cannot be overpowered. Since A-vidyâ is unreal, and since the Self is real, there can be no relation or connection between them, because no relation or connection can subsist between reality and unreality. Or, were there to be a connection between them, there would be conflict with the Śruti declaring the Self to be devoid of attachment, etc.

In the feeling of Ânanda, again, there is the contradiction of the object and the subject (in the shape of Ânanda feeling Ânanda).

Further, what is the proof that the Self is Bliss? If you reply, "What need of a search after proof, when the Self, just as such, is of the form of proof?", we say that such is not the case, because, since the supposition or admission of Prameyas or provables is for the sake of the establishment or distribution of Pramâṇa or Proof, what is to be determined by Proof when there is no Provable? And when it does not lead to acquirement of Pramiti or knowledge established by Proof, the very character of being Proof does not belong to it.

And to be of the form of Chit is not the same as to be of the form of Ânanda, since there is a difference between them. Neither can it be the case that, by reason of their being transcendental, their non-difference is established, because, on account of the very fact of their being transcendental, there cannot be the cognisance of their Vyâpti or Logical Pervasion. Hence the characteristic of having a double form does not belong to the Self.

If, on the other hand, in the state of Release, Bliss is not experienced, what is the harm? If it is experienced, there must be asserted the Experiencer, the Experience, and the Object of Experience. Just as, on the one hand, by reason of its taking place so long as the body lasts, Samâdhi or Trance is said to be possible also through the immediate vision of the Self (âtma-sâkṣâtkâra), and as the existence of the Self continues after the body has dropped down, where then is Samâdhi or Trance? So, on the other hand, there is the Abhimâna or conceit that, in the state of Samâdhi, through the cessation of all pain, there is the attainment of Ânanda, and, on the loss of Samâdhi, on account of the non-existence of the body, where is the experience of Ânanda?

This being so, the experience of Ânanda in the state of Release is erroneous.—66.

Bhâṣya :—Illumination is the svarûpa or essential form of the Self,—this has been established by the author as a tenet of his own. In regard to this, the author refutes the Pûrva-pakṣa or contrary view that Ânanda or Bliss also constitutes the essential form of the Self, since there is the Śruti:

विज्ञानमानन्दः ब्रह्म

Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman. -Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat, III. ix. 28.

To an entity possessing a single nature, there cannot belong the characteristic of being of the form of both Ânanda or Bliss and Chaitanya or Intelligence; because, by reason of the non-experience of pleasure at the time of the cognition of pain, there is a difference between pleasure and cognition. Such is the meaning.

Neither is it possible to assert that pleasure is a particular form of cognition; because cognition or knowledge which constitutes the essential form of the Self, is one and indivisible (akhaṇḍa).

For the very same reason, it cannot also be asserted that, at the time of the experience or intuition of Intelligence, there is an obscuration or veiling of pleasure; because, by reason of the Self being one and indivisible, in the state of the veiling of Ânanda or Bliss, the experience or intuition of "I know pain" cannot be possible. For there does not exist a division of parts in the Self, whereby even in the state of the veiling of the Ânanda part, the part of Chaitanya or Intelligence will still manifest or shine.

Nor can it be said that by virtue of Śrutis (to the contrary), these are Asat Tarkas or invalid reasonings; because, by reason of the fact that non-existence of Ânanda also has been established by such Śrutis as

नानन्दं न निरानन्दम्

Neither Bliss nor absence of Bliss,

and also by such Smṛitis as

अदुःखमसुखं ब्रह्म भूतभव्यभवात्मकम्

Pain-less, pleasure-less is Brahman, consisting of beings past, future, and present,

it is reasoning alone that should be given the preference in the present discussion; and also because it has been declared by the Śruti itself that the negative Śrutis alone are the more forcible; since, otherwise, by means of the Śrutis such as

सत्यसङ्कल्पः

Of infallible will etc.,

the attributes of will, etc., will also be entailed in the case of the Self.—66.

The Śruti *on* Ânanda *is secondary.*

दुःखनिवृत्तेर्गौणः ॥ ५ । ६७ ॥

दुःखनिवृत्तेः Duḥkha-nivṛitteḥ, on account of cessation of pain. गौणः Gauṇaḥ, secondary, derivative, metaphorical.

67. On account of (its reference to) cessation of pain, (the Śruti on Ânanda is) metaphorical.—394.

Vṛitti :—Now, what account (do you give, it may be asked), of the Śruti on Ânanda? Thus,

आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न बिभेति कुतश्चन ।

Knowing the Ânanda or Bliss of Brahman, one does not fear from anything whatever. —Taittirîya Upaniṣat, II. iv. 1.

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह ।

From which Speech turns back, without reaching it, along with the mind.—Taittiriya Upaniṣat, II. iv. 1.

In regard to this the author says :

It is clear.—67.

Bhâṣya.—But then, if this be so, what will be the fate, it may be asked, of the Śruti which declares that the Self is of the form of Ânanda? To this the author replies :

By reason of (reference to) cessation of pain, the word Ânanda or Bliss, as applied by the Śruti to the Self, is derivative. Such is the meaning. And the Guṇa or property from which it is derived, is exceeding dearness; since the exceeding dearness of the Self is proved by perception, reasoning, and by Śruti such as

तत् प्रेयः पुत्रात्

It is dearer than son, etc.—Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat, I. iv. 8.

Such is the import.

So has it been said:

सुखं दुःखसुखात्ययः

Happiness consists in the passing away of pain and pleasure.

The Śruti

न निरानन्दम्

Not devoid of Ânanda,

has, on the other hand, reference to Ânanda due to the Upâdhi or external investment of the Self,—just like the Śruti on its being of infallible will, etc.

What some one says, namely, that there is inference of the Self being of the form of pleasure, by means of its (intrinsic) dearness independent of Upâdhis or external investments,—that is not so; because this love of the Self can be explained as being of the form of the absence of pain, and also because, just like the characteristic of its having pleasure, the characteristic of its being the Self is also the exciting cause of love towards it; since, otherwise, there will be the implication of love even in the case of another's pleasure.—67.

The Purpose of the metaphorical Mention of Ânanda *in the* Śruti.

विमुक्तिप्रशंसा मन्दानाम् ॥ ५ । ६८ ॥

विमुक्तिप्रशंसा Vimukti-praśaṃsâ, praise of Release. मन्दानाम् Mandânâm, of the dull.

68. (This is) praise of Release (for the sake) of the dull.—395.

Vṛitti:—The author gives another explanation.

"Mandânâm", of the dull, that is, of those in whom the qualities of Tamas predominate. "Praise of Release" is encouragement for the purpose of making them strive after Release.—68.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—"Of the dull", that is, of those in whom the qualities of Rajas and Tamas predominate.

Bhâṣya :—The author mentions the seed or the origin of the above derivative application of the word Ânanda.

With reference to the "dull", that is, the ignorant, the Śruti praises the release of the essential form of the Self, in the shape of the cessation of pain, as being pleasure, for the purpose of instigating them to seek release. Such is the meaning.—68.

Refutation of the Theory that Manas *is All-pervading.*

न व्यापकत्वं मनसः करणत्वादिन्द्रियत्वाद्वा ॥ ५ । ६९ ॥

न Na, not. व्यापकत्वं Vyâpaka-tvaṃ, all-pervading-ness; universality. मनसः Manasaḥ, of Manas. करणत्वात् Karaṇa tvât, because of its being a Karaṇa or Instrument. इन्द्रियत्वात् Indriya-tvât, because of its being an Indriya or Sense or Power. वा Vâ, or.

69. All-pervadingness does not belong to Manas, because it is an Instrument, or because it is an Indriya.—396.

Vṛitti:—The author refutes the universality of Manas.

And what universality of Manas, cognition, namely, "There is pain in my head, pleasure in my leg," establishes, that is due to the non-apprehension of the succession (of the cognitions) on account of the quick movement of Manas. Hereby there is no establishment of universality—69.

Bhâṣya :—With a view to establish more firmly the production of the Antaḥkaraṇa described above, the author discards the contrary theory of the universality of Manas.

Universality does not belong to Manas, meaning Antaḥ-Karaṇa or the Internal Instrument in general, because it is an instrument, just like an axe, etc.

The word Vâ, or, has been used in the sense of a definite alternative. Moreover, because of its being an Indriya, Manas, as a particular Antaḥ-Karaṇa, the third one, (the other two being Buddhi and Ahaṃkâra), cannot possess universality. Such is the meaning.

Cognition, etc., on the other hand, extending over the whole body, can be explained just by means of their being of intermediate extent (*i.e.*, neither infinite nor atomic).—69.

Argument in support of the above.

सक्रियत्वाद् गतिश्रुतेः ॥ ५ । ७० ॥

सक्रियत्वात् Sa-kria-tvât, on account of its performing action. गतिश्रुतेः Gati-śruteḥ, there being Śruti about going.

70. (Manas cannot be universal), because it performs action, and possesses movement, as the Śruti says, (Aniruddha); or because it performs action, since there is Śruti that the Self goes (to other worlds). (Vijñâna).—397.

Vṛitti:—The author points out another defect.

"Because it performs action,"—herein is Inference shown. "Because it possesses movement, as the Śruti says,"—herein is Śabda or Verbal Proof shown.—70.

Bhâṣya:—Lest it be said that the reasons given above are inoperative, the author states an argument in support of them.

By the hearing (from the Śruti) of the going of the Self to other worlds, it being established that the Antaḥ-Karaṇa, which forms its Upâdhi or investment, performs action or possesses motion, universality (of the latter) is not possible. Such is the meaning.—70.

Manas *is not partless.*

न निर्भागत्वं तद्योगाद् घटवत् ॥ ५ । ७१ ॥

न Na, not. निर्भागत्वं Nir-bhâga-tvaṃ, partless-ness. तद्योगात् Tat-yogât, because of connection with that, *i.e.*, Indriyas (Vijñâna), "part" or cause (Aniruddha). घटवत् Ghaṭa-vat, as is the case with a jar.

71. Manas is not cause-less, because it has connection with a cause, just as a water-pot and the like. (Aniruddha). Manas is not part-less, because it has connection with the Indriyas, just as is the case with a water-pot and the like. (Vijñâna).—398.

Vṛitti:—Even if it be atomic, on account of the non-existence of a cause, it will, one may say, be eternal In regard to this, the author says:

"Na nir-bhâga-tvaṃ," that is, not cause-less-ness. "Tat-yogât," that is, on account of connection with a "part." What is its cause? Ahaṃkâra. Through their simultaneous connection with the sextet of the Indriyas, there is establishment of the ultimate atoms' having parts. Therefore, just like the water-pot, etc., Manas is non-eternal.—71.

Bhâṣya :—With a view to establish that Manas is an effect, the author discards also the theory that it is partless.

The word "tat," that, in "Tat-yogât," alludes to the word, Indriya, occurring in a preceding aphorism (V. 69). Part-less-ness does not belong to Manas, on account of its connection with more than one Indriya at one and the same time; but just like a water-pot, it is of an intermediate size (*i.e.*, is neither universal nor atomic), and contains parts. Such is the meaning.

And in the causal state, Antaḥ-Karaṇa, it should be understood, is certainly atomic.—71.

Objects Eternal and Non-Eternal.

प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरन्यत् सर्वमनित्यम् ॥ ५ । ७२ ॥

प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः Prakṛiti-puruṣayoḥ, except Prakṛiti and Puruṣa. अन्यत् Anyat, other; else. सर्वम् Sarvam, all. अनित्यम् A-nityam, non-eternal.

72. Except Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, all else is non-eternal.—399,

Vṛitti :—The author states the division of eternal and non-eternal.

It is clear.—72.

Bhâṣya :—The author forbids the eternality of Manas, Time, etc.

It is easy.

And, in their causal states, Antaḥ-Karaṇa, Âkâśa, etc., are called only Prakṛiti, but not Buddhi, etc, owing to the non-existence (at the time) of their specific or uncommon properties, such as ascertainment, etc.—72.

Eternality of Prakṛiti *and* Puruṣa *defended.*

न भागलाभोऽभागिनो निर्भागत्वश्रुतेः ॥ ५ । ७३ ॥

न Na, not. भागलाभः Bhâga-lâbhaḥ, connection with parts; combination of parts. अभागिनः* A-bhâginaḥ, of the partless, *viz*, Prakṛiti and Puruṣa निर्भागत्वश्रुतेः Nir-bhâga-tva-śruteḥ, because of the Śruti that they are partless.

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*"Bhoginaḥ": "This reading", remarks Mr. F. E. Hall, "is peculiar; many Mss. of Vijñâna, with which agree Aniruddha, Nâgeśa, and Vedântin Mahâdeva, having भोगिनः (Bhâginaḥ)..... भागिनः (Bhâginaḥ) is, without doubt, the correct reading."

But we cannot be so sure. Bhâgin means, literally, that which is made up of parts, and, therefore, it can, by no means, signify Prakṛiti or Puruṣa, since both of them have no parts in their composition. The reading, Bhâginaḥ, therefore, seemed puzzling to Nâgeśa, and he interpreted the aphorism as follows: In the case of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, (the clause being, according to him, understood in the aphorism), the connection of a whole with its parts, that is, the relation of parts and whole, is not reasonable. The reading, Bhoginaḥ, adopted by Vijñâna, no doubt, removes the difficulty, for both Puruṣa and Prakṛiti are Bhogin, *i.e.*, undergo Bhoga or Experience. But the structure of the aphorism as

73. Combination of parts does not exist in the partless, (and, therefore, in Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), since there is the Śruti that they are partless.—400.

Vṛitti :—Since Space, Time, etc. are eternal, how, it may be asked, is all non-eternal? In regard to this the auther says.

There is no connection with cause "bhâginaḥ," that is, of the cause of the world, namely, Pradhâna, "nir-bhâga-tva-śruteḥ", that is, because there is the Śruti:

मूलकारणत्वान्नास्य कारणान्तरम्

Since it is the root cause, there is no other cause of it.—73.

Bhâṣya :— But, then, since, by means of such Śrutis as:

मायान्तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनन्तु महेश्वरम् ।
अस्यावयवभूतैस्तु व्याप्तं सर्वमिदं जगत् ॥

Let one know Mâyâ to be Prakṛiti, and the Lord of Mâyâ to be Maheśvara, and all this world to be pervaded by what form his parts.—Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat, IV. 10.—

it is established that Puruṣa and Prakṛiti also contain parts, it follows, one may say, that they are non-eternal. In regard to this the author says:

"A-bhâginaḥ", that is, either of Puruṣa or of the Pradhâna, (possession of) part is not appropriate, since it is heard that they are partless, from such Śrutis as:

निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनम् ।

Part-less, act-less, quiet, blame-less, spot-less.—Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat, VI. 19.

Such is the meaning.

And the Śruti cited above (by the objector) imports the relation of part and whole merely by way of A-bibhâga or non-division, just as in the case of the consciousness of the father and son, and in the case of heaven and water.—73.

Release is not Manifestation of Bliss.

नानन्दाभिव्यक्तिर्मुक्तिर्निर्धर्मत्वात् ॥ ५ । ७४ ॥

न Na, not. आनन्दाभिव्यक्तिः Ânanda-abhivyaktiḥ, manifestation of Ânanda or bliss. मुक्तिः Muktiḥ, release. निर्धर्मत्वात् Nir-dharma-tvât, because of having no attribute.

74. Mukti is not the manifestation of Ânanda, since the Self possesses no attributes.—401.

well as its drift are against this reading. It seems to us that the best reading would be A-bhâginaḥ. In fact, Vedântin Mahâdeva reads it as such; for, he analyses the word in the following way: In the case of which Bhâgâḥ, *i.e.*, causes do not exist, so as to make it an effect, of that, *i.e.*, of Pradhâna. It will be noticed that, according to the rules of Grammar, the letter *A* of A-bhâginaḥ elides, when the words Bhâga-âbhaḥ and A-bhâginaḥ are put together, as in the aphorism. Neither is it at all unlikely that the mark of elision should be missed by the copyst. For these reasons we have thought it fit to read A-bhâginaḥ for Bhâginaḥ and Bhoginaḥ.

Vritti:—Release, according to some, is the manifestation of bliss. The author condemns this view.

Because in Release the relation of attribute and the possessor of attribute does not exist.

Does that manifestation exist at all times? Then Release will be entailed even in the state of Saṃsâra or transmigratory existence.

If it is said that it is effected in the state of Release; in that case, since an entity which is an effect, must necessarily perish, there will not be absolute or permanent release.—74.

Bhâṣya :—It has been stated that cessation of pain is Release. With a view to determine this with certainty, the author repels the theories of others in regard to that view of Release.

In the Self does not exist the attribute or property in the form of bliss or in the form of manifestation Its Svarûpa or essential form, again, is verily eternal : hence it is not what can be effected by a means Sâdhana). Therefore, manifestation of bliss is not Release. Such is the meaning.

Manifestation of bliss, on the other hand, is, in the worlds of Brahmâ etc., Release only in a secondary or figurative sense. Such is the import. Since, otherwise, there will be conflict with the Śruti :

विद्वान् हर्षशोकौ जहाति

The knowing (Puruṣa) abandons joy and grief.—Kaṭha Upaniṣat, II. 12.

Moreover, were manifestation to be an attribute of the Self, would it be eternal or non-eternal? In the first alternative, by reason of its being an accomplished fact, it cannot be an object to be desired by Puruṣa. In the latter, since a thing which is producible, is perishable, the destruction of Release would be entailed. Therefore, manifestation of bliss is Release in the primary sense,—this is simply an erroneous tenet of the Neo-Vedântins. Such is the hint.—74.

Release is not the Elimination of all Particulr Attributes.

न विशेषगुणोच्छित्तिस्तद्वत् ॥ ५ । ७५ ॥

न Na, not. विशेषगुणोच्छित्तिः Viśeṣa-guṇa-uchchhittiḥ, eradication of particular qualities. तद्वत् Tat-vat, similarly to that.

75. Nor, likewise, (is Release) the eradication of (all) particular attributes.—402.

Vritti :—The author condemns the view that the eradication of particular qualities is Release.

Through the exclusion of the particular (attributes), there will be the admission of the general (attributes). So that, through connection with attributes, there will not be permanent release.—75.

Bhâṣya :—Eradication of all particular attributes whatever, is also not Release : "tat-vat", that is, just because the Self is devoid of attributes. Such is the meaning.

But, then, how has it been said, you may ask, that only the cessation of pain is Release, when the non-existence of pain also possesses the characteristic of being an attribute? To this we reply that such is not the case; because non-existence of pain has been declared by us to be the object desired by Purûṣa, simply by the relation of its being the object to be experienced.—75.

Attainment of Particular Worlds is not Release.

न विशेषगतिर्निष्क्रियस्य ॥ ५ । ७६ ॥

न Na, not. विशेषगतिः Viśeṣa-gatiḥ, going to particular worlds ; higher journey. निष्क्रियस्य Niṣkriyasya, of the act-less or inactive.

76. Nor (can there be) movement to particular places on the part of the act-less (Self).—103.

Vṛitti :—The Self is of the measure of the body ; and Release, say some, is nothing but its going away from every form of body. This view the author condemns.

Release does not result by means of journey upward, since there is the Śruti :

निर्गुणो निष्क्रियो निर्धर्मक आत्मा

The Self is devoid of attribute, devoid of motion, devoid of quality.

(Further, the Self being all-pervading) how (there can be) Release (in this sense)? (If you say that the Self will move from one place to another by the help of particular bodies, in that case), by reason of its undergoing transformation in the shape of the bodies of the elephant and the worm, and consequently, of contraction and expansion, it would be a whole made up of parts, and therefore, non-eternal.—76.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—Release is the steady upward journey of the Self which is of the size of the body, after it has gone out of the body,—this external view of the matter the author condemns.

For, were the Self of the size of the body, then, by reason of the necessity of increase and decrease in respect of entering the body of the elephant and that of the worm, it must be asserted that the Self is a whole made up of parts. And thence it would follow that it is non eternal. It is proper, therefore, to hold that the Self is all-pervading, and consequently motionless. Hence its upward journey is not possible. Such is the import

Bhâṣya :—Attainment of the world of Brahmâ is also not Release, because the Self, being act-less, possesses no motion. And if the Liṅga Śarîra or Subtle Body is admitted, (as that which can go to the world of Brahmâ, then, because of connection with that very Body), Release does not take place. Such is the meaning.—76.

Release is not Cessation of Connection with Objects.

नाकारोपरागोच्छित्तिः क्षणिकत्वादिदोषात् ॥ ५ । ७७ ॥

न Na, not. आकारोपरागोच्छित्तिः Âkâra-uparâga-uchchhittiḥ, eradication of the influence of objects. क्षणिकत्वादिदोषात् Kṣaṇika-tva-âdi-doṣât, on account of the faults of momentariness, etc.

77. Nor (is Release) the removal of the impress of objects, because of the faults of momentariness, etc. —404.

Vṛitti :—The author condemns the Release of the Bauddhas.

Is that "âkâra" or impress the essential form of cognition? If that be so, there will be eradication of cognition also: of which, then, is Release? Now, if it be an attribute, then, since, on account of its momentariness, there is destruction of it at all times, there will be release of those Puruṣas also who are undergoing Saṃsâra or transmigratory existence. If it be said that, in that state, they are not released owing to the influence of Vâsanâ or tendency, then let the eradication of Vâsanâ be itself release: what need of the removal of the impress of objects?

From the word "âdi," etc., it is obtained that, since the stream of transparent states of consciousness also is perishable, of which will be release?—77.

Bhâṣya :—What is the view of the Nâstikas or heretics, namely, that the Self is nothing but a momentary cognition, that its modification into the form of the object is bondage, and that the annihilation of the influence thereof, called Vâsanâ or tendency, is Release,—that also is not so, because, by reason of the faults of its being momentary, etc., such Release cannot be a Puruṣa-artha or object desired by Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.—77.

Total Extinction of the Self is not Release.

न सर्वोच्छित्तिरपुरुषार्थत्वादिदोषात् ॥ ५ । ७८ ॥

न Na, not. सर्वोच्छित्तिः Sarva-uchchhittiḥ, eradication or annihilation of all अपुरुषार्थत्वादिदोषात् A-puruṣa-artha-tva-âdi-doṣât, on account of the fault of its not being an object desired by Puruṣa, etc.

78. Nor (is Release) total annihilation (of the Self), because of the faults of its not being an object desired by Puruṣa, and the like.—405.

Vritti:—The author condemns the Release of a particular section of the Bauddhas.

It is clear.—78.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—The author condemns the view that the extinction of all except the Self is Release.

What is the offence of all, wherefore the extinction of all is desired? Nor is this possible.

Bhâṣya:—The author condemns another view of Release held by the Nâstikas or heretics themselves.

Neither is Release the wholesale extinction of the Self the form of which is cognition, because, among other reasons, it is seen in the world that the annihilation of the Self is not an object desired by Puruṣa Such is the meaning.—78.

The Void is not Release.

एवं शून्यमपि ॥ ५ । ७९ ॥

एवं Evaṃ, similarly. शून्यं Śûnyam, the Void. अपि Api, also.

79. Similarly, the Void also (is not Release).—406.

Vritti:—The author condemns the view that the Void is Release.

("Evaṃ" refers to) "Because of its not being an object desired by Puruṣa and the like" (in the preceding aphorism). By the term "and the like" is indicated the non-existence or impossibility of anuṣṭhâna or practical application (of the theory).

If the Self is admitted, may argue our opponent, then, there will be aversion towards what is antagonistic to it, and affection towards what is congenial to it, and, since these are the causes of bondage, there will be no release. But (we reply) such is not the case. For, bondage does not result through desire and aversion as such, but through particular forms thereof. Just as in the very theory of the Baudhhas, bondage does not take place through the stream of conscious states as such, inasmuch as the stream of transparent states is subservient to Release; similarly, through aversion to what is antagonistic to the isolated state of the Self, or through desire for the stability of the Self in the state in which it is divested of all upâdhi or external condition, there does not take place bondage; on the contrary, they are indeed the causes of Release.—79.

Bhâṣya:—The annihilation of the whole fabric of creation consisting of cognition and the objects of cognition, is also "evaṃ", that is, on account of its not being an object desired by Puruṣa, not Release. Such is the meaning.—79.

Release is not the Possession of Excellent Enjoyables.

संयोगाश्च वियोगान्ता इति न देशादिलाभोऽपि ॥ ५ । ८० ॥

संयोगाः Saṃyogâh, conjunctions. च Cha, and. वियोगान्ताः Viyoga-antâḥ, having disjunction as their end. इति Iti, hence. न Na, not देशादिलाभः Deśa-âdi-lâbhaḥ, attainment of places, etc. अपि Api, also

80. And conjunctions end in disjunctions,—hence attainment of places, etc., is also not (Release).—407.

Vṛitti:—Release (takes place, according to some), through particular time, place, and act. The author condemns that view.

Since conjunction with place ends in disjunction, Saṃsâra or transmigration will again take place. By the word "âdi," etc., time and act are included. So is it also the case with conjunction with time. And Karma also being perishable, there will again be Saṃsâra or transmigration.—80.

Bhâṣya:—Neither is Release the ownership of excellent place, riches, girls and the like, because, as is heard,

संयोगाश्च वियोगान्ता मरणान्तञ्च जीवनम्

Conjunctions end in disjunctions, and life ends in death.

Such is the meaning. So that, on account of its perishableness, ownership is not Release.—80

Release is not the Absorption of Jîva *into* Brahman.

न भागियोगो भागस्य ॥ ५ । ८१ ॥

न Na, not. भागियोगः Bhâgi-yogaḥ, connection with the whole. N.B. Aniruddha reads Bhâga-yogaḥ, meaning connection of part (with the whole). भागस्य Bhâga-sya, of the part. N.B. Aniruddha reads A-bhâgasya, meaning, of the partless.

81. There can be no connection of the part with the partless (Aniruddha). Nor (is Release) the connection of the part with the whole.—408.

Vṛitti:—Release, according to some, consists in the connection of the Jîva Âtmâ or the Incarnate Self which is a part, with Brahman which is the whole containing the parts. This the author condemns.

The Jîva Âtmâ is not a part of Brahman, since there do not exist parts in Brahman.

(Further), since connection ends in separation, bondage will result again. Now, if it is said that, on account of the non-existence of the cause of the Saṃsâra or transmigration, there will be no separation, then let that alone be (Release): what need for the supposition of connection of part?—81.

Bhâṣya :—Release is not the absorption "bhâgasya", of the part, that is, the Jîva, bhâgini, in the possessor of parts, that is, the Supreme Self, because of the reason that conjunctions end in disjunctions, also because of the non-admission of Îśvara, and, moreover, because the absorption of oneself is not an object desired by Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.—81.

Release is not the Acquisition of Supernatural Powers

नाणिमादियोगोऽप्यवश्यम्भावित्वात्तदुच्छित्तेरितरयोगवत्॥५।८२॥

न Na, not. अणिमादियोगः Aṇimâ-âdi-yogaḥ, connection with, or acquisition of, attenuation and other Yogic powers. अपि Api, also. अवश्यम्भावित्वात् Avaśyam-bhâvitvât, because of its necessarily taking place. तदुच्छित्तेः Tat-uchchhitteḥ, of the eradication thereof. इतरयोगवत् Itara-yoga-vat, like other acquisitions.

82. Nor (is Release) the acquisition of Attenuation and the like, because of the inevitableness of their destruction,—just as (it is) in the case of other acquisitions.—409.

Vritti :—Release, say some, is nothing but (the acquisition of) the powers of Attenuation, etc. In regard to this, the author says :

These also, being effects, are non-eternal. By the word "âdi," "and the like", are denoted Levitation, Heaviness, Acquisition, Unrestricted Desire, Lordliness, Control, and Free Movement.—82.

Bhâṣya :—Neither also is Release connection with the supernatural powers of Attenuation and the like, because, just like the connection with other powers, these also necessarily come to an end. Such is the mean-

In the reading "Itara-viyoga-vat," as in the case of disjunction from [illegible], (adopted by Aniruddha), the meaning, on the other hand, is that, in respect of their destruction, this is an example.—82.

Release is not the Attainment of Supreme Power.

नेन्द्रादिपदयोगोऽपि तद्वत् ॥ ५ । ८३ ॥

न Na, not. इन्द्रादिपदयोगः Indra-âdi-pada-yogaḥ, elevation to the status of Indra,

83. Similarly thereto (Release is) not elevation to the status of Indra and the like.—410.

Vritti :—Release takes place, in the opinion of some, just from the attainment of a position of exceeding power. In regard to this the author says :

(Certainly not), because it is non-eternal.—83.

Bhâṣya :—Neither again is Release the attainment of the power of Indra and the like, because, like other and inferior powers, it is perishable. Such is the meaning.—83.

The Indriyas *are not the products of the Elements.*

न भूतप्रकृतित्वमिन्द्रियाणामाहंकारिकत्वश्रुतेः ॥ ५ । ८४ ॥

न Na, not. भूतप्रकृतित्वम् Bhûta-prakriti-tvam, the characteristic of having the Bhûtas or elements as their material causes. इन्द्रियाणाम् Indriyâṇâm, of the Indriyas or the Powers of Cognition and Action. आहंकारिकत्वश्रुतेः Âhaṃkârika-tva-śruteḥ, owing to the Śruti or Vedic declaration of their being produced from Ahaṃkâra.

84. The Indriyas are not produced from the Elements, because there is the Śruti that they are produced from Ahaṃkâra.—411.

Vritti :—The Indriyas, according to some, are produced from the Elements. The author repels this view.

Thus, there is :

एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च ।
खं वायुर्ज्योतिरापश्च पृथिवी विश्वस्य धारिणी ॥

From Him is produced Prâṇa ; Manas and all the Indriyas ; Ether, Air, Fire, Water and Earth, the supporter of the universe.—Muṇḍaka Upaniṣat, II, i. 3.

"Bhûta-prakriti-tvam", the characteristic of having the Elements as their material causes,—the application of this expression to the Indriyas is due to the mistake or misconception that by whatever Indriya whatever cause of the Gross Elements, that is, Tan-mâtra, is cognised, has that as its material cause.—84.

Bhâṣya :—What has been stated before, (*Vide* II. 17), namely, that the Indriyas are produced from Ahaṃkâra, in respect thereof, the contradictory doctrines of others, the author repels.

The (syntactical) connection is easy to grasp.

Previously the author's own tenet has been established ; and in the present book, the doctrines of others or opponents are being refuted ; hence there is no tautology.—84.

Release does not result through Knowledge of the Six Predicables.

न षट्पदार्थनियमस्तद्बोधान्मुक्तिश्च ॥ ५ । ८५ ॥

न Na, not. षट्पदार्थनियमः Sat-padârtha-niyamah, limitation of six predicables, as done in the Vaiśeṣika Darśana. तद्बोधात् Tat-bodhât, through knowledge thereof. मुक्तिः Muktiḥ, Release. च Cha, also. N. B. Aniruddha does not read Cha.

85. Neither is there any limitation of Six Predicables, nor does Release take place through the knowledge thereof. —412.

Vṛitti :—Release takes place, according to some, (the Vaiśeṣikas), through the knowledge of the Six Predicables. In regard to this the author says :

" Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Combination (are the Six Predicables). *Kaṇâda-Sûtram*, I. i. 4).

" Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Self and Manas are the only Substances. (*Ibid.* I. i. 5).

" Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Numbers, Measures, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority, Cognitions, Pleasure and Pain, Desire and Aversion, Volitions, Gravity, Fluidity, Viscidity, Potentiality, Merit, Demerit, and Sound are the Attributes. (*Ibid.* I. i. 6).

" Throwing upwards, Throwing downwards, Contraction, Expansion, and Motion are the Actions. (*Ibid.* I. i. 7).

" High and low is Genus. (*Ibid* I. ii. 3, *Upaskâra*).

" The Ultimate Species are those residing in the " eternal " Substances. (*Ibid.* I. ii. 6).

" Combination is that relation of things inseparably associated together by nature, which is the cause of intuition in the form of " It is in it." (*Ibid.* VII. ii. 26).

Such rule or limitation does not exist, since the Sâṃkhyas believe in an indefinite number of Predicables.

Nor is Release due to the knowledge of those (six) Predicables, since, (as the Sâṃkhyas believe), Release takes place through the knowledge of the Self alone.—85.

Bhâṣya :—Having in mind that there exist other Tattvas or principles also such as Force, etc., the author refutes the limitation of Predicables to a fixed number and the theory of Release through the knowledge of those Predicables only, as held by others.

What is the rule with the Vaiśeṣikas, namely, that the only Predicables are Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Combination,

and what is, again, admitted by them, namely, that Release takes place through the knowledge of these six Predicables,—that is not supported by evidence; because there are, in addition, Force and the like; because Prakṛiti exceeds the number of nine Substances beginning with the Earth; for, thus, it has been declared that Release is obtained only through the discrimination of Prakṛiti. Such is the meaning. For, the use of the terms Earth, etc., is due only to the possession of Smell, etc., and Smell, etc., do not exist in the state of equipoise (of the Guṇas). Hence the Jâti or universals of Earth-ness, etc., are also, like the characteristics of being a water-pot, etc., reside in effects only. So has it been said:—

नाहो न रात्रि र्न नभो न भूमि-
र्नासीत्तमो ज्योतिरभून्न चान्यत् ।
शब्दादिबुद्ध्याद्युपलभ्यमेकम्
प्राधानिकं ब्रह्म पुमांस्तदासीत् ॥

There was then (during Pralaya) neither day nor night, neither heaven nor earth; neither was there darkness nor light nor anything else, cognisable by the Senses of Hearing, etc., and by the Understanding. There were then singly the Pradhâna, Brahman, and Puruṣa,—Viṣṇu Purâṇa, I. ii. 23.—85.

Nor does Release result through Knowledge of the Sixteen Predicables.

षोडशादिष्वप्येवम् ॥ ५ । ८६ ॥

षोडशादिषु Śoḍaśa-âdi-ṣu, in the case of the sixteen Predicables of the Nyâya Darśana, etc. अपि Api, also. एवम् Evam, the same.

86. Similarly in the case of the Sixteen Predicables, etc., also.—413.

Vṛitti :—Release, says the Naiyâyika, results through the knowledge of the Sixteen Predicables (enumerated in the Nyâya-Sûtram of Gotama). In regard to this, the author says:

" Proof, Provable, Doubt, Purpose, Example, Tenet, Member (of a Syllogism), Argumentation, Ascertainment, Declaration Wrangling, Cavil, Fallacy, Equivocation, Futility, and Ground of Defeat,—through the knowledge of the truth about these Predicables, takes place the attainment of the Supreme Good. (*Nyâya-Sûtram*, I. i. 1).

" Proofs are Perception, Inference, Comparison, and Word. (*Ibid* I. i. 3).

" The Provables are the Self, Body, Indriya (Powers of Cognition and Action), Objects, Understanding or Reason, Manas, Activity, Fault, Re-birth, Fruit, Pain, and Release. (*Ibid.* I. i. 6.)

"Doubt is reasoning wanting in definiteness, which arises from the cognition of common and uncommon properties, from indetermination, and from irregularity of cognition and non-cognition. (*Ibid.* I. i. 23).

"Purpose is that with reference to which one proceeds to act. (*Ibid.* I. i. 24.)

"Example is the thing about which the opinion of ordinary men and of experts is unanimous. (*Ibid.* I. i. 25.)

"A Tenet is a doctrine laid down with authority by a Śâstra or an Adhikaraṇa or Topic of it, or by way of Abhyupagama or Admission without proof. (*Ibid.* I. i. 26).

"It is fourfold: according as it is a Tenet of all the Śâstras, a Tenet confined to a particular Śâstra, a Tenet under a Topic, and a Tenet by Admission, among which there is a real difference. (*Ibid.* I. i. 27).

"The Members of a Syllogism are Proposition, Reason, Instance, Application, and Conclusion. (*Ibid.* I. i. 32).

"Argumentation is reasoning for the purpose of knowing, by means of the determination of the cause, the true character of an object the true character of which is unknown. (*Ibid.* I. i. 40).

"Ascertainment is the determination of an object by considering the views for and against it. (*Ibid.* I. i. 41).

"A Declaration is the adoption of either of two opposite sides, which is established by the five Members of the Syllogism, is not contradicted by the Tenets, and the knowledge of which is obtained by the means of Proof and Argumentation. (*Ibid.* I. ii. 1).

"Wrangling is cognition by the means of Equivocation, Futility, and Ground of Defeat, and established in the manner aforesaid (*i.e.*, by the five Members of the Syllogism). (*Ibid.* I. ii. 2).

"Cavil is a kind of wrangling which is devoid of the establishment of one's own side. (*Ibid.* I. ii. 3).

"The Fallacies are the Variable, the Contradictory, the same as the topic, the same as the thing to be proved, and the mistimed. (*Ibid.* I. ii. 4).

"Equivocation is the contradiction of a proposition by the establishment of an alternative meaning. (*Ibid.* I. ii. 10).

"It is threefold: Equivocation in respect of a term, Equivocation in respect of genus, and Equivocation in respect of a metaphor. (*Ibid.* I. ii. 11).

" Futility is opposition by means of similarity and dissimilarity. (*Ibid.* I. ii. 18).

(Futility is of twenty-four varieties: *viz.*) "(1) Balancing the homogeneity, (2) balancing the heterogeneity, (3) balancing an addition, (4) balancing a subtraction, (5) balancing the questionable, (6) balancing the unquestionable, (7) balancing the alternative, (8) balancing the reciprocity, (9) balancing the co-presence, (10) balancing the mutual absence, (11) balancing the infinite regression, (12) balancing the counter-example, (13) balancing the non-produced, (14) balancing the doubt, (15) balancing the controversy, (16) balancing the non-reason, (17) balancing the presumption, (18) balancing the non-difference, (19) balancing the demonstration, (20) balancing the perception, (21) balancing the non-perception, (22) balancing the non-eternality, (23) balancing the eternality, and (24) balancing the effect." (*Ibid.* V. i. 1).

" Ground of Defeat is indetermination as well as wrong determination. (*Ibid.* I. ii. 19)

" The Grounds of Defeat are: (1) Hurting the proposition, (2) Shifting the proposition, (3) Opposing the proposition, (4) Renouncing the proposition, (5) Shifting the reason, (6) Shifting the topic, (7) The meaningless, (8) The Unintelligible, (9) The Incoherent, (10) The Inopportune, (11) Saying too little, (12) Saying too much, (13) Repetition, (14) Silence, (15) Ignorance, (16) Non-ingenuity, (17) Evasion, (18) Admission of an opinion, (19) Overlooking the censurable, (20) Censuring the non-censurable, (21) Deviating from a tenet, and (22) The Semblance of a reason." (*Ibid.* V. ii. 1.

—This much, and no more,—such rule or limitation does not exist, nor does Release take place through the knowledge of this.

From the word, Âdi, (it follows that) such other determination of Predicables should also be rejected.—86.

Bhâṣya :—As regards also the sixteen and other number of Predicables maintained in the Nyâya, Pâśupata, and other Darśanas, there is no such limitation, nor, again, is it the case that, through the knowledge thereof, Release takes place, because, in the manner aforesaid, there is an excess of Predicables. Such is the meaning.

In our opinion, on the other hand, the Predicables which are eternal, are two only; but there is no limitation with us that the number of Predicables in general, both eternal and non-eternal, is twenty-five only, and not more. "(All that our mention of twenty-five Predicables is intended to indicate is that) Attribute, Action, Genus, Force, and all the rest are included just in the twenty-five substances (enumerated by us).—86.

The Ultimate Atoms of the Vaiśeṣikas *cannot be eternal.*

नाणुनित्यता तत्कार्यत्वश्रुतेः ॥ ५ । ८७ ॥

न Na, not. अणुनित्यता Aṇu-nitya-tâ, eternality of the atoms. तत्कार्यत्वश्रुतेः Tat-kârya-tva-śruteḥ, because there is Śruti or Vedic declaration that they are effects.

87. Atoms are not eternal, because there is Śruti that they are effects.—414.

Vṛitti:—There are four classes of "eternal" Ultimate Atoms, and since, by means of these alone, there can be the origination of the Great Elements, what need, it may be asked, of the Pradhâna? Hence the author says:

All was produced from the Pradhâna; excepting Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, all else is non-eternal:—there being such Śruti, since they are effects, the Ultimate Atoms can have neither eternality nor causality.—87.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—From the hearing of the eternality of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa alone, it is learnt that all else is effect. Such is the meaning.

Bhâṣya:—For the purpose of demonstrating that the five Gross Elements are effects as declared above (I. 61), the author repels the eternality of the atoms of Earth, etc., admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas and others.

Eternality of the atoms of Earth, etc. does not exist, because it is heard from the Śruti that their atoms also are effects. Such is the meaning.

Although by us such Śrutis are not seen by reason of their having disappeared in course of time, yet they can be inferred (to have existed) from the statements of teachers and also from the memory of them recorded by Manu For example, says Manu:

अण्वो मात्रा विनाशिन्यो दशार्द्धानां च याः स्मृताः ।
ताभिः सार्द्धमिदं सर्वं सम्भवत्यनुपूर्वशः ॥

The atomic measures or parts of the half of ten (*i.e.*, the five Gross Elements) which are remembered to be perishable,—along with them, all this is produced one after the other.—Manu-Saṃhitâ, I. 27.

"Of the half of ten," that is, of the five Gross Elements beginning with Earth.

Neither can it be said that, in the above saying, by the word "Atom," only diatomic combinations are to be understood; since there is no evidence or reason for so narrowing the sense of the term. Here the word "Atom" denotes nothing but the ultimate atoms of the Gross Elements.

And, (it should be observed), by the present aphorism is refuted the eternality of these (ultimate atoms) as maintained by the Vaiśeṣikas, but

not the eternality of substances in general which have the magnitude of atoms: because there is proof or establishment of atomic existence by means of the necessity of accounting for the restlessness of the Guṇa called Rajas; since, were there the intermediate magnitude only, and also were eternality to be universal, there would be no explanation of action or motion or change.—87.

Atoms are not partless.

न निर्भागत्वं कार्यत्वात् ॥ ५ । ८८ ॥

न Na, not. निर्भागत्वं Nir-bhâga-tvaṃ, partlessness. कार्यत्वात् Kârya-tvât, being effects.

88. Being effects, they cannot be partless.—415.

Vritti:—And this being so, says the author, the very characteristic of being ultimate atoms (*i.e.*, indivisible parts) is not possible.

That which is an effect, cannot be without parts; *e.g.*, a piece of cloth.—88.

Bhâṣya:—But, then, how can it be possible, it may be asked, for the ultimate atom which is partless, to be an effect? In regard to this, the author says:

By reason of the fact that its being an effect, as proved by the Śruti, cannot be otherwise explained, it belongs to the atoms of Earth, etc., not to be without parts. Such is the meaning.

For this very reason has it been established by the revered Vyâsa, in his Commentary on the Yoga Sûtram of Patañjali, that the fine substances, called the Tan-mâtras, are themselves the parts of the atoms of Earth, etc.

Usage such as "the ultimate atom of Earth, the ultimate atom of Water," etc., is, on the other hand, intended to imply only the extreme limit of sub-division. Hence there is no harm if the characteristic of being atom reaches even up to Prakṛiti.

Although, even in the Tan-mâtras, there exist Smell, etc., still these, being imperceptible, do not become the determinant of the characteristics of being Earth, etc.; because it is established that only manifested Smell, etc., possessing the distinctions of being manifestedly pacific, terrific, etc., constitute the characteristics of being Earth, etc. Hence (is it not that) the Tan-mâtras are Earth, etc. And it should be further understood that, in respect of them also, the use of the term, Subtle Elements, is simply by reason of their being the immediate causes of the (Gross) Elements, and for like reasons.—88.

Criticism of the Vaiśeṣika *Theory of Visual Perception.*

न रूपनिबन्धनात् प्रत्यक्षनियमः ॥ ५ । ८९ ॥

न Na, not रूपनिबन्धनात् Rûpa-nibandhanât, from the cause of Colour-*cum*-Form. प्रत्यक्षनियमः Pratyakṣa-niyamaḥ, rule of perception.

89. There can be no such rule that Perception is due to Colour and Form.—416.

Vṛitti :—And through the possession of developed Rûpa, say some, is perception possible, nor is the atom so (*i.e.*, possessed of developed Rûpa). How is it perceived? Hence the author says:

Because Âkâśa or Sky (which is devoid of colour and form) is an object of perception, in such cases, for instance, as "Here is this bird," and because there are cases of violation of the rule, therefore, there is no such rule. that Perception takes place through the cause of developed Rûpa. And in respect of the super-normal perception of the Yogins, produced through the strength of Samâdhi or Trance, there exists no ground of objection.—89.

Bhâṣya :—Direct intuition of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa cannot be possible, because Rûpa or Form is the cause of the intuition of substances, (which they do not possess);—this allegation of the heretics the author repels.

From Rûpa alone, as the efficient cause, arises the characteristic of a thing's being the object of perception,—such a rule does not exist; because, by means of Dharma or Merit, and the like, also, there is possibility of direct intuition. Such is the meaning. Irregularity of the manifestor (Rûpa, Dharma, and so forth), on the other hand, is no fault, because it is seen in the case of the collyrium, etc. Therefore, only in regard to the ordinary perception of external substances, developed Rûpa is the manifestor. Such is the import.—89.

Magnitude is not fourfold, as maintained by the Vaiśeṣikas.

न परिमाणचातुर्विध्यं द्वाभ्यां तद्योगात् ॥ ५ । ९० ॥

न Na, not. परिमाणचातुर्विध्यं Parimâṇa-châturvidhyaṃ, fourfoldness of magnitude. द्वाभ्यां Dvâ-bhyâṃ, by means of two. तद्योगात् Tat-yogât, because of the connection or possibility thereof, *i.e.* of four magnitudes.

90. (There is) not fourfold magnitude, because of the possibility thereof by means of two.—417.

Vṛitti :—The author says that fourfold magnitudes, *viz.*, small, large, long and short, do not exist.

Because usage is established by means of small and large, through connection of effect and cause, it is these differences (small and large) that are the divisions of magnitude.—90.

Bhâṣya :—But, then, it may be asked, does there exist, or does not, a thing having the magnitude of an atom ? There being room for such an enquiry, the author makes the ascertainment of magnitude :

Small, large, long, short,—such fourfoldness of magnitude does not exist, whereas twofoldness certainly does exist. "Dvâ-bhyâm tat-yogât": because fourfoldness is obtained just "dvâ-bhyâm," that is, by means of the small and large magnitudes. Such is the meaning. For, short and long are nothing but minor divisions of large magnitude ; since, otherwise, by means of the forms of curved, etc., an infinity of magnitudes will be entailed.

Of these two, in our System of Thought, the atomic magnitude should be conceived as existing in the Guṇas, Sattva, etc., which are the root causes of the Gross Elements and the Indriyas, with the exception of that particular modification of the Guṇas which is the cause of Âkâsa. In other places, appropriately in each individual case, the magnitudes are those beginning with the medium and ending with the extreme large, and these are nothing but the minor divisions of largeness.—90.

Note:—The theory of four magnitudes is held by the Vaiśeṣikas. Compare the Kaṇâda-Sûtram, VII. i. 8, *Upaskâra* and VII. i. 17 and *Upaskâra*. For facility of comparison, we give the following extracts from our translation of the Kaṇâda-Sûtram (S. B. H. Vol. VI).

"This Measure or Extension is of four kinds, namely, Largeness, Smallness, Length, and Shortness.

"Some maintain that length and shortness do not exist in the "eternal" substances (Time, Space, Ether, and Soul). Others hold that these are not even modes of Measure or Extension ; for, what they mean is this : As in the command "Bring the longer ones from among those bodies," so also in the command "Bring the spherical and the triangular ones from amongst those bodies," discrimination being equally possible, sphericity or roundness, etc., also will have to be admitted as modes of Measure or Extension.

Whatever is productive of magnitude (largeness), the same is productive of length ; whatever is productive of minuteness (smallness), the same is productive of shortness. If it be asked, the cause being the same, how there can be this difference in the effect, the reply is that it is proved or explained, like attributes produced by burning, by the presence of antecedent non-existence."

Criticism of the Theory of Eternal Genus.

अनित्यत्वेऽपि स्थिरतायोगात् प्रत्यभिज्ञानं सामान्यस्य ॥ ५ । ६१ ॥

अनित्यत्वे A-nitya-tve, in the case of being non-eternal. अपि Api, even. स्थिरतायोगात् Sthira-tâ-yogât, through connection of lastingness or persistence. प्रत्यभिज्ञानं Prati-abhijñânam, recognition. सामान्यस्य Sâmânyasa, of the Genus, Universal, Ideal.

91. Even though (the individuals are) non-eternal, recognition thereof takes place through the persistence of the Genus (Aniruddha), or, recognition which is dependent upon connection with persistence, is of the Genus (Vijñâna). —418.

Vritti :—Some are of opinion that, besides Prakriti and Puruṣa, there exists some eternal Genus. In regard to this the author says:

Just as in the case of "He is that Devadatta," the recognition has not the Genus as its object, so, also even though the Genus is non-eternal, through the persistence of the Genus for a long time, takes place the recognition of a flame and the like.—91.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—Just as the recognition, *e.g.*, "He is that Devadatta," has not the Genus for its object, but, on the contrary, has the individual for its object, owing to the lastingness of the individual, so the recognition of Genus also is due to its persistence, and not to its being eternal.

Bhâṣya :—It has been declared in clear voice that the unity of Puruṣas is by means of their Genus. It has been declared, through the sense or significance (*i.e.*, by implication), that the unity of Prakriti is by means of Genus. For the purpose thereof, the author rebuts the contrary opinions of the heretics in respect of the Genera :

Even though the individuals are non-eternal, that is, impermanent, the recognition, for example, "This is that very same water-pot," that takes place by means of connection with permanence,—that is of the Genus, that is, that recognition has nothing but the Genus for its object. Such is the meaning.—91.

Genus exists.

न तदपलापस्तस्मात् ॥ ५ । ९२ ॥

न Na, not. तदपलापः Tat-apalâpaḥ, repudiation or negation thereof, *i.e.*, of the Genus. तस्मात् Tasmât, therefore.

92. (There can be), therefore, no denial thereof—419.

Vritti.—The author refutes the non-existence of Genus.

There can be no denial of Genus, because of recognition, and because of the opposition by perception of the argument of the others —92.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—"Tasmât", that is, since there is perception (of Genus), "Tat-apalâpaḥ", that is, the denial of Genus, should not be made, inasmuch as unobstructed perception is the means of establishing the existence of objects.

Bhâṣya :—Therefore, the denial of Genus, says the author, is not reasonable. It is easy.—92.

Genus is not a Negative Idea.

नान्यनिवृत्तिरूपत्वं भावप्रतीतेः ॥ ५ । ९३ ॥

न Na, not. अन्यनिवृत्तिरूपत्वं Anya-nivṛitti-rûpa-tvam, the characteristic of having the form of non-application to, or exclusion of, others. भावप्रतीतेः Bhâva-pratiteḥ, owing to the intuition of existence.

93. It cannot belong to Genus to be of the form of non-application to others, since there is intuition of it as a positive existence.—420.

Vṛitti :—There exists the concept of the form of one, but, says an objector, it has reference to non-application to, or exclusion of, others. Hence the author says:

In respect of a thing which is of the form of non-existence, the knowledge that is obtained, is dependent upon the recollection of the counter-opposite, but not by way of an affirmation. Thus has it been said :—

सिद्धश्चागोरपोह्यो त गोनिषेधात्मकश्च सः ।
तत्र गौरेव वक्तव्यो नञा यः प्रतिषिध्यते ।
गव्यसिद्धे त्वगौर्नास्ति तदभावे च गौः कुतः ॥

And Non-cow which is proved, should be ascertained : And that is of the nature of the negation of Cow. Therein it is the Cow that must be affirmed,—which is negated by the particle, Non. If the Cow be, on the other hand, non-proved, then there is no Non-cow ; and in the absence thereof, where is the Cow ?—93.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—The author repels the view that Jâti, or Genus consists in the ascertainment of others :

It does not belong to the genera of bovineness, etc., to be of the form of difference from non-cow, etc. Why not "Bhâva-pratiteḥ", that is, because the intuition thereof, as being of the form of positive existences, takes place without, indeed, the recollection of the counter-opposite in the form of the non-cow.

Bhâṣya :—But, then, may contend our opponent, recognition should be explained just by means of non-existence in the form of non-divergence from that, and let this very same (*i.e.*, recognition) be the meaning of the word Genus. To this the author replies :

Since there takes place such positive intuition as "That very same person is this", Genus cannot be of a negative form. Such is the meaning. For, otherwise, the intuition would be only this that "This is not

water-pot." Moreover, divergence from not-water-pot should be asserted to be the meaning of the words, divergence from others ; therein to be not-water-pot is to be different from the water-pot as a genus ; and thus the result is nothing but the admission of Genus.—93.

Similarity is not a Separate Principle.

न तत्त्वान्तरं सादृश्यं प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धेः ॥ ५ । ९४ ॥

न Na, not. तत्त्वान्तरं Tattva-antaram, a separate or distinct principle. सादृश्यं Sâdriśyam, likeness, similarity. प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धेः Pratyakṣa-upalabdheḥ, because of perceptual cognition.

94. Similarity is not a separate Principle, since there is perceptual cognition.—421.

Vritti :—Recognition, one may say, will take place by means of similarity. Hence the author says :

Similarity consists in the connection or presence of a large number of common or generic parts. It is not a separate Principle, because, through the apprehension of a larger number of such parts by means of Perception itself, there arises the cognition that "This is similar to that."—91.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—The author repels the view that similarity is a separate principle.

(It is not), because there is cognition, by means of perception, of only the form of the respective Substances, Attributes, etc. Such is the meaning.

Bhâṣya :—But still, one may say, recognition will take place by the help of similarity. To this the author replies :

There does not exist similarity which is other than the common possession of a large number of parts ; since there is, through perception itself, cognition (of similarity) as being of the form of Genus. Such is the meaning.—94.

Nor is Similarity an Inherent Power of the Thing.

निजशक्त्यभिव्यक्तिर्वा वैशिष्ट्यात्तदुपलब्धेः ॥ ५ । ९५ ॥

निजशक्त्यभिव्यक्तिः Nija-śakti-abhivyaktiḥ, manifestation of the own power of something. वा Vâ, or. वैशिष्ट्यात् Vaiśiṣṭyât, under distinguishtedness or distinction. तदुपलब्धेः Tat-upalabdheḥ, because of the cognition thereof.

95. Nor is Similarity the manifestation of the own power of a thing, because the cognition thereof takes place under a distinction.—422.

Vritti :—The author exhibits another mode.

Own power of things there does exist. And this power, being particularised by manifestation, after the seeing of another like body,

becomes the cause of the cognition of the similarity that "It is similar" But similarity is not a distinct Principle.—95.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—"Manifestation of own power": own power manifested,—such is the meaning. "Manifested" means evolved as being favourable to the production of their respective effects. "Under a distinction" means through relation to such power. "Because of the cognition thereof" means because of the cognition of similarity. Such is the meaning. So that, it is the power inherent in the objects respectively, that is the object of the intuition of similarity. Such is the import.

Bhâṣya :—The author removes the apprehension that some one may contend: But still let the natural power of the thing be itself the similarity, and that cannot be the Genus.

Even the appearance of a particular modification of the natural power of a thing cannot be its similarity; because the cognition of similarity is different from the cognition of power. For, the cognition of power is not dependent upon the knowledge of another thing (lit. possessor of properties); whereas the cognition of similarity, just like the cognition of non-existence, depends upon the cognition of the counter-opposite; hence there is a characteristic difference between the two cognitions. Such is the meaning. Because there is observation of accidental similarity also.

The term, Manifestation, has been used with the object of differentiating the power which lasts as long as the thing lasts.

Moreover, sameness of power belonging to a thing or possessor-of-properties is not its similarity; since, in that case, similarity to youth will be entailed even in the state of boyhood. It should, on the other hand, be asserted that particular modification of power appertaining to youth, etc., is the similarity to youth, etc.

So that, in comparison with the supposition of an infinity of power belonging to each individual separately, it is the supposition of a single Genus common to all the individuals, that is more reasonable.—95.

Nor is Similarity the Relation of Names and Things.

न संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धोऽपि ॥ ५ । ९६ ॥

न Na, not. संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धः Saṃjñâ-saṃjñi-saṃbandhaḥ, connection or relation of names and things or the named. अपि Api, also.

96. Nor is (Similarity), moreover, the relation between the name and the named.—423.

Vritti :--Similarity is the cause of the cognition of the relation between the name and the named ; hence is the proof thereof, say some. In regard to this, the author says :

Similarity is not the cause of the cognition of the relation, because there are exceptions, inasmuch as elsewhere also the relation of the name and the named is ascertained through instruction, etc.

By the derivation of the word in the instrumental sense, Sambandha or relation is indicative of the cognition of which it is the object.—96.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :--(The connection of the name and the named is not) eternal,—such is the complement of the aphorism.

Bhâṣya :—But still, let the mutual similarity of individual water-pots be merely that they bear the (same) name, water-pot, etc. ; likewise, in the case of pieces of cloth, etc. So that, when, by means of this alone, assimilative intuition is explained, there is no need of the Genus. To this, the author replies :

Moreover, the relation, as described above, of the name and the named, is not Similarity, simply because the cognition thereof takes place with a distinction. Such is the meaning. For, there is cognition of similarity even in the case of one who is unaware of the relation of the name and the named.—96.

Because their relation is non-eternal.

न सम्बन्धनित्यतोभयानित्यत्वात् ॥ ५ । ९७ ॥

न Na, not सम्बन्धनित्यता Sambandha-nitya-tâ, eternality of the relation. उभयानित्यत्वात्, Ubhaya-anitya-tvât, on account of the non-eternality of both the correlatives.

97. The relation (of the name and the named) is not eternal, since both (the correlatives) are non-eternal.—424.

Vritti :—The author repels the view that the relation of Word and Object is eternal.

Since Word and Object are non-eternal, how can their relation be eternal ?--97

Bhâṣya :—Moreover :

Since the name and the named are non-eternal, eternality cannot belong to their relation also. Hence, how, by means of that (relation), can be possible, in a present object, similarity to an object of the past ? Such is the meaning.—97.

Nor can the Relation be from Eternity.

नाजः सम्बन्धो धर्मिग्राहकमानबाधात् ॥ ५ । ९८ ॥

न Na, not. अजः Ajaḥ, unoriginated, from eternity. सम्बन्धः Sambandhaḥ, relation. धर्मिग्राहकमानबाधात् Dharmi-grâhaka-mâna-bâdhât, owing to opposition of

obstruction by the evidence cognisant of the thing as the subject of certain definite properties, *i.e.*, by the definition of the term.

98. Nor can the relation be unoriginated, since there would be self-contradiction.—425.

Vritti :—The author rejects the suggestion of unoriginated relation.

Saṃyoga or Conjunction, when it takes place, must be produced through karma or action (*vide* Kaṇâda-Sûtram, VII. ii. 9,-S. B. H. Vol. VI, page 247). Neither is there action or change or motion in the case of what is eternal and all-pervading.

And Mahat and the rest are non-eternal : how can their conjunction be eternal ?

And inasmuch as the Selves are devoid of properties, with them there cannot be conjunction of the Pradhâna.

Moreover, by what proof or evidence the thing is cognised, by the very same is the cognisance of conjunction,—such is the opposition by, or of, the evidence cognisant of the thing as the seat of properties, (that is entailed).—98.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—Since the very relation subsisting between the subject and the property is proved by means of the intuition of the subject as possessing the property, and since that (intuition) is impossible in the absence of the relation of the subject and property, it is illogical to suppose that the relation can be unoriginated.

Bhâṣya :—But then, notwithstanding that the correlatives be non-eternal, the relation, it may be said, may be eternal : what is there to hinder its being so ?

To this the author replies :

Relation or Conjunction is proved, only if there ever be Disjunction; as, otherwise, there is no room for the supposition of relation, inasmuch as the case is accounted for, as will be explained hereafter (*vide* V. 100 below), by the very Sva-rûpa or own or essential form of the things in question. And this possible Disjunction cannot be possible in the case of the relation being eternal. Hence, because there is opposition by the very evidence which makes us cognise the relation, relation cannot be eternal. Such is the meaning.—98.

Denial of the Samavâya *or Combination of the* Vaiśeṣikas.

न समवायोऽस्ति प्रमाणाभावात् ॥ ५ । ९९ ॥

न Na, not. समवायः : Samavâyaḥ, Combination, Co-inherence, *e.g.*, of attributes in substances. अस्ति Asti, exists. प्रमाणाभावात् Pramâṇa-abhâvât, owing to absence of proof,

99. Samavâya does not exist, since there is no proof of it.—426.

Vṛitti : —The author discards Samavâya.

Is Samavâya related or is it unrelated? If it be unrelated, how can it make another thing to be invested with relation? If it be related, then, since no other relation is possible, Samavâya itself must be stated (to be the relation by which it is related); of this also, another; of that, again, another; and thus, since there would be infinite regression, Samavâya does not exist.

What, on the other hand, is the manifestation together by way of non-separation—that is due to a particular variety of Conjunction, just as, for example, of fire in a hot mass of iron.—99.

Bhâṣya : —But then, if this be so, the eternal combination, it may be said, of attribute and possessor of attribute, where both are eternal, would not be explained. In regard to this the author says :

It is easy.—99.

"Absence of proof" shown.

उभयत्राप्यन्यथासिद्धेर्न प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं वा ॥ ५ । १०० ॥

उभयत्र Ubhaya-tra, in both cases, *i.e.*, of perception and inference. अपि Api, also. अन्यथासिद्धेः Anya-thâ-siddheḥ, since there is explanation otherwise. न Na, not. N.B. Aniruddha alone omits this word. प्रत्यक्षम् Pratyakṣam, perception. अनुमानं Anumânam, inference. वा Vâ, or.

100. Since, in both the cases (*i.e.*, of perception and inference, what is called Samavâya) is otherwise accounted for, neither Perception nor Inference (proves the existence of Samavâya).—427.

Vṛitti : —If Samavâya does not exist, how does, it may be asked, cognition such as "White cloth," "The horse goes," "It is a cow," arise? To this the author replies :

Because, in both the cases, (the origin of the cognition) is explained by means of identity alone. Otherwise (*i.e*, in the absence of identity), co-existence in one and the same substratum will not be possible.—100.

Vedântin Mahâdeva : —The author demonstrates the very absence of proof.

For, in respect of Samavâya, perception such as "White jar," etc, is, (according to our opponent), the proof. There is Inference also (says he), namely, that a qualified intuition, (that is, intuition in which not merely the thing intuited, but the thing *plus* a qualification, something else

added to it, is present) must have, for its object, the relation subsisting between both the qualification and the thing qualified, because it is a qualified intuition, just like the intuition "(He is) bearing-a-staff." But as regards both alike, the intuition is proved otherwise (without the supposition of Samavâya) by means of identity alone.

Intuition such as "The cloth exists in these yarns," etc., is, on the other hand, imagined merely by one's own Vâsanâ or natural tendency, and does not establish an objective reality.

Bhâṣya :—But then, the evidence (required) is the perception of qualifiedness or of a thing's possessing a certain form, and also the unaccountableness otherwise of the notion of the qualified. In regard to this, the author says:

"Ubhaya-tra api," in both cases also, in the perception of qualifiedness, and in the inference thereof, since the case is explained otherwise by means of the Svarûpa or own form of the thing alone, both of them are not evidence in respect of Samavâya. Such is the meaning.

The idea is this: Just as the notion or cognition of qualifiedness in the case of Samavâya is desired to arise by means of its Svarûpa or own form alone, in consequence of the apprehension of infinite regression, and the perception and inference in this case are otherwise explained; so let the qualified notion or cognition in respect of attribute, the possessor of attribute, etc., also be desired to arise simply by the Svarûpa or own form of attribute, etc.; hence, in these cases also, perception and inference are otherwise accounted for.

But if this be so, may argue our opponent, then Conjunction also is not established, inasmuch as the intuition of the jar, etc., as lying on the ground, etc., will also be otherwise accounted for by means of their Svarûpa or own form. Such is not the case, we reply; because at the time of Disjunction also, since the surface of the earth and the jar will have their Svarûpa or own form in the same identical state, qualified cognition will be entailed. While, in the case of Samavâya, there is never disjunction of the thing combined from its own substratum. Hence this is not a fault.

Some one (Aniruddha), however, has said that, in the case in question, the explanation otherwise of Samavâya is by means of the relation of identity; but that is not so, since the difference is merely one of words. For identity here cannot be asserted to be absolute, because, even in the absence of the attribute, the thing of which it was an attribute, continues to exist, and also because the intuition of qualifiedness still takes place

But it is a particular form of relation which is determinative of the cognition of difference in non-difference, that must necessarily be asserted. So that, "(It is) Samavâya," or "(It is) identity,"—thus merely the name is different. But there is no question that a relation other than the two correlatives, is established.

If again it is asserted that identity is nothing but Svarûpa or own form, then the very same has been asserted by us also;—thus the difference is one of mere words.

Moreover, of identity, to be the determinant of the idea of difference is seen in such cases as "The jar is a substance," etc., but not also its being the determinant of the idea of the relation of the container and the contained, since intuition in the form of "Substance of the jar" does not take place. Hence it is Substanceness, etc., that are the identity of Substance, etc. And, therefore, how can the relation of Samavâya, desired by others as being the determinant of the relation of the container and the contained, be fulfilled by means of identity, when the characteristic of being a cloth does not exist in the yarns and the like? -100.

N B.—For a presentation of the case of Samavâya from the Nyâya-Vaiśeṣika point of view, see Kaṇâda-Sûtrau, VII. ii. 26-28.

Motion is Perceptible also.

नानुमेयत्वमेव क्रियाया नेदिष्ठस्य तत्तद्वतोरेवापरोक्षप्रतीतेः

॥ ५ । १०१ ॥

न Na, not. अनुमेयत्वम् Anumeyatvam, inferribility. एव Eva, only. क्रियायाः Kriyâyâḥ, of action, change, or motion. नेदिष्ठस्य Nediṣṭhasya, of the nearest observer. तत्तद्वतोः Tat-tat-vatoḥ, of it, action, and of what it belongs to एव Eva, just, indeed. अपरोक्षप्रतीतेः Aparokṣa-pratîteḥ, because of immediate intuition.

101. Action is not merely a matter of inference, because he who stands very near, has, indeed, immediate intuition of it and of what it belongs to.—428.

Vṛitti:—Action, one may say, will have to be inferred. In regard to this, the author says:

Because only one who stands very near, has immediate intuition of just the action and what possesses action. Otherwise, there would be exclusion of the perception of proved objects. If action is to be inferred by means of Conjunction and Disjunction, then, since they embrace both (the things conjoint or disjoint), when a person climbs a tree from the root towards the top, action would be inferred in the tree also.

But, Conjunction and Disjunction being established by the action of the person, for what purpose, it may be asked, should action be admitted in the tree? It would have been so, we reply, were it a case of production, but, on account of their invariableness, by means of Conjunction and Disjunction, the inference of action in the tree cannot be resisted. Moreover, in the dark, the cognition of mere trembling in such cases as "The tip of my arm trembles," etc., is (an error or, according to another and better reading), not due to Conjunction and Disjunction. And the non-cognition of the action of the sun is due to the 'fault' of its being at too long a distance, and the like.—101.

Bhâṣya :—Through the agitation of Prakṛiti takes place the conjunction of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, and therefrom, creation,—such is our tenet. In regard to this, there is this objection of the heretics: The action, called agitation, does not belong to anything whatever. All entities are momentary: they perish no sooner than they are produced. Hence is not established action inferrible from conjunction with a different place.

To this, the author replies:

It is not merely the case that action can be inferred only by means of conjunction, etc., with another place; because "nediṣṭhasya," that is, of an observer standing near by, there is intuition by means of perception also, of action and of what possesses action, such as "The tree moves," etc. Such is the meaning.—101.

The Body is not Composed of Five Elements.

न पाञ्चभौतिकं शरीरं बहूनामुपादानायोगात् ॥ ५ । १०२ ॥

न Na, not. पाञ्चभौतिकं Pâñcha-bhautikam, constituted by five elements. शरीरं Śarîram, the body. बहूनां Bahûnâm, of many. उपादानायोगात् Upâdâna-a-yogât, because of unfitness or unsuitableness as material causes.

102. The body is not made of five elements, because many (heterogeneous things jointly) are unfit to be the material cause (of anything).—429.

Vṛitti :—The body, according to some, is originated by the five elements. In regard to this the author says:

"Of many," heterogeneous things.

But, in being helpers or supporters, the efficient causality of the four certainly exists. And that is why the Body is said to be constituted by five elements.—102.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—("Upâdâna-a-yogât," on account of unfitness of material): on account of unfitness to be the materials; such is the meaning.

Moreover, did the body consist of five elements, the non-perception of it, just like that of the conjunction of the jar and the sky, would be entailed, because it is only what is combined with what is appropriate to it, that is, as a rule, an object of perception.

Bhâṣya :—In the third book, only the different opinions were mentioned, that the Body is formed of five elements, and so forth, but no particular one of them was ascertained (to be the true). Among them, the author here refutes the contention of an opponent.

"Bahûnâm," that is, (of many) heterogeneous things. The rest is easy.

And heterogeneous things are not seen to be jointly the material causes in the case of the jar, cloth, etc.; hence only what is homogeneous can be the material cause. And the remaining quartet of elements are auxiliaries. To signify this, it is usual to speak of the Body as formed of five elements

Hereby is refuted the contention of the Body's being constituted by two, three, or four elements.

And, further, while the Body has one element as its material cause, it is Earth itself that is, as the author will declare later on (V. 112), the material cause of all Bodies.—102.

Body is not necessarily Gross.

न स्थूलमिति नियम आतिवाहिकस्यापि विद्यमानत्वात् ॥५।१०३॥

न Na, not. स्थूलम् Sthûlam, gross. इति Iti, such. नियमः Niyamah, rule. आतिवाहिकस्य Âtivâhikasya, of the vehicular. अपि Api, also. विद्यमानत्वात् Vidyamâna-tvât, because of the existence.

103. (Body is) gross,—such is not the rule; because of the existence of the Vehicular Body also (which is not gross).—430.

Vritti :—The Subtle Body does not exist, say some, since there is no proof (of its existence). In regard to this, the author says :

Since there can be no movement of Manas without a seat or vehicle, a vehicle should be affirmed for the purpose of Manas getting to another Body at death. The very same vehicle is the Vehicular Subtle Body. Says the Śruti also :

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रं पुरुषं निश्चकर्ष यमो बलात्।

Yama forcibly extracted the Puruṣa of the size of the thumb.

In the city (puri), *i.e.*, in the Gross Body, it lies (dete),—such is Puruṣa, *i.e.*, the Subtle Body.—103.

Bhâṣya :—Only Gross is the Body, say some. The author refutes this.

The characteristic of being body is to be the seat or support of the Indriyas, as will be seen from the declaration of Manu, *viz.*

यन्मूर्त्यवयवाः सूक्ष्मास्तस्येमान्याश्रयन्ति षट् ।
तस्माच्छरीरमित्याहुस्तस्य मूर्तिं मनीषिनः ॥

What are the subtile parts of corporeal bodies, them do these six (Indriyas) take to as their support. Therefore, do the sagacious people call his corporeal form by the name of Śarîra or body.—Manu Saṃhita, I. 17.

And Body which is of this description, is only the gross and preceptible one,—such is not the rule. Why not? Because of the existence also "Âtivâhikasya," of another Body which is imperceptible, subtle, and formed of the elements. Such is the meaning.

It conveys the Liṅga Deha or Subtle Body from one world to another world, so is it Âtivâhika or Vehicular. For, as has already been stated (*vide* III. 12), without the support of the elements, the movement of the Subtle Body, just like that of a picture, is impossible. And this aphorism is for the purpose merely of the elucidation of that very aphorism.

And the subtle one's being a Body should be understood to be either by reason of its being the seat of Bhoga or Experience or by reason of its being the seat of the reflection of Puruṣa.

And of the existence of the Vehicular Body, the evidence is furnished by the Śruti ; for example :

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मा
सदा जनानां हृदये सन्निविष्टः ।
(तं स्वाच्छरीरात् प्रवृहेन्
मुञ्जादिवेषीकां धैर्येण ।
तं विद्याच्छुक्रममृतं तं विद्याच्छुक्रममृतम् ॥)

The Puraṣa of the size of the thumb, the internal body, is always seated in the heart of all beings; (one should distinguish it from one's own (external) body, with patience, just as one does the stock from the straw. One should know that to be shining and imperishable, one should know that to be shining and imperishable).—Kaṭha Upaniṣat, VI. 17.

and by the Smṛiti ; for example :

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रं पुरुषं निश्चकर्ष बलाद्यमः ।

Puruṣa, of the size of the thumb, Yama extracted with force.—Mahâbhâratam.

For, it is not possible that the Subtle Body, which pervades the whole Gross Body, should itself be of the size of the thumb. Hence it is established from the sense that it is the receptacle of the Subtle Body that is of the size of the thumb. Just as the light of a lamp, though it

pervades the whole room, is of the shape of a cone, by reason of the fine particles of the terrene portions of the oil, wick, etc. condensed above the wick, having a conic shape; even so does the Subtle Body, though it pervades the whole Gross Body, possess the magnitude of the thumb, by means of the subtile elements which constitute its seat or support, having the magnitude of the thumb.—103.

How the senses illuminate objects.

नाप्राप्तप्रकाशकत्वमिन्द्रियाणामप्राप्तेः सर्वप्राप्तेर्वा ॥ ५ । १०४ ॥

न Na, not. अप्राप्तप्रकाशकत्वम् A-prâpta-prakâśaka-tvam, to be the illuminator of objects which they do not reach to. इन्द्रियाणाम् Indriyâṇâm, of the Indriyas or senses. अप्राप्तेः A-prâpteḥ, because of non-reaching to. सर्वप्राप्तेः Sarva-prâpteḥ, because of reaching to everything. वा Vâ, or.

104. It does not belong to the senses to be the illuminator of what they do not reach to, because of their not reaching, or because they would (else) reach everything. —431.

Vritti :—The senses are the illuminators of what they do not reach to, say some, because there is perception of sound at a distance, and because there is perception of objects through glass, mica, and crystal. In regard to this, the author says:

Not to be the revealer of objects which they do not reach to, that is, to be the revealer of what they reach to. Hearing, by means of its Vritti or modification, is connected with Sound. Glass, etc., on the other hand, on account of their transparency, do not resist the passage of the Eye. And at a distance, cognisance of things takes place by means of the modifications of the Senses).

If (it be said that) the Senses do not cognise objects (at a distance), on account of their not reaching to them, just as in the case of (an object) intercepted by a wall, (then) since there is no distinction (of the not reaching to objects near by which is implied), from the not-reaching to objects by reason of their lying at a distance, they would not cognise even objects which are not intercepted.

Note :—Here the point at issue is whether, in cognising objects, the Senses reach to them, or not. The opponent says that they do not, and argues that, if they did, then they would cognise distant and intercepted objects also, but that, that is not the case, and that, therefore, it follows that they do not reach to objects which they cognise. Now, the author points out the defect in this argument by the expression "because of not reaching". That is to say, if, as alleged by the opponent, the Senses do not reach to objects, then this disability of the Senses would affect the cognition not only of distant and intercepted

objects, but that of unintercepted objects as well, because the disability must operate equally in both the cases. But, in fact, the cognition of unintercepted objects is not so affected. Therefore the position is untenable that the Senses do not reach to objects.

If, on the other hand, (it be said that) they cognise objects even without reaching to them, then, since there is no distinction (in this respect, in the case of any object whatever), they would cognise all objects whatever lying within the womb of the world (—which is contrary to experience).—104.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—There is no rule that the Senses operate by reaching (to objects); for, even if it be possible for the Eye, by reason of its being formed of Light, to go to the place of the objects, it is impossible in the case of the Ear, etc. On the contrary, it is the Sound itself that, arrived at the locality of the Ear according to the principle of ripples and waves, or according to the principle of the budding forth of the *Kadamba* flower,* is cognised by the Ear. Smell also, arrived, along with the particles in which it inheres, at the locality of the Power of Smell, is cognised by the Power of Smell. Similarly in the other cases also. The intuition, on the other hand, of Sound at a distance, is nothing but an error, or has the causal Sound as its object.

The author discards these views.

"Aprâptânâm," of things unconnected as objects of cognition, "prakâśakatvam," to be the revealer, does not belong to the Senses, "aprâpteḥ," on account of non-connection. Now, if it be said that there is, indeed, connection of the Senses, since they are pervaded (*i e.*, pervading), to this the author replies "Sarva-prâpteḥ". So that the senses would cognise everything whatever lying within the womb of the world. Therefore, a different or special connection is necessary. Such is the import

* A statement of the principles referred to herein, will be found in the following extract from the Gloss of Jayanârâyaṇa Tarkaratna on the Vaiśeṣika Sûtram of Kaṇâda, (*Vide Ibid.* II. ii. 37, S. B. H. Vol. VI, page 103): "Some explain the production of Sound on the principle of ripples and waves. According to them, the first Sound is produced from the impact (*e. g.*) of a drum and a drum-stick, etc., within the limits of that particular space. Then, outside that circle, and within the limits of the ten quarters, the second Sound is produced from the first, and extends it. After that, beyond this second circle, and within the confines of the ten quarters, the third sound is produced from the second. And, in the same way, the production of the fourth and other Sounds should be understood. Others, however, hold that the production of Sound takes place on the principle of the ball of the *Kadamba* flower. In their view, the second and other Sounds are neither single nor confined to the ten quarters taken together, but are produced tenfold in ten quarters. (Thus, the one is the theory of the successive production of single Sounds, while the other is the theory of the simultaneous production of multiple Sounds). This is the difference."

Bhâṣya :—The senses (*e.g.*, the Eye) have already (*Vide* II. 23) been declared to be other than the eye-balls. With a view to establish that, the author refutes that the Senses are the revealers of what are not reached to (by them).

Objects unconnected with them, the Senses do not reveal; "aprâpteḥ," (because of their not reaching to them), since it is not seen that a lamp and the like reveal what is not reached to by them; also because, in the case of their being the revealer of what is not reached to, there is the implication of their being the revealer of all things, including the intercepted, etc. Such is the meaning. The Sense, therefore, must be other than the eye-ball for the purpose of connection with the sun lying at a distance, etc. Such is the import.

And, in the case of the Senses, to be the revealer of objects is just by way of their delivering objects to Puruṣa, since they are themselves unintelligent,—just as is, in the case of the mirror, to be the revealer of the face. Or, their being the revealer of objects consists simply in their taking on the reflection or image of objects.—104.

The Eye is not formed of Light.

न तेजोऽपसर्पणात्तैजसं चक्षुर्वृत्तितस्तत्सिद्धेः ॥ ५।१०५ ॥

न Na, not. तेजोऽपसर्पणात् Tejas-apasarpaṇât, because of the gliding forth of Tejas or Light. तैजसं Taijasam, formed of Tejas or Light. चक्षुः Chakṣuḥ, the Eye (other than the eye-ball); Sight; the Power of Vision. वृत्तितः Vṛitti-taḥ, through modification or function. तत्सिद्धेः Tat-siddheḥ, owing to the possibility or accomplishment thereof, *i.e.*, of gliding forth.

105. Not because Light glides (and the Eye, does so too,) is the Eye formed of Light, because of the taking place thereof through the modification (of the Eye).—432.

Vṛitti :—If the Eye be gliding, then, some one may say, it must be formed of Light. In regard to this, the author says :

Just as in the case of Light, "apasarpaṇât," through its being the revealer (of objects, even at a distance, the abhimâna or misconception (arises that it is) formed of Light. In reality, however, by means of modification, that is, through connection, is the accomplishment thereof, that is, is the proof of the objects of cogintion.—105.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :— And that ("different or special connection", *vide* above) is, says the author, Vṛitti or modification (of the Senses).

Bhâṣya :—But, if this be so, then, one may say, the opinion that the Eye is formed of Light is alone reasonable, because Light alone is seen

to glide, to a distance, in the form of rays :—this apprehension the author repels.

The gliding forth of Light is seen,—by making this the ground, it must not be asserted that the Eye is formed of Light. Why (not)? Because, just as in the case of Prâṇa or Life, even though it is not formed of Light, the gliding forth can be accounted for by means of a kind of modification. Such is the meaning.

For, just as Prâṇa or Life, without at all altogether abandoning the body, glides out from the tip of the nose, up to a certain distance, by means of the modification called vitalising (prâṇana), even so will the Eye, though it is a Substance not formed of Light, without, indeed, altogether abandoning the body, dart off, all in a moment, towards an object lying at a distance, such as the sun, etc., by means of a particular transformation of itself called Vṛitti or modification.—105.

Proof of the Vṛitti *or Modification of the Senses.*

प्राप्तार्थप्रकाशलिङ्गाद् वृत्तिसिद्धिः ॥ ५ । १०६ ॥

प्राप्तार्थप्रकाशलिङ्गात् Prâpta-artha-prakâśa-liṅgât, through the sign or mark of the manifestation of object reached to. वृत्तिसिद्धिः Vṛitti-siddhiḥ, proof of modification

106. Through the mark of the manifestation of objects reached to, (there is) proof of the modification (of the Senses).—433.

Vṛitti :—Since Vṛitti or modification, is not an object of sense-perception, how, it may be asked, is its existence established? To this, the author replies :

It is clear.—106.

Bhâṣya :—But then, what is the proof, it may be asked, in respect to any such modification? To this the author replies :

It is easy.—106.

Note :—The reasoning, indicated here, may be exhibited as follows: For the manifestation of objects, the Senses must reach to them. In reaching to objects, they must not quit connection with the body. So that, while their connection with the body is maintained, their connection with objects has to be explained. And this can be possible only by means of a peculiar modification of the Senses themselves, which is technically called Vṛitti, modification. Thus is the existence of Vṛitti proved.

Nature of modification of the Senses described.

भागगुणाभ्यां तत्त्वान्तरं वृत्तिः सम्बन्धार्थं सर्पतीति ॥ ५ । १०७॥

भागगुणाभ्यां Bhâga-guṇâbhyâm, from a fragment and a quality. तत्त्वान्तरं Tattvantaram, a different Tattva or principle. वृत्तिः Vṛittiḥ, modification of the Senses

सम्बन्धार्थं Sambandha-arthaṃ, for the purpose of connection. सर्पति Sarpati, glides forth. इति Iti, hence.

107. The 'modification' is a different principle from a fragment or a quality (of the Senses), because it is for the purpose of connection (with objects) that they glide forth.—434.

Vṛitti:—Is the modification, it may be asked, just like the flame of a lamp, of the form of a fragment, or is it a sort of quality? To this the author replies:

The 'modification' which is (to be) inferred by means of the effects, is a different Principle which is formed of Ahaṃkâra, (and this does not run counter to our enumeration of twentyfive principles), because padârtha or predicable is indeterminate (in number).

Since the cognition of unconnected (objects) is impossible, (it, *i.e.*, the 'modification') glides forth for the purpose thereof. So has it been said:—

वृत्तयः प्रसरद्रूपाः स्फारिताक्षस्य यत्र च ।
अदृष्टानुग्रहात्तत्र सम्बद्धार्थावबोधिकाः ॥

And where, in the case of one with the eyes widely opened, arise the modifications in the form of gliding forth, there they become, under the favourable influence of Adṛiṣṭam, the causes of the enlightenment of connected objects.—107.

Bhâṣya:—With a view to establish the going (of the Senses), without, indeed, at the same time, parting connection with the body, the author displays the Svarûpa or essential form of Vṛitti or the 'modification' (of the Senses).

For the purpose of connection (with objects), (the Senses) glide forth,—for this reason, of the Eye, etc., 'Bhâgaḥ', that is, a disjoined part like a spark, or a quality like colour and the like, is not their 'modification'. On the contrary, the modification, whilst a portion thereof, is something different from a fragment or a quality. For, if it were a disjoined part, connection of the Eye with the Sun, etc., would not take place by means of it; and, if it were a quality, the action called gliding forth, would be impossible. Such is the meaning.

Hereby is it established that the modification of Buddhi also, like the flame of a lamp, is a transformation quite of the form of a Substance, resembling a piece of very clean cloth which, by means of its transparency, is capable of taking up images possessing the shape of objects.—107.

Modification may be a Quality as well as a Substance.

न द्रव्यनियमस्तद्योगात् ॥ ५ । १०८ ॥

न Na, not. द्रव्यनियमः Dravya-niyamaḥ, limitation to substance. N.B. Aniruddha here reads two words instead of one; *viz.*, Dravye, in respect of substances, Niyamaḥ, rule. तद्योगात् Tat-yogât, on account of the presence thereof, *i.e.*, of etymological meaning in the word, modification (Vijñâna); through connection thereof, *i.e.*, of action (Aniruddha).

108. (It is) not a rule (that action takes place) in substances (only), because (the rule as to action depends upon) connection of action (Aniruddha).

(It is) not a rule (that modification is always the name) of a Substance, because there is present (in it) an etymological meaning (as well) (Vijñâna).—435.

Vritti:—But how can the action of gliding forth take place, it may be asked, in the case of the modification which is incorporeal? To this, the author replies:

Owing to the indeterminateness (of the number) of Predicables, action is not confined to Substances alone. But, on the contrary, wherever proof (of action) is seen, we infer it. And action is seen in the modification, as, otherwise, there would not take place the cognisance of things.—108.

Bhâṣya:—But, if this be so, then all modifications being Substances, how, some one may ask, do you account for the use of the word, modification, to (denote) the attributes of Buddhi in the form of desire and the like? To this, the author replies:

Modification is substance and nothing but substance,—such rule does not exist. Why? "Tat-yogât", that is, because of the presence of the etymological meaning therein, that is, in (the word,) modification. For, this word is derivative in this sense, namely,

वृत्तिर्वर्त्तनजीवने ।

Vritti denotes (manner of) existence and life.

And "life" is an operation which is the cause of one's own preservation or continued state, (as follows) from the teaching:

जीव बलप्राणधारणयोः

The root Jîv, to live, is in the sense of upholding strength and upholding vitality.—Dhâtupâṭha, XV. 54.,

as well as from such uses as "the occupation of a Vaiśya," "the occupation of a Śûdra," and so forth. Therein, just as, by means of the

modification in the form of a Substance, Buddhi lives, so also by means of desire and the like; hence these too are modifications; because on the very suppression of them all, there would be death of the Chittam or Buddhi. Such is the meaning.—108.

Ahaṃkâra *is everywhere the uniform cause of the Senses.*

न देशभेदेऽप्यन्योपादानतास्मदादिवन्नियमः ॥ ५ । १०९ ॥

न Na, not. देशभेदे Deśa-bhede, there being a difference of locality. अपि Api, even. अन्योपादानता Anya-upâdânatâ, to have something else as the material cause. अस्मदादिवत् Asmat-âdi-vat, as is with us and the like. नियमः Niyamaḥ, rule.

109. Nor, even though there be a difference of locality, have the Senses something else (than Ahaṃkâra) as the material cause; the rule is as with us and the like.—436.

Vṛitti:—In a particular locality, the Senses, it may be said, will be formed of the Elements,—just as, in a particular locality, death occurs to one bitten by a scorpion. In regard to this, the author says:

In one's own body itself, the Vyâpti or logical pervasion or universal concomitance is recognised that the Senses are formed of Ahaṃkâra. On the violation thereof, the smoke also will wander away from fire.—109.

Bhâṣya:—Since it is sometimes also heard (from the Vedas) that the Senses are formed of the Elements, it may be doubted, whether the Śruti (on this subject) is perhaps to be established by means of (occasional) differences of particular localities. In regard to this, the author says:

Not even according to difference of localities such as the world of Brahmâ, etc., do the Senses have anything else than Ahaṃkâra for their material cause; but, just as in the case of ourselves and the like who dwell in the terrestrial world, so also in the case of all, without exception, they are all uniformly formed of Ahaṃkâra; for, (in an analogous case, difference of locality causes no difference in the constitution of the Subtle Body, as) it is heard from the Śruti that it is one and the same Subtle Body that merely moves from place to place by reason of there being differences of localities. Such is the meaning.—109.

The doubtful Śruti *explained.*

निमित्तव्यपदेशात्तद्व्यपदेशः ॥ ५ । ११० ॥

निमित्तव्यपदेशात् Nimitta-vyapadeśât, through mention or predication of the nimitta or efficient cause. तद्व्यपदेशः Tat-vyapadeśaḥ, the mention or predication thereof, *i.e.*, of the Senses having the Elements as their material causes.

110. The mention thereof is due to the mention of the efficient cause.—437.

Vṛitti :—The author shows the reason for the predication : "formed of the five elements."

The material causality of the five is denied, but not their efficient causality : wherefore is the predication : "formed of the five elements." —110.

Bhâṣya :—But, if this be so, then, how, it may be asked, is the Śruti about the Senses being formed of the Elements to be accounted for ? To this, the author replies :

The predication of being the material cause is made even in respect of the instrumental cause, from the desire to emphasise or to point out that it is the chief cause ; just as fire (is spoken of as arising) from fuel. Hence is the predication of the Senses as having the Elements as their material causes. Such is the meaning. For, it is by means of the Support given by the Elements of Fire, etc., that the Senses arise from the Ahaṃkâra inhering in them ; just as fire, by means of the Support given by the earthly fuel, arises from the fire inhering in it. On this point, the proof is furnished by Śrutis such as :

अन्नमयं हि सौम्य मनः

For, formed of food, O calm one, is Manas.—*Chhândogya Upaniṣat*, VI. v. 4.

and the arguments mentioned therein.—110.

Varieties of the Gross Body.

उष्मजाण्डजजरायुजोद्भिज्जसांकल्पिकसांसिद्धिकं
चेति न नियमः ॥ ५ । १११ ॥

उष्मजाण्डजजरायुजोद्भिज्जसांकल्पिकसांसिद्धिकं Uṣmaja-aṇḍaja-jarâyuja-udbhijja-sâṃkalpika-sâṃsiddikaṃ, heat-born, egg-born, womb-born, vegetable, will-born and artificial. च Cha, and. इति Iti, hence. न Na, not. नियमः Niyamaḥ, rule ; determination.

111. (Gross Bodies are the) heat-born, egg-born, womb-born, vegetable, will-born, and artificial ; hence it is not a rule (that the varieties of the Gross Body are the first four only as held by the Vaiśeṣikas and others).—438.

Vṛitti :—How many are the varieties of the (Gross) Body ? it may be asked. So the author says:

The heat-born are the flies, mosquitoes, etc.; the egg-born, birds, reptiles, etc.; the womb-born, man, etc.; the vegetable, tree, etc.; the will-born, Manu, etc.; the artificial, those produced by means of Mantra or incantation, herbs, etc.

[illegible] Bodies are) the (first four only,—there is no such li[illegible]

Bhâṣya :—Incidentally the author determines the variety that belongs to the Gross Body.

In the Śruti :

तेषां खल्वेषां भूतानां त्रीण्येव बीजानि भवन्ति अण्डजं जीवजमुद्भिज्जम् ।

Of the same, those beings, verily the seeds are three only : egg-born, life-born, vegetable.—*Chhândogya Upaniṣat*, VI. iii. 1.

threefoldness of the Body, in the form of the egg-born etc., has been mentioned with a view or with reference to the usual varieties, but not that such is the rule, or that it is an exhaustive enumeration ; because the Body becomes indeed of the six varieties of the heat-born, and the rest. Such is the meaning.

Among these, the heat-born are mosquito, etc. ; the egg-born, birds, reptiles, etc. ; the womb-born, man, etc. ; the vegetable, tree, etc. ; the will-born, Sanaka, etc., the artificial, those produced from the perfection or supernatural power attained by means of Mantra or incantation, penance, etc., *e.g.*, the bodies produced from the body of Raktabîja, etc.—111.

Earth is the material of the Gross Body.

सर्वेषु पृथिव्युपादानमसाधारण्यात्तद्व्यपदेशः पूर्ववत् ॥ ५ । ११२ ॥

सर्वेषु Sarveṣu, in all bodies पृथिव्युपादानम् Pṛithivî-upâdânam, earth, the material cause. असाधारण्यात् A-sâdhâraṇyât, on account of uncommonness or speciality. तद्व्यपदेशः Tat-vyapadeśaḥ, the predication thereof, *i.e.* of the body's being formed of five, four, etc., Elements. पूर्ववत् Pûrva-vat, as in the preceding case, *i.e.*, of the Senses.

112. In all (Bodies), there is Earth as the material cause, because of some speciality ; the predication thereof is as in the preceding case.—439.

Vṛitti :—Which Element, it may be asked, is predominant in the Body ? To this, the author replies :

"In all"—this phrase has been used to denote "generally," "to a larger extent" ; because there is the Śruti that, in the world of Sûrya, etc., the Body is formed of Light There even there is reliance on the Support of a larger number of terrene particles, because, on the other hand, were their number small, there would be no enjoyment.

"As in the preceding case," that is, everything is explained.—112

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—Because, in the matter of enjoyment, terrene particles alone possess the fitness or capability (of being enjoyed).

Bhâṣya :—It has previously been declared that the Body has only one Element as its material cause. In this very incidental connection the author mentions it specifically.

"In all", that is to say, bodies, it is Earth alone that is the material, "because of some speciality," that is, because of its predominance by means of excess and the like. The predication of the body's being formed of five, four, etc., Elements, is, on the other hand, "as in the preceding case," that is, just like (the predication of) the Senses being formed of the Elements, by reason merely by their presence as auxiliary or instrumental causes or as supports. Such is the meaning.—112.

Prâṇa *or the Life-Breath is not the originator of the body.*

न देहारम्भकस्य प्राणत्वमिन्द्रियशक्तितस्तत्सिद्धेः ५ । ११३ ॥

न Na, not. देहारम्भकस्य Deha-ârambhakasya, of the originant of the body. प्राणत्वम् Prâṇa-tvam, the characteristic of being Prâṇa or the Breath of Life. इन्द्रियशक्तितः Indriya-śakti-taḥ, through the power of the Indriyas. तत्सिद्धेः Tat-siddheḥ, because of the accomplishment thereof.

113. Not to the originant of the Body (belongs) the characteristic of being Prâṇa, because of the accomplishment thereof through the power of the Indriyas.—440.

Vṛitti :—The author removes the apprehension, (which may arise) from seeing Prâṇa in the Body, that it is the originant of the Body.

It belongs to the elemental Air to be the originant of the Body; nor is Prâṇa Vâyu or the "vital air" elemental, since there exists the Śruti:

प्राणात् सर्वमजायत ।

All was produced from Prâṇa.

And because it lasts as long as the Body endures, (there arises) the error of its being the originant.

Prâṇa is supported or upheld by the power of all the Indriyas: hence, as long as the Indriya exists, so long is "the accomplishment thereof", that is, accomplishment of the upholding of Prâṇa.—113.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—The author refutes the view that Prâṇa is Air.

The import is that Prâṇa is a modification of all the Indriyas.

Bhâṣya :—But then, on account of the pre-eminence of Prâṇa in the Body, let, one may say, Prâṇa itself be the originant of the Body. In regard to this, the author says:

Prâṇa is not the originant of the Body. "Because of the accomplishment" of Prâṇa, that is, because, by reason of the fact that Prâṇa does not remain without the Indriya, (it is established), by means of Agreement and Difference, (that) the production of Prâṇa is only from a particular no[illegible] the Indriyas. Such is the meaning.

The import is this: Prâṇa which is of the form of a modification of the Instruments (*i.e*, Indriyas), does not subsist in the absence of the Instruments. Therefore, since in a dead Body, by reason of the absence of the Instruments, there is the absence of Prâṇa, (it follows that) Prâṇa is not the originant of the Body.—113.

The Building of the Body is due to the Self.

भोक्तुरधिष्ठानाद् भोगायतननिर्माणमन्यथा पूतिभावप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ५ । ११४ ॥

भोक्तुः Bhoktuḥ, of the Experiencer. अधिष्ठानात् Adhiṣṭhânât, through the Superintendence, presence. भोगायतननिर्माणम् Bhoga-âyatana-nirmâṇam, building of the house of experience. अन्यथा Anyathâ, otherwise. पूतिभावप्रसङ्गात् Pûti-bhâva-prasaṅgât, because of the implication of the putrid state.

114. Through the superintendence or presence of the Experiencer (takes place) the building of the House of Experience; since, otherwise, there would be the implication of the putrid state.—441.

Vritti:—The author makes the ascertainment whether it is after the Body has been produced that there comes to be in it the Superintendence of the Self, or whether it is after the Superintendence of the Self has come into existence that there takes place the production of the Body.

It is lucid.—114.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—Commencing with the deposit of the seed into the womb, etc., (the Body builds up under the Superintendence of the Self).

"Adhiṣṭhânât," that is, through a particular connection.

Bhâṣya:—But then, Prâṇa being thus not a cause of the Body, the Body will be produced, it may be said, even without Prâṇa. In regard to this, the author says:

"Through the Superintendence," that is, just through the operation, "of the Experiencer," that is, of that to which Prâṇa belongs, takes place "the building of the House of Experience," that is, of the Body; since, "otherwise," that is, in the absence of the operation of Prâṇa, the result would be the putrid state of the blood and semen,—just as is the case with a dead body. Such is the meaning.

So that, by the particular operations of circulation of the juices, etc., Prâṇa is the instrumental or efficient cause of the Body, owing to

its being the means of upholding or sustaining the Body. Such is the import.—114.

The Superintendence of the Self is Relative, and not Absolute.

भृत्यद्वारा स्वाम्यधिष्ठितिर्नैकान्तात् ॥ ५ । ११५ ॥

भृत्यद्वारा Bhṛitya-dvârâ, through, or by means of, the servant. स्वाम्यधिष्ठितिः Svâmi-adhiṣṭhitiḥ, Superintendence of the master. न Na, not. एकान्तात् Eka-antât, immediately; real, full, effective.

115. Through the servant is the Superintendence of the master,—not immediately. (Vijñâna). Superintendence through a servant cannot be effective. (Aniruddha).—442.

Vṛitti:—Because Pradhâna is the root of the Body, Superintendence (of the Self) will be, one may say, only through that and not otherwise. In regard to this, the author says:

* Just as where an unintelligent servant is depended upon, there is not well-being everywhere, so, through superintendence of the unintelligent Pradhâna, there cannot be the counteracting or prevention of the putrid state.—115.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—The Superintendence of Puruṣa, through Pradhâna, (cannot be)—the counteractive of the putrid state—such is the complement (of the aphorism); "Na-eka-antât," (on account of its being not-one-ended), that is, on account of its vyabhichâra or promiscuous connection, in other words, on account of its being present everywhere.

Bhâṣya:—But then, some one may say, it is possible for Prâṇa alone to be the Superintendent, because it is this which possesses operation, and not for that to which Prâṇa belongs (*i.e.*, the Self), because it is immutable, and because there is no purpose in the Superintendence of that which is devoid of operation. To this, the author replies:

In the building of the Body, superintendence, in the form of operation, of the master, that is, the intelligent Principle, does not exist, "ekântât," that is, immediately, but through its servant in the form

* The translation given here is that of the reading of the Vṛitti found in Dr. Garbe's Jeypur MS, which we adopt, without the least hesitation, as being the correct one. Dr. Garbe, instead of caring to understand it, "corrected" the reading! Had he paid due regard to the sense required, he would not have misled himself into reading the two words "avalambite" and "na" as one word "avalambitena." With the result that his "corrected" reading conveys a meaning which is obscure and inappropriate. For, rendered into English, it runs as follows: As, dependent upon an unintelligent servant (is) everywhere one's own presence, so etc.

of Prâṇa;—just as in the case of a king's building a city. Such is the meaning.

And thus it is established that Prâṇa's being the Superintendent is immediate, while Puruṣa's being the Superintendent is by means of the mere conjunction of Prâṇa.

So is it also in the case of the acts of construction of a water-pot, etc., by a potter, etc.

The difference, however, is this: In that (*i.e.* construction, *e.g.*, of a water-pot) there is the contributiveness of the intelligent Principle as well as of Buddhi, etc., as the creation (by a potter) is preceded by Buddhi.

Although the building of the Body takes place only through the Superintendence of Prâṇa, yet, by Prâṇa, is awaited conjunction of that to which Prâṇa belongs, *i.e.*, Puruṣa, inasmuch as the building up of the Body by Prâṇa is only for the purpose of Puruṣa. With a view to show this, has been declared: "Through the Superintendence of the Experiencer."—115.

Puruṣas *are ever free.*

समाधिसुषुप्तिमोक्षेषु ब्रह्मरूपता ॥ ५ । ११६ ॥

समाधिसुषुप्तिमोक्षेषु Samâdhi-suṣupti-mokṣe-ṣu, in the states of meditative trance, profound sleep, and release. ब्रह्मरूपता Brahma-rûpa-tâ, the condition of being of the form of Brahman.

116. In trance, profound sleep, and release, (Puruṣa rests in) the condition of being of the form of Brahman.—443.

Vṛitti :—With a view to the determination of the form of Brahman, the author declares others' being of a like form.

(In these states there is) the condition of having a similar form with Brahman, on account of the non-perception of external objects anywhere, but not the condition of being of the (very) form of Brahman.—116.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—In order to declare, by the example of deep sleep, the absence of pain in the state of release, the author says :

"The condition of being of the form of Brahman", that is, the not-feeling of pain.

Bhâṣya :—It was stated before that (the activity) "of Prakṛiti is for the sake of the release of the released" (II. 1). In regard to this, since there is (room for) the objection of the opponents, namely, how can the

Self be eternally free when its bondage is seen ? therefore, with a view to demonstrating its eternal freedom, the author says :

" Samâdhi, " (trance) that is, the ultra-cognitive state (*vide* foot-note on pages 305-306 above) ; and " Suṣupti " (profound sleep), that is, total profound sleep ; and " Mokṣa " (release), that is, disembodied singleness (*i.e.*, the resting purely and absolutely alone of the Self after its separation from the Body). In these states, (there is), of Puruṣas, ' Brahma-rûpatâ," that is, the resting by being full of its own Svarûpa or intrinsic form, by reason of the disappearance, through the dissolution of the modifications of Buddhi, of the limitations caused by them as its upâdhi or external investment; just as, *e.g.*, is the fullness of the portion of space confined within a water-pot, after the destruction of the water-pot. Such is the meaning.

And the same, has been declared (before) :

तन्निवृत्तावुपशान्तोपरागः स्वस्थः ॥

On the cessation thereof, the adventitious tint having subsided, (Puruṣa becomes) self-seated.—Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram, II. 34.

And thus it is nothing but Brahma-ness, the being Brahman, that is, the nature or essence of Puruṣas, since it is not due to any nimitta or (external) instrumental cause,—just as is whiteness in the case of the crystal.

But at the time of connection with the modifications of Buddhi, by reason of the manifestation (of the Self) as having the form of consciousness limited or conditioned (by those modifications), (there arises) the abhimâna or conceit or misconception of limitation or determination ; and, likewise, under the influence of the reflection of the modifications (falling on it), pain, etc. come to be as though they were its impurity ;—all this is nothing but aupâdhika, caused by external investment, or adventitious, as it varies concomitantly with the presence and absence of the nimitta or occasional or instrumental cause called the upâdhi or external investment ; just as is the case with the redness of the crystal, such is the import.

And so there is the Yoga Sûtram :

वृत्तिसारूप्यमितरत्र ॥

Elsewhere (there is) similarity of form with the modifications.—*Yoga Sutram*, I. 4.

And in our Śâstra, the word, Brahman, denotes conscious or intelligent existence in general, which is all-full, and devoid of limitation, impurity, and the like, caused by the upâdhi or external investment ; but not, as in the Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ, (Vedânta), merely a particular Puruṣa characterised by being the Lord. This distinction should be observed.

In this connection, the following Ślokas are recited for the sake of the illumination of the disciples :

चिदाकाशेऽभिव्यक्ते नानाकारैरितस्ततः ।
धीरटन्ती सहव्यक्तेरटन्तीं दर्शयेच्चितिम् ॥
वस्तुतस्तु सदा पूर्णमेकरूपं च चित्तमः ।
वृत्तिशून्यप्रदेशेषु दृश्याभावान्न पश्यति ॥
चक्षुषी रूपवत् पुंसो दृश्या वृत्तिर्हि नेतरत् ।
समाध्यादौ च सा नास्तीत्यः पूर्णः पुमांस्तदा ॥

Buddhi, moving here and there and everywhere, by manifold forms, in the unmanifested firmament of consciousness, may show consciousness as moving along with the manifestation.

In reality, however, the firmament of consciousness is always full and of the same form throughout ; in those quarters which are devoid of modifications (of Buddhi), (one) does not see (it) on account of the absence of any object of sight.

For, just as is colour in the case of the Eye, the modification is the object of vision in the case of Puruṣa,—nothing else ; and this (modification) does not exist in the state of trance and the like ;—hence, at that time, is Puruṣa full (of himself).—116.

Release distinguished from Deep Sleep and Trance.

द्वयोः सबीजमन्यत्र तद्धतिः ॥ ५ । ११७ ॥

द्वयोः Dva-yoḥ, in the case of the two, *i.e.*, profound sleep and ultra-cognitive trance. सबीजं Sa-bîjam, seed-carrying, with a seed. अन्यत्र Anya-tra, elsewhere, *i.e.*, in the case of release. तद्धतिः Tat-hatiḥ, the destruction thereof, *i.e.*, of the seed.

117. In the case of the two (the condition of being of the form of Brahman is impregnated) with the seed (of Saṃsâra) ; in the other case (there is) the destruction thereof. —444.

Vritti :—The author tells us the Sva-rûpa or essential form of Brahman.

"Dvayoḥ," that is, of trance and deep sleep, (there is) the characteristic of being with the seed, that is, the possession of Saṃskâra or impression (of past experiences) ; of the other, that is, of Release, (there is) absence of the seed.—117.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—"Sa-bîja-tvam," the being with the seed, means the possession of the impression of past experiences which is the predisposing or exciting cause of a recurrence of pain. "Destruction thereof" means the destruction of the impression.

Bhâṣya :—What then, it may be asked, is the difference of Release from deep sleep and trance? To this, the author replies:

"Dvayoḥ," that is, of trance and deep sleep, the characteristic of being Brahman is "Sabîjam," that is, attended with the seed of Bondage; "Anyatra," that is, in the state of Release, there is the absence of the seed;—this is the distinction. Such is the meaning.

Well, if, as you admit, the seed of Bondage exists in the state of trance, etc., then, limitation or determination being caused by that itself, how, our opponent may ask, can there be in them the characteristic of being Brahman? But such is not the case, we reply; because the seed of Bondage such as Vâsanâ or tendency, Karma or merit and demerit, and the like, remain, in those states, in the upâdhi or the external investment alone, and not in the intelligent principles, and because, moreover, they are not reflected in Puruṣa.

In the waking and other states, on the other hand, the bondage is, as has been declared more than once, aupâdhika or caused by the external investment, arising, as it does, under the influence of the reflection of the modifications of Buddhi.

But still, may ask our opponent, when in the (Yoga) Aphorisms of Patañjali as well as in the Commentary thereon, Ultra-cognitive Trance has been declared to be seedless, how is it stated here to be with a seed? We reply that this is not exactly the case; the declaration of seedlessness has been made there just with a view to indicate that, in the ultra-cognitive trance, the dissolution of seed takes place gradually; since, otherwise, were all ultra-cognitive individuals, without exception, seedless, there would be no explanation or accounting for of the fact of their rising again into waking consciousness.—117.

The Reality of Release demonstrated.

द्वयोरिव त्रयस्यापि दृष्टत्वान्न तु द्वौ ॥ ५ । ११८ ॥

द्वयोः Dva-yoḥ, of the two, *i.e.*, deep sleep and trance. इव Iva, like. त्रयस्य Trayasya, of the third, *i.e.*, release. अपि Api, also. दृष्टत्वात् Dṛiṣṭa-tvât, because of being "seen," *i.e.*, cognised or proved. न Na, not. तु Tu, but. द्वौ Dvau, two.

118. But (there are) not the two (only). (Release also is a reality), because, just like the two, the third also is seen.—445.

Vṛitti :—In the case of trance and deep sleep, successfulness, through their having the modifications suppressed, is evident, but it is not so,

it may be said, in the case of Release. In regard to this, the author says :

"Trayasya Api," that is, of Release also, "Dṛiṣṭva-tvât," that is, through demonstration by Śruti and inference, (there is) successfulness; but not the "two," that is, deep sleep and trance (only are successful). Since they are with seed, their successfulness is secondary or relative, --118.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—Just as deep sleep is proved by perception, or just as trance is proved by the Veda, so also is Release proved by the Śâstra or Scripture. Among them, again, the "two," deep sleep and trance, are not absolutely the ends of Puruṣa, since they are with seed, but Release alone is, since it is seedless. Such is the import.

Bhâṣya :—But then, trance and deep sleep are "visible," but what proof is there, it may be asked, of Release? This insinuation of the heretics the author averts.

Since Release also is "seen," that is, inferred by the example of trance and deep sleep, there are not the "two," that is, deep sleep and trance, only, but Release also is. Such is the meaning.

And the inference is in this way: The abandonment of the condition of Brahman which exists during deep sleep, etc., takes place through the fault such as Desire and the like, inhering in the Chitta or mind. If this fault be annihilated by Knowledge, then a condition, quite similar to deep sleep, etc, becomes permanent. It is the very same that is Release.—118.

Vâsanâ *is powerless during Deep Sleep.*

वासनयाऽनर्थख्यापनं* दोषयोगेऽपि न निमित्तस्य प्रधानबाधकत्वम् ॥ ५ । ११९ ॥

वासनया Vâsanayâ, by Vâsanâ or the impression of past experiences. अनर्थख्यापनं An-artha-khyâpanam, non-informing or non-manifestation of objects. This is

* For "An-artha-khyâpanam," Vijñâna clearly read "Na Sva-artha-khyâpanam" *Vide Bhâṣya*. Nâgeśa follows Vijñâna in this reading. F. E. Hall's doubt on this point ought not to have prevailed. It is equally clear, however, that Aniruddha read "An-artha-khyâpanam," and hinted, in his *Vṛitti*, at the plain, natural meaning of the term, *viz.*, "manifestation of 'evils' (anartha) or wrong objects," which is specifically set forth in the *Sâṃkhya-Vṛitti-Sâra* of Vedântin Mahâdeva, who herein follows Aniruddha. Quite evidently, therefore, the two great commentators had different readings of the same original Aphorism before them. What that original reading was, it is now difficult to ascertain. Aniruddha being the older of the two, his reading might be preferred. Secondly, while to derive Vijñâna's meaning from Aniruddha's reading, requires a little imagination only, it is impossible to derive Aniruddha's meaning from Vijñâna's reading. For these reasons, we have adopted the reading "An-artha-khyâpanam."

according to Vijñâna. From Aniruddha's view of the sense of the aphorism, the phrase means manifestation or cognition of anartha or evils or wrong things or things which cause desire, aversion, etc. दोषयोगे Doṣa-yoge, while there is conjunction of fault (V.); in respect of the conjunction, *i.e.*, production, of faults (A.) अपि Api, even; also. न Na, not. निमित्तस्य Nimittasya, of the instrumental cause. प्रधानबाधकत्वम् Pradhâna-bâdhaka-tvam, the being the impeder of the principal cause (V.); the being the impeder in the case of Pradhâna (A).

119. Even in the production of faults, the manifestation of wrong objects by Vâsanâ (is the cause); (therefore, desire, etc., are) not (the sole causes of Bondage); the instrumental or efficient cause (of these, *i.e.*, Vâsanâ, is) the impeder (of Release) in the case of Pradhâna.—Aniruddha.

Likewise, during the conjunction of the fault (in the shape of sleep), there does not take place the manifestation of (its own) objects by Vâsanâ; (for), the instrumental cause does not obstruct the principal.—Vijñâna.—446.

Vṛitti.—Since Desire, etc., are the cause of Bondage, what need, it may be asked, of Vâsanâ? Hence the author says:

It should not be asserted that Bondage takes place through the "fault" alone. Manifestation of wrong objects by Vâsanâ must be made. It should be asserted that the instrumental or efficient cause of the faults themselves, (which is Vâsanâ), is the impeder of the release of Pradhâna. And Vâsanâ, (therefore), is the primary or chief thing—119.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—"Doṣa-yoge api," even in the conjunction of Desire, etc., "anartha-khyâpanam," the cognition or knowledge of beauty and non-beauty (which arises), "Vâsanayâ," by means of Vâsanâ alone,—(is) the cause,—such is the complement (of the aphorism). Hence it does not belong to Desire, etc., alone to be the cause of Bondage; but "nimittasyâ," also of the instrumental cause of Desire, etc., that is, of Vâsanâ, is "pradhâna-bâdhaka-tvam," the characteristic of being the impeder of Release. Therefore, effort should be made only in respect of the uprooting of Vâsanâ. Such is the import.

Bhâṣya:—But then, may say our opponent, even notwithstanding the existence of the seed called Vâsanâ, let there be not, during trance, a modification (of Buddhi) in the shape of an object, on account of the deadening of Vâsanâ by Dispassion and the like; but, since Vâsanâ prevails in a person in deep sleep, there certainly will be cognition of object;

hence the condition of being Brahman or Brahman-hood during deep sleep is not reasonable (to assert). In regard to this, the author says:

As when there is Dispassion, so also when there is the conjunction of the fault of sleep, there does not take place "Sva-artha-khyâpanam," the reminding of its own object, by Vâsanâ; inasmuch as it is not possible, "nimittasya," for the mental impression (of past experiences), holding, as it does, a secondary place, to be the counteractive of the more potent fault of sleep. Such is the meaning. For it is precisely the more potent fault that makes Vâsanâ weak, that is, incompetent to produce its own effect. Such is the import.—119.

A Defence of Release during Life.

एकः संस्कारः क्रियानिर्वर्तको न तु प्रतिक्रियं संस्कारभेदा बहुकल्पनाप्रसक्तेः ॥ ५ । १२० ॥

एकः Ekaḥ, one single. संस्कारः Saṃskâraḥ, impression; Saṃskâra. क्रियानिर्वर्तकः Kriyâ-nirvartakaḥ, complete performer of action. न Na, not. तु Tu, but. प्रतिक्रियं Prati-kriyaṃ, one for each action. संस्कारभेदाः Saṃskâra-bhedâḥ, differences of Saṃskâra. बहुकल्पनाप्रसक्तेः Bahu-kalpanâ-prasakteḥ, owing to supposition of too many being entailed.

120. A single Saṃskâra is sufficient to carry action to the end; but there are not different Saṃskâras, one for each action; as, (else), a supposition of too many will be entailed.—447.

Vritti:—In the case of the shooting of an arrow or the like, action (or motion) takes place through Saṃskâra or impression called Vega or momentum, and, by means of action (is produced) Saṃskâra: hence, it may be said, there are more than one Saṃskâras. This the author denies.

In the case of there being a single Saṃskâra, it is unreasonable to suppose that the arrow will never fall down. While, in the case of transformation, through the transformation of the very single Saṃskâra, as becoming gradually less and less, (there will be) the falling down (of the arrow). Hence there would be redundancy in the supposition of a multiplicity (of Saṃskâras, one to each instant of motion of the arrow).—120.

Bhâṣya:—It was clearly stated, in the Third Book (*vide* aphorism III 83, page 357), that the retention of the Body is, in the case of the Jîvan-Mukta, through the least trace of Saṃskâra. In regard to that there is this objection: Experience is seen (to take place), in the case of the Jîvan-Mukta (the person who is released during life), just as it is in the

case of ourselves and others like us (who are not released during life), constantly in respect even of one and the same object. And this is unaccountable; because, just after producing the first (instant of) experience, the previous Saṃskâra is destroyed, and because a new Saṃskâra is not produced by reason of the obstruction caused by knowledge, just as is the case with Karma or Merit and Demerit. To this, the author replies:

The Saṃskâra whereby is commenced the experience of the Body of a Deva or the like,—that very single Saṃskâra is the completer of the experience of the Prârabdha (or Karma which has begun to yield fruits) to be accomplished in that Body; and that (Sâṃskara) is, exactly like action, destructible by the completion of Experience; "but not one for each action," that is, one for each individual instant of Experience, there is not a multiplicity of Saṃskâras; as (in that case) redundancy in the form of the supposition of too many individual Saṃskâras would be entailed. Such is the meaning.

Likewise, also, in the case of the whirling of the potter's wheel, the Saṃskâra called Vega or Momentum, is to be regarded as being one only,—continuing till the completion of the whirling.—120.

The Vegetable Kingdom also is a Field of Experience.

न बाह्यबुद्धिनियमो वृक्षगुल्मलतौषधिवनस्पतितृणवीरुधादीनामपि भोक्तृभोगायतनत्वं पूर्ववत् * ॥ ५ । १२१ ॥

न Na, not. बाह्यबुद्धिनियमः Bâhya-buddhi-niyamaḥ, limitation or restriction to external cognition. वृक्षगुल्मलतौषधिवनस्पतितृणवीरुधादीनाम्, Vṛikṣa-gulma-latâ-oṣadhi-vanaspati-tṛiṇa-vîrût-âdînâm, trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees with invisible flowers, grasses, creepers, etc. अपि 'Api, also. भोक्तृभोगायतनत्वं Bhoktṛi-bhoga-âyatanatvam, the being the site of the Experiencer and of Experience. पूर्ववत् Pûrva-vat, just as in the former case.

121. (There is) no restriction (of the "Body" or the House of Experience) to external cognition: it belongs also to trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees with invisible flowers, grasses, creepers, etc., (in which consciousness is internal), to be the site of the Experiencer and of Experience,—just as in the former case (V. 114).—448.

* Aniruddha and Vedântin Mahâdeva split up the aphorism into two and interpret them quite in a different way.

Vritti:—The object (of cognition) is one (only), it may be said, because the cognition (thereof) is a single one, inasmuch as there is no distinction in the (individual) intuition that "it is existent," "it is existent." Hence the author says:

As the intuition that "it is existent," is unobstructed, so also is the intuition that "it is a water-pot" or that "it is a piece of cloth," or the like. The intuition, again, that "it is existent," has the genus (of existence) for its object. Therefore, in the case of external cognition, there is no such rule as that it is of one and of one only.—121.

The Body of the Jîva or Incarnate Puruṣa consists of five Elements; originated from how many Elements, it may be asked, is the immobile? To this, the author replies:

"Just as in the former case": That is, since it is the site of Experience, it is formed of five Elements.

And its being the site of Experience is due to some particular action appertaining to another birth, because there is the Śruti:

जीवात्मान एव स्थावराश्रयतामुपगच्छन्ति ।

It is the Jîvâtmans or Incarnate Puruṣas that take to the immobile as their support.—122.

Bhâṣya:—It has been declared (in V. 111.) that there exists vegetable Body. The author repels the objection of the heretics that, owing to the absence of external cognition in that, there does not exist the characteristic of being a Body.

There is no such rule or restriction that that only should be a Body, in which there is external cognition; but it is to be considered that "to be the site of the Experiencer and of Experience," that is, to be a Body, belongs also to trees, etc., in which there is internal consciousness (or an under-current of consciousness without any external manifestation); because, "just as in the former case," that is, precisely like what putrescence has been mentioned before (in V. 114, as taking place) in the Body of man, etc., in the absence of the superintendence of the Experiencer, do withering, etc, take place in the Body of the tree, etc. Such is the meaning.

And thus, there are such Śrutis as:

यस्य यदेकां शाखां जीवो जहात्यथ सा शुष्यति ।

What single branch of it the Jîva abandons, the same withers thereafter.—*Chhândogya Upaniṣat*, VI. xi. 1.

Even if the portion, "(There is) no restriction (of the Body) to external cognition," constitue a separate aphorism, the two aphorisms,

after being made into one, should be explained just in the above manner and not otherwise; but it should be understood that the division of the aphorism (into two as done, *e. g.*, by Aniruddha) is due to the apprehension of the aphorism being otherwise too long.—121.

The evidence of Smṛiti *on the point.*

स्मृतेश्च ॥ ५ । १२२ ॥

स्मृतेः Smṛiteḥ, from the Smṛiti or that class of literature which embodies memories or recolletions of by-gone days. च Cha, and, also.

122. From Smṛiti also (the reality of the vegetable Body is established).—449.

Vṛitti.—In regard to this there exists, says the author, (the evidence of) the Smṛiti also.

It is clear.

And to this effect there are:

अभिवादितश्च यो विप्र आशिषं न प्रयच्छति ।
श्मशाने जायते वृक्षो गृध्रकङ्कनिषेवितः ॥

The Brâhmaṇa who, having been saluted, does not give blessing in return, is born in a burning ground, as a tree occupied by vultures and kites.

शरीरजैः कर्मदोषैर्याति स्थावरतां नरः ।
वाचिकैः पक्षिमृगतां मानसैरन्त्यजातिताम् ॥

By reason of faults of actions, produced by means of the body, man goes into immobile existence; (by reason of those, produced) by means of speech, into existence as a bird or a beast; and (by reason of those produced) by means of the mind, into the life of the lowest beings.—123.

Bhâṣya:—Also from the Smṛitis such as शरीरजैः (the second verse just now cited by Aniruddha), is established that the characteristic of being the site of the Experiencer and of Experience exists in trees, etc. Such is the meaning.—122.

Vegetables are not Moral Agents.

न देहमात्रतः कर्माधिकारित्वं वैशिष्ट्यश्रुतेः ॥ ५ । १२३ ॥

न Na, not, देहमात्रतः Deha-mâtra-taḥ, through merely being a Body. कर्माधिकारित्वं Karma-adhikâri-tvam, competency to perform meritorious acts (Aniruddha); Susceptibility to the production of Merit and Demerit. (Vijñâna) वैशिष्ट्यश्रुतेः Vaiśiṣṭya-Śruteḥ, because of the Śruti declaring the possession of a distinction or qualification.

123. Not through the mere Body is there competency to perform meritorious acts (Aniruddha), or susceptibility (to the production) of Merit and Demerit (Vijñâna), because the

Śruti declares (the necessity of) a special qualification (for this).—450.

Vritti :—If trees, etc., be Bodies, then, one may say, they will have competency to the performance of meritorious acts. Hence the author says :

Even the Bodies of Jîvas or Incarnate Puruṣas, such as those of Chaṇḍâlas (an untouchable class), etc., are not fit for the performance of meritorious acts; what to say, then, of the immobiles? Because competency for the performance of meritorious acts belongs to a Body specially qualified.—124.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—He who is rich, physically able, learned and unsubdued, is the competent person. Such is the import.

Bhâṣya :—But then, in the case also of trees, etc., by reason of their being conscious, there would be, one may say, the possibility of the production of Merit and Demerit. To this, the author replies :

Not by means of a Body merely does fitness for the production of Merit and Demerit appertain to the Jîva. Why? "Vaiśiṣṭya-Śruteḥ": because it is *heard* that competency arises only by means of being qualified as the Body of a Brâhmaṇa, or the like. Such is the meaning.—123.

Bodies are of three principal kinds.

त्रिधा त्रयाणां व्यवस्था कर्मदेहोपभोगदेहोभयदेहाः ॥५ । १२४ ॥

त्रिधा Tridhâ, threefold. त्रयाणां Trayâṇâṃ, of the three classes, good, middling and sluggish, and, therefore, of all creatures. व्यवस्था Vyavasthâ, allotment; distribution. कर्मदेहोपभोगदेहोभयदेहाः Karma-deha-upabhoga-deha-ubhaya-dehâḥ, the body of Karma or Merit, the body of Bhoga or Experience, and the Body of both Karma and Bhoga.

124. Of three (classes of living beings there is) a threefold distribution (of Bodies; *viz.*,) the Karmic Body, the Bhogic Body, and the Dual Body.—451.

Vritti :—The author states the division of Bodies.

The Karmic Body is of the dispassionate, because the performance of act, by them, is by means of, or along with, the renunciation of the fruits. The Bhogic Body is of the beasts, and the like. The Karmic-*cum*-Bhogic Body is of those competent persons who are also Experiencers.—125.

Bhâṣya :—Showing that fitness for (the acquisition of) Merit and Demerit arises only by means of the *kind* of the Body, the author declares that there are three kinds of Bodies.

"Of the three," the good, the middling, and the sluggish, that is to say, of all living beings, there is a threefold division of Bodies: Karmic Body, Bhogic Body, and Dual Body. Such is the meaning. Among them, Karmic Body is of the great sages; Bhogic Body is of Indra and others as well as of the immobiles, etc; Dual Body is of the royal sages.

Here the threefold division is (not exhaustive, but made) by reason of (these three) being the principal (kinds of Body); for, otherwise, it would consequently belong to all, without exception, to be, or to have, the Bhogic Body.—124.

A Fourth kind of Body.

न किंचिदप्यनुशयिनः ॥ ५ । १२५ ॥

न Na, not. किंचित् Kim chit, any one. अपि Api, even. अनुशयिनः Anuśayinaḥ, of one who is dispassionate.

125. Not any one whatever (of these) is that of the Yogins (Aniruddha), or the dispassionate (Vijñâna).—452.

Vritti:—The author mentions a fourth (Body) which is not competent for meritorious acts.

Says the lexicon Śâśvata:

विद्यादनुशयं द्वेषे पश्चात्तापानुबन्धयोः ॥

One should know the word, Anuśaya, in the sense of aversion, and in those of repentance and attachment.

"Anuśayinaḥ," in the case of the Yogin, there is no karma, meritorious act whatever, because he is above all moral obligation.—126.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—"Anuśayaḥ" means the end or termination of prârabdha karma, that is, Merit and Demerit which had commenced to work out their effects. ("Anuśayinaḥ", therefore,) means, of the person in whom there is Anuśaya, that is, of the wise or knowing Puruṣa. Such is the meaning. Nothing whatever—'karma' is the complement. A knowing Puruṣa, after experiencing the remnant of his Prârabdha, remains no longer liable for the observance of injunctions and prohibitions.

Bhâṣya:—Yet a fourth Body, the author mentions.

According to the saying that "One should know the word, Anuśaya, in the sense of aversion and in those of repentance and attachment", Anuśayaḥ here means dispassion. The Body of the dispassionate is, among these three, none whatever, that is, is different from these three. Such is the meaning; as, *e.g.*, were those of Dattâtreya, Jaḍa Bharata, and the like; because they had Bodies constituted principally by knowledge alone.—125.

Eternality of Buddhi *refuted.*

न बुद्ध्यादिनित्यत्वमाश्रयविशेषेऽपि वह्निवत् ॥ ५ । १२६ ॥

न Na, not. बुद्ध्यादिनित्यत्वम् Buddhi-âdi-nitya-tvam, eternality of Buddhi, etc. आश्रयविशेषे Âśraya-viśeṣe, in a particular receptacle or site. अपि Api, even. वह्निवत् Vahni-vat, as in the case of fire.

126. Buddhi, etc., are not eternal, even (when they exist) in a particular site (as is alleged),—just as is the case with fire.—453.

Vritti :—The author refutes (the theory of) eternal Buddhi.

In the case of a violation or transgression of the essential nature of Vyâpti or logical pervasion (which the theory of eternal Buddhi really implies), there would be uncertainty and insecurity everywhere. So that, in the case of a particular site, absence of heat would belong to fire produced from the sandal wood.—127.

Bhâṣya :—For the purpose of the establishment of the non-existence of Îśvara (*i.e.*, of an *eternal* Îśvara), which was declared before, the author disproves the eternality of knowledge, desire, act, etc., which is admitted by others (as existing in the case of Îśvara).

Here the word, Buddhi, denotes the modification called ascertainment or certainty (and not the Principle called Mahat or Buddhi). So that, eternality does not exist in the case of knowledge, desire, act, etc., even where there is a particular site of them, *i.e.*, even when they arise in that particular evolution of the Principle of Buddhi which is admitted by others as the Upâdhi or external investment of Îśvara ; because, by the example of the Buddhi of ourselves and the like, there is inference of the non-eternality of knowledge, desire, act, etc., in all cases without exception ; just as, by the example of ordinary or human fire, there is inference of the non-eternality of the covering or empyrean fire also. Such is the meaning.—126.

Above continued.

आश्रयासिद्धेश्च ॥ ५ । १२७ ॥

आश्रयासिद्धेः Âśraya-a-siddheḥ, because of the unreality or non-existence of the alleged site, *i.e.*, Îśvara. च Cha, and, also.

127. Moreover, because the (alleged) site does not exist.—454.

Vritti :—The author points out another defect.

Because of the non-existence of Îśvara ; and because of the absence of attribute in the Self ; because of the attributes of Prakṛiti undergoing transformation ; because of the non-enternality of Mahat and the rest.

Nor can the attributes, residing in non-eternal sites, properly be eternal.

Therefore there exists no site or place of inherence for an eternal Buddhi.—128.

Bhâṣya :—Let alone altogether the eternality of knowledge, desire, etc. ; the (alleged) site thereof, namely, the Upâdhi or external investment of Îśvara does not itself exist, in consequence of the non-existence of Îśvara. This the author says :

It is easy.—127.

Defence of Yogic *Perfections.*

योगसिद्धयोऽप्यौषधादिसिद्धिवन्नापलपनीयाः ॥ ५ । १२८ ॥

योगसिद्धयः Yoga-siddhayaḥ, Yogic perfections. अपि Api, also. औषधादिसिद्धिवत् Auṣadha-âdi-siddhi-vat, like the success or effect of drugs, etc. न Na, not. अपलपनीयाः Apalapanîyâḥ, to be ignored or denied.

128. (But) Yogic perfections also, like the success of drugs, etc., are not to be repudiated.—455.

Vṛitti :—Success through the power or potency of gems, charms, drugs, and penance is seen, but the Yogic perfections are not seen, one may say. In regard to this, the author says :

(Yogic perfections, such as) the power of attenuation, the building up of bodies, entering into another's body, etc., are seen. And these, which cannot arise from charms, etc., which yield minor perfections, depend upon Yoga alone. Hence they are not to be ignored.—129.

Bhâṣya :—But then, such being the case, how can it even possibly be supposed, one may ask, that omniscience, etc., adequate to the creation of the world, etc., should be producible (in the course of progress towards Release, instead of being present from before the creation of the world, *i.e.*, being eternal), when such lordliness or Îśvara-like powers are not seen, in the human world, to arise by means of penance, etc. ? To this, the author replies :

By the example of the success or power of drugs, etc., perfections such as attenuation, etc., produced through Yoga, and adapted to the work of creation, etc., are also established. Such is the meaning.—128.

Consciousness is not a product of the Elements.

न भूतचैतन्यं प्रत्येकादृष्टेः सांहत्येऽपि च सांहत्येऽपि च ॥ ५ । १२९ ॥

न Na, not. भूतचैतन्यं Bhûta-chaitanyam, consciousness of the Elements. प्रत्येकादृष्टेः Prati-eka-a-dṛiṣṭeḥ, because of not being seen in each separately. सांहत्ये Sâṃhatye, in the combined state. अपि Api, also, even. च Cha, and.

129. Because it is not found in each of them separately, therefore, Consciousness does not belong to the Elements, even in their combined state, even in their combined state.—456.

Vṛitti :—Even though there is non-observation of consciousness in the Elements separately, they, one may say, while combined, that is to say, arrived at the condition of a Body, may invest it with consciousness. In regard to this, the author says :

Greater power is produced through the combination of those in which power, in a small measure, exists ; as, for example, power to bind down an elephant is seen to arise through the combination of fibres possessing very little power each. But, likewise, consciousness is not seen in the Elements separately, whereby, on their combination, there might be the development of consciousness.

(Moreover), since there is no distinction in respect of the combinedness of the Elements (between a dead and a living body), the implication (of the theory of Elemental consciousness) would be the existence of consciousness in a dead body also (which is contrary to fact).

Therefore, what is conscious, is indeed something different (from the Elements).

The subject, although mentioned before, is called back to mind (by the present aphorism), because it was intercepted by topics and subtopics ; therefore, there is no tautology.

The repetition of " in their combined state" is to indicate the close of the Book.—130.

Here ends the Fifth Book, of the Demolition of Counter-Theories, in the Vṛitti to the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram of Kapila.

Bhâṣya :--The author refutes him who asserts that consciousness arises from the Elements ; because it is hostile to (the proof of) the existence of Puruṣa.

Consciousness does not exist in the five Elements, even in their combined state ; because, during their disjunction or state of separation

in space, consciousness is not seen in them severally. Such is the meaning.

And, in the Third Book, this was stated under the name of the author's own tenet, while, here, it is stated for the sake of refutation of an opponent's view. Hence the repetition does not amount to a fault.

The repetition (of "even in their combined state") marks the close of the Book.—129.

By refuting, in the Fifth Book, those misleading disputants who declare things which are opposed to the author's own tenets, the author's own tenets have been firmly established.

Here ends the Fifth Book, of the Demolition of Counter-Theories, in the Commentary, composed by Vijñâna Bhikṣu, on the Sâṃkhya-Pravachanam of Kapila.

Book VI.

OF THE RECAPITULATION OF TEACHINGS.

INTRODUCTION.

Vritti :—All the tenets of the Śâstra having been declared, with a view to state, by recapitulating, the very same tenets, according to the maxim of the Tantra or System, is made the origination of the Sixth Book, after the demolition of Counter-Theories.

Bhâṣya :—Having enunciated, by means of the (first) four Books, all the matter of the Śâstra, and having, in the Fifth Book, established it by the refutation of Counter-Theories, now the author brings the Śâstra to a close, by recapitulating, by means of the Sixth Book, the very same matter of the Śâstra which forms its essence. For, where a further elaboration, called Tantra or summary, of the matters, previously discussed, is made, an undoubted, unerring, and more solid knowledge is produced in the minds of the disciples. Hence, according to the maxim of fixing a peg into the ground (by means of repeated strokes on the head), and also because of the bringing forward of arguments, etc., not previously mentioned, the repetition does not here amount to a fault.

The Existence of the Self.

अस्त्यात्मा नास्तित्वसाधनाभावात् ॥ ६ । १ ॥

अस्ति Asti, exists. आत्मा Âtmâ, the Self. नास्तित्वसाधनाभावात् Nâsti-tva-sâdhana-abhâvât, because of the non-existence of any means of proving its non-existence.

1. The Self exists, since there is nothing to prove that it exists not.—457.

Vritti :—It is clear. In regard to the Self in general (*i.e.*, in its generic aspect), there is no conflict of opinion.—1.

Bhâṣya :—By reason of there being manifestation to consciousness in such form as "I think," the existence of Puruṣa is, indeed, established generically, because there exists no evidence to countervail this. Therefore, merely the discrimination thereof (from other things gathering about him) has to be made. Such is the meaning.—1.

Marks of Discrimination : (a) Difference of Self and Body, etc.

देहादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽसौ वैचित्र्यात् ॥ ६ । २ ॥

देहादिव्यतिरिक्तः Deha-âdi-vyatiriktaḥ, absolutely different from the Body, etc. असौ Asau, this ; the Self. वैचित्र्यात् Vaichitryât, on account of diversity.

2. This (the Self) is absolutely different from the Body, etc., because of diversity.—458.

Vritti : -The author gives a description (of the Self) in particular.

In the (opposite) theory of the non-difference (of the Self) from the Body, would be the implication of there being a manifoldness of Selves (in one and the same Body) according to the differences of the Bodies of childhood, boyhood, youth and old age ; (and, further,) since there takes place the destruction of the Body, when the Body is dead, there can be no accounting for of the diversity of another birth.

Says the Śruti also :

अपाणिपादो जवनो ग्रहीता
पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः ।
स वेत्ति सर्वं न हि तस्य वेत्ता
तमाहुरग्र्यं पुरुषं पुराणम् ॥

Having no hand and leg, he goes and grasps ; having no eye, he sees ; having no ear, he hears ; he knows all, verily there is no knower of him ;—him they call the first-born Puruṣa of old.—*Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat*, III. 19.-2.

Bhâṣya :—In respect to that Discrimination, the author mentions two proofs by means of two aphorisms.

"Asau," the Self, the Seer, is absolutely different from (all other things) beginning with the Body and ending with Prakṛiti ; "Vaichitryât," on account of the differences of characteristics such as to undergo transformation, not to undergo transformation, and so forth. Such is the meaning.

Prakṛiti and all the rest are, to be sure, established, by means of Perception, Inference and Testimony, just as undergoing transformation ; while, in the case of Puruṣa, the characteristic of not undergoing transformation is inferred through his ever knowing the object (of his cognition). For, thus, just as Rûpa or Colour alone is the object of the Eye, and not Taste, etc., even though they be, equally (with colour), in close proximity to it, similarly it is the modification of his own Buddhi that alone is the object (of cognition) of Puruṣa, and not anything else, even though it be equally proximate ;—this is established through the force of actual results.

It is only by having risen into the modification of Buddhi that other things become the object of Experience to Puruṣa,—and not through themselves, since, in that case, the manifestation of all things, at all times, would be entailed.

And these modifications of Buddhi never lie without being cognised. For, on the admission of the uncognised existence of knowledge, desire, pleasure, etc., there would be, in respect of them also, as in respect of a water-pot, etc., room for doubt, etc., by such forms as "Whether I think or not," "Whether I feel pleasure or not," etc.

Hence, from the fact that they are always cognised, it is obtained that the Seer of them, the intelligent principle, is not liable to transformation; because, were the intelligent principle liable to transformation, then, by reason of its transformation into blindness, whenever it may occur, even actually existent modifications of Buddhi would not, in consequence, be seen.

Similarly, it should be understood to be the case also with the whole lot of differences in characteristics (between Puruṣa and the rest), previously mentioned, such as to exist for the sake of another and not to exist for the sake of another, etc.—2.

(b) *Use of the possessive case.*

षष्ठीव्यपदेशादपि ॥ ६. । ३ ॥

षष्ठीव्यपदेशात् Śaṣṭhī-vyapadeśât, from the application of, or predication or reference by, the sixth case-ending. अपि Api, also.

3. Also because of reference by the sixth case.—459.

Vritti:—The author mentions another reason.

"My body,"—Such cognition there is, and the sixth or possessive case is heard (to be used) where there is a difference.

If it be said that there is co-extensiveness or identity of denotation (of the Body with the Self), *e.g.*, "I am fat"; (we reply), No; for, since Experience takes place through the Body, thereby is occasioned this secondary or derivative intuition.—3.

Bhâṣya:—Also because of reference in the sixth or possessive case, made by the learned, such as, *e.g.*, "This is my Body," "This is my Buddhi," etc., the Self is different from the Body, etc.; because, were there absolute non-difference (between them), the use of the sixth case would not be justified. Such is the meaning.

So has it been declared in the Viṣṇu-Purâṇa :

त्वं किमतच्छिरः किं तु शिरस्तव तथोदरम् ।
किं तु पादादिकं त्वं वै तवैतद्धि महीपते ॥
समस्तावयवेभ्यस्त्वं पृथग्भूय व्यवस्थितः ।
कोऽहमित्यत्र निपुणो भूत्वा चिन्तय पार्थिव ॥

Are you this head, or is the head yours; so too the abdomen? Are these legs, etc., you, or are they, O Lord of the Earth, yours?

You are situated, being separate from all the limbs (of your Body). "Who am I?"—being skilful in this, reflect, O Ruler of the Earth.—*Viṣṇu Purâṇa*, II. xiii., 98—99.

Neither should it be said that there is also such usage of the learned as, *e.g.*, "I am fat," etc.; because, since it is contradicted or opposed by the Śruti, it is to be accounted for just as being a secondary use, (a case of transference of epithet),—just like "My Self is Bhadra Sena."—3.

An alternative explanation rejected.

न शिलापुत्रवद्धर्मिग्राहकमानबाधात् ॥ ६ । ४ ॥

न Na, not. शिलापुत्रवत् Śilâ-putra-vat, as in the case of the pestle. धर्मिग्राहकमानबाधात् Dharmi-grâhaka-mâna-bâdhât, because of opposition by the evidence cognisant of the specific thing.

4. (The use in question of the sixth case is) not as in the case of the pestle, because of opposition by the evidence cognisant of the specific thing.—460.

Vṛitti :—Because we hear the sixth case used in the case of non-difference also, *e.g.*, "The body of the pestle," therefore, one may say, (it is used here) not in the sense of difference. In regard to this, the author says :

No; in that case (*i.e.*, of the pestle), because there is intuition of non-difference by the very means of Perception, (the differentiating sense of) the sixth case is obstructed; hence the use (of the sixth case) is secondary. In the case in question, (of "My Body"), since the primary use is possible, (as there is no obstruction), there is no (room for the supposition of the) secondary use.—4.

Bhâṣya :—But then, one may say, let this declaration also (of the Self by the sixth case) be just like the declarations such as "The consciousness of Puruṣa," "The head of Râhu," "The body of the pestle," etc., (where the possessive denotes identity instead of difference). To this, the author replies :

This declaration by the sixth case cannot be just like the declarations, *e.g.*, "The body of the pestle," etc. In the case of the pestle, etc., since

there is obstruction (to the existence of difference) by means of the evidence cognisant of the thing, (the use of the sixth case) is a mere figure of speech. But in the case of "My body," no obstruction by such evidence exists, because it is only of the Body's being the Self that there is obstruction by means of the evidences of the Śruti and the like. Such is the meaning.

What prohibition, on the other hand, there is, in the Śâstras, of the sense of My-ness, that, by reason of the impermanence of ownership, has reference to its unreality by being a mere creation of speech. Such is the import.

"The consciousness of Puruṣa,"—here also there is obstruction by the evidence cognisant of the thing: for fear of a *regressus ad infinitum* as well as for the sake of simplicity, when the Self is established as being different from the Body, etc., there is, at the bottom, the cognition of its being essentially of the form of consciousness.—4.

Puruṣa's *Aim how fulfilled.*

अत्यन्तदुःखनिवृत्या कृतकृत्यता ॥ ६ । ५ ॥

अत्यन्तदुःखनिवृत्या Atyanta-duḥkha-nivṛittyâ, by the absolute cessation of pain. कृतकृत्यता Kṛita-kṛitya-tâ, fulfilment of the end.

5. By the absolute cessation of pain, is the fulfilment of the end.—461.

Vṛitti:—Through excess of pleasure, one may say, there is the fulfilment of the end. Hence the author says:

Because excess of pleasure also is liable to waste, there can be no fulfilment of the end thereby. But absolute cessation of pain is not so (liable to waste), because there is no recurrence of pain after it.—5.

Bhâṣya:—Having ascertained Puruṣa as being different from the Body, etc., the author ascertains his Release.

It is easy.—5.

Pain is more intense than Pleasure.

यथा दुःखात् क्लेशः पुरुषस्य न तथा सुखादभिलाषः ॥६।६॥

यथा Yathâ, as. दुःखात् Duḥkhât, from, *i.e.*, towards pain. क्लेशः Kleśaḥ, suffering, annoyance, aversion. पुरुषस्य Puruṣasya, of Puruṣa. न Na, not. तथा Tathâ, so. सुखात् Sukhât, for pleasure. अभिलाषः Abhilâṣaḥ, desire.

6. There is not so much desire from pleasure as there is annoyance from pain.—462.

Vṛitti :—Since the absence of pleasure is also present, therefore, one may say, that (*i.e.*, entire cessation of pain) cannot be the highest end of Puruṣa. In regard to this, the author says :

Because of the unavoidable or necessary presence of pain in pleasure. If, there being pleasure, pain must necessarily take place, who will desire for pleasure? Therefore, because of the abundance of pain, it is the cessation of pain that alone is the highest end of Puruṣa.—6.

Bhâṣya :—But then, our opponent may contend, by reason of there being an equality of gain and loss, through the cessation of pleasure also by means of the cessation of pain, that (*i.e.*, cessation of pain) cannot be the end of Puruṣa (as declared above). To this, the author replies :

The two-fifth case-endings (in "Duḥkhât" and "Sukhât") have been used in the sense of the hetu or cause in the shape of the subject matter. And "Kleśaḥ" or annoyance here means aversion.

As aversion towards pain is stronger, not so stronger is desire for pleasure; on the contrary, by comparison with that (*i.e.*, aversion), it is weak. Such is the meaning.

So that, even by obstructing the desire for pleasure, aversion towards pain generates will only in respect to the cessation of pain : hence there is not a case here of the equality of gain and loss.

So has it been said :

अभ्यर्थनाभङ्गभयेन साधु—
माध्यस्थमिष्टेऽप्यवलम्बितेऽर्थे ॥

For fear of a refusal of the request, a good man employs an intermediary, even in the case of a cherished object.—Kumâra-Sambhavam, I. 53.

What striving, on the other hand, (there is seen) for minor pleasures, even after seeing the pain of hell, etc., that is only due to the influence of passion, etc.—6.

Rareness of Pleasure.

कुत्रापि कोऽपि सुखीति ॥ ६ । ७ ॥

कुत्र Kutra, somewhere. अपि Api, may be. कः Kaḥ, some one. अपि Api, may be. सुखी Sukhî, happy. इति Iti, because.

7. For, only some one, somewhere may be happy.—463.

Vṛitti :—The author tells us that pleasure is the thing to be avoided. Reflect and see for yourself.—7.

Bhâṣya :—Because, moreover, pain is abundant, in comparison with pleasure, it is the cessation of pain alone that is the end of Puruṣa, says the author.

Among the infinity of grasses, trees, beasts, birds, men, etc., only few, such as man, Deva, etc., become happy. Such is the meaning.

The word, Iti, is in the sense of Hetu or reason.—7.

All Pleasure is alloyed with Pain.

तदपि दुःखशबलमिति दुःखपक्षे निःक्षिपन्ते विवेचकाः ॥६।८॥

तत् Tat, that, *i.e.*, the very rare pleasure. अपि Api, even. दुःखशबलम् Duḥkha-śabalam, mixed or alloyed with pain. इति Iti, hence. दुःखपक्षे Duḥkha-pakṣe, in the side of pain. निःक्षिपन्ते Niḥkṣipante, throw. विवेचकाः Vivechakâḥ, those who can discriminate.

8. Even that is alloyed with pain: wherefore the discriminating throw it to the side of pain.—464.

Vritti:—But, evident to the senses is, indeed, may say one, the characteristic of the wife and the like to be the cause of pleasure. In regard to this the author says:

Verily one's own feeling itself is proof that there is pain in the acquisition of garlands and the like as well as in their waste, etc.—8.

Bhâṣya:—Even that pleasure which may occur at some time to some one, is, just like the food which is mixed with honey and poison, fit to be rejected by those who can discriminate,—says the author.

"Tat api", that is, even the pleasure mentioned in the preceding aphorism, is mixed with pain: hence those who discriminate between pleasure and pain, throw it to the side of pain. Such is the meaning.

So has it been declared by the Yoga Sûtram:

परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च
सर्वमेव दुःखं विवेकिनः ॥ २ । १५ ॥

By reason of the pains due to the consequences (flowing from the enjoyment of pleasure), to warmth (in the enjoyment of pleasure which gives rise, at the same time, to aversion to whatever interferes with such enjoyment), and to the impressions (created by the enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, which lead to future suffering), and, on account of the mutual contradiction of the modifications of the Guṇas, all, indeed, is pain to the discriminating.—*Yoga Sûtram*, II. 15.

And also in the *Viṣṇu Purâṇa* (VI. v. 55):

यद्यत् प्रीतिकरं पुंसां वस्तु मैत्रेय जायते ।
तदेव दुःखवृक्षस्य बीजत्वमुपगच्छति ॥

Whatever thing, O Maitreya, grows to be the cause of pleasure to men, the very same comes to be the seed of the tree of pain.—8.

An Objection Answered.

सुखलाभाभावादपुरुषार्थत्वमिति चेन्न द्वैविध्यात् ॥ ६ । ९ ॥

सुखलाभाभावात् Sukha-lâbha-abhâvât, owing to the absence of the acquisition of pleasure. अपुरुषार्थत्वम् A-puruṣa-artha-tvam, not to be the end of Puruṣa. इति चेत् Iti chet, if this is said. न Na, no द्वैविध्यात् Dvai-vidhyât, because of two-foldness.

9. If it be said that, owing to the absence of pleasure (in it, cessation of pain is) not the end of Puruṣa, (we reply) No, because of the two-foldness (of the end of Puruṣa).—465.

Vṛitti :—Pleasure alone is the highest end of Puruṣa, say some, and not non-existence (*i.e.*, of pain.) In regard to this, the author says:

Of the passionate, is pleasure, and of the dispassionate, is the non-existence of pain, (the end of volition).—9.

Bhâṣya :—The author discards the opinion that the mere cessation of pain is not the end of Puruṣa, but (that it is this) tinctured with pleasure.

If it be said that, owing to the absence of the acquisition of pleasure, the absence of pain, which is called Release, is not the end of Puruṣa; we reply that this is not so; "Dvai-vidhyât": that is, because of the double variety of the end of Puruṣa, according as it is pleasure and the absence of pain. Such is the meaning. For, quite a distinct desire, *viz.*, "May I be happy," or "May I not be miserable," is seen amongst men.—9.

A Doubt Raised.

निर्गुणत्वमात्मनोऽसङ्गत्वादिश्रुतेः ॥ ६ । १० ॥

निर्गुणत्वम् Nir-guṇa-tvam, devoidness of properties or qualities. आत्मनः Âtmanaḥ, of the Self. असङ्गत्वादिश्रुतेः A-saṅga-tva-âdi-śruteḥ, because there is Śruti or Vedic declaration of its being free from association or attachment, etc.

10. It belongs to the Self to be devoid of qualities, because there is the Śruti that it is free from association, etc.—466.

Vṛitti :—Release, according to some, consists in the uprooting of particular qualities. In regard to this, the author says:

Through the denial of particular qualities, there is admission of general qualities. So that there will be contradiction of the Śruti about (the Self's) being free from association, etc.—10.

Bhâṣya :—The author apprehends (an objection.)

But then, of the Self, the characteristic of being devoid of qualities, that is, the characteristic of being bereft of all qualities whatever, such as pleasure, pain, delusion, etc., is indeed eternally established; because

here is Śruti of its being free from association, that is, because it is heard that there is absence of conjunction which is the cause of modification, and because, without that (conjunction), modification called quality, is impossible. Hence the cessation of pain also cannot be the end of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

If (the Sâṃkhyas say) that modification may take place, of itself, without association, we (the objectors) reply that it cannot:

दाहाय नाऽनलो वन्हे र्नापः क्लेदाय वाम्भसः ।
तद्द्रव्यमेव तद्द्रव्यविकाराय न वै यतः ॥
किं च स्वयं विकारित्वे मोक्षो नैवोपपद्यते ।
स्वयं मोहविकारेण पुनर्बन्धप्रसङ्गता ॥

Fire is not for the burning of fire, nor is water for the wetting of water, because the same respective thing is not verily for the modification of that thing. In the case, moreover, of its (the self's) being transformable of itself, Release cannot certainly be possible: by means of the modification into delusion of itself, Bondage over again will be the result.

And the same has been declared in the Kûrma Purâṇa (II. ii. 12):

यद्यात्मा मलिनोऽस्वच्छो विकारी स्यात् स्वभावतः ।
न हि तस्य भवेन्मुक्तिर्जन्मान्तरशतैरपि ॥

For were the Self, by nature, impure, untransparent, mutable, verily Release would not accrue to it even by hundreds of re-births.—10.

The Doubt Solved.

परधर्मत्वेऽपि तत्सिद्धिरविवेकात् ॥ ६ । ११ ॥

परधर्मत्वे Para-dharma-tve, being the property of another. अपि Api, even, though. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, proof or knowledge thereof. अविवेकात् A-vivekât, through Non-discrimination.

11. Though it (Pleasure, etc.) be the property of another, (*i.e.*, Buddhi), the (supposed) existence thereof (in Puruṣa) is due to Non-discrimination.—467.

Vṛitti:—But if Puruṣa be free from association, how do you say, may ask our opponent, that through Merit, there is heaven, and that through De-Merit, there is hell? To this, the author replies:

Though they are the attributes of Prakṛiti, by means of the falling of the shadow of those attributes, through the non-discrimination of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, the Abhimâna or misconception or conceit arises that the attainment of heaven, etc., is of the Self.—11.

Bhâṣya:—The author solves the doubt.

Though the qualities such as pleasure, pain, etc., are the property of the Chittam, ("Tat-siddhiḥ":) 'tatra,' that is, in the Self, 'siddhiḥ,' that is, existence or resting (of them), by the form of reflection, is

"A-vivekât," that is, (through Non-discrimination) as the instrumental cause, that is to say, by means of the conjunction of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

And this has been established in the First Book and also in the aphorism (No. 74) of the Third Book: Non-discrimination is the Nimitta or efficient cause,—(so that) there is no loss of the "visible."

So that, since, just like redness in a crystal, there is, in Puruṣa, the existence of pain by the form of reflection, it is the cessation thereof that alone is the end of Puruṣa. Because Bhoga or Experience consists just in the connection of pain entering as a reflection, and because it is just by the form of a reflection that pain is the thing to be avoided.—11.

Non-discrimination is from Eternity.

अनादिरविवेकोऽन्यथा दोषद्वयप्रसक्तेः ॥ ६ । १२ ॥

अनादिः An-âdiḥ, beginning-less. अविवेकः A-vivekaḥ, Non-discrimination. अन्यथा Anya-thâ, otherwise. दोषद्वयप्रसक्तेः Doṣa-dvaya-prasakteḥ, because of the implication of the two faults.

12. Non-discrimination is beginning-less, since, otherwise, two faults will be entailed.—468.

Vṛitti:—Is Non-discrimination with a beginning, or is it without a beginning? it may be asked. To this, the author replies:

Were Non-discrimination to be with a beginning, then, prior to the arising thereof, there would be Release, and, on the arising thereof, Bondage; thus (there would be) bondage of the released:—this is one fault.

Because of the existence also of the antecedent non-existence of Non-discrimination, futile would be the effort or practical application made for the purpose of the annihilation of Non-discrimination in regard to the accomplishment of Release:—this is the second fault—12.

Bhâṣya:—In Puruṣa, bondage with the Guṇas has Non-discrimination for its root; but what does Non-discrimination have for its root?—there being room for such an enquiry, the author says:

Non-discrimination is cognition, which embraces both (Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, for example,) as its objects, and which fails to grasp the absence of connection (between them). And this property of the Chittam, which, by the form of a stream, is without a beginning, remains or continues, during Pralaya or Cosmic Dissolution, by the form of Vâsanâ or impression or tendency; since, otherwise, if it were with a beginning, two faults

would be entailed. For, in the case of its being with a beginning, since it would be *causa sui* or produced of itself alone, bondage of the released (Puruṣa) also would be the result; and, in the case of its being producible by Karma, etc., then, since, by reason of its being the cause of Karma, etc., also, one will have to look for another (antecedent) Non-discrimination, the consequence would be infinite regression. Such is the meaning.

And this (beginning-less) Non-discrimination (as described just now), having the form of a modification, looks, by means of the reflection of itself, as though it were a property of Puruṣa; hence it becomes the operative cause of the bondage of Puruṣa, as has been previously stated and as will be declared in the sequel.—12.

But it is not eternal.

न नित्यः स्यादात्मवदन्यथाऽनुच्छित्तिः ॥ ६ । १३ ॥

न Na, not. नित्यः Nityaḥ, eternal. स्यात् Syât, will be. आत्मवत् Âtma-vat, like the Self अन्यथा Anya-thâ, otherwise. अनुच्छित्तिः An-uchchhittiḥ, non-eradication

13. It cannot be eternal, like the Self; otherwise, (there would be) no eradication (of it).—469.

Vṛitti: —Is Non-discrimination, since it is without a beginning, eternal, or is it non-eternal? it may be asked. To this, the author replies:

Eternal is two-fold: eternal by the form of being immutable, which is the Self, and eternal by the form of undergoing transformation, which is Prakṛiti. Neither of these is Non-discrimination, but, on the contrary, it is verily non-eternal, on account of its destruction. Otherwise, were it eternal, there would be no eradication of it (and consequently, no Release.)

"Âtma-vat," "like the Self," is merely indicative; "like Prakṛiti also,"—it should be observed.—13.

Bhâṣya:—But, if it is without a beginning, then, our opponent may say, it will be eternal. In regard to this, the author says:

(Non-discrimination) is not, like the Self, eternal and without beginning as one undivided and indivisible whole, but is without beginning by the form of a stream (of continuous flow); because, otherwise, of it, the existence of which is without beginning, the eradication, which is established by the Śruti, would not be possible. Such is the meaning.—13.

Cause of the Annihilation of Non-discrimination.

प्रतिनियतकारणनाश्यत्वमस्य ध्वान्तवत् ॥ ६ । १४ ॥

प्रतिनियतकारणनाश्यत्वं Prati-niyata-kâraṇa-nâśya-tvam, to be destructible by a fixed and determinate cause in each respective case. अस्य Asya, its. ध्वान्तवत् Dhvânta-vat, as is the case with darkness.

14. *It belongs to Non-discrimination to be destructible by a fixed and determinate cause (in each respective case),—just as is the case with darkness.—470.*

Vritti :—Whereby is the destruction of Non-discrimination ? it may be asked. To this, the author replies :

Just as light is the destroyer of darkness.—14.

Bhâṣya :—Having stated the cause of Bondage, the author states the cause of Release.

"Asya," that is, of the cause of Bondage, namely, Non-discrimination, is the characteristic of being destructible by that, that is, Discrimination, which is the fixed and determinate cause of the destruction (of mistake or non-discrimination) in the cases of the mistaking of a mother-of-pearl shell for silver, etc.,—just as is the case with darknes ; for darkness can be destroyed only by the fixed and determinate cause which is light, and not by any other means. Such is the meaning.

So has it been said in the *Viṣṇu Purâṇa* (VI. v. 62) :

'अन्धं तम इवाज्ञानं दीपवच्चेन्द्रियोद्भवम् ।
यथा सूर्यस्तथा ज्ञानं यद् विप्रर्षे विवेकजम् ॥

Ignorance is just like blinding darkness, and the development of the Senses is like the lamp ; just as is the sun, so is, O sage among Brâhmaṇas, the Knowledge produced from Discrimination.—14.

Proof that Discrimination is the only destroyer of Non-discrimination.

अत्रापि प्रतिनियमोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकात् ॥ ६ । १५ ।

अत्र Atra, here, on this point, in the case of discrimination being the cause of the destruction of non-discrimination. अपि Api, also, as in the case of darkness. प्रतिनियमः Prati-niyamaḥ, pre-determination, allotment. अन्वयव्यतिरेकात् Anvaya-vyatirekât, through agreement and difference.

15. Here, also, the pre-determination (is proved) through Agreement and Difference.—471.

Vritti :—What is the annihilator here? it may be asked. To this, the author replies :

On account of its invariability, it is Discrimination that alone is the annihilator (of Non-discrimination).—15.

Bhâṣya :—The author tells us that also which cognises the pre-determination that it is by means of Discrimination alone that Non-discrimination is destroyed.

Just as in the case of darkness and light, so also in the case in question, the fixed and determinate relation is cognisable by means only of

Agreement and Difference in the cases of a mother-of-pearl shell and silver, etc. Such is the meaning.

Or, the aphorism may be interpreted in the following way: But then, what again, it may be asked, is the fixed and determinate cause of Discrimination? To this, the author replies:

"Atra api," that is, in the case of Discrimination also, the rule about the cause is established by the very means of Agreement and Difference. The cause (of Discrimination) is just of the form of Hearing, Thinking, and Meditating, and not Karma, etc.; Karma, etc., are, on the other hand, only the external means. Such is the meaning.—15.

Non-discrimination is the sole cause of Bondage.

प्रकारान्तरासम्भवादविवेक एव बन्धः ॥ ६ । १६ ॥

प्रकारान्तरासम्भवात् Prakâra-antara-a-sambhavât, on account of the impossibility of any other manner. अविवेकः A-vivekaḥ, non-discrimination. एव Eva, alone, only. बन्धः Bandhaḥ, bondage.

16. On account of the impossibility of any other manner, Non-discrimination alone is Bondage.—472.

Vṛitti:—Is the Self bound through Non-discrimination, or is there, one may ask, also any other cause of Bondage? To this, the author replies:

It is clear.—16.

Bhâṣya:—The author calls back to mind what has been declared in the First Book, namely, that it is not possible for Bondage to be natural (to Puruṣa), or the like.

"Bondage" here denotes the cause of bondage designated as conjunction of pain. The rest is easy.—16

Bondage does not over again befall the released.

न मुक्तस्य पुनर्बन्धयोगोऽप्यनावृत्तिश्रुतेः ॥ ६ । १७ ॥

न Na, not. मुक्तस्य Muktasya, of the released. पुनर्बन्धयोगः Punar-bandha-yogaḥ, conjunction of bondage over again. अपि Api, also. अनावृत्तिश्रुतेः An-âvṛitti-śruteḥ, because of the Śruti or Vedic declaration of non-return.

17. (In the case) of the released, there is not conjunction of bondage over again, because the Śruti declares his non-return (to Saṃsâra).—473.

Vṛitti:—Since Release is an effect, on the destruction thereof, there will be, one may say, bondage over again. In regard to this, the author says:

And the Śruti (referred to) is:

आत्मा ज्ञातव्यो प्रकृतितो विवेकव्यो न पुनरावर्तते ।

The Self is to be known, to be discriminated from Prakṛiti : he does not return (to Saṃsâra) again.

And the argument (in support of the above proposition) is : Because destruction is of an effect which is an entity ; whereas the cessation of pain (wherein consists Release) is of the form of a non-entity.—17.

Bhâṣya :—But then, since Release also, by reason of its being an effect, is liable to destruction, there will be, our opponent may say, bondage over again. In regard to this, the author says :

Because it is effect which is an entity, that alone is liable to destruction, there is no destruction of Release, since there is the Śruti :

न स पुनरावर्तते

He does not return again.

Such is the meaning.

The word, Api, also, is in the sense of the addition of the sense stated in the preceding aphorism.—17.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—Through the word, Api, is added Release by the manifestation of Discrimination, because, in both cases, there is the Śruti about non-return.

Opposite view is defective.

अपुरुषार्थत्वमन्यथा ॥ ६ । १८ ॥

अपुरुषार्थत्वम् A-puruṣa-artha-tvam, not to be the end of Puruṣa. अन्यथा Anya-thâ, otherwise.

18. Otherwise, (Release will be) not the end of Puruṣa.—474.

Vṛitti :—The author points out the defect on the opposite side.

Discrimination is the end of Puruṣa.—18.

Bhâṣya :—"Otherwise," that is, in the case of the bondage over again of the released also, Release, just like Pralaya or Dissolution, will not be the end of Puruṣa, or, in other words, will lack the characteristic of being the highest end of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.—18.

Reason for the above.

अविशेषापत्तिरुभयोः ॥ ६ । १९ ॥

अविशेषापत्तिः A-viśeṣa-âpattiḥ, implication of non-difference. उभयोः Ubha-yoḥ, of both.

19. (Were Bondage to befall the released also), non-difference between the two (*i.e.*, the released and the bound) would be the consequence.—475.

Vṛitti :—The author points out another defect.

Because of the non-distinction between the transmigrating and the released (Puruṣa), in respect of conjunction of bondage.—19.

Bhâṣya :—The author gives the reason why it cannot be the end of Puruṣa.

By reason of the sameness of the character of the future bondage, there will be no distinction between the two, that is, between the released and the bound. So that, the result is not to be the end of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.—19.

Nature of Release.

मुक्तिरन्तरायध्वस्तेर्न परः ॥ ६ । २० ॥

मुक्तिः Muktiḥ, release. अन्तरायध्वस्तेः Antarâya-dhvasteḥ, from the removal or destruction of obstacles. न Na, not. परः Paraḥ, different, other.

20. Release is nothing but the removal of obstacles. —476.

Vritti :—Disease, etc., are the obstacles to Yoga. And thus says Patañjali :

व्याधिस्त्यानसंशयप्रमादालस्याविरतिभ्रान्तिदर्शनालब्धभूमिकत्वानवस्थितत्वानि चित्तविक्षेपास्तेऽन्तरायाः ॥ योगसूत्रम् । १ । ३० ॥

Disease, weakness of the mind, doubt, heedlessness, sloth, attachment to the world, error, failure to gain the ground, and unsteadiness,—these distractions of the mind, are called Obstacles.—Yoga Sûtram, I. 30, S. B. H. Vol. IV, page 52.

'Disease' is, *e.g.*, fever, etc. 'Weakness of the mind' is incapacity to do work. 'Doubt' is cognition touching the two ends or alternatives. 'Heedlessness' is inattention to Samâdhi or Trance. 'Sloth' is heaviness of the body. 'Attachment to the world' is thirst after objects (of enjoyment.) 'Error' is false knowledge. 'Failure to gain the ground' is the non-reaching of the plane of Sâmâdhi or Trance. 'Unsteadiness' is the susceptibility to slip in mind, in the case of one who has reached the ground.

(Now), in Release, is there, one may ask, the mere destruction of these (obstacles), or is there the attainment of some other characteristic? To this, the author replies :

In the case (of the attainment) of some other characteristic, there will be lapse from the character of being immutable.—20.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—In Release, there is only the destruction of the obstacles, and not "Paraḥ," that is, some other,—characteristic : such is the complement of the aphorism.

Bhâṣya :—But, then, when there is, in this way, the admission or acknowledgement of a distinction between the bound and the released, how is it asserted (*vide* I. 19) that it belongs to Puruṣa to be eternally free? To this, the author replies:

Something other than the destruction of the obstacle presently to be mentioned, is not Release. Such is the meaning.

For, just as, in the case of the naturally white crystal, the redness due to the Upâdhi or adjunct of the China rose, is a mere obstacle in the form of an envelope or cover of whiteness, but it is not the case that, by means of the superimposition or investment of the China rose, the whiteness is destroyed, and that, on the removal of the China rose, is produced again, very similarly, in the case of the Self which is by nature free from pain, the reflection of pain due to the upâdhi or investment of Buddhi, is a mere obstacle in the form of the envelope or cover thereof (*i.e.*, of the naturally painless state of the Self), but it is not the case that, by the investment of Buddhi, pain is produced, and, on the removal thereof, is destroyed. Hence there is no conflict in the proposition that the Self is eternally or ever free and that Bondage and Release are phenomenal.—20.

Conflict with the Vedas avoided.

तत्राप्यविरोधः ॥ ६ । २१ ॥

तत्र Tatra, therein, in the connection of some other characteristic (Aniruddha); in the removal of obstacle being release (Vijñâna). अपि Api, even. अविरोधः A-virodhaḥ, non-conflict.

21. Therein, even, there is no conflict.—477.

Vṛitti :—Even admitting (the contrary view, for the sake of argument), the author says :

Let there be, (in the state of Release), conjunction of some other characteristic (with the Self), still there is no harm. After Release no return has been declared (by the Śruti), and this (non-return) exists even if there be conjunction of some other characteristic.—21.

Bhâṣya :—But, if, in this way, Bondage and Release are unreal, then, there will be, one may say, conflict with the Śruti and the like, which establish Release as being the end of Puruṣa. In regard to this, the author says:

"Tatra api," that is, even in the case of Release consisting in the destruction of the obstacle, there is no conflict with its being the end of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

For, it is only the conjunction and disjunction of pain that have been imagined in Puruṣa, but not also the experience of pain. And experience (of pain) is the connection of pain by the form of a reflection. Hence the cessation of pain by the form of a reflection is, indeed, in the real sense of the term, the end of Puruṣa. It is just this that is the destruction of the obstacle; and Release of this description is, indeed, (objectively) real. Such is the import.—21.

A distinction pointed out.

अधिकारित्रैविध्यान्न नियमः ॥ ६ । २२ ॥

अधिकारित्रैविध्यात् Adhikâri-trai-vidhyât, owing to the three-foldness of those competent to attain release. न Na, no. नियमः Niyamaḥ, rule, uniformity.

22. (There can be) no rule (that, by the mere *hearing* about the removal of the obstacle, there will be Release), because those competent (for Release) are of three classes. —478.

Vritti:—It may be enquired whether Hearing, Thinking, and Meditating are, (as means of Release), common to all Puruṣas, or are not. In regard to this, the author says:

But those competent are of three sorts: mild, middling and exceeding or intense. Of the exceeding, Release takes place through mere Hearing; of the middling, through the two (*i.e.*, Hearing and Thinking); of the mild, through the three. All these do not apply in the case of all (equally).—22.

Bhâṣya:—But, if the mere destruction of the obstacle is Release, then, one may say, there will be the accomplishment thereof by the very means of the mere hearing (about the truth),—just as is the case with the accomplishment or attainment of the gold round the neck, the conscious attainment of which was obstructed by ignorance. In regard to this, the author says:

Those competent for knowledge are threefold: good, mediocre, and sluggish; thereby it is not the rule that, immediately after the mere Hearing, direct mental intuition of the truth does, indeed, take place in the case of all. Such is the meaning. Hence, through the fault of the competency of the sluggish type, mental cognition, capable of causing the dissolution of the Chitta, was not produced, in the case of Virochana, etc., through the mere hearing of the truth, but not because Hearing was incapable of the production of cognition.—22.

Utility of Other Means.

दार्ढ्यार्थमुत्तरेषाम् ॥ ६ । २३ ॥

दार्ढ्यार्थम् Dârḍhya-artham, for the sake of confirmation. उत्तरेषाम् Uttareṣâm, of the others, *i.e.*, the sluggish (Aniruddha), thinking and meditating (Vijñâna).

23. (The injunction) of the others is for the sake of the confirmation or of ensuring the permanence of (what is achieved by the first).—479.

Vṛitti :—The author exhibits another side.

"Of the others," that is, the sluggish : for the sake of confirmation, the triad of the means have been declared. Says the Śruti also :

आत्मा वाऽरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ॥

Lo, the Self has to be beheld, to be heard about, to be reasoned about, to be constantly meditated upon.—*Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat*, II, iv, 5.—23.

Bhâṣya :—Not only is mere hearing the visible cause in the case of cognition, but there are, says the author, others also :

"Of the others" than hearing, that is, of thinking, meditating, etc., for the purpose of the confirmation in the form of absoluteness of the destruction of the obstacle, is the rule or injunction,—which word is pursued in the preceding aphorism.—23.

Misconception about Yogic Posture removed.

स्थिरसुखमासनमिति न नियमः ॥ ६ । २४ ॥

स्थिरसुखम् Sthira-sukham, steady and easeful. आसनम् Âsanam, Âsana, posture. Compare III. 34, page 308. इति Iti, hence. न Na, no. नियमः Niyamaḥ, rule, restriction.

24. Âsana is whatever is steady and easeful; hence (there is) no restriction (of it to Svastika, Padma, etc).—480.

Vṛitti :—In regard to which Posture amongst the Svastika, etc., should be practised, the author says :

The practice of Posture is for the sake of steadiness and for the sake of ease. Let that alone be, because of its universality.—24.

Bhâṣya :—The author states these very other means :

In regard to Posture, there is no restriction (of it) to the Padma or Lotus Posture and the like; because whatever is steady and easeful, that itself is a Yogic Posture. Such is the meaning.—24.

Chief Means of Release.

ध्यानं निर्विषयं मनः ॥ ६ । २५ ॥

ध्यानं Dhyânam. Dhyâna, meditation. निर्विषयं Nir-viṣayam, objectless. मनः, Manas, the Internal Instrument.

25. Dhyâna is Manas without object.—481.

Vṛitti :—Is Dhyâna the contemplation of an object with one-pointedness of mind, or is Dhyâna mind without object? it may be asked. In regard to this, the author says :

The word, Dhyâna, is here in the sense of Samâdhi or Trance.—25.

Bhâṣya :—The author mentions the principal means.

What Internal Instrument becomes devoid of modification, that only is "Dhyânam," that is, Yoga or Concentration of the form of the inhibition of the modifications of the Chitta. Such is the meaning.

According to the non-difference of the effect and the cause, the word (Dhyâna) denoting the cause, has been here applied to the effect, since Dhyâna will later on be declared as being the means thereof (*i.e.*, of the inhibition of the modifications of the mind).—25.

Defence of Yoga.

उभयथाप्यविशेषश्चेन्नैवमुपरागनिरोधाद्विशेषः ॥ ६ । २६ ॥

उभयथा Ubhaya-thâ, both ways. अपि Api, even. अविशेषः A-viśeṣaḥ, non-difference. चेत् Chet, if you say. न Na, not एवम् Evam, so. उपरागनिरोधात् Uparâga-nirodhât, through suppression of the tincture or reflected colour. विशेषः Viśeṣaḥ, difference.

26. Bothways even there is, if you say, no difference, (we reply), it is not so,—through suppression of the reflected colour there is a difference.—482.

Vṛitti :—When inhibition of the modifications is the same in both the cases, what, it may be asked, is the difference between Deep Sleep and Trance? To this, the author replies :

"Uparâgaḥ," tincture or reflected colour, is the vâsanâ, aroma or impression, of objects. The inhibition thereof takes place in Trance (but not in Deep Sleep): such is the difference.—26.

Bhâṣya :—But then, when Puruṣa remains of the same form during Concentration and Non-Concentration, what need, it may be asked, of Concentration? To this, the author replies :

"Through the suppression of the tincture," that is, through the departure of the reflection of the modifications, there is, in the state of

Concentration, as compared with the state of Non-Concentration, a difference belonging to Puruṣa,—such is the sense of all the established tenets. The rest is as good as explained.—26.

Cause of Tincture.

निःसङ्गेऽप्युपरागोऽविवेकात् ॥ ६ । २७ ॥

निःसङ्गे Niḥ-saṅge, though unassociated with anything. अपि Api, even. उपरागः Uparâgaḥ, tincture. अविवेकात् A-vivekât, through non-discrimination.

27. Even though (Puruṣa) is unassociated (with anything), the tincture (of the modifications of the mind takes place in him) through Non-discrimination.—483.

Vṛitti :—Since, the Self being free from association, there will be absence of the tincture (of external things), there will be, one may say, release at all times. In regard to this, the author says :

Through the non-discrimination of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, by means of the tincture in Prakṛiti, arises the Abhimâna, fancy or misconception, that there is tincture in the Self.—27.

Bhâṣya :—But then, how can there be, one may ask, tincture in what is unassociated (such as the Self is alleged to be)? To this, the author replies :

Although in that which is unassociated, real tincture does not exist, still, conveying, as it does, the idea that it is, as it were, a tincture, reflection itself is treated as tincture by those who know the discrimination of tincture (from Puruṣa). Such is the meaning.—27.

Above elaborated.

जपास्फटिकयोरिव नोपरागः किन्त्वभिमानः ॥ ६ । २८ ॥

जपास्फटिकयोः Japâ-sphaṭikayoḥ, in the case of the China rose and the crystal. इव Iva, as. न Na, not. उपरागः Uparâgaḥ, adjacent tincture. किन्तु Kiṃ tu, but. अभिमानः Abhimânaḥ, conceit, fancy, misconception.

28. Just as in the case of the China rose and crystal, there is no (real) tincture (in the case of Puruṣa), but the conceit (of it).—474.

Vṛitti :—The author here says that Uparâga or tincture also is not real.

Because of the association of the two (*i.e.*, China rose and crystal), tincture is reasonable. While, because the Self has no association, there is not tincture, but the conceit of it, that is, through the superimposition of the Ahaṃkâra upon the Self, is the superimposition of the tincture.—28.

Bhâṣya :—The author expounds the very same :

Just as in the case of the China rose and crystal, there is no (actual) tincture, but the mere conceit of tincture, *viz.*, "The crystal is red," through the influence of the reflection of the China rose, even so, in the case of Buddhi and Puruṣa, there is no (actual) tincture, but the mere conceit of it, due to the reflection of Buddhi under the influence of Non-discrimination. Such is the meaning.

Hence the resultant meaning of these two aphorisms is that it is just the reflection of the modifications, that is called the tincture of Puruṣa, by reason of its similarity to tincture.

And to this effect has it been remembered :

यथा जले चन्द्रमसः कम्पादिस्तत्कृतो गुणः ।
दृश्यतेऽसन्नपि द्रष्टुरात्मनोऽनात्मनो गुणः ॥

Just as is seen the attribute of the moon, created by water, such as the trembling of the moon in water, etc., similarly is seen the attribute of the Not-Self to belong to the Self which is the Seer.—*Śrîmad Bhâgavatam*, III. vii.—11.

And it is this very tincture of the essentially painful modification, that is the obstacle to Release designated as the cessation of pain ; and the annihilation thereof is through the dissolution of the mind ; and that, again, is by means of the A-samprajñâta or Ultra-Cognitive Trance, designated as the inhibition of the modifications of the mind. Hence it is through Trance or Yoga alone that there takes place the annihilation of the obstacle. This is the established tenet of the Yoga Śâstra also.—28.

Means of the Suppression of the Tincture.

ध्यानधारणाभ्यासवैराग्यादिभिस्तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ६ । २९ ॥

ध्यानधारणाभ्यासवैराग्यादिभिः Dhyâna-dhâraṇâ-abhyâsa-vairâgya-âdi-bhiḥ, by means of Dhyâna or Meditation, Dhâranâ or Concentration, Abhyâsa or Constant Practice, Vairâgya or Dispassion, and the like. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, the accomplishment thereof, *i.e.*, of the removal or suppression of the tincture of the Not-Self upon the Self.

29. By means of Meditation, Concentration, Practice, Dispassion, and the like is the accomplishment thereof.—485.

Vṛitti :—How can there be, one may ask, the destruction of Abhimâna or the conceit (of tincture)? To this, the author replies :

Through the word, Âdi, and the like, there is inclusion of Samâdhi or Trance.—29.

Bhâṣya :—"Dhyâna is mind without object," (VI. 25),—thus is Yoga stated. Just declaring the various means of its accomplishment, the

author states the means of the suppression of the tincture as exhibit above:

Through Trance, Meditation is the cause of Yoga, and of Meditatio the cause is Concentration, and of this, the cause is Practice, that i institution of the means for the steadiness of the mind; of Practic again, the cause is Dispassion towards objects; of that, again, the seein of the faults (of objects), Restraint of the Senses, Observances, and forth. By this process, as taught in the System of Patañjali, "the suppre sion thereof," that is, the suppression of the tincture, takes place, b means of Yoga, designated as the inhibition of the modifications of th mind. Such is the meaning.--29.

Note:—As to the process taught by Patañjali, referred to by Vijñâna, compa *Yoga Sûtram*:

अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः ॥ १ । १२ ॥

By means of Practice and Dispassion, is the supression thereof, *i.e.*, of the modific tions of the mind or the states of consciousness.—I. 12.

तत्र स्थितौ यत्नोऽभ्यासः ॥ १ । १३ ॥

Of these, Practice is the effort to secure steadiness of the mind.—I. 13.

दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम् ॥ १ । १५ ॥

Dispassion is the consciousness of self-command in one who has killed, within onesel all desires for "visible" as well as scriptural objects of enjoyment.—I. 15.

तत् परं पुरुषख्यातेर्गुणवैतृष्ण्यम् ॥ १ । १६ ॥

This is Higher Dispassion; it results from knowing Puruṣa, and its effect is absen of desire for association with the Guṇas.—I. 16.

तस्यापि निरोधे सर्वनिरोधान्निर्बीजः समाधिः ॥ १ । ५२ ॥

When there is the suppression of all the (modifications), on the suppression of th (the mind) also, there is the Seedless Trance.—I. 51.

ध्यानहेयास्तद्वृत्तयः ॥ १ । ११ ॥

Their modifications are to be destroyed by Meditation.—II. 11.

हेयं दुःखमनागतम् ॥ २ । १६ ॥

Pain not-yet come is the Avoidable.—II. 16.

द्रष्टृदृश्ययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः ॥ २ । १७ ॥

The Conjunction of the knower and the knowable is the cause of the Avoidable.—II. 1

विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः ॥ २ । २६ ॥

Discriminative knowledge undisturbed, is the means of Avoidance.—II. 26.

योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिराविवेकख्यातेः ॥ २ । २८ ॥

According as the impurity (in the Self) wears away through the performance of th (several) members of (the eightfold) Yoga, the light of knowledge shines brighter a brighter, till the manifestation of Discrimination.—II. 28.

यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टावङ्गानि ॥ २ । २९

Restraint, Observance, Posture, Regulation of Breath, Abstraction, Concentration, Meditation, and Trance are the eight Aṅgas or Members of Yoga. - II. 29.

सत्त्वपुरुषयोः शुद्धिसाम्ये कैवल्यम् ॥ ३ । ५४ ॥

Kaivalya or absolute independence or release consists in the equally perfect purity of the Objective Essence and of Puruṣa (by means of Discrimination).—III. 54.

Compare also the Introduction to the *Yoga Sûtram*, S. B. H. Vol. IV.

Teaching of the Ancients on the point.

लयविक्षेपयोर्व्यावृत्त्येत्याचार्याः ॥ ६ । ३० ॥

लयविक्षेपयोः Laya-vikṣepayoḥ, of inaction and distraction, व्यावृत्त्या Vyâvṛittyâ, by the turning away or exclusion. इति Iti, thus. आचार्याः Âchâryâḥ, the Âchâryas or teachers.

30. (Suppression of the tincture is) by means of the exclusion of inaction and distraction,—thus say the Achâryas.—486.

Vṛitti :—Having stated the opinion of a branch School, the author states his own opinion.

"Layaḥ" means deep sleep; "Vikṣepaḥ," the waking state. By means of their exclusion, is the annihilation of the conceit of tincture.—30.

Bhâsya :—In respect of the suppression of the tincture of Puruṣa, by means of Meditation, etc., appertaining to the mind, the author shows the way established by the previous teachers :

By the suppression, by means of Meditation, etc., of the modification of Sleep as well as of the modification such as Proof, etc., of the mind, takes place, of Puruṣa also, the suppression of the tincture of the modifications, because the suppression of the reflection takes place on the suppression of the reflecting body,—so say the previous teachers. Such is the meaning. Just as, for example, says Patañjali the very same thing by the three aphorisms :

योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः ॥ १ । २ ॥

Yoga is the suppression of the modifications of the Chitta or mind.—*Yoga Sûtram*, I. 2.

तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम् ॥ १ । ३ ॥

Then is the resting of the On-looker in his own form.—*Ibid.* I. 3.

वृत्तिसारूप्यमितरत्र ॥ १ । ४ ॥

Elsewhere there is identity of form with the modifications.—*Ibid.* I. 4 ;

So too do the Smṛitis such as :

नित्यः सर्वगतो ह्यात्मा बुद्धिसन्निधिमात्रया ।
यथा यथा भवेद्बुद्धिरात्मा तद्वदिहेष्यते ॥

For the Self is eternal and all-reaching. By reason of its being attended with the vicinity of Buddhi, howsoever the Buddhi becomes (modified), similar to that is the Self here desired to be,

say the very same thing.

Thus, then, the sense of the sub-topic (herewith concluded) is that the destruction of the obstacle of Release takes place, (directly) by means of the immediate intuition (of the truth about the Self and the Not-Self), through the A-samprajñâta Yoga or Ultra-Cognitive Trance alone.—30.

For Practice of Yoga, no Need of a Particular Locality.

न स्थाननियमश्चित्तप्रसादात् ॥ ६ । ३१ ॥

न Na, no. स्थाननियमः Sthâna-niyamaḥ, rule about localities. चित्तप्रसादात् Chitta prasâdât, from tranquillity of the mind.

31 There is no rule about localities; (Yoga is produced) from tranquillity of the mind.—487.

Vritti:—In which amongst the cave and other localities, it may be asked, should meditation, etc., be practised? To this the author replies:

Where tranquillity of the mind does not arise, there the cultivation should not be made.—31.

Bhâṣya:—The author declares that, in the case of Meditation, etc there is no rule about localities such as the cave, etc.

Only from tranquillity of the mind is produced Meditation etc hence, in respect thereto, no rule or restriction exists as to localities such as the cave, etc. Such is the meaning.

In the Śâstra, on the other hand, with a general intent only, has the woods, the hills, the caves, etc., been indicated as being suitable places for the cultivation of Yoga. For this very reason says the Brahm (Vedânta) Sûtram (IV. i. 11) also:

यत्रैकाग्रता तत्राविशेषात् ॥ ४ । १ । ११ ॥

Wherever there takes place one-pointedness of the mind, there let Meditation be performed; because there are no such conditions laid down with regard to this meditat as there are laid down with regard to the Vedic Sandhyâ.—31.

Prakṛiti *is the Material of the World.*

प्रकृतेराद्योपादानताऽन्येषां कार्यत्वश्रुतेः ॥ ६ । ३२ ॥

प्रकृतेः Prakṛiteḥ, of Prakṛiti. आद्योपादानता Âdya-upâdâna-tâ, to be the prin dial material अन्येषां Anyeṣâṃ, of the others, Mahat, etc. कार्यश्रुतेः Kârya-śruteḥ, because of the Śruti or Vedic declaration of being effects.

32. It belongs to Prakṛiti to be the primordial material, because the Śruti declares the others to be effects.—488.

Vṛitti :—Let material causality, one may say, belong to Ahaṃkâra, etc. ; what use of Prakṛiti ? To this, the author replies :

Because of the Śruti that Ahaṃkâra, etc., are effects, of them also the cause is Prakṛiti ; and this has been mentioned more than once.—52.

Bhâṣya :—The consideration of Release is completed. Now, for the sake of (establishing) the immutability of Puruṣa, the author compendiously deduces the (material) cause of the world :

Because it is heard that Mahat, etc, are effects, Prakṛiti is established as being their root or primal cause. Such is the meaning.—32

Puruṣa *cannot be the Material of the World.*

नित्यत्वेऽपि नाऽत्मनः योग्यत्वाभावात् ॥ ६ । ३३ ॥

नित्यत्वे Nitya-tve, being eternal. अपि Api, even. न Na, not. आत्मनः Âtmanaḥ, of the Self. योग्यत्वाभावात् Yogya-tva-abhâvât, because of absence of fitness or suitableness.

33. (To be the material of the world does) not (belong) to the Self, though it is eternal, because of its want of suitableness.—489.

Vṛitti :—Since there is no distinction between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa as regards their existence antecedently to all other things, which of them, one may ask, is the cause ? To this, the author replies :

Suitableness for being the cause lies in the characteristics of possessing Guṇas or subordinate constituents and of entering into association, and this does not exist in the Self ; hence Prakṛiti is the cause.—33.

Bhâṣya :—But then, let Puruṣa alone be the material, may say our opponent. To this, the author replies :

Possession of Guṇas and associableness make up suitableness for being the cause. Owing to the absence of these, material causality does not belong to Puruṣa, though he is eternal. Such is the meaning.—33.

The Śruti *is against the Opposite View.*

श्रुतिविरोधान्न कुतर्कापसदस्यात्मलाभः ॥ ६ । ३४ ॥

श्रुतिविरोधात् Śruti-virodhât, because of conflict with the Śruti. न Na, not. कुतर्कापसदस्य Kutarka-apasadasya, of the low perverse thinker. आत्मलाभः Âtma-lâbhaḥ attainment of the knowledge of the Self.

34. Because of conflict with the Śruti, there is not attainment of the Self in the case of the low perverse thinker.—490.

Vṛitti :—To be the experiencer, etc., is appropriate in the case of the Self, because of its being intelligent, but not, one may say, in the case of the Pradhâna, which is non-intelligent In regard to this, the author says:

It is clear.—34.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—The author condemns the view that agency and experiencership belong to the Self just according to its own nature, and that there is no need of introducing the tincture of Prakṛiti.

("Kutarka-apasadaḥ" :) Apasadaḥ, that is, a perverse assembly, engaged in misleading argumentation. The knowledge of the Self propounded by it, is not reasonable, because of its contradictoriness to the Śruti, because the Self does not possess agency of itself, and because (on this theory) non-release will be entailed, since there is the saying :

आत्मा कर्त्रादिरूपश्चेन्मा काङ्क्षीस्तर्हि मुक्तताम् ।
न हि स्वभावो भावानां व्यावर्त्तेतौष्ण्यवद्रवेः ॥

If the Self be of the form of an agent or the like, do not then desire for its freedom for, the nature or essence of entities cannot depart from them,—just as does not heat from the sun.

Bhâṣya :—But then, since from the Śrutis such as :

बह्वीः प्रजाः पुरुषात् संप्रसूताः

Many creatures are begotten from Puruṣa.—*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣat.* II. i. 5.,

there is knowledge of Puruṣa's being the cause, the doctrine of Vivart or Illusion, our opponent may say, should be adopted. Having apprehended this, the author says :

The various views, in regard to Puruṣa's being the cause, which are conceivable, are all contradictory to the Śruti; hence, in the case of the low, such as the perverse reasoners, etc., there does not take place knowledge of the essential nature of the Self. Such is the meaning.

Hereby it should be understood that those (e. g., the Vaiśeṣika who teach that the Self possesses the characteristic of being the material cause of pleasure, pain, and such other qualities, are also, indeed, perverse thinkers, and that, in their case also, there is no knowledge of the truth about the Self, or the real character of the Self.

And the Śrutis on the causality of the Self are, by reason of the non difference between power and the possessor of power, simply for the

purpose of worship, since the causality of the Pradhâna is established by means of such Śrutis as

अजामित्यादि

One Unborn etc.

And if it is asserted that the causality of the Self is just like the causality in the form of being the receptacle of the cloud, etc., belonging to the sky, then we do not controvert that, because it is transformation (of the Self as the world) only that there is denial of by us.—34.

A Misconception Removed.

पारंपर्येऽपि प्रधानानुवृत्तिरणुवत् ॥ ६ । ३५ ॥

पारंपर्ये Pâramparye, in successiveness. अपि Api, even. प्रधानानुवृत्तिः Pradhâna-anuvṛittiḥ, successive presence or transfluence of the Pradhâna or Prakṛitic matter. अणुवत् Aṇu-vat, as is the case with the atoms.

35. Though (evolution be) successive, there is (still) the transfluence of Prakṛitic matter (in each evolute),—just as is the case with the Atoms (of the Vaiśeṣikas).—491.

Vṛitti:—But when it is seen that the Tan-mâtras are the cause of the Great Elements, how, it may be asked, can causality belong to Prakṛiti? To this, the author replies:

Just as, in the case of a jar, etc., though they be the effects of a lump of earth, there is, mediately, the material causality of the ultimate atoms, so too in the present case.—35.

Bhâṣya:—But when only Earth, etc., are seen to be the causes of things immobile, mobile, etc., how can it belong to Prakṛiti, one may ask, to be the material of all? To this, the author replies:

Though there be intermediate causality in things immobile, etc., since there is in them the transfluence of the Pradhâna, its material causality is unimpaired; just as, though the seed, etc., be the gate-way, still, since there is in things immobile, etc., the inflow of terrene and other atoms, these are the material of those. Such is the meaning.—35.

Proof that Prakṛiti *is All-Pervading.*

सर्वत्र कार्यदर्शनात् विभुत्वम् ॥ ६ । ३६ ॥

सर्वत्र Sarva-tra, in all places. कार्यदर्शनात् Kârya-darśanât, from the seeing of effects, activity, or change. विभुत्वम् Vibhu-tvam, all-pervadingness, universality.

36. From seeing change everywhere, (is established) the universality (of Prakṛiti).—492.

Vritti :—In regard to whether Prakṛiti be all-pervading, or not, the author says :

It is clear.—36.

Bhâṣya :—The author cites the proof, on the maxim of the forest (which is a collection of trees, every one of them being pervaded by the characteristic of being a forest), in regard to the Universality of Prakṛiti.

From seeing change or transformation, everywhere, without any rule or system (to regulate it), is established the all-pervadingness of the Pradhâna,—just as is the characteristic of the atom to pervade the jar, etc. Such is the meaning. And this has indeed been previously explained.—36.

Motion of Prakṛiti *is not in conflict with her being the Primal Cause.*

(न) गतियोगेऽप्याद्यकारणताहानिरणुवत् ॥ ६ । ३७ ॥

न Na, not. [*N.B.*—This word is not read in current editions of the Aphorisms. But the context and otherwise obscurity of the sense would seem to require it.] गतियोगे Gati-yoge, there being connection of going or motion. अपि Api, even. आद्यकारणताहानिः Âdya-kâraṇa-tâ-hâniḥ, loss or impairment of the characteristic of being the primal cause. अणुवत् Aṇu-vat, just as in the case of the atoms.

37. Though there be connection of motion, still Prakṛiti does not lose her character of being the primal cause,—just as is the case with the atoms.—493.

Vritti :—The author points out the fault on the opposite side.

"Gati" means action or change. To which connection thereof belongs, that is not all-pervading. Were Prakṛiti to possess action, she would be an effect, just like the ultimate atom, and not the primal cause.—37.

Bhâṣya :—(Prakṛiti is not universal, but limited). But, it should be asserted, may contend our opponent, that, though limited, she goes wherever effect or change is produced. In regard to this, the author says :

Even while you admit the going of Prakṛiti, by reason of her being limited, absence of the characteristic of being the primal cause would follow by the example of the ultimate atoms. Such is the meaning.

Or, the aphorism should be interpreted in the following way : But action then, called agitation, is heard to take place in the Pradhâna constituted by the three Guṇas, for the purpose of their mutual conjunction. And because she possesses action, therefore, by the example of the yarns,

etc., she must lack the characteristic of being the primal cause. Having pondered on this, the author averts it :

Even while there is connection of action, there is no loss of the characteristic of being the primal cause, as in the case of the atoms, "Gati" means action; notwithstanding the presence thereof, there is no loss of the characteristic of being the primal cause, just as in the case of the terrene and other atoms in the theory of the Vaiśeṣika. Such is the meaning.—37.

Pradhâna *is* sui generis.

प्रसिद्धाधिक्यं प्रधानस्य न नियमः ॥ ६ । ३८ ॥

प्रसिद्धाधिक्यं Prasiddha-âdhikyaṃ, the condition of that which exceeds or is over and above the notorious numbers of substances held by the Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyâyikas, Pâśupatas, Bauddhas, etc. प्रधानस्य Pradhânasya, of the Pradhâna. न Na, no. नियमः Niyamaḥ, limitation, rule, restriction.

38. Pradhâna exceeds the well-known (numbers of Substances); (hence) there is no limitation (of their number).—494.

Vṛitti :—If Prakṛiti is to be the material, and since it belongs to Substance to be the material, there would be, one may say, the inclusion of Prakṛiti in Substance. In regard to this, the author says :

Pradhâna is additional to the well-known Substances, because the number of Predicables is indeterminate. And material causality is not the same as combinative causality, but is the characteristic of being the Pradhâna, *i.e.*, that in which all things are contained, because the Sâṃkhyas do not admit the "Combination" of the Vaiśeṣikas.—38.

Bhâṣya :—But then, when we see only nine Substances, such as Earth, etc., and not more, how is it possible, our opponent may ask, that there should be a Substance called the Pradhâna, which is devoid of the nature of Earth, etc.? Nor can it be said, "Let the Pradhâna be not a Substance at all," because by means of its conjunction, disjunction, transformation, etc., it is established that it is a Substance. In regard to this, the author says :

The Pradhâna is in addition to the well-known nine Substances (of the Vaiśeṣikas); hence there can be no such rule or limitation that Substances are nine and nine only. Such is the meaning. And the Śruti that the eight (Substances) other than the Self, are all effects, is here the impediment to there being any such limitation. Such is the import.—38.

Relation of the Guṇas *to* Prakṛiti.

सत्त्वादीनामतद्धर्मत्वं तद्रूपत्वात् ॥ ६ । ३९ ॥

सत्त्वादीनाम् Sattva-âdînâm, of Sattva, etc., *i.e.*, Rajas, and Tamas. अतद्धर्मत्वं A-tat-dharma-tvam, not to be the properties thereof, *i.e.*, of Prakṛiti तद्रूपत्वात् Tat-rûpa-tvât, being the form thereof, *i.e.*, of Prakṛiti.

39. Sattva and the rest are not the properties of Prakṛiti, because they are the form thereof.—495.

Vṛitti:—It may be enquired whether Prakṛiti be constituted by the Guṇas or have the Guṇas, as her properties. To this, the author replies:

Because of their identity.—39.

Bhâṣya:—Are Sattva, etc., just the properties of Prakṛiti, or is Prakṛiti what forms the substratum of the three substances in the form of the three Guṇas?—there being room for such a doubt, the author makes certain what the case is.

It does not belong to Sattva and the other Guṇas, to be the property of Prakṛiti, because they are the very essence of Prakṛiti. Such is the meaning.

Although both of the views are heard from the Śrutis and Smṛitis, yet, from a consideration of such points as simplicity, naturalness, etc., only this is ascertained that the Guṇas form the very essence of Prakṛiti, but not that they are the properties thereof. For, then, should the triad of Sattva, etc. be the property of Prakṛiti in the form of being her effects, or should they be just the eternal property of Prakṛiti by reason of mere conjunction with her, just as is the air in the case of the sky? In the first case, there is the impossibility of the production of three diverse Guṇas or qualities without the association of Prakṛiti with another substance, and there is also the impropriety of the supposition of what is contradictory to what is seen. In the last, since all diverse effects can be accounted for from the very eternal Sattva, etc., by means of their mutual association, there is the futility of the supposition of Prakṛiti in addition to them.

And the declarations about Sattva, etc., being the effects of Prakṛiti, by reason of the fact that she is partially influenced by the effect of illumination, etc., express nothing but the manifestation, etc., just as (do similar declarations) the production of the lamp from the earth.

But then, if this be so, there will be, our opponent may urge, conflict with the Śâstra or teaching which demonstrates twenty-eight Principles. We reply that such is not the case, because, in that Śâstra, the enumeration

of twenty-eight Principles, is accounted for by the admission separately of the properties of Prakṛiti, such as pleasure, etc., which the Vaiśeṣikas treat as Guṇas.

In reality, however, this aphorism is to be interpreted in the following manner: Of Sattva, etc., is "not to be the property thereof," that is, a want of the characteristic of being the mere effect of Prakṛiti, "being the form thereof," that is, because Prakṛiti also is of the form of Sattva, etc., as is evident from such Smṛitis as:

सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति यथैव प्रकृतिः स्मृता

Sattva, Rajas, Tamas,—these very same are remembered to be Prakṛiti.

So that, just as with the Vaiśeṣikas, in the case of the Earth, etc., so also with us, in the case of Sattva, etc., by reason of their being of the form of both the effect and the cause, there is no contradiction among the interpretations of their being effects (or attributes), etc., of Prakṛiti. Therein Sattva in the state of equilibrium, which may be likened to the fibres, is the cause of the Sattva in the state of inequilibrium, which may be likened to the yarns, and which is the cause of the Principle of Mahat, etc. Similarly are Rajas and Tamas also—39.

Purpose of Prakṛiti's *Creation.*

अनुपभोगेऽपि पुमर्थं सृष्टिः प्रधानस्योष्ट्रकुङ्कुमवहनवत् ॥६।४०॥

अनुपभोगे An-upabhoge, in the absence of her own enjoyment. अपि Api, even. पुमर्थं Pum-artham, for the sake of Puruṣa. सृष्टिः Sṛiṣṭiḥ, creation. प्रधानस्य Pradhânasya, of the Pradhâna. उष्ट्रकुङ्कुमवहनवत् Uṣṭra-kuṅkuma-vahana-vat, like the carrying of saffron by the camel.

40. Even though there is no enjoyment for herself, for the sake of Puruṣa, is the creation by the Pradhâna,—just as is the case with the carrying of saffron by the camel.—496.

Vṛitti :—Activity is seen for the sake of enjoyment, nor does, one may say, enjoyment exist for the unintelligent (such as Prakṛiti is alleged to be). In regard to this, the author says:

This aphorism has been explained in the aphorism (III. 58) "Creation by Prakṛiti etc." of the Third Book.—40.

Bhâṣya :—The author concludes the teaching on the purpose of the activity of the Pradhâna.

This has been explained in the aphorism "Creation by Prakṛiti is for the sake of another etc." of the Third Book.—40.

Reason for Diversity of Creation.

कर्मवैचित्र्यात् सृष्टिवैचित्र्यम् ॥ ६ । ४१ ॥

कर्मवैचित्र्यात् Karma-vaichitryât, owing to diversity of Karma or deserts. सृष्टिवैचित्र्यम् Sṛiṣṭi-vaichitryam, diversity of creation.

41. Diversity of Creation is according to diversity of Karma.—497.

Vṛitti :—But when Prakṛiti is one, how, it may be asked, does diversity of creation arise? To this, the author replies:

Though there is no difference in the material, still difference is caused by difference in the nimitta or efficient or instrumental cause; just as, though there is no difference in the gold, there arises the difference of the crown, the necklace, etc.—41.

Bhâṣya :—The author mentions the nimitta or instrumental cause in respect to diversity in creation.

Karma means Merit and Demerit. The rest is easy.—41.

How Prakṛiti *Destroys as well as Creates.*

साम्यवैषम्याभ्यां कार्यद्वयम् ॥ ६ । ४२ ॥

साम्यवैषम्याभ्यां Sâmya-vaiṣamyâbhyâṃ, by means of equilibrium and inequilibrium, or equality and inequality. कार्यद्वयम् Kârya-dvayam, twofold effect.

42. The twofold effect is by means of equilibrium and inequilibrium.—498.

Vṛitti :—How do creation and annihilation take place? it may be asked. To this, the author replies:

Annihilation is "Sâmyât", from equality, that is, from homogeneous transformation of Prakṛiti. Creation is "Vaiṣamyât", from inequality, that is, from heterogeneous transformation of Prakṛiti by the condition of Mahat, etc.—42.

Bhâṣya :—But then, granted that creation proceeds from the Pradhâna; but whence is Pralaya or Dissolution? it may be asked. For two contrary effects cannot possibly come from one and the same cause. To this, the author replies:

The triad of the Guṇas, Sattva, etc., is Pradhâna; and their inequilibrium is the mutual contact or aggregation amongst them by the relation of more and less; the absence thereof is equilibrium. By means of these two, as instrumental or concomitant causes, take place, from one and the same (material), the duad of contrary effects, in the form of creation and dissolution. Such is the meaning.

With the idea, on the other hand, that preservation is included within creation, the causality therein of the Pradhâna has not been separately discussed.—42.

Activity of Prakṛiti *is no bar to Release.*

विमुक्तबोधान्न सृष्टिः प्रधानस्य लोकवत् ॥ ६ । ४३ ॥

विमुक्तबोधात् Vimukta-bodhât, owing to the awakening of the released. न Na, not. सृष्टिः Sṛiṣṭiḥ, creation. प्रधानस्य Pradhânasya, of the Pradhâna. लोकवत् Loka-vat, as in the world, as with men.

43. Owing to the awakening of the released, there is no (longer) creation by the Pradhâna (with regard to him),—just as is the case with men.—499.

Vṛitti :—The author discusses Dissolution.

Just as man toils for the sake of release from bondage, and one whose bondage has been released, remains aloof, because one's object has been fulfilled, so too does the Pradhâna .—43.

Bhâṣya :—But then, when creation is the very nature of the Pradhâna, there will be Saṃsâra or worldly existence, one may say, even after the attainment of knowledge. In regard to this, the author says:

Through the reason of its direct vision of Puruṣa as one released, creation by the Pradhâna, over again, for the sake of that Puruṣa, does not take place, because of its object having been fulfilled. "Just as is the case with men:" Just as men, *e.g.*, ministers, etc., having accomplished the object of the king, and with their purpose thus fulfilled, do not energise again for the sake of the king, very similarly acts the Pradhâna. Such is the meaning. For it has already (II. 1.) been mentioned that the activity of the Pradhâna is for the sake of the release of the released. And that is accomplished by means of knowledge. Such is the import.—43.

Creation for one Puruṣa *does not affect another.*

नाऽन्योपसर्पणेऽपि मुक्तोपभोगो निमित्ताभावात् ॥ ६ । ४४ ॥

न Na, not. अन्योपसर्पणे Anya-upasarpaṇe, in approach to others. अपि Api, even. मुक्तोपभोगः Mukta-upabhogaḥ, experience of the released one. निमित्ताभावात् Nimitta-abhâvât, on account of the absence of the nimitta or concomitant cause.

44. Even on the (Pradhâna's) approach to others, does not take place the experience of the released one, in consequence of the absence of the concomitant cause.—500.

Vṛitti :—In consequence of their being all-pervading, connection between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa does verily exist, and hence, one may say,

even in the state of release, there is the implication of experience. In regard to this, the author says:

It would have been so, were the mere approach of the other, *i.e.*, the Pradhâna, the instrumental cause of experience. But that is not so, but, on the contrary, the instrumental cause of experience is the object of experience. And this does not exist in the state of release.—44.

Bhâṣya:—But then, there is no cessation of the creation of the Pradhâna, because the Saṃsâra or mundane existence of the ignorant is seen. So that, our opponent may urge, by means of the creation by the Pradhâna, there will be bondage over again of the released Puruṣa also. In regard to this, the author says:

Even when there is the approach of the Pradhâna towards others, by means of the creation of the aggregates, etc., in the form of effects and causes, experience of the released one does not take place, "in consequence of the absence of the concomitant cause," that is, in consequence of the absence of the concomitant causes of experience, such as the particular conjunction of one's own Upâdhi or Buddhic investment, Non-discrimination which is the cause of that conjunction, etc. Such is the meaning. For the cessation of the creation by the Pradhâna in regard to the released one, is nothing but this, namely, the non-production of the cause of the experience thereof, that is, the particular transformation of one's own Upâdhi, which is called birth.—44.

Multiplicity of Puruṣas *proved by the* Veda.

पुरुषबहुत्वं व्यवस्थातः ॥ ६ । ४५ ॥

पुरुषबहुत्वं Puruṣa-bahutvaṃ multiplicity of Puruṣas. व्यवस्थातः Vyavasthâ-taḥ, from allotment or distribution (of release and bondage, lots on earth, etc., made in the Veda).

45. Multiplicity of Puruṣas (is established) from allotment.—501.

Vṛitti:—There is but one Self, our opponent may contend; and to this effect there is the statement:

एक एव परं ब्रह्म सत्यमन्यद्विकल्पितम् ।
को मोहो को तदा शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः ॥

Supreme Brahman, one and one only, is the truth; all else is empty thought. What delusion, what sorrow is there then for one who looks back into the unity?

The author discards this view.

This has been shown in the first book in the aphorism (I. 149), beginning with Janma.

And to this effect there is (the Śruti):

अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां
बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः ।
अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते
जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥

The one Unborn (Puruṣa), for enjoyment, consorts with the one Unborn (Prakṛiti), having the colours of red, white, and black, the procreatrix of manifold progeny like unto herself. The other Unborn deserts her, after she is enjoyed.—*Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat*, IV. 5.—45.

Bhâṣya:—But then, this arrangement could be possible then only, were there a multiplicity of Puruṣas, but, may urge our opponent, that is obstructed by the Śruti about the Non-duality of the Self. With this apprehension the author says:

Through the very distribution of bondage and release, mentioned in the Śrutis, such as:

ये तद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति
अथेतरे दुःखमेवापि यन्ति ।

Whoever know this, they become immortal, while others experience only sorrow.—*Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat*, IV. iv. 14.,

is established the multiplicity of Puruṣas. Such is the meaning.—45.

Upâdhi *cannot explain the situation.*

उपाधिश्चेत्तत्सिद्धौ पुनर्द्वैतम् ॥ ६ । ४६ ॥

उपाधिः Upâdhiḥ, Upâdhi, adjunct, external investment. चेत् Chet, if. तत्सिद्धौ Tat-siddhau, on the establishment thereof. पुनः Punaḥ, again, द्वैतम् Dvaitam, duality.

46. If Upâdhi (is acknowledged), then, on the establishment thereof, there is again Duality.—502.

Vṛitti:—But diversity or multeity will be, it may be contended, according to differences of Upâdhi. In regard to this, the author says:

"On the establishment thereof," that is, on the establishment of difference. In the case of Upâdhi being an unreality, where is the establishment of difference? While in the case of its reality, by means of that itself, there will again result Duality.—46.

Bhâṣya:—But then, according to differences of Upâdhi, there will be, may rejoin our opponent, the distribution of bondage and release. In regard to this, the author says:

In case Upâdhi is acknowledged, then, by the very establishment of Upâdhi, there will be again a breakdown of Non-duality. Such is the meaning.

In reality, however, even if there be differences of Upâdhi, still the distribution is not possible, and this has been elaborately shown in the very First Book.—46.

Even A-vidyâ *is a Contradiction to Non-Duality.*

द्वाभ्यामपि प्रमाणविरोधः ॥ ६ । ४७ ॥

द्वाभ्याम् Dvâbhyâm, by the two. अपि Api, also, even. प्रमाणविरोधः Pramâṇa-virodhaḥ, contradiction of (the Vedic text which is supposed to be) the proof (of Non-Duality).

47. Even by the two, there is contradiction of the evidence (of Non-Duality).—503.

Vṛitti:—The author points out another defect.

("Dvâbhyâm":) In the case of reality and unreality. In the case of reality, there will be impairment of the tenet of Non-Duality. In the case of unreality, whence will be the distribution of diversity?—47.

Bhâṣya:—But then, the Upâdhis also will be, may contend our opponent, constituted by A-Vidyâ, and, therefore, there will be no breach of Non-Duality by them. There being room for such an apprehension, the author says:

Puruṣa, and A-Vidyâ,—by these two also, being acknowledged, the contradiction of the Śruti which is the evidence for Non-Duality, is in the very same state. Such is the meaning.—47.

Other Faults in the Teaching of Non-Duality.

द्वाभ्यामप्यविरोधान्न पूर्वमुत्तरं च साधकाभावात् ॥ ६ । ४८ ॥

द्वाभ्याम् Dvâbhyâm, by the two. अपि Api, even. अविरोधात् A-virodhât, because of non-contradiction. न Na, not. पूर्वम् Pûrvam, the first. उत्तरं Uttaram, the last. च Cha, and. साधकाभावात् Sâdhaka-abhâvât, because of the absence of means of proof.

48. Since, by means even of the two (interpretations), there is no opposition (between the Śruti on Non-Duality and the tenet of Duality), (it is) neither the first (*i.e.*, unity of the Self) nor the last *i.e.*, (contradiction of the Śruti), because of the absence of the means of proof (of unity of the Self).—Aniruddha.

Since, even by the two (the Self and A-Vidyâ), there is no conflict (with the Śruti on Non-Duality), the first (*i.e.*,

that our Duality is in conflict with the Śruti) is not possible; nor is the last (*i.e.*, the tenet of Non-Duality), because there is no means of proof (of the Self).—Vijñâna.—504.

Vṛitti:—The author shows that neither is there contradiction of the Śruti on Non-Duality, nor is there detriment to Duality.

If the Śruti on Non-Duality bear a different sense (from its literal meaning), either being directed to denote the genus (of the Self) or being directed to express eulogy, there is no contradiction, while in the case of the reality of the Upâdhi, there is no detriment to Duality;—thus no conflict exists. Therefore, neither is the first, that is, the unity of the Self, nor is the last, that is, contradiction of the Sruti. Because of the non-existence of proof in respect to Non-Duality, there is no establishment thereof,—hence something different exists. Such is the meaning.—48.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—The first, that is, the unity of the Self, and the last, that is, manifoldness according to differences of the Upâdhi, are not (established), because, in both of the cases, does not exist the means of proof. But, on the other hand, the difference of the Self is true by itself. The Śruti on Non-Duality has the oneness of the Self-hood for its object, while the perception of difference has for its object real difference not caused by the Upâdhi: hence there is no contradiction between the Śruti and Perception.

Bhâṣya:—The author mentions two other defects also:

Even by the two being acknowledged, the first, that is, your Pûrva-Pakṣa or *primâ facie* proposition, is not possible; we also acknowledge only two, that is, Prakṛiti and Puruṣa; because it is desired or intended by us also that Vikâra or transformation, by reason of its being non-eternal, is a mere creation of speech.

But our opponent may urge that, in consequence of our admission of the multiplicity of Puruṣas, and also in consequence of our admission of the eternality of Prakṛiti, there is, indeed, our conflict with them. Having apprehended this, the author mentions another defect by the words, "Nor is the last, etc." The last, that is, the established tenet of the teachers of Non-Duality is also not possible, because of the non-existence of the proof to establish the Self. And if the existence of such proof is acknowledged by them, then, by the very means thereof, there will be impairment of Non-Duality. Such is the meaning.—48.

The Self cannot prove itself.

प्रकाशतस्तत्सिद्धौ कर्मकर्तृविरोधः ॥ ६ । ४९ ॥

प्रकाशतः Prakâśa-taḥ, through light or illumination. तत्सिद्धौ Tat-siddhau, in

the case of the establishment thereof, *i.e.*, of the Self. कर्मकर्तृविरोधः Karma-kartṛi virodhaḥ, contradiction of the object and subject.

49. In the case of the establishment of the Self through the light (of the Self), there is the contradiction of the subject and the object.—505.

Vṛitti :—There is no want of proof, may rejoin our opponent; there does exist proof which indeed is self-revealed. In regard to this, the author says :

It is clear.—49.

Bhâṣya :—But then, the Self will be proved, may rejoin our opponent, as being the revealer of itself. To this, the author replies :

In the case of the establishment of Chaitanya or Intelligence through the light in the form of Intelligence, there is the contradiction of the subject and the object. Such is the meaning. For, in the case of light, etc., illumination is seen where there is a relation of the object of illumination and the light ; and the relation of one thing directly with itself is contradictory.

In our opinion, on the other hand, since we acknowledge the proof called the modification of Buddhi, by means thereof, is possible the relation of the thing itself, in the form of a reflection, to itself, in the form of that which casts the reflection ; just as is in the sun, by means of water, the connection of itself in the form of the reflection. Such is the import.

The Śruti, on the other hand, which declares the Self to be self-revealed, is to be understood to refer to its illumination, etc., being not dependent upon the Upâdhi of any other Self.

"Light" is not a property of the Self.

जड़व्यावृत्तो जडं प्रकाशयति चिद्रूपः ॥ ६ । ५० ॥

जड़व्यावृत्तः Jaḍa-vyâvṛittaḥ, the other than the unintelligent. जडं Jaḍam, the unintelligent. प्रकाशयति Prakâśayati, illuminates. चिद्रूपः Chit-rûpaḥ, of the form of Intelligence.

50. The other than the unintelligent, of the form of Intelligence, illuminates the unintelligent.—506.

Vṛitti :—The author points out another defect.

The other than the unintelligent, of the form of Intelligence, illuminates the unintelligent. Its being of the form of light arises by means of

its being different from the unintelligent, but not that it is stated that light is its property. For this very reason, is it said :

स एष नेति नेति

He the same, is not this, not that ;

but not in the way of a positive affirmation.

Now, if it is said that the Self may be of the form of Light which is supra-mundane or transcendental, we reply that, in that case, because there can be no cognisance of Vyâpti or logical pervasion, there will be a want of a familiar example (which is essential to a complete syllogism).

Now, if it is said that that is cognisable by the Yogin, (we reply that this is not possible). In the case of the ultra-cognitive Yogin, since cognition and volition are absent, the mark does not exist (whereby he can know that the Self is of the form of transcendental light). And in the case of the Cognitive Yogin, there exists the mark such as speech, volition, etc., and thereby only ordinary objects can be inferred. Neither is he, too, capable of establishing Intelligence or Consciousness in the form of Anubhava or sensation or intuition. To this effect has it been said :

इक्षुक्षीरगुडादीनां माधुर्यस्यान्तरं महत् ।
तथापि न तदाख्यातुं सरस्वत्याऽपि शक्यते ॥

Vast is the difference in the sweetness of the sugar-cane, milk, treacle, etc. Yet this is not possible, even by Sarasvatî (the Goddess of Learning), to describe.

Similarly, a thing is said to be conscious, through its being different from what is unconscious; but it is not that there is in it the inherence of consciousness, or that it is formed of consciousness ; because in the state of ultra-cognitive trance, the use of the expression, " Super-normal consciousness," even when the modifications of the mind have been suppresssd, cannot be otherwise accounted for ; while in the cognitive state, the predication of "Consciousness" is just by means of the cognition of the modifications.

In like manner, the application of the expression " It is of the form of bliss " is in respect of the cessation of pain. If the being of the form of bliss denotes a positive state, is the application of it in respect of pleasure as such ? That being so, since an unknown pleasure is not seen, (three things are entailed, *viz.*) pleasure, its cognition, and the cogniser ; hence where is Non-Duality ? Now, if you say that the predication of bliss is in respect of a particular pleasure, we reply that pleasure and the form of consciousness are not found together. Only the non-discriminating think so. But the discriminating consider that, when the thing is explained by its being of the form of difference or divergence,

which is quite visible, the supposition of something invisible and extraordinary is cumbrous.

If you say that, were there no Consciousness, the very intuition of things would not take place; we reply, that it is not so. Just as a particular conjunction, in that manner, of the gourd, piece of bamboo, and strings, is the cause of sound, but it is not the case that there exists something over and above the conjunction of the three, so, although they are all alike formed of the five Elements, through the combination, in that manner, of the bodies modified by the form of living beings, there arises Consciousness.

In the case also of the Self's being Light, the characteristic of being non-intelligent partially attaches even to it.—50.

Bhâṣya:—But, then, may urge our opponent, there is no contradiction of the subject and the object, because by means of the property of illumination appertaining to it, is possible its relation to itself, just as, with the Vaiśeṣikas, by means of cognition appertaining to it, it is its own object. To this, the author replies:

In the intelligent principle, does not exist the property of the form of illumination, just as it does in the sun and the like; but "Chit-rûpaḥ," that is, of which intelligence is the essential form, that illuminates the non-intelligent, because it is called intelligent by reason of its mere divergence from the non-intelligent, but not by reason of its possessing a property different from the non-intelligent. Such is the meaning.

It is for this reason that, by reason of its being devoid of properties, it is taught by the Śruti just in this way, *viz.*,

स एष नेति नेति

This, the same, is not this, is not that;

but not by way of an affirmation.

So, too, says the Smṛiti:

इदं तदिति निर्देष्टुं गुरुणाऽपि न शक्यते ।

Even the preceptor is not competent to refer to it as that "That is this."

Where the reading is "Jaḍa-vyâvṛittau," in the case of divergence from the non-intelligent, the seventh case-ending is in the sense of denoting the reason, and, consequently, the meaning of the aphorism is the very same.

And in this aphorism, it is not the meaning that what is of the form of intelligence, illuminates the non-intelligent alone, but not the Self

For, if it were so, then, by reason of its being unknowable, it would not be proper to throw before our opponents the obstacle in the form of absence of means of proof, because the same argument would apply to us also.—50.

Conflict with the Veda *avoided.*

न श्रुतिविरोधो रागिणां वैराग्याय तत्सिद्धेः ॥ ६ । ५१ ॥

न Na, no. श्रुतिविरोधः Śruti-virodhaḥ, contradiction of the Veda. रागिणां Râgiṇâṃ, of those who are attached to the things of the world. वैराग्याय Vairâgyâya, for the sake of dispassion. तत्सिद्धेः Tat-siddheḥ, because of the proof thereof, *i.e.*, of the Vedic texts.

51. There is no contradiction of the Veda, because it is established (otherwise, as being) for the sake of dispassion in those who are attached to the world.—507.

Vṛitti :—This being so, the Śruti that the Self illuminates itself, will, may say our opponent, be contradicted. To this, the author replies:

Because the unintelligent, by reason of its being constituted by the three Guṇas, is the cause of passion or attachment, proof, etc., also, by reason of their being made of the three Guṇas, are to be avoided. And eradication of passion is to be effected. "Tat-siddheḥ," that is, because the Śruti that the Self illuminates itself, is otherwise established.—51.

Bhâṣya :—But then, when, in this way, Duality is established in accordance with proof, etc., what, it may be asked, will become of the Śruti on Non-Duality? To this, the author replies:

Contradiction of the Śruti on Non-Duality, however, does not exist, because it is only for the purpose of evoking Dispassion towards things other than Puruṣa, on the part of those who have passion for worldly objects, that there is establishment of Non-Duality by the Śrutis; since it is not heard that, as in the case of the knowledge of Puruṣa, so also in the case of the knowledge of the absence of Duality, there is any other separate fruit.

And this Dispassion is made possible by means of the non-duality of the existent alone, and to be existent is to be immutable. Such is the meaning.

It is for this reason that the Śruti also has established the non-duality of the existent only in the Chhândogya Upaniṣat. Such is the import. —51.

Reality of the World also is subversive of Non-Duality.

जगत्सत्यत्वमदुष्टकारणजन्यत्वात् बाधकाभावात् ॥ ६ । ५२ ॥

जगत्सत्यत्वम् Jagat-satya-tvam, reality of the world. अदुष्टकारणजन्यत्वात् A-duṣṭa-kâraṇa-janya-tvât, being the product of not-imperfect or not-defective cause. बाधकाभावात् Bâdhaka-abhâvât, because of the absence of any impediment.

52. The reality of the world (follows) from its being the product of not-imperfect causes, and from the absence of any impediment (to its reality).—508.

Vritti:—But when the world is unreal, how, it may be asked, is the Śruti otherwise established? To this, the author replies:

Product of imperfect causes is, as, *e.g.*, the cognition that the conch shell is yellow. Impediment is, for example, the cognition that "it is not silver." But such is not the case here, because Prakṛiti, etc., are not imperfect or defective. Nor does there exist any impediment, because of the absence of the intuition that "it is not the world."

Briefly, the Universe is being described: Above are the worlds Bhû, Bhuva, Svaḥ Mahaḥ, Jana, Tapaḥ, and Satya. Below are the worlds Mahâtala, Rasâtala, Talâtala, Pâtâla, Sutala, Vitala, and Atala. In the middle is the Jambu Island. In the middle thereof is the Mount Sumeru. To the four directions thereof, beginning with the East, are the Pillar-Mountains, bearing the names of Mandara, Gandhamâdana, Vipula, and Supârśva. To the south of the Meru are the mountains Himâlaya in the country of Bharata, Hemakûṭa in the country of the Kimpuruṣas, and the Niṣadha in the country of Hari. To the north of the Meru are the mountains Śṛingî in the country of the Kurus, the Śveta in the country of Hiraṇyaka, and the Nîla in the country of Ramyaka. To the east of the Meru is the mountain Mâlyavân in the country of Bhadrâśva. To the west of the Meru is the mountain Gandhamâdana in the country of Ketumâla. Opposite the Meru, on the other side, is the country of Ilâvṛita.

The extent of the Jambu Island is one hundred thousand Yojanas. Surrounding it, of equal extent, is the Salt Sea. Surrounding it, of double the extent, is the Śaka Island. Surrounding it, of equal extent, is the Sea of Sugar-cane Juice. Surrounding it, of double the extent, is the Kuśa Island. Surrounding it, of equal extent, is the Sea of Wine. Surrounding it, of double the extent, is the Krauñcha Island. Surrounding it, of equal extent, is the Sea of Clarified Butter. Surrounding it, of double the extent, is the Śâlmali Island. Surrounding it, of equal extent, is the Sea of Curd. Surrounding it, of double the extent, is Plakṣa Island.

Surrounding it, of equal extent, is the Sea of Milk. Surrounding it, of double the extent, is the Puṣkara Island. Surrounding it, of equal extent, is the Sea of Sweet Water.

The Universe is surrounded on all sides by the hemisphere of Brahmâṇḍa, of which the mountain Loka-Aloka forms the extreme barrier.—52.

Bhâṣya :—The author tells us that the teachers of Non-Duality are to be rejected not only by means of the argument set forth above, but also by means of the non-existence of any proof to lead to the cognition of the unreality of the Universe.

In the world, the unreality is seen of dream-objects, the yellowness of conch-shell, etc., by reason of their being the product of the Internal Instrument, etc., affected with the defects of sleep, etc. But this (unreality) does not exist in the fabric of creation beginning with Mahat, because Prakṛiti, the cause thereof, and also the Buddhi of Hiraṇya-Garbha (Brahmâ) are not defective, inasmuch as it is heard, for instance, from the Śruti :

यथापूर्वमकल्पयत्

Created without departing from the past.—*Ṛig Veda*, X. cxc. 3.

But then, since it is opposed by such Śrutis as

नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन

Nothing here exists which is manifold.—*Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upaniṣat*, IV. iv. 19,

some eternal defect, called by the name of A-Vidyâ or the like, should, our opponent may say, be conceived. To this, the author replies by saying "from the absence of any impediment." The idea is as follows :—The Śrutis such as "Nothing here exists which is manifold," which are intended or employed by our opponent as being the debarrer of (the reality of) the fabric of Creation,—they, according to their context, simply forbid the non-division or non-separation in space of the Self, but are not directed to signify or establish the absolute nothingness of the fabric of Creation ; since, as, in that case, obstruction to their own reality also would be entailed, it would follow that they do not establish their own sense or signification. For it is not that, though there is obstruction to the reality of the words heard in a dream, the objects denoted by them are never doubted again. Therefore, because they are not detrimental to the Self, the Śrutis are not directed to establish the absolute negation of the fabric of Creation. Among them the meaning of such Śrutis as "Nothing here exists which is manifold," is that nothing whatever exists which is separated from Brahman, because they convey the same import as do the Smṛitis such as

सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मेति तज्जलानिति शान्त ।

Thou reachest all, whence art Thou All.—*Gitâ.*, XI. 40.

Of the Śrutis, for example:

वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ।

Modification (*e.g.*, a water-pot) is a creation of speech, a mere name; (while "It is) clay,"—only this much is the truth.—*Chhândogya Upaniṣat*, VI. i. 4.,

on the other hand, the meaning is the absence of transcendental reality in the form of eternality, as, otherwise, the familiar example of the clay would be unproven; for, in the world, the absolute nothingness of the modifications of clay is not established, whereby they could be used as familiar examples.

Of the Śrutis, again, such as:

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।
न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥

Neither suppression, nor, again, production,—neither entangled, nor, again, engaged in the pursuit of freedom,—neither desirous of release, nor, again, released:—such is the absolute truth.—*Brahma Bindu Upaniṣat*. 10.,

the import is the absence of ultra-transcendental existence, in the form of the eternality of the immutable, of something other than the Self. The import, moreover, is the non-existence of the suppression, etc., of the Self, since, otherwise, there would be conflict with the demonstration that such knowledge has release as its fruit. For, it cannot be that, having demonstrated that "Release in unreal," one, being quite unmindful, demonstrates Release to be the fruit.

What Śrutis there are, again, on the unity of the Self, have been explained in the very First Book. In our Commentary on the Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ, these and other Śrutis have been explained by us. Such is the hint.—52.

The Universe is ever existent, never created.

प्रकारान्तरासम्भवात् सदुत्पत्तिः ॥ ६ । ५३ ॥

प्रकारान्तरासम्भवात् Prakâra-antara-a-sambhavât, owing to the impossibility of any other mode or manner. सदुत्पत्तिः Sat-utpattiḥ, production of the existent.

53. Because of the impossibility of the other mode, production must be of the existent.—509.

Vṛitti:—For the benefit of the disciple, the author establishes over again even what was mentioned before.

And the alternative mode has already been condemned.—53.

Bhâṣya:—The author tells us that not only in the present state is the web of creation existent, but also always.

Because, by reason of the arguments mentioned before, production of the non-existent is impossible, it is that which is existent in a subtle form, that is produced, that is, becomes manifested. Such is the meaning.—53.

Agency belongs to Ahaṃkâra.

अहंकारः कर्ता न पुरुषः ॥ ६ । ५४ ॥

अहंकारः Ahaṃkâraḥ, ahaṃkâra, the Ego. कर्ता Kartâ, agent. न Na, not. पुरुषः Puruṣaḥ, Puruṣa.

54. Ahaṃkâra is the agent, (and) not Puruṣa.—510.

Vritti :—Since there is the immediate cognition that "I do," the doubt arises whether Ahaṃkâra be the agent or whether, by the word Ahaṃkâra, the Self be denoted and it be the agent. In regard to this, the author says:

Because Puruṣa is not liable to transformation. And the co-existence of activity and intelligence in one and the same subject fails in such cases as "The tree stands."—54.

Bhâṣya :—Even though agency and experiencership reside in different subjects, the author establishes their (separate) distribution by means of the (following) two aphorisms:

The Internal Instrument possessing the modification of Abhimâna or conceit, is Ahaṃkâra. It is that which possesses activity, as exertion is generally seen to follow immediately after conceit; but not Puruṣa, since he is not liable to transformation. Such is the meaning.

And what has been previously stated, namely, that Dharma, etc., belong to Buddhi,—that was with reference to the differences of the mere modification of one and the same Internal Instrument.—54.

When Experience ceases.

चिदवसाना भुक्तिस्तत्कर्मार्जितत्वात् ॥ ६ । ५५ ॥

चिदवसाना Chit-avasânâ, resulting to intelligence. भुक्तिः Bhuktiḥ, experience. तत्कर्मार्जितत्वात् Tat-karma-arjita-tvât, being earned by his Karma or Deserts.

55. Experience ends with knowledge (Aniruddha), or, Experience results to Intelligence (Vijñâna), because it is earned by the Karma thereof.—511.

Vritti :—Although one Karma is worked out, when other Karmas will be produced, inasmuch as Karma is co-eval with the Body, there will be non-release. In regard to this, the author says:

Through Non-discrimination is the acquisition of Karma, whereby is Experience.

"Chit-avasânâ" means that of which the termination is in the ' ow ledge of the Self. On the appearance of Discrimination, where as th acquisition of other Karmas? In the absence thereof, where is Experi ence? Of Karma already effected, the destruction is through knowledg itself. So has it been declared:

यथैधांसि समिद्धोऽग्निर्भस्मसात् कुरुतेऽर्जुन ।
ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात् कुरुते तथा ॥

Just as fire to which fuel has been added, reduces the fuel to ashes, similarly, Arjuna, does the fire of knowledge burn all Karmas into ashes.—*Gîtâ*, IV. 37.—55.

Bhâṣya:—Though agency belongs to Ahaṃkâra, Experience ult mately results to the Intelligent Principle alone, because Ahaṃkâra, b reason of its being an aggregate, is for the sake of another (*vide* I. 140).

But if Experience thus results to one by means of Karma inherin in another (Ahaṃkâra), then, one may say, there will be no limitation ((particular Experiences) to particular Puruṣas. To this, the author replie in the words: "because it is earned by the Karma thereof": becaus Experience is the result of that Karma which belongs to the Intelliger Principle, being transferred to it by Ahaṃkâra. Such is the meaning.

What Ahaṃkâra, by taking up what Puruṣa, produces in the uni telligent the modification of "I" and "Mine," the act of that Ahaṃkâ is said to belong to that Self, and by means of that very act, Experienc in respect of that Self is acquired: thus there is no undue extension (in the causality of the agency of Ahaṃkâra being responsible for the Experience of Puruṣa). Such is the idea.—55.

How Re-birth takes place after attainment of Higher Worlds.

चन्द्रादिलोकेऽप्यावृत्तिर्निमित्तसद्भावात् ॥ ६ । ५६ ॥

चन्द्रादिलोके Chandra-âdi-loke, in the world of the Moon, etc. अपि Api, even आवृत्तिः Âvṛittiḥ, return to Saṃsâra or transmigration. निमित्तसद्भावात् Nimitta-sat-bhâvât, because of the presence of the instrumental cause.

56. Even in the world of the Moon, etc., there is return (to transmigration), because of the presence of the instrumental cause (of transmigration).—512.

Vṛitti:—On account of its excellence, the attainment of the worlds of the Moon, etc., will, one may say, itself be the end of Puruṣa. In regard to this, the author says:

From the word, Âdi, etc., the world of Brahmâ, etc., are to be understood.—56.

Bhâṣya :—The author shows the reason for what was mentioned before, namely, that there is no cessation of liability (to re-birth) by means of reaching to the worlds ending with that of Brahmâ.

"The instrumental cause" is Non-discrimination, Karma, etc.

The rest is easy.—56.

Higher Instruction in the Higher Worlds availeth not.

लोकस्य नोपदेशात् सिद्धिः पूर्ववत् ॥ ६ । ५७ ॥

लोकस्य Lokasya, of the denizens of the higher worlds. न Na, not. उपदेशात् Upadeśât, through instruction. सिद्धिः Siddhiḥ, success, development of knowledge, effectuation of non-return. पूर्ववत् Pûrva-vat, as in the former case (*i.e.*, of the terrestrial world), as before, *i.e.*, while on earth.

57. Not through instruction by the denizens (of the Higher Worlds) is there success,—as (it was not) before.—513.

Vritti :—In the case of one who has (duly) approached a preceptor, Release will take place, one may say, just through the hearing of the words (uttered by the preceptor) : what is the use of reflection, etc.? To this, the author replies :

Already has this been verily stated. Of the sluggish, Release does not take place through mere hearing, but by means of reflection, etc.

Hereby are to be indicated Restraint, Observance, Posture, Regulation of Breath, Abstraction, Concentration, Meditation, and Trance.—57.

Bhâṣya :—But then, through instruction by the denizens of those respective worlds, one may say, there will be non-return. In regard to this, the author says :

Just as there is no "Siddhiḥ", that is, development of Knowledge, through the mere instruction of the former, that is, of the human world, so does not development of Knowledge take place, as a rule, in the case of those who have reached the higher worlds, through the mere instruction of the denizens of those respective worlds. Such is the meaning.—57.

A doubtful Śruti explained.

पारम्पर्येण तत्सिद्धौ विमुक्तिश्रुतिः ॥ ६ । ५८ ॥

पारम्पर्येण Pâramparyeṇa, intermediately, gradually. तत्सिद्धौ Tat-siddhau, there being the attainment thereof, *i.e.*, of knowledge. विमुक्तिश्रुतिः Vimukti-śrutiḥ, the Śruti about Release.

58. Because the accomplishment thereof takes place

intermediately, there is the Śruti about Release (in the worlds of Brahmâ, etc.).—514.

Vritti :—How then is it heard, it may be asked, that Release takes place through mere instruction? To this, the author replies :

Because *Hearing*, being the first to take place, is proved to be the cause intermediately, there is the Śruti about Release (being the result of Hearing alone).—58.

Bhâṣya :—But this being so, what will become, one may ask, of the Śruti which declares non-return from the world of Brahmâ? To this, the author replies :

Seeing that, in the case of those gone to the world of Brahmâ, etc., development of Knowledge generally takes place gradually by means of *Hearing*, Reflection, etc., the Śruti declares Release (taking place in those worlds). But it is not the case that Release takes place there by the mere going there directly. Such is the meaning.

In those worlds, Knowledge being very common, there is a distinction from the other worlds.—58.

Going of the Omnipresent explained.

गतिश्रुतेश्च व्यापकत्वेऽप्युपाधियोगाद्भोगदेशकाललाभो व्योमवत्

॥ ६ । ५९ ॥

गतिश्रुतेः Gati-śruteḥ, from the Śruti about going. च Cha, and. व्यापकत्वे Vyâpaka-tve, being all-pervading. अपि Api, even. उपाधियोगात् Upâdhi-yogât, through conjunction of Upâdhi or external investment. भोगदेशकाललाभः Bhoga-deśa-kâla-lâbhaḥ, connection with, or reaching, the place of experience in time, connection with the place and time of Experience. व्योमवत् Vyoma-vat, like the sky.

59. And, in accordance with the Śruti about its going, though the Self is all-pervading, there takes place, in the course of time, its connection with the place of Experience, through conjunction of the Upâdhi,—just as in the case of the Sky.—515.

Vritti :—Just as it belongs to Prakṛiti, because she is all-pervading, to be the cause of the world, similarly, it may be said, of the Self, because it is all-pervading, there will be the implication of Experience in all places. In regard to this, the author says :

Just as, through conjunction of the Upâdhi in the shape of a water-pot, etc., when the water-pot moves, there arises the cognition that "the

Space confined within the water-pot moves," similarly, is the going of the Self, by the going of the Body, by reason of its delimitation by the Body. Through the going of the Body to that place where, under the influence of Karma, Experience is to take place, is the reaching of Experience by the Self.

If you say that, were the Self all-pervading and of the form of Intelligence, simultaneous cognition would be entailed in respect of all objects, everywhere and at all times, but that that is not seen; we reply that this is not so. It would be so, did the Self produce cognition of the modifications by its own form of being all-pervading, but it is not so; on the other hand, it produces such cognition just by being delimited or conditioned by the Body, etc. Just as the sun, although illumination is its very nature, does not, while it lies to the south of the Mount Meru, illumine the northern quarters, and while it lies to the north, the southern quarters, because it is not all-pervading.

While, on the other hand, the receptacle of Karma (*i.e.*, Manas) having been consumed by means of Knowledge, etc., the aggregates such as the Body, etc, disappear, and the Self becomes free from the influences of Rajas and Tamas, and becomes all-pervading, it does not produce cognition of the modifications, because it is immutable, but remains itself, indeed, of the very form of the illumination of the Universe.

And just as the Sky which is all-pervading, does not become black by the local connection of smoke, etc., but when it is confined within a water-pot and the like, the whole of it lying within the hollow of the water-pot and the like is thought to be black: though in that case the sky does not become black, because it does not possess adhesion, but the idea of blackness is a mere false misconception of the non-discriminating, inasmuch as, on the breaking of the water-pot, it is no longer so seen; similarly, is the self all-pervading; it has no connection with Merit and so forth, nor even cognition, but by means of the delimitation or determination caused by the Body, through conjunction of Manas by the relation of the Jîva, as is the case with the conjunction of the air and fire, it is called Jîva-Âtmâ, and appears as though it possessed Merit, Demerit, cognition, non-cognition, pleasure, pain, and so forth, Ahaṃkâra, the Senses, their Objects, birth, etc., which are all of Prakṛiti. Because of the clearness or transparency of Prakṛiti in her Sattva part, the Self reflected therein, mistakes (abhimâna) the agency, etc., of Prakṛiti as belonging to itself. The false misconception also is in the Self as reflected in Prakṛiti, and not in the Self (as such); just as the moon, though it is motionless, being reflected in water, moves through the motion of the

water,—such false intuition arises; or just as the face, though it be free from dirt, being reflected in a dirty mirror, is erroneously regarded as dirty.

The discriminating, on the other hand, who behold the aloneness (of the Self), see that, since the Self is not liable to transformation and is free from association, its agency, etc., are unreal. But when there is the non-production of another Body, after the breaking up of the previous Body, in consequence of the destruction of Vâsanâ or tendency, through the dissolution of the Manas, in the order of the decrease of Vâsanâ, under the influence of the maturity of meditation, then, since the Jîva-Âtmâ also, by being one with the Supreme Self, is all-pervading, wherein is the conjunction of Merit and Demerit?—or agency, etc.? But while it is beyond the cognisance of Speech, the characteristic of being of the form of bliss of supra-sensuous intuition is attributed to it, as, otherwise, it is incapable of being demonstrated.—59.

Bhâṣya:—The author explains the Śruti about the going of the Self, although the Self is all-full.

Although the Self is all-pervading, yet, by having regard to the hearing of its going, the attainment of the place of experience by it is established through the influence of time, just as it is in the case of the Sky by means of the conjunction of Upâdhi or adjunct or external investment. Such is the meaning. For, just as, though the Sky is all-filling, yet movement to particular places is attributed to it through conjunction of the Upâdhis such as a water-pot etc., very similarly.

And thus there is the Śruti:

घटसंवृतमाकाशं नीयमाने घटे यथा ।
घटो नीयेत नाकाशं तद्वज्जीवो नभोपमः ॥

As the Sky, enveloped within the water-pot, (seems to move), while the water-pot is carried (from place to place), (whereas, in reality), the water-pot is removed, and not the Sky, so the Jîva, the embodied Self, which is like the Sky (in this respect).—*Brahma-Bindu Upaniṣat*, 13.—59.

Existence of the Body is dependent upon the presence of the Self.

अनधिष्ठितस्य पूतिभावप्रसंगान्न तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ६ । ६० ॥

अनधिष्ठितस्य An-adhiṣṭhita-sya, of that which is not superintended. पूतिभावप्रसंगात् Pûti-bhâva-prasaṅgât, owing to the implication of the putrescent state. न Na, not. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, proof thereof.

60. Because, in the case of that which is not superintended (by the Self), there is the implication of the putrescent state, there is no proof thereof.—516.

Vritti:—Since, prior to the production of the Body, superintendence is impossible, in consequence of there being no support (in which the Self may reside), the superintendence of the Self takes place, one may say, after the production (of the Body). In regard to this, the author says:

Because, in the case of the all-pervading and eternal, there is no connection of the relation of the prior and the posterior, through superintendence just simultaneous with the production of the Body, is not "the proof thereof," that is, is not the proof of non-superintendence (prior to such production), and thence also is not the (implication of) the putrescent state (of the embryo).—60.

Bhâṣya:—The author expounds what has been stated before, namely, that the building of the house of Experience (*i.e.*, the Body) is through the superintendence of the Experiencer (*i e.*, the Self.)

Because semen, etc., not superintended by the Experiencer, are liable to putrescence, there would not be the building of the house of Experience mentioned before. Such is the meaning.—60.

Formation of the Body is not possible through Adṛiṣṭam.

अदृष्टद्वारा चेदसम्बद्धस्य तदसम्भवाज्जलादिवदङ्कुरे ॥६। ६१ ॥

अदृष्टद्वारा Adṛiṣṭa-dvârâ, through Adṛiṣṭam or Desert. चेत् Chet, if. असम्बद्धस्य A-sambaddha-sya, of the unconnected. तदसम्भवात् Tat-a-sambhavât, owing to the impossibility thereof, *i.e.*, of being the cause of the formation of the Body. जलादिवत् Jala-âdi-vat, as is the case with water, etc. अङ्कुरे Aṅkure, in respect of a sprout.

61. If (you say that), through Adṛiṣṭam, (takes place the formation of the Body, we reply that it is not so), because this is impossible in the case of that which is unconnected with the seed, as is the case with water, etc., in respect of the sprout.—517.

Vritti:—It is just through the influence of Adṛiṣṭam, one may say, that the putrid state will not take place. In regard to this, the author says:

Because of the incompetency of Adṛiṣṭam which is without a support, there cannot be the production of an effect through it, by reason of its being unconnected with the Body, just as the power of producing the sprout does not belong to water unconnected with the seed.

From the word, Âdi, etc., there is the inclusion of Fire.—61.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—If you say that the Self does not exercise superintendence from the very seed state of the Body, but after its production, and that the superintendence of the Self prior to the production

of the Body, is through Adṛiṣṭam, we reply that it is not so, because of the impossibility thereof, that is, of the unconnected, *i.e.*, Adṛiṣṭam, being the cause. The meaning is this: Of course, the connection of Adṛiṣṭam therewith must be asserted, and that is nothing but of the form of a particular conjunction, etc., of its own support.

The phrase "As is the case with water, etc.," gives a familiar example. Just as water, etc., though they be the generators of the sprout do not, being unconnected with the seed, generate the sprout.

Bhâṣya:—But then, may say our opponent, let the construction of the house of Experience take place from the Experiencers, even without their superintendence, through Adṛiṣṭam. To this, the author replies:

Because it is impossible for Adṛiṣṭam which is not directly connected with the semen, etc., to operate, through the Experiencers, in the construction of the Body, etc., just as it is impossible for water, etc., which are unconnected with the seed, to operate, through the tillers, in the production of the sprout. Such is the meaning.

Hence it should be affirmed that, in the case of the semen, etc., there is connection of Adṛiṣṭam just by means of the connection in the form of the conjunction of its own support or substratum. So that it is established that superintendence in the form of the conjunction of the Self attended with Adṛiṣṭam, is the Hetu or efficient cause of the construction of the materials of Experience. Such is the import.—61.

Reason for the above.

निर्गुणत्वात्तदसम्भवादहंकारधर्मा ह्येते ॥ ६ । ६२ ॥

निर्गुणत्वात् Nir-guṇa-tvât, because it is free from the Guṇas. तदसम्भवात् Tat-a-sambhavât, because of the impossibility thereof, *i.e.*, of its possessing Adṛiṣṭam. अहंकारधर्माः Ahaṃkâra-dharmâḥ, properties of Ahaṃkâra. हि Hi, for एते Ete, these, *i.e.*, Merit, Demerit, etc.

62. (The Self cannot, through Adṛiṣṭam, be the cause of the Body), because it is free from the Guṇas and because Adṛiṣṭam is not possible to it; for these, (Merit, Demerit, etc.), are the properties of Ahaṃkâra.—518.

Vṛitti:—Merit, etc., residing in which as their substratum, become, it may be asked, the producers of effects? To this, the author replies:

Because, since the Self is free from the Guṇas, it is impossible that they should be its properties, these, merit, etc., are the properties of Ahaṃkâra.

Since there is no difference between effect and cause, it is the properties of Buddhi (the cause) that are here stated to be the properties of Ahamkâra (the effect).—62.

Bhâṣya :—By the Systems of Thought, such as the Vaiśeṣika, etc., after having admitted, without proof, that the Self is the cause (in the construction of the Body) through Adṛiṣṭam, is established the superintendence of the Self as consisting in its being the means of bringing about the connection of Adṛiṣṭam with the semen, etc. But, in the author's own tenet, says he, since Adṛiṣṭam, etc., lack the characteristic of being the properties of the Self, it is not possible for the Experiencer to be, through that, even the Hetu or concomitant cause of the Body.

By reason of the Experiencer's being free from the Guṇas, and also on account of the impossibility of Adṛiṣṭam (appertaining to the Self), there is no intermediateness of Adṛiṣṭam : "Hi", because, "Ete", Adṛiṣṭam, etc., are the properties only "Ahamkârasya", of the Internal Instrument in general. Such is the meaning.

So that, in our doctrine, it follows that the superintendence of the Experiencer is quite immediate, by means of mere conjunction, independently of any intermediary. Such is the import.—62.

"Jîva" *distinguished from* Puruṣa.

विशिष्टस्य जीवत्वमन्वयव्यतिरेकात् ॥ ६ । ६ ३ ॥

विशिष्टस्य Viśiṣṭa-sya, of that which possesses a distinction. जीवत्वम् Jîva-tvam, the characteristic of being Jîva or Embodied Self. अन्वयव्यतिरेकात् Anvaya-vyatirekât, from Agreement and Difference.

63. The characteristic of being Jîva belongs to that which possesses a distinction, (as is proved) from Agreement and Difference.—519.

Vṛitti :—Does the characteristic of being Jîva belong to the Self in its own intrinsic form, or otherwise? it may be asked. To this, the author replies :

Were the Self to be Jîva by its own intrinsic form, its immutability would be lost through agency and experiencership. Also from Agreement and Difference. The characteristic of being Jîva belongs to that (Self) which is distinguished by the conjunction of the Senses, through the conjunction of Air and Fire, by means of the limitation caused by the Body.—63.

Bhâṣya :—But then, if Puruṣa be all-pervading, then, may say our opponent, the limitedness of the Jîva, established by the Śruti, *viz.*,

बालाग्रशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य च ।
भागो जीवो स विज्ञेयः स चानन्त्याय कल्पते ॥

Jîva should be known to be a part of the one-hundredth part of the end of a hair, divided one-hundredfold, and he prevails for eternality.—*Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat*, V. 9.,

is unfounded. Similarly, in consequence of the denial of Îśvara, and also in consequence of the identity of form among the Puruṣas, the division, made in the Śâstras, of the Jîva-Âtmâ and the Parama-Âtmâ is also unfounded. Therefore, in order to remove these two causes of apprehension, the author says :

According to its derivation, *viz.*,

जीव बलप्राणधारणयोः

The root √Jîva is in the sense of upholding strength and upholding vitality.—*Dhâtu-Pâṭha*, XV. 54.,

to be a Jîva is to be a living being, and that is a property of Puruṣa possessing the distinction of Ahaṃkâra, but not of Puruṣa as he is in himself. Why? " From Agreement and Difference ": because it is only in the case of those who possess Ahaṃkâra, that the sustentation of excess of strength and vitality is seen, while, in the case of those who are devoid of it, only the suppression of the modifications of the mind is seen, in consequence of the absence of Ahaṃkâra which is the cause of the production of Râga or Passion which is the cause of activity. Such is the meaning.

Or, the agreement and difference are to be explained in this way that there is no *living* in the states of Release, Dissolution, etc., when there is non-existence of the Antaḥ-karaṇa or Internal Instrument, and that when there is the presence thereof, there is *living*.

So that, the limitedness of the Jîva as well as his being different from the pure Puruṣa, called the Supreme Self, are caused by means of the Upâdhi or external investment of the Antaḥ-karaṇa. Such is the import.

By this aphorism is declared neither that experiencership belongs to that which possesses the distinction, nor that it is the object of cognisance of the intuition of "You" and "I"; for, experience which is of the form of immediate intuition, does not possess the characteristic of being a property of Ahaṃkâra; and also because it is not established that Discrimination is produced by the bringing forward of the subjects of the properties of "You" and "I". But, on the contrary, has been exhibited

the division of the Jîva-Âtmâ and the Parama-Âtmâ declared by hundreds of sayings such as :

यदा त्वभेदविज्ञानं जीवात्मपरमात्मनोः ।
भवेत्तदा मुनिश्रेष्ठ पाशच्छेदो भविष्यति ॥
आत्मानं द्विविधं प्राहुः परापरविभेदतः ।
परस्तु निर्गुणः प्रोक्तोऽप्यहंकारयुतोऽपरः ॥

But when there will be cognition of the non-difference between the Jîva-Âtmâ and the Parama-Âtmâ, then, O best of Munis, will there be the cutting asunder of the noose.

They declare the Self to be twofold, according to the distinction of the Higher and the Lower : the one free from the Guṇas, is said to be the Higher, and the one conjoint with Ahaṃkâra, the Lower.

Of these, in respect to the state of being the Jîva, Ahaṃkâra is nothing but the mark of distinction.—63.

Ahaṃkâra, *and not* Îśvara, *is the Cause.*

अहंकारकर्तृधीना कार्यसिद्धिर्नेश्वरकर्त्रधीना प्रमाणाभावात् ॥ ६ । ६४ ॥

अहंकारकर्तृधीना Ahaṃkâra-kartṛi-adhînâ, dependent upon Ahaṃkâra as the agent. कार्यसिद्धिः Kârya-siddhiḥ, accomplishment of effects. न Na, not. ईश्वरकर्त्रधीना Îśvara-kartṛi-adhînâ, dependent upon Îśvara as the agent. प्रमाणाभावात् Pramâṇa-abhâvât, because of the absence of proof.

64. Dependent upon Ahaṃkâra as the agent is the accomplishment of effects, (and) not dependent upon Îśvara as the agent, because there is no proof (of this).—520.

Vṛitti :—Since it possesses lordliness (Âiśvarya), therefore, it is the Jîva-Âtmâ, may say our opponent, that is Îśvara, and it is He who will create the Universe. And to this effect has it been said :

ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ।
भ्रामयन् सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रारूढानि मायया ॥

Îśvara dwells, O Arjuna, in the region of the heart of all beings, causing, by means of His Mâyâ, all beings to move about, like puppets made to perform movements through a mechanical apparatus.—*Gîtâ*, XVIII. 61.

In regard to this, the author says :

"Because of the absence of proof" : because of the absence of the knowledge of the material cause of the Universe.

Because (the supposed Îśvara, *i.e.*, the Jîva as Îśvara) is not all-pervading, the supposition of more than one Îśvara (will also be necessary).—64.

Bhâṣya :—Now, with a view to establish that the triad of Brahmâ, etc., are the only Îśvaras in a practical (and not in a transcendental) sense, the author desires to demonstrate that it is of Mahat and Ahaṃkâra only that the Universe, excepting these, is the effect, and not of any Îśvara. Therein, in the first place, he states the effect of Ahaṃkâra.

The agent which is of the form of Ahaṃkâra,—it is dependent upon that only that there is "the accomplishment of the effect," that is, the fulfilment of creation and destruction; because power equal to such a task, is the effect of Ahaṃkâra, since that power is not seen in those who are devoid of Ahaṃkâra.

On the other hand, ("the accomplishment of the effect" is) not dependent upon a Supreme Îśvara, not affected by Ahaṃkâra, as declared by the Vaiśeṣikas and others; because there is no evidence of creatorship uninfluenced by Ahaṃkâra, and of an eternal Îśvara. Such is the meaning. For, it is creation preceded by Ahaṃkâra that alone is heard in the Śruti,

अहं बहु स्यां प्रजायेय

I will be many, I will procreate.—*Chhândogya Upaṇisat*, VI. ii. 3.

There is no evidence that, in the above Śruti, the word, Aham, I, is a mere imitation (of secular language).

By this aphorism it is also established that the agency of Brahmâ and Rudra, in creation and destruction (respectively), as proved by the Śruti and Smṛiti, is due to the Upâdhi or investment of Ahaṃkâra.—64.

There is no Intelligent Cause of Ahaṃkâra.

अदृष्टोद्भूतिवत् समानत्वम् ॥ ६ । ६५ ॥

अदृष्टोद्भूतिवत् Adṛiṣṭa-udbhûti-vat, like the arising or development of Adṛiṣṭam, or Desert. समानत्वम् Samâna-tvam, sameness.

65. It is the same as in the case of the arising of Adṛiṣṭam.—521.

Vṛitti :—The author says that, because it is an effect, even the characteristic of being the effect of an Intelligent cause is not-one-pointed, *i.e.*, inconclusive.

"As in the case of the arising of Adṛiṣṭam," because it has no creator. If that also were to have a cause, another arising of Adṛiṣṭam will be required as a concomitant; of this of that also, yet another; and hence there will be non-finality. And because it has a beginning, there is no abandonment of the beginninglessness of Saṃsâra or mundane existence.—66.

Bhâṣya :—But granted that Ahaṃkâra is the cause of all the rest: but what, pray, our opponent may ask, is the cause of Ahaṃkâra? To this, the author replies:

Just as, in the case of creation, etc., manifestation of karma, action or change, causing agitation in Prakṛiti, takes place merely through a particular time, inasmuch as, in the supposition of another karma or action as being the cause of the development of the preceding one, non-finality is entailed, very similarly is Ahaṃkâra produced just from time merely as the Nimitta or concomitant cause, but not that there exists another cause of it also: thus there is equality between us. Such is the meaning.

Neither can it be said, in the opinion of those who admit an Îśvara, that the manifestation of effects also is caused by Îśvara himself, inasmuch as it would entail partiality and want of compassion on the part of Îśvara. For, it is just by means of their being dependent upon karma that partiality etc., on the part of Îśvara, are to be avoided by those who admit an Îśvara. If, then, Îśvara himself is to superintend karma, then partiality, etc., will certainly be entailed. Such is the import.—65.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—As in the case of the Udbhûti or production of that of which there is no visible creator, *e.g.*, earth, sprout, etc., there is (in the case in question) the sameness of the absence of an intelligent cause. For, as in the case of the earth, sprout, etc., there is no intelligent creator, because there is no knowledge of it, similarly in the case of the Tan-mâtras also.

Other functions of the supposed Îśvara *accounted for.*

महतोऽन्यत् ॥ ६ । ६६ ॥

महतः Mahataḥ, of Mahat. अन्यत् Anyat, another (Aniruddha); the rest (Vijñâna)

66. Of Mahat, (the cause is) something else (than Ahaṃkâra.)—Aniruddha. From Mahat is the rest.—Vijñâna.—522.

Vṛitti :—While Ahaṃkâra is the cause, does it, it may be asked, possess causality towards Mahat also? To this, the author replies:

The cause of one thing cannot be its effect.—66.

Bhâṣya :—What is other than the effect of Ahaṃkâra, *viz.*, creation, etc.,—that is, preservation, inner rulership, etc.,—that arises from the Principle Mahat itself; because, by reason of absence of the cause of

Abhimâna or conceit, and the like, on account of its being constituted by pure Sattva, the spring of its activity is only benevolence towards others, and also because it possesses exceeding knowledge, power, and lordliness. Such is the meaning.

And by this aphorism it is established that the character of Viṣṇu as the Preserver of the Universe is due to the Principle Mahat as his Upâdhi or adjunct. While, because the Principle Mahat is His Upâdhi, Viṣṇu is sung as the Great, the Supreme Lord, and Brahmâ. So has it been said :

यदाहुः वासुदेवाख्यं चित्तं तन्महदात्मकम् ॥

What they declare to be the Chitta or mind called Vâsudeva, *i.e.*, (Viṣṇu), that consists of Mahat.—Śrîmad-Bhâgavatam, III. xvi. 21.

In this (Sâṃkhya) Śâstra, the Causal Brahman is, however, intended to be nothing but the genus of Puruṣa free from the Guṇas, inasmuch as there is non-admission of Îśvara. Therein the word, cause, either refers to the Upâdhi in the shape of its own power or energy, *viz.*, Prakṛiti, or refers to Nimitta or instrumental or concomitant causality, since the end of Puruṣa is the cause of moving Prakṛiti to activity.—66.

In any case, the relation of Prakṛiti *and* Puruṣa *is from eternity.*

कर्मनिमित्तः प्रकृतेः स्वस्वामिभावोऽप्यनादिः
बीजाङ्कुरवत् ॥ ६ । ६७ ॥

कर्मनिमित्तः Karma-nimittaḥ, of which Karma or Desert is the nimitta or instrumental cause. प्रकृतेः Prakṛiteḥ, of Prakṛiti. स्वस्वामिभावः Sva-Svâmi-bhâvaḥ, the relation of the thing owned and the owner thereof. अपि Api, also. अनादिः Anâdiḥ, beginningless. बीजाङ्कुरवत् Bîja-aṅkura-vat, as in the case of the seed and the sprout.

67. The relation of the owned and the owner, in the case of Prakṛiti (with Puruṣa), even though it be due to the instrumentality of Karma or Desert, is without beginning, as in the case of the seed and the sprout.—523.

Vṛitti :—The thing owned is Prakṛiti, the owner is Puruṣa. Is the relation between them, it may be asked, natural, or is it due to the instrumentality of something else ? If it be natural, then, since nature never departs, there will be non-release. In regard to this, the author says:

" Of Prakṛiti ",—this is an illustration : of Puruṣa,—this also is to be observed.

And if Karma is the cause of the relation of the owned and the owner, on the exhaustion of Karma through Discrimination, from the absence of the relation of the owned and the owner, there will be Release.

By means of what is non-eternal being with a beginning, there is no avoidance of beginninglessness in the case of what is eternal also: hence "Beginningless",—this has been stated.—67.

Bhâṣya :—In places it has been stated that, for the sake of the owner, the activity of Prakṛiti arises quite spontaneously. Herein the relation of the owned and the owner is the relation of the experienced and the experiencer. And that, one may say, does not exist prior to the activity of Prakṛiti.

The author removes this apprehension.

According to what class of the Sâṃkhyas, of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, the relation of the owned and the owner, that is, the relation of the experienceable and the experiencer, is due to the instrumentality of Karma or Desert, in their opinion also, that relation is, in the form of a continuous stream, indeed, without a beginning, as in the case of the seed and the sprout, because it is borne out by evidence. Such is the meaning. For, if it be an accidental or chance relation, the bondage over again of the released one also will be entailed.—67.

A Second View of the Case.

अविवेकनिमित्तो वा पञ्चशिखः ॥ ६ । ६८ ॥

अविवेकनिमित्तः A-viveka-nimittaḥ, due to the instrumentality of Non-Discrimination. वा Vâ, or. पञ्चशिखः Pañchaśikhaḥ, Pañchaśikha, the celebrated Sâṃkhya teacher.

68. Or, (it is the same if the relation of the owned and the owner) be, as says Pañchaśikha, due to the instrumentality of Non-Discrimination.—524.

Vṛitti :—The author states another view.

"The relation of the owned and the owner",—this follows (from the preceding aphorism).—68.

Bhâṣya :—This beginninglessness is, says the author, the same even in the doctrine of (the relation of the owned and the owner) being due to the instrumentality of Non-Discrimination.

Pañchaśikha says: Or the relation of the owned and the owner is caused by Non-Discrimination as the nimitta or instrumental cause. In

that doctrine also the relation is without a beginning. Such is the meaning.

It is this very doctrine which is the author's own, because it has already been declared by him.

And Non-Discrimination, just like Karma or Desert, persists, in Pralaya or Dissolution also, in the form of Vâsanâ or Tendency.

In the doctrine, on the other hand, that Non-Discrimination is the antecedent non-existence of Discrimination, beginninglessness, as in the case of the seed and the sprout, is not possible; because it is the undivided (akhaṇḍa) antecedent non-existence alone that is the Hetu or cause of all experience whatever.—68.

A Third View of the Matter.

लिङ्गशरीरनिमित्तक इति सनन्दनाचार्यः ॥ ६ । ६९ ॥

लिङ्गशरीरनिमित्तकः Liṅga-śarîra-nimittakaḥ, due to the instrumentality of the Liṅga Śarîra or Subtle Body. इति Iti, thus. सनन्दनाचार्यः Sanandana Âchâryaḥ, the teacher Sanandana.

69. (The relation of the owned and the owner, between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa is) due to the instrumentality of the Subtle Body,—thus holds Âchârya Sanandana.—525.

Vṛitti:—The author states the doctrine of a branch (of the Sâṃkhya School).

Because it undergoes transmigration (layana), therefore, it is called the Liṅga; it is the Subtle, Vehicular Body.

So long there is the going of the Subtle Body into the Gross Body, so long, there being the relation of the owned and the owner (between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa Puruṣa), is said to be bound.—69.

Bhâṣya:—Professor Sanandana, on the other hand, says that the relation of the owned and the owner, between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, that is, their relation of the experienceable and the experiencer, is due to the Liṅga Śarîra as the instrumental cause thereof, because it is by means of the Liṅga Śarîra itself that Experience takes place.

In his doctrine also, that (relation) is without a beginning. Such is the meaning.

Although the Liṅga Śarîra does not exist in the state of Pralaya or Dissolution, yet there exists the cause thereof, *viz.*, Non-Discrimination Karma, etc., produced by the Liṅga Śarîra belonging to a previous

Creation. By means thereof is the similarity of the relation of the owned and the owner and the Liṅga Śarîra to the seed and the sprout. Such is the intention.—69.

Conclusion.

यद्वा तद्वा तदुच्छित्तिः पुरुषार्थस्तदुच्छित्तिः पुरुषार्थः ॥६।७०॥

यत् Yat, what. वा Vâ, or. तत् Tat, that. वा Vâ, or. तदुच्छित्तिः Tat-uchchhittiḥ, eradication or uprooting thereof, *i.e.*, of the relation. पुरुषार्थः Puruṣa-arthaḥ, the end of Puruṣa.

70. Be that either this way or that way, the uprooting thereof is the end of Puruṣa,—the uprooting thereof is the end of Puruṣa.—526.

Vṛitti :—The author states his own opinion.

"Be that either this way or that way": whether it be through exhaustion of Karma or Desert, or through Knowledge, or through anything else; the cutting short of Saṃsâra, by means of the uprooting of the relation of the owned and the owner, is the end of Puruṣa.

"The uprooting thereof is the end of Puruṣa",– the repetition of this is to indicate the close of the Book.

This tenet of "Existent Effect," which was indeed previously ascertained, was to be established according to the Tantra or the Principle of Re-capitulation; hence it will not count as a tautology.—70.

Here ends the Sixth Book in the Vṛitti to the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram of Kapila.

And this treatise is here completed.

By the wise Aniruddha has been composed the Vṛitti of the Sâṃkhya-Sûtram for the discrimination of the Sattva of the sluggish or dull and also for the Release of the Self.

Bhâṣya :—The author sums up the sense of the teachings of the Śâstra.

Whether the relation of the experienceable and the experiencer, between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, be due to the instrumentality of Karma or Desert, or be due to the instrumentality of Non-Discrimination, etc., the uprooting of this which is by all means difficult to uproot, by reason of its being without a beginning, is the supreme end of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning. This, the same, was premised in the beginning: "Permanent Prevention of the threefold Pain is the Supreme Purpose of Life" (I. 1.)

But then, may say our opponent, here the cessation of experience, equally of pleasure and pain, is said to be the end of Puruṣa, whereas there the cessation of mere pain is said to be the end of Puruṣa: how then is here the conclusion of what was stated there? We reply that it is not so; because, even if there is a difference of language, there is no difference of sense. For, pleasure is verily thrown to the side of pain: hence experience of pleasure is the very same as the experience of pain: the experience of pain also is nothing but the connection of pain with Puruṣa in the form of a reflection: and by reason of the fact that the Self is of itself eternally free from the association of pain as an attribute, in the first aphorism also is intended the cessation of pain just in the form of a reflection: hence there is one and the same sense in the opening and concluding aphorisms.

The twice repetition of the greater portion of the aphorism is for the purpose of showing the close of the treatise.

In the Sixth Book, called the Tantra, has been made the elaboration of the principal teachings of the Sâstra which were not mentioned by the ancients, and afterwards the sense of the treatise also has been summed up.

This the same Sâṃkhya Śâstra was promulgated by the Lord Viṣṇu, in the form of Kapila, for the benefit of the world. In regard to this, what a certain so-called Vedântin says, namely, that Kapila, the author of the Sâṃkhya, is not Viṣṇu, but is a different Kapila who was an incarnation of Agni; since there is the Smṛiti:

अग्निः स कपिलो नाम सांख्यशास्त्रप्रवर्तकः

He is Agni, by name Kapila, who is the promulgator of the Sâṃkhya Śâstra.—*Mahâbhâratam*,

that is merely an illusion caused to mankind, inasmuch as we learn from such Smṛitis as:

एतन्मे जन्म लोकेऽस्मिन्मुमुक्षूणां दुराशयात् ।
प्रसंख्यानाय तत्त्वानां सम्मतायात्मदर्शने ॥

This My birth in this world is for the sake of a complete exhibition of the Tattvas or Principles, as approved in the Philosophy of the Self, to those who crave for release from a painful state.—*Śrîmad-Bhâgavatam*, III. xiv. 36.,

that it is the son of Devahûti, the incarnation of Viṣṇu, that is the teacher of the Sâṃkhya, and also because the supposition of two Kapilas is redundant. And in the above passage of the Mahâbhâratam, the word, Agni,

has been used simply because of the appearance or influence of the power called Agni ; just as, *e.g.*, in the saying of Srî Kṛiṣṇa :

कालोऽस्मि लोकक्षयकृत् प्रवृद्धः

I am Kâla, the destroyer of worlds, aroused.—*Gîtâ*, XI. 32.,

has been employed the word, Kâla, simply because of the appearance of the power of Kâla ; since, otherwise, there will be entailed the difference of Kṛiṣṇa, as the Manifestor of the Universal Form, from Kṛiṣṇa, as the incarnation of Viṣṇu. Such is the hint.—70.

Having filled up, to overflow, the receptacle of the Sâṃkhya with the nectar churned from the Vedânta, the Ṛiṣi Kapila entertained, in days of yore, other Ṛiṣis, at the Sacrifice of Knowledge.

By means of faith in his words, through constant devotion to that Guru, with the help of a drop of his grace, that Śâstra, in this form, has been expounded by me.

Here ends the Sixth Book, called the Book of Tantra, in the Commentary, composed by Vijñâna Bhikṣu, on the Sâṃkhya-Pravachanam of Kapila.

Thus is complete the Commentary on the Sâṃkhya-Pravachanam.

APPENDIX I.

INDEX OF APHORISMS.

Alphabetical Index of the Aphorisms.

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APPENDIX IV.

A CATALOGUE OF SOME OF THE IMPORTANT WORKS ON THE SÂMKHYA.

A CATALOGUE OF SOME OF THE IMPORTANT WORKS ON THE SÂMKHYA.

A List of Recognised Text-Books of the Sâṃkhya School (Taken from Fitz-Edward Hall's Collection).

1. Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram attributed to Ṛisi Kapila.
2. Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtra-Vṛitti by Aniruddha.
3. Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtra-Vṛitti-Sârah by Mahâdeva Sarasvati, more commonly known as Vedântin Mahâdeva.
4. Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Bhâṣyam by Vijñâna Bhikṣu.
5. Laghu-Sâṃkhya-Sûtra-Vṛitti by Nâgoji Bhatta or Nâgeśa Bhatta, surnamed as Upâdhyâya.
6. Tattva-Samâsaḥ, attributed to Ṛisi Kapila.
7. Sâṃkhya-Taraṅgaḥ, a Commentary on No. 1, by Viśveśvaradatta Miśra, ascetically called Deva Tîrtha.
8. Sarvopakâriṇî, a Commentary on No. 6. Author is not known.
9. Sâṃkhya-Sûtra-Vivaraṇam, ditto. ditto.
10. Sâṃkhya-Krama-Dîpikâ, also called Sâṃkhyalaṅkaraḥ and Sâṃkhya-Sûtra-Prakṣepikâ, ditto. ditto.
11. Tattva-Yâthârthya-Dîpanam, ditto, by Bhâvâ Ganeśa Dîkṣita.
12. Tattva-Samâsa-Vyâkhyâ, by Kṣemânanda.
13. Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, also called Saptatih, by Îśvara Kṛiṣṇa.
14. Sâṃkhya-Karikâ-Bhâṣyam, by Gauḍapâda.
15. Sâṃkhya-Tattva-Kaumudî, shortly called Tattva-Kaumudî, by Vâchaspati Miśra.
16. An exposition of No. 14, by Yati Bhâratî.
17. Tattvârnavaḥ, otherwise called Tattvâmṛita-Prakṣini, a Commentary on No. 14, by Râghavânanda Sarasvatî.
18. Tattva-Chandraḥ, ditto, by Nârâyaṇa Tîrtha Yati.
19. Kaumudî-Prabhâ, ditto, by Svapneśvara.
20. Sâṃkhya-Tattva-Vilâsaḥ, also called Sâṃkhya-Vṛitti-Prakâśaḥ and Sâṃkhyârtha-Sâṃkhyâyikâ, by Raghunâtha Tarka Vâgiśa Bhaṭṭâchârya.
21. Sâṃkhya-Chandrikâ, a Commentary on No. 12, by Nârâyaṇa Tîrtha.
22. Sâṃkhya-Sâra-Vivekaḥ, by Vijñâna Bhikṣu.
23. Sâṃkhya-Tattva-Pradîpaḥ, by Kavirâja Yati or Kavirâja Bhikṣu.
24. Sâṃkhyârtha-Tattva-Pradîpikâ, by Bhatta Keśava.
25. Sâṃkhya-Tattva-Vibhâkaraḥ, perhaps by Vansîdhara.
26. Sâṃkhya-Kaumudî, by Râmkṛiṣṇa Bhaṭṭâchârya.
27. Râja-Vârtikam, attributed to Raṇaraṅga Malla, king of Dhârâ.

APPENDIX V.

TATTVA-SAMÂSA OR KÂPILA-SÚTRAM.

KÂPILA-SÛTRAM

(TATTVA-SAMÂSA)

WITH

NARENDRA'S COMMENTARY.

COMMENTATOR'S INTRODUCTION.

Aum

SALUTATION TO THE SUPREME SELF.

I compose this Commentary on the Aphorisms of Kapila, after making obeisance to Him, the Lord of infinite bliss, Whom the mind of thoughtful men reaches by thinking in deep meditation, as well as to Kapila, that Seer of ancient fame.

Now, verily, in this world, all beings, endowed with life, desire, "May there be no pain, may there be pleasure for me," and, thus, production of pleasure and avoidance of pain are the two things always desired by them. For there can be no feeling of pleasure without the disappearance of pain, inasmuch as, possessing contradictory properties as they do, they, like darkness and light, cannot exist at one and the same time. If pain had no existence in the Saṃsâra, stream of transmigration,—the world-process—then nobody would care to find out the means of its removal. But if it does exist there, care must be taken in respect of the remedy of the threefold afflictions; for, it is the cessation of the threefold afflictions that is the supreme object of desire.

[illegible] derived from the Śâstra is the only means for that, [illegible] no other such means, because knowledge imparted in the Śâstra desired to be composed, *i.e.*, Kapila-Sûtram, is the cause of discrimination,—so concluded in his mind Âchârya Pañchaśikha of great powers. He went through the vast field of Vedic literature according to the rules of study, such as "The Vedas should be studied," etc., and gathered that the Self had to be discriminated from Prakriti or the First Cause, such discrimination being capable of yielding the final result, (*i.e.*, Release). Accordingly he approached the great Seer Kapila who, in his intrinsic form, was Nârâyaṇa Himself.

Thereupon Kapila, whose mind has been purified by the consideration of the Real and the Unreal, with a view to demonstrate the Avoidable, (*i. e.*, pain), through the removal of false knowledge, by means of this collection of twenty-two aphorisms, briefly proposes the beginning of the Śâstra, for the illumination of the disciple.

The Sâṃkhya (-Pravachana-Sûtram), consisting of six books, of which the first aphorism is, Final cessation of the threefold pain is the supreme object of desire, appears, it is said, to be a repetition or reproduction of what is taught in this Śâstra, inasmuch as brevity in speech should be the characteristic of Kapila who is spoken of in the Veda and who was master of meditation. Thus there is the Śruti :

ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्बिभर्ति जायमानञ्च पश्येत् ।

(Who at first nourishes the Seer Kapila, when brought forth, with knowledge, and also looks upon him as he is brought forth.)

This is true; for, their subject-matter being the same, the present one was taught as an elementary course, while the object of both the Śâstras is the ascertainment of the Principle of the Self.

Kapila's system is called the Sâṃkhya, because the word Sâṃkhya conveys a technical or singular sense derived from its etymology. Thus there is the authority of the Mahâbhârata (Śânti Parvan) :

संख्यां प्रकुर्वते चैव प्रकृतिं च प्रचक्षते ।
तत्त्वानि च चतुर्विंशत् तेन सांख्याः प्रकीर्तिताः ॥

[They are called Sâṃkhyas, because they cause illumination (of the nature of the Self), and declare Prakṛiti or the First Cause and the twenty-four Principles].

What, then, is that Śâstra ?

अथातस्तत्त्वे समासः ॥ १ ॥

अथ Atha, now, denotes undertaking and refers to the subject-matter. अतः Atah, therefore, gives the reason why cultivation of knowledge is required. तत्त्वे Tattve, of truths, principles. समासः Samâsah, collection, compendium.

1. Now, therefore, a Compendium of Principles (is wanted).—1.

"Atha signifies a good omen, enquiry, inception of an act, sequence, undertaking, promise, substitution, etc." Although so many different meanings of the word Atha are observed, yet it is here taken in the sense of an undertaking, the other senses being inappropriate. It may be rightly urged that, at the commencement of a book, the

observance of a good omen is indispensable, as, without the observance of a good omen, the completion of the book cannot be expected. But we believe that the sense of a good omen is obtained here from the mere recital of the word, Atha, which drives away all possible hindrances. Hence there is no violation of the practice of the polite. Atha, therefore, denotes undertaking. The word, Atah, conveys the sense of cause or reason. The meaning is, because the fruit of action does not endure, as declared by the following and other Śrutis :

यथेह कर्मजितो लोकः क्षीयते एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यजितो लोकः क्षीयते ।

(As here the world conquered by action wears away, so there also the world conquered by virtue wears away.)

The word, tattva, bears the sense of reality as demonstrated in the Veda. Samâsah means throwing in together or collection, *i.e.*, compendium or abridgment. Tattve (locative) samâsah has been used for tattavasya (genitive) samâsah, a short account *of* the Principles. The expression, "should be understood," is the complement of the aphorism.—1.

In order to throw light on those Principles, the author lays down the aphorism :

कथयामि अष्टौ प्रकृतयः ॥ २ ॥

कथयामि Kathayâmi, declare, describe. अष्टौ Aṣṭau, eight. प्रकृतयः Prakṛitayaḥ, Prakṛitis, natures, roots, radicals, originals, evolvents, first causes.

2. (I) describe or declare (the *Prakṛitis*). (There are) eight *Prakṛitis*.—2.

There is a stop after Kathayâmi. The meaning is that the author is declaring the Prakṛitis one by one. What is the designate of the word, Prakṛiti? What, again, are the kinds of Prakṛiti? And how many (are the Prakṛitis)? Prakṛiti (derived from pra-kṛi-kti, in the sense that) it multiplies, modifies, procreates, means procreatrix, that which brings forth. It is two-fold : pure and mixed. Pure Prakṛiti is one, being the state of equilibrium, or neutral state, of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, the sentient, mutative, and conservative Principles, or the Principles of Illumination, Evolution, and Involution; it is Unmanifest, Principal, Insentient, and the Cause of the World. By means of their unequilibrated, disengaged, or perturbed states (arise) the Principles of Mahat, Ahaṃkâra, and the five Tan-mâtras, (collectively) called Prakṛiti-vikṛiti or mother-principles as well as products or transformations. The mixed Prakṛitis, therefore, are seven. These are the eight Prakṛitis. Cf.

प्रकृतेर्महान्, महतोऽहंकारः, अहंकारात् पञ्च तन्मात्राणि ॥

(Mahat springs from Prakṛiti ; from Mahat, Ahaṃkâra ; from Ahaṃkâra, the five Tan-mâtras.)—(Samkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram I. 61).

What is the nature of Mahat? It is a species of Buddhi or Understanding. Ahaṃkâra, on the other hand, is the Principle underlying such conduct as "I do." The five Tan-mâtras also are the five species of sound, touch, form or colour, taste or flavour, and smell.

But how can there be production from an insentient cause? For no production can take place in the absence of a sentient agent, as, for example, the water-pot will not be produced where there is no sentient agent at work. This may be rightly contended, except that productive power is observed in insentient things also, as, *e. g.*, even insentient milk causes the growth of the baby. In like manner, insentient cow-dung, etc., give birth to insects. Similarly. If it is rejoined that, in the case of milk and cow-dung, the power of production comes from the sentient principle presiding over the bodies of the mother and the cow, we reply that this is not well said. How can the perception of sentiency in the bodies of the cow and the mother be continued as the perception of sentiency in the milk and cow-dung expurgated by them? At no time is sentiency perceived in them as they are being ejected. Or, it may be understood in this way that as the loadstone, which is unconnected with sentiency, is found to possess the power of causing vibration of particles in other bodies by means of its mere proximity to them, so do sentient effects everywhere follow from insentient causes.—2.

After declaring Prakṛiti, the author lays down the following aphorism, with the object of reciting the Transformations :

षोडशकस्तु विकारः ॥ ३ ॥

षोडशकः Ṣoḍaśakaḥ, sixteenfold. तु Tu, only. विकारः : Vikâraḥ, transformation, modification, evolute, product.

3. Transformation is numerically sixteen only.—3.

Transformation is sixteen in number. The word, tu, is used to show that the enumeration is exhaustive. Now, what are the sixteen Transformations? The sixteen Transformations are the five elements, *viz.*, Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Ether ; the five Energies of Action, locally named as the voice, hand, leg, anus, and organ of [illegible]on ; the five Energies or Faculties of Perception, located in the [illegible]ye, tongue, and nose ; and Manas, Intellect. But why should Earth, etc., which enter into the production of the water-pot, and the like, as material causes, be characterised as Transformations only, when, like the five Tan-mâtras,

they embrace the nature of both Prakṛiti and Vikâra? This objection cannot be allowed, as, in that case, the result would be infinite regression in this way that curd is the tranformation of milk, cream is the transformation of curd, bad smell is the transformation of cream, and so on. Moreover, the objects, water-pot, cloth, etc., are not different from Earth, etc., as is found in the Śruti:

वाचारम्भणं विकारः नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ॥

(Transformation, such as a pot, a plate, a cup, etc., is a name, the creation of speech, while, in reality, it is nothing but clay).—Chh. Up., VI, i. 4. Hereby it is understood that water-pot, milk, sprout, etc., are not different objects from earth, animal, seed, etc., since perceptual cognition arises in the same form in both the cases.—3.

Motion in a chariot and the like, which are insentient, arises from their conjunction with horses. In like manner, the perception of sentiency in objects is everywhere due to their relation to a sentient object. Intending to teach this, the author says:

पुरुषः ॥ ४ ॥

पुरुषः Puruṣaḥ, Person, Spirit, Self, In-dweller.

4. (There is one) in-dwelling Self (in every object appearing as sentient).—4.

He who lies (śete) within the body, like one within a room (purī), is Puruṣa, by conjunction with whom everything appears to possess sentiency. He is the Enjoyer, stainless, eternal, and unproductive. So say the Śrutis, *e. g.*:—

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो ज्योतिरिवाधूमकः ।
ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य स एवाद्य स उ श्व एतद् वै तत् ॥

(The Puruṣa, of the measure of the thumb, 'smokeless' like light, the Lord of the past and the future; He is the very same to-day and will remain so the next day; this is that)—Kaṭha Upaniṣat, II. iv. 13.

अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययम् ।

[(He) p[illegible] no sound, gives no touch, possesses no form, and is immutable.]

Now, here the question may be raised whether there is only one Puruṣa, or whether there are many Puruṣas. Let us see how the two theories stand.

Objection to the first theory :—It is not tenable, as, there being unity of the Puruṣa, on the death of one, all would die, and so on, and that thereby creation would suddenly vanish out of existence.

Answer :—Still there may be unity of the Puruṣa since he is capable of manifold divisions, according to variety of upâdhis or external limitations, like (portions of) space confined within a water-pot and a temple and known as Ghaṭa (water-pot)-Âkâśa (space) and Maṭha (temple)-Âkâśa.

Objection :—Even if the accidental manifoldness of the Puruṣa be conceded, it would still entail the disappearance of the world (Saṃsâra) in course of time, as, the Śruti teaches, Release is attained on the destruction of the upâdhi by knowledge of truth. For, a thing which is not capable of growth, cannot be lasting, in the same way, for example, as immeasurable masses of wealth, belonging to a charitable person, will be spent up in no time, if there be no fresh source of income.

Answer :—This is not a sound objection. The body of the son, produced from the mother and the father, being made up of parts of their bodies, what is there to prevent, in the son, etc., the inflow of the parts of the Puruṣas seated within the parental bodies as well as of the part of their Vâsanâ or the tendency of their nature? For, living beings do not spring into existence as not embodying parts of the bodies of their parents. Consequently, sentiency of the same kind as exists in the causes, is perceived in the effects, as, for example, pieces of cloth are perceived to be red or yellow, because the threads which are their material causes, have conjunction with red or yellow colour. In the Mahâbhârata we find :—

कलेरंशश्च संजज्ञे भुवि दुर्योधनो नृप ।

(And a part of Kali, O king, was born on earth as Duryodhana.)—Also in the Veda :

आत्मा वै जायते पुत्रः

(Verily the Self is born as the son).

Thus the one unborn Puruṣa becomes multiplied to infinity as emanations from successive parents. Amongst them, some undergo transmigration, and some are released.

Objection :—Such a view cannot find favour with those who know the traditions of the School, as it is in contradiction with the Sâṃkhya conception of the Puruṣa as undergoing no transformation at all.

Hence the second theory should be accepted, namely, that there are many Puruṣas, there being diversity of pleasures, pains, births, deaths, etc., as well as variety of virtuous lives such as Varṇa, castes, Âśrama, stages of life, etc. It cannot be said that in this theory also there will be an

end of the world, since such a conclusion is contravened by the infinity and eternality of the Puruṣa.

These are the twenty-five principles maintained by the Sâṃkhya teachers.

Now, why should not the Puruṣa, it may be asked, have a beginning or birth? We reply that the Puruṣa is unborn, because, there being the Vâsanâ or tendency towards transmigration, the beginning of which is not known, the Vedas had no occasion to believe in repeated births and deaths of the Puruṣa, as repeated windings and turnings are required in the case of the clock and the potter's wheel. For, there is the Śruti:

संवत्सरो वै प्रजापतिस्तस्यायने दक्षिणञ्चोत्तरञ्च तत् वेह वै तदिष्टापूर्त्ते कृत इत्युपासते ते चान्द्रमसमेव लोकमभिजयन्ते त एव पुनरावर्त्तन्ते तस्मादेत ऋषयः प्रजाकामाः दक्षिणं प्रतिपद्यन्ते एष भूर्वै रयि पितृयान अथोत्तरेण तपसा ब्रह्मचर्येण श्रद्धया विद्यया ज्ञानमन्विष्याद्दित्यभिजायन्ते ॥

(The whole year is verily the Lord of Beings. It consists of two Paths, the southern and the northern. Those who worship by means of sacrifices and benevolent deeds, surely ascend to the World of the Moon. It is they that return into transmigratory existence. So the Ṛiṣis, desirous of progeny, take to the Southern Path. This is Bhuḥ, this is Rayi, this is the Path of the Pitṛis. Again, by the Northern Path, by penance, by continence, by faith, by reason, one should search for knowledge. For these they are born.)—4.

After declaring the twenty-five Principles, the author now analyses the subsidiary states:

त्रैगुण्यम् ॥ ५ ॥

त्रैगुण्यम् Traiguṇyam, tri-qualified-ness.

5. Prakṛiti has three modes, manifestations, or states. —5.

Traiguṇyam means the essential form, essence, or (unmanifested) existence, of the three Guṇas, modes or states, namely, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas Herefrom it is learnt that Traiguṇyam or Prakṛiti is Pradhâṇam, *i. e.*, the Principal or Primary (as distinguished from the Guṇas which are, as their name probably implies, Secondary or Subsidiary), and is the existence of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas in their intrinsic or essential form and in equilibrium, apart from the state of their predominance over one

another. If it be asked, what the reason for this interpretation is, we reply that it is so taught in the Veda. Thus:

अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां स्वरूपाः ।
अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥

[The One Unborn (Puruṣa), for enjoyment, consorts with the One Unborn (Prakṛiti), having the colours of red, white, and black, the procreatrix of manifold progeny, like unto herself. The other Unborn deserts her, after she is enjoyed.]—Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat, IV. 5.

There is connection of the unattached, sentient Puruṣa with these modes, or subsidiary states, inherent in their material cause (Prakṛiti), and this connection takes place through mere proximity, as in the case of a lamp and darkness.

Objection:—But how can connection of states or modes, be possible in the case of the material cause of the world, which contains no parts? In the world, blue and other attributes are observed in the lotus and the like, which are made up of parts. But nowhere is found connection of attributes in things which contain no parts.

Answer:—This is true. But we may point out that super-ordinary things, made known by the Vedas, do not possess merely the same power as do ordinary things, since objects, proved in the Vedas, are capable of everything. Or, we may say, if white and other attributes may be admitted in the case of part-less, popular entities, namely, ultimate atoms, then the anomaly in the case of the all-powerful (material) cause of the world is really an adornment —5.

After stating Sattva, and the other modes or states, of Prakṛiti, the author lays down the following aphorism, with the desire of declaring their properties also:

सञ्चरः प्रतिसञ्चरः ॥ ६ ॥

सञ्चरः Sañcharaḥ, production, appearance. प्रतिसञ्चरः Prati-sañcharaḥ, destruction, disappearance.

6. Entities spring from the eight Prakṛitis, and disappear into them.—6.

The meaning of the word, Sañchara, is production, and of the word, Prati-sañchara, dissolution. It is learnt from the Veda that production is from the eight Prakṛitis, and that dissolution is into them. How? Because, as, in the Veda itself:—

प्रकृतेर्महान्, महतोऽहंकारः, अहंकारात् पञ्च तन्मात्राण्यभिजायन्ते ।

from Prakṛiti, Mahat; from Mahat, Ahaṃkâra; and from Ahaṃkâra, the five Tan-mâtras are produced, so the five Tan-mâtras are dissolved into Ahaṃkâra, Ahaṃkâra into Mahat, and Mahat into Prakṛiti. As a tortoise sometimes extends and sometimes withdraws its limbs, and, similarly, as a spider itself spins out and withdraws its thread, in like manner the Prakṛitis also work in the order of evolution and involution.—6.

Since these Predicables of the Sâṃkhya System possess the characteristics of pleasure and pain, the author now describes the nature of Pleasure and Pain:

अध्यात्ममधिभूतमधिदैवञ्च ॥ ७ ॥

अध्यात्मम् Adhi-âtmam, adhyâtma, springing from the embodiment of the self. अधिभूतम् Adhi-bhûtam, adhibhûta, caused by elemental creation. अधिदैवम् Adhi-daivam, adhidaiva, caused by celestial beings, super-human agencies

7. Pain is threefold: adhyâtma, adhibhûta, and adhidaiva.—7.

In the world of living entities, none is known to be free from the three-fold suffering. Why? Because they are subject to three kinds of pain. What, then, are those three kinds of pain? To this it is replied. अध्यात्ममधिभूतमधिदैवञ्च Adhyâtmam means that (pain) which is *adhi*, relative, *âtmani*, to (the embodied state of) the self. It is twofold: bodily and mental. Bodily (pain) is occasioned by disorders of wind, bile, and phlegm within the physical organism. Mental (pain) is occasioned by desire, anger, lust, bewilderment, fear, sadness, envy, and non-attainment of the object of desire. All this should be regarded as adhyâtma pain, because they are produced from within, (that is, from the person himself). Adhibhûtam is that (pain) which is *adhi*, relative, *bhûtam*, to the elements, that is, occasioned by men, beasts, birds, reptiles, and immovable things. Adhidaivam is that (pain) which is *adhi*, relative, *daivam*, to celestial agencies, that is, occasioned by the influence of planetary powers, Vinâyaka, Yakṣa, Râkṣasa, and the like.

The import of the aphorism is that Prakṛiti, the Prakṛiti-and-Vikâras, and the Vikâras (mentioned above) have identity of nature with these threefold pains.

There are many easy means of exterminating them. Thus, for the cure of bodily pain, such an easy means as arborial elixir has been prescribed by the physicians. To counteract the torments of the mind, there are such pleasant and easily applicable remedies as a splendid

palace, woman, excellent dishes, ornaments, and so forth. In like manner, for the prevention of elemental pain, thorough mastery of polity or the science and art of civic life, is the means. Similarly, again, for the removal of adhidaiva pain, use of jewels and incantations is the means.

(*Objection*:—When pain is remediable by these quite ordinary means, where, then, is the necessity for this Śâstra which purports to teach discrimination of the Puruṣa from Prakṛiti as the means for the termination of pain?)

Answer:—There are no doubt all these means, but still, it should be observed, absolute or permanent cessation of pains is not possible by them, there still remaining the possibility of the re-appearance of those pains, time after time.—7.

Being desirous of pointing out the general characteristic of Buddhi or understanding, the author frames the aphorism:

पञ्चाभिबुद्धयः ॥ ८ ॥

पञ्च Pañcha, five. अभिबुद्धयः Abhi-buddhayaḥ, cognitive faculties or powers.

8. The Cognitive Powers are five—8.

Abhibuddhayaḥ means that by which objects are known. How many are they? Five. Which, again, are they? The three inner senses, the power of perception, and the power of action. Buddhi, Ahaṃkâra, and Manas are the inner senses. Adhyavasâya, certainty, is the characteristic of Buddhi, Understanding (another word for Mahat): Abhimâna, undue application of the Self (*e. g.*, to think that the Self is the agent in all acts, which, however, is not a fact), or Self-assumption, is of Ahaṃkâra, Egoity; and Saṃkalpa, ideation (or conception), and Vikalpa, imagination, are of Manas, Intellect. The Powers of Perception are, according to the differences of the acts of seeing, etc., respectively (localised in) the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin. Their sub-divisions are five. The Powers of Action, again, are, as, according to the differences of the acts of speaking, etc., respectively (localised in) the vocal organ, hand, leg, anus, and the organ of generation, five in number. Taking them all together, with their sub-divisions, we find, Karaṇa, sense or the instrument of knowledge, is of thirteen kinds. Hence, in this world, consisting of births and deaths in continuous succession the beginning of which is enveloped in darkness, every object being knowable, these Powers of Knowledge are maintainable.

Some are, however, of opinion that, amongst the inner senses, Manas is not a sense or power or faculty of knowing. But this is not a sound

opinion, because, as in the case of a ball of iron, the (external) senses are found to have, with regard to their respective objects, identity of nature with Manas, the ruler of all the senses. The sense-ness of *Buddhi* and Ahaṃkâra is hereby explained, inasmuch as there is such perceptual knowledge as "I shall go," "I am happy," etc. For, there could not be such perceptual knowledge, did not Buddhi, etc., possess the characteristic of senses.

Objection :—But, in your theory, even when you admit the (co-) extensiveness of all the predicables, diversity of Buddhi, etc., according to diversity of Puruṣa, is not justified. Why? Because there is certainty of their (ultimate) unity or homogeneity.

Answer :—True, but your objection is futile. For, we admit (diverse) Buddhi, etc., as undergoing change or transformation (at every moment), and taking their origin and form from the (peculiar) Vâsanâ or tendency (of each individual embodied Self). By reason of this Vâsanâ or tendency the senses attend to, or turn away from, particular objects.—8.

(An objection is apprehended :) This may be the case. But whence is this invention of Vâsanâ? With this apprehension, the author says:

पञ्च कर्मयोनयः ॥ ९ ॥

पञ्च Pañcha, five. कर्मयोनयः Karma-yonayaḥ, action-borns, the products of action, the functions of Buddhi, Understanding or Consciousness.

9. The products of action are five—9.

Karmayonayaḥ means things of which karma, action, alone is yoni, the source or origin, that is, modifications of the understanding or states of consciousness. Thus, the products of action which, distinguished as painful and non-painful, are responsible for the experience (bhoga) of pleasure and pain by living beings, are used as being five in number. Thus, in consequence of the painful modification, the living being suffers pain, being scorched with the fire of Saṃsâra or transmigration, and, similarly, by means of the non-painful modification, enjoys pleasure, possessing developed discriminative knowledge, and being desirous of Release and filled with the greatest bliss. What are those functions? It is said, (they are) Pramâṇa, Proof, Viparyaya, Fallacy, Vikalpa, Fancy, Nidrâ, Sleep, and Smṛiti, Recollection. Vijñâna-Bhikṣu has elaborately explained this point in his Commentary on the Sâṃkhya Aphorisms in Six Chapters. We refrain from doing the same here for the sake of brevity.—9.

Now the author shows the formal differences of one of the elements:

पञ्च वायवः ॥ १० ॥

पञ्च Pañcha, five. वायवः Vâyavaḥ, airs.

10. The Airs are five—10.

These Airs should be known to be five, seeing that living beings, undergoing production and destruction, possess a variety of (physiological) functions of Air, namely Prâṇa, Apâna, Samâna, Udâna, and Vyâna. Where are these different functions of Air located? The function operating in the mouth, nose, etc., belongs to Prâṇa; the function operating in the back, anus, the organ of generation, etc., belongs to Apâna; the function operating in the heart, navel, and all the joints, belong to Udâna: the function operating in the skin, etc., belongs to Vyâna.

Objection:—But Vâyu, Air, also may be regarded as causing all living beings to move or to shine, being itself sentient, moving, and the performer of vital activities in all bodies. Why, then, do you imagine a sentient Puruṣa different from it?

Answer:—Quite so, but there is nothing to be disputed here, because we learn from the Veda that there is a Puruṣa different from Prâṇa, etc. Thus there is the Śruti:

असङ्गोऽयं पुरुष इत्यादि

(This Puruṣa is unattached, and so forth.)

Or, were Prâṇa itself the sentient Principle, then, in the case of a person in dreamless sleep, whose Prâṇa does not at that time leave him, water-pot, cloth, and other objects would be perceived by him, in that state, in the same way as perceptual knowledge arises in him in the waking state, because in dreamless sleep Prâṇa exists all the same. But no such cognition takes place in dreamless sleep, as the senses then cease to be active. The matter should be regarded in this light that, as the owner of a house goes out, with his whole family, employing a gate-man to guard the door, so does the Puruṣa, (in dreamless sleep), rest in bliss, employing Prâṇa alone to protect the body.—10.

After stating Sattva and the other Guṇas of Prakṛiti, the author now ascertains the essences of action:

पञ्च कर्मात्मानः ॥ ११ ॥

पञ्च Pañcha, five. कर्मात्मानः Karma-âtmânaḥ, essences of action.

11. The essences of action are five.—11.

Karmâtmâ means âtmâ, the discriminator, that is, determinant, karmaṇâm, of actions. Herefrom it should be learnt that the determinants or essences of actions are five, of which the causes are Yama, Abhyâsa, Vairâgya, Samâdhi, and Prajñâ. These, being developed, enable all acts to be performed. The proof, on this point, is furnished by:

न चास्य कर्म इत्यादि

[Action does not belong to him (Puruṣa), etc.]

They are described, one by one: Yama, Restraint, is the designation of harmless-ness, truthfulness, non-stealing, continence, not to enter into family life or unworldliness, etc. Abhyâsa, Habituation, denotes attention to pure thoughts, deeds, and objects, for a long time, without intermission. Vairâgya, Dispassion, is absence of desire for enjoyment here and hereafter. Samâdhi, Concentration or Meditation, consists in one-pointed-ness of Manas. Prajñâ, True Knowledge, means knowledge of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa as different things. This has been explained by Vyâsa Deva in the Aphorisms of Patañjali.—11.

Now, in the next aphorism, the author teaches the mutual distinctions of the five kinds of A-vidyâ or False Knowledge:

पञ्चपर्वा अविद्याः ॥ १२ ॥

पञ्चपर्वा : Pañcha-parvâḥ, five-knotted. अविद्या : A-vidyâḥ, false knowledges.

12. False Knowledge has five knots.—12.

Here parva means a knot. Kinds of False Knowledge which is knotty, are five. As, in consequence of the hardness of the knot in a string, a man cannot easily free himself from it, so also in consequence of the surpassing hardness of the knot of Saṃsâra or transmigration.

How many are they? A-vidyâ, ignorance, Asmitâ, the sense of "I am," *i.e.*, egoity, Râga, attraction, Dveṣa, aversion, and Abhiniveśa, clinging-to, idle terror, or love of life, respectively called Tamas, obscurity, Moha, infatuation, Mahâmoha, great infatuation, Tâmiśra, darkness, Andha-tâmiśra, blinding darkness, will be five in number. It is A-vidyâ to call things eternal, pure, and pleasant, which are, in reality, perishable, impure, and painful. Its form or function is as, *e.g.*, "I am surely a Brâhmaṇa," the conceit being due to the identification of the Self with the Not-Self (or cognition of the Not-Self as the Self). Asmitâ is of the form of Abhimâna (q.v.). "Wealth is dearer to me"—such a state of mind is of the form of Râga. "It is not desirable, being perishable"—

such a state of mind is of the form of Dveṣa. Abhiniveśa is the state of mind having the form of, that is, leading into, births and deaths.

There are eight varieties of Tamas and Moha; ten varieties of Mahâ-moha; and thirty-six varieties of the other two. The same has been declared in the Kârikâ (Verse 48):

भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च दशविधो महामोहः ।
ताभिस्रोऽष्टादशधा तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥

(The division of Tamas is eightfold; so it is also of Moha; Mahâ-moha is tenfold; Tâmiśra is eighteenfold; the same is Andha-Tâmiśra.) —12.

Thus declaring the five divisions of the opposite of True Knowledge, the author describes the twenty-eight varieties (of Incapacity):

अष्टाविंशतिधाऽशक्तिः ॥१३॥

अष्टाविंशतिधा Aṣṭâviṃśati-dhâ, twenty-eightfold. अशक्तिः Aśaktiḥ, feebleness, incapacity, disability.

13. Incapacity is twenty-eightfold.—13.

Here the suffix, dhâ, is employed in the sense of variety. Hence it should be known that incapacity has twenty-eight varieties, inasmuch as it is diversified in form on account of A-vidyâ. What are those varieties? It is said: Owing to the dead-ness or depravity of the senses or powers of perception and action, there exist eleven varieties of incapacity belonging to the eleven senses, namely, deafness, paralysis, blindness, loss of taste, loss of smell, dumbness, inactivity of the hand, lameness, constipation, impotence, and insanity, respectively belonging to the ear, skin, eye, tongue, nose, voice, hand, leg, anus, organ of generation, and Manas. Similarly, there are seventeen more varieties constituted by the opposities of Tuṣṭis and Siddhis. By their addition, these are the twenty-eight A-siddhis or imperfections (or inversions of Siddhis). Although the senses are the seats of these imperfections, still Vṛitti or state of consciousness is included in Buddhi, Understanding or Consciousness and nowhere else, since there is no room for a state of consciousness in any other place except where Buddhi is the material cause.—13.

The author now enumerates Tuṣṭis:

नवधा तुष्टिः ॥ १४ ॥

नवधा Navadhâ, ninefold. तुष्टिः Tuṣṭiḥ, acquiescence, compl

14. Complacency is ninefold.—14.

It, Tuṣṭi, is (primarily) twofold: Âdhyâtmika, internal, and Bâhya, external. The internal divisions are four, designated by reference to Prakṛiti, Upâdâna, means or materials, Kâla, time, and Bhâgya, luck. Immediate intuition of the difference of Puruṣa from Prakṛiti is really a species of Transformation, and is the work of Prakṛiti itself, while I (Puruṣa) am perfect; what is the use of contemplation, and the like? —the Tuṣṭi which the disciple derives from so thinking, (is of the first kind). It is called Ambhas. For, Viveka, discriminative knowledge, does not result from Prakṛiti alone. The same Tuṣṭi is found in retirement; there is no use of contemplation, and the like,—the Tuṣṭi which lies in such instructions, is designated by Upâdâna. It is called Salila. Retirement will take place, by means of meditation, after waiting for a long time,—the Tuṣṭi which lies in such instructions, is designated by Time. It is called Megha. Nirvikalpa Samâdhi, meditation without discreet consciousness, will result by the force of luck alone,—the Tuṣṭi which lies in this, is designed by Luck. It is called Vṛiṣṭi.

Five external complacencies are produced or arise for him who unduly applies the characteristic of the Self to Prakṛiti, Mahat, Ahaṃkâra, Tan-mâtras, and the gross Elements. These complacencies, consequent on the disappearance, dissolution, or dispersal of objects which entail acquisition, preservation, waste, enjoyment, and injuriousness, are respectively known by the names of Pâra, Supâra, Pâra-pâra, An-uttama-ambhas, and Uttama-ambhas. Whatever people will become delighted by obtaining external complacency, would not be knowers of Principles; for, *e.g.*, acquisition of wealth can be effected only with the greatest trouble, and also there is no knowledge of Principles in it. So it has been said:

अर्थानामर्जने दुःखं तथैव परिरक्षणे ।
रागे दुःखं व्यये दुःखं हिंसायां तुल्यमेव वा ॥

(There is trouble in the acquisition of wealth, and the same also in its preservation. There is pain in attachment to it, and also in its expenditure. Similarly, again, in the case of injuriousness or killing.)—Mahâbhârata.

By the aggregation of these, complacency is said to be nine-fold—14.

The author now lays down an aphorism, enumerating the minor divisions of the uninverted Siddhis alluded to above (*vide* Aphorism 13):

अष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ १५ ॥

अष्ट Aṣṭa-dhâ, eightfold. सिद्धिः Siddhiḥ, perfection.

15. Perfection is eightfold.—15.

What, again, are those eight sorts of perfection? Accordingly they are being specifically ascertained:

It is divided into two sorts: three primary ones and five secondary ones. The three primary ones are those named Pramodâ, hilarious; Muditâ, delighted; and Modamânâ, joyful. Study, oral knowledge, reasoning, intercourse of friends, and charity are the secondary perfections. Thus, knowledge that is produced, after causing the disappearance of Adhidaiva pain, is Pramodâ Siddhi; knowledge that is produced, after causing the removal of Adhibhûta pain, by means of service, etc., is Muditâ Siddhi; knowledge that is born, immediately after the prevention of Adhyâtma pain, is Modamânâ Siddhi.

To receive instruction regarding knowledge of the Self, from a competent teacher, with due rites and ceremonies, constitutes *study*. That which is established by study, is *oral* or *verbal knowledge*. *Reasoning* is that perfection which consists in reasoning about the Principles, under the influence of previous practice, instinct, without instruction from teacher. *Intercourse of friends* is where pleasure is obtained by the mere company of near and dear ones. The perfection in *charity* consists in donation, according to ordinances, by one whose mind is absolutely free from all sorts of impurity.—15.

Now the author distributes properties or characteristics amongst the twenty-five Principles.

दशमूलिकार्था ॥ १६ ॥

दश Daśa, ten. मूलिकार्थाः Mûlika-arthâḥ, radical or root objects.

16. The root objects are ten.—16.

Herefrom these, mûlikâḥ, root, arthâḥ, objects (of perception), should be known to be ten. (Why are they called root objects?) Because objects reside, so far as may be, in one or other predicable amongst these twenty-five Principles. What are they? Where do they reside? All this will be stated. Unity, productiveness, and existence for the sake of another *i. e.*, (Puruṣa), have been declared with regard to Prakṛiti; other-ness, non-agent-ship, and diversity, with regard to Puruṣas; and is-ness, union, and separation, with regard to both. Occupation of space or existence in time (has been declared) with reference to gross and subtle bodies. Thus, in the Bhoja-Vârtika:

प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता ।
पराध्यक्ष्य तथानैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ।
शेषवृत्तिरकर्तृत्वं मौलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ॥

(Principal existence, unity, productiveness, other-ness, existence for nother, plurality, separation, union, finite existence, and non-agent-ship re remembered to be the ten root objects or primary qualities).—16.

After declaring the properties of the twenty-five Principles, the uthor now describes the manner of Creation.

अनुग्रहः सर्गः ॥ १७ ॥

अनुग्रहः Anu-grahah, taking or putting together, composition accumulation, ggregation. सर्गः Sargah, emanation, evolution, production, creation.

17. Emanation is accumulation.—17.

Here the word, anu, has the sense of 'together with.' Anugrahah eans that which takes together. It is springing into existence. And it as two varieties: one, of the form of Vâsanâ or tendency or disposition, nd the other, of the form of the subtile body. Both these forms are apable of being known, as they do not appear one without the other. 'or, there can be no subtile body in the absence of Vâsanâ, nor does Vâsanâ exist in the absence of subtile body, as is the case with seed nd shoot.

Objection:—But, since, in your theory, Buddhi, and the other predicables are beginningless, how can you hold the theory of emanation with a beginning?

Answer:—Quite so, but, in spite that they are beginningless, yet perforce, by the maxim of ripples and waves, it is hinted that emanation ppears in the form of development and envelopment.—17.

Evolution of species is next elaborately ascertained:

चतुर्दशविधो भूतसर्गः ॥ १८ ॥

चतुर्दशविध: Chaturdaśa-vidhah, of fourteen sorts. भूतसर्गः Bhûta-sargah, elemental creation, evolution of beings.

18. Evolution of beings is of fourteen sorts.—18.

Herefrom the evolution of all entities should be known to be chaturdaśa-vidha, of fourteen specific kinds. For, all living beings come into existence, under the influence of Vâsanâ or tendency, by the form of Svedaja, sweat-born; Aṇḍa-ja, egg-born; Udbhid-ja, shoot-born; and Jarâyu-ja, uterus-born, during the disengaged state of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. And this evolution has three minor divisions: celestial or superhuman, human, and the grovelling. The first has eight varieties, the second, one, and the third, five. These varieties are declared: Brâhma,

Prâjâpatya, Aindra, Gândharva, Yakṣa, Râkṣasa and Paiśâcha, these are the eight varieties of superhuman evolution. Human evolution has one variety only. Beasts, domestic animals, birds, reptiles, and immoveables are the grovelling kinds.

Objection:—But why is evolution of entities limited to fourteen kinds only, when we observe evolution of such entities as a water-pot, etc.?

Answer:—The objection cannot be allowed, because we do not know of any producible thing, like a water-pot, etc., which is different from the five gross elements. Similarly, it should be understood in all other cases.—18.

It is so; for, without the knowledge of the predicables already mentioned, cessation of bondage cannot take place, since bondage has no beginning. Intending, therefore, to declare the nature of bondage, the author introduces the next aphorism:

त्रिविधो बन्धः ॥ १९ ॥

त्रिविध: Tri-vidhaḥ, threefold. बन्ध: Bandhaḥ bondage.

19. Bondage is threefold.—19.

Here, what is precisely the nature of bondage? Bondage is the fabrication of false knowledge, occasioned by upâdhi or external condition or adjunct, and is by no means real. Of how many kinds is it? (They are) Prâkṛitika, Vaikârikâ, and Dâkṣiṇaka. This threefold bondage should be known. They are, therefore, successively recited. Thus, the absorption into the Prakṛitis, of those, who devote themselves to Prakṛiti by meditation, wrongly believing that the eight Prakṛitis are the ultimate or transcendental realities, constitutes Prâkṛitika bondage. The absorption into the Vikâras or Transformations, of those who devote themselves to them, wrongly believing that sentiency exists in the Vikâras, *e.g.*, the powers of perception and action, etc., constitute Vaikârika bondage. Those whose mind has been misled by transmigration, and who, knowing only the sacred performances intended for the Southern Path (*vide* Aphorism 4), think that the performance of Aśva-medha and other sacrifices is the supreme object of life, and thereby experience the fruits of action,—theirs is Dâkṣiṇaka bondage, for they uniformly follow the revolutions of births and deaths, like a wheel. So says the Śruti:

यामिमां पुष्पितां वाचं प्रवदन्त्यविपश्चितः ।
वेदवादरताः पार्थ नान्यदस्तीति वादिनः ॥

(According to their action and enlightenment, migratory Selves, for the sake of embodiment, resort, some to wombs, and others to immoveable entities).—Kaṭha Upaniṣat, II. V. 7.—19.

Notwithstanding, therefore, that bondage has no beginning, exertion must still be made for its dissolution. So thinking, the author reads the aphorism:

त्रिविधो मोक्षः ॥ २० ॥

त्रिविधः Tri-vidhaḥ, threefold. मोक्षः Mokṣaḥ, release, liberation.

20. Release is threefold.—20.

Now, threefold release of living beings results by the exhaustion of virtue and vice. What, then, are these three kinds of release? So it is said Krama-mokṣa, gradual release; Vi-deha-kaivalya, dis-embodied singleness; and Svarûpa-pratiṣṭhâ, rest in one's self. Where a man who is attached to the objects of the world, pursues also the investigation of the Principles, for him release will result in another birth. This is Krama-mokṣa. For, we may recall:

बहूनां जन्मनामन्ते ज्ञानवान् मां प्रपद्यते ।

(The wise come unto Me at the end of many births).—Gîtâ, VII, 19.

Dis-embodied singleness implies the enjoyment of that bliss which is attained by a man who is dispassionate towards the objects of the world and who "regards pleasure and pain in the same light," as the Śruti says:

अपाम सोममृता अभूम

[We drank the Soma (acid asolepias) juice, and we became immortal.]

Rest in one's self means existence of one by one's pure essential form, continued through the endless future time. For according to the Śruti:

न ह वै स शरीरस्य प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति*

connection with the essence of Buddhi may again take place.—20.

The author now fully defines the characteristic of Pramâṇa or Proof:

त्रिविधं प्रमाणम् ॥ २१ ॥

त्रिविधं Tri-vidhaṃ, threefold. प्रमाणम् Pramâṇam, proof.

21. Proof is threefold.—21.

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* *I. e.*, (Verily there can be no extinction of the pleasant and the non-pleasant so long as there remains the body.)—Chh. Up. VIII. xii. 1.

Here Pramânam means that by which something is proved, that is to say, the instrument of Pramâ or certain knowledge. Proof is threefold, *viz.*, Dṛiṣṭa, Anumâna, and Âpta-vachana. Whatever entities Buddhi makes its objects, in the form of their identity with Chitta or Manas, by the gateways of the senses or powers of perception, the same are objects perceived. This is Dṛiṣṭa, visible or immediate, proof, *e. g.*, "I see the Deva," "I am happy," etc. Anumâna, inference, is threefold: (successional, from the observed to the unobserved), Pûrva-vat, from cause to effect, Śeṣa-vat, from effect to cause, and (co-existential, from two equally observed marks:) Sâmânyato-dṛiṣṭa, equally observed. Pûrva-vat inference is where the effect is inferred from the cause; as, *e.g.*, a shower by the ascent of clouds. Śeṣa-vat inference is where the cause is inferred by means of the effect; as, *e. g.*, ultimate atoms, etc., by the observation of a water pot. Sâmânyato-dṛiṣṭa inference is where, after leaving a place for a time, something, previously observed in one place, is next observed in another place; as, *e. g.*, going is inferred by the observation that Devadatta who was previously observed inside his house, is now outside it. The Veda which is the repository of all knowledge and the cause of the divisions of Devas, Yakṣas, birds, men, castes, stages of life, etc., not being the work of a personal author (and being accordingly free from the defects of personal equation), its declarations are Âpta-vachana, trustworthy sayings, upon which proceeds the conduct of the elders that this is real, that this is unreal, that this is a water-pot, etc.

Discriminative knowledge of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa by means of this threefold proof, is the source of the supreme object of desire with Puruṣa—21.

Therefore, after declaring these predicables, and desiring to briefly recapitulate them, for showing that release is attainable through knowledge of them, the author lays downs the aphorism:

एतत् सम्यक् ज्ञात्वा कृतकृत्यः स्यात्
न पुनस्त्रिविधेन दुःखेनानुभूयते ॥ २२ ॥

एतत् Etat, this. सम्यक् Samyak, thoroughly. ज्ञात्वा Jñâtvâ, knowing. कृतकृत्यः Kṛita-kṛityaḥ, fulfilled, successful. स्यात् Syât, will be. न Na, not. पुनः Punaḥ, again. त्रिविधेन Tri-vidhena, by threefold. दुःखेन Duḥkhena, by pain. अनुभूयते Anûbhûyate, made to feel, joined.

22. By thoroughly knowing this, man will be fulfilled, and will not have to suffer again from the threefold pain.—22.

Etat is easily understood. Here 'man' is the complement of the sentence: Samyak jñâtvâ kṛita-kṛityah syât. Tri-vidhena, with pains Adhyâtma, etc. Na anubhûyate, is not conjoined; for, on account of their absolute extinction, it is impossible for them to come to appear again.—22.

This Commentary on the Sâṃkhya was composed, with great delight, by Śrî Narendra, a terrestrial divinity (*i. e.*, a Brâhmaṇa), in the Śaka era 1793.

THE END.

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THE SÂMKHYA-KÂRIKÁ.

The Sâṃkhya is the only means of the Supreme Good.

दुःखत्रयाभिघातात् जिज्ञासा तदवघातके हेतौ ।
दृष्टे सापार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥ १ ॥

दुःखत्रयाभिघातात् Duḥkha-traya-abhighâtât, from the disagreeable occurrence, lection or action (abhighâta) of the threefold pain or causes of suffering. जिज्ञासा ijñâsâ, the desire to know, enquiry. तदवघातके Tat-avaghâtake, preventive or unter-active thereof, *i.e.*, of the threefold pain. हेतौ Hetau, into the means. दृष्टे ṛiṣṭe, there existing visible or ordinary means. सा Sâ, it, *i.e.*, the enquiry. सार्था Apa-arthâ, purpose-less, superfluous. चेत् Chet, if it is said न Na, no. एकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् Ekânta-atyanta-taḥ-abhâvât, because of the absence of certainty nd permanency.

I. From the disagreeable occurrence of the threefold pain, (proceeds) the enquiry into the means which can prevent it; nor is the enquiry superfluous because ordinary means) exist, for they fail to accomplish certain and permanent prevention of pain.

ANNOTATION.

1. Wise men want to demonstrate that which, by being known, would complish the Supreme Good. Knowledge about the subject matter of e proposed Śâstra is the means of accomplishing the Supreme Good. he present Kârikâ, therefore, introduces an enquiry into that subject.—achaspati Miśra's *Tattva-Kaumudî.*

2. The subject-matter of the Sâṃkhya System comprises the well-nown Twenty-five Tattvas or Principles, from the knowledge of which sults the destruction of the three kinds of pain. Cf. Gauḍpâda's *hâṣyam.*

3. The Supreme Good is Mokṣa or Release which consists in the ermanent impossibility of the incidence of pain in any form whatever, at is, in recovering that state of the pristine purity of the Self in which he occurrence of pain is impossible, in other words, in the realisation of he Self as Self pure and simple.

4. Pains, according to the place of their origin, are divided primarily into two classes: internal and external. Internal pains, again, are either bodily or mental. These are called Âdhyâtmika or intra-organic. External pains are either Âdhibhautika or caused by created beings, namely, man, beast, bird, reptile, and the immobile, or Âdhidaivika or caused by supernatural agencies, such as Yakṣa, Râkṣasa, Vinâyaka, etc. Now, pain, such as it is, cannot be ignored, because it is experienced by every individual being.

5 Pain is not a condition of the pure Self. It resides in the Internal Instrument of Action and Cognition, that is, the inner sense, or Buddhi, and is a particular modification of that component element of it which is called Rajas. "Abhighâta" is the contact of the power of Sentiency with pain as an object of disagreeable sensation.

6. It may be objected that when such obvious remedies as medicines, desirable objects, skill in political arts and sciences, employment of gems and charms, etc., for the alleviation and removal of pain, do exist, whilst the knowledge of the Tattvas is difficult of attainment and to be acquired only by long study and traditional tuition through many generations, the investigation proposed is needless. To this, the answer is that the obvious means are neither Ekânta or absolute, nor Atyanta or final; that is, there is in them no certainty of the cessation of pain nor of the non-recurrence of pain that has ceased. Therefore, the good accomplished by them is not the Supreme Good. The means of accomplishing the Supreme Good must possess these two properties. Such a means is the knowledge of the Tattvas. The enquiry, therefore, is certainly not needless.

7. But our opponent may contend that, though the obvious means may fail, still there are means declared in the Vedas, which bring about absolute and final cessation of pain, and that, consequently, the proposed enquiry is quite superfluous Accordingly, the next Kârikâ declares:

Scriptural, like ordinary, means are defective.

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः सह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ।
तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥ २ ॥

दृष्टवत् Drisṭa-vat, like the ordinary (means). आनुश्रविकः Ânuśravikaḥ, the revealed, Vedic, scriptural. सः Saḥ, it, *i.e*, the Vedic means. हि Hi, for अविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः A-viśuddhi-kṣaya-atiśaya-yuktaḥ, attended with impurity, waste and excess. तद्विपरीतः Tat-viparîtaḥ, the opposite thereof, *i.e.*, of ordinary and scriptural means. श्रेयान् Śreyân, preferable. व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् Vyakta-a-vyakta-jña-vijñânât

as it consists in discriminative knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest, and the Knower.

II. Like the ordinary, is the scriptural (means ineffectual), for it is attended with impurity, waste, and excess. (The means which is) the opposite of both is preferable, as it consists in a discriminative knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest, and the Knower.

ANNOTATION.

8. "Scriptural" here refers to the rituals laid down in the Vedas, and not to their Jñâna-Kâṇḍa portion, for Discriminative Knowledge also is enjoined in them.

The scriptural means are, *e.g.*, the drinking of the Soma juice, performance of sacrifices such as the Jyotiṣṭoma, the Aśvamedha, etc. They are "impure" from sacrifice of animals, etc. The result produced by them is liable to "waste," for even heaven and the gods pass away in course of time. They are also inequal in the distribution of their rewards.

9. The "opposite of both" that is, that which is absolute and final in its result, and is free from impurity, deficiency, and inequality. Such a means is the discriminative knowledge of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa.

10. "Vijñâna" means knowledge of discrimination Knowledge of the Manifest leads to the knowledge of its cause, the Unmanifest. And knowledge of both as existing for the sake of another, leads to the knowledge of the Self. The Manifest begins with Mahat and includes Ahaṃkâra, the five Tan-mâtras, the eleven Indriyas, and the five Great Elements. The Unmanifest is the Pradhâna, *i.e.*, Prakṛiti. The Knower is Puruṣa. These are the Twenty-five Tattvas.

11. The mutual differences of the Manifest, the Unmanifest, and the Knower are declared in the next Kârikâ.

The Manifest, the Unmanifest, and the Knower distinguished.

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तु विकारः न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥

मूलप्रकृतिः Mûla-prakṛitiḥ the root-evolvent. अविकृतिः A-vikṛitiḥ, non-evolute. महदादयः Mahat-âdyâḥ, Mahat, etc. प्रकृतिविकृतयः Prakṛiti-vikṛitayaḥ, evolvent-evolutes सप्त Sapta, seven. षोडशकः Ṣoḍaśakaḥ, sixteen. तु Tu, merely. विकारः Vikâraḥ, evolute. न Na, not. प्रकृतिः Prakṛitiḥ, evolvent. न Na, not. विकृतिः Vikṛitiḥ, evolute. पुरुषः Puruṣaḥ, Puruṣa.

III. The Root Evolvent is no evolute; Mahat, etc., are the seven evolvent-evolutes; the sixteen are mere evolutes; (that which is) neither evolvent nor evolute, is Puruṣa.

12. By "Prakṛiti" is meant that which procreates or evolves—the Pradhâna, that is, that in which all things are contained, and in its general significance, it denotes that which becomes the material cause of another Tattva.

13. The Root Evolvent is the state of equipoise of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. It has no root of its own and is the root of all things. Hence it is not a product. To imagine a root for the Root Evolvent would entail infinite regression.

14. Evolvent-Evolutes: Mahat springs from the Pradhâna and, in its turn, gives rise to Ahaṃkâra; Ahaṃkâra, in its turn, to the Tan-mâtras of Sound, Touch, Smell, Form, and Taste; and these, in their turn, respectively to the gross elements of Ether, Air, Earth, Fire, and Water.

15. It is next to be considered how the existence of the Tattvas described above can be rationally established. The causes of cognition and non-cognition are, therefore, expounded in the following four Kârikâs.

Sources of knowledge enumerated.

दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।
त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥ ४ ॥

दृष्टम् Dṛiṣṭam, the seen, sensuous, perception. अनुमानम् Anumânaṃ, inference. आप्तवचनं Âpta-vachanaṃ, statement of trustworthy persons. च Cha, and. सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् Sarva-pramâna-siddha-tvât, because all proofs are established. त्रिविधं Tri-vidhaṃ, threefold. प्रमाणम् Pramâṇaṃ, proof. इष्टं Iṣṭaṃ, desired. प्रमेयसिद्धिः Prameya-siddhiḥ, establishment of the existence of the things to be proven, *viz.*, the Twenty-five Tattvas. प्रमाणात् Pramâṇât, from proof. हि Hi, verily.

IV. Perception, Inference, and Testimony (are the Proofs; by these) all proofs being established, Proof is intended to be threefold. From Proof verily is the establishment of the Provables.

Perception, Inference, and Testimony defined.

प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टं त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।
तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकमाप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनन्तु ॥ ५ ॥

प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायः Prati-viṣaya-adhyavasâyaḥ, ascertainment of each respective object by the senses. दृष्टं Dṛiṣṭaṃ, perception. त्रिविधम् Trividhaṃ, threefold. अनुमानम्,

Anumânam, inference. आख्यातम् Âkhyâtam, declared. तत् Tat, it. लिङ्गिलिङ्गिपूर्वकम् Liṅga liṅgi-pûrvakam, preceded by the mark and by that of which it is the mark आप्तश्रुतिः Âpta-śrutiḥ, trustworthy person and the Veda. आप्तवचनं Âpta-vachanam, trustworthy statement, testimony. तु Tu, while.

V. Perception is the ascertainment of each respective object (by the Senses). Inference has been declared to be threefold. It is preceded by the mark and it is preceded by the thing of which it is the mark. While Testimony is the statement of trustworthy persons and the Veda.

ANNOTATION.

16. Vâchaspati Miśra interprets "Prati-viṣaya-adhyavaṣâyaḥ" as follows: Adhyavaṣâya, that is, the operation of Buddhi, in other words, cognition, based on or depending upon Prati-viṣaya, that is, that which functions in regard to, that is, comes into contact with, the several objects, in other words, the Senses.

17. The same authority describes the process of perceptual cognition thus: On the modification of the Senses apprehending objects, when there takes place the subdual of the Tamas of Buddhi, there is predominance of the Sattva, which is variously called Adhyavaṣâya, Vṛitti, and Jñâna. And the favour that is hereby done to the power of intelligence, that is the fruit; it is the consciousness of Pramâ or Right Cognition. For the Buddhi Tattva, being derived from Prakṛiti, is unintelligent; hence its Adhyavaṣâya also is unintelligent, like a jar, etc Similarly, the other modifications of the Buddhi Tattva, such as pleasure, etc., also are unintelligent. While Puruṣa, unassociated with pleasure, etc., is intelligent. Yet he, by the falling of the shadow of cognition, pleasure, etc., reflected by those residing in the Buddhi Tattva, becomes, as though possessed of cognition, pleasure, etc. This is how the intelligent one is favoured. And by the falling of the shadow of intelligence, Buddhi and also its Adhyavaṣâya, though unintelligent, appear, as though intelligent.

18. Anumâna is inference, by means of the mark, of the thing of which it is the mark, and *vice versâ*. The Methods of Inference are either of Agreement, called Vîta, or of Difference, called A-Vîta. A-Vîta inference is called Śeṣa-vat, because it has the Śeṣa or the remainder or the residue as its subject matter. *E.g.*, Earth is not not-Earth, because it possesses smell. Gauḍapâda explains Śeṣa-vat to be inference in respect of the Śeṣa or remainder of the class; *e.g.*, having found a drop of water taken from the sea to be salt, the saltness of the rest also is inferred.

Vîta inference is two-fold: Pûrva-vat and Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa. Pûrva-vat is the inference of an individual of a genus particular instances of which have previously been seen; *e.g.*, the inference of fire from smoke, in a mountain, fire having previously been seen in the kitchen. Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa is inference of a thing particular instances of which same kind have not previously been seen, but particular instances of a kind similar to which have previously been seen in analogous cases; that is, in this case, the particular is not seen but the genus is seen. *E.g.*, Karaṇa-tva or instrumentality, that is, the capability of effecting an act is, as a genus, a known thing, because it has been seen in the axe which is an instrument of cutting. But an Indriya or Power of Cognition and Action (commonly rendered as Sense Organ) does not belong to the same class as the axe, and is also not an object of perception. Now, cognition and action are acts, and as the act of cutting cannot be effected without an instrument, so the acts of cognition and action cannot be effected without some instrument. Thus is inferred the existence of the Indriyas as the Instruments of Cognition and Action.

Âpta means Âchâryas, such as Brahmâ and the rest.

Super-Sensible objects how proved.

सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानात् ।
तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥

सामान्यतः Sâmânyatah, of the generic. तु Tu, but. दृष्टात् Dṛiṣṭât, from the seeing. अतीन्द्रियाणां Ati-indriyâṇâm, of things transcending the senses. प्रतीतिः Pratîtih, approach, intuition, cognition. अनुमानात् Anumânât, from inference. तस्मात् Tasmât, from that. अपि Api, even. च Cha, and also, from Śeṣa-vat inference (Vâchaspati). असिद्धं A-siddham, not-established. परोक्षम् Parokṣam, super-sensuous. आप्तागमात् Âpta-âgamât, from Testimony and Revelation. सिद्धम् Siddham, proved.

VI. (Intuition of sensible things is from perception). But the intuition of super-sensible things is from Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa and Śeṣa-vat Inference. And super-sensible things not established from that even, are established from Testimony and Revelation.

19. Prakṛiti and Puruṣa are not objects of perception and therefore they are unreal, argue our opponents; for a hare's horn or a castle in the air is not perceived, because it is unreal. It is, accordingly, next pointed out that perception cannot be the sole test of reality, because there are well-known causes from which even admittedly existent things are not perceived. These causes are declared in the next Kârikâ.

Causes of failure of external perception enumerated.

अतिदूरात् सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।
सौक्ष्म्याद्व्यवधानादभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ ७ ॥

अतिदूरात् Ati-dûrât, from extreme distance. *N.B.*—The word Ati qualifies distance as well as all the rest. सामीप्यात् Sâmîpyât, from nearness. इन्द्रियघातात् Indriya-ghâtât, from impairment of the senses. मनोऽनवस्थानात् Manaḥ-anavasthânât, from non-presence of mind. सौक्ष्म्यात् Saukṣmyât, from fineness. व्यवधानात् Vyavadhânât, from intervention. अभिभवात् Abhibhavât, from suppression by others. समानाभिहारात् Samâna-abhihârât, from intermixture with likes. च Cha, and others.

VII. (Apprehension of even existing things may not take place) through extreme remoteness, nearness, impairment of the senses, non-presence of the mind, extreme fineness, intervention, suppression by other matters, intermixture with likes, and other causes.

Why Prakṛiti is not an object of perception.

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात् कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः ।
महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च ॥ ८ ॥

सौक्ष्म्यात् Saukṣmyât, from extreme fineness. तदनुपलब्धिः Tat-anupalabdhiḥ, non-apprehension thereof, *i.e.*, of Prakṛiti. न Na, not. अभावात् Abhâvât, from non-existence. कार्यतः Kârya-taḥ, from effects. तदुपलब्धेः Tat-upalabdheḥ, because of the apprehension thereof. महदादि Mahat-âdi, Mahat and the rest. तत् Tat, that. च Cha, and. कार्यं Kâryam, effect. प्रकृतिसरूपं Prakṛiti-sarûpam, similar to Prakṛiti. विरूपं Virûpam, dissimilar. च Cha, and.

VIII. From extreme fineness is the non-apprehension of Prakṛiti, and not from her non-existence, because there is apprehension of her from the effect. And that effect is Mahat, etc., similar and dissimilar to Prakṛiti.

20. "Similar and dissimilar to Prakṛiti": for these resemblances and differences, see Kârikâs X and XI.

21. But from the effects, a mere cause or cause in the abstract is deduced, and not its nature, and, on this point, different conclusions have been arrived at by different thinkers. Thus, some Buddhists, say that the existent is produced from the non-existent; *e.g.*, from the non-existence, by destruction, of the seed is produced the sprout. 2. Some, the Vedântins, say that the effects are the Vivarta or revolution of one

single existent thing, and are not themselves ultimately real. 3. Some, the Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyâyikas, etc., say that from the existent, *i.e.*, the Ultimate Atoms, is produced the non-existent. 4. The elders, the Sâṃkhyas, say that from the existent is produced the existent. Of these, on the first three alternatives, the Pradhâna is not established. For the characteristic of being the Pradhâna, *i.e.*, that in which all things are contained, and of being of the nature of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, belonging to the Cause of the World, consists in being of the nature of Sound and all other Pariṇâma or transformations, the essences of which possess the distinctions of pleasure, pain, and bewilderment. Now, if the existent is to be produced from the non-existent, how can a non-existent, nameless, form-less cause possess the nature of Sound, etc., in the form of pleasure, etc. ? for there is no proof of the identity of nature between the existent and the non-existent. If, again, the diversity of Sound, etc., is the Vivarta of a single existent thing, still it would not follow that the existent is produced from the existent. For a one without a second cannot have identity of nature with the diversity; on the contrary, the apprehension of the non-diversity under the characteristic of the diversity is an error pure and simple. With those also, again, namely Kaṇâda, Gotama, and others, who say that it is from the existent that the non-existent is produced, the cause cannot be of the nature of the effect, because there is no proof of the unity of the existent and the non-existent. Hence there can be no proof of the Pradhâna on these theories. In order, therefore, to establish the existence of the Pradhâna, the next Kârikâ determines that the effect must be existent from before its "productfon."

Effects pre-exist in their causes.

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसम्भवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत् कार्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

असत्करणात् A-sat-a-karaṇât, from the non-effectuation of the non-existent. उपादानग्रहणात् Upâdâna-grahaṇât, from the selection of material for the effect. सर्वसम्भवाभावात् Sarva-sambhava-abhâvât, from the absence of the production of every thing by every means. शक्तस्य Śaktasya, of the competent. शक्यकरणात् Śakya-karaṇât, from the effectuation of the producible. कारणभावात् Kâraṇa-bhâvât, from the nature of the cause. सत् Sat, existent. कार्यम् Kâryam, effect.

IX. The effect is ever existent, because that which is non-existent, can by no means be brought into existence; because effects take adequate material causes; because all

things are not produced from all causes ; because a competent cause can effect that only for which it is competent; and also because the effect possesses the nature of the cause.

ANNOTATION.

22. That which is non-existent, etc. : *e.g.* a hare's horn.

Effects take, etc. : Oil, for instance, can be produced from mustard seeds, but not a piece of cloth.

All things are not produced, etc. : Did effects not pre-exist in their causes, then, in mustard seeds, for example, there would be non-existence of a piece of cloth, a jar, in fact, of every other thing as well as of oil, and it would be quite as easy to produce a piece of cloth, a jar, and all the rest from them as it is to produce oil. But such is not the case.

A competent cause can effect, etc. : Competency means potentiality, the unmanifested state of the effect. A lump of clay, for instance, is potentially a jar; in it the jar lies hidden, unmanifested; it is manifested in the form of the jar by the operation of the potter.

The effect possesses the nature, etc. : The colour, weight, touch, etc. of a piece of cloth for instance, are the colour, weight, touch, etc., of the threads from which it is made. This could not have been so, were not cause and effect identical in essence.

The Manifest and the Unmanifest contrasted.

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।
सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

हेतुमत् Hetu-mat, possessing or depending on a cause. अनित्यम् A-nityam, non-eternal, perishable. अव्यापि A-vyâpi, unpervading, finite. सक्रियम् Sakriyam, mobile, mutable. अनेकम् Anekam, multitudinous, manifold. आश्रितं Âśritam, supported, dependent. लिङ्गम् Liṅgam, mergent, mark. सावयवं Sâvayavam, made up of parts. परतन्त्रं Para-tantram, subordinate. व्यक्तं Vyaktam, the manifested. विपरीतम् Viparitam, the reverse. अव्यक्तम् A-Vyaktam, the unmanifested.

X. The Manifest is producible, non-eternal, non-pervading, mobile, multiform, dependent, (serving as) the mark (of inference), a combination of parts, subordinate. The Unmanifest is the reverse (of this).

ANNOTATION.

23. *Sakriya*, migratory : Buddhi and the rest leave, one after another, bodies which they had taken up and enter into other bodies : this is their movement. The movement of the Body, Earth, etc., is indeed well-known.

Aneka, multitudinous: There are as many of them as there are Puruṣas; Earth and the rest also are multiplied according to the differences of Bodies, jars, etc.

Âśrita, supported: They are supported by their respective causes.

Liṅga, mergent, mark: Buddhi and the rest are marks of the Pradhâna. Gauḍapâda explains the word to mean "subject to dissolution." At the time of the Dissolution the five Great Elements merge into the Tanmâtras, and these together with the eleven Indriyas, into Ahaṃkâra, and this, into Buddhi; and that merges into the Pradhâna.

Paratantra, subordinate: Buddhi, for instance, when it has to produce its own effect, namely, Ahaṃkâra, has to draw upon Prakṛiti; otherwise, being weak or exhausted, it will not be able to produce Ahaṃkâra. Similarly, by Ahaṃkâra and the rest also is awaited the inflow of Prakṛiti in the production of their own effects.

24. *Viparîta*, reverse: The Unmanifest is causeless, eternal, all pervading, motion-less, single, self-sustained, the subject of the mark or non-mergent, part-less, and supreme.

The Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower contrasted and compared.

त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ।
व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ ११ ॥

त्रिगुणम् Tri-guṇam, having or constituted by the three Guṇas, *viz.*, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. अविवेकि A-vivekí, non-discriminative. विषयः Viṣayaḥ, objective. सामान्यम् Sâmânyam, common. अचेतनं A-chetanam, non-intelligent. प्रसवधर्मि Prasava-dharmi, prolific. व्यक्तं Vyaktam, the Manifest. तथा Tathâ, so. प्रधानं Pradhânam, the Pradhâna, Prakṛiti. तद्विपरीतः Tat-viparîtaḥ, the reverse of this. तथा Tathâ, so. च Cha, yet. पुमान् Pumân, Puruṣa.

XI. The Manifest is constituted by the three Guṇas, is non-discriminative, objective, common, non-intelligent, prolific. So is also the Pradhâna. Puruṣa is the reverse of them both (in these respects), and yet is similar (to the Pradhâna and also to the Manifest in those other respects mentioned in the preceding Kârikâ.)

ANNOTATION.

25. *Á-viveki*:-Just as the Pradhâna is not discriminated from itself even so are not Mahat and the rest also discriminated from the Pradhâna because of their essential identity. Or, A-viveka is to create by uniting

together, for none of them singly are capable of producing their own effects, but, on the contrary, only by uniting together.

Viṣaya: because it is the Object as distinguished from the Subject, to be apprehended and made use of by all Puruṣas alike.

26. *Tathâ cha*, and yet is similar: that is, as the Pradhâna is, in the preceding Kârikâ, declared to be without cause, etc., such is Puruṣa. Thus, "* * * The Manifest is multitudinous; the Unmanifest is single; so is Puruṣa also single.* * *" (Gauḍapâda)." "But when similarity to the Pradhâna belongs to Puruṣa in respect of non-causability, eternality, etc., and likewise multiplicity is his similarity to the Manifest, how is it said that" the reverse of them both is Puruṣa? To this, it is replied: Tathâ cha: Cha has the sense of Api, even, yet; although there is similarity in respect of non-causability, etc., yet he possesses dissimilarity in respect of not being constituted by the three Guṇas, etc. Such is the meaning" (Vâchaspati Miśra). "The S. Chandrikâ confirms the interpretation: 'The phrase *tathâ cha* implies that (soul) is analogous to the undiscrete principle in non-causability and the rest, and analogous to discrete principles in manifold enumeration.' This is, in fact, the Sâṃkhya doctrine, as subsequently laid down by the text, ver. 18, and is conformable to the Sûtra of Kapila; 'Multitude of souls is proved by variety of condition': that is, 'the virtuous are born again in heaven, the wicked are regenerated in hell; the fool wanders in error, the wise man is set free.' Either, therefore, Gauḍapâda has made a mistake, or by his *eka* is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations; or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it (R.A.S. Trans. vol. I. p. 31) 'individual.' So in the Sûtras it is said 'that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the etherial element may be confined in a variety of vessels.' This singleness of soul applies therefore to that particular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage, and liberation; for, as the commentator observes, 'one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body)' The singleness of soul, therefore, as asserted by Gauḍapâda, is no doubt to be understood in this sense." (*Wilson*).

Characteristics of the Guṇas described.

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।
अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥

[illegible]: Prîti-aprîti-viṣâda-âtmakâḥ, of the nature of pleasure, pain and dulness. [illegible]: Prakâśa-pravṛitti-niyama-arthâḥ adapted to serving

the purpose of, or capable of causing, illumination, activity, and, restraint. अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयः : Anya-anya-abhibhava-âśraya-janana-mithuna-vṛittayaḥ, having mutual domination, dependence, production, consociation, and co-existence. Vâchaspati does not consider the term Vṛitti as a distinct condition; he interprets it as Kriyâ, act, operation or function, and compounds it with each of the foregoing terms. च Cha, and. गुणाः Guṇâḥ, the Guṇas.

XII. The Guṇas possess the nature of pleasure, pain and dulness; serve the purpose of illumination, activity, and restraint; and perform the function of mutual domination, dependence, production, and consociation.

ANNOTATION.

27. Possess the nature, etc: Hereby the intrinsic forms of the Guṇas Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas are declared. The force of the word Âtmâ, nature, is that it is a reply to those who think that pleasure is nothing but absence of pain, and that pain is nothing but absence of pleasure. For Âtmâ denotes being, something positive, and is a negation of non-being.

28. Serve the purpose, etc: Hereby the purposes served by the Guṇas respectively are declared. *Artha* means *prayojana* or purpose. Gauḍapâda interprets the term in the sense of competency, fitness, capability.

29. Perform the functions, etc: Hereby the various operations of the Guṇas are declared.

Dependence: Although dependence, that is, co-existence by the relation of the container and the contained is not possible, still that is the support of that, the operation of which depends upon it. Thus, Sattva, by resting on activity and restraint, subserves Rajas and Tamas with illumination; Rajas, by resting on illumination and restraint, subserves Sattva and Tamas with activity; Tamas, by resting on illumination and activity, subserves Sattva and Rajas with restraint.

Production: Production is transformation, and it is of the same form as the Guṇas; hence causability is not entailed, owing to the absence of a cause which is a different Tattva. Neither is non-eternality entailed, owing to the absence of dissolution into a different Tattva.

Consociation: That is, the Guṇas are constant companions of one another.

Co-existence is explained by Guaḍapâda thus: As a beautiful and amiable woman, who is a source of delight to every one else, is the cause

of misery to the other wives of her husband, and of bewilderment to the dissolute; so does Sattva produce the functions of Rajas and Tamas. As a king, assiduous in protecting his people, and curbing the profligate, is the cause of happiness to the good, of misery and mortification to the wicked; so does Rajas produce the functions of Sattva and Tamas. Similarly, Tamas produces the functions of Sattva and Rajas, as clouds, overshadowing the heavens, cause delight upon earth, animate by their rain the active labours of the husbandman, and overwhelm absent lovers with despair. In this manner, the Guṇas perform the functions of one another.

The Co-operation of the Guṇas explained.

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।
गुरु वरणकमेव तमः प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

सत्त्वं Sattvaṃ, sattva. लघु Laghu, alleviating, light. प्रकाशकम् Prakâśakam, enlightening, illuminating. इष्टम् Iṣṭam, desired, considered. उपष्टम्भकं Upaṣṭambhakaṃ, urgent, exciting. चलं Chalam, versatile, restless. च Cha, and. रजः Rajaḥ, rajas. गुरु Guru, heavy. वरणकम् Varaṇakam enveloping, covering, obscuring. एव Eva, to be sure. तमः Tamaḥ, tamas. प्रदीपवत् Pradîpa-vat, like a lamp. च Cha, and. अर्थतः Artha-taḥ, for a purpose. वृत्तिः Vṛittiḥ, function, operation.

XIII. Sattva is considered to be light and illuminating, and Rajas, to be exciting and restless, and Tamas, to be indeed heavy and enveloping. Like a lamp (consisting of oil, wick, and fire), they co-operate for a (common) purpose (by union of contraries).

ANNOTATION.

30. Contraries need not necessarily oppose and counteract one another. As co-operation of contraries for a common purpose is seen in the case of a lamp, even so is it the case with the Guṇas which co-operate with one another to serve a common purpose, *viz.*, the experience and release of Puruṣa.

31. Granted, one may say, that non-discriminativeness, etc., are proved by perception in the case of Earth, etc., which are objects of perception; but how can Sattva, etc., which are not objects of perception, be said to be non-discriminative, objective, common, non-intelligent, and prolific (Kârikâ XI)? To this, the reply is given in the next Kârikâ.

Proof of the properties of the Unmanifest.

अविवेक्यादेः सिद्धिस्त्रैगुण्यात्तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ।
कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्य अव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥१४॥

अविवेक्यादेः A-viveki-âdeh, of non-discriminativeness, etc. सिद्धिः Siddhiḥ, proof. त्रैगुण्यात् Traiguṇyât, from their being constituted by the three Guṇas or from their manifesting the three qualities of pleasure, pain, and dulness. तद्विपर्ययाभावात् Tat-viparyaya-abhâvât, from the absence of non-discriminativeness, etc., in the reverse thereof, *i.e.*, of the Manifest and the Unmanifest, *i.e.*, Puruṣa; from the absence of the reverse of Traiguṇya in the Unmanifest; from the absence of the divergence or non-concomitance or disagreement between the properties in question and the Manifest and the Unmanifest or the Unmanifest only. कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् Kâraṇa-guṇa-âtmaka-tvât, from the effect's containing the attributes of the cause. कार्यस्य Kâryasya, of the effect. अव्यक्तम् A-Vyaktam, the Unmanifest. अपि Api, also. सिद्धम् Siddham, proved, established.

XIV. The proof of non-discriminativeness, and the rest (in the Manifest and the Unmanifest) is from their being constituted by the three Guṇas and from absence of their non-concomitance. From the effect possessing the attributes of the cause is proved the Unmanifest also.

ANNOTATION.

32. According to Vâchaspati, the proof of non-discriminativeness and the rest is by the method of agreement, thus:—

Whatever possesses pleasure, pain, and dulness, is non-discriminative, etc.,

As, for instance, are the objects of the senses;

Prakṛiti, Mahat, etc., possess pleasure, pain, and dulness;

They are, therefore, non-discriminative, etc:

and also by the method of difference, thus:—

Whatever is not non-discriminative, etc., does not possess pleasure, pain and dulness,

As, for instance, is the case with Puruṣa.

But Prakṛiti, Mahat, etc., possess pleasure, pain, and dulness;

They are, therefore, not-non-discriminative, etc.

But the proof of these attributes must be subject to the proof of their alleged substratum. How then is this, namely, the Pradhâna proved? Thus: The effect characterised as Mahat, etc., possessing the form of pleasure, pain, and dulness, must have the nature or essence of pleasure,

pain, and dulness inhereing in its own cause; so that its cause, possessing the nature of pleasure, pain, and dulness, that is, the Pradhâna Unmanifest, is established.

33. Gauḍapâda's interpretation is different from the above. According to him, the properties of non-discriminativeness, etc., are proved in the Manifest from their being constituted by the three Guṇas, through the absence of divergence, that is, because the properties of non-discriminativeness, etc., have never been found except in conjunction with the property of being constituted by the three Guṇas. And their existence in the Unmanifest is proved from the absence of divergence, that is, from the invariable and universal concomitance of the Manifest and the Unmanifest: just as, wherever there is the cloth, there are the yarns; similarly whoever sees the Manifest, sees the Unmanifest as well; and also from the effect possessing the nature of the cause: thus, from the effect, *viz.*, Mahat and the rest which are non-discriminative, objective, common, non-intelligent, and prolific, is proved that their cause, namely, the Unmanifest, possesses the same properties.

Proof of the Unmanifest.

भेदानां परिमाणात् समन्वयात् शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
कारणकार्यविभागादविभागाद् वैश्वरूपस्य ॥ १५ ॥
कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तं प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च ।
परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥१६॥

भेदानां Bhedânâṃ, of differentiated particulars, specific objects, of the evolutes, Mahat and the rest. परिमाणात् Parimâṇât, from finiteness, measurableness. समन्वयात् Samanvayât, from homogeneity, agreement. शक्तितः Sakti-taḥ, from power. प्रवृत्तेः Pravṛitteḥ, from activity, from production. च Cha, and कारणकार्यविभागात् Kâraṇa-kârya-bibhâgât, from differentiation of cause and effect. अविभागात् A-vibhâgât, from non-differentiation, from reunion. वैश्वरूपस्य Vaiśvarûpasya, of the formal Universe. कारणम् Kâraṇam, cause. अस्ति Asti, exists. अव्यक्तं A-vyaktam, Unmanifest. प्रवर्तते Pravartate, energises, operates. त्रिगुणतः Tri-guṇa-taḥ, through or of the three Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. समुदयात् Sam-udayât, through combination, co-operation. च Cha, and. परिणामतः Pariṇâma-taḥ, through transformation. सलिलवत् Salila-vat, like water. प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् Prati-prati-guṇa-âśraya-viśeṣât, through differences according to the differences of the several receptacles of the Guṇas, or differences created by the Guṇas severally based on the principal Guṇa.

XV-XVI. Of the particulars (*e.g.*, Mahat and all the rest down to the earth), there exists an Unmanifest cause:

because the particulars are finite; because they are homogeneous; because production is through power; because there is differentiation of effect from cause or difference of cause and effect; and because there is reunion of the multiform effect with the cause.

It operates, in the form of the three Guṇas and by combination, undergoing transformation, (diversified) according to the differences severally of the other Guṇas depending on the principal Guṇa.

ANNOTATION.

34. Because they are homogeneous: Homogeneousness is the possession of a common form among a number of distinct individuals. The presence of a common form infers a common origin.

Because production is through power: Power inhering in the cause is nothing but the unmanifested state of the effect.

Differentiation and reunion: Discrete products of every sort of form from Mahat down to a jar, for instance, successively rise from their causes at the time of creation and disappear into them at the time of destruction and universal dissolution. The ultimate points in the process of evolution and involution are one and the same. It is the absolute unmanifested state of a single entity. It is called the Unmanifest, the Pradhâna and Prakṛiti.

35. It operates etc.: The Guṇas of which the nature is to undergo transformation, never rest, even for a moment, without transforming themselves. Their transformation may be homogeneous or heterogeneous. Homogeneous transformation takes place during Pralaya or the period of latency intervening Creation and Dissolution, when Sattva transforms as Sattva, Rajas as Rajas, and Tamas as Tamas. Such is the meaning of the phrase Tri-guṇa-taḥ, in the form of the three Guṇas severally. Heterogeneous transformation takes place during Creation and Dissolution. For this, combination of the Guṇas with one another in different proportions is necessary. Such combination is rendered possible by the diversified activity of the Guṇas in the evolution of Mahat and all the rest, of which each successive one is more and more specified than, and differentiated from, its predecessor. And this differentiation is brought about by the difference in the ratio in which the subsidiary Guṇas combine and co-operate with the principal Guṇa. Thus, as regards the eleven Indriyas

and the five Tan-mâtras, while Rajas is equally operative in the evolution of both, the former arise from Ahamkâra in which Sattva is predominant and Tamas is dormant; whereas the latter arise from Ahamkâra in which Tamas is predominant and Sattva is dormant.

Salila-vat: As simple water shed by the clouds, coming into contact with various situations, is modified as sweet, sour, bitter, pungent, or astringent, in the character of the juice of the cocoa-nut, palm, bel, karanja, amalaka, wood-apple, etc.

Proof of Puruṣa.

संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

संघातपरार्थत्वात् Saṃghâta-para artha-tvât, since an aggregate or structure of manifold parts into one whole is for the sake of another of a different character त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् Tri-Guṇa-âdi-viparyayât, since there must exist an entity in which there is the reverse of the properties of being constituted by three Guṇas, and the rest mentioned in Kârikâ XI. अधिष्ठानात् Adhiṣṭhânât, since there must be superintendence over Buddhi and other products of the Guṇas. पुरुषः Puruṣaḥ Puruṣa. अस्ति Asti, exists. भोक्तृभावात् Bhoktṛi-bhâvât, since there must be an experiencer of pleasure and pain. कैवल्यार्थं Kaivalya-arthaṃ, for the sake of isolation. प्रवृत्तेः Pravṛitteḥ, since activity is. च Cha, and.

XVII. Puruṣa exists: since the aggregate must be for the sake of the non-aggregate; since there must exist an entity in which the properties of being constituted by the three Guṇas and the rest do not appear; since there must be a superintendent; since there must be an experiencer; and since activity is for the sake of abstraction.

ANNOTATION.

36. Since there must exist an entity, etc.: Hereby is prevented the inference of an aggregate by the aggregate. For all aggregates possess the three Guṇas, whereas Puruṣa is free from them, as declared in Kârikâ XI. Therefore, the entity for which the aggregate is, must be a non-aggregate. And Puruṣa is a non-aggregate.

Proof of Multiplicity of Puruṣa.

जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत् प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ १८ ॥

जननमरणकरणानां Janana-maraṇa-karaṇânâṃ, of birth, death, and the instrument of cognition and action. प्रतिनियमात् Prati-niyamât, individual allotment. अयुगपत्

A-yugapat, non-simultaneous. प्रवृत्तेः Pravṛitteḥ, from activity or occupation. च Cha, and. पुरुषबहुत्वं Puruṣa-bahu-tvaṃ, multiplicity of Puruṣas. सिद्धं Siddhaṃ, established. त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययात् Traiguṇya-viparyayât, from absence of the condition of the three Guṇas, from diverse modification of the three Guṇas. च Cha, and. एव Eva, verily.

XVIII. From the individual allotment of birth, death and the Instruments, from non-simultaneous activity (towards the same end), and from the diverse modification of the three Guṇas, multitude of Puruṣas is verily established.

ANNOTATION.

37. Birth consists in conjunction with body, Indriya, Manas, Ahaṃkâra, Buddhi, and experience, and death consists in their abandonment. So that they do not entail the transformation of Puruṣa. The distribution of body and the rest, which is different in each individual case, must imply a plurality of Puruṣas, as, otherwise, on the birth of one, all would be born and on the death of one, all would die.

Non-simultaneous activity towards the same end : as, *e.g.*, some are busy with virtuous, others with vicious, actions; some cultivate dispassion, others knowledge.

Diverse modification of the three Guṇas: thus, though birth is common to all, one possessing Sattva is happy, another possessing Rajas, is wretched, and a third possessing Tamas, is dull.

Proof of the Nature of Puruṣa.

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात् सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १९ ॥

तस्मात् Tasmât, from that. च Cha, and. विपर्यासात् Viparyâsât, from contrast, divergence. सिद्धं Siddhaṃ, proved. साक्षित्वं Sâkṣi-tvaṃ, to be the witness. अस्य Asya, of this. पुरुषस्य Puruṣa-sya, of Puruṣa. कैवल्यं Kaivalyaṃ, aloneness, solitariness. माध्यस्थ्यं Mâdhyasthyaṃ, indifference, to be the bystander. द्रष्टृत्वं Draṣṭṛi-tvaṃ, to be the spectator. अकर्तृभावः A-kartṛi-bhâvaḥ, non-agent-ship. च Cha, and.

XIX. And from that contrast it is proved that this Puruṣa is witness, solitary, indifferent, spectator, and non-agent.

ANNOTATION.

38. That contrast: that is, Puruṣa is not constituted by the three Guṇas, is discriminative, is not objective but subjective, is not common, is indifferent, and is not prolific (see Kârikâ XIV).

Because he is intelligent and subjective, he is spectator and witness. A witness is one to whom objects are shown. Prakṛiti exhibits herself to Puruṣa.

From his not being constituted by the three Guṇas follow his solitariness and indifference. For solitariness consists in the absolute non-existence of the three sorts of pain, and indifference denotes absence of love for pleasure and hate for pain. But pleasure and pain are properties of the three Guṇas. And because Puruṣa is not constituted by the three Guṇas, he is absolutely free from pleasure, pain and bewilderment.

And since he is discriminative and non-prolific, he is not the agent.

But if Puruṣa is a non-agent, how does he make determination? as I will perform acts of merit, I will not perform acts of demerit: hence Puruṣa must be the agent; neither is Puruṣa the agent;—thus there is, may say our opponent, defect in both the theories. Accordingly, the seeming agency of Puruṣa is explained in the next Kârikâ.

The agency of Puruṣa is not real, but fictitious.

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ॥ २० ॥

तस्मात् Tasmât, therefore. तत्संयोगात् Tat-saṃyogât, from conjunction therewith, *i.e.*, with the intelligent Puruṣa. अचेतनं A-chetanaṃ, the non-intelligent. चेतनावत् Chetanâ-vat, possessing intelligence. इव Iva, like, as if. लिङ्गम् Liṅgam, the effect, Mahat and the rest. गुणकर्तृत्वे Guṇa-kartṛi-tve, in the case of the agency of the Guṇas. च Cha, and. तथा Tathâ, likewise. कर्ता Kartâ, agent. इव Iva, like, as if. भवति Bhavati, becomes. उदासीनः Udâsînaḥ, indifferent, *i.e.*, Puruṣa.

XX. Therefore (the inference that intelligence and agency belong to one and the same subject is a mistake.) Through conjunction with Puruṣa, the non-intelligent Effect appears as if it were intelligent, and although agency is of the Guṇas, the indifferent (Puruṣa) appears, in the same way, as if he were the agent.

39. Liṅgam here denotes Mahat, Ahaṃkâra, Manas and the five Tan-mâtras. See Kârikâ XL.

40. The confusion then is due to the conjunction of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa. And conjunction means mutual approach and co-operation,

which necessarily pre-supposes some object or purpose to be achieved. That purpose can be nothing but mutual benefit, as declared in the following Kârikâ.

Object of the conjunction of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti.

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥२१॥

पुरुषस्य Puruṣa-sya, of Puruṣa. दर्शनार्थं Darśana-artham, for the sake of seeing or exhibition. कैवल्यार्थं Kaivalya-artham, for the sake of separation. तथा Tathâ, likewise. प्रधानस्य Pradhâna-sya, of the Pradhâna. पङ्ग्वन्धवत् Paṅgu-andha-vat, like that of the halt and the blind. उभयोः Ubhayoḥ, of both. अपि Api, also. संयोगः Saṃyogaḥ, conjunction. तत्कृतः Tat-kṛitaḥ, originated by that, *i.e.*, conjunction. सर्गः Sargaḥ, creation, evolution.

XXI. The conjunction of Puruṣa and the Pradhâna is, like that of the halt and the blind, for mutual benefit, that is, for the exhibition of the Pradhâna to Puruṣa and for the isolation of Puruṣa. From this conjunction proceeds Creation.

ANNOTATION.

41. The halt and the blind: "As a lame man and a blind man, deserted by their fellow-travellers, who, in making their way with difficulty through a forest, had been dispersed by robbers, happening to encounter each other, and entering into conversation so as to inspire mutual confidence, agreed to divide between them the duties of walking and of seeing; accordingly the lame man was mounted on the blind man's shoulders, and was thus carried on his journey, whilst the blind man was enabled to pursue his route by the directions of his companion. In the same manner, the faculty of seeing is in soul, not that of moving; it is like the lame man: the faculty of moving, but not of seeing, is in nature; which resembles, therefore, the blind man. Further, as a separation takes place between the lame man and the blind man, when their mutual object is accomplished, and they have reached their journey's end, so nature, having effected the liberation of soul, ceases to act; and soul, having contemplated nature, obtains abstractedness; and, consequently, their respective purposes being effected, the connexion between them is dissolved."—Gauḍapâda's Bhâṣya, translated by Wilson.

The Evolutions of Prakriti and the order of their evolution stated.

प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहंकारस्तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः ।
तस्मादपि षोडशकात् पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥

प्रकृतेः Prakṛiteḥ, from Prakṛiti. महान् Mahân, Mahat. ततः Tataḥ, thence, from Mahat. अहंकारः Ahaṃkâraḥ, Ahaṃkâra. तस्मात् Tasmât, therefrom, from Ahaṃkâra. गणः Gaṇaḥ, set, group, series. च Cha, and. षोडशकः Ṣoḍaśakaḥ, sixteenfold. तस्मात् Tasmât, from that. अपि Api, again. षोडशकात् Ṣoḍaśakât, from sixteenfold. पञ्चभ्यः Pañcha-bhyaḥ, from the five. पञ्च भूतानि Pañcha bhûtâni, the five gross elements.

XXII. From Prakṛiti (evolves) Mahat; thence, Ahaṃkâra; and from this, the sixteenfold set; from five, again, among the sixteenfold, the five Elements.

ANNOTATION.

42. The sixteenfold set: that is, the eleven Indriyas and the five Tan-mâtras. From five, etc: that is, from the lower five among the sixteen, that is, the five Tan-mâtras.

Five Elements: *viz.*, Ether, Air, Fire, Water and Earth.

43. The synonyms of Prakṛiti are Pradhâna, that in which all things are contained, Brahmâ, that which expands, A-vyakta, the unmanifest, Bahu-dhânaka, that in which manifold things are contained, Mâyâ, that which measures or limits.

The synonyms of Mahat are Buddhi, that which makes things known, Âsurî, probably Chheda-bheda-âdi-âtmikâ as in the medical science, that is, that which causes separation, differentiation, etc., Mati, that by which things are understood, Khyâti, that by which things are manifested, Jñânâ, that by which knowledge is acquired, Prajñâ, that by which perfect knowledge is obtained.

The synonyms of Ahaṃkâra are Bhûta-âdi, the origin of the Bhûtas or elements, Vaikṛita, the modified, Taijasa, partaking of Tejas, *i.e.*, Rajas, Abhimâna, self-consciousness.

By Tattva is meant the Tva, *i.e.*, condition or existence of Tat, or that by which all the three worlds are pervaded. Prakṛiti, Mahat, Ahaṃkâra, Manas, the Indriyas, the Tan-mâtras and the Elements are then the physical and metaphysical existences, realities, or principles pervading all the three worlds.

Buddhi and its modifications described.

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् ।
सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥

अध्यवसायः Adhyavasâyaḥ, ascertainment. बुद्धिः Buddhiḥ, Mahat, Buddhi. धर्मः Dharmaḥ, virtue, merit. ज्ञानं Jñânam, knowledge. विरागः Virâgaḥ, dispassion. ऐश्वर्यं Aiśvaryam, lordliness, power. सात्त्विकम् Sâttvikam, partaking of Sattva. एतद्रूपं Etatarupam, its forms. तामसम् Tâmasam, partaking of Tamas. अस्मात् Asmât, from this विपर्यस्तम् Viparyastam, the reverse.

XXIIII. Ascertainment is Buddhi. Virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power are its forms or manifestations or modifications, partaking of Sattva. Those partaking of Tamas, are the reverse of these.

ANNOTATION.

44. Ascertainment is Buddhi: this statement in apposition is intended to teach that there is no difference between the function and the fuctionary.

Ascertainment is to arrive at the certainty that this is a jar, this I will do, etc., which is above the stage of doubt, differentiation, assimilation, and deliberation.

Virtue is that which is the cause of happiness and release, and includes the fruits of sacrifices and of the practice of Yoga as taught by Patañjali.

Knowledge is the manfestation of the discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa.

Dispassion is absence of Râga or passion. It has four names: the name of Yatamâna, Vyatireka, Ekendriya and Vaśikâra. Passion and the like, which act like dyes of different hues, reside in the Chitta or the Retentive Faculty. By them the Indriyas, the Powers of Cognition and Action, are employed on their respective objects. Now, the endevour, *i.e.*, the putting forth of energy for the purpose of boiling down and dissolving them, with the desire that the Indriyas may not go out to the objects, is designated as Yatamâna. And when the boiling is once begun, some passions will become boiled, while others will be in the course of being boiled. In that stage, the relation of before and after thus coming into existence, the ascertainment of the boiled by means of their discrimination from those that are in the course of being boiled, is designated as Vyatireka. They being thus disabled to excite the Indriyas to activity, the persistence

of the boiled passions in the mind in the form of mere longing, is designated as Ekendriya. The surcease of even the mere longing in regard to sensible and scriptural objects of enjoyment, even though they be near at hand, which, in its appearance, is subsequent to the first three stages, is designated as Vaśîkâra.—Vâchaspati.

Power is will-power or thought-power, whereby a Yogin becomes at will light as a leaf or heavy as a hill, whereby he can ascend to the sun on a sunbeam or can touch the moon with the tip of his finger, etc.

Partaking of Sattva : that is, when Sattva becomes predominant in Buddhi, by subduing Rajas and Tamas.

Partaking of Tamas : that is, when Tamas becomes predominant in Buddhi, by subduing Sattva and Rajas.

The reverse are vice, ignorance, passion and weakness.

Ahaṃkâra and its Modifications described.

अभिमानोऽहंकारस्तस्मात् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।
एकादशकश्च गणस्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव ॥ २४ ॥

अभिमानः Abhimânaḥ, consciousness, self-assertion अहंकारः Ahaṃkâraḥ, Ahaṃkâra. तस्मात् Tasmât, from it. द्विविधः Dvi-vidhaḥ, twofold. प्रवर्तते Pravartate, proceeds. सर्गः Sargaḥ, creation, evolution. एकादशकः Ekâdaśakaḥ, elevenfold. च Cha, and. गणः Gaṇaḥ, set, series. तन्मात्रपञ्चकं Tan-mâtra-pañchakam, the pentad of the Tan-mâtras. च Cha, and. एव Eva, nothing else.

XXIV. Self-assertion is Ahaṃkâra. From it proceeds a twofold evolution only : the elevenfold set and also the fivefold Tan-mâtra.

ANNOTATION.

45. The elevenfold set comprises the eleven Indriyas, *i.e.*, the five Indriyas of cognition and the five Indriyas of action and Manas.

The fivefold Tan-mâtra comprises the subtile particles or essences which are Sound, Touch, Form, Taste, and Smell. Whatever word conveys the sense of subtilty or fineness is a synonym of Tan-mâtra.

Self-assertion : All that is considered (âlochita) and reasoned (mata) refers to me, in this I am competent, all these objects of sense are for my sake only, this does not concern any one else but me, hence I am,—such abhimâna, self-assertion or consciousness by reference to oneself, from its having an uncommon or unique operation of its own, is called Ahaṃkâra, by working upon which Buddhi determines that this is to be done by me.

Transformations of Ahaṃkâra distinguished.

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहंकारात् ।
भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसस्तैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥

सात्त्विकः Sâttvikaḥ, partaking of Sattva, in which Sattva is dominant, pure. एकादशकः Ekâdaśakaḥ, elevenfold. प्रवर्तते Pravartate, proceeds. वैकृतात् vaikṛitât, modified by the predominance of Sattva; an older term conveying the same sense as Sâttvika. अहंकारात् Ahaṃkârât, from Ahamkâra. भूतादेः Bhûta-âdeḥ, from the original of the elements in which Tamas is dominant; an older term conveying the same sense as Tâmasa. तन्मात्रः Tan-mâtraḥ, the Tan-mâtras. सः Saḥ, it. तामसः Tâmasaḥ, Tâmasa, having Tamas dominant in it. तैजसात् Taijasât, from Taijasa, which is an older term having the sense of Râjasa, that in which Rajas is dominant. उभयम् Ubhayam, both, *i.e.*, the Indriyas and the Tan-mâtras.

XXV. The Sâttvika elevenfold set proceeds from the Vaikṛita Ahaṃkâra; from the Bhûtâdi Ahaṃkâra, the Tan-mâtras; they are Tâmasa; from Taijasa Ahaṃkâra, proceed both.

ANNOTATION.

46. From the Taijasa, both: Of the three Guṇas, Rajas alone is exciting and restless (see Kârikâ XIII). Rajas alone, therefore, is active while Sattva and Tamas are inert. These must then depend upon the activity of Rajas for the evolution of their products. It is in this sense that from the Taijasa proceed both, and not that a duplicate set of the Indriyas and the Tan-mâtras simultaneously issue from the Râjasa Ahaṃkâra.

Indriyas enumerated.

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्यानि ।
वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थान् कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि Bûddhi-indriyâṇi, the Indriyas or Powers of cognition. चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्यानि Chakṣuḥ-śrotra-ghrâṇa-rasana-tvak-âkhyâni, called the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and skin. वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थान् Vâk-pâṇi-pâda-pâyu-upasthân, speech, hands, feet, excretory organ and organ of generation. कर्मेन्द्रियाणि Karma-indriyâṇi, the Indriyas or Powers of action. आहुः Âhuḥ, they say.

XXVI. Those called the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue and the skin are said to be the Indriyas of cognition, and the speech, hands, feet, the excretory organ and the organ of generation, to be the Indriyas of action.

Manas described.

उभयात्मकमत्र मनः संकल्पकमिन्द्रियञ्च साधर्म्यात् ।
गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च ॥ २७ ॥

उभयात्मकम् Ubhaya-âtmakam, possessing the nature of both, *i.e.* Indriyas of cognition and of action. अत्र Atra, herein, in the set of Indriyas. मनः Manaḥ, Manas. संकल्पकम् Saṃkalpakam, that which forms a complete idea at last, by means of assimilation and differenitation ; reflective ; deliberative ; combinative. इन्द्रियं Indriyaṃ, indriya. च Cha, as well. साधर्म्यात् Sâdharmyât, from homogeneousness. गुणपरिणामविशेषात् Guṇa-pariṇâma-viśeṣât, from differences in the transformation of the Guṇas. नानात्वं Nânâ-tvaṃ, manifoldness ; variety ; diverseness. बाह्यभेदाः Bâhya-bhedâḥ, external diversities. च Cha, and.

XXVII. Among the Indriyas, Manas possesses the nature of both. It is deliberative, and is as well an Indriya, as it is homogeneous with the rest. The variety of the Indriyas is due to the differences in the transformation of the Guṇas, and so are the external diversities (of objects of the senses).

ANNOTATION.

47. Nature of both : The presence of Manas is necessary both in respect to cognition and in respect to action ; for, to quote from Locke, "a man whose mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, takes no notice of impressions made by sounding bodies upon the organ of hearing : therefore it is evident that perception is only when the mind receives the impression." Similarly, there can be no movement of the hands, etc., without the co-operation of Manas.

48. Saṃkalpa or deliberation is the uncommon or distinctive function of Manas. By the form of deliberation, Manas is marked out, because, when a thing is first simply observed by the sense as It is something, and doubt arises as to whether it be this or whether it be that, Manas perfectly images it as It is this and not that, that is to say, discriminates the thing as a particular substance possessing specific attributes. In other words, from the materials of the senses, Manas creates percepts. These are then transferred to Ahaṃkâra, which regards them either as concerning itself or not concerning itself. Thus coloured with the personal equation, they are next taken up by Buddhi, which makes certain their true nature and determines conduct accordingly. Such, in brief, is the process of sensuous cognition propounded in the Sâṃkhya Darśana.

49. But Manas thus possesses a unique definition of its own, yet it does not lie altogether out of the category of the Indriyas, like Buddhi and Ahaṃkâra; for, unlike them, it is, along with the other Indriyas, produced from the same material cause, *viz.*, Ahaṃkâra modified by the predominance of Sattva. Hence, Manas also is an Indriya.

50. But how, from the same material, are diverse effects, *viz.*, eleven Indriyas of eleven sorts, produced? Further, the eleven Indriyas necessarily imply, and must depend for their existence upon, eleven different sorts of objects. How is this diversity created? when the Pradhâna, Buddhi, and Ahaṃkâra are non-intelligent, and Puruṣa is a non-agent. Is it created by Îśvara or by Svabhâva or Spontaneity? The answer is, that a certain Spontaneity is the cause of the variety of the Indriyas and their objects. Just as through Spontaneity, secretion of milk takes place for the growth of the calf, so the Guṇas become spontaneously modified by the forms of the eleven Indriyas for the benefit of Puruṣa. Similarly, through particular transformation of the Guṇas spontaneously, external objects of various kinds are produced; for whatever is the modification of the Guṇas, is their object; hence, external objects must be understood to be the products of the Guṇas.

"Vâchaspati understands the allusion to external objects to be merely illustrative; that is, the internal organs are diversified by the modification of the qualities, in the same manner that external objects are varied by the same modification".—Wilson's free translation.

Vijñâna Bhikṣu reads the passage as Bâhya-bhedât cha, and from the variety of external objects, instead of Bâhya-bhedâḥ cha, and so are the external diversities.

The Functions of the Indriyas described.

शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।
वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥

शब्दादिषु Śabda-âdi-ṣu, in respect to sound and the rest, *i.e.*, form, touch, taste, and smell. पञ्चानां Pañchânâm, of the five, *i.e.*, senses of cognition. आलोचनमात्रम् Âlochana-mâtram, observation simply, the mere observation of things, the identity of which is not free from doubt. इष्यते Iṣyate, is considered. वृत्तिः Vṛittiḥ, modification, function. वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाः Vachana-âdâna-viharaṇa-utsarga-Ânandâḥ, speech, manipulation, locomotion, excretion and generation. च Cha, and. पञ्चानाम् Pañchânâm, of the five, Indriyas of action.

XXVIII. The function of the five, in respect to sound and the rest, is considered to be observation simply. Speech,

manipulation, locomotion, excretion and generation are considered to be the functions of the other five.

The common and uncommon functions of the Antaḥ-Karaṇas distinguished.

स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।
सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २९ ॥

स्वालक्षण्यं Svâlakṣaṇyam, the condition of having specific or distinctive or uncommon or characteristic definitions of their own. वृत्तिः Vṛittiḥ, function, operation. त्रयस्य Traya-sya, of the three, *viz.*, Buddhi, Ahaṃkâra, and Manas. सा Sâ, the same. एषा Eṣâ, this. भवति Bhavati, is. असामान्या A-sâmânyâ, uncommon, peculiar to each. सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः Sâmânaya-karaṇa-vṛittiḥ the common function or modification of the Instruments. प्राणाद्याः Prâṇa-âdyâḥ, Prâṇa and the rest, *viz.*, Apâna, Samâna, Udâna, and Vyâna, the five vital airs, life-breaths. वायवः Vâyavaḥ, airs. पञ्च Pañcha, five.

XXIX. Of the three (internal Instruments), their own definitions are their respective functions. These, the same, (functions) are peculiar to each. The common modification of the Instruments is the five airs beginning with Prâṇa.

ANNOTATION.

51. It is to be noted that the five vital airs are taught to be the modifications jointly of Buddhi, Ahaṃkâra, and Manas, and not of the elements, as otherwise might be imagined.

The functions of the Indriyas are successive as well as simultaneous.

युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा ।
दृष्टे तथाप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥

युगपत् Yugapat, simultaneous, consentaneous. चतुष्टयस्य Chatuṣṭayasya, of the quartet, *viz.*, Buddhi, Ahaṃkâra, Manas, and one of the external senses. तु Tu, but. वृत्तिः Vṛittiḥ, function. क्रमशः Krama-śaḥ, successively, gradually. च Cha, and. तस्य Tasya, its, of the quartet. निर्दिष्टा Nirdiṣṭâ, found. दृष्टे Dṛiṣṭe, in the case of the seen, in regard to sensible objects, in the case of perceptual cognition. तथापि Tathâ api, so too. अदृष्टे A-dṛiṣṭe, in regard to supra-sensible objects, in the case of the unseen, in the case of cognition by inference, testimony, revelation, and recollection. त्रयस्य Traya-sya, of the triad, *viz.*, Buddhi, Ahaṃkâra, and Manas. तत्पूर्विका Tat-pûrvikâ, preceded by that, the seen. वृत्तिः Vṛittiḥ, function.

XXX. Of all the four, the functions are instantaneous; their functions are found to be successive also. This is in

regard to sensible objects. In regard to unseen objects, so too are the functions of the three, but preceded by that.

ANNOTATION.

52. Instantaneous: as when one suddenly comes across a tiger in a dark night, one's eyes at once observe, Manas considers, Ahaṃkâra identifies, and Buddhi determines, and the man immediately runs away for his life.

Successive: as when a man sees in dim light something moving in front of him and doubt arises as to what it might be; his Manas considers that it is nothing but a robber; his Ahaṃkâra makes him self-conscious that he is approaching towards him; and his Buddhi determines, I must move away.

So too: that is, in the case of non-perceptual cognition, the functions of Buddhi, Ahaṃkâra, and Manas may be simultaneous as well as successive.

But preceded by that: Hereby the condition of cognition by inference, revelation, and recollection is laid down, which may be stated in the phraseology of Locke as that nothing can be in the intellect which was not previously in the senses. For there can be no inference or revelation or recollection of what has never before been perceived.

How the Indriyas act in harmony with one another.

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूतहेतुकां वृत्तिम् ।
पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित् कार्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥

स्वां स्वां Svâṃ svâṃ, own, own. प्रतिपद्यन्ते Pratipadyante, reach, enter into. परस्पराकूतहेतुकां Paraspara-âkûta-hetukâṃ, of which the cause is proneness to activity arising from mutual sympathy. वृत्तिम् Vṛittim, function, modification. पुरुषार्थः Puruṣa-arthaḥ, the purpose of Puruṣa. एव Eva, alone. हेतुः Hetuḥ, cause, motive. न Na, not. केनचित् Kena chit, by any one whatever. कार्यते Kâryate, wrought, made to act. करणम् Karaṇam, instrument.

XXXI. The Instruments enter into their respective modifications to which they are incited by mutual desire. The purpose of Puruṣa is the only (cause of the activity of the Instruments). By none whatever is an Instrument made to act.

The number, functions and effects of the Indriyas described.

करणं त्रयोदशविधं तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम् ।
कार्यञ्च तस्य दशधाहार्यधार्यं प्रकाश्यञ्च ॥ ३२ ॥

करणं Karaṇam, instrument. त्रयोदशविधं Trayodaśa-vidhaṃ, thirteenfold. तत् Tat, it. आहरणधारणप्रकाशकरं Âharaṇa-dhâraṇa-prakâśa-karam, performer of apprehension, sustentation and manifestation. कार्यं Kâryaṃ, effect. च Cha, and. तस्य Tasya, its. दशधा Daśa-dhâ, tenfold. आहार्यं Âhâryaṃ, apprehensible. धार्यं Dhâryaṃ, sustainable. प्रकाश्यं Prakâśyaṃ, manifestable. च Cha. and.

XXXII. The Instrument is of thirteen sorts. It performs apprehension, sustentation, and manifestation. And its effect or act, *viz.*, the apprehensible, the sustainable, and the manifestable, is (each) tenfold.

ANNOTATION.

53. Apprehension is of the five instruments of action. Their effects are speech, manipulation, locomotion, excretion and generation, which being distinguished as earthly and non-earthly, become tenfold.

Sustentation is of the five vital airs, which support the Body. The thing to be sustained, *i.e.*, Body, is fivefold according as it is made of Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Ether, and these, again, being distinguished as celestial (divya) and non-celestial, become tenfold.

Manifestation is of the five instruments of cognition. The things to be manifested are sound, touch, form, taste, and smell, and these being distinguished as celestial and non-celestial, become tenfold.

Gauḍapâda explains the Kârikâ differently. According to him, the instruments of action apprehend and sustain, those of cognition manifest. The action or effect of these instruments is tenfold, *viz*, sound, etc., and speech, etc. Thus, what is manifested by the instruments of cognition, is acquired and maintained by those of action.

The Thirteen Indriyas described and distinguished.

अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दशधा बाह्यं त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् ।
साम्प्रतकालं बाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥

अन्तःकरणं Antaḥ-Karaṇam, the internal instrument. त्रिविधं Tri-vidhaṃ, threefold. दशधा Daśa-dhâ, tenfold. बाह्यं Bâhyaṃ, external. त्रयस्य Trayasya, of the three. विषयाख्यम् Viṣaya-âkhyam, called object. साम्प्रतकालं Sâmprata-kâlaṃ, at time present. बाह्यं Bâhyaṃ, external. त्रिकालम् Tri-kâlam, at three times, *i.e.*, time past, present and future. आभ्यन्तरं Âbhyantaraṃ, internal. करणम् Karaṇam, instrumen.

XXXIII. The internal Instrument is threefold; the external, tenfold, called the object of the three. The external instrument operates at time present; the internal at all the three times.

ANNOTATION.

54. Called the object of the three: because the external-instruments of cognition and action are the channels through which the three internal instruments of Buddhi, Ahaṃkâra, and Manas come into contact with, and exercise their functions in regard to, the external objects.

Objects of the Indriyas described.

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि ।
वागुभवाति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥३४॥

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि Buddhi-indriyâṇi, the Indriyas of cognition. तेषां Teṣâṃ, of these. पञ्च Pañcha, five. विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि Viśeṣa-aviśeṣa-viṣayâṇi, having as their objects gross sound, etc., causing pleasure, pain, and dulness, and subtile sound, etc., in the form of the Tan-mâtras. वाक् Vâk, speech. भवति Bhavati, is. शब्दविषया Śabda-viṣayâ, having sound as object. शेषाणि Śeṣâṇi, the rest, *i e.*, hands, feet, the excretory organ and the organ of generation. तु Tu, but. पञ्चविषयाणि Pañcha-viṣayâṇi, having all the five, sound, etc., as objects.

XXXIV. Among these (ten Indriyas) the five Indriyas of cognition have for their objects things gross and subtile. Speech has sound (alone) for its object. But the rest have (all) the five as their objects.

ANNOTATION.

55. But the rest have the five etc.: for, a jar, *e.g.*, which may be taken hold of by the hand, possesses sound, touch, form, taste, and smell; the foot treads upon the earth of which sound and the rest are the characteristics; the excretory organ separates that in which these five abide; and the organ of generation produces the secretion in which all these five are present.

Why Buddhi is principal among the Indriyas.

सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।
तस्मात्त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥

सान्तःकरणा Sa-antaḥ-karaṇâ, together with the internal instruments of Ahaṃkâra and Manas, बुद्धिः Buddhiḥ, Buddhi. सर्वं Sarvaṃ, all. विषयम् Viṣayam,

object. अवगाहते Avagâhate, adverts to, comprehends. यस्मात् Yasmât, since. तस्मात् Tasmât, therefore. त्रिविधं Tri-vidham, threefold. करणं Karaṇam, instrument. द्वारि Dvâri, warders, gatemen, room. द्वाराणि Dvârâṇi, gates. शेषाणि Seṣâṇi, rest.

XXXV. Since Buddhi, together with Ahaṃkâra and Manas, comprehends all objects (at all times), therefore, the three Instruments are like a house of which the rest are gates.

Above continued.

एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।
कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छंति ॥ ३६ ॥

एते Ete, these, the ten external Indriyas, Manas, and Ahaṃkâra. प्रदीपकल्पाः Pradîpa-kalpâḥ, comparable to a lamp. परस्परविलक्षणाः Paraspara-vilakṣaṇâḥ, characteristically different from one another. गुणविशेषाः Guṇa-viśeṣâḥ, particular modifications of the Guṇas. कृत्स्नं Kṛitsnaṃ, whole. पुरुषस्य Puruṣa-sya, of, i.e., to Puruṣa. अर्थं Artham, object. प्रकाश्य Prakâśya, manifesting. बुद्धौ Buddhau, to Buddhi. प्रयच्छंति Prayachchhanti, present, make over.

XXXVI. These particular modifications of the Guṇas, which are characteristically different from one another, and which are, therefore, in this matter, comparable to a lamp, present all their respective objects to Buddhi, so that these may be exhibited to Puruṣa.

ANNOTATION.

56. Comparable to a lamp : see Kârikâ XIII.

Present.....to Buddhi : for Puruṣa can experience objects, pleasure, etc., only such as are lodged in Buddhi. The process by which ideas are conveyed to Puruṣa is here described.

Above continued.

सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात् पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः ।
सैव च विशिनष्टि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥३७॥

सर्वं Sarvaṃ, all. प्रति Prati, in regard to. उपभोगं Upa-Bhogaṃ, experience through conjunction. यस्मात् Yasmât, since. पुरुषस्य Puruṣa-sya, of Puruṣa. साधयति Sâdhayati, effects, accomplishes. बुद्धिः Buddhiḥ, Buddhi. सा Sâ, it. एव Eva, the same. च Cha, and. विशिनष्टि Viśinaṣṭi, differentiates, discriminates. पुनः Punaḥ, again. प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं Pradhâna-puruṣa-antaraṃ, difference between the Pradhâna and Puruṣa. सूक्ष्मम् Sukṣaṃ subtile, difficult to discern, not to be apprehended by those who have not practised religious austerities.

XXXVII. (The other Indriyas present all objects to Buddhi, so that they may be exhibited to Puruṣa), since it is Buddhi which accomplishes the experience of Puruṣa in regard to all (objects at all times). And it is that, again, which discriminates the subtile difference between the Pradhâna and Puruṣa.

ANNOTATION.

57. In these three Kârikâs it is established that Buddhi is supreme among the Indriyas. It is the principal means of accomplishing the apparently contradictory purposes of Puruṣa, *viz.*, experience and release. For Buddhi, through the adjacence of Puruṣa, by means of the falling of his shadow, becoming verily of his form, accomplishes Puruṣa's experience of all objects; for experience consists in the apprehension of pleasure and pain, and this exists in Buddhi, and Buddhi is verily of the form of Puruṣa; hence it causes experience to Puruṣa. And while, on the one hand, it is the cause of experience, it is, on the other hand, the cause of release as well, since it is Buddhi which causes discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa.

The Tan-mâtras and their products described.

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषास्तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः ।
एते स्मृता विशेषाः शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

तन्मात्राणि Tan-mâtrâṇi, Tan-mâtras, subtile elements, the originals of atoms अविशेषाः A-viśeṣâḥ, indistinguishables, indiscernibles, undifferentiated as pleasant painful or dull. तेभ्यः Tebhyaḥ, from these. भूतानि Bhûtâni, the gross or great elements. पञ्च Pañcha, five. पञ्चभ्यः Pañchabhyaḥ, from the five. एते Ete, these स्मृताः Smṛitâḥ, remembered. विशेषाः Viśeṣâḥ, the distinguishables, discernibles differentiated as pleasant, painful and dull. शान्ताः Śântâḥ, pacific, causing pleasure, tranquil. घोराः Ghorâḥ, terrific, causing pain, disagreeable. च Chi since. मूढाः Mûḍhâḥ, stupefic, dull. च Cha, and.

XXXVIII. The Tan-mâtras are the indiscernibles. From these five, proceed the five gross Elements which are remembered to be the discernibles; for they are pacific, terrific, and stupefic.

ANNOTATION.

58. Tan-mâtra: *lit.* That-merely or its measure. The Tan-mâtras are subtle forms of Sound, Touch, Form, Taste, and Smell which have

not yet come down to that degree of materialisation in which they cause pleasure, pain, and dulness, and thereby become capable of experience. Such is the force of the word *merely*, according to Vâchaspati's interpretation. They are, however, not properties or qualities but substances. Vijñâna Bhikṣu describes them as "fine substances, the undifferentiated originals of the Gross Elements, which form the substrata of Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour, and Smell, belonging to that class (that is, in that state of their evolution) in which the distinctions of Śânta, etc., do not exist." So we find from the Viṣṇu-Purâṇam and other sources, *e.g.*, that 'in them severally reside their parts (mâtrâ) wherefore the Smṛiti describes them as Tan (their)-mâtra (part). They are neither Śânta, pacific, nor Ghora, terrific, nor, again, Mûḍha, stupefying, but are indistinguishables.'

59. Pacific, etc. :—Every one of the five Gross Elements possesses the threefold characteristic of causing pleasure, pain, and dulness.

Subtile and Gross Bodies described and distinguished.

सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सह प्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।
सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥ ३९ ॥

सूक्ष्माः Sûkṣmâḥ subtile Bodies. मातापितृजाः Mâtâ-pitṛi-jâḥ, Bodies produced from mother and father. सह Saha, together. प्रभूतैः Pra-bhûtaiḥ, with the Great Elements. त्रिधा Tri-dhâ, threefold. विशेषाः Viśeṣâḥ, distinguishables, specific objects. स्युः Syuḥ, will be. सूक्ष्माः Sûkṣmâḥ, subtile Bodies. तेषां Teṣâṃ, among them. नियताः Niyatâḥ constant, continuant. मातापितृजाः Mâtâ-pitṛi-jâḥ, Bodies produced from mother and father. निवर्तन्ते Nivartante, cease, perish.

XXXIX. The Subtile Bodies, Bodies produced from father and mother, together with the Great Elements, will be the Viśeṣas. Amongst them, the Subtile Bodies are continuant; Bodies produced from father and mother cease (to entangle after death.)

ANNOTATION.

60. Wilson's learned disquisition on the meaning of the present Kârikâ is misguided and misleading. The Sâṃkhya describes or displays the gradual materialisation of the Pradhâna from the highest degree of subtelity to the lowest form of grossness. In the series of evolutes, the Tan-mâtras and the Gross Elements may be said, loosely speaking, to occupy the same plane, that is, the plane of materiality in the current sense of the term, and to stand to each other as do atoms to earth, air,

etc. But though they are on the same plane, there is a marked difference between them; for the Tan-mâtras are indiscernible, while the Elements are discernible. A Viśeṣa is what contains a Viśeṣaṇa or qualification, something extra by means of which it is distinguished from others. In the present case the Viśeṣaṇa is the property of causing pleasure, pain and dulness. This is absent from the Tan-mâtras and is present in the Elements. It is clear, therefore, that the transition from the Tan-mâtras to the next succeeding form of evolution is marked by the development of the property of causing pleasure, pain and dulness. Similarly, the Subtile Body which is a combination of the Tan-mâtras and the Tattvas upward, and Indriyas which are pacific, terrific, and stupefic, contains the aroma of past experiences. So is it as well as the Elements and the Bodies formed of them classed among the Viśeṣas, as distinguished from the Tan-mâtras which are A-Viśeṣas.

How the Subtile Body migrates.

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।
संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥

पूर्वोत्पन्नं Pûrva-utpannaṃ, primæval, produced at the beginning of creation by the Pradhâna, one for each Puruṣa. असक्तं A-saktaṃ, unconnected, unconfined to any particular gross Body, and therefore unobstructed in its passage even through a mountain. नियतं Niyataṃ, continuant, constant, as it lasts from the beginning of creation to the time of the Great Dissolution. महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् Mahat-âdi-sûkṣma-paryantam, being the combination of the Tattvas beginning with Mahat and ending with the Subtile, *i.e.*, the Tan-mâtras. संसरति Saṃsarati, moves from Body to Body, transmigrates. निरुपभोगं Nir-upabhogaṃ, free from, or without, experience. भावैः Bhâvaiḥ, dispositions, conditions, such as virtue, vice, etc. अधिवासितं Adhivâsitaṃ, perfumed, affected, tinged. लिङ्गम् Liṅgam, mergent, that which suffers resolution, being a product, a combination of things.

XL. The Liṅga or mergent Body, the one primordially produced, unconfined, continuant, composed of the Tattvas beginning with Mahat and ending with the Tan-mâtras, transmigrates, free from Experience, tinged with the Bhâvas.

ANNOTATION.

61. Tinged with the Bhâvas: The Bhâvas reside in Buddhi which accompanies or is associated with the Subtile Body, and through such association, the Subtile Body is affected by the Bhâvas in the same manner, for instance, as a piece of cloth is perfumed with the sweet smell of a

Champaka flower from contact with it. And it is this affection by the Bhâvas which is the cause of the transmigration of the Subtile Body.

Necessity for Gross Creation shown.

चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो विना यथाच्छाया ।
तद्वद्विना विशेषैर्न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४२ ॥

चित्रं Chitram, a painting or picture. यथा Yathâ, as. आश्रयम् Âśrayam, ground, support. ऋते Ṛite, without. स्थाण्वादिभ्यः Sthâṇu-âdi-bhyaḥ, a stake, etc. विना Vinâ without. यथा Yathâ, as. छाया Chhâyâ, shadow. तद्वत् Tat-vat, similarly to that. विना Vinâ, without. विशेषैः Viśeṣaiḥ, Viśeṣas, Subtile Bodies (Vâchaspati), the Tan-mâtras (Gouḍapâda), Âtivâhika or Vehicular Bodies (Vijñâna Bhikṣu). न Na, not. तिष्ठति Tiṣṭhati, stands, subsists. निराश्रयं Nir-âśrayam, supportless. लिङ्गम् Liṅgam, that which makes known, *viz.*, Buddhi, Ahaṃkâra, Manas and the other Indriyas (Vâchaspati, Gauḍapâda), the Subtile Body called Liṅga. (Vijñâna).

XLI. As a painting stands not without a support, nor is there a shadow without a stake or the like, so neither does the Liṅga subsist supportless, without the Viśeṣas.

ANNOTATION.

62. Viśeṣas : The difference of the interpretation of this word points to a difference of doctrine. Thus, according to Gauḍapâda and Vâchaspati, there are only two kinds of Body, as described above. But, according to Vijñâna Bhikṣu, there is also a third kind of Body, the Adhiṣṭhâna Śarîra, which is formed of a finer form of the gross elements and which serves as the receptacle of the Liṅga Śarîra.

The activity of the Subtile Body further explained.

पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसंगेन ।
प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगान्नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम् ॥ ४२ ॥

पुरुषार्थहेतुकम् Puruṣa-artha-hetu-kam, which has the object of Puruṣa as motive. इदं Idam, this. निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसंगेन Nimitta-naimittika-parasaṅgena, by association with instrumental causes such as virtue, vice, etc., and with their consequences such as the body of a god or a man or a beast. प्रकृतेः Prakṛiteḥ, of Prakṛiti. विभुत्वयोगात् Vibhu-tva-yogât, from conjunction or the universal supremacy of Prakṛiti. नटवत् Naṭa-vat, like a dramatic actor. व्यवतिष्ठते Vyavatiṣṭhate, appears in different roles. लिङ्गम् Liṅgam, the subtile body.

XLII. Impelled by the purpose of Puruṣa, this Subtile Body appears in different roles, like a dramatic performer, by means of association with instrumental causes and

their consequences, through the universal supremacy of Prakṛiti.

ANNOTATION.

63. Like a dramatic performer: Just as, on the stage, one and the same person plays the parts of Paraśurâma, Ajâtaśatru and Vatsarâja, so the same Subtile Body may appear in the body of a god or an elephant or a man. The final and material causes of this transmigration of the Subtile Body in general are respectively the purpose of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, and the formal and efficient causes which determine particular migrations, are respectively the consequences of the Nimittas and the Nimittas, namely, virtue, vice, and the like.

Bhâvas divided and described.

सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च धर्माद्याः ।
दृष्टाः करणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः ॥४३॥

सांसिद्धिकाः: Sâṃsiddhikâḥ, produced from means already in existence, *viz.*, previous Karma; innate, instinctive. च Cha, and. भावाः Bhâvâḥ, dispositions, conditions, circumstances. प्राकृतिकाः Prâkṛitikâḥ, essential, natural, springing from Prâkṛiti direct. वैकृतिकाः Vaikṛitikâḥ, acquired, due or relating to vikṛiti or transformations. च Cha, and. धर्माद्याः Dharma-âdyâḥ, virtue and the rest. दृष्टाः Dṛiṣṭâḥ, seen. करणाश्रयिणः Karaṇa-âśrâyiṇaḥ, residing in the Karaṇa, *i.e*, Buddhi. कार्याश्रयिणः Kârya-âsrayiṇaḥ, residing in the effect, *i.e*, body. च Cha, and. कललाद्याः Kalala-âdyâḥ, the uterine germ and the rest.

XLIII. The Bhâvas or dispositions are instinctive, essential, and also acquired. Dharma and the rest are considered as residing in Buddhi, and the uterine germ and the rest as residing in the Body.

ANNOTATION.

61. *Sâṃsiddhika*: as, at the beginning of creation, when the Lord Kapila was to appear, the four Bhâvas, *viz.*, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power, were produced along with him. They are then the effects of causes appertaining to a former creation.

Prâkṛitika: These are equally innate or instinctive, but are the effects of causes appertaining to the present creation. Thus, from the very same causes, *i.e.*, highly purified form of Prakṛitic matter, from which the perpetually youthful Bodies of the four sons of Brahmâ, namely, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanâtana, and Sanatkumâra, were produced, were

also at the same time produced the Bhâvas of virtue and the rest in them.

Vaikṛitika: These are those acquired from a Vikṛiti or evolute, namely, a teacher whose Body is an evolute; thus the effect of tuition is knowledge, knowledge leads to dispassion, dispassion to virtue, and virtue to power. This is how ordinary human beings acquire the Bhâvas.

The Bhâvas, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power, grow when Sattva is dominant. Hence they are characterised as Sâttvic. Those that grow during the predominance of Tamas, are vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness. These are characterised as Tâmasic.

These eight Bhâvas are the Nimittas or efficient causes of particular migrations of the Liṅga Śarira. They operate through bringing about connection with their effects, the Naimittikas, from the first commingled blood and semen in the uterus up to the fully developed Body.

Effects of the Bhâvas described.

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण ।
ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ॥ ४४ ॥

धर्मेण Dharmeṇa, by means of virtue. गमनम् Gamanam, going. ऊर्ध्वं Urdhvaṃ, upward. गमनम् Gamanam, going. अधस्तात् Adhastât, downward. भवति Bhavati, is. अधर्मेण A-dharmeṇa, by means of vice. ज्ञानेन Jñâneṇa, by means of knowledge. च Cha, and. अपवर्गः Apavargaḥ, release विपर्ययात् Viparyayât, from the reverse, *i.e.*, of knowledge, that is, ignorance. इष्यते Iṣyate, considered. बन्धः Bandhaḥ, bondage.

XLIV. By virtue, is going upward; going downward is by vice; and by knowledge, is Release; from the reverse, Bondage is considered (to be.)

ANNOTATION.

65. Upwards: that is, to the worlds of Brahmâ, Prajâpati, Soma, Indra, the Gandharvas, the Yakṣas, the Râkṣasas, and the Piśâchas.

Downward: that is, into the Bodies of beasts, birds, reptiles, trees, etc.

Knowledge: that is, knowledge of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti.

Release: when the Subtile Body ceases and Puruṣa becomes Paramaâtmâ.

Bondage: it is either Prâkṛitika, or Vaikṛitika, or Dâkṣiṇaka. The first is of those who, mistaking either of the eight Prakṛitis, *viz.*, the Pradhâna, Mahat, Ahaṃkâra, and the five Tan-mâtras, to be Puruṣa,

contemplate upon that, and not upon Puruṣa. After death, they are absorbed in the Prakṛitis, and are called Prakṛiti-layas. The second is of those who contemplate upon the transformations, *viz.*, the elements, the Indriyas, individual Ahaṃkâra and individual Buddhi, mistaking them for Puruṣa, and after death reach unto the archetypes of those transformations. The third is of those who, not knowing the Tattva, *i.e.*, Puruṣa, seek mundane and heavenly happiness through performance of acts of charity and public utility.

Above continued.

वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात् ।
ऐश्वर्यादविघातो विपर्ययात्तद्विपर्यासः ॥ ४५ ॥

वैराग्यात् Vairâgyât, from dispassion, that is, from dispassion divorced from knowledge of the Tattvas. प्रकृतिलयः Prakṛiti-layaḥ, absorption into the eight Prakṛitis, which state of absorption lasts for full one hundred thousand Manvantaras. संसारः Saṃsâraḥ, transmigration, revolution of births and deaths. भवति Bhavati, is. राजसात् Râjasât, produced from, or appertaining to, Rajas. रागात् Râgât, from passion. ऐश्वर्यात् Aiśvaryât, from power. अविघातः A-vighâtaḥ, non-impediment *i.e.*, of desire. विपर्ययात् Viparyayât, from the reverse, *i.e.*, from weakness. तद्विपर्यासः Tat-viparyâsaḥ, the contrary thereof, *i.e.* impediment.

XLV. From dispassion is absorption into the Prakṛitis, transmigration is from the passion of Rajas, from power is unimpediment, from the reverse is the contrary.

ANNOTATION.

66. In these two Kârikâs, the eight efficient causes and their eight effects have been declared. They are:

	CAUSE.	EFFECT.
Sattvic	1. Virtue.	2. Elevation to the higher worlds.
	3. Knowledge.	4. Release.
	5. Dispassion.	6. Dissolution into the Prakṛitis.
	7. Power.	8. Unimpediment to fulfilment of desire.
Tamasic	9. Vice.	10. Degradation to the lower worlds.
	11. Ignorance.	12. Bondage.
	13. Passion.	14. Migration.
	15. Weakness.	16. Impediment to fulfilment of desire.

The creations of Buddhi classified and explained.

एषो प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः ।
गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात्तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥ ४६ ॥

एषः Eṣaḥ, this. प्रत्ययसर्गः Pratyaya-sargaḥ, the creation of that by which intuition of things is made, that is, Buddhi. विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः viparyâya-aśakti-tuṣṭi-siddhi-âkhyaḥ, called ignorance, incapacity, complacency, and perfection,

गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात् Guṇa-vaiṣamya-vimardât, from the conflict of the Guṇas in unequal degrees of strength, from the combination of the Guṇas in different proportions, and consequent predominance of one over others. तस्य Tasya, its, of the creation of Buddhi. च Cha and. भेदाः Bhedâḥ, sorts, divisions. तु Tu, again. पञ्चाशत् Pañchâśat, fifty.

XLVI. This is the creation of Buddhi, termed ignorance, incapacity, complacency, and perfection. And from the conflict of the Guṇas in unequal degree of strength, its sorts, again, are fifty.

ANNOTATION.

67. This : that is, the sixteenfold cause and effect mentioned in the preceding Kârikâ. They are all modifications or products of Buddhi. Their minor divisions are legions. To attempt some classification, they are primarily of four sorts, and secondarily of fifty sorts.

The creations of Buddhi subdivided.

पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणवैकल्यात् ।
अष्टाविंशतिभेदा तुष्टिर्नवधाष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥

पञ्च Pañcha, five, *viz.*, A-vidyâ, Asmitâ, Râga, Dveṣa, and Abhiniveṣa. विपर्ययभेदाः Viparyaya-bhedâḥ, divisions of mistake or ignorance. भवन्ति Bhavanti, are. अशक्तिः A-śaktiḥ, incapacity. च Cha, and. करणवैकल्यात् Karaṇa-vaikalyât, according to the impairment of the Instruments or Indriyas. अष्टाविंशतिभेदा Aṣṭâviṃśati-bhedâ, having twenty-eight divisions. तुष्टिः Tuṣṭiḥ, complacency. नवधा Nava-dhâ, ninefold. अष्टधा Aṣṭa-dhâ, eightfold. सिद्धिः Siddhiḥ, perfection.

XLVII. Five are the divisions of ignorance ; and according to the impairment of the instruments, incapacity has twenty-eight varieties ; while complacency is ninefold ; perfection, eightfold.

Divisions of Error subdivided.

भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च दशविधो महामोहः ।
तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥ ४८ ॥

भेदाः Bhedâḥ, distinctions, divisions. तमसः Tamasaḥ, of Tamas, which is a technical term for A-Vidyâ or false knowledge. अष्टविधः Aṣṭa-vidhaḥ, eightfold. मोहस्य Mohasya, of Moha, which is technical for Asmitâ or Am-ness or egotism. च Cha and. दशविधः Daśa-vidhaḥ, tenfold. महामोहः Mahâ-mohaḥ, Mahâmoha, which is technical for Râga or passion. तामिस्रः Tâmisraḥ, Tâmisra, which is technical for Dveṣa

or aversion. अष्टधा Aṣṭâdaśa-dhâ, eighteenfold. तथा Tathâ, so. भवति Bhavati, is. अन्धतामिस्रः Andha-tâmisraḥ. Andhatâmisra, which is technical for Abhiniveśa or blind attachment to life.

XLVIII. The distinctions of A-Vidyâ are eightfold, as also of Asmitâ ; tenfold is Râga ; Dveṣa is eighteenfold ; so also is Abhiniveśa.

Incapacity subdivided.

एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।
सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥ ४९ ॥

एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः Ekâdaśa-indriya-badhâḥ, injuries of the eleven Indriyas. सह Saha, together. बुद्धिवधैः Buddhi-badhaiḥ, with injuries of Buddhi. अशक्तिः A-śaktiḥ incapacity. उद्दिष्टा Uddiṣṭâ, pronounced. सप्तदश वधाः Saptadaśa-badhâḥ, seventeen injuries. बुद्धेः Buddheḥ, of Buddhi. विपर्ययात् Viparyayât, from inversion. तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् Tuṣṭi-siddhînâm, of complacencies and perfections.

XLIX. Injuries of the eleven Indriyas, together with injuries of Buddhi, are pronounced to be Incapacity. The injuries of Buddhi are seventeen, through inversion of complacencies and perfections.

Complacency subdivided.

आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः ।
बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च नव तुष्टयोऽभिमताः ॥ ५० ॥

आध्यात्मिकाः Âdhyâtmikâḥ, self (soul)-regarding, it is that form of complacency in which there is belief in the existence of a Self, as distinct from Prakṛiti, but in which the Self is identified with the Not-Self. चतस्रः Chatasra, four. प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः Prakṛiti-upâdâna-kâla-bhâgya-âkhyâḥ, called after Prakṛiti or Root, Upâdâna or Material, Kâla or Time, and Bhâgya or Luck. बाह्याः Bâhyâḥ, external, Not-Self-regarding. विषयोपरमात् Viṣaya-uparamât, through abstinence from objects. पञ्च Pañcha, five. नव Nava-dhâ, ninefold. तुष्टयः Tuṣṭayaḥ, complacencies. अभिमताः Abhimatâḥ, propounded.

L. The nine Complacencies are propounded : the four Self-regarding ones called after Prakṛiti, Material, Time, and Luck ; the external five, through abstinence from objects.

Perfection subdivided.

ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःखविघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।
दानं च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः ॥ ५१ ॥

ऊहः Uhaḥ, reasoning, argumentation. शब्दः Śabdaḥ, word, verbal instruction. अध्ययनं Adhyayanaṃ, study. दुःखविघातः Duḥkha-vighâtâḥ, preventions of pain. त्रयः Trayaḥ, three. सुहृत्प्राप्तिः Suhṛit-prâptiḥ, acquisition of friend, intercourse with friend. दानं Dânaṃ, charity, purity. च Cha, and. सिद्धयः Siddhayaḥ, perfections. अष्टौ Aṣṭau, eight. सिद्धेः Siddheḥ, of perfection. पूर्वः Pûrvaḥ, preceding, first. अङ्कुशः Aṅkuśaḥ, goad, curb, restrainer. त्रिविधः Tri-Vidhaḥ, threefold.

LI. Argumentation, Word, Study, the three Preventions of Pain, Acquisition of friends, Charity or Purity are the eight Perfections. Those mentioned before Perfection are the threefold goad to (Ignorance and suffering).

ANNOTATION.

68. Those mentioned before Perfection are Ignorance, Incapacity, and Complacency.

Aṅkuśa :—This word may also be rendered by curb, meaning that Ignorance and the rest curb, *i.e.*, impede or obstruct the means to Perfection.

69. Vijñâna Bhikṣu has interpreted this Kârikâ in a different manner and has criticised unfavourably the exposition of Gauḍapâda and Vâchaspati. See our Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram, Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. XI, page 321.

70. The above details of the creations of Buddhi have been fully explained in the commentaries on the Tattva-Samâsaḥ and the Sâṃkhya Pravachana-Sûtram. The reader is accordingly referred to Vol. XI of the Sacred Books of the Hindus.

71. Now, if it be questioned that when any one of the two, *viz.*, creations of Buddhi and creations of the Tan-mâtras, is enough for the accomplishment of the purpose of Puruṣa, what need is there for a twofold creation ? so it is declared in the succeeding Kârikâ.

Twofold creation, of Buddhi and of Tanmâtra, upheld.

न विना भावैर्लिङ्गं न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः ।
लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यस्तस्माद्द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ॥ ५२ ॥

न Na, not. विना Vinâ, without. भावैः Bhâvaiḥ, dispositions, the creations of Buddhi mentioned above. लिङ्गं Liṅgaṃ, the creation of the Tan-mâtras. न

Na, not. विना Vinâ, without. लिङ्गेन Liṅgena, the creation of the Tan-mâtras. भावनिर्वृत्तिः Bhâva-nirvṛittiḥ, cessation or pause of the dispositions. लिङ्गाख्यः Liṅga-âkhyaḥ, termed Liṅga. भावाख्यः Bhâva-âkhyaḥ, termed Bhâva. तस्मात् Tasmât, hence. द्विविधः Dvi-vidhaḥ, twofold. प्रवर्तते Pravartate, proceeds. सर्गः Sargaḥ, creation.

LII. Without the Bhâvas, there would be no Liṅga, without the Liṅga, there would be no surcease of the Bhâvas; wherefrom a twofold creation proceeds: the one called after the Liṅga, the other called after the Bhâvas.

ANNOTATION.

72. Vâchaspati explains the necessity for a twofold creation and their interdependence thus: Experience which is the object of Puruṣa, cannot be possible in the absence of the objects of experience, such as sound and the rest, as well as of the twofold Body which is the Âyatana or house of experience: wherefore the creations of the Tan-mâtras are necessary. In the same manner, the very same Experience is not possible without the Indriyas and the Antaḥ-karaṇa which are the instruments of Experience; these, again, cannot be possible without the Bhâvas, virtue and the rest. Neither is the manifestation of Discrimination, which is the cause of Release, possible in the absence of the twofold creation. Hence the twofold creation is established.

The succession of the two kinds of creation as mutually cause and effect is no fault, as it is from eternity, like that of the seed and the sprout. Even in the beginning of a Kalpa the production of the Bhâvas and the Liṅga under the influence of the Saṃskâra or impression of the Bhâvas and the Liṅga produced in a previous Kalpa, is not unproved.

Gross Creation subdivided.

अष्टविकल्पो दैवस्तैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति ।
मानुष्यश्चैकविधः समासतोऽयं भौतिकः सर्गः ॥ ५३ ॥

अष्टविकल्पः Aṣṭa-vikalpaḥ, having eight specific kinds, *viz.*, Brâhma, Prâjâpatya, etc. दैवः Daivaḥ, divine, celestial, supernatural, super-human. तैर्यग्योनः Tairyak-yonaḥ, the grovelling-born. च Cha, and. पञ्चधा Pañcha-dhâ, fivefold. भवति Bhavati, is. मानुष्यः Mânuṣyaḥ, human. च Cha, and, while. एकविधः Eka-vidhaḥ, uniform, of one kind. समासतः Samâsa-taḥ, briefly. अयं Ayaṃ, this. भौतिकः Bhautikaḥ, of the Bhûtas or beings. सर्गः Sargaḥ, creation.

LIII. The superhuman is of eight kinds; and the grovelling species is of five kinds; and the human is of a

single kind; this, briefly, is the Bhautika Sarga or Creation of Beings.

Higher, Lower, and Intermediate Worlds characterised.

ऊर्द्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालस्तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः ।
मध्ये रजोविशालो ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः ॥ ५४ ॥

ऊर्द्ध्वं Urddhvam, above, in the higher worlds of Brahma and the rest. सत्त्वविशालः Sattva-viśâlaḥ, abundant in Sattva, in which Sattva is dominant and Rajas and Tamas are dormant. तमोविशालः Tamaḥ-viśâlaḥ, abundant in Tamas, in which Tamas is dominant and Sattva and Rajas are dormant. च Cha, and. मूलतः Mûla-taḥ, at the bottom, below.

सर्गः Sargaḥ, creation. मध्ये Madhye, in the middle, in the world of man. रजोविशालः Rajaḥ-viśâlaḥ, abundant in Rajas, in which Rajas is dominant and Sattva and Tamas are dormant. ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः Brahma-âdi-stamba-paryantaḥ, beginning with Brahmâ and ending with a stock.

LIV. Above, the creation is abundant in Sattva; below, it is abundant in Tamas; in the middle, it is abundant in Rajas; such is the creation from Brahmâ down to a stock.

Universality of pain demonstrated.

तत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखं प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः ।
लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेस्तस्माद्दुःखं स्वभावेन ॥ ५५ ॥

तत्र Tatra, therein, in the three worlds, in the bodies of the superhuman, human and grovelling species. जरामरणकृतं Jarâ-maraṇa-kritam, caused by decay and death. दुःखं Duḥkham, pain. प्राप्नोति Prâpnoti, experiences. चेतनः Chetanaḥ, intelligent. The force of this word is to exclude experience of pain from Prakṛiti and her products which are all non-intelligent. पुरुषः Puruṣaḥ, that which lies (*Sete*) in the *Puri* or the Liṅga Śarîra or Subtile Body, Puruṣa. लिङ्गस्य Liṅga-sya, of the Liṅga Śarîra. अविनिवृत्तेः A-vinivṛitteḥ, owing to the non cessation, or till the cessation of the Liṅga Śarîra which is continuant (see Kârikâ XL), and does not cease till the development of discriminative knowledge. तस्मात् Tasmât, therefore. दुःखं Duḥkham, pain. स्वभावेन Sva-bhâvena, by nature.

LV. Therein does intelligent Puruṣa experience pain caused by decay and death, on acount of the non-cessation of, or till the cessation of, the Subtile Body: wherefore pain is the natural order of things.

Object of Prakriti's creation explained.

इत्येषः प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।
प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थ इव परार्थ आरम्भः ॥ ५६ ॥

इति Iti, thus then. एषः Eṣaḥ, this. प्रकृतिकृतः Prakṛiti-kṛitaḥ, originated by Prakṛiti. महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः Mahat-âdi-viśeṣa-bhûta-paryantaḥ, beginning with Mahat and ending with the particular, *i.e.*, gross elemental creations. प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं Pratipuruṣa-artham, for the release of each individual Puruṣa. स्वार्थे Sva-arthe, in her own interest. इव Iva, as. परार्थे Para-arthe, in the interest of another, *i.e.*, of Puruṣa. आरम्भः Ârambhaḥ, creation.

LVI. Thus then is this creation beginning with Mahat and ending with specific entities, originated by Prakṛiti in the interest of another as in her own interest, for the release of each individual Puruṣa.

ANNOTATION.

73. Originated by Prakṛiti: Creation by Prakṛiti is not guided, directed, and controlled by Îśvara or Âdi Puruṣa, for this is impossible, inasmuch as no activity can belong to him. Neither can Brahman be the material of creation, for, being the power or energy of Consciousness, it can undergo no transformation or modification.

For the release of each individual Puruṣa: This explains why, on the release of one Puruṣa, the release of others does not result, and how the activity of Prakṛiti whose nature is to energise, can cease in regard to a particular Puruṣa, and how creation does not ever continue, making release of any one impossible. Vâchaspati explains the passage thus: As a man who desires food, being engaged in the cooking of food, rests after the food has been cooked, so does Prakṛiti, who is engaged in activity with a view to release every individual Puruṣa, cease from energising again in regard to that Puruṣa whom she releases.

Spontaniety of Prakṛiti explained and illustrated.

वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।
पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥

वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं Vatsa-vivṛiddhi-nimittam, for the sake of, or due to the nourishment of, the calf. क्षीरस्य Kṣîra-sya, of milk. यथा Yathâ, as. प्रवृत्तिः Pravṛittiḥ, activity, *i.e.*, secretion. अज्ञस्य A-jña-sya, of the unintelligent. पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं Puruṣa-vimokṣa-nimittam, due to the release of Puruṣa. तथा Tathâ, so. प्रवृत्तिः Pravṛittiḥ, activity, *i.e.*, creation. प्रधानस्य Pradhâna-sya, of the Pradhâna.

LVII. Just as is the secretion of milk, which is unintelligent, for the sake of nourishment of the calf, so is the creation of the Pradhâna for the sake of the release of Puruṣa.

ANNOTATION.

74. This Kârikâ gives an answer to those who entertain doubts as to how an unintelligent substance such as Prakṛiti is represented here to be, can engage in activity for an altruistic end. It cannot be maintained that the secretion of milk takes place under the superintendence of Îśvara. For all intelligent activity such as, for instance, as is here attributed to Îśvara, proceeds either from selfish motives or from compassion. Now, in the case of Îśvara, who is *exhypothesi* all-full, having all desires fulfilled, wanting in nothing whatever, can possibly have no selfish ends to accomplish. Compassion also is impossible; for compassion implies the desire to alleviate, remove or prevent suffering, but prior to creation there is no existence of the Jîvas, Indriyas, Bodies, and Objects, and consequently no pain, no suffering. Compassion, therefore, cannot be the motive for creation. Further, were creation an act of compassion on the part of Îśvara, one would expect to find in it only happy beings, but such is not the case, but just the opposite. The anomaly cannot be explained by reference to diversity of Karma, as in that case the alleged superintendence of Karma by an omniscient and omnipotent Being falls to the ground. Prakṛiti, on the other hand, being unintelligent, has no selfish motive nor any motive of compassion to impel her to activity. Her activity is directed simply by the end of the other; she exists for his sake. Her action is of the nature of a sympathetic response, of harmonical variation or correspondence, like the secretion of the mother's milk, in response to the requirement of the baby.

Above continued.

औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥ ५८ ॥

औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं Autsukya-nivṛitti-artham, for the sake of relieving or gratifying desire or curiosity. यथा Yathâ, as. क्रियासु Kriyâsu, in acts. प्रवर्तते Pravartate, engages. लोकः Lokaḥ, man. पुरुषस्य Puruṣa-sya, of Puruṣa. विमोक्षार्थं Vimokṣa-artham, for the sake of release. प्रवर्तते Pravartate, energises. तद्वत् Tat-vat, similarly to this. अव्यक्तम् A-Vyaktam, the Unmanifest, Prakṛiti.

LVIII. Just as people engage in acts to relieve

anxiety or desires, so does the Unmanifest energise for the purpose of the release of Puruṣa.

How Prakṛiti's creation ceases spontaneously.

रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।
पुरुषस्य तथात्मानं प्रकाश्य निवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ ५९ ॥

रङ्गस्य Raṅga-sya, to the stage, *i.e.*, the spectators. दर्शयित्वा Darśayitvâ, having exhibited. निवर्तते Nivartate, ceases, desists. नर्तकी Nartaki, fair dancer. यथा Yathâ, as. नृत्यात् Nṛityât, from dance. पुरुषस्य Puruṣa-sya, to Puruṣa. तथा Tathâ, similarly. आत्मानं Âtmânaṃ, herself. प्रकाश्य Prakâśya, having exhibited. निवर्तते Nivartate, ceases. प्रकृतिः Prakṛitiḥ, Prakṛiti.

LIX. Just as a fair dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectators, desists from the dance, so does Prakṛiti desist, having exhibited herself to Puruṣa.

Unselfishness of Prakṛiti demonstrated.

नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिण्यनुपकारिणः पुंसः ।
गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थकं चरति ॥ ६० ॥

नानाविधैः Nânâ-vidhaiḥ, manifold. उपायैः Upâyaiḥ, by means. उपकारिणी Upakâriṇi, generous, beneficent. अनुपकारिणः An-upakâriṇaḥ, non-beneficent, ungrateful. पुंसः Puṃsaḥ, of Puruṣa. गुणवती Guṇa-vatî, possessing the Guṇas, possessing qualities, virtuous. अगुणस्य A-guṇa-sya, devoid of the Guṇas, devoid of qualities, worthless. सतः Sataḥ, as he is. तस्य Tasya, his. अर्थं Artham, object. अपार्थकं Ap-artha-kaṃ, objectless. चरति Charati, pursues.

LX. By manifold means does benevolent Prakṛiti, possessed of the Guṇas, pursue, in a manner in which she has no interest of her own, the object of Puruṣa who makes no return, being devoid as he is of the Guṇas.

How activity of Prakṛiti ceases for ever, in regard to the released Puruṣa.

प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।
या दृष्टास्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥

प्रकृतेः Prakṛiteḥ, than Prakṛiti. सुकुमारतरं Sukumâra-taraṃ, more gentle or delicate. न Na, not. किञ्चित् Kiṃ chit, anything. अस्ति Asti, exists. इति Iti, such. मे Me, my. मतिः Matiḥ, opinion. भवति Bhavati, is. या Yâ, who. दृष्टा Dṛiṣṭâ, seen.

अस्मि Asmi, I am. इति Iti, so. पुनः Punaḥ, again. न Na, not. दर्शनम् Darśanam, seeing, gaze, sight. उपैति Upaiti, approaches. पुरुषस्य Puruṣa-sya, of Puruṣa.

LXI. My opinion is that nothing exists which is more delicate than Prakṛiti who, knowing that, "I have seen," comes no more within the sight of Puruṣa.

ANNOTATION.

75. This Kârikâ explains and illustrates how Prakṛiti does not energise, over again, in regard to the released Puruṣa.

Bondage, Transmigration and Release are all of Prakṛiti, and not of Puruṣa.

तस्मान्न बध्यतेऽद्धा न मुच्यते नापि संसरति पुरुषः ।
संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥ ६२ ॥

तस्मात् Tasmât, therefore. न Na, not. बध्यते Badhyate, is bound. अद्धा Addhâ, any, whatever. न Na, not. मुच्यते Muchyate, is released. न Na, not. अपि Api, also. संसरति Saṃsarati, transmigrates. पुरुषः Puruṣaḥ, Puruṣa संसरति Saṃsarati, transmigrates. बध्यते Badhyate, is bound. मुच्यते Muchyate, is released. च Cha, and. नानाश्रया Nânâ-âśrayâ, the support of manifold creations or beings. प्रकृतिः Prakṛitiḥ, Prakṛiti.

LXII. Wherefore, verily, no Puruṣa is ever bound, nor is released, nor transmigrates. Prakṛiti, being the support of manifold creations, is bound, is released, and transmigrates.

How Prakṛiti binds and releases herself.

रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।
सैव च पुरुषार्थं प्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥

रूपैः Rûpaiḥ, by forms, modes, conditions, dispositions. सप्तभिः Saptabhiḥ, seven, *viz.* virtue, vice, dispassion, passion, power, weakness, and ignorance. एव Eva, verily. बध्नाति Badhnâti, binds. आत्मानम् Âtmânam, herself, आत्मना Âtmanâ, by herself. प्रकृतिः Prakṛitiḥ, Prakṛiti. सा Sâ, she. एव Eva, it is. च Cha, and. पुरुषार्थं Puruṣa-artham, object of Puruṣa. प्रति Prati, in regard to. विमोचयति vimochayati, releases. एकरूपेण Eka-rûpeṇa, by one form, *i. e.*, of Knowledge.

LXIII. By seven forms does Prakṛiti bind herself by herself; and it is she who, by one form, releases herself for the sake of Puruṣa.

How discriminative knowledge is fully developed.

एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्ति न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।
अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥

एवं Evam, so, in the manner taught above. तत्त्वाभ्यासात् Tattva-abhyâsât, through cultivation of the knowledge of the Tattvas or twenty-five Principles. न Na, not. अस्ति Asti, is. न Na, not. मे Me, mine. न Na, not. अहम् Aham, I. इति Iti, thus. अपरिशेषम् Apariśeṣam, beyond which there remains nothing to know, final. अविपर्ययात् A-viparyayât, from the absence of error and doubt. विशुद्धं Viśuddham, purified, free. केवलम् Kevalam, single, unsullied. उत्पद्यते Utpadyate, is produced. ज्ञानम् Jñânam, knowledge.

LXIV. So, through cultivation of the knowledge of the Tattvas, is produced the final, pure, because free from error and doubt, and one single knowledge that neither does agency belong to me, nor is attachment mine, nor am I identical with the Body, etc.

Relation of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa after Release.

तेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशात् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् ।
प्रकृतिं पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः स्वस्थः ॥ ६५ ॥

तेन Tena, thereby, by means of knowledge of the Tattvas, as described in the preceding Kârikâ. निवृत्तप्रसवाम् Nivṛitta-prasavâm, whose prolificness has come to cease through creation of all that was to be created for the sake of Puruṣa. अर्थवशात् Artha-vaśât, through the influence of the object, *viz.*, knowledge of the Tattvas. सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् Sapta-rûpa-vinivṛittâm, desisting from the seven forms, virtue and the rest, by which she binds herself and which are no longer required for the sake of Puruṣa, both of whose objects, experience and release, are accomplished. प्रकृतिं Prakṛitiṃ, Prakṛiti. पश्यति Paśyati, looks at. पुरुषः Puruṣaḥ, Puruṣa. प्रेक्षकवत् Prekṣaka-vat, like a spectator in a theatre. अवस्थितः Avaṣthitaḥ, seated, standing by. स्वस्थः Sva-sthaḥ, self-reposed, undisturbed, freed from the reflection of Buddhi rendered impure by means of the modifications of Rajas and Tamas.

LXV. Thereby having her prolific energy stopped, and desisting from the seven forms under the influence of knowledge, Prakṛiti is looked at by Puruṣa just like a spectator, standing by, self-reposed.

Conjunction of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa is not, as such, the cause of creation.

दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षक एको दृष्टाहमित्युपरमत्यन्या ।
सति संयोगेऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनं नास्ति सर्गस्य ॥ ६६ ॥

दृष्टा Dṛiṣṭâ, seen. मया Mayâ, by me. इति Iti, so. उपेक्षकः Upekṣakaḥ, regardless, indifferent, unaffected. एकः Ekaḥ, the one, Puruṣa. दृष्टा Dṛiṣṭâ, seen. अहम् Aham, I. इति Iti, so. उपरमति Uparamati, desists. अन्या Anyâ, the other, Prakṛiti. सति Sati, existing, continuing. संयोगे Saṃyoge, conjunction, existence side by side. अपि Api, even. तयोः Tayoḥ of the two. प्रयोजनं Prayojanaṃ, purpose, motive. न Na, not. अस्ति, Exists. सर्गस्य Sarga-sya, of creation.

LXVI. "She has been seen by me,"—so the one stands indifferent; "I have been seen,"—so the other desists. Though their conjunction still remains, there does not exist any motive for creation.

Jîvan-Mukti explained.

सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमाद्धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ ।
तिष्ठति संस्कारवशाच्चक्रभ्रमवद्धृतशरीरः ॥ ६७ ॥

सम्यक् Samyak, perfect. ज्ञानाधिगमात् Jñâna-adhigamât, from attainment of knowledge. धर्मादीनाम् Dharma-âdînâm, of virtue and the rest. अकारणप्राप्तौ A-kâraṇa-prâptau, on reaching or being reduced to the state in which they lose their power of causing effects. तिष्ठति Tiṣṭhati, remains. संस्कारवशात् Saṃskâra-vaśât, from the influence of Saṃskâra or impression or the effect of the impulse previously given to it चक्रभ्रमवत् Chakra-bhrama-vat, like the whirling of the potter's wheel. धृतशरीरः Dhṛita-śarîraḥ, invested with a Body.

LXVII. Through attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest coming to be deprived of their power as causes, Puruṣa yet continues invested with body under the influence of previous Dharma and A-Dharma, as the potter's wheel continues whirling (from momentum).

ANNOTATION.

76. This Kârikâ explains the fact of Jîvan-Mukti or release in life, as in the case of Kapila, Vâmadeva, and others. Jîvan-Mukti consists in the release of an incarnate Puruṣa from the entanglement of Prakṛiti prior to his separation from the Body. These two things, *viz.*, release from bondage and continuance of the Body, are compatible with each other, as they are dependent upon independent causes. For, universally, release

takes place on the manifestation of discriminative knowledge between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, in other words, it does not imply the acquisition of a new state or condition, but consists merely in the removal of a veil or a shadow, as it were; whereas the Body is the positive result of positive causes and depends for its existence or non-existence upon those very causes. These causes are Dharma and A-Dharma, or merit and demerit, collectively termed Karma. Now, Karma is distinguished as Prârabdha or operative, Sañchita or stored or potential, and Agamika, or to come, or future. On the attainment of discriminative knowledge, Sañchita Karma or Karma in seed-form is burnt up and rendered infructuous, and Âgamika Karma also is necessarily precluded. Only the Prârabdha then remains. It is Karma acquired by acts performed in a previous life and which has become operative in the present life, that is to say, it is the cause of conjunction with the present Body and of all the experiences of the present incarnate existence. It is not affected by discriminative knowledge, and it goes on sustaining the Body till it is exhausted or works itself out, in its natural course, when the Body which was supported by it, automatically drops down. It is hence, therefore, that when discriminative knowledge is perfectly developed before the Prârabdha has worked itself out, the incarnate Puruṣa in question, is released, but remains awhile burdened with the Body. This is what is called Jîvan-Mukti or the state of release during life.

When a Jîvan-Mukta is finally released.

प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ ।
ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥

प्राप्ते Prâpte, come to pass, that is, on the exhaustion of Prârabdha Karma by experience. शरीरभेदे Śarîra-bhede, on separation from the body. चरितार्थत्वात् Charita-artha-tvât, for the reason that she has fulfilled her purpose, *viz.*, Creation for the experience and release of Puruṣa. प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ Pradhâna-vinivṛittau, on the cessation of the activity of the Pradhâna. ऐकान्तिकम् Aikântikam, certain, absolute. आत्यन्तिकम् Âtyantikam, final, imperishable. उभयं Ubhayam, both. कैवल्यम् Kaivalyam, singleness, pureness, freedom from the reflection of the threefold pain. आप्नोति Âpnoti, attains.

LXVIII. When (in due course) separation from the Body takes place, and there is cessation of the activity of the Pradhâna from her purpose having been fulfilled Puruṣa attains both absolute and final Kaivalya.

Origin of the Sâṃkhya declared.

पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यं परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम्।
स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥ ६९ ॥

पुरुषार्थज्ञानम् Puruṣa-artha-jñânam, knowledge for the accomplishment of the end of Puruṣa, *i.e.*, release. इदं Idam, this. गुह्यं Guhyam, secret, abstruse, unintelligible to the dull. परमर्षिणा Parama-ṛiṣiṇâ, by the great Ṛiṣi or Seer, namely Kapila. समाख्यातम् Sam-âkhyâtam, thoroughly expounded, expounded in all details. स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाः Sthiti-utpatti-pralayâḥ, duration, production, and dissolution. चिन्त्यन्ते Chintyante, are considered, discussed. यत्र Yatra, wherein. भूतानाम् Bhûtânâm, of created things, beings.

LXIX. This abstruse knowledge, adapted to the end of Puruṣa, wherein the production, duration, and dissolution of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the great Ṛiṣi.

ANNOTATION.

77. Vâchaspati construes the second line of the Karika in a different manner. It is thus: Yatra, wherein, that is, in which knowledge, that is to say, for which knowledge, the origin, duration and destruction of living beings are considered by the Śrutis. Hereby he wants to bring out the sense that the Sâṃkhya is connected with, and is supported by, the Veda.

Traditional succession of the Sâṃkhya stated.

एतत् पवित्रमग्र्यं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ।
आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय तेन च बहुधाकृतं तन्त्रम् ॥७०॥

एतत् Etat, this. पवित्रम् Pavitram, purifying, *i.e.*, from the sin causing the threefold pain. अग्र्यं Agryam, first in order, principal among all purifying things, foremost. मुनिः Muniḥ, Muni, sage Kapila. आसुरये Âsuraye, to Âsuri. अनुकम्पया Anukampayâ, through compassion. प्रददौ Pradadau, taught, imparted. आसुरिः Âsuriḥ, Âsuri. अपि Api, again. पञ्चशिखाय Pañchaśikhâya, to Pañchaśikha. तेन Tena, by him. च Cha, and. बहुधाकृतं Bahu-dhâ-kṛitam, extensively propagated, elaborated in manifold ways. तन्त्रम् Tantram, the system.

LXX. This foremost purifying knowledge the Muni, through compassion, imparted to Asuri; Âsuri, again, to Pañchaśikha, by whom the System was elaborated in manifold ways.

ANNOTATION.

78. In this and the succeeding Kârikâ the traditional succession of the Sâṃkhya doctrine is recorded with a view to establish its authentic character and thereby to inspire reverence towards it.

79. According to Gauḍapâdá, the Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ ends with this Kârikâ. "For the Sâṃkhya which is the cause of release from transmigration, was declared by the Muni Kapila, wherein or in regard to which," as he says, "there are these seventy verses in the Âryâ metre." This is supported by the other traditional name for the Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ which is Sâṃkhya-Saptati or the Seventy (Verses) on the Sâṃkhya Vâchaspati, on the other hand, has not questioned the genuineness, or the claim to authority, of the additional two Kârikâs and has added his comment to them.

Above continued.

शिष्यपरम्परयागतमीश्वरकृष्णेन स चैतदार्याभिः ।
संक्षिप्तमार्यमतिना सम्यग् विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ ७१ ॥

शिष्यपरम्परया Śiṣya-paramparayâ, by tradition of disciples. आगतम् Âgatam descended, received. ईश्वरकृष्णेन Îśvarakṛiṣṇena, by Îśvarakṛiṣṇa, the author of the Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ. सः Saḥ, this. च Cha, and. एतत्, this. आर्याभिः Âryâbhiḥ, by Âryâ verses. संक्षिप्तम् Saṃkṣiptam, abridged, summarised, compendiously written आर्यमतिना Ârya-matinâ, whose intelligence reached to the Tattvas; holy-minded सम्यक् Samyak, thoroughly. विज्ञाय Vijñâya, understanding, realising. सिद्धान्तम् Siddhântam, domonstrated truth, established tenet, doctrine.

LXXI. And this doctrine, descended by tradition of disciples, to the holy-minded Iśvarakṛiṣṇa, having been thoroughly understood by him, has been summarised by means of these Âryâs.

Relation of the Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ to the Sâṃkya-Pravachana-Sûtram.

सप्तत्या किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य ।
आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि ॥ ७२ ॥

सप्तत्या Saptatyâ, by the seventy-versed treatise. किल Kila, truly. ये Ye, whatever. अर्थाः Arthâḥ, subjects, topics. ते Te, those. अर्थाः Arthâḥ, subjects. कृत्स्नस्य Kṛitana-sya, entire, whole. षष्टितन्त्रस्य Ṣaṣṭi-tantra-sya, of the system of sixty topics. आख्यायिकाविरहिताः Âkhyâyikâ-virahitâḥ, disjoined from the illustrative stories. परवादविवर्जिताः Para-vâda-vivarjitâḥ, omitting demolition of opposite doctrines. च Cha, and. अपि Api, also.

LXXII. The subjects which are treated by the Saptati, are the subjects of the entire Ṣaṣṭi-Tantra, exclusive of the illustrative stories, and omitting demolition of opposite doctrines.

ANNOTATION.

80. The term Ṣaṣṭi-Tantra alludes to the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram divided into the six Books, namely, of Topics, of the Evolutions of the Pradhâna, of Dispassion, of Fables, of the Demolition of Counter-Theories, and of Recapitulation of Teachings. It is thus constructive, illustrative and destructive in its method. In its constructive portions, it establishes the sixty topics of the Sâṃkhya System. The same is done by the Saptati as well. Inasmuch, however, as the latter omits the stories and controversies, and also does not deal with the topics in so much detail, it has, in the preceding Kârikâ, been described as a summary of the former.

The sixty topics alluded to above are: 1. the existence, that is, conjunction with, and disjunction from, Puruṣa, of the Pradhâna, 2. her unity or singleness, 3. her objectiveness, 4 her subservience, 5. the distinctness of Puruṣa, 6. his manifoldness, 7. his inactivity, 8. his conjunction, 9. his disjunction, and 10. the duration of the rest, these are the ten radical topics.

According to another enumeration, the ten radical categories are 1. Puruṣa, 2. Prakṛiti, 3. Mahat, 4. Ahamkâra, 5-7. Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, 8. the Tan-Mâtras, 9. the Indriyas, and 10. the Elements.

A third enumeration specifies them as, 1. the eternality of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, 2. the reality of experience and discriminative knowledge in Prakṛiti, 3. the unity of Prakṛiti and of Puruṣa, throughout transmigration, 4. the subservience of Prakṛiti, 5. the difference between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, 6. the inactivity of Paruṣa, 7. the multiplicity of Puruṣa, 8. the conjunction of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti at the time of creation, 9. the disjunction of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti at the time of release, and 10. the pre-existence of Mahat and the other Tattvas in their respective causes.

Add to them, the five kinds of error, nine of complacency, twenty-eight of incapacity, and eight of perfection. Thus the number sixty is obtained.

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APPENDIX VII.

PANCHAŚIKHA SÚTRAM

OR

A FEW OF THE APHORISMS OF PANCHAŚIKHA.

PANCHASIKHA-SUTRAM.

INTRODUCTORY.

1. Pañchaśikha is one of the few earliest writers on the Sâṃkhya. He is an authority on the subject, and is mentioned as an Âchârya or Professor of the School. According to Îśvarakṛiṣṇa, the author of Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, the original Sâṃkhya which descended from its founder Kapila to Pañchaśikha (through Âsuri, see Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ, No. LXX), was elaborated by him in manifold ways. But not a single one of his works is amongst the current coins of the Sâṃkhya literature. "He is known, by scanty fragments, as the author of a collection of philosophical aphorisms. One other performance, if not two, is likewise imputed to him; and he, perhaps, descanted on the theistic (sic) Sâṃkhya as well as on the atheistic (sic.)" (F. E. Hall). It would appear, from Vijñâna Bhikṣu's Commentary on the Vedânta-Sûtram, that Pañchaśikha wrote a commentary on the Tattva-Samâsa.

2. The only source, as yet discovered, so far as we know, from which a few of the aphorisms of Pañchaśikha can be recovered, is Vyâsa's Commentary on the Yoga-Sûtram of Patañjali. In the Preface to his edition of the Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Bhâṣyam of Vijñâna Bhikṣu, Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall has collected eleven aphorisms of Pañchaśikha quoted by Vyâsa in his said Commentary. Another collection of extracts from the same source has been published, under the title of Pañchaśikha-âchârya-praṇîta Sâṃkhya-Sûtra, by Paṇḍita Râjâ Ram, Professor of Sanskrit, D. A. V. College, Lahore, in Nos. 4 and 5, Vol. VIII, 1912, of the series entitled Ârṣa-Granthâvali, Lahore. This collection contains twenty-one aphorisms including one of Vârṣagaṇya. Quite recently, again, we had the peculiar opportunity of examining the MS. of another collection of aphorisms attributed to Pañchaśikha, prepared by Svâmî Hariharânanda Araṇya of the Kâpila Âśrama in the District of Hooghli. This was obviously not an original compilation, but a reproduction of the Lahore publication, with a few additions, one of which was taken from the Veda without acknowledgment! As regards the collection of Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall and the collection of Paṇḍita Râja Râm, we have found that the one is in certain respects, more complete and correct than the other, while the paternity of some of the aphorisms attributed in it to Pañchaśikha

is not free from suspicion. These will be noticed more in detail in the subsequent pages.

3. "Little can safely be conjectured," as rightly observes Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall, "with regard to the character of the work or works from which these sentences were collected by Vyâsa. They may be text; and they may be commentary. Probably they are Sâṃkhya; but, possibly, they pertain to the Yoga. That Pañchaśikha treated of other subjects than the Sâṃkhya, may be inferred from a remark of Vijñâna Bhikṣu's:

Svaprayojana-abhâve'pi viduṣâṃ pravṛittau Pañchaśikha-âchârya-vâkyaṃ sâṃkhya-sthaṃ pramâṇayati.—Yoga-Vârtika, I. 25."

आदिविद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय कारुण्याद्भगवान् महर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच ॥

4. आदिविद्वान् Âdi-Vidvân, the primeval Seer. "Primeval" means pro-ed at the beginning of Creation. "Seer" means Darśana-kâra or one o has had direct vision of Puruṣa as distinct from Prakṛiti. In its nary significance, the term "Âdi-Vidvân" is applicable to Viṣṇu alone. re it refers to Kapila, the reputed founder of the Sâṃkhya Tantra, cause "it is the self-existent Viṣṇu who appeared as the first Wise Man, pila, at the beginning of the current cycle of Cosmic Evolution, dowed with virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and infallible will" (Vâchas-ti Miśra).

5. निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय Nirmâṇa-chittam adhiṣṭhâya, presiding over, ensoul-g, or through the medium of, a self-made mental vehicle. These words plain how Viṣṇu became incarnated as Kapila. He, by an act of will, produced Himself as the mighty sage Kapila. Kapila was not a deve-ped man, but an enveloped Divinity. This artificial creation of bodies, ensouled by artificial emanations of the mind, which is one of the most wonderful discoveries of the Hindu Spiritual Science, is not expected to make any deep impression on the minds of the majority of Western Scholars in the present age, nor to engage them in the investigation or in an examination of the truth in this matter, in a true scientific spirit. Neither do we here propose to enter into a discussion with them on this subject. We shall simply mention, for the information of readers at large, that this subject of the creation of artificial bodies and minds is dealt with in the Yoga-Sûtram of Patañjali, IV. 4, 5, and 6 (See the Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol IV., 272-273). And to make the words of our text a little more illuminating to them, we may take the following extract from the Introduction to the above volume :—

"A Yogi, having attained the power of Samâdhi, sets about destroying his past Karmas. All Karmas may be divided into three classes :—(1) The acts done in the past, the consequences of which the man *must* suffer in the present life; the Karmas to expiate which he has taken the present birth or incarnation. They are the *ripe* Karmas (Prârabdha). (2) The Karmas done in the past, but which are not ripe, and will have to be expiated in some future life. They are the *stored* Karmas, or *unripe* (Sañchita). (3) The Karmas which a man creates in his present life, and which have to be expiated in a future or the present life. This last kind of act,—the fresh Karmas, can be stopped. By devotion to the Lord and doing everything

in a spirit of service, no *fresh* Karmas are generated. The incurring of debt is stopped. The man, however, has to pay off past debts—the ripe and unripe Karmas. The ripe Karmas will produce their effects in the present life. The Yogî does not trouble himself about this. But the *unripe* or *stored* Karmas require a future birth. It is here that the Yogî is of the greatest practical importance. The Yogî is not bound to wait for future lives in order to get an opportunity to pay off the debt of Sañchita Karmas. He simultaneously *creates* ALL the bodies that those Sañchita Karmas require,—through those bodies expiates all his Karmas simultaneously. Every one of such bodies has a Chitta or mentality of his own. This is the Nirmâṇa-chitta or the Artificial mind—like the Pseudo-Personalities of hypnoptic trance. These artificial minds arise simultaneously like so many sparks from the Âhaṃkâric matter of the Yogî's Self, and they ensoul the artificial bodies created for them. These artificial bodies with artificial minds in them, walk through the earth in hundreds,—they are distinguished from ordinary men by the fact that they are perfectly methodical in all their acts, and automatic in their lives. All these artificials are controlled by the consciousness of the Yogî,—one consciousness controlling hundred automatons. Every one of these automatons has a particular destiny, a particular portion of the Sañchita Karma to exhaust. As soon as that destiny is fulfilled, the Yogî withdraws his ray from it, and the "man" dies a sudden death,—a heart-failure generally.

"Now, what is the difference between the ordinary mind and the Yoga-created mind,—the natural Chitta and the artificial Chitta? The natural mind by experience gains a habit, the impressions are stored in it, and they, as Vâsanâs, become the seeds of desires and activities. The artificial mind is incapable of storing up impressions in it. It has no Vâsanâs and consequently it disintegrates as soon as the body falls down."

6. कारुण्यात् Kâruṇyât, through compassion. This word, according to Vyâsa, tells us what the teaching of the text is. It is this that Îśvara, out of the abundance of His compassion towards all Puruṣas, incarnates Himself, from time to time, in order to teach them knowledge and virtue, whereby they may be delivered from bondage. The passage of the text is quoted by Vyâsa in his Commentary on the Yoga-Sûtram, I. 25, and Vâchaspati explains the purpose of the quotation thus: "This theory that the [illegible] passionate Lord teaches knowledge and virtue is also common teaching of Kapila:—So has it been said by Pañchaśikha." *Prasâda's translation.*

7. भगवान् Bhagavân, divine. This term connotes the possession [illegible]

virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and infallible will. And we know that these were cognate with Kapila.

8. परमर्षिः Parama-ṛiṣiḥ, the mighty sage. Viṣṇu appeared on earth as Kapila, in the highly purified and richly developed body of a saint who held communion with the gods. The necessity for such bodies for divine manifestations has been admirably explained and illustrated by the late Babu Sisir Kumar Ghosh in his *Lord Gauraṅga.*

9. आसुरये Âsuraye, to Âsuri, a disciple of Kapila and the first recipient of the Sâṃkhya.

10. जिज्ञासमानाय Jijñâsamânâya, who wished to know Âsuri approached the divine man Kapila and desired to know from him the means for the accomplishment of the Supreme Good, namely, the permanent prevention of pain.

11. तन्त्रम् Tantram, the systematic teaching, the Sâṃkhya doctrine.

12. प्रोवाच Pra-uvâcha, declared fully, revealed. Such, then, is the origin of the Sâṃkhya.

I. The primeval Seer, (incarnated), through the medium of an artificial mind, (as) the mighty divine sage (Kapila), out of compassion (towards all entangled Puruṣas), revealed the (Sâṃkhya) doctrine, in a systematic way, to Âsuri, who desired to know them.

13. Now, what is this Sâṃkhya Darśana? "Darśana" etymologically means the act or the result of seeing, from the root √Dṛiś, to see. Here it stands for Sâkṣâtkâra or immediate vision, that is, intuition of the Self. And "Sâṃkhya" means that by which something is perfectly revealed, from the root √Khyâ, to manifest. The "Sâṃkhya Darśana," therefore, is that form of Spiritual Intuition of the Self, whereby the nature of the Self is perfectly revealed. So declares Pañchaśikha :—

एकमेव दर्शनं ख्यातिरेव दर्शनम् ॥

एकम् Ekam, one, single. एव Eva, only, there is no second. दर्शनं Darśanam, intuition, knowledge. ख्यातिः Khyâtiḥ, coming to light, shining, manifestation, revelation. एव Eva, alone. दर्शनम् Darśanam. intuition, knowledge.

II. There is but one Spiritual Intuition of the Self; nothing but manifestation which is the Spiritual Intuition of the Self.

14. The word 'Khyâti' is suggestive in more respects than Now, manifestation is declared to be the means of accomplishing Mokṣa Release. (1) What, then, must be its nature? It cannot obviously be of t nature of the attainment of some advanced state or development from a st less advanced or less developed; for Manifestation itself cannot acco plish this. It will also be repugnant to the Sâṃkhya conception of t Self; for the Self is kûṭastha, unchangeable; it ever *is*, never *becom* It follows, therefore, that Mokṣa consists merely in the removal of shadow, as it were, that is, of something which casts its reflection the Self and thereby overshadows it and causes obstruction to its shini out in the fullness of its own light. (2) This shadow, this obstructi is not of, or from, the Self, but is a creation of the Not-Self. And wh is the cause of its origin, the same is also the cause of its remov It fades or deepens, it contracts or expands, it exists or ceases to exi and for this depends entirely on the activity or non-activity of the Not-Se (3) The Self is altogether passive and inert. Shadow or no shadow, it ever there, all-full, ever shining, unaffected, unsullied. In ignoranc men speak of the Bondage of the Self which is never bound, ever release Bondage, in reality, is this supreme ignorance, this veil of the No Self,—the non-discrimination of the principle of Becoming and t principle of Being,—to which alone is due all the suffering in t world,—not exactly suffering, for actual suffering there can be, and i nothing in the Self, but the Abhimâna or assumption or attributi of it to the Self. Replace non-discrimination by Discrimination, t veil is gone, and gone with it is the Shadow—the obstruction—and s the ever pure, ever constant, ever shining Self.

15. This Aphorism of Pañchaśikha has been quoted by Vyâs in his Commentary on the Aphorism I. 4 of Patañjali's Yoga-Sûtram i the following context: Yoga is the inihibition of the modificatio of the mind (chitta) (Yoga-Sûtram I. 2). Then the Seer (Puruṣa) stan in his own nature (*Ibid* I. 3), that is, is established in his own intrins form, as in the state of kaivalya or absolute abstractedness. Elsewhe (there takes place in him) similarity of form with the modificatio (*Ibid* I. 4). How does it take place? Because objects are presented him. Whatever, therefore, be the modifications of the mind, with t same is Puruṣa invested, so long as the mind remains up and doin That is to say, Puruṣa, with the light of his intelligence, illumina the manifold modifications of the active mind, which, consequently, mistaken as being the manifestations of Puruṣa. It is thus this mista the failure to distinguish between the unintelligent modifications

he unintelligent mind and the intelligence of the inert, immutable Puruṣa, which is the cause of all the mental phenomena so universally ttributed to Puruṣa. In reality, however, the manifestation of Puruṣa is ne and one only, the same at all times and in all circumstances. And so here is the Aphorism: "There is but one Spiritual Intuition of the Self; it s nothing but Manifestation, which is the Spiritual Intuition of the Self."

16. The Self is most difficult to know. It is inscrutable. Only a teady, pure, and peaceful mind can reflect it as it is in itself. Steadiness f the mind implies a long and arduous process of Yogic practice. The tepping-stone to it is what is called Jyotiṣmatî or the state of lucidity, r the activity which causes illumination. This activity of the mind is wofold, according as it is painless objective (viśoka-viṣayavatî) or is urely egoistic (asmitâ-mâtrâ). It is described by Vyâsa in his Commentary on Yoga-Sûtram, I. 36, in the following manner: "It is the onsciousness of thought-forms (Buddhi), on the part of one who practises oncentration upon the Lotus of the Heart. For, the substance of Buddhi is refulgent and is like Âkâśa, *i.e.*, all-pervading. Through success n concentration upon that, the activity of the mind modifies by the orms having the colour of the light of the sun, the moon, the planets nd precious stones. Likewise, the mind concentrated upon Asmitâ, -am-ness or egoism, becomes pure egoism, calm and infinite, like a raveless ocean." And he supports his exposition by quoting the ollowing Aphorism of Pañchaśikha:

तमणुमात्रमात्मानुविद्यास्मीत्येवं तावत् संप्रजानीते ॥

तम् Tam, that. अणुमात्रम् Aṇu-mâtram, of the size of an atom, small as an tom, difficult to understand, inscrutable. आत्मानम् Âtmânam, Self. अनुविद्य Anuidya, knowing at last. अस्मि Asmi, am. इति Iti, that. एवं Evaṃ, in this form. तावत् Tâvat, for certain. संप्रजानीते Saṃ-pra-jânîte, fully and accurately knows

III. Knowing, at last, that inscrutable Self, his consciousness mainfests as "I am" only.

17. It has been mentioned above that the identification of the rinciple of Being with the Principle of Becoming, of the Self with the ot-Self, is the cause of all the suffering in the Universe. This identification is called A-vidyâ. Its nature is declared by Pañchaśikha in the ollowing two Aphorisms:

व्यक्तमव्यक्तं वा सत्त्वमात्मत्वेनाभिप्रतीत्य तस्य संपदमनुन्दत्यात्मसंपदं मन्वानस्तस्य व्यापदमनुशोचत्यात्मव्यापदं न्वानः स सर्वोऽप्रतिबुद्धः ॥

व्यक्तम् Vyaktam, unfolded, sentient substances or existences. such as wife son, animals, etc. अव्यक्तम् A-vyaktam, not unfolded, insentient objects, such as riches house, couch, etc. वा Vâ, or. सत्त्वम् Sattvam, existence, substance, object. आत्मत्वेन Âtma-tvena, under the characteristic of the Self, as being the Self. अभिप्रतीत्य Abhi-pratîtya, approaching towards in mind, thinking, believing, taking up. तस्य Tasya, its, of the object. संपदम् Sampadam, prosperity, well-being. अनुनन्दति Anu nandati, rejoices at or according to. आत्मसंपदं Âtma-Sampadam, well-being of the Self. मन्वानः Manvânah, imagining. तस्य Tasya, its, of the object. व्यापदम् Vyâpadam, adversity. अनुशोचति Anu-Śochati, grieves according to. आत्मव्यापदं Âtma-vyâpadam, adversity of the Self. मन्वानः Manvânah, imagining. सः Sah, he. सर्वः Sarvah all. अप्रतिबुद्धः A-prati-buddhah, unawakened in regard to the truth.

IV. They are all unawakened who, believing the objective entities, whether they be sentient or insentient, to be the Self, rejoice at their prosperity, imagining it to be the prosperity of the Self, and grieve at their adversity, imagining it to be the adversity of the Self.

18. This Aphorism has been quoted by Vyâsa in his Commentary on Yoga-Sûtram II. 5 which describes A-vidyâ as being "the manifestation of the non-eternal, the impure, the painful, and the Not-Self to be the eternal, the pure, the pleasant, and the Self."

बुद्धितः परं पुरुषमाकारशीलविद्यादिभिरपश्यन् कुर्यात्तत्रात्मबुद्धिं मोहेन ॥

बुद्धितः Buddhi-tah, from Buddhi. परं Param, different. पुरुषम् Purusam, Purusa. आकारशीलविद्यादिभिः Âkâra-Śîla-vidyâ-âdibhih, by nature, character, knowledge, etc. The nature of Purusa is constant purity. Indifference is his character. By knowledge is denoted his being intelligent. Whereas Buddhi is impure, not indifferent, and non-intelligent. अपश्यन् A-paśyan, not seeing. कुर्यात् Kuryât, is led to form. तत्र Tatra, therein, in respect of Buddhi. आत्मबुद्धिं Âtma-buddhim, the notion of the Self. मोहेन Mohena, by reason of the dullness (of Tamas).

V. Not knowing Purusa to be different from Buddhi in nature, character, knowledge, etc., a man is led, by reason of the dullness born of Tamas, to form the notion of the Self in respect of Buddhi.

19. The above has been quoted by Vyâsa in his Commentary on the Yoga-Sûtram II. 6 which describes Asmitâ or Egoism as being "the apparent identity of the subjective power of seeing (*i.e.*, Purusa) and the instrumental power of seeing (*i. e.*, Buddhi)."

20. It follows, therefore, that there is Bondage as long as this notion of the Self in respect of the Not-Self remains, and that there is Release when this notion is destroyed by the knowledge of the Self as being distinct and different from the Not-Self in all essential particulars.

स्यात् स्वल्पः संकरः सपरिहारः सप्रत्यवमर्शः कुशलस्य नापकर्षायालम् ॥

स्यात् Syât, can be. स्वल्पः Svalpaḥ, little. संकरः Saṃkaraḥ, mixture. सपरिहारः Sa-parihâraḥ attended with, *i.e.*, capable of, avoidance or removal. सप्रत्यवमर्शः Sa-pratyavamarśaḥ, attended with, *i.e.*, capable of, being borne easily. कुशलस्य Kuśalasya, of the good. न Na, not. अपकर्षाय Apakarṣâya, for damage or impairment or lessening the effect. अलम् Alam, sufficient, strong or powerful enough.

VI. A little mixture (of evil entailed, for instance, by the killing of animals) which is capable of removal (by expiation) or is easy to bear, cannot prevail for the diminution of the (greater) good (produced by the performance of sacrifices such as the Aśvamedha and the like).

21. The above bears reference to the vexed question as to the consequences of the acts of sin necessarily committed in the course of the performance of sacrifices which are calculated to produce merits of far-reaching consequences. For instance, an Aśvamedha sacrifice cannot be performed without the killing of a horse, and killing is a sinful act. So that, while the performance of the Aśvamedha produces its desirable consequences, the killing of the horse cannot, at the same time, fail to produce its undesirable consequences. The question, therefore, arises whether what is acquired through the sacrifice, be not lost through the sin. This is an important issue arising in the discussion of the Law of Karma as a whole.

22. Now, "the killing of animals, etc., has," as Vâchaspati explains, "two effects. The first is that, being ordained as part of the principal action, it helps in its fulfilment. The second is that, the causing of pain to all living beings being forbidden, it results in undesirable consequences. Of these, when it is performed only as subsidiary to the principal action, then, for that very reason, it does not manifest its result all at once, independently of the principal action. On the contrary, it keeps its position of an accessory only, and manifests only when the fruition of the principal ruling action begins. It is said to be tacked on to the ruling action, when, while helping the ruling action, it exists as the seed of its own proper effect. Pañchaśikha has said the following on the subject: 'A, little mixture.'

"When the ruling factor of the present karma, born from the sacrifice of Jyotiṣṭoma, etc, is mixed up with the present cause of evil, it may be easily removed. It is possible of removal by a small expiatory sacrifice. Even if an expiatory sacrifice be not performed by carelessness, the subsidiary action would ripen at the time of the ripening of the principal only, and, in that case, the evil generated thereby would be easy to bear. The wise who are taking their baths in the great lake of the nectar of pleasure brought about by a collection of good actions, put up easily with a small piece of the fire of pain produced by a small evil. It is not, therefore, capable of diminishing, *i.e.*, appreciably lessening the effect of the good, *i.e.*, of his large virtues."—*Râma Prasâda's translation.*

23. This Aphorism of Pañchaśikha has been quoted by Vyâsa in his Commentary on the Yoga-Sûtram II. 13. "So long as the cause remains, the fruition of Merit and Demerit is in the kind of birth, length of life and experience."

24. Pandit Raja Ram is wrong in reading the next sentence in the Commentary as part of the present Aphorism. For both Svapneśvara and Vâchaspati are against this reading.

25. But the fact remains that even a highly meritorious act is tainted with sin, and with consequent pain. It is even as Patañjali declares that "to the discriminative, all is pain" (Yoga-Sûtram II. 15). And pain is the thing which every mortal seeks to get rid of: not merely present pain, but pain not-yet-come is the thing to be avoided (Yoga-Sûtram II. 16). Accordingly, both in the Sâṃkhya and in the Yoga Śâstra, enquiries have been instituted into the cause of its origin as well as into the means of its removal. In the Yoga-Sûtram II. 17, Patañjali declares that the conjunction of Buddhi and Puruṣa is the cause of pain. And on this subject, also says Pañchaśikha:

तत्संयोगहेतुविवर्जनात् स्यादयमात्यन्तिको दुःखप्रतीकारः ॥

तत्संयोगहेतुविवर्जनात् Tat-Saṃyoga-hetu-vivarjanât, through abandonment of the cause, namely, Non-discrimination, of the conjunction thereof, *i.e.*, of Buddhi. स्यात् Syât, will be. अयम् Ayam, this, *i.e.*, the desired prevention of pain not-yet-come. आत्यन्तिकः Âtyantikaḥ, final, permanent. दुःखप्रतीकारः Duḥkha-pratîkâraḥ, prevention or remedy of pain.

VII. Through the abandonment of the cause thereof, there can be the permanent prevention of pain, which is desired.

26. The above has been quoted by Vyâsa in his Commentary on the Yoga-Sûtram II. 17.

27. Pain is due to conjunction. Rajas gives rise to pain in Sattva, which reflects it on Puruṣa, through conjunction. In this reflection consists the experience (Bhoga) of Puruṣa from which emancipation (Apavarga) is sought. To describe them more correctly, Bhoga is the ascertainment of the essential nature of the Guṇas, as desirable and undesirable, in their undifferentiated form; and Apavarga is the ascertainment of the essential nature of the Experiencer, through the withdrawal of the influence of Prakṛiti upon him. To accomplish both these objects, namely, Bhoga and Apavarga, is the creation of the world. Creation is the exhibition of Prakṛiti to Puruṣa. Puruṣa regards or looks at Prakṛiti from these points of view only; and there is no third point of view. So declares Pañchaśikha also:

अयंतु खलु त्रिषु गुणेषु कर्तृष्वकर्तरि च पुरुषे तुल्यातुल्यजातीये तत्क्रियासाक्षिण्युपनीयमानान्त्सर्वभावाननुपश्यन्नदर्शनमन्यच्छंकते ॥

अयं Ayam, this Puruṣa. तु Tu, but. खलु Khalu, surely. त्रिषु Triṣu, in the three. गुणेषु Guṇeṣu, in the Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. कर्तृषु Kartṛiṣu, which are the actors, agents. अकर्तरि A Kartari, who is not the actor. च Cha, and. पुरुषे Puruṣe, in Puruṣa. तुल्यातुल्यजातीये Tulya-a-tulya-jâtîye, who is of a like and unlike kind. चतुर्थे Chaturthe, the fourth. तत्क्रियासाक्षिणि Tat-kriyâ-sâkṣiṇi, who is the witness of the action thereof, *i.e.* of the Guṇas. उपनीयमानान् Upanîyamânân, that are being presented. सर्वभावान् Sarva-bhâvân, all objects. उपपन्नान् Upapannân, established, known. अनुपश्यन् Anupaśyan, knowing. न Na, not. दर्शनम् Darśanam, view. अन्यत् Anyat, other. शंकते Śaṅkate, suspects.

VIII. This one, however, seeing all things explained as these are being presented to the three Guṇas as the actors and to the fourth, *viz.*, Puruṣa, of a like and unlike kind, as the non-actor and as the witness of their action, does not suspect (the existence of) any other point of view, or object of knowledge.

28. "Of a like and unlike kind":—For instance, the Guṇas are eternal, so is Puruṣa; Puruṣa is intelligent, but the Guṇas are non-intelligent.

29. "The above has been quoted by Vyâsa in his Commentary on Yoga-Sûtram II 18: The object (Dṛiśya) which possesses the nature of illumination (Sattva), activity (Rajas), and inertia (Tamas) and consists

of the elements and of the powers of cognition and action, exists for the purpose of experience and of emancipation.

30. "But these two, experience and emancipation, which are effected by Buddhi, reside in Buddhi alone; how are they, then," asks Vyasa, "predicated of Puruṣa?" He next gives the answer: "Just as victory or defeat, which lies in the army, is predicated of the owner of the army, as he is the experiencer of its consequences, so too are Bondage and Release, residing in Buddhi alone, are predicated of Puruṣa, as he is the experiencer of their consequences. Of Buddhi alone are Bondage in the shape of the non-accomplishment of the object of Puruṣa, and Release in the shape of the fulfilment thereof. Similarly, are perception, memory, reasoning, doubt, knowledge of the truth, and blind attachment to life, which reside in Buddhi, are attributed as existing in Puruṣa, as he is the experiencer of their consequences, by having their reflections thrown upon him from Buddhi, through proximity."

31. Puruṣa, then, is neither quite similar to Buddhi nor quite dissimilar to it. He is not quite subject to Bondage and Release, nor is quite free from them. On this subject, Pañchaśikha further declares:

अपरिणामिनी हि भोक्तृशक्तिरप्रतिसंक्रमा च परिणामिन्यर्थे प्रतिसंक्रान्तेव तद्वृत्तिमनुपतति। तस्याश्च प्राप्तचैतन्योपग्रहरूपाया बुद्धिवृत्तेरनुकारमात्रतया बुद्धिवृत्त्याऽविशिष्टा हि ज्ञानवृत्तिरित्याख्यायते ॥

अपरिणामिनी A-pariṇâminî, not subject to transformation, unchangeable. हि Hi, for. भोक्तृशक्तिः Bhoktṛi-Śaktiḥ, the power of the experiencer, intelligence, consciousness. अप्रतिसंक्रमा A-prati-Saṅkramâ, not moving towards objects, inert, actionless, inactive. च Cha, and. परिणामिनी Pariṇâminî, subject to transformation, changeful. अर्थे Arthe, into the object, *i.e.*, Buddhi. प्रतिसंक्रान्ता Pratisaṃkrântâ, transferred, moved to. इव Iva, as if. तद्वृत्तिम् Tat-vṛittim, the modifications thereof, *i.e.*, of Buddhi. अनुपतति Anu-patati, imitates, modifies according to. तस्याः Tasyâḥ, its, *i.e.*, of Buddhi. च Cha, and. प्राप्तचैतन्योपग्रहरूपायाः Prâpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rûpâyâḥ, transformed by receiving the reflection of intelligence. बुद्धिवृत्तेः Buddhi-vṛitteḥ, of the modification of Buddhi. अनुकारमात्रतया Anu-kâra-mâtra-tayâ, by reason of mere imitation. बुद्धिवृत्त्या Buddhi-vṛittyâ, by the modification of Buddhi अविशिष्टा A-viśiṣṭâ, unqualified. हि Hi, verily. ज्ञानवृत्तिः Jñâna-vṛittiḥ, modification of consciousness. इति Iti, thus. आख्यायते Âkhyâyate, called, described.

IX. For the power of the Experiencer which is unchangeable as well as inert, as if running into the changeful

object (*i.e.*, Buddhi), imitates its modifications. And by reason of the mere imitation of the modifications of Buddhi, while that is transformed by receiving the reflection of intelligence, it (the imitation) is described as the modification of intelligence unqualified by the modification of Buddhi.

32. The above has been quoted by Vyâsa in his Commentary on Yoga-Sûtram II. 20: "The seer is the power of seeing merely: though pure, he sees ideas by imitation," and he thereby supports the proposition that "though pure, he sees ideas by imitation; because he sees, by imitation, ideas belonging to Buddhi, and, though he is not of the same nature as Buddhi, as he sees by imitation, because he looks as if he were of the nature of Buddhi." This is further explained by Vâchaspati in the following manner:

"Although the moon is not, as a matter of fact, transferred into pure water, yet, inasmuch as its reflection passes into water, it is, as it were, transferred into it. So also, the power of consciousness, although not actually transferred into the Buddhi, yet is, as it were, transferred into it, because it is reflected into it. By that fact, consciousness becomes, as it were, of the very nature of the will-to-be (Buddhi). It accordingly follows the modifications of the will-to-be. This explains the words "by imitation." It is said, it cognises by imitation, as it cognises by following the modifications of the will-to-be."—*Ram Prasâda's translation.*

33. Conjunction has been stated to be the cause of Bhoga. The objective world owes its existence to it. But when, in the case of a Puruṣa whose objects have been fulfilled, the objective world no longer exists for him, it does not at the same time altogether vanish out of existence, because there are other Puruṣas whose Bhoga and Apavarga still remain to be accomplished. (*Vide* the Yoga-Sûtram II. 22). Thus is the continuity of creation established. Hereby is also established that, whereas the Subject and the Object exist from eternity, their conjunction must, in the form of a stream of successive conjunctions, be without beginning. On this subject there has been quoted by Vyâsa, in his Commentary on the above Yoga-Sûtram, the following Aphorism of Pañchaśikha:

धर्मिणामनादिसंयोगात् धर्ममात्राणामप्यनादिः संयोगः ॥

धर्मिणाम् Dharmiṇâm, of the containers, that is, the Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. अनादिसंयोगात् An-âdi-saṃyogât, because conjunction with Puruṣa is without beginning. धर्ममात्राणाम् Dharma-mâtrâṇâm, of all the contained, that is, the products

Mahat and the rest. अपि Api, also. अनादिः An-âdiḥ, without beginning. संयोगः Saṃyogaḥ, conjunction.

X. Because the conjunction of the Guṇas (wit Puruṣa) is without beginning, the conjunction also of th products thereof, taken as a class, is without beginning.

34. "It is for this reason that, although the conjunction of o Puruṣa with one manifestation of the principle of Mahat has ceased exist, the conjunction of another Puruṣa with another manifestation the Mahat has not become a thing of the past."—*Ram Prasada's translatio of Vâchaspati.*

35. In the Yoga-Sûtram III. 13, Patañjali declares: "By this a described the changes of characteristic (dharma), of secondary qualit (lakṣaṇa), and of condition (avasthâ) in the objective and instrument phenomena."—*Ram Prasada's translation.*

36. In the course of his Commentary on the above, Vyâsa observes "The change of secondary quality is the moving of the characteristi along the paths of being (past, present, and future). The past characte istic joined to the past secondary quality, is not devoid of the futu and the present secondary quality. Similarly, the present (characteristi joined to the present secondary quality, is not devoid of the past an the future secondary quality. Similarly, the future (characteristic) joine to the future secondary quality, is not devoid of the present and pa secondary qualities. For example, a man who is attached to one woma does not hate all the others.

"Others find a fault in this change of secondary qualities The say that all the qualities being in simultaneous existence, their paths being must be confused, (and thus overlapping one another, cannot b considered as distinct and different).

"This is thus met: That the characteristics do exist as such, requir no proof. When there is such a thing as a characteristic, the differenc of the secondary qualities also must be posited. It is not only in t present time that the characteristic characterizes. If it were so, the mi would not possess the characteristic of attachment, seeing that attachm is not in manifestation at the time of anger. Further, the three (peacef fearful, and dull) secondary qualities are not possible of existence in individual simultaneously. They may, however, appear in successi by virtue of the operation of their several (exciting causes. Therefo there is no confusion. For example, attachment being in the height manifestation with reference to some object, it does not, for that rea

cease to exist with reference to all other objects. On the contrary, it is then ordinarily in existence with reference to them."—*Ram Prasada's translation.*

And in support of the above view, Vyâsa quotes the following Aphorism of Pañchaśikha:

रूपातिशयाः वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च विरुध्यन्ते सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते ॥

रूपातिशयाः Rûpa-atiśayâḥ, intensities of nature or characteristic. वृत्त्यतिशयाः Vritti-atiśayâḥ, intensities of function or manifestation. च cha, and. विरुध्यन्ते Virudhyante, are opposed. सामान्यानि Sâmânyâni, ordinary ones. तु Tu, but. अतिशयैः Atiśayaiḥ, with the intense ones. सह Saha, with. प्रवर्तन्ते Pravartante, co-exist, co-operate.

XI. Intensities of characteristic and intensities of manifestation are opposed to each other, but the ordinary ones co-exist with the intense ones.

37. This simple Aphorism of Pañchaśikha embodies the discovery of the important doctrine of the sub-conscious mind.

38. As to the relation between Âkâśa and the Power of Hearing, there is the following Aphorism of Pañchaśikha:

तुल्यदेशश्रवणानामेकदेशश्रुतित्वं सर्वेषां भवति ॥

तुल्यदेशश्रवणानाम् Tulya-deśa-śravaṇânâm, of those having their powers of hearing similarly located, that is, equally in Âkâśa or soniferous ether. एकदेशश्रुतित्वं Eka-deśa-śruti-tvam, to have the power of hearing in the same situation. सर्वेषां Sarve-ṣâm, of all. भवति Bhavati, is.

XII. In the case of all, having their powers of hearing equally located in Akâśa, hearing takes place in the same situation.

39. The above has been quoted by Vyâsa in his Commentary on the Yoga-Sûtram III. 40: "By Saṃyama over the relation between Âkâśa and the power-of-hearing, comes the higher power hearing."

40. And Vâchaspati explains its sense and significance in the following manner: "This sense of hearing, then, having its origin in the principle of egoism, acts like iron, drawn as it is by sound originating and located in the mouth of the speaker, acting as loadstone, transforms them into its own modifications in sequence of the sounds of the speaker, and thus senses them. And it is for this reason that for every living

creature, the perception of sound in external space is, in the absence of defects, never void of authority. So says the quotation from Pañchasikha: "To all those whose organs of hearing are similarly situated, the situation of hearing is the same." "All those" are Chaitras and others whose powers of hearing are similarly situated in space. The meaning is, that the powers of hearing of all are located in Âkâśa. Further, the Âkâśa in which the power of hearing is located, is born out of the Soniferous Tanmâtra, and has therefore the quality of sound inherent in itself. It is by this sound acting in unison, that it takes the sound of external solids, etc. Hence the hearing, *i.e.*, the sound, of all is of the same class.

"This, then, establishes that Âkâśa is the substratum of the power of hearing, and also possesses the quality of sound. And this sameness of the situation of sound is an indication of the existence of Âkâśa. That which is the substratum of the auditory power (Śruti) which manifests as sound of the same class, is Âkâśa."—*Ram Prasada's translation.*

41. In his Pañchasikha—Âchârya-praṇîta Sâṃkhya-Sûtra, Paṇḍita Râja Râm includes the following quotations by Vyâsa:

प्रधानं स्थित्यैव वर्तमानं विकाराकरणादप्रधानं स्यात् तथा गत्यैव वर्तमानं विकारनित्यत्वादप्रधानं स्यात् उभयथा चास्य प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानव्यवहारं लभते नान्यथा कारणान्तरेष्वपि कल्पितेष्वेष समानश्चर्चः ॥

XIII. The Pradhâna, the material cause of all manifestation, would become what it is not, if it tended only to rest, because in that case there would not be any manifestation into phenomena; nor would it be what it is, if it were to remain in constant motion, because in that case, the phenomena would become eternal and never disappear. It is only when it tends to both these states, that it can be called the Pradhâna (the cause of manifestation), not otherwise. The same considerations apply to any other causes that might be imagined.—*Vide* Vyâsa's Commentary on Yoga-Sûtram II. 23.

मूर्तिव्यवधिजातिभेदाभावाच्चास्ति मूलपृथक्त्वम् ॥

XIV. On account of, the absence of the difference of form, intervening space and time, and genus, there is no separation in the Root (*i.e.*, the Pradhâna.)—*Vide* Vyâsa's Commentary on Yoga-Sûtram III. 52.

जलभूम्योः पारिणामिकं रसादिवैश्वरूप्यं स्थावरेषु दृष्टं तथा स्थावराणां जङ्गमेषु जङ्गमानां स्थावरेषु ॥

XV. All the diverse forms of juice, etc., caused by the transformation of earth and water, is seen in immobile objects; similarly of the immobile, in the mobile, and of the mobile, in the immobile.—*Vide* Vyâsa's Commentary on Yoga-Sûtram III. 14.

एकजातिसमन्वितानामेषां धर्ममात्रं व्यावृत्तिः ॥

XVI. Of these which possess the same genus, the differences are in (specific) properties only.—*Vide* Vyasa's Commentary on Yoga-Sûtram III. 43.

महामोहमयेनेन्द्रजालेन प्रकाशशीलं सत्त्वमावृत्य तदेवाकार्ये नियुङ्क्ते ॥

XVII. By the magic panorama of Mahâmoha (desire and ignorance), overshadowing the Sattva which is luminous by nature, the very same is employed in acts of vice.—*Vide* Vyâsa's Commentary on Yoga-Sûtram II., 52.

तपो न परं प्राणायामात्ततो विशुद्धिर्मलानां दीप्तिश्च ज्ञानस्य ॥

XVIII. There is no penance greater than Prâṇâyâma: whence are the purification from dirts and the brightness of knowledge.—*Vide* Vyâsa's Commentary on Yoga-Sûtram II. 52.

स्वभावं मुक्त्वा येषां पूर्वपक्षे रुचिर्भवति अरुचिश्च निर्णये भवति ॥

XIX. (In the case of those who do not possess the curiosity to know the nature of the Self), giving up, through faults (*i. e.*, demerits), the nature, there arises a liking for *primâ facie* contrary views, and dislike for the ascertainment of the truth.—*Vide* Vyâsa's Commentary on Yoga-Sûtram, IV 25.

स ब्राह्मणो यथा यथा व्रतानि बहूनि समादित्सते तथा तथा प्रमादकृतेभ्यो हिंसादिभ्यो निवर्तमानस्तामेवावदातरूपामहिंसां करोति ॥

XX. As a Brâhmaṇa undertakes many a vow, one after another, he turns away successively from acts of injury due to inadvertence, and thereby makes the virtue of non-injury (ahiṃsâ) gradually purer and purer.—*Vide* Vyâsa's Commentary on Yoga-Sûtram II. 30.

ये चैते मैत्र्यादयो ध्यायिनां विहारास्ते बाह्यसाधननिरनुग्रहात्मानः प्रकृष्टं धर्ममभिनिर्वर्तयन्ति ॥

XXI. And what are these activities of the Dhyâyins, namely, friendliness (maitrî), etc., being, by nature, independent of external means, accomplish the highest virtue.—*Vide* Vyâsa's Commentary on Yoga-Sûtram IV. 10.

42. And to them, the Kâpila Âśrama reproduction adds :

प्रधानस्यात्मख्यापनार्था प्रवृत्तिः ॥

XXII. The activity of the Pradhâna is for the sake of the exhibition of herself.—*Vide* Vyâsa's Commentary on Yoga-Sûtram II. 23.

43. But Vâchaspati tells us that No. XIII is a doctrine of an opposite school, and Nos. XVII—XX are the teachings of the Âgamins (Śaiva Darśana); while Vyâsa himself tells us that No. XIV is an aphorism of Vârṣagaṇya and No. XXII is a text of the Veda. Both of them, again, are silent as to the paternity of Nos. XV and XVI. The remaining one, No. XI, is referred by Vâchaspati to the Âchâryas or older teachers of the Sâṃkhya School. In these circumstances, we do not feel we should be justified in affiliating these aphorisms to Pañchaśikha.

44. Paṇḍita Râja Râm has, we observe, arranged *his* aphorisms of Pañchaśikha in a particular order, and has explained them in a connected form. This may mislead the unwary in thinking that this collection of aphorisms is a complete treatise composed by Pañchaśikha which, however, it is not, and can, by no means, pretend to be. To avoid any such misconception, we have, with the single exception of the first one,—and this, for obvious reasons—presented the aphorisms just in the order of their quotation by Vyâsa; for there is no more reason known to us for placing them in one particular order than in any other.

45 It may also be just mentioned here that some other views, not aphorisms or sayings, of Pañchaśikha have been referred to in the Sâṃkhya-Pavrachana-Sûtram also. See *Ibidem* V. 32 and VI 68, and Vijñâna Bikṣu's Commentary on I. 127.