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MAJOR B. D. BASU, I.M.S. (Retired)

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THE

SAMKHYA PHILOSOPHY

CONTAINING

SĀMKHYA-PRĀVACHANA SŪTRAM, WITH THE VṛITTĪ OF ANIRUDDHA,
AND THE BRĀHYA OF VIJNĀNA BHIKṢU AND EXTRACTS
FROM THE VṛITTĪ-GĀRA OF MAHĀDEVA VEDANTIN;
(2) TATVĀ RAMĀRA; (3) SĀMKHYA KĀRIKĀ;
(4) PANCASAÎIKĀ SŪTRAM.

TRANSLATED BY

NAÎDALAL SINHA, M.A., B.L., P.C.S.
DEPUTY MAGISTRATE, DALTONGANJ.

PUBLISHED BY

SUDhindRA NâTî Vânu,
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The present volume of the Sacred Books of the Hindus which bears the modest title of the Śāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram, is, in reality, a collection of all the available original documents of the School of the Śāmkhyas, with the single exception of the commentary composed by Vyāsa on the Śāmkhya-Pravachana-Yoga-Sūtram of Patañjali. For it contains in its pages not only the Śāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram of Kapila together with the Vṛtti of Aniruddha, the Bhāṣya of Vijnāna Bhikṣu, and extracts of the original portions from the Vṛttisāstra of Vedāntin Mahādeva, but also the Tatvam-Samāna together with the commentary of Narendra, the Śāmkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with profuse annotations based on the Bhāṣya of Gaudapāda and the Tatvam-Kaumudi of Vāchaspati Miśra, and a few of the Aphorisms of Puṇḍarīkka with explanatory notes according to the Yoga-Bhāṣya which has quoted them. An attempt, moreover, has been made to make the volume useful in many other respects by the addition, for instance, of elaborate analytical tables of contents to the Śāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram and the Śāmkhya-Kārikā, and of a number of important appendices.

In the preparation of this volume, I have derived very material help from the excellent edition of the Vṛtti of Aniruddha and the Bhāṣya of Vijnāna Bhikṣu on the Śāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram by Dr. Richard Garbe, to whom my thanks are due. And, in general, I take this opportunity of acknowledging my indebtedness to all previous writers on the Śāmkhya, living and dead, from whose writings I have obtained light and leading in many important matters connected with the subject.

An introduction only now remains to be written. It is proposed, however, to write a separate monograph on the Śāmkhya Darśana, which would be historical, critical and comparative, in its scope and character. In this preface, therefore, only a very brief account is given of some of the cardinal doctrines of the Śāmkhya School.

The first and foremost among these is the Sat-Kārya-Siddhi or the Established Test of Existent Effect. It is the Law of the Identity of Cause and Effect: what is called the cause is the unmanifested state of what is called the effect, and what is called the effect is only the manifested state of what
is called the cause; their substance is one and the same; differences
manifestation and non-manifestation give rise to the distinctions
Cause and Effect. The effect, therefore, is never non-existent; whether
before its production, or whether after its destruction, it is always
existent in the cause. For, nothing can come out of nothing, and nothing
can altogether vanish out of existence.

This doctrine would be better understood by a comparison with
the contrary views held by other thinkers on the relation of cause and effect. But before we proceed to state these views, we should define the terms “cause” and “effect.” One thing is said to be the cause of another thing, when the latter cannot be without the former. In its widest sense, the term, Cause, therefore, denotes an agent, an act, an instrument, a purpose, so material, time, and space. In fact, whatever makes the accomplishment of the effect possible, is one of its causes. And the immediate result of the operation of these causes, is their effect. Time and Space, however, are universal causes, inasmuch as they are presupposed in each and every act of causation. The remaining causes fall under the descriptions of:

- Aristotelian Division of Causes,
- The Sāṃkhya Division.

The Sāṃkhyaas further reduce them to two descriptions only, *viz.,* Upādāna, *i.e.,* the mater which the Naiyāyikas call Samaśāyi or Combinative or Constitutive, and Nimitta, *i.e.,* the efficient, formal, and final, which may be variously, though somewhat imperfectly, translated as the instrument efficient, occasional, or conditional, because it includes the instrument with which, the agent by which, the occasion on which, and the condition under which, the act is performed. Obvioulsy there is a real distinction between the Upādāna and the Nimitta: the Upādāna enters into the constitution of the effect, and the power of taking the form of, in other words, the potentiality of being re-produced as, the effect, resides in the Nimitta, by the exercise of an extraneous influence only, operates with the power inherent in the material, in its re-production the form of the effect, and its causality ceases with such re-product. To take the case of a coin, for example: the material causality was a lump of gold; it made possible the modification of the gold into the form of the coin, it will remain operative as long as the coin will last as a coin, and after its destruction, it will pass into the potential state again; the operation of the Nimittas came to an end as soon as the coin was minted.
Similarly, the Sāṃkhyaśas distinguish the Effect under the twofold aspect of simple manifestation and of re-production. Thus, the coin is an instance of causation by re-production, while the production of cream from milk is an instance of causation by simple manifestation.

Now, as to the origin of the world, there is a divergence of opinion among thinkers of different Schools: Some uphold the Theory of Creation, others maintain the Theory of Evolution. Among the Creationists are counted the Nāstikas or Nihilists, the Buddhists, and the Naiyāyikas; and among the Evolutionists, the Vedāntins and the Sāṃkhyaśas. The Nāstikas hold that the world is non-existent, that is, unreal, and that it came out of what was not; the Buddhists hold that the world is existent, that is, real, and that it came out of what was not; the Naiyāyikas hold that the world is non-existent, that is, non-eternal, perishable, and that it came out of the existent, that is, what is eternal, imperishable; the Vedāntins hold that the world is non-existent, that is, unreal, and that it came out of what was existent, that is, real, namely, Brahman; and the Sāṃkhyaśas hold that the world is existent, that is, real, and that it came out of what was existent, that is, real, namely, the Pradhāna. Thus, there are the A-Sat-Kārya-Vāda of the Nāstikas that a non-existent world has been produced from a non-existent cause, and of the Buddhists that an existent world has been produced from a non-existent cause, the Abhāva-Utpatti-Vāda of the Naiyāyikas that a non-eternal world has been produced from an eternal cause, the Vivarta-Vāda of the Vedāntins that the world is a resolution, an illusory appearance, of the one eternal reality, viz., Brahman, and the Sat-Kārya-Vāda of the Sāṃkhyaśas that an existent world has been produced from an existent cause.

Against the theories of A-Sat-Kārya, Abhāva-Utpatti, and Vivarta, arguments which and in support of their theory of Sat-Kārya, the Sāṃkhyaśas advance the following arguments:

I. There can be no production of what is absolutely non-existent; e.g., a man's horn.

II. There must be some determinate material cause for every product. Cream, for instance, can form on milk only, and never on water. Were it as absolutely non-existent in milk as it is in water, there would be no reason why it should form on milk, and not equally on water.

III. The relation of cause and effect is that of the producer and the produced, and the simplest conception of the cause as the producer is that it possesses the potentiality of becoming the effect,
and this potentiality is nothing but the unrealised state of the effect.

IV. The effect is seen to possess the nature of the cause, e.g., a coin still possesses the properties of the gold of which it is made.

V. Matter is indestructible; “destruction” means disappearance into the cause.

It follows, therefore, that cause and effect are neither absolutely dissimilar nor absolutely similar to each other. They possess essential similarities and formal dissimilarities. Such being the relation between cause and effect, the world cannot possibly have come out of something in which it had been absolutely non-existent, and which accordingly was, in relation to it, as good as non-existent. For the world is neither absolutely unreal nor absolutely real. The test of objective reality is its opposition to consciousness. It is distinguished as Pratyabhśita or apparent, Vyavahārika or practical or phenomenal, and Pāramārtika or transcendental. Of these, the world possesses phenomenal reality, and must, therefore, have a transcendental reality as its substratum. Thus is the Doctrine of Sat-Kārya established.

A natural corollary from the above doctrine is the other doctrine of Pariṇāma or transformation. It is the doctrine that, as all effects are contained in their causes in an unmanifested form, the “production” of an effect is nothing but its manifestation, and that, as cause and effect are essentially identical, an effect is merely a transformation of the cause.

Now, the question arises, whether the cause of the world be a single one, or whether it be manifold. Some think that, according to the Naiyāyikas, who declare the existence of Parama-Ayus or the ordinary Atoms of Matter, the world has sprung from a plurality of causes. This is, however, to take a very superficial view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Darsana. The Naiyāyikas were certainly not timid explorers of metaphysical truths; there is absolutely no reason for supposing that they either would not or could not penetrate behind and beyond the ordinary Atoms of Matter. As I have elsewhere pointed out, it would be a mistake to treat the six Darsanas as each being a complete and self-contained system of thought; in respect of their scope and purpose, they bear no analogy to the philosophies of the West. They are singly neither universal nor final; but they mutually supplement one another. Their Risis address themselves to particular sets of people possessing different degrees of mental and spiritual advancement. They reveal
and explain the truths embodied in the Vedas to them from their point of view and according to their competence, and thus help them in realising the truths for themselves and thereby in progressing towards Self-realisation. If the Naiyāyikas, therefore, do not carry their analysis of the world further than the ordinary Atoms of Matter, it must not be assumed that they teach a sort of atomic pluralism as the ultimate theory of the origin of the world, and are in this opposed to the authors of the other Sāstras which teach a different origin. The right explanation is that they make but a partial declaration of the Vedic truths and cut short the process of resolution at the ordinary Atoms of Matter, because they address themselves to a class of students who do not possess the mental capacity to grasp subtler truths.

For the sense of unity which has found expression in the Law of Parsimony, points to a single original of the world or material manifestation, as revealed in the Vedas. And the Sāmkhya makes its students acquainted with this. It is called the Root, and is described as the Pradhāna, that in which all things are contained, and as Prakṛiti, the mother of things.

It is a long way from the ordinary Atoms of Matter to the Pradhāna or Primal Matter. The Sāmkhya undertakes to declare and expound the successive transformations of the Pradhāna down to the Gross Matter, with the object of accomplishing the complete isolation of the Self from even the most shadowy conjunction with the Pradhāna.

The definition of Prakṛiti is that it is the state of equilibrium of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, called the Guṇas. It is the genus of which the Guṇas are the species. Their state of equilibrium is their latent, potential, or inactive state, the state of not being developed into effects. The Guṇas are extremely fine substances, and are respectively the principles of illumination, evolution, and involution, and the causes of pleasure, pain, and dullness. For, Sattva is light and illuminating, Rajas is active and urgent, and Tamas is heavy and enveloping. They are in eternal and indissoluble conjunction with one another, and, by nature, mutually overpower, support, produce, and intimately mix with, one another.

The doctrine of the Three Guṇas is the very foundation of the Sāmkhya Tantra. It is explained in the following manner: (1) Everything in the world, external as well as internal, is in constant change; and there can be no change, whether it be movement in space, or whether it
be movement in time, without rest. Side by side, therefore, with the principle of mutation, there must be a principle of conservation. And, as Berkeley tells us, existence is perception,—whatever is not manifested to Consciousness, individual or universal, does not exist. Another principle is, therefore, required which would make the manifestation of the other two principles and of their products, (as also of itself and of its own), to Consciousness possible. Thus, at the origin of the world, there must be a principle of conservation, a principle of mutation, and a principle of manifestation. (2) Similarly, an examination of the intra-organic energies would disclose the existence of three distinct principles behind them. These energies are the eleven Indriyas or Powers of Cognition and Action, and Prāṇa or Vital Force. Among them, the Powers of Cognition, e.g., Seeing, Hearing, etc., cause manifestation of objects, the Powers of Action, e.g., seizing by the hand, etc., produce change, and Prāṇa conserves and preserves life. (3) In the mind, again, modifications of three distinct characters take place; viz., cognition, conation, and retention; and these could not be possible without there being a principle of manifestation, a principle of mutation, and a principle of conservation respectively. (4) Likewise, a psycho-aesthetic analysis of our worldly experience yields the result that everything in the universe possesses a threefold aspect, that is, it may manifest as agreeable, or as disagreeable, or as neutral, i.e., neither agreeable nor disagreeable. It must then have derived these characteristics from its cause; for nothing can be in the effect which was not in the cause. The principles of manifestation, mutation, and conservation, therefore, which are operative in the change of the states of agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral, must also possess the nature of being pleasant (ānanta), unpleasant (ghora), and dull (mūḍha).

It is these principles of manifestation, mutation, and conservation, possessing the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness, that are respectively the Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, of the Śaṅkhya. They are the constitutive elements of Prakṛti. They are Guṇas in their manifested forms; they are Prakṛti in their unmanifested form.

The transformations of Prakṛti are either prakṛti-vikṛti, original or evolvent as well as modification or evolute, or vikṛti, modification or evolute merely. The former are, themselves transformations of their antecedents, and, in their turn, give rise to subsequent transformations. They are Mahaḥ, Aḥamkāra, and the five Tan-mātras. The latter are the eleven Indriyas and the five gross Elements. The transformation of Prakṛti ceases with them. Of course, the gross Elements combine and evolve the
material world; but the world is not a different Tattva or principle from the Elements, because it does not develop a single attribute which is not already possessed by them. For the test of a Tattva or original or ultimate principle is that it possesses a characteristic property which is not possessed by any other Tattva.

The objective world thus contains twenty-four Tattvas, namely, Prakriti, Mahat, Aham-kâra, Manas, the five Indriyas of Cognition, the five Indriyas of Action, the five Tan-mâtras, and the five gross Elements.

At the beginning of creation, there arises in Prakriti Spandana or cosmic vibration which disturbs its state of equilibrium, and releases the Gunas from quiescence. Rajas at once acts upon Sattva and manifests it as Mahat. Mahat denotes Buddhi, the material counterpart and basis of what we term Understanding or Reason. Buddhi is called Mahat, great, because it is the principal among the Instruments of Cognition and Action. Mahat also means “light”; it is derived from the Vedic word Mahas or Mahâs, meaning light. And Buddhi is called Mahat, because it is the initial transformation of Sattva which is the principle of manifestation. Or, Buddhi which is the first manifestation of the Gunas and which is the material cause of the world, is called Mahat, in order to distinguish it from individual or finite Buddhis which are its parts. For “what is the Buddhi of the first-born golden-egg (Brahmâ), the same is the primary basis of all Buddhis; it is here called the ‘great self.’”

The function of Buddhi is Adhyavasaya or certainty leading to action. It manifests in eight forms; viz., as virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power, while Sattva is predominant in it, and as vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness, while Tamas is predominant in it. And these, again, are modified into innumerable forms, which are classified as Error, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection. Such is Pratyaya-sarga or the creation of Buddhi or intellectual creation as contra-distinguished from elemental creation.

From Buddhi springs Aham-kâra: from “cogito,” I think, “sum,” I am. Aham-kâra is literally the I-maker. It is the material counterpart and basis of what we term egoism, and causes modifications of Buddhi in the forms of “I am,” “I do,” etc., etc. It is the principle of personal identity and of individuation. Its function is Abhimandâ, conceit, thinking with reference to itself, assumption of things to itself. But it is not a mere function; it is a substance.
in which reside Vásanas or the resultant tendencies of accumulated experience, and which is capable of modification into other and grosser forms.

This Ahamkāra, which is the first transformation of Buddhi, is the cosmic Ahamkāra, the Upādhi or adjunct of the golden-egg'd Brahmac, the Creator. It is the infinite source of the finite Ahamkāras of individual Jivas.

The modification of Ahamkāra is twofold, according as it is influenced by Sattva or by Tamas. The Sāttvic modifications are the eleven Indriyas; that is, the five Indriyas of Cognition, viz., the powers located in the Eye, Ear, Nose, Tongue, and Skin, the five Indriyas of Action, viz., the powers located in the voice, hand, feet, and the organs of generation and excretion, and Manas. Manas is both a power of cognition and a power of action. Assimilation and differentiation are its distinctive functions.

The Tāmasic modifications of Ahamkāra are the five Tanmātras, viz., of Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour and Smell.

They are pure, subtle or simple elements, the metaphysical parts of the ordinary Atoms of Matter. They are "the substances," to quote from Vijnāna Bhikṣu, "the undifferentiated (a-viṣeṣa) originals of the Gross Elements, which form the substratum of Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour and Smell, belonging to that class (that is, in that stage of their evolution) in which the distinctions of Sānta ('pleasant'), etc., do not exist." The process of their manifestation is as follows: The Tanmātra of Sound, possessing the attribute of Sound, is produced from Ahamkāra; then, from the Tanmātras of Sound, accompanied by Ahamkāra, is produced the Tanmātra of Touch, possessing the attributes of Sound and Touch. In a similar manner, the other Tanmātras are produced, in the order of their mention, by the addition of one more attribute at each successive step.

The transformations of the Tanmātras are the Gross Elements of Ether, Air, Fire, Water, and Earth,—the ordinary Atoms of Matter, in which appear for the first time the distinctions of being pleasant, painful, and neutral.

All Bodies, from that of Brahmac down to a stock, are formed of them.

Now, all this objective world is non-intelligent, because its material cause, Prakṛti, is non-intelligent. It does not, therefore, exist or energise for its own sake. There must be some one else of a different nature,
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some intelligent being, for whose benefit, i.e., experience and freedom, all this activity of Prakṛiti is. Thus do the Sāṅkhyaśas explain the existence of Puruṣa.

The Twenty-first Tattvas.

To classify the Tattvas logically, they may be exhibited thus:

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<tr>
<td>A-pujita. Unmanifest :</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 Prakṛiti, the state of equilibrium of Sattva, Rājas and Tamas.</td>
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<tr>
<td>पुजित. Manifest :</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Mahat.</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Aham-kāra.</td>
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<tr>
<td>× Sattva.</td>
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<td>× Tamas.</td>
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Indriyas of Cognition: 21 Manas.

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<th>Manas.</th>
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<tr>
<td>2 The Eye.</td>
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<td>19 The Ear.</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 The Nose.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 The Tongue.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 The Skin.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Indriyas of Action:

| 15 Hands. |
| 14 Feet. |
| 13 Speech. |
| 12 Excretory organ. |
| 11 Organ of generation. |

10 Sound. 8 Touch. 6 Form. 4 Flavour. 2 Smell. 9 Ether. 7 Air. 5 Fire. 3 Water. 1 Earth.

Of these, Puruṣa is the principle of Being, Prakṛiti is the principle of Becoming: Puruṣa eternally is, never becomes, while Prakṛiti is essentially Movement; even during Pralaya or Cosmic Dissolution, its activity does not altogether cease; it then undergoes homogeneous transformation: Sattva modifying as Sattva, Rājas modifying as Rājas, and Tamas modifying as Tamas. Puruṣa, on the other hand, is eternal consciousness undisturbed. Nothing can come into him, nothing can go out of him; he is Kāla-stha, dwelling in the cave. And these two eternal co-ordinate principles are in eternal conjunction with each other. But conjunction as such does not set Prakṛiti in movement. Creation is caused by Rāga or Passion. Rāga is a change of state which spontaneously takes place in the Rājas of Buddhi, through the influence of Dharma and A-dharma. These are the natural consequences of the previous changes in the transformations of Prakṛiti.
and they reside in Aham-kāra in the form of Vāsanā or tendency, and render impure the Sattva of Buddha. The activity of Prakṛti, in the form of the disturbance of its Rajas element, is spontaneously evoked for the purpose of working out and exhausting the stored up Vāsanā; its successive transformation is really a process of purification of the Sattva of Buddha. This spontaneous tendency towards purification is due to the vicinity of Puruṣa.

The Sāmkhyas constantly hammer on the theme that no pain, no suffering, no bondage ever belongs to Puruṣa. Puruṣa is eternally free, never bound, never released. And because they thus thoroughly reveal the nature of Puruṣa, their doctrine is described as the Sāmkhya, thorough-reveler.

The “experience” of Puruṣa consists in his being the indifferent spectator of the changes that take place in Buddha; his “bondage” is nothing but the reflection on him of the bondage, that is, the impurities, of Buddha; his “release” is merely the removal of this reflection which, again, depends upon the recovery by Buddha of its state of pristine purity, which means its dissolution into Prakṛti. To say that the activity of Prakṛti is for the benefit of Puruṣa is, therefore, a mere figure of speech. It is really for the purification of the Sattva of Buddha.

To think, as people generally do, that pleasure and pain, release is due to A-viveka, and bondage really belong to Puruṣa, is a mistake pūrṇa and simple. It is A-vidyā. A-viveka is the cause of A-vidyā. And A-viveka, non-discrimination, is the failure to discriminate Puruṣa from Prakṛti and her products. Many are ignorant of the very existence of Puruṣa. Many are ignorant of his exact nature: some identify him with Prakṛti, some with Mahat, some with Aham-kāra, and so on. Many, again, know the Tattvas in some form or other, but they know them not: knowledge, in the sense of mere information, they have, but no realisation, and it is realisation which matters. The Sāmkhya, for this reason, enters into a detailed examination of the Tattvas, their number, nature, function, effect, inter-relation, resemblance, difference, etc., and

The Aim of the Sāmkhya is on Tattva-abhyāsa or the habitual contemplation of the Tattvas, so that they may be Sākṣipta or immediately known or realised. The way is also shown as to how, and the means, too, whereby, to discriminate, on the one hand, the gross Elements from the Tan-mātras, the Tan-mātras from the Indriyas, and both from Aham-kāra, Aham-kāra from Buddha, and Buddha
from Puruṣa, and, on the other hand, to discriminate Puruṣa from the gross and subtle Bodies and to prevent their further identification.

The Yoga which is the practice of the Sāṃkhya, which is the theory, takes up, and starts from, these central teachings of its predecessor, viz. (1) All activity—all change—is in and of Prakṛti. (2) No activity—no change—is in Puruṣa. (3) The modifications of the mind are reflected in Puruṣa, and make him look like modified. (4) When the mind is calm and purified, Puruṣa shines as he really is. (5) Save and except these, reflection and its removal, bondage and release do not belong to Puruṣa. (6) Bondage and release are really of Prakṛti, or, more strictly speaking, of the individualised form of its first transformation, viz., Buddhi. From the point of view of the philosophy of the history of the Darśanas, these are the last words of the Sāṃkhya.

The Sāṃkhya also has brought the doctrine of Sūkṣma or Līlgā Sarīra, the Subtle Body, prominently to the fore. For, the purification of the Sattva of Buddhi may not be, and, as a general rule, is not, possible in one life, nor in one region of the Universe. But death seems to put an untimely end to the process of purification, by destroying the gross Body. How then can the process of purification be continued in other lives and in other regions? The Sāṃkhya replies that it can be and is so continued by means of the Subtle Body. It is composed of the seventeen Tatwās, beginning with Buddhi and ending with the Tattvāmātras. It is produced, at the beginning of Creation, one for each Puruṣa, and lasts till the time of Maha-Pralaya or the Great Dissolution. It is altogether unconfined, such that it may ascend to the sun dancing on its beams, and can penetrate through a mountain. And it transmigrates from one gross Body to another, from one region of the Universe to another, being perfumed with, and carrying the influence of, the Bhāvas or dispositions of Buddhi characterised as virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power, and their opposites.

The Sāṃkhyas, again, teach a plurality of Puruṣas. This topic has been very fully discussed in the Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram, 1. 140-150, and the commentaries. Therein Vijñāna Bhikṣu has mercilessly criticised the doctrine of Non-duality maintained by some of the Vedicāntins, and has sought to establish the plurality of Puruṣas. And Garbe, in his characteristic style, contents himself with a flippant criticism of Vijñāna Bhikṣu’s explanations. But Vijñāna Bhikṣu’s criticisms are not aimed principally against the unity of Puruṣas, but at those interpretations of it, according
to which the empirical Puruṣas, that is, mundane Puruṣas, the plurality of whom is established by irrefutable arguments, as in the Sāmkhya Śāstra, are reduced to mere shadows without substance. He does not so much attack the unadulterated A-Dvaita of the Vedas and the Upaniṣats as its later developments. He was fully aware of the fact that none of the six Darśanas, for example, was, as we have hinted more than once, a complete system of philosophy in the Western sense, but merely a catechism explaining, and giving a reasoned account of, some of the truths revealed in the Vedas and Upaniṣats, to a particular class of students, confining the scope of its enquiry within the province of Creation, without attempting to solve to them the transcendental riddles of the Universe, which, in their particular stage of mental and spiritual development, it would have been impossible for them to grasp. Similarly, Garbe is wrong in thinking that Vijnāna Bhikṣu “explains away the doctrine of absolute monism.” It is only a matter of interpretation and of stand-point; compare Rāmānuja, Madhva, etc. For Vijnāna does not hesitate to do away even with the duality of Prakṛti and Puruṣa when he observes that all the other Tatwas enter into absorption in Puruṣa and rest there in a subtle form, as does energy in that which possesses it. (Vide his Commentary on S-P-S., I. 61). For an explanation, therefore, of the apparent contradictions in the Darśanas, one must turn to the Vedas and Upaniṣats and writings of a similar scope and character. The Bhagavat-Gītā, for instance, declares:—

In the world there are these two Puruṣas only, the mutable and the immutable. The mutable is all created things; the intelligent experiencer is said to be the immutable.—XV. 16.

While the highest Puruṣa is a different one, who (in the Upaniṣats) is called the Parama-Ātma, the Supreme Self, and who, presiding over the three worlds, preserves them, as the undecaying, omniscient, omnipotent Īśvara.—XV. 17.

Along such lines the so-called contradictions of the Darśanas find their reconciliation and true explanation in the higher teachings of the Upaniṣats.

It will probably be contended that, in the case in question, such reconciliation is impossible in view of “one of the fundamental doctrines of the genuine Sāmkhya, which

The Sāmkhya does not deny the Existence of God.
is the denial of God” (Garbe): No graver blunder has ever been committed by any student of the Sāṃkhya! The genuine Sāṃkhya no more denies the existence of God than does Garbe’s illustrious countryman, Emmanuel Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason. To make this position clear, let us paraphrase the Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram on the subject. Thus, Iśvara is not a subject of proof (I. 92). For, we must conceive Iśvara as being either Mukta, free, or Buddha, bound. He can be neither free nor bound; because, in the former case, being perfect, He would have nothing to fulfil by creation, and, in the latter case, He would not possess absolute power (I.93-94). No doubt, in the Šrutis, we find such declarations as “He is verily the all-knower, the creator of all,” and the like; these, however, do not allude to an eternal, uncaused Iśvara (God), but are only eulogies of such Jivas or Incarnate Selves as are going to be freed, or of the Yogins, human as well as super-human, who have attained perfection by the practice of Yoga (I. 95). Some say that attainment of the highest end results through absorption into the Cause (III. 54). But this is not so, because, as people rise up again after immersion into water, so do Purusas, merged into Prakriti at the time of Pralaya, appear, again, at the next Creation, as Iśvaras (III. 54-55). The Vedic declarations, e.g., “He is verily the all-knower, the creator of all,” refer to such Highest Selves (III. 56). Neither is the existence of God as the moral governor of the world, proved; for, if God Himself produce the consequences of acts, He would do so even without the aid of Karma; on the other hand, if His agency in this respect be subsidiary to that of Karma, then let Karma itself be the cause of its consequences; what is the use of a God? Moreover, it is impossible that God should be the dispenser of the consequences of acts. For, His motive will be either egoistic or altruistic. But it cannot be the latter, as it is simply inconceivable that one acting for the good of others, should create a world so full of pain. Nor can it be the former, because (1) in that case, He would possess unfulfilled desires, and, consequently, suffer pain and the like. Thus your worldly God would be no better than our Highest Selves. (2) Agency cannot be established in the absence of desire; for, behind every act, there lies an intense desire. And to attribute intense desire to God would be to take away from his eternal freedom. (3) Further, desire is a particular product of Prakriti. It cannot, therefore, naturally grow within the Self, whether it be God or the Jiva; it must come from the outside. Now, it cannot be said that desire, which is an evolute of Prakriti, directly has connection with the Self, as it would contradict hundreds of
Vedic declarations to the effect that the Self is \textit{Aatanga}, absolutely free from attachment or association. Neither can it be maintained that Prakriti establishes connection of desire with the Self by induction, as it were, through its mere proximity to it; as this would apply equally to all the Selves at the same time (V. 2-9). Furthermore, the above arguments might have lost their force or relevancy, were there positive proof of the existence of God; but there is no such proof. For, proof is of three kinds, \textit{viz.}, Perception, Inference and Testimony. Now, God certainly is not an object of perception. Neither can He be known by Inference; because there is no general proposition (\textit{Vyaapati}) whereby to infer the existence of God, inasmuch as, Prakriti alone being the cause of the world, the law of causation is of no avail here. And the testimony of the Veda speaks of Prakriti as being the origin of the world, and hence does not prove the existence of God (V. 10-12).

Thus the Sámkhya maintain that it cannot be proved by evidence that an eternal, self-caused God exists; that the ordinary means of proof, Perception, Inference and Testimony, fail to reach Him; and that there is no other means of correct knowledge on our plane of the Universe. And when, therefore, Kapila thus declares that the various objective arguments for the establishment of theism, \textit{viz.}, the ontological, the cosmological, the teleological, and the moral, cannot stand, and pronounces the verdict of ‘non-proven’ in regard to the existence of God, he takes up the right philosophical attitude, and there is absolutely no justification for branding his doctrine as atheistical merely on this score. "The notion that the existence of God is susceptible of dialectic demonstration has been surrendered, in later times," Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall remarks, "by most Christian theologians of any credit: it now being, more ordinarily, maintained that our conviction of deity, on grounds apart from revelation, repose solely on original consciousness, antecedent to all proof."

Thus the Sámkhya is \textit{Nir-Iśvara}, but not \textit{Nāstika}. It is not \textit{Nāstika}, atheistical, because it does not deny the existence of God. It is \textit{Nir-Iśvara}, lit. god-less, as it explains all and every fact of experience without reference to, and without invoking the intervention of, a divine agency. Those who imagine that, in the Sámkhya, there is a denial of God, obviously fail to recognize the distinction between the two words, \textit{Nāstika} and \textit{Nir-Iśvara}. They, further, fail to bear in mind that the Sanskrit \textit{Iśvara} and the English \textit{God} are not synonymous terms. For, the opposite of \textit{Nāstika} is \textit{Aṣṭika} (believer), one who believes in the existence of God, the authority of the
Accordingly, the Hindu Dārsanās have been classified as being either "Āstika" or "Nāstika," and the "Nir-Iśvara" Ānkhya has been always regarded as falling under the former category.

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N. SINHA.
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THE
SĀṂKHYA-PRAVAÇANA-SŪTRAM

Vṛitti of Aniruddha.

Salutation to Śri Ganesa.

Aum.

Salutation to the Origin of the Manifested.

INTRODUCTION.

After saluting Viśnu, Viṣṇu, Sūrya, Sarasvatī, Lakṣmī, Gaṅgā, and Mahēśṭa, I begin to write the Vṛitti (of the Śāṁkhyā-Sūtram).

Verily, in consequence of Vairāgya, dispassion, Puruṣa, man, is inclined to the study of the Šāstra, (writings), which teaches the means of attaining Mokṣa, Release. Vidyā, knowledge of Truth, also comes through Vairāgya, dispassion. Vairāgya, again, arises after the exhaustion of Pravṛitti, inclination to, or desire for, external enjoyments, by means of Bhoga, experience, or it arises after the extinction of Dūrita, demerits, acquired in previous births. Thus says the Śruti:

कर्मे विरक्ते सर्वस्य अनेकं—(Jātaka Upaniṣat, 4).

The very day one grows dispassionate, the same day let one retire from the world.

Man inclined to the study of Šāstra (as stated above) is, next, released through Para-vairāgya, higher dispassion. Accordingly Patañjali has declared:

हृदात्मकविविधतयोरिष्टमण्डलोऽस्य क्रियाकारायाः पृथ्वीयं तत्परं पुरुष्यात्मकं सन्तुष्ट्यत


—Vairāgya is the consciousness of self-command in one who has killed within oneself all desires for visible (e. g., garland, sandal paste, woman, etc.) as well as Vedic (or invisible, e. g., heaven and the like) objects of enjoyment. This is higher Vairāgya. It results from knowing the Puruṣa (i.e., from spiritual intuition of the self), and its effect is absence of desire for association with Prakṛti, the root-cause of the world.

Now, the very kind and great sage Kapila, being desirous of saving the world, commences this Mokṣa-śāstra, Lessons on Release, and, in order to teach this very para-vairāgya, lays down the first aphorism:
INTRODUCTION.

One, without a second (Cf. Chhándogya Upáníṣat, VI. ii. 1)—these words of the Veda declare absence, in the Puruṣa, of difference characterised as Vaidharnyu or difference in essential attributes, for the purpose of showing that he attains Mukti or release through annihilation of all Abhināma, egoity, that is, the sense of separate personality; and not that Puruṣa is one and one only, as is the sky, because of the non-contradiction of hundred attributes.

(Note.—One of the charges levelled against the Śāmkhya Philosophy as a whole is that its teachings conflict with the teachings of the Veda, inasmuch as it admits plurality of Selves, while the Veda says there is but one Self. Vījñāna-Bhikṣu has undertaken to defend the Śāmkhya against all such adverse criticisms. In those opening verses, he prepares the ground for his future arguments. Now, the diversity of embodied selves can be by no means ignored. Philosophy, again, seeks unity. And thus the problem of the One and the Many has ever been the crux of all philosophies. Some explain the relation of the two on the analogy of a sheet of water and the bubbles that appear on it. According to them, as bubbles rise out of, and ultimately coalesce into, the water, so finite souls rise out of, and ultimately coalesce into, the Supreme Self, and the words, One, without a second, refer to one individual reality. Vījñāna-Bhikṣu does not accept this view. He thinks that the state of Mukti does not imply a state of coalescence, but of harmony, as in a choir, and that, therefore, the above words of the Veda refer simply to absence of difference in kind amongst a plurality of Selves, so that there can be no conflict between the teachings of Kapila and the teachings of the Veda.)

Now, in order to teach a complete system of valid arguments for the purpose of Manana, intellect, that is, assimilation, differentiation, and elaboration, in thought of the truth, thus heard, i.e., learnt, from the Veda, there appeared on earth Nārāyana, the person of Kapila, as the Author of the Śāmkhya System of Thought, for the purpose of annihilation of the infinite sufferings of all Jīvas or embodied Selves: I bow down to Him.

(Note.—This verse is directed against those who say that the teachings of Kapila are not worthy of acceptance, because he is an atheist. Vījñāna-Bhikṣu proposes to show, on the contrary, that Kapila is verily an incarnation of God.)

We adore that Universal of (Pure) Consciousness, the same in all created things, which shines in various forms, in various upādhis, receptacles or limiting situations, like fire (in different pieces of wood which give to it differences of size, shape, colour, smell, etc.) and like the sun (in mirrors of different shape, colour, etc.).
I am that Supreme Power or Light, that Being of the uniform essence of consciousness, in which the bewildered distinguish the characteristics of divinity, non-divinity, and the like.

Only a portion (i.e., a sixteenth part) is left of the Sāṃkhya-Sāstra, Lessons on Sāṃkhya, which, moon-like, contains the ambrosia of knowledge, after the rest has been swallowed up by the Sun of Time; I shall make it grow again by means of the nectar of (my) words.

And by cutting asunder the knot of consciousness and unconsciousness, I shall deliver (men) from (the limitation imposed on them by) consciousness also, under the cover of a Commentary on Sāṃkhya. May Hari, the Giver of Release, accordingly be pleased.

Non-difference in essential attributes amongst all the Selves, declared by hundreds of texts of the Veda, in such forms as "Thou verily art That," is within the cognisance of this Sāstra alone.

अत्मा या घरे द्वाराः भौतिको मन्तव्यो निविद्या हस्तम्!

—Lo, the Self has to be beheld, to be heard about, to be reasoned about, to be constantly meditated upon (Bṛihat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣat, II. iv. 5),—in this and other passages of the Veda, the triplet of Śravaṇa, hearing, i.e., acquiring information about the Self from authoritative external sources, and the rest, (i.e., Manana, intellection, i.e., assimilation, differentiation and elaboration, of the knowledge so acquired, and Nidānāyāna, constant meditation, for the realization of that truth), has been prescribed as the cause of Ātma-siddhāthā, intuition of the Self or Self-realization, which is the source of Parama-puruṣa-artha, the Supreme Purpose of Personal Existence or the Highest Object of Volition. Now, what, again, are the ways of Śravaṇa, etc. ? So it is recalled:—

भौतिको ज्ञातव्ये न निद्रायान निविद्या हस्तम्!

मर्या व सत्तं च ज्ञेय च प्रधानहेतुः

(Truth about the Self) should be learnt from the teachings of the Veda, subjected to reasoning by means of arguments and, after such reasoning, constantly meditated upon, (as) these are the causes of Darsana, intuition of the Self.

The words 'in the manner laid down in Yoga-Sāstra or Lessons on Yoga' complete the meaning of the word 'Dhyeya,' should be meditated upon. Now, the Lord, in the person of Kapila, taught, by this Viveka-Sāstra, Lessons on Discrimination between the Self and the Not-Self, consisting of Six Books, valid arguments, not conflicting with the Veda, in respect of Puruṣa-artha, Purpose of Life, Jñāna, knowledge, which is its source, Ātma-svarūpa, Nature of the Self, which is the object of knowledge and the like, as learnt from the Veda.
An objector may say: The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika also have (already) shown the way to these objects, and have thus taken away the necessity of the present Śāstra. Again these Śāstras being demonstrative of the Self under the contradictory forms of Saguna, phenomenal, and Nirguna, noumenal, characteristics, there is opposition between the arguments of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems and the arguments of this System; hence the validity of either is difficult to establish.

To this we reply that it does not stand thus, inasmuch as the difference of their subject-matter as Vyavahārika or practical truth, in the one case, and Paramārtha or ultimate truth, in the other, leaves no room for absence of necessity and for opposition as apprehended. For, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, by bringing forward such facts as ‘I feel pleasure,’ ‘I feel pain,’ etc., have merely differentiated the Self from its embodiment, etc., and have thus raised it, by means of inference, to the first higher plane, as it is impossible to enter at once into the Para-sūkṣma or most abstract. And the knowledge that is derived from them, by removing the idea of the Self in respect of the embodiment and the like, becomes only practical or moral Tattva-jñāna or cognition of reality, in the same way as, (when, on seeing something possessing height and extension at a distance, doubt arises, at the first blush, whether it be a person or a pillar), knowledge of the possession of hands, legs, and the like, by removing the mistake of a pillar in respect of the person, becomes cognition of reality for all practical purposes. Hence—

प्रहृदेश्यसंस्कृतम् स्वर्णम् गृहस्मसन्धि !
तान्त्रिकस्वते सद्यत् हृदयविश्व विम्बायते !

Being blinded by Ahaṃkāra, egotism, and other limitations, they stick to the modifications of Prakṛti, Primeval Matter, and to activities. (Not knowing the Self) they do not know all and are therefore ignorant. He who knows all should not divert them from the Path of Action.—Gītā, III. 39.

In the above verse of the Gītā it is declared that in comparison with the all-knowing Śāṅkhyā philosophers, the debater (i.e., the follower of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy), who thinks that he is the agent in all acts apparently done by him, does not really know all as he does not know the Self, and not that he does not know anything at all. So that the knowledge that is derived from them also, certainly becomes the source of Mokṣa, Release, through successive steps, by means of what is called lower dispassion. And, also, as compared with that knowledge, it is knowledge derived from the Śāṅkhya Śāstra that is ultimate or spiritual, and that becomes the immediate source of Mokṣa by means of higher dispassion, inasmuch as it is proved by the above passage of
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the Gîtâ, that it is only he who knows that the Self is not the agent in actions, that knows all. Hundreds of texts of the Veda also prove this point. For example:—

दीर्घो हि तद्भवति दुःखं शोकादः—कामाभिषेकमनुजनमात्रनाय—कर्मे

काश्चाहार्यसूचरति भूतावशिवं कहायावत—स यद्व निष्ठायु पवनमृत्युगततलैं

सत्ति।

He then overcomes all the sorrows of the heart.—Considering desire, etc., as nothing but modifications of the mind.—(The Self) is existent, moves into the two worlds, seems as if it thinks, seems as if it desires (Brihad. Upan., IV. III. 7)—Whatever he (the Self) sees here cannot influence, or produce any impression on, him.

It is proved also by hundreds of texts of the Smrîti, treating of spiritual truths. For example:—

प्रश्नातेन किपमयायां शुचि: कर्मांश्च सर्व्यथा।

चाहुंकाश्चिर्मूलामा कर्माविशिष्टमिति मयाये गौताद हि ॥ २५ ॥

निवृत्तथानम्प्राणमतमा द्वारस्याम्रम्भः।

तु: याहानमयां चर्मा प्रकृतेतेऽतु नासन।॥

He whose self is blinded by Ahamkāra, thinks that he is the agent of actions which are, in all cases, performed by the attributes of Prakṛiti (Gîtâ. III. 27).—Verily this self is full of peace and full of knowledge and free from impurities. Pain and ignorance are qualities of Prakṛiti, and not of the self.

Besides, the knowledge by the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika Sûtras is obstructed in, i.e., does not reach up to, Paramārtha-bhûmi or the spiritual plane, the level of ultimate reality. But the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika do not, on this ground, become worthless, because there is the maxim, viz., वै: वा: केवलः: that the significance of a word is that to which it is directed, and there is no obstruction to the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika to prove (in man) an element over and above the body, etc., which they are intended to prove, (so that they fulfil their own purpose). The possession of pleasure, etc., in the Self is proved by ordinary experience or is the experience of ordinary people. In the absence, therefore, of the necessity of further proof in this respect, the above additional element has been simply translated into these Sûstras, and hence it does not fall within their scope.

(Nota:—the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika undertake to teach that the body is not the whole man, in other words, that the self is not identical with the physical organism. For this they appeal to the experience of man, namely, that man feels pleasure, pain, and so on, and then show that pleasure, pain, and the like cannot be properties of the body, and that, therefore, there is in man something different from the body, which is the seat of pleasure, pain, etc. Hence it cannot be said that it is a defect in these Sûstras that they do not teach what the self is in itself, whether pleasure, pain, etc., are properties of the self or are mere accidents, and so on, for that they do not undertake to teach.)

The objector may still say:—It may be so. There may be no contradiction between the Sāṃkhya, on the one hand, and the Nyāya and
the Vaiśeṣika, on the other. But certainly there is conflict with the Brahma-Mimamsā, i.e., the Vedānta, and the Yoga Śāstra. For, they prove an eternal Īśvara, God, whereas here Īśvara is going to be excluded. It cannot be said that here too there is non-contradiction between the theistic and the atheistic theory on account of their distinction as being practical or moral and ultimate or transcendental, seeing that theism may possibly be said to have been designed for the ends of worship; for, there does not exist any principle of such distinction, since it is equally possible to say that such atheism as that Īśvara is unknowable, which is proved by the conduct of men, is designed to produce indifference towards the lordliness of Īśvara. On the other hand, like the existence of attributes in the Self, Īśvara has been nowhere manifestly excluded in the Veda and other sacred books, whereby it could have been ascertained that the theory of the existence of Īśvara serves only a practical purpose.

To this it is replied as follows: Here too the relation of the practical and the transcendental exists. For, the World is unreal, unfounded, God-les (Gītā, XVI, 8.)—by teachings like this, the theory that there is no Īśvara has been condemned, and it is in this (i.e., Sāṁkhya) Śāstra that the exclusion of Īśvara has been made for practical purposes only, and it is, therefore, proper to translate it as designed to produce indifference towards the lordliness of Īśvara. The idea of the Sāṁkhya teachers is that should eternal lordliness be not contravened in the manner of the Lokāyata or sensualist doctrines, then Chitta or the inner sense being drawn away towards it by the vision of perfect, pure and eternal lordliness, there would arise an obstacle to the formation of the habit of Viveka or discrimination between the Self and the Not-Self. Is it not also a fact that nowhere there is any condemnation or the like of the theistic theory? That theory, therefore, should not be distorted so as to make it serve only the purposes of worship, etc. Passages such as—


There is no knowledge comparable with Sāṁkhya. There is no power equal to Yoga. Here let there be no doubt in you. Sāṁkhya is believed to be the highest knowledge.—Mahābhārata, Śūrdi Parvan.

prove the superiority of the Sāṁkhya System of Thought to all other systems, only in respect of Viveka or discrimination between the Self and the Not-Self, but not also in respect of the exclusion of Īśvara. Similarly, it is ascertained, from the unanimous verdict
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...of Pārśār and hundreds of other men of light and leading, that it is the theory that there is Īśvara that is transcendentally true. Moreover

चक्षुपायमयो जा कायारे शास्त्रयोगिणया।

श्लोकः भृतिविक्रियया: भृतिकवाचस्यविनयः॥

१४०२ यथास्यो जैनयादि बिद्विज्ञानः न कम्भन।

धूरता वेदार्थविशेषास्य भृतिपारं गतस्य हि तैस॥

In the writing of Aksapāda (i.e., Gautama, the author of the Nyāya), in the teachings of Kaṇṭha (the author of the Vaiśeṣika), in the Sāṁkhya and in the Yoga, the portion that conflicts with the Veda, should be given up by those whose only resort is the Veda. In the works of Jaimini (the author of the Pūrva-Mimāṃsā), and of Vyāsa (the author of the Vedānta), however, there is no such contradictory portion; for by understanding the meaning of the Vedas from the Veda, they have gone to the end of the Vedas (i.e., have thoroughly mastered it).

these passages of the minor Purāṇa by Pārśāra and other writings also establish the superiority of the Vedānta so far as it treats of Īśvara. Similarly—

ङ्गासांतचारणेऽकश्च तैसाः सत्सर्वं धार्मिकः॥

Various theorists have propounded manifold systems showing the way to salvation. That system should be followed which is supported by Reason and Revelation and is in accordance with pious conduct.

Pursuant to this direction of the Mahābhārata, given in the portion dealing with Mokṣa Dharma or religion which secures Release, as well as the conduct of all pious men such as Pārśār, etc., only the argument or method of reasoning which demonstrates the existence of Īśvara, as propounded in the Vedānta, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika and other Systems of Thought, should be accepted as being of greater validity. So also—

यद न प्रयत्नं योगिनया: सांख्य धार्मि महेश्वरम्॥

प्रागतिर्विद्योतिः प्राचीन तमेव शर्मेण यसा॥

Seek shelter in Him alone, Who is Brahman, the Great Lord, without beginning and without end, whom the master Yogins and even the Sāṁkhya fail to behold.—Kūrma Purāṇa?

by these and like words of the Kūrma and other Purāṇas what has been already declared by Nārāyaṇa and others, is only this that the Sāṁkhya is in knowledge of Īśvara. Moreover, it is Īśvara that is the principal object of the Vedānta, consciously aimed at from the very beginning. Were it obstructed or futile in that part, the Śāstra would have been altogether useless, because of the maxim, 'The significance of a word is that to which it is directed.' The principal object of the Sāṁkhya Śāstra, on the other hand, is Puruṣa-artha, the Supreme Purpose of Life, and Prakṛiti-puruṣa-viveka, Discrimination
between the Self and the Not-Self, which is its source. Hence it cannot be said to be useless, even though it be opposed in that part of it which deals with the exclusion of Iśvara, because of the maxim, ‘The significance of a word is that to which it is directed.’ Therefore, there being room for adverse criticism in it, the Sāmkhya is certainly weak, in so far as it deals with the exclusion of Iśvara. It cannot be said, however, that in the Vedānta only Iśvara is the principal subject but not (His) eternal lordliness. For, it presupposes that the view that there can lie no interval between the idea of Iśvara, the Lord, and the idea of lordliness, entails an error, and the presupposition is not proved. It has been accordingly ascertained that Iśvara comes within the scope of the Brahma Mīmāṃsā, Enquiry into Brahman, the Vedānta, only under the characteristic of being possessed of eternal lordliness. But the word Brahman, in its primary sense, denoting only Para-Brahman, Vyāsa did not frame his aphorism thus, Now, therefore enquiry into Higher Brahman, instead of as, Now therefore, enquiry into Brahman, (vide Vedānta-Sūtras, I. i. 1, S. B. II., vol. v, p. 6). From this, again, it should not be apprehended that in consequence of opposition to the Sāmkhya, the Vedānta and the Yoga Dārṣṭāna, Philosophy, have in view only Kārya-Iśvara, i.e., Iśvara as manifested in Creation, which is an effect. For in that case, Prakṛti would become independent in Creation and consequently design in Creation would not be proved, and a series of Vedānta Sūtras beginning with बुधवार, Not the inferred one, (Vedānta Sūtras, I. iii. 3, S. B. II. Vol., v., p. 104), would become out of place. In like manner बुधवारमेधाश्वः कवित्तयांकवित्तया: भवेतसत्त्वस्वरूपाः He is the teacher of them also who have passed away, because (being uncaused) He is not delimited by time (Yoga-Sūtras, I. 26, S. B. II., Vol. iv. p. 48)—this aphorism of the Yoga System and the commentary on it by Vyāsa clearly bring home to the mind that Iśvara is eternal. Thus it is by Abhyupagama-vāda, concession to current views, Praudhi-vāda, a bold or dogmatic assertion and the like that the exclusion of Iśvara in the Sāmkhya appears as being designed to serve a practical purpose. Hence there is no contradiction with the Vedānta and the Yoga. Abhyupagama-vāda also is found in the Śāstras; for example, in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (I. XVII. 83):

पते सिंहब्रह्म हैव विकल्प: कष्टिता सया
इश्वरेणुपयं तथ संहेष्य घ यति मये

These, the divergent views of thinkers of different standpoints, have been, O Daitya, described by Me. Accept them and hear their summary from Me.

Or, it may be that, for the purpose of impeding the knowledge of the sinful men, even in theistic Dārṣṭānas, theories have been established,
which are opposed to the Veda. Of course, these Dāsānas are not authoritative in those portions of them; but authoritiveness certainly belongs to them in respect of their principal subjects, which are not opposed to the Veda and the Smṛiti. It is, therefore, on this ground one that the disparagement of all Dāsānas except the Vedānta and Yoga in the Padma-Purāṇa can be justified. Thus, in the Padma-Purāṇa, Śiva says to Pārvatī:—

महो श्रवणं प्रवसयाति सामसायनि यथाज्ञानम्।
वेषं पवयामायेव पावित्रः भानिनामनि॥
प्रथमं हि यत्वेवलक्षी हृदं पावुपङ्चार्थम्॥

मच्चकस्यनवेशाति: संप्रोक्तानि तत: परम्॥
कर्मादिनूत समेतकं शास्त्रं वैदेशिकं महत्।
गैतिष्ठनं ततञ्च न्यायं साविकं तु कहिलेन है॥
हितज्ञमनं जैसलिनान पूर्वं वेददमानयतः॥

निरीक्ष्यकेव भाजनेर इति शास्त्रं महत्तम॥
विचारणं तत् गोकु वाद्यतमित्तिन्तिन्तम॥
दैवताणि नादानाययं विपुष्यनु बुद्धिपर्वा॥
वैदयानात्मसत् गोकुं नादोनिलपटार्थिम॥

मायावादसम्मच्छिन्नः प्रयासं वैद्यमेव ।
मथेष काल्यं कहिलं भास्त्रस्यसिद्धिम॥

cारपर्यं भूतितवात्यायो दुर्योद्धकार्यितम॥
कार्यस्यभ्यासविज्ञानम् च प्रतिपादते।

tवेषकाशीपरिशः शास्त्रमवयम् तत्र चाचित्ते॥
पर्वतीययोविदीयं मयाच्छ चाचित्तोऽपि।।

हस्ताक्षरं नृत्यां तिलुं यं सतितं मया॥

वस्तुस्य जागतोपस्य नादानायं कलौ दुरे।

'वैद्यात्ममहादात्मं मायावादस्यविषयम।'।

मथेष कहिलं यात्रां नासकार्याः ॥

—Listen to me, O Dovi, I omnolurate, in their order, the Tānsa Sāstras (i.e., teachings which, instead of illuminating, still more darken the understanding), by the very hearing of which even the wise undergo a fall (1). First of all, I myself taught the Śaiva Sāstra, e.g., the Pañcapāta, etc., and after that, Sāstras were composed by Śaiva-saṁgha possessed by my influence (2). Kaṇḍā composed the great Vaiśeṣika Sātra; similarly, Gautama, the Nyāya, and Kapila, the Sāṁkhya (3). And the twocorn Jaimini, the Purva-Mīmāṁsā, which, in its teachings, is identical with the Veda. Miśapa composed a greater Sāstra, by the doctrine of atheism; so was composed the very contemptible Chārvaka Sātra, the Philosophy of Sensualism. For the purpose of the annihilation of the Dāityas, Viṣṇu, in the form of Buddha (4-5), composed the Baudha Philosophy of Nihilism, thereby creating the Naked Order, the Order of the Blue Cowl, etc. And the Theory of Māyā, which also teaches Nihilism, and is only Buddhism in
diagnosis (6), has been taught by myself, O Devi, in the Kali Yuga, Dark Age, in the form of a Brāhmaṇa, giving wrong meanings to the words of the Veda, which should be condemned by all right-thinking men (7). It proves that Karma, action, i.e., religious performance, and the like, should be abandoned, and it is also said there that Naiṣkarmya, non-performance of acts (from selfish motives) results from breaking loose from all Karmas (8). I have proved there the unity of Para-Ātmā, the Supreme Self, and Jīva, the Embodied Self, and have shown that the ultimate form of Brahma is Nirguṇa, devoid of attributes, i.e., changeless (9). For the purpose of the annihilation of the whole world, I myself have, in the Kali Yuga, taught the great Śāstra, purporting to convey the teachings of the Veda, namely, the Theory of Māyā, which in reality is not taught in the Veda, intending it to be the cause of the annihilation of the world (10-11).

We have further elaborated our view in our commentary on the Brahma-Mimāṃsā, Enquiry into Brahma, the Vedānta.

It follows, therefore, that none of the Āstika, theistic or orthodox, Dārśana is either unauthoritative or vitiated by contradiction among themselves. All of them are unimpeded in their progress towards the ends which they respectively have in view, and there is (as shown above) no opposition among themselves.

Our objector may rejoin: Well, likewise, in that portion of it also where it teaches plurality of Puruṣas or Selves, the (Śāṅkhyā) Śāstra may be merely an Abhyupagama-vida, an adopted or conceded doctrine.

We reply that it cannot, inasmuch as (on this point) there is no contradiction. For, in the Vedānta also, by a number of aphorisms such as जग्यात्मकत्वम्—(Selves are) manifold, on account of predication (in manifold ways) —(Vedānta-Sūtras II. iii. 41, S. B. H. Vol. V., p. 381), nothing but plurality of Jīva Ātmās or Embodied Selves has been established. The doctrine of the Śāṅkhyā; namely, that the Puruṣas established by it, are also Selves, of course, goes against the teaching of the Vedānta, since, by the aphorism अपने तत्वकेषा—But (they) approach (Him) as the Self (Vedānta-Sūtras, IV. i. 3, S. B. H., Vol. v, p. 682)—it has been ascertained that the Parama-Ātmā or Supreme Self is the only Self on the transcendental plane, i.e., the plane of Paramārtha or the ultimate reality. But still the Śāṅkhyā is not unauthoritative, inasmuch as there is no obstruction to its fulfilling its avowed purpose, that is, to show that the knowledge of the difference of the worldly or phenomenal Self, i.e., the Jīva, from the Not-Self, is the source of Mokṣa or Release. In the Vedānta, we have pointed out in detail that, such being the case, i.e., in consequence of the distinction of the practical or phenomenal standpoint and the point of view of the ultimate reality, there is no contradiction between the doctrines of Plurality of the Self and of the Unity of the Self, which are well-known in the Veda and the Smṛti.
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The objector may urge further: Even then this Sāstra contains the defect of saying the same thing over again, inasmuch as there are the older aphorisms called Tattva-Samāsa or Compendium of Principles dealing with the same subject.

Our reply to this is that there is no such defect. For, the Tattva-Samāsa is an epitome, while the present treatise is an elaboration, of the Sāmkhya System, and hence neither of them can be a useless repetition.

It is for this reason that this Collection of Six Books, like the Yoga Darśana, is appropriately designated as the Sāmkhya-Pravachana or Elaboration of the Sāmkhya Theory. For, that which has been called the Compendium of Principles, gives an epitome of the Sāmkhya Darśana, and it is of this that an elaborate exposition has been given in this Collection of Six Books. There is, however, this difference between the Sāmkhya and the Yoga Darśana that in the Collection of Six Books there is only an elaboration of the subjects enunciated in the treatise called the Compendium of Principles, whereas, in the Yoga Darśana, incompleteness has been also avoided by the determination of Īśvara, by means of similar enunciation and elaboration, so far as Īśvara was excluded by the Abhyupa-agama-vāda, or popular view.

The name, Sāmkhya, is also significant here as will appear from the sayings of the Mahābhārata, etc., such as:—

तस्क्याप्रकृतिः प्रकृतिः प्रकृतिः प्रकृतिः
तत्त्वादेव च चरुविविधतेन तद्वक्ष्या प्रकृतिः

They are known as Sāmkhyas, because, they make Sāmkhya, and unveil the nature of Prakṛti, Primal Matter, as well as of the twenty-four Tattvas, Truths, Principles, or Realities.—(Mahābhārata, Sānti Parvau).

Sāmkhya means declaration of the nature of the Self, by means of thorough differentiation.

(Note.—The word, Sāmkhya, is derived from the word, Sāmkhya, formed from the prefix, sam, complete or perfect, and the root, khyā, to declare or state, and, therefore, meaning complete enumeration or perfect declaration. Hence Sāmkhya denotes the Sāstra which gives a complete enumeration of all the Tattvās or Principles, or which perfectly declares the nature of the Self. The word is accordingly, Yoga-rūḍha, i.e., a compound word formed in a general way but universally known as denoting a particular object).

Thus Sāmkhya being a Yoga-rūḍha word, (it has been referred to in) such passages of the Veda and the Smṛiti as:—

तत्रं कारणं सांक्ययोगवाचस्मयमः

That is the Cause, and is accessible to knowledge by means of the Sāmkhya and the Yoga.—Svetāvatara Upaniṣat, VI. 13.

न्यायं तद्देशितं सांक्यं बुद्धिः चविचारं प्रकृतिः

This then I have said unto you the knowledge taught in the Sāmkhya. Now listen to this of the Yoga.—(Gītā, II, 59).
By the word, Sāmkhya, only the Sāmkhya Śāstra should be understood. A different meaning should never be supposed.

Now, this same Mokṣa-Śāstra, Lessons on Release, like the Science of Medicine, contains four Vyūhas or divisions. As the Science of Medicine has to demonstrate Disease, Healthy State, Cause of Disease, and Cure, so a Mokṣa-Śāstra also has to demonstrate Heya, the Avoidable, Hāna, Avoidance, Heya-Hetu, the Cause of the Avoidable, and Hāna-Upāya, the Means of Avoidance, because curiosity or enquiry is directed to them by those who desire Mokṣa. Among them, the threefold pain is the Avoidable; Avoidance is its final cessation; A-viveka, non-differentiation, due to the conjunction of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, is the Cause of the Avoidable; while Viveka-khyāti, knowledge of their difference or separateness, is the Means of Avoidance. The word, Vyūha, also includes the ingredients or constituents of these. Out of the above four, Avoidance comes nearest to the heart, being the end desired. The author of the Śāstra also intends to demonstrate the Avoidable, just in the manner of its being the counter-opposite of Avoidance. Accordingly, in order to draw the attention of the disciples, he proposes the opening of the Śāstra:

Book First—The Book of Topics.

Supreme Good described.

अष्ट त्रिविधुः कायतिनतिन्त्रितत्तत्पुरुषार्थः॥ १ १ १ ॥

Atha, now. त्रिविधुः: त्रिविधुः Trividha (threefold) duḥkha (pain) atyanta (absolute, permanent, final) nivṛttiḥ (cessation, prevention), permanent prevention of threefold pain. अतियुग्मस्तः: Atyanta (no plus ultra, absolute, supreme) Puruṣārthah (object desired by the Puruṣa), supreme object of volition or purpose of life.

1. Now, Permanent Prevention of the threefold Pain is the Supreme Purpose of Life.—1.

Vṛtti. —Atha: This word conveys the sense of Maṅgala, an auspicious observance, and not of sequence to Karma, religious performances, as it is clear from the Śruti तत्र, etc., (quoted above), that there is no need of the sense of sequence in the auspicious observance. It is also proper that auspicious ceremonies should be observed at the start of any undertaking. Moreover, the word Atha is observed to denote a good omen. Thus—

नामार्दायकायाकायाक्रमायेत्र पुराणे । कर्मिकमस्ता विनिधान्तो तेन मांगलकार्यादाने ॥

Om and Atha, these two words came out, at the beginning, by breaking through the throat of Brahmā; hence both of them are auspicious. Trividha-duḥkha, etc.:—Pains arising from bodily and mental processes, being classed together as referring to the Embodied Self, form one kind, (called
BOOK I, SûTRA 1.

Adhahautika pains, referring to created beings, are those caused by beasts, birds, and the like. Adhidaivika pains, referring to supernatural forces, are those caused by Graha (planetary powers), (unfavourable) stars, Bhûta, fallen spirits, and so on. If it be urged that cessation of these pains will take place of itself, seeing that pleasures and pains last for only two moments; so the author adds Atyanta; for cessation of particular pains only is not intended but also of all future experiences of painful kind. Here the word, Atyanta, conveys the sense of cessation of also future experiences of painful kind. Dharma, acquisition of merits, Artha, acquisition of wealth, Kama, satisfaction of desires, and Moksha, attainment of Release, are objects of volition. But the characteristic of being ultimate or final does not belong to the first three, because they are perishable, and the pleasure that is found in them is derived from objects of the senses. This is, however, not the case with Moksha, since it is eternal and possesses the form of illumination. Hence it has been stated to be the ultimate object of volition.—1.

Bhûga:—This word, Atha, by its very pronunciation, assumes the form of a Mahâgala or good omen. It is for this reason that the author himself will declare, in the Fifth Book, pûrañçatra viññâna—Observance of a Mahâgala (is obligatory) according to the practice of enlightened men (Sûtram V. I, infra). The sense, however, of the word, Atha, in this aphorism, is this that it introduces the main theme. Here it can have no other meaning.

(Note.—The other sense which the word, Atha, conveys, is that of sequence. If the same is said to be the sense conveyed here, then it will be either sequence to the query of the disciples, or sequence to the acquisition of knowledge, and the like. The aphorism will, then, mean either that the disciples asked Kapila what the Supreme Purpose of Life was, and so he laid down this aphorism, or that the final cessation of the three-fold pain results after knowledge, etc. The commentator shows that the aphorism can bear neither of these meanings.)

For, sequence, e.g., to the enquiry of the disciples, can possibly have no connection with the Supreme Purpose of Life.

(Note.—What the commentator means is this that even a schoolboy knows that the final cessation of the three-fold pain is the Supreme Purpose of Life, so that there can be no occasion for enquiring about it.)

And sequence to knowledge, etc., being the subject of treatment in the sequel, by means of aphorisms specially laid down for that purpose, it is useless to bring out the same sense by the word, Atha. Moreover, if Atha carry a sense different from Adhikâra or the principal or leading topic, the result will be that we shall find no proposition or premise declaring the opening of the Sadéstra, and such other matters. Hence, seeing that the Supreme Purpose of Life has been consciously aimed at at the opening
of the Śastra and arrived at at the end, it is proper to hold that Ātha conveys the sense of Adhikāra only. The conclusion (of the Śastra) will be सुधि (सुधि)—The eradication of that is the Supreme Purpose of Life (VL 70). Adhikāra, again, means introduction as the principal thing. Although commencement is obviously of the Śastra, i.e., the book itself, still, through the Śastra, it is also of the end which the Śastra has in view as well as of its discussion. So that the meaning of the sentence in the aphorism is that it has been begun by us (the author) principally to determine the Supreme Purpose of Life, as described here, together with its Śādhana or means, and other subsidiary topics.

Pain is three-fold: Adhyātmika, originating from the sufferer himself, Adhibhautika, originating from created beings, and Adhidaivika, originating from the gods. Therein, Adhyātmika is so called, because it arises by reference to Ātmā or one’s own embodiment. It is bodily as well as mental, of which the bodily is that springing from disease, and the like. Similarly, the Adhibhautika is so called, because it arises by reference to Bhūtas or created beings. It springs from the tiger, thief, and the like. The Adhidaivika is so called, because it arises by reference to the Devas such as Agni, Vāyu and other Gods. It springs from burns, colds, and the like. Such is the idea expressed by the term, Tri-vidha-duḥkha. Although all pain is, without exception, mental, yet there is the distinction of the mental and the not-mental in consequence of the fact that some pains are produced entirely by the mind, while there are other pains which are not so produced. That which is the Atyanta, complete, without leaving any remainder, Nivṛtti, cessation, of these threefold pains, in their gross or sensible or actual as well as in their fine or ideal or potential forms, the same is Atyanta, supreme, object, agreeable to the understanding of Puruṣas, men,—such is the meaning of the sentence in general. Of these two, gross or sensible pain exists in the present state, and it will die out of itself after the second moment (of its origin); hence there is no necessity of knowledge in this case. Pain that is past, again, has already disappeared; hence there is no need of taking steps towards its destruction. By the method of exhaustion, therefore, it is the cessation of fine or ideal or potential pain, in the state of future, that comes to be the subject of investigation as the Supreme Purpose of life. Thus, there is the aphorism of the Yoga, सुधित्वम्. The avoidable is pain not yet come (Yoga Śātras, II. 16, S. B. H., vol., iv., p. 20). Nivṛtti, cessation, again, does not signify destruction or non-existence, but the past state, since, Dhvamā, consequent non-existence, and Prāgabhāva, antecedent non-existence, being
essentially the same as the past and the future state, respectively non-existence is not admitted by those who hold the Sat-kārya-vāda, the theory that effects are existent prior as well posterior to their production, that is the Sāṃkhya.

(Note.—The Sāṃkhya maintain that an effect, e.g., a water-pot, exists, in an enveloped form, in its cause, viz., earth, and that production means only development. The opposite school, such as the Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, contend that an effect is altogether non-existent so long as it is not produced, but that it is capable of coming into existence. For the purpose of their theory, they divide non-existence as Atyanta-abhāva or absolute non-existence, as for example, of a castle in the air, and Saṃsarga-abhāva or non-existence associated with existence, which they further divide as Prāga-abhāva or antecedent non-existence, as, for example, of a water-pot so long as it was not produced, Dhvani-abhāva or consequent non-existence, as, for example, of the water-pot after its destruction by means of a club or the like, and Anyonya-abhāva or mutual non-existence or absence of identity, that is, difference, as, for example, the non-existence of the nature of a cow in a horse, and vice versa (vide the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, IX. 1. 1-10, S. B. E., Vol. vi. p. 327 et seq.). The Sāṃkhya do not accept this theory of non-existence. What is called antecedent non-existence is, according to them, potential existence, and what is called consequent non-existence is existence in the state of being past.

An objector may argue: Pain which is not-yet-come, that is, which is not present or existent at any time, is incapable of proof, i.e., unreal. Hence, like a flower in the sky, it cannot appropriately become an object of volition.

We reply that this is not the case. For, it has been established in the (Yoga) Darsāna of Patañjali that the power or force of things to produce their respective effects lasts so long as the things themselves endure, since the existence of fire and other things, devoid of the power of burning, etc., has been nowhere observed. And this power lies in the form of those respective effects in the state of not-yet-come. It is the same which is also described as capability of being the Svārūpa or original or unmodified form of the material cause (e.g., of the pain subsequently produced).

(Note.—Pain, for instance, is a state of consciousness. So long as pain is not actually produced, this consciousness remains in a pure, unmodified condition. This is its original form. When pain is actually produced, this consciousness becomes its material cause. And the power that is inherent in this consciousness and that makes it capable of being modified into a painful state, is called the capability of being the original form of the material cause. It is, in other words, potentiality of subsequent transformation into a state of pain.)

It is, on this ground, inferred that the existence of pain not-yet-come, (i.e., the possibility of pain), remains so long as the existence of Chitta or the inner sense continues. "The cessation of that, therefore, is the Purpose of Life. There is, however, this minor distinction that, in what is called Jīvan-mukti-dāta or the state of Release during Life, pains,
over and above Prārabdha-karma-phala (or consequences of acts previously performed, which are actually experienced and thereby exhausted in the present life), that is, pains in the state of not-yet-come, known as the seeds of pain, are burnt up, while, in what is called Videha-kaivalya or disembodied isolation, they are destroyed together with the Chitta or the inner sense. The burning up of the seed, again, means only the destruction of the contributory cause of A-vidyā or false knowledge, since everybody admits that Vidyā or knowledge can eradicate only A-vidyā or false knowledge. It is for this reason that destruction of pain takes place along with that of the Chitta or the inner sense; for, there is no proof that knowledge can directly destroy pain, etc.

(Note.—For an account of the theory of Samsāra and Mokṣa, hero alluded to, see our introduction to the Valdeśika Sūtras, S. B. H., Vol. vi, p. xxxii-xxxiv.)

The objector may argue further: But still the cessation of pain cannot possibly be Puruṣa-artha, an object desired by the in-dwelling Self, i.e., an object of volition, because pain being a property or quality of Chitta, the inner sense, the cessation of it is not possible, in the Puruṣa. The theory lies open to the same objection, even if the expression, Duḥkhahāvittti, cessation of pain, be taken to mean non-production of pain, as, in that case, it is a permanently-established fact with regard to the Puruṣa that no pain can arise in him (so that there is no necessity of proving it over again). It may be urged, however, that as in cases of sudden forgetfulness, such as of an article of ornament hanging round the neck, people search for articles erroneously believed to be missing, so here also, although it is established, (by the very conception of the Puruṣa as being eternally free from all changes of states, and altogether unaffected by external influences), that pain cannot be produced in the Puruṣa, still it may be erroneously believed that such characteristic does not belong to the Puruṣa; and that, in consequence of such error, the state of non-production of pain in the Puruṣa may become an object of voluntary pursuit. But the position is not a tenable one. For, even were this the case, the error would be removed, the moment one learns (Śravaṇa) and thinks about (Manana) it that the Puruṣa is, by nature, free from pain, and accordingly the subsequent Pravṛtti-application, to meditation and the like for the purpose of annihilation of pain, would have no legs to stand upon. For, activity in the direction of employing means which require so much exertion, proceeds only when there is certainty about the result to be attained by it, but in the case of the matter under discussion, it is known, by means of Śravaṇa (learning from authoritative external sources) and Manana (thinking) that no pain can be produced.
in the Purusa as he is, and hence here there can arise no such certainty, unaffected by the knowledge that it is groundless, that non-production of pain is not present in the Purusa as an essential characteristic, and is therefore a result to be secured by voluntary attempt. Granted, moreover, that, on account of error and the like, non-existence of pain may occasionally come to be an object of desire to the Purusa; but why should the Veda which possesses the power of removing all infatuation (Moha), seek to establish that which is already in existence, as a result to be attained by voluntary effort? For, there are passages in the Veda such as योगी केन्द्राणि —He who knows the Self, overcomes sorrow (Chhand. Upan., VII. i. 3); विद्याक इत्यस्य व्यक्ति —He who knows, avoids joy and grief (Katha Upan., I. ii. 12); and so forth.

To this it is replied as follows: The above Purva-paksa, adverse argument, will be solved by the very aphorism (I. 19 post), namely that, except connection with Prakriti, there is no other bond in the Purusa who is, by nature, eternally pure, eternally enlightened, and eternally free, which aphorism determines the Cause of the Avoidable. Thus, pleasure and pain exist also in the Purusa in the form of reflections or images, as otherwise there would be no reason or possibility of their being Bhogya or objects of experience under the Law of Karma. For, Bhoga or experience consists in the reception of pleasure, etc., and reception means transformation into their shape. But such transformation, like transformation of Budhhi, Understanding or Reason, into the shape of the objects apprehended by it, is not possible in the case of Kutastha-chiti or Consciousness seated in the cave (i.e., the Self into which, according to the Sankhya conception, no ideas can enter from the outside). And, there being no other alternative, Tattva-karata, ‘transformation into their shape,’ is necessarily reduced, in the case of the Purusa, to nothing but the nature of an Image. It is this reflection of the function of Budhhi or Reason, that has been declared by the Yoga aphorism, कित्तास्थचित्तात्.—In other states, (there is in the Self) similarity in form to the functions (of the mind).—(Yoga-Stras, I. 4, S. B. II., vol. iv., p. 10). In the commentary on the Yoga-Stras also, in the passage, विद्याकारता कित्तास्थचित्ता च स्त्रेप्ता —While burning (i.e., suffering) is caused to the mind, the Purusa also, because he is obliged to transform into the shape of the mind, appears as though burning were caused to him be image or reflection of pains such as ‘burning,’ etc., is mentioned, specifically and without leaving room for doubt, by the expression, तत्स्वायत्नेन, influence, that is, inflow, of the form of the mind. It is for his reason also that the author of the aphorisms (Kapila) will later on
give the example of the crystal, in the case of the Purusa taking on the
colour of the function of Reason, Of. पृगः वसः—As the crystal by means
of the flower (I. 35 post). The Vedanta thinkers also declare that
Dristi, that which is visible, i.e., the object of cognition, is manifested,
i.e., is known, only as it is super-imposed upon, or reflected in, consciousness.
Here Adhyasa, super-imposition cannot be anything but reflection
of one thing into another, inasmuch as to argue that knowledge as such
is Adhyasa or super-imposition would be arguing in a circle in this way
that knowledge results from Adhyasa, while knowledge itself is Adhyasa.
On this point the following also may be recalled:—

तस्मान विद्यते स्त्रां समस्ता चस्तुद्रयप.
दस्तुद्रयां सत्वविकृतम् चर्चितान्तदुखम्।

All these same appearances of things are reflected in that large mirror of the
mind, as (are reflected) in a lake the trees that stand on the banks (Yoga-Vasishtha
Bhadrdasya).

Here the word, Dristi, appearance or, lit., vision, from the similarity
of argument, denotes function of the Reason in general. And reflection
means transformation of the mind into the form of those shining bodies
which serve as Upadhis or things which super-impose their shadows
upon adjacent things.

It follows, therefore, that association of pain, called Bhoga or
experience, exists in the Purusa, in the form of reflection. Hence the
cessation of pain, in that very form, properly becomes an object of
voluntary pursuit by the Purusa. Hence also, even the man on the
street, as is observed, prays, Let me not suffer pain. Cessation of the
experience of pain, moreover, could not reasonably be an object of
volition, were it only a means to an ulterior end; it is, therefore, by
itself, the object of voluntary pursuit by the Purusa. Cessation of pain,
on the other hand, being, like the removal of thorns, etc., a means to
an end, is not itself an object desired by the Purusa. Likewise, pleasure,
also is not in itself an object desired by the Purusa. It is the experience
of them that, as such, comes to possess the characteristic of being an
object desired in itself by the Purusa. Vyasa-deva also has said the
same thing, viz., that cessation of the experience of pain is an object
desired by the Purusa, in his commentary on the Yoga-Sutras; for, he
says नमस्तिस्ते पुरुष: पृगिंच्छ चालाते न पुरुषः.—That having ceased, the Purusa does
not again suffer these threefold afflictions. Hence the teaching of the
Veda also that cessation of pain is an object desired by the Purusa,
should be understood only in the relation of pain being an object
of experience. All this has been fully discussed by us in our
Yogā-Vārtika. Thus, by this aphorism, the first two divisions of the
subject in discourse, (the Avoidable and the Avoidance), have been
brieﬂy enunciated; and a detailed account of them will be given in
the sequel.—1.

Ordinary means inadequate for the purpose.

न दृष्टान्ततिथिनिर्देशस्मावटवर्णात् I 1 2 II

Na, not. दृष्टात, From observed, visible, or ordinary (means).
तिथिनिर्देश, the production, accomplishment, or realisation of that (i.e., the
permanent cessation of the experience of pain). अवटवर्णा, being stopped or
prevented. अपि, even. अवटवर्णा Anuvriddi-dārśanā, on account of the obser-
vation of return, re-appearance, or recurrence.

2. The realisation of that (i.e., permanent cessation
of the experience of pain) (can-) not (take place) by ordinary
(means, such as men and money), because, when (by those
means) (pain is) prevented (at one time), it is found to return
(at another time).—2.

Vṛtti.—(Pūrva-pakṣa or prima facie adverse argument): Let
cessation of pain be an object desired by the Puruṣa. Still this object can
be attained by quite ordinary means also, means which, again, are of
easy employment. What sane man will, therefore, resort to such means
as inhibition of Chitta or the inner sense, and so forth, which the
Śāstras, (and not ordinary experience), prove to be useful, and which can
be completed or brought to perfection by a succession of many births?
As it has been said:

प्राक्के प्राप्तं निषिद्ध फलम् परस्तं अभयं ।
प्रवर्तयायितं संसारिकं कर्माण्य वर्षमाम्बेदेन ॥

If (there is a honey-comb) in a corner of the house, (from which) honey can be obtained,
for what purpose will a man go to the mountain? What wise man will take pains to
secure the object desired in an arduous manner?

Thus, for the prevention of bodily pain, there are medicines, etc.,
for the prevention of mental pain, there are progeny, wife, sweetmeats, etc.,
for the prevention of Ādhi-bhāsatika pain or pain caused by beasts, birds,
etc., there are various means declared by the authors of the Art of
Government, etc., and for the prevention of Ādhi-daivika pain or pain
caused by planets, evil spirits, etc., there are paciﬁcations (i.e., perform-
ances by which cruel and offended planetary powers are paciﬁed),
jewels (which ward off evil spirits), incantations, etc.

The reply to the above Pūrva-pakṣa is given in the present
aphorism,
We do not call mere cessation to be the object desired by the Purusa, but cessation of production (of pain), we say, if the object desired by the Purusa. By means of medicines, and so forth, again, pain does not invariably cease. Or, if it ceases to a certain extent, there is no certainty or law of nature that it will not appear again in another form.—2.

Bhāṣya.—Now, in order to show the necessity for the Means of Avoidance, the fourth division of the subject-matter, which will be described hereafter, the author declares, by a number of aphorisms, that all other means cannot effect the Avoidance of Pain desired.

The realisation of the permanent cessation of pain does not result from ordinary means such as wealth, etc., Why? Because it is found that where pain is prevented by means of wealth, and the like, it comes back again afterwards on the disappearance of the wealth, etc. Thus says the Veda:—

There is no hope of attaining immortality by means of wealth (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣat, IV. V. 3).—2.

Still they have their use.

प्रात्याहिकःसूत्रप्रतिकारकःतत्रप्रतिकाराधिष्ठातः
पुरुषार्थेल्वम् || १ १ ३ ||

Pratyahika-kṣut-pratikāra-vat, like the satisfaction of daily hunger. ‘Pratikāra’ is a general word, meaning remedy, relief, redress. Tat-pratikāra-chesanāt, on account of the endeavour or solicitation for relief or removal of pain by means of that, i.e., ordinary objects such as wealth. Purusa-arthā-tvam, the being an object desired by the Purusa. It is an object of volition or end of consciously purposive activity.

3. (Cessation of pain by ordinary means also) is an object desired by the Purusa, inasmuch as, like the satisfaction of hunger every day (by means of food), people, (as a matter of fact), earnestly seek relief of pain by those means.—3.

Vṛtti.—(It has been said above that pain may cease to a certain extent by ordinary means. Now, one may go to the other extreme, and urge): Let there be (temporary) cessation of pain (by ordinary means); still it cannot, on that account, be a proper object of desire for the Purusa, inasmuch as such relief has to be repeated over and over again.

For this reason the author says:

As the satisfaction of hunger every day, by means of delicious rice and other articles of food, is an object of desire to him who is so satisfied,
for cessation of pain, medicines, and such other things are objects of desire, insomuch as they bring relief over and over again.—3.

(Note.—The extremist argues that the effect produced by ordinary remedies is not permanent, and that their use has to be repeated on every occasion, and therefore argues that they are not proper objects of desire. Aniruddha seems to reply that precisely for the very same reason, namely, that they are capable of constant repetition, these worldly remedies are really objects of desire, because by means of constant repetition, the effect produced by them somewhat assumes the character of permanency).

Bhāya.—(Pārva-pahya) If the acquisition of wealth and the like fails, in this way, to give relief from pain, then it is useless, like the bathing of the elephant. Why do then people engage in such pursuits?

To this the author gives the reply:

Cessation of pain, producible by means of worldly objects, is simply not the ultimate object of desire or the Supreme Purpose of Life; otherwise, in some degree, it is certainly an object of desire. Why? Because, as in the case of the removal of the pain of hunger which is felt every day, people also seek removal of pain by means of wealth, and the like. Hence activity in the acquisition of wealth, and the like, is justified. The bathing of the elephant, etc., insomuch as they give, at least, temporary relief from pain, are really objects of desire, although of a lower order.—3.

Nevertheless, they must be rejected.
through intimate connection with the body, it has not been found that an embodied self has been happy. Hence this Purusa-artha or object of desire should be forsaken by reasonable men, and that which is learnt from the Såstra should be adopted.—4.

Bhåra.—He states that the above-mentioned Purusa-artha, object of volition of a lower kind, should be rejected by men of wisdom:

And the above-mentioned remedy of pain, producible by visible means, ‘heyaḥ,’ should be thrown into the side of pain, ‘Pramåsa-kusñalaḥ,’ by those who are well versed in the Såstra, learning of discrimination between pain and not-pain. Why? ‘Sarva-saṁbhavat’ : Because remedy by visible means is not possible in all cases of pain. He further observes that even where there is such possibility, there still pain arising from sins of acceptance of gifts, etc., is inevitable : ‘Sambhāve api,’ that is, even in case of such possibility, there must necessarily exist connection with pain not preventible by visible means. Compare Yoga Såtram, XXII. For the discriminative, all, without exception, is pain, inasmuch as (enjoyment of pleasure is accompanied) with affliction, (in the shape of aversion to all that interferes with the enjoyment of pleasure), and is followed by resultant pain and by pain due to the recollection that the enjoyment of pleasure has passed away, and also on account of active opposition among the functions (e.g., pleasure, pain, etc.) of the Guṇas or principles, (namely, of illumination, Satyam, evolution, Rajas, and involution, Tamas, which are constantly struggling to overpower one another).—(Yoga Såtram, II. 15, S. D. II., Vol. iv., p. 114).—4.

Because Mokṣa or Release is the good par excellence.

उत्तक्षरशि मोक्षस्य सर्वोत्तक्षरसुद्दा: ॥ १ १ ५ ॥

Uttakṣaraśī, Mokṣasya sarva-uttakṣarasuddhaḥ: on account of excellence or superiority. Kā Api, also; or. Kā Mokṣasya, of Mokṣa or Release. कोपेन्द्रं: Sarva-ukkāraś-Srutaḥ, from the texts of the Veda, which declare excellence over all else.

5. (Cessation of pain by visible means should be rejected), because it varies in degrees of excellence, (according as different means are applied), whereas Mokṣa is, as is evident from the Veda, absolutely the most excellent. (Aniruddha); or, (Existence of pain in objects of desire attainable by visible means is inferred) from the superiority of Mokṣa to those objects, and the superiority of Mokṣa to all else is proved by the Veda. (Vijñāna-Bhikṣu.)—5.
Vritti.—The author advances another argument:

Again, comparative excellence (in different acts) of cessation of pain (by visible means) is an observed fact. Moksha, on the other hand, is the most excellent of all, being permanent and uniform and possessing the form of eradication of all pain.—5.

Bhadra.—An objector may urge: Intermixture with pain is not applicable to one and all cases of relief of pain producible by visible means. Hence it is also realised:

अयुग्मसाधनानं न य ग्रहोपनितयाः:
मलिनतेपथीताः व तत्तूर्भासाध्यायुः॥

That which is not intermixed with pain, nor is afterwards eclipsed or swallowed up in pain, and which comes to one as soon as it is desired, the same in pleasure or happiness fit to be called heavenly enjoyment. (Bhṛṣṭha-Sattva-Kaṇṭhā, introduction to Prākṛti-Kārikā 2).”

In view of this argument the author states:

Existence of pain in them is ascertained from the superiority of Moksha, which is not realisable by visible means, to kingdom and other objects of desire, attainable by visible means. From the word, Api, also it follows that there are also such other reasons as that those objects are, in essence, modifications of the three Guṇas or creative principles (vide post), etc. If it be asked, what evidence there is as regards the superiority of Moksha, so he says, Sarva-utkāra-sūtra, which means that the superiority of Videha-Kaivalya, disembodied isolation or singleness, is proved by such texts of the Veda as—

न च वै स्वारीरस्त्र स्त्र: प्रायादिपियोष्वष्टरिति

Verity obliteration of the distinction of the agreeable and the disagreeable cannot take place in the state of embodied existence—(Chh. Uṣṇ. VIII. xii. 1).

वर्तनिर्धारितने व स्वरीरस्त्र न स्वरूपता:

The agreeable and the disagreeable cannot touch him who exists in a disembodied form (ibid.)—5.

Scriptural remedies are equally inadequate.

श्रवणिप्रक्षेपणयोः ॥ १ ॥ ६ ॥

अनित्त: Aviśeṣaḥ, non-distinction. = Cha, and. उभयोः: Ubhayah, between the two.

6. (As regards the temporary character of the result contemplated by them), there is no distinction between the two theories.—(Aniruddha). Or, (as regards the temporary character of their effect; i.e., cessation of pain), there is no distinction between the two (i.e., visible means, on the one
hand, and religious performances, prescribed in the Veda, on the other).—(Vijnana-Bihisya.)—6.

Vritti:—An objector may say: “Well, but there is not a Darshana or System of Thought in which Moksa has not been held up as the Purusa-artha or supreme object of life. Nor does Moksa consist in the mere cessation of pain by means of medicine and the like. Hence that which is your conclusion, will also be ours.” To this the author replies:

An opponent’s theory can be condemned by proof of one’s own theory, but not otherwise. It has been also said:

यथैन्यं समेत भूषण परिचयार्थे वा समाः।
नैवतीः पौन्दोराया व्यासाध्वेश्वचारः॥

Where the same defect exists in both, or where the rejection of both is equally immaterial, there one of them cannot be selected for consuise, as regards the consideration of the particular subject in question.—6.

Bhiksta:—An objector may say: “Let it be so that permanent cessation of pain cannot result from visible means. But it may result from invisible means, namely, religious performances, prescribed in the Veda, there being such texts of the Veda as जयते कैलासपुरुषम् जयतु—We drank the Soma juice and we became immortal (Atharvasiras Upanisat, 3).” In that case, the author says:

The meaning is that 'A-viseshah,' non-difference, only should be regarded to exist, ‘ubhayoḥ,’ in the case of both of them, that is, visible and invisible means, in respect of their not being the means of permanent cessation of pain, and in respect of their being the causes of what has been already stated, (i.e., temporary effects). The very same thing has been observed in the Kārikā: दोषाः न भौतिकान्तरस्यात् तत्र न विभिन्नताः।

The means or practices taught in the Veda are similar to the visible ones; for, they are attended with impurity, waste, and excess.—(Sāmkhya-kārikā, Verse 2).

'Anuśrávika,': Anuśrava means that which is heard from the Guru or preceptor, after recital by him, that is, the Veda; Anuśrávika means sacrifices and so forth enjoined in it. The meaning is that these scriptural means are, like the visible ones, admixed with impurity, i.e., sins due to killing, etc., and possess the characteristic of producing perishable as well as superfluous results.

As objector may argue:—(Killing in a sacrifice is lawful, being enjoined in the Veda, and) the significance of an injunction consists in the form of (conduct in accordance to it) being the means of realization of a good which is not followed by a greater evil. If, therefore, lawful killing be productive of sin, the significance of the injunction would be difficult to maintain.
But we say that such is not the case. For, that part of the injunction, viz., that conduct in accordance to it is not followed by a greater evil, is of this form that it is not productive of pain in addition to the pain immediately following the production of the good. Inasmuch as, therefore, the evil producible by lawful killing, immediately follows the production of the good, the above significance of the injunction remains unimpaired. Some, however, think that only killing other than lawful killing, is productive of sin. But the explanation is not correct, there being no reason for so curtailing the meaning (of the texts on the sinfulness of killing). It is also heard that Yudhishthira and others had to perform penances in order to avert the evil consequences of having killed their kinsmen and of other acts of cruelty towards them, on the field of battle and elsewhere, even though, by their Svadharma, or dictates of their personal morality (as Kshatriyas or deliverers from oppression), they were required, nay, compelled, to do so. There is, moreover, the observation of Mārkaṇḍeya:

वद्याच्य साध्यायं ततो हत्यामुं हुःसत्तविचित् ||
वियोध्येष्यमांश्च किमाक्षुसत्तविचितम् इ॥

I shall, therefore, go away, my son (or sir), seeing that it is the receptacle of pain—that morita springing from Vedic performances are rich in homerita, hence resembling a fruit hard to digest.—Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, X. 31.

There is, of course, the text of the Veda: अतिशर वह्यन तमः—Not killing any creature elsewhere than in sacred places (Chh. Upa., VIII. LXV, I, S. B. II., Vol. III, Pt. II. p. 587). But it declares only that forbearance from killing besides that which is lawful, is the means to the attainment of some good, but not also that in lawful killing there is absence of casualty towards the production of evil. More on this point may be looked for in the Yoga-Vārtika.

There are, again, texts of the Veda such as:

न कर्मया न ज्ञया न धचन तारयैव स्वत्तरमाण्याः

Some attained immortality, not by action, nor by progeny, nor by wealth, but by renunciation.—(Kalamāya Upaniṣat, I. 3);

वर्गविविधार्थायामेव नाना जग्या विद्यते उच्चारण

Only by knowing Him, one can pass beyond Death; there exists no other path for Aravallag.—(Svētārītār Upan., III. 8).

(On the other hand, it is also revealed in the Veda, that immortality can be attained by means of drinking the Soma juice, etc.) By reason of this obvious contradiction, which, otherwise, must necessarily appear in the Veda, immortality, attainable by means of drinking the Soma juice,
etc., should be understood in a relative or secondary sense, on the authority, for example, of the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, which declares:

ब्रह्माण्डदृष्टे त्यानामवस्तुतः दि माधवे

Existence till the dissolution (Pralaya) of the Cosmic System, is called immortality. (Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, II. viii. 90).—6.

Bondage is not natural to Puruṣa.

न स्वभावतो बद्धस्य मोक्षसाधनोपदेशविविधः \| १ १ ७ \|

* Na, No. सवत्तम: Svabhāvataḥ, by nature. बद्ध Baddhasya, of (one who is) in bondage, or confined. विविधविविधः: Mokṣa-sādhanā-upadesā-vidhiḥ, observance of instructions regarding the means for the attainment of Mokṣa or Release.

7. Observance of instructions regarding the means for the attainment of Mokṣa (can-) not (be enjoined) in the case of one who is confined by nature.—7.

Vṛtti:—It may be asked whether instructions regarding the means for the attainment of Mokṣa refer to one who is confined by nature, or otherwise. So the author says:

(Observance of instructions regarding the means for the attainment of Mokṣa does not refer to one who is confined by nature), because destruction of natural condition will entail destruction of Svarūpa, i.e., the thing in itself. (vide Bhāṣya below). It has been also said:

वस्तुनिर्विविधः न विनिर्बलिता तद्विकरणोदपि मुक्तिः \| १ १ ७ \|

There is no confinement or bondage by the nature of things, nor does the state of release follow from its non-existence. Both of these, (Confinement and Release), being constituted by error, have no real existence.—7.

Bhāṣya:—It has been thus established that ‘visible’ (popular) and ‘invisible’ (scriptural) means are not directly the means for the realisation of Puruṣa-artha or the (highest) object of desire. What then is the means for its realisation? The author will say that the means (required) is the knowledge of the Viveka or distinction (between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti). Now, it is only by way of rooting out the cause of pain, known as A-viveka or non-differentiation between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, that knowledge of Viveka or their distinction becomes the means of the avoidance (of pain). With this in view, by a minor section at the very beginning, the author shows, by the method of exhaustion, by the exclusion of all others, that A-viveka itself is the cause of the avoidable (i.e., pain);
Permanent cessation of pain having been already declared to possess the characteristic of Mokṣa, Bandha here means nothing but connection or association with pain.

It, Bondage, does not possess the characteristic of being natural, as described below, to the Puruṣa, inasmuch as 'Vidhiḥ,' observance or performance, 'Śādhanā-upadesasya,' that is, of Vedic precepts regarding the means to be employed, Mokṣa, for the purpose of release, of one who is confined by nature, is not possible for those who are enjoined in this behalf. For, the release, i.e., separation, of fire from its natural hotness is not possible, because that which is natural to a thing, is co-existent with the thing itself. Such is the meaning.

Accordingly it has been declared in the Īśvara-Gītā:

यदात्मा महिनेन्द्र्वेदि विकारिण्य स्वात् स्वभावतः

न हि तत्वं अवेदनस्यामान्तररत्निं

Wore the Self, by nature, impure, untransparent, mutable, worldly Release would not accrue to it even by hundreds of re-births.—Kārma-Pūrāṇa, II. 11, 12.

One thing is said to be natural to another, when, the former existing, no delay occurs in the production of the latter, from delay (in the appearance) of the cause. Such is the definition of the characteristic of being natural.

An objector may interpose that there can be no doubt at all that pain is natural, as there is the incidence or possibility of constant experience of it. But this is not so. For, although pain is inborn to, or of the very nature of, the Chitta or the mind, for the reason that the latter is essentially constituted by the threefold Gunaṣ or elements of Prakṛti, yet, as there is not constant experience of pain in consequence of the overwhelming preponderance of Sattva or the element of stability in the Prakṛti, so the non-experience of it is possible for the Self also. Furthermore, the Baudhās who maintain that pain is inborn to the Chitta or mind, make a concession to the popular view that the Chitta or mind itself is the Self.

Our opponent may urge: Now, that being so, (i.e., if Bondage does not by nature belong to the Self), let Mokṣa or Release result only from the annihilation of the Self.

But we do not grant this. For, 'I am in bondage, I will be completely released'—such statements of mind clearly prove that Mokṣa or Release is the highest object of volition only in so far as it is co-extensive with Bondage.—7.
Bondage is not natural to Puruṣa.—(contd).

Svabhāvāya, of the nature of a thing. Ana-apāyitvat, on account of the unchangeableness, or permanence. An-anuṣṭhāna-lakṣaṇam, characterised by non-performance. Aprāmāṇya, irrelevancy, unauthoritativeness.

8. (Were Puruṣa confined by nature), because the nature of a thing is unchangeable, (the instructions laid down in the Sāstras for the attainment of Release), would be conspicuous by non-performance, and, therefore, irrelevant and unauthoritative.—8.

Vṛitti:—The author only strengthens the argument of the preceding aphorism:

Whereas confinement or bondage which had an eternal nature, could not be dissolved, performance for the sake of its destruction would be, therefore, impossible.—8.

Bhāṣya:—(Pārśa-pākṣa). “Let there be non-performance, what does it matter?” To this the author replies:

(Were bondage a part of the Puruṣa’s nature), the nature of a thing being co-essential with the existence of the thing itself, there could be no Release. Consequently, the teachings of the Veda for the attainment of Release, would not be carried into practice. And being thus characterised by non-performance, they would be irrelevant or unauthoritative.—8,

Above continued.

Na, no. Vṛddhāpya:—A (im)-ṣākyam (possible)-upadeśā (instruction)-vidhiḥ, precept containing instruction for the impossible. Upadīṣṭaḥ, were (it) instructed. Āpi, even. An (non)-upadeśāḥ (instruction), non-instruction.

9. There can be no precept (in the Veda and other authoritative writings) imparting instruction for the attainment of that which is impossible. Were even (such attainment) instructed (in them), (the instruction would be) no instruction.—9.

Vṛitti:—It may be argued that someone, for the sake of deception, may instruct something impossible, as, e.g., the presence of a hundred elephants on the tip of the finger. Accordingly the author says:

The meaning of the aphorism is clear.—9.
Bhāṣya: —To those who would contend that the practical observance of those precepts will follow by virtue of their being revealed texts, the author says:

It is not possible to carry into practice an instruction for a 'fruit' or result which is incapable of attainment. For, 'Upadiṣṭe api,' were even some means laid down (in a precept) for an impossible end, that (precept) would really be no instruction at all, but merely the semblance of an instruction, according to the maxim that even the Veda cannot teach that which is contrary to reality.—9.

Bondage is not natural to Puruṣa.—contd.

शुक्रपत्रवद्बीजवचेत् || १ १ २० ||

शुक्रपत्रः Sukra (white)-pata (cloth)-vat (like), like a piece of white cloth. बीजवचेत् Bija (seed)-vat, like a seed. चेत Chet, if it is said.

10. (One may argue that change of nature is observed) as in the case of a piece of white cloth (when it is coloured otherwise) and as in the case of a seed (when it grows into a shoot or is burnt), (and that, therefore, there is nothing strange in the theory that Bondage is the natural state of Puruṣa, which, however, can be removed by appropriate means).—10.

Vṛtti: —The author apprehends an objection:

Annihilation of nature also is observed, as of whiteness in a piece of cloth, by means of colouring matter, etc., and of a seed, through the growth of the shoot.—10.

Bhāṣya: —At this place the author apprehends an objection:

An objector may argue as follows: Annihilation of even that which is natural is observed. For example, the natural whiteness of a piece of white cloth is removed by means of some colouring matter, so also the natural sprouting power of a seed is destroyed by fire. Hence, as in the case of a piece of white cloth, and as also in the case of a seed, annihilation of natural bondage also is possible in the case of the Puruṣa. In the very same way, therefore, as in the case of the analogetic, there is legitimate ground for instruction of means for its (of bondage) dissolution.—10.
Bondage not natural to Puruṣa—(contd.)

11. By reason of the development and envelopment of power, there is no instruction for the impossible (in the instances cited).—11.

Vṛitti:—The author concludes:

An effect being existent prior to its appearance as such, the whiteness of the cloth is not destroyed, but is enveloped by the colouring matter, and is again developed after washing. (For the same reason), in consequence of the growth of the sprout also, the seed is not destroyed, but is enveloped or overpowered. Its re-appearance, however, is not observed, owing to the variety of things in nature.—11.

Bhāṣya:—The author gives the solution:

In the case of the given examples also, people do not give instruction for the removal or annihilation of the Āśā or impossible, that which is incapable of destruction, i.e., the natural. Why not? Śakti-udbhava-anudbhavabhavyam, by reason of the development and envelopment of power. For, in the case of the two given examples, only the appearance and disappearance of whiteness, etc., take place, and not, on the contrary, the non-existence or annihilation of whiteness and of the sprouting power, seeing that whiteness and sprouting power again appear in the reddened or coloured cloth and fried seed, respectively, by means of the operations of the washerman, etc., in the one case, and by the volition or will force of Yogins, in the other. Such is the import.

Objection:—Likewise let Release consist only in the disappearance of the power of pain in the Puruṣa (i.e., of the influence of pain upon the Puruṣa).

Answer:—No; for the common experience of mankind as well as the authority of the Veda and the Smṛti prove that it is the absolute or permanent cessation of pain that is the (highest) object of desire, and not, on the contrary, the mere disappearance (of pain), as in the case of the instances cited.

Moreover, the theory that Release consists in the mere disappearance of the power of pain, would entail non-(permanent) release, by making
Development of power of pain again possible in the case of the released ones also, as in the case of fried seeds, by means of the will force, etc., of Yogins and of God.

(Nota.—A seed, for instance, does not really undergo a change of nature by burning. According to the Sämkhya theory of causation, all production is development and all destruction is envelopment, so that the effect antecedently exists in the cause in an undeveloped form and the cause afterwards exists in the effect in an enveloped form. Therefore, after burning, a seed still retains its power of sprouting as evidenced by the fact that the Yogins, by willing, can make a burnt seed to sprout again. That being so, if a man instructs another to take away (for a time) the sprouting power of a seed, he does not instruct something impossible, as the act does not involve a change of nature. But this is not so in the case of the Purusa. For Release or permanent removal of Bondage, Bondage, being ex-hypothesis the natural state of the Purusa, involves a change of nature which is impossible. The hypothesis, therefore, must be abandoned)—11.

Neither is Bondage a temporal state.

न कालयोगतो व्यापितो नित्यस्य सत्वसम्बन्धात् ॥ १ ॥ १२ ॥

* Na, not. कालयोग: Kàla (time)-yuga (connection)-tah (from), from connection with time. व्यापितं: Vyapinah, of the pervading. नित्यस्य: Nityasya, of the eternal. सत्वसम्बंधाः: Sarva (all)-sambandhati, in account of relation to all.

12. (The bondage of the Purusa can-) not (be constituted) by connection with time, because (time which is) all-pervading and eternal, is related to all (Purusas, released and unreleased).—12.

Vritti:—It may be contended that the Purusa may not be in bondage from nature, but that he will be in bondage by virtue of time. So the author says:

The Purusa would have been so bound, did his connection with time sometimes exist and sometimes not exist. But this is not the case, because relation to all times is one of his upadhis or adjuncts, since he is eternal and all-pervading.

(Note.—It will be observed that Aniruddha has taken the words, 'eternal' and 'pervading' as qualifying Purusa, whereas we have, following Vijfana, applied them to time.)

The sense of 'relation to all times' having been conveyed by the word, 'eternal,' the word, 'pervading,' has been stated simultaneously with the former, by reference to the next aphorism.—12.

Bháśya:—After refuting the theory of Bondage from nature, the author refutes, by a group of aphorisms, the theory of Bondage from Nimittas, occasional causes or conditions. Were pain, on the other hand, occasional in the Purusa, it would not be capable of being rooted out by
knowledge and like other means, inasmuch as subtle pain, in the form of not-yet-come, (i.e., the possibility or potentiality of pain) would remain so long as the substance in which it inheres, lasts. Having this in view, the author refutes the theory of occasional pain:

Nor is the Bondage of the Puruṣa occasioned by connection with time. Why not? Because time, all-pervading and eternal, by the determination or delimitation of everything, is connected with all Puruṣas, released and unreleased, and the determination of everything by time will entail the Bondage of all Puruṣas at all times, (so that Release would be impossible).

In this section the conditional, occasional, or instrumental causality of time, space, action, and the like is not confused, because it is established by the Veda, Smrti, and argument. But that which is denoted by Naimittikatva, occasionality, that is, the characteristic of being produced by an occasion, condition, or instrument, as in the case of colour, etc., produced by burning (vide Kaṇḍāda Sūtram, VII. i. 6, S. B. H., Vol. VI, p. 212)—the same is forbidden in the case of Bondage, in consequence of the admission of the accidental nature of Bondage so far as Puruṣa is concerned.

Objection: Even in the theory that Bondage is occasioned or conditioned by time, etc., gradation or difference of status (as released and unreleased Puruṣas) can be accounted for by the presence and absence of other contributory causes.

Answer: In that case, it is proper for the sake of simplicity, to refer Bondage to that contributory alone, that is, that conjunction which taking place, Bondage must necessarily be caused, since there is no harm in the use of Bondage, with regard to the Puruṣa, in an accidental, transferred, or derivative sense.

Thus there is an end of the theory of the occasional or conditional nature of pain.—12.

Nor is Bondage a spatial state.

न वेश्योगोत्प्यत्स्मात् ॥ १ ॥ १३ ॥

Na, not. वेश्योगोत्प्यत्स्मात्: Desa (space)-yoga (connection)-taḥ (from), from connection with space. कि Api, again. अस्मात for the same (reason).

13. Nor, again, (is Bondage constituted) by connection with space, for the same (reason as given above).—13.

Vṛtī:—May not the Puruṣa be in bondage by virtue of space?

To this the author replies:
(It cannot be so), because Purusa, eternal and infinite as he is, has no connection with all space.—13.

Bhāṣya:—Nor does Bondage result from connection with space. Why not? 'Asmāt,' owing to the same, as stated in the preceding aphorism, (objectionable) connection with all Purusas released and unreleased. The import is that the theory would entail the bondage of even the released Purusa.—13.

Nor does Bondage result from embodiment.

नात्रस्यातो वेषपरिवर्त्तः तस्या: || 11 14 ||

Na, not. वेषपरिवर्तः: Avasthā, from location, situation, environment, organisation, or circumstances. वेषपरिवर्तः Doha (body)-dharma (property)-tvāt, being a property of the body. तस्या: Tasyāḥ, its, of the environment.

14. Nor is Bondage constituted by organisation, the latter being the property of the body.—14.

Vṛtti:—Now, to meet the suggestion whether the Purusa may not be bound from organisation or circumstances, the author says:

'Tasyāḥ' means 'of circumstances.' 'Doha-dharmatvāt' is indicative; the ultimate significance is (that the reason why the Purusa cannot be bound by organisation or circumstances is) that (the Purusa) undergoes no change or transformation.—14.

Bhāṣya:—'Avasthā' consists in the form of the body described as the appearance of a particular Sānghita, organisation or embodiment. The bondage of the Purusa does not result from 'avasthā' or embodiment as an occasional or instrumental cause. Why not? Because 'avasthā' is a property of the body, that is to say, a property of an insentient object. The application of the property of one object as directly causing bondage in a different object, would be too wide, and would entail the bondage of the released ones also.—14.

Above continued.

असांगवधू पुरुष हृति || 11 14 ||

असांगवधू: Asanga, free from all attachment or association, detached. अयं: Ayam, this, he. तस्या: Purusa, Self. हृति: Iti, because.

15. (Embodiment cannot be a property of the Purusa), because he, the Purusa, is free from all association.—15.

Vṛtti:—May not organisation be a property of the Self also? To the author replies:
(It cannot be), as, in that case, the Śruti, वर्धिते पुरुसः, he, the Puruṣa, is free from all attachment (Brīhad-Āraṇyaka Upa. IV. iii. 15), would be contradicted.—15.

Bhāṣya :—But, it may be asked, what is the objection to ‘avasthā,’ organisation or embodiment, being a property of the Puruṣa? To this the author replies:

The word, ‘iti,’ gives the reason. This aphorism should be read with the preceding one: thus, the Puruṣa being free from all association or attachment, ‘avasthā,’ organisation or embodiment, must be a property of the body alone. The purport of the aphorism is that to admit change or transformation in the shape of ‘avasthā’ or embodiment, in the case of the Puruṣa, would entail that the Puruṣa possesses association or attachment which may be here described as conjunction with the cause of that change or transformation.

That the Puruṣa is free from all attachment is proved by the Śruti:

स यदBerry किंयते पद्यक्षण्यन्सागत्स्तेन मबति अस्ति कृष्टि हर्य पुरुषः।
Whatever he sees here, cannot enter into him, for, he, the Puruṣa, is free from all attachment.—(Brīhad-Āraṇyaka Upaniṣat, IV. iii. 15).

Sāṅga, again, is not mere conjunction or connection. For, it has been stated above that the Puruṣa has connection or conjunction with time and space. It is also learnt from the Veda and Smṛiti that the freedom of the lotus leaf from attachment with the water resting on it is an example of the Puruṣa’s freedom from all attachment.—15.

Nor does bondage result from karma.

न कर्मगात्यमेत्सादित्यस्तक्षेत ॥ १ ॥ १६ ॥

Na, not. कर्म यमक्षण् by action. अन्य (another)-dharma (property)-tvat (being), being the property of a different object अतिक्रमणा: Ati (over)-prakāśaka (implication), going too far, being too wide. च च and, also.

16. Nor (is the Puruṣa bound) by action, because (action) is the property of a different object, and also because (the argument) is too wide.—16.

Vṛtti :—The author shows the defect in the suggestion that the Puruṣa may be in bondage by virtue of action:

The Self being void of Guṇas, states or modifications, action possesses the characteristic of being the property of the Not-Self. If it be said that the Puruṣa will be bound by action, notwithstanding that the latter is the property of a different object; that would be improper: for (i) nothing can be deposited by the property of one thing in another, (ii) the
diversity in the universe would not be explained, and (iii) the argument
would be too wide, inasmuch as, in the absence of (the effect of) the
distinction of other-ness, it would entail the bondage of the released
Selves also.—16.

Bhāṣya:—Bondage does not certainly accrue to the Puruṣa by means
of action, prescribed and prohibited, Anya-dharma-tvāt, because actions are
the property of the Not-Self. For, the theory of the bondage of one being
immediately caused by the property of another, would entail the bondage
of the released Puruṣa also. Thinking that it may be argued that this
defect will not arise if we admit that Bondage is caused by the action
of the respective Upādhis or adjuncts of the Puruṣas, the author gives
another reason in the words, ‘Ati-prasaktē cha,’ which mean that the
theory of bondage by the action of the Upādhis would entail bondage in
the form of conjunction or incidence of pain during Pralaya or dissolution
of the cosmic system, and such other times. The supposition of the
continuance of pain during Pralaya, in consequence of the continuance of
other contributory causes, has been already controverted in the aphorism
(12 ante) beginning with ‘Na kāla-yoga.’—16.

Above continued.

विचिन्त्रोनात्तुपासिर्मण्यधर्मस्ये || १ || १७ ||

विचिन्त्रमणिपुली: Vichitra (diverse)-bhoga (experience)-an (non)-upapattiḥ (proof,
explanation), possibility of diverse experience. अनया (another)-dharma
(property)-tvā, (that which produces action in one thing), being the property of
another thing. This is according to the Vṛtti of Aniruddha. Viśiṣṭa-Bhikṣu
interprets the terms as meaning, (bondage in the form of conjunction or incidence
of pain) being the property of another thing.

17. Were it the property of a different thing, diversity of (worldly) experience would not be explained.—17.

Vṛtti:—The author points out another defect:
Some people, it is observed, enjoy pleasure, while others suffer pain. Nor is it the case that in the beginningless Samsāra, stream of transmigration,
neither action which is the source of pleasure, nor action which is the
source of pain, has been performed by a single individual. Did the
property of one produce change in another, all would either enjoy pleasure or suffer pain.—17.

Bhāṣya:—It may be objected: It is well known that pain is a
property of the Chitta, the mind or intellect. In compliance, therefore,
with the rule that action appears in the same substratum where that
which produces the action resides, let also bondage in the form of conjunction or incidence of pain be of the Chitta or intellect alone Why do you suppose the bondage of the Purusa also?

Apprehending this, the author says:

If bondage in the form of conjunction or incidence of pain were the property of the Chitta or intellect alone, diversity of (worldly) experience would not be explained. For, if the experience of the Purusa described as Duḥkha-sīkṣātākara or the presentation of pain to the senses, be admitted, even in the absence of conjunction or incidence of pain, then, there remaining nothing to govern or determine the experience of pain, etc., the pain, etc., of all the Purusas will become the object of experience of all the Purusas. And consequently diversity of experience, such as, for example, "He is the experiencer of pain," "He is the experiencer of pleasure," and so on, will not be explained or justified. This is the meaning. Therefore, for the sake of the proof or explanation of diversity of experience, bondage in the form of conjunction of pain, etc., should be admitted in the Purusa also, (by the characteristic of its being the determinant of, or) as determining experience.

And this conjunction of pain in the Purusa, is, as has been already stated, merely of the form of a reflection, and the reflection is only of the Vṛtti or function of one's own Upādhi or adjunct, (i.e., of the states of consciousness). Hence the experience of all pains does not fall to the lot of all men. Such is the purport.

The above conclusion follows from the following passage in the Commentary on the Yoga Aphorisms:

विस्तारतिः पुरुषार्थानांृवस्त्रापिपुषष क्लब्यो हेतु।

The beginningless relation of the Purusa (to the Chitta or intellect), namely, the relation of the thing owned and the owner of it, is the cause of (the Purusa's) knowing the function of the Chitta.

And the ownership of the Purusa in the Chitta or intellect consists in its possession of the Vāsāna, tendency, sub-conscious latency, persistence, or potentiality, of its own function which has been experienced by the Purusa. The declaration in the Vedas and Sūtris, however, that Bondage and Release appertain to the Chitta or intellect alone, and not to the Purusa, should be understood by reference to Bondage in the ultimate or transcendental sense, namely Bondage constituted by conjunction of pain in the form of a reflecting disc.—17.

(Note.—The substance of Bondage is in the Chitta or intellect while its shadow falls on the Purusa.)
Nor is Bondage due to Prakriti.

18. Does Bondage result from Prakriti as its cause? No, because Prakriti herself is not autonomous.—18.

Vritti:—It may be said that Prakriti will be the determinant in the matter of the production of change in one thing by the property of another thing, that is to say, that Bondage will accrue to that Purusa towards whom she will be inclined or active, or move. Hence the author says:

Prakriti also is all-pervading, and consequently there can be no distinction or peculiarity of her connection with all the Purusas. (She cannot, therefore, be the determinant, and) there can be no determination or uniformity without the help of action. Hence she too is dependent on action. And the defect in that case has been pointed out (vide 16 ante).—18.

Bhagyā:—The author rejects the theory that Prakriti is the direct cause of Bondage:

But cannot Bondage follow from Prakriti as its cause? No. Because, in being a cause of Bondage, she also is, as will be shown in the sequel, dependent on conjunction. If it be contended that she may be the cause of Bondage even without the help of particular conjunctions, then it will entail (the existence of) pain and Bondage even during the state of Pralaya or dissolution, etc. This is the meaning.

Where the reading is, Prakriti-nibandhanā chet, there the meaning (or rather construction) is, 'if Bondage have Prakriti as its cause.'—18.

Bondage, in the form of reflection of pain, accrues to Purusa from connection with Prakriti.

19. Without the conjunction of Prakriti, (there can no conjunction of Bondage in the Purusa who is, by
nature, Eternal, and eternally Pure, Enlightened, and Unconfined.—19.

**Vṛti**:—If there be no bondage of the Puruṣa caused by Prakṛti, etc., and if, again, there be no bondage by nature also, then the teaching of a Mokṣa-Śāstra, Lessons on Release, will be fruitless. In reply to this possible objection, the author says:

Suddha means not attached or adhering to the Guṇas, states or modifications (of Prakṛti). Buddha means transparent. Tat-yogāḥ means conjunction of bondage. Tat-yogāt-rīte means without the conjunction of Prakṛti. Bondage can never accrue to the Self without A-viveka-or non-discrimination between the Self and the Not-Self. But, on the other hand, that which arises from A-viveka or non-discrimination is (not actual bondage, but) the Abhimāna, sense or idea, that one is in bondage. And this (wrong notion) should be certainly removed by the teaching of the Śāstra.—10.

**Bhāṣya**:—Prakṛti, then, in order to be the cause of bondage, is dependent on a particular (vide below) conjunction. It is, therefore, from the self-same species of conjunction that Aupādhiḥ (due to Upādhiḥ), reflectional, shadowy, adventitious, accidental, bondage results, like the hotness of water from the conjunction of fire. The author establishes the above conclusion of his own system, in this very context, in the middle of his criticism of the theories of different thinkers.

Therefore, Tat-yogāt-rīte, without the conjunction of Prakṛti, Puruṣa’s ‘tat-yogāḥ,’ association with bondage, does not exist. In fact it is this (conjunction of Prakṛti) that constitutes bondage. This roundabout statement, by means of two negatives, has been made for the purpose of obtaining the shadow-like, adventitious, or super-imposed character of Bondage. For, if Bondage were the effect of the conjunction of Prakṛti, like colour produced by burning (vide Kanāda-Śūtram, VII. I. 6, S. B. H., Vol. vi, p. 212), then similarly to that also, it would continue even after the disjunction of Prakṛti. Nor should it be supposed that the moment next to that in which pain is produced, and such other things will be the cause of the destruction of pain, as we have not made this supposition, seeing that the destruction of pain is explained or accounted for by the destruction of its cause alone, on the supposition that the destruction of the cause produces destruction of the effect. For, Vṛitti, function, activity, or modification, (of the chitta or intellect), is the material cause of pain, etc. Therefore, as in the case of the flame of a candle, destruction of pain, desire, and other properties or products of the Vṛitti (or activity of the chitta or intellect) becomes
possible entirely by means of the speedy destructibility of the Vṛtti which breaks down in a moment. Hence, non-existence of Bondage being consequent on (the non-existence of conjunction, i.e.) disjunction of Prakṛti. Bondage is merely Auspādīhika, (ideal as opposed to real), accidental or adventitious or reflectional, and neither natural nor occasional (i.e., produced by instrumental causes or the necessary conditions as distinguished from the principal cause).

In like manner, it is also the effect of this indirect statement that the immediate means of the avoidance of pain is the dissolution of the conjunction of Prakṛti, and nothing else. So also says the Śruti:

 ignorant,

As a house attached to another, burning, house, is saved by dividing it off from the burning one, so ho (Purusa), being separated from Prakṛti, the mother of all faults, does not come to grief.—(Source not traced.)

Thinkers of the Vaiṣeṣika School labour under the mistake that conjunction of pain is (not ideal but real, i.e.) ultimately true. In order that a similar mistake may not crop up here, the author declares Nītya, etc. As conjunction of redness does not take place in the crystal which is naturally pure, (i.e., white), without the conjunction of the China rose, in the very same way, there being no possibility of the existence of pain, etc., by themselves, conjunction of pain cannot take place in the Purusa who is, by nature, eternally pure, etc., without the conjunction of Upādīh or adjunct or super-imponent. That is the meaning. So it has been declared in the Saura Purusa:

For, as the pure crystal is observed by people to be red on account of the superimposition laid on it by some red colouring matter, etc., so is the great Purusa.

Eternality consists in not being limited by time. The characteristic of being, by nature, pure, etc., also denotes eternal purity, etc. Therewith, eternal enlightenment denotes possession of the form of inextinguishable sentience. The being eternally released, i.e., eternal freedom, denotes the characteristic of never being in conjunction with ultimately true, i.e., real, pain. Conjunction of pain in the form of reflection, however, is not ultimately true, i.e., not-real or ideal, bondage. This is the import.

As regards the eternal purity, etc., of the Self, there is the Śruti:

This Self is purely Existent, Eternal, Pure, Enlightened, True, Free, Stainless, Universal, etc. (Nyāya-uṇāṇa-Tāpāni Upaniṣad, II. ix. 9).
Objection:—But this being a Manana Sāstra, rational or intellectual science, reasons also must be given in support of the conclusion that the Self is eternal, etc.

Answer:—Quite so: By the expression 'Na tat-yogah tat-yogat rite,' reasons have been certainly advanced in proof of the eternal purity, etc., of the Self. Thus, eternality, universality, and other characteristics have been completely established in the Self in Darśanas or Systems of Thought like Nyāya, etc. (vide Kaṇāda Sūtram, III. ii. 5 and VII. i. 22, S. B. H., Vol. vi, pp. xxv, 131 and 220). Now, the Self being eternal and universal, there must exist some cause without which it can have no conjunction with pain and all other similar changes or disorders. That cause is, by common consent, no other than the Antaḥ-karaṇa or inner sense. For the sake of simplicity, therefore, Antaḥ-karaṇa or the inner sense itself should be properly regarded as being the only material cause of pain and other disorders. There is also another reason, namely, the concomitant variation of the Antaḥ-karaṇa or inner sense with regard to all changes or disorders (that is to say, that the activity of the Antaḥ-karaṇa is invariably present where there is any change, and is invariably absent where there is no change). In the case, again, of intra-organic changes or disorders, it will not be reasonable to suppose instrumental causality (or causality as a necessary condition) for the Manas or intellect, and material causality for the Self, since the supposition of two causes will involve superfluity.

Objection:—That the Self is the material cause of (pain and other) changes, is proved from perception such as "I feel pleasure," "I feel pain," "I do," etc.

Answer:—Such is not the case. For, those perceptions, falling as they do within the class of hundreds of mistakes such as "I am fair in complexion," etc., are not free from the apprehension of being invalid as means of proof, and accordingly carry less weight than the inference supported by the argument stated above.

The hint may be given here that the reason for the view that the Self is pure consciousness will be stated in the sequel.

The sense of this very aphorism has been declared in the Kārikā also.

तस्मात्स्त्रादस्येऽऽथ च तत्स्त्रव अवस्थास्वस्यः ॥

Therefore, through proximity to him (sentient Puruṣa), the insentient Līṅga (i.e., Mahat, Ahaṅkāra, Buddha, Manas, and the Tan-mātrā) seems sentient; and, similarly, though agency or activity belongs to the Guṇas (states or modifications of Prakriti), the bystander (Puruṣa who is indifferent or inactive) appears as the agent.—Śaṇkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, verse 30.
The mere expression, agency or to be agent, is indicative of all
changes or disorders, such as to suffer pain, etc.

In like manner, in the Yoga Aphorisms also, the sense of this very
aphorism has been declared. Thus—

Conjunction of the seer (Puruṣa) and the seen (Mahat or Buddhī) is the cause of the
endurable (i.e., pain).—Yoga Sūtra, II. 17. S. B. H., Vol. IV., p. 121.

Also in the Gītā:

For the Puruṣa, dwelling in Prakṛti, experiences the Guṇas, states or modifications,
produced from Prakṛti—Gītā, XIII. 21.

'Prakṛtiśṭhālāb', dwelling in Prakṛti, means being combined in Prakṛti. Similarly in the Śruti also:

Thoughtful men call the Self, combined with the Senses or Powers of Cognition and
sensation and Manas, by the name, experiencer—Kathā Upan., III. 4.

Objection:—In the very same way as are time and the rest, conjunction
of Prakṛti also is common to all Puruṣas released and unreleased. How can it, therefore, become the cause of Bondage?

Answer:—The objection does not arise. For, here the denotation of
the word, Saṁyoga, conjunction, is exclusively or simply a particular form of
the conjunction of Prakṛti, reduced into, or appearing in, the form of
individual Buddhīs or Understandings or Reasons, which conjunction is otherwise designated as birth. In his commentary on the Yoga
Aphorisms, the revered Vyāsa has explained the term in the above sense.
Moreover, it is only by reason of the function of Buddhī as the Upadhī or
upper-imposing that conjunction of pain takes place in the Puruṣa.
Again, just like the Vaiśeṣika and other thinkers, it is desired also by
ourselves that conjunction of the Antah-karaṇa or inner sense, having
the effect of determining the power of causing experience (bhoga),
possessed by conjunction of Buddhī, is different in kind from the latter
conjunction. Consequently there is no implication of Bondage in dreamless sleep and such other states. On the other hand, the stream
of whatever functions of the intellect it may be and its Saṁskāra,
impression, recept, or after-image, accompanied by the Vāsaṇā, sub-con-
cious latency or persistence, of the function respectively experienced by
the Puruṣas, is beginningless, and hence the continuity or uniformity
in the relation of the thing owned and the owner of it (between Mahat
and Puruṣa, vide Aphorism 13 above) is sustained.
Some, however, are of opinion that the hypothesis of conjunction between Prakṛti and Puruṣa would necessarily involve transformation and attachment of the Puruṣa, and that, therefore, the denotation of the word, Yoga, in this place, is only A-viveka or non-discrimination, and not conjunction. But their opinion cannot be upheld. For, by the aphorism \\( साध्वे पदम् स्वाद्ध्वे ) (I. 55 post, q. v.), the author of the aphorisms will declare that A-viveka or non-discrimination is (not the same as, but really) the cause of Yoga, association or conjunction. Again, in the (Yoga) System of Patañjali also, by the two aphorisms:

\\( सत्त्वाभिवद्यायः सत्त्वाभिवद्यायः सप्तेवः II २५ II \\

Sanyoga or conjunction, is the name given to the cause of the knowledge of the true nature—(of the Puruṣa) as he who experiences and (of Prakṛti) as the object of experience)—of the power of the thing owned (Prakṛti) and of the power of the owner of it (Puruṣa), (i.e., perceptibility and perceptibleness respectively).—Yoga Śūtra, II. 23.

\\( तत्त्व द्वैतविद्या II २५ II \\

A-vidyā, Nescience, is the cause thereof (i.e., of Sanyoga or conjunction).—Yoga Śūtra, II. 25. S. B. H. Vol. iv. p. 144.

A-vidyā has been declared as being only the cause of conjunction. Moreover, were A-viveka (non-discrimination), in the form of absence of Viveka or discrimination, the same as Sanyoga or conjunction, then Bhoga or experience, etc., would be entailed during Pralaya or dissolution, etc., also, by reason of the existence therein of the conjunction of Prakṛti and Puruṣa. To hold that conjunction consists in A-viveka or non-discrimination in the form of false knowledge, would involve a form of Ātma-āśraya, (Self-dependence) i.e., the fallacy of arguing in a circle, inasmuch as conjunction of the Puruṣa and Prakṛti is the cause of false knowledge, etc. (In the above passage of the Śruti), therefore, Yoga (in 'yuktam') must denote something more than A-viveka or non-discrimination. The same is nothing but Sanyoga, conjunction or union, there being no reason for any other supposition.

Sanyoga or conjunction, again, is not the same as Parināma, development or evolution, since we speak of a thing as undergoing development or evolution only when some particular property, in addition to the general attributes of the class, is produced in it. Otherwise, the universality of the immutable (Puruṣa, etc.), in the form of omnipresence, would not be proved or possible. Nor, again, does Saṅga or attachment or association consist in mere Sanyoga or conjunction, as it will be later on declared that it is Sanyoga or conjunction which is the cause of Parināma or evolution, that is the denotation of the word, Saṅga or attachment or association.
Objection:—But, still, how does temporary conjunction which is the origin of Mahat, etc., take place between Prakriti and Purusa both of whom are eternal?

Answer:—There is nothing impossible in this. For, Prakriti appears in the form of the sum-total or collection of the three Guṇas, states or modifications, conditioned as well as unconditioned, and thus production of conjunction with Purusa is possible by means of the imitation imposed by the conditioned or manifested Guṇas. This conjunction of Prakriti and her perturbation (by which the Guṇas are manifested) are proved by the Veda and the Smrti. And upon the same theme we have elaborately discoursed in our Yoga-Vārtika.

There are, however, others who think that the conjunction of Purusa and Prakriti consists merely in their respective fitness as the enjoyer and the enjoyable. But this too cannot be admitted; for, if fitness were eternal, it would be unreasonable to say that it could be terminated by knowledge. If it be non-eternal, then there is no harm in admitting Samyoga or conjunction, as the objection of entailing the characteristic of undergoing Pariṇāma or evolution on the part of the Purusa, equally applies to both. Moreover, the view that fitness as the enjoyer and the enjoyable constitutes the form of Samyoga or conjunction, has been nowhere declared in the aphorisms, etc., and is, therefore, unauthoritative.

It follows, therefore, that only a particular form of conjunction is here intended by the author of the aphorisms as the cause of the avoidable. Thus the cause of Bondage, according to the author, is ascertained—19.

Nor is Bondage caused by A-vidyā.

नास्वियातोप्यवस्तुना भन्नयोगात् ॥ १ ॥ २० ॥

Na, not. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā-tab, from A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge. अवस्तुना: A-vidyā, i.e., non-existence of Vidyाएड़ियात्रय वस्तुना भन्नयोगात् ॥ १ ॥ २० ॥

20. Nor (does Bondage result) from A-vidyā also, because of the impossibility of Bondage by means of a non-entity.—20.

Vritti:—If it be asserted that Bondage will accrue to him (Puruṣa) by means of A-vidyā, so the author says:

(It cannot). For, A-vidyā denotes either the antecedent non-existence of Vidyā or knowledge or its consequent non-existence, (i.e.,
Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram.

either that knowledge has not yet been acquired but that it may be acquired afterwards, or that knowledge which was acquired, has been afterwards lost. And, either way, it is a non-entity. Nor is Bondage by means of a non-entity possible in the case of the Self which is an entity. It is, therefore, a mere form of speech, and no truth, to say that Bondage results by means of A-vidyā.—20

Bhāṣya:—The causes of Bondage maintained by the unbelievers (Nāstikas, i.e., those who say that it—God, Veda, etc.,—does not exist) also should be now refuted. Amongst them, a sect of the Baudhāyas who hold the theory that the Self is a stream of temporary states of consciousness, as evidenced by the description or saying:

प्रकटिभो द्वारायामप्रक्षेपयो विनायकः

The Vaiśṇavas (Baudhāyas) who holds the theory of non-duality, is armed with the ten, and is conversant about the six.—Amara-kosa I. i. (1) 9.

argue as follows: There is no second, external, reality or entity, such as Prakṛti and so forth, whereby Bondage, real or reflexional, may take place through conjunction with it. But the mere continuity of succession of momentary states of consciousness is the reality, and it is without a second. All else is due to Samvritti or obscuration. And Samvritti or obscuration is A-vidyā, described as false knowledge, from which alone results Bondage. Thus has it been declared by them:

चालितोपरि ये द्वारायाम प्रक्षेपानाधिकारी

Praṇamānulakāṁvīrakāśāyānam ṣūkye

For, although the Self consisting of Buddhī or Reason or Understanding, is not different from acts or instances of Viparyāsa or inversion of correct knowledge, yet it is observed as though possessing the distinction of the consciousness of that which is apprehended and the consciousness of that which apprehends.—Saṅga-Dhāraya-Saṅgraha.—(Ed. Bibl. Ind., p. 18.)

Their opinion is first of all being disproved:

The word, 'Api,' also, has been used by reference to time, etc. mentioned above. From A-vidyā also, there is no immediate possibility of Bondage. The A-vidyā of the above non-dualists is also a non-entity, and hence no Bondage can properly take place by means of it; for, the binding of any one with a rope seen in a dream has never been observed. This is the meaning.

It cannot be asserted that Bondage too is unreal; as the author of the aphorisms himself will afterwards show that it is not, and also because the theory that Bondage is unreal, would be in conflict with the admission or concession that, subsequent to the learning of the theory of the non-dualism of consciousness or idealistic monism, practice of Yoga or holy communion should be resorted to for the annihilation of Bondage,
BOOK I: SUTRA 21, 22.

...much as it is not probable or reasonable that men should observe practices subsidiary to Yoga, which can be done with great hardship, ten in consequence of the teaching of the unreality of Bondage, there is remain no doubt that the fruit or result, called annihilation of Indage, is already accomplished.—20.

Nor is Bondage caused by A-vidyā. A-vidyā cannot be an entity.

वस्तु वै सिद्धान्तहानि: ॥ २१ ॥


21. If the reality (of A-vidyā be asserted by the monist, then there is) abandonment of (his) tenet.—21.

Vṛttī:—It may be said that A-vidyā denotes something different from Vidyā or knowledge, and is, as such, an entity. So the author lays down:

In our view, A-vidyā certainly possesses the form of that which exists. Consequently, there being no destruction of it, there is no telos-case. The A-vidyā of the non-dualists, on the contrary, is not transcendentally real. While the A-vidyā of the dualists is beginningless and is an entity, and, therefore, on account of the impossibility of its destruction, the teaching of the annihilation of Bondage is useless.—21.

Bhāṣya:—If, on the other hand, the reality of A-vidyā be admitted, then there will be abandonment of the non-reality or non-existent character of A-vidyā already admitted or advanced by the monist himself. This is the meaning.—21.

Above continued.

विज्ञातीयेन्द्विद्यापरिश्रवः ॥ २२ ॥

विज्ञातीयेति: Vijnātīya (heterogeneous); dvaita (duality); āpattib (entailment), entailment of duality through there being an entity of a different kind. च च Chā, o.

22. (On the assumption of the reality of A-vidyā, there would be) entailment of duality by means of a heterogeneous second.—22.

Vṛttī:—The author points out another defect in the theory of the duality of A-vidyā:

Were A-vidyā existent as an entity, and beginningless, it would be, the Self, eternal. It being different from the Self, the duality culminated by it would be heterogeneous duality.—22.
Bhāṣya:—Moreover, if the reality of A-vidyā be assumed, there will be then involved a second entity different in kind from the succession of momentary states of consciousness, which is not desired by you (i.e., the monists). This is the meaning.

The adjective, heterogeneous, has been used in view of the possible reply, (in case homogeneous duality were also raised as a point in objection), that, owing to the infinity of the individuals falling within (and making up) the stream of consciousness, homogeneous duality is certainly desired.

Objection:—Well, but A-vidyā also being a species of knowledge, how can there arise heterogeneous duality by means of A-vidyā also?

Answer:—The objection cannot stand. For, A-vidyā which is a form of knowledge, is subsequent to Bondage, whereas it is only A-vidyā in the form of Vāsanā or acquired tendency of the Self, that is recognised by them (the non-dualists) as the cause of Bondage. And Vāsanā is certainly different in kind from knowledge.

The mistake must not be committed that by these aphorisms the tenet of the Vedānta System is confuted, inasmuch as it has not been declared therein, even by a solitary aphorism, that Bondage results from mere A-vidyā. Moreover, even in the case of the reality of A-vidyā and the like, there is no contradiction of the non-duality characterised as non-division or non-differentiation, which is intended in the Brahma-Mimāṃsā, by such aphorisms as—

अभिब्रह्मेऽवत्सः कषट्यो मूर्तिः ।

(Taken is) non-division (of Brahma into many), (as follows) from the declaration (of the Veda).—Vedānta Sūtra, IV. II. 16, (S. B. H., Vol. V, p. 717).

As regards, however, the modern doctrine of Māyā or limitation, preached by the so-called Vedānta thinkers, of which the characteristic mark is in evidence in this context, the author’s remarks quite properly apply to them also, because they form a sub-division of the (Buddhist) Vijnānavādins or idealists, as we learn from the traditions of the sayings of Śiva in the Padma-Purāṇa beginning with:

मायावदन्तिमयायाम् श्रवणेऽवत् ।

In the Kali Age, O Devi, the system of non-existence, namely, the doctrine of Māyā, which is merely Buddhism in disguise, has been declared by no other than myself in the form of a Brahmapa.

The doctrine of Māyā, however, is not a tenet of the Vedānta System as we learn from the concluding words of Śiva:

वेदांतप्रमाणेऽवत् मायावदन्तिमयायाम्।
That great system, the doctrine of Māyā, containing the truths of the Veda, but not supported by the Veda.

The Māyā-vādins (those who hold the doctrine of Māyā) are not directly attacked here, as, in that case, the use of the adjective, heterogeneous, would be meaningless, inasmuch as in the doctrine of Māyā homogeneous duality also is not recognised. In this section, therefore, only the explanation of the cause of Bondage, given by the Vijnāna-vādins or idealists, is directly refuted. It should be understood that, by the selfsame method (of reasoning), the view of the moderns, the disguised Saundhas, i.e., the Māyā-vādins also, that an insignificant thing like mere A-vidyā is the cause of Bondage, is refuted.

In our view, on the other hand, A-vidyā, of course, lacks transcendental or ultimate reality in the form of immutability and eternity, but it possesses as much reality as a water-pot, etc., and, therefore, there is no opening for the impediment or objection stated above in respect of it being the cause of Bondage by means of the conjunction to be declared in the sequel. Similarly, in the view of the Yoga and also in the view of the Brahma-Mimāmsā Durśana.—22.

Above continued.

Viruddha-vādins:—If it be assumed that A-vidyā possesses the form of both the contradictories, i.e., the real and the unreal. वृत्ति, if it be assumed.

23. If it be assumed that A-vidyā possesses the form of both the contradictories (i.e., is both real and unreal).—23.

Vṛttī:—Well, such will be the fate of other predicates, but A-vidyā which is real and beginningless, will be also perishable, in our theory. The author states the above argument of the opponent:—

Viruddha-ubhaya-rūpā, possessing mutually contradictory forms, that is, although (A-vidyā) is beginningless, yet, inasmuch as it undergoes annihilation, it also possesses the form of antecedent non-existence, (like things which have a beginning).—23.

Titā of Vedāntin Mahādeva: An objection is apprehended: A-vidyā is not real or existent, wherefrom duality of dissimilar things might result, nor is it unreal or non-existent, as its effects are observed. On the other hand, therefore, it possesses both real and unreal forms.

Bhāṣya:—The author apprehends (an objection):

It may be asserted by the objector that A-vidyā should be conceived as possessing exclusively the form either of the two which are contradictory.
to each other, viz., the real is the unreal, or of that which is different from the real and the unreal, and that consequently there is no harm of (the theory of) transcendental non-duality. Such is the meaning of the aphorism. The author himself will, however, afterwards declare that the fabric of creation is both real and unreal. But there reality and unreality, in the form or sense of manifestedness and unmanifestedness, are not really contradictory to each other. This is indicated by the inclusion of the word: Viruddha (contradictory), in the aphorism.—23.

Above continued.

न ताद्वृत्तवार्थार्थमप्रतीति: ॥ १ ॥ २४ ॥

Na, not. भावार्थार्थमार्थप्रतीति: Tādrik (such)-padārtha (thing)-a (non)-pratīth (perception, observation), because of the non-observation of such a thing.

24. (It can-) not, because of the non-observation of such a thing.—24.

Vṛtti:—The author gives the reply:

Such a thing (as is both real and unreal) has never been observed by any man whatever in any place.—24.

Bhāṣya:—The author removes the above apprehension:

(The sense is) quite clear. Moreover, were A-vidyā the direct cause of Bondage described as connection with, or liability to, pain, then there will be left no possibility of the experience of Prārabdha or operative Adrīṣṭaṁ after the annihilation of A-vidyā by means of knowledge, in consequence of the destruction of the cause of the experience of pain, of which Bondage is a synonym. In our and other theories, however, this is no defect, for, (we maintain), A-vidyā, Karma or moral conduct, and the like become causes of Bondage by way of (establishing) conjunction (of soul with body). And the conjunction (of body and soul) described as birth (vide Kapāda Sūtram, VI. ii. 16, S. B. H., Vol. vi, page 207) does not pass away except on the termination of Prārabdha or operative Adrīṣṭaṁ.—24.

(Note:—Prārabdha: Karma or Merits and Demerits are divided as past and future. The former, i.e., consequences of action which have been already acquired, are further divided as Saścītaṁ, stored up, and Prārabdha, operative. Saścīta Karma is that the experience of which has not yet begun. Prārabdha is that Karma for the experience of the consequences whereof the present birth has taken place. The future or āgami Karma is that which will be afterwards acquired.)

Above continued.

न वर्ग पदः पार्थवार्थवार्थीनो बैहोष्पात्यार्थम ॥ १ ॥ २५ ॥

Na, not. ≤ Vasyarth: we. स्थलपद: (six)-padārtha (pratīthā): (holding the theory), those who hold the theory of the six sthāna.
25. We do not hold the theory of Six Predicables, like the Vaiśeṣika and other thinkers (vide Kanāda Sūtram, i. i. 4, S. B. H., Vol. vi, page 9; Gautama Sūtram, i. i. 1, S. B. H., Vol. viii, page 1).—25.

Vṛitti:—Our opponent may ask: If this be your argument, where will Prakṛti, etc., enter, when they are essentially different from the Six Predicables? So, with reference to it, the author says:

(The meaning is) clear. — 25.

Note.—The word, Adi, refers to the Nyāya School who teach the theory of Sixteen predicables. — Veddūtika Mahādeva.

Bhāṣya:—The author further apprehends:

Well, like the Vaiśeṣika and other Āstika or orthodox philosophers, we do not hold the theory that Predicables are constant in number, e.g., six, sixteen, and so on. Hence a predicable which embraces the nature of both the real and the unreal, or which is different from both, for example, A-vidyā, should be admitted by us, although it may remain unobserved. This is the import.—25.

Above continued.

श्लोकतत्त्ववीय नायोतिकयस्य संप्रहोप्यथा
बालोन्मत्तचिन्तितमल्य || १ || २६ ||

तत्त्ववीय A (in)-niyata (constant)-tve (ness), in the case of the inconstancy or unlimitedness of the number of predicables, वै Api, even. ना, not. वैषेषिकत्व (un)-yautikāya (reasonable), of that which is unreasonable. नै: Samgrihah, inclusion. नै: Anyathā, otherwise. बालोन्मत्तचिन्तितम Bāla (children)-unmatta (madmen)-Adi (and the like)-samattva (equality), equality with children and madmen and the like.

26. Even in the case of the indefiniteness (of the number of predicables), inclusion of something illogical cannot be allowed, (as), otherwise, we would come to the level of children and madmen and the like.—26.

Vṛitti:—If the predicables are indefinite (in number), how, it may be asked, can we say that, there are twenty-five Principles? Hence the author answers:

We do not say that there are only six predicables, but we do not say that, we do not admit even that, which is established by valid
arguments. Otherwise, we shall be on the same footing with children and madmen. So it has been said:

अ विद्याः ज्ञाताः कालोऽविद्याः ।
युक्तिसङ्केत्रम् प्राणं नायायेऽर्थः सवःकः ॥

Huge giants do not verify drop from heaven, because an Āpta, competent or trustworthy person, so says. Only sayings which are supported by reason, should be accepted by me and others like yourself.—26.

Bhāṣya:—The author removes the above apprehension:

Let there be no fixed rule regarding the number of predicables; still it is not possible for the disciples to accept or admit, relying upon your bare words, a predicable, (A-vidyā), at once real and unreal, which is opposed to reason by means of the opposition between existence and non-existence. Were it otherwise, there should be acceptance also of unreasonable things mentioned by children and the like. This is the meaning. On this subject (i.e., the conception of A-vidyā as at once real and unreal) there is no clear text of the Veda, etc., and a different object is proved from passages of the Veda rendered doubtful on account of their opposition to reason. This is the import.

The sense is the sense of such sentences of the Saura Purāṇa, etc., as—

नासूपूर्णं स दूरोप्य माया ज्ञातेयायायिकः ।
सत्सृप्रभुमिलिङ्गाय भिक्षामृत्ता सताताती ॥

Māyā (the principle of determination) possesses neither the form of unreality nor the form of reality, nor does it partake of the nature of both. It is indescribable by the terms, real and unreal. It is Falsity itself, and is everlasting.

Prakṛti, designated as Māyā, and proved by such texts of the Veda as—

विकारायनात मायामथध्वंसत: नुभास ॥

Māyā, the mother of transformations or modifications, possessing eight-fold form, unborn, permanent.—Sāṅkhyā Upaniṣat, 3.

cannot be real in the ultimate sense or as a transcendental object, inasmuch as she undergoes waste or passes away by the forms of successive modifications, the prior giving rise to the posterior. Nor can she be absolutely unreal, since she differs from the (imaginary) horns of a hare by the characteristic of being capable of producing object and exerting activity. Nor can she partake of the nature of both, because of the self-contradiction involved in the supposition. Hence ज्ञाताः कालोऽविद्याः—“indescribable by the terms, real and unreal,” that is, incapable of teaching, after obtaining certain knowledge, that she is real and nothing but real, and that she is unreal and nothing but unreal. But she is निविषयोः—“false-like,” that is, she possesses practical or phenomenal unreality designated as (laya dissolution), the state of dissolution of all phenomenal existences, and at the same time, also possesses practical or phenomenal
panty in the form of eternally undergoing transformation. The hint
is hereby given that we shall develop this point in the sequel.

And everyone of the defects brought out in this sub-division of
the book can be put down also against the modern doctrine of Mayā.—26.

Nor is Bondage caused by unbroken influences of external objects.

नानादिविषयोपगामनिमित्तोऽपवत् || १ २७ ||

* Na, not. कमलसिद्धानिश्चित: Anādi (beginningless)-vīṣya (object)-upa-
     गाः (stain)-nimittakah (occasioned), occasioned by the tint of objects from
     रत्न एकत्रितीय के (eternity). एव Api, again. पञ्चa, his, of the Puruṣa.

27. His bondage, moreover, is not caused by means
     of the tint (reflected) from objects from all eternity.—27.

Vṛtti.—The author refutes the Baudhāya view.

It cannot be maintained that 'his' i.e., of the Self, bondage
will be caused by the instrumentality of the Vāsanā, tendency to or long-
ning for, objects, from all eternity or of which no beginning can be traced.
With us there can be, by no means, connection of the Self with Vāsanā,
and consequently bondage cannot result from it. (While) in the Baudhāya
system, since a permanent Self does not exist, and Vāsanā also does not
endure for ever, who will be bound?—27.

Bhāṣya.—Others, the Nihilists, assert that external objects of
momentary duration, exist, and that in consequence of their influence,
or tendency towards them, bondage of the Jīva or embodied Self takes
place. The author condemns this view also:

Bondage occasioned by tendency towards objects which continues
from all eternity in the form of a stream of temporary tendencies, is
also not possible for the Self. Such is the meaning.

The reading विन्दित्ताद्यपयया:—(Nor does) his (bondage)
result from (the influence or reflection of objects from all eternity as)
the instrumental cause, is preferable to विन्दित्ताद्य: Nimittikah, having, etc., as
the instrumental cause.—27.

Above continued.
28. Also between the external and the internal there is not the relation of that which is tinted and that which tints, because of the interval of space (between them), as between one staying at Śrūgna and another staying at Pātaliputra.—28.

Vṛtti.—It may be replied (by the Baudhā) that bondage of the continuous stream of conscious states composing the self, will take place with the continuous stream of Vāsā, tendencies, arising from reflections cast by external objects. Hence the author declares:

If it is said that the relation of that which is tinted and that which tints has been observed also between the sun and a vessel of water, (we reply that) there the infusion of colour is due to the connection (established) by the sun-beam, and that in the present case, no such connection exists. If it be rejoined (that, in the present case, 'infusion of colour,' i.e., affection, is possible) by means of Vāsā or tendency or impression (by applying the connecting link, we say, it is) not; when it does not exist for all time, how (can Vāsā form) the connection? If it is said (that the required connection consists not of an individual impression, but) of the continuous stream (of impressions, in that case), if that to which the stream of the passing states belongs, be different from the states, then your theory (that the Self is but a stream of conscious states) is gone. On the other hand, (if you say that) although it (the soul, is not different (from the stream of passing states), yet something may be deposited or superimposed upon it by the latter, (we reply that) to deposit or superimpose is impossible on account of its momentary character. While, in the case of non-superimposition, what is the use of it which is almost a non-entity, (as it has no reason for its existence)? —28

Bhāṣya.—The author gives the reason for the above:

In your theory, it is something limited and lying wholly within the body, that is called the soul. Now, also the relation of the tinted and the tinter is not possible in the case of that which is thus within, as regards an external object. Why? Because of the intervention of space, as in the case of two persons, the one of whom remains at Śrūgna and the other at Pātaliputra. Such is the meaning. But it is only
there conjunction exists that adjacent tincture, called Vāsanā or affection, observed, as in the case of madder and cloth, or of flower and crystal.

By the word, api (also), it is implied that absence of conjunction, etc., apply to the author’s own theory also.

Śrughna and Pātaliputra are two particular places at a distance from each other.—28.

Above continued.

Dravyaṁ keśalabdhoparyāśaṃ Vyavastha ॥ १ ॥ २५ ॥

पि। Dvayoh, of the two. समस्यान्तः Eka (same)-doṣa (place)-labdha
received)-uparāgat (tincture), on account of tincture received from the same place. न Na, no.

29. The Law (of Bondage and Release) will be impossible, in consequence of tincture of both of them received from the same place.—29.

Vyāstā.—(The objector may continue:) Granted that internal tincture cannot be induced by means of Vāsanā or affection. Inasmuch, however, as the soul is all-pervading, tincture will arise through the connection of the soul with a portion of the external (world).

To this the author replies:

(On this theory), there is no Release for those who hold that there is but one soul, because they always receive tincture, and hence, with them, there can be no rule or distinction (of bondage and release). On the other hand, it does not exist in the case of those who hold that there are a multiplicity of souls, because equal knowledge will be produced, at one and the same time, in all of them, through their connection with the entire universe of objects.—29.

Bhāṣya:—(The objector may reply :) The tincture of objects should be asserted (in the soul) by means of conjunction with objects, because the soul, according to us, goes out to the place of objects, just as the senses do according to you.

In that case the author declares:

In consequence of ‘tincture,’ i.e., the tincture of objects, i.e., in bound and released souls, received at the ‘same’ place, i.e., the place of objects, there will be no rule or distinction of bondage and release, because of the liability, (according to this hypothesis), of the released act to return to bondage. Such is the meaning.—29.
Above continued.

30. If (the objector suggest that a distinction between the bound and the released souls does exist) in virtue of Adṛśṭam, (the answer is as given in the next aphorism).—30.

Vṛitti:—The author apprehends:

Although (equal) knowledge is entailed in all cases through connection with objects at all times, still it is the same Adṛśṭam by which a particular knowledge is produced in a man, that is the cause of that—that distinctive knowledge—in him. Hence no knowledge can arise universally.—30.

Bhāṣya:—Here the author apprehends:

Granting that they (the bound and the released soul) are alike in respect of their conjunction with objects by means of connection with the same locality, yet the reception of the tincture may (or may not) result from the force of adṛśṭam alone. Such is the meaning.—31.

Above continued.

31. The relation of deserver and bestower (can-) not (subsist) between the two on account of their non-compossibility at one and the same time.—31.

Vṛitti:—The author points out the defect (in the above suggestion):
(The meaning is) clear.—31.

Bhāṣya:—The author discards (the above suggestion):

On the admission of momentary duration (of souls), the agent-soul and the experiencer or patient-soul cannot exist at the same moment of time, and hence the relation of deserver and bestower cannot subsist. Tincture of objects, pertaining to the patient-soul, is not possible by means of Adṛśṭam pertaining to the agent-soul. Such is the meaning.—31.
Above continued.

पुत्रकर्मेऽविद्य चेत || १.१ ३२ ||

पुत्र (son)-कर्म (performance)-विद्य (like), like the performances towards a son. इति चेत, if it is suggested.

32. If (it is suggested that the case is) like that of performances toward a son, (we reply that the illustration is not a fact for the reason given in the next aphorism).—32.

Vṛitti:—The author (further) apprehends:

Just as by Pratisthā, a sacrifice for the birth of a son, and like other performances, (in which the father is the agent), benefit is conferred on the son, the patient, who is yet unborn, through the purification of his flesh, it will be here also.—32.

Bhāgya:—The author (further) apprehends:

The objector may urge that as benefit accrues to the son by means of ceremonies in regard to the son which (really) belong to the father who performs them, in like manner tincture of objects may be induced (in the soul, for instance, of to-day) by Adhīṣṭham inhering in a different subject, i.e., for instance, the soul of yesterday. Such is the meaning.—32.

Above continued.

नासित द्वि तत्र निवम एकाल्मा यो गर्भपाण्यादिधिना
संस्कृतयते || १.१ ३३ ||

नम, not. आसि, is, exists. हि, because. तत्र, there, in the opponent’s theory. शिरा, permanent. एका (one)-अत्मा (soul), selfsame soul. यह, which. गर्भाणि Garbha (embryo)-अध्यात्मा (depositing)-अधिनी नाते, by the ceremony of depositing the embryo in the womb, and the like, namely Sanskritiyate, is consecrated.

33. (The above illustration is not a real one), because your theory there is no self-same permanent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies beginning with the ceremony of depositing the embryo in the womb.—33.

Vṛitti:—The author declares a demonstrated fact:

(The opponent’s illustration is not a real one on his own theory). In theory, on the other hand, the soul is uncaused, eternal, pure, and enlightened. Oblation of clarified butter, and like other performances,
for its benefit, are quite possible. Thus the soul, conceived as permanent, is proved.—33.

(N. B.—The words, 'In our theory, on the other hand,' and 'Thus the soul, conceived as permanent, is proved' are not found in Garbe's edition of Aniruddha's Commentary, with the result that the portion of the Commentary under notice is not easily intelligible.)

Bhāṣya:—The author removes the above apprehension by showing the falsity of the illustration:

Even by the sacrifice for the sake of a son, no benefit can accrue to the son on your own theory: 'hi,' because, 'tatra,' in your view, there is no permanent, self-same soul, continuing from the time of depositing the embryo in the womb up to the moment of birth, which could be consecrated by the Purāṇa sacrifice, so as to acquire fitness for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth. Hence follows the falsity of the illustration also. Such is the meaning. On the other hand, the permanency of the soul being an implied tenet of our theory, at that time also, (i.e., at the time subsequent to birth), Adriṣṭam certainly co-exists with the soul in its self-identity, (in which it was originally produced), inasmuch as it is by means of Adriṣṭam belonging to the Upādhi or the sum-total of external conditions which make the son what he is, that benefit accrues to the son through the Upādhi or external condition of sonship. Hence does not follow the falsity of the illustration in our theory also. Such is the import.—33.

Bondage is permanent:
Theory of the transiency of things criticised.

स्पर्शरापात्तिचः चत्त्वाक्तवः ॥ १ ॥ ३४ ॥

विबुधिक शिभर (permanent)-kārya (effect)-a (want of)-siddheḥ (proof), since there is no proof of a permanent effect. अविभिन्न Keśāṅkivām, momentariness.

34. Since there is no proof of a permanent effect, the momentariness (of Bondage is to be admitted).—34.

Vṛtti:—The author cites the view that the soul is not-permanent-consciousness:

Existence and possibility of particular uses (belong to the soul). These characteristics are pervaded by succession and non-succession. And they cannot possibly belong to a non-momentary thing. Hence they establish momentariness.—34.

Bhāṣya:—Well, bondage also being momentary, let bondage either have no fixed cause or have non-being for its cause. With this in mind, another unbeliever puts forward:
BOOK I, SUTRA 35.

"Of bondage"—such is the complement. The import has been clearly stated above. Here the application of the argument is as follows:
The subject in dispute, bondage, etc., is momentary.
Because it exists,
(For whatever exists is momentary),
As the flame of a lamp.

And, (continues the unbeliever), the argument does not fail in the use of (what you choose to regard as a permanent product, such as) a water-pot, and the like, because that also (in my opinion) is like the subject in dispute (in being momentary). This is precisely what is asserted in the expression "Since there is no proof of a permanent effect."—34.

Above continued.

न प्रायमिष्टाबायात्त ॥ १ १ ३४ ॥

= Na, nay. अवश्यकतायम् Pratyabhijñā (recognition)-bādhāt (obstruction), on account of obstruction to recognition.

35. Nay, (things are not momentary in their duration), so (in that case) there would be obstruction to knowing them ever again.—35.

Vṛtti:—The author rejects the above view:
Although the existence of a permanent thing should be demonstrated by arguments that a thing is a principal cause or is not a principal cause, according to the presence or absence of co-operative causes, yet, (the fact of recognition) being proved by the common consent of all thinkers, obstruction to unobstructed recognition in the form, 'This is that,' has been mentioned here. This has been elaborated elsewhere, and hence it not here dealt with at large.—35.

Bhāṣya:—The author proves his theory of permanency of things:
"Momentariness does not belong to a single thing"—such is the complement. Facts of recognition such as "What I saw,—that same do I touch," prove permanency, and consequently there is obstruction to the theory of momentariness, that is, by an opposite argument to that of the unbeliever, which may be fully stated as follows:
Bondage, etc., is permanent,
Because it exists,
(For whatever exists is permanent),
As the water-pot, etc.
It is only in our theory that, by the existence of favourable arguments, there is no opposition by an equally valid argument to the contrary.
And in the case of the lamp and the like, the idea of momentariness is merely an error which the others fall into by not recognising the numerous minute instants through which they endure.—35.

Above continued.

तथा तन्मात्रा विरोधाः ॥ १ ॥ ३६ ॥

तात्त्विकोत्तरा व्रती (Veda)-Nyāya (logic)-virodha (contradiction), because of contradiction by the Veda and by logic. Ṭ Chā, and also.

36. And (things are not momentary), also because this is contradicted by the Veda and by logic.—36.

व्रती:—The author points out another defect (in the unbeliever's theory):

The Veda says:

प्रति ज्ञानरोपणोपणयेत् पुराणः

There exists Purāṇa, Self, the experiencer of the objects of experience in a different birth.

Logic also: Who so will exert himself in an act which is incapable of enjoyment or in the employment of means for its accomplishment?

(The objector may say that) the activity of kind-hearted persons is observed (to proceed) from unselfishness; but this is really not so, since even in such cases one acquires merit for oneself by doing good to others, and since, although this merit is not directly aimed at, still it becomes the means of Release.—36.

Bhāṣya:—The meaning is that nothing whatever is momentary, because the inference of momentariness, in the whole web of the world consisting of effects and causes, is contradicted by texts of the Veda such as—

सन्देश स्त्रादेशम् भाषी

All this, O peaceful one, was verily existing at the beginning.—Chhānd. Up. VI. ii. 1, 4, 8, 8, Vol. III, p. 280.

तम प्येदम् भाषी

Timeing all this was mere darkness.—Maitreya Upaniṣat, V. 2.

For scriptural and other arguments as—

कथास्तं भाष्यानि

How then that which exists proceed from that which exists not?—Chhānd. Upa., VI. ii. 8, 8, 8, B. H., Vol. III, p. 280.—94.

Above continued.

दृष्टांतादित्यादिः ॥ १ ॥ ३५ ॥

दृष्टांता (instance)-a (un)-siddheḥ (reality), because of the unreality of the instance. Ṭ Chā, also.
37. (Things are not momentary), also because the instance (adduced in the above syllogism, vide Sūtram 34) is not a fact.—37.

Vṛtti:—The author points out another defect (in the opponent's theory).

All things, without exception, being included in the pāka (the subject of the conclusion proposed to be drawn, i.e., the minor term in which the existence of the major term, i.e., momentariness, is doubtful), there is no (independent) familiar example. If it is not included therein, the same is permanent (falling, as it would do, outside the class of momentary things). If you say that the momentariness of this also may be established by another syllogism, we reply that there too the unreality of the instance will (similarly) be a defect.—37.

Bhāṣya:—The meaning is that there can be no inference of momentariness, also because there is no proof of momentariness in such instances as the flame of a lamp and the like.—37.

Above continued.

38. (There can be) no relation of effect and cause between (two things) simultaneously produced.—38.

Vṛtti:—The author declares that it is only on the theory of momentariness that no predication is possible.

"Between (two things) simultaneously produced," that is, between (two things: possessing predicates identical with themselves, (because, on the theory of momentariness, they perish no sooner than they are produced), as, e.g., between the right and the left horn, (there can be no relation of effect and cause). And this has been declared more than once.

Bhāṣya:—Moreover, the author declares, the relation of cause which, according to those who maintain the transiency of things, established by the impossibility otherwise of activity and inactivity, does not hold good even in the case of earth and water-pot, and so forth.

Does the relation of effect and cause subsist, between (two things) simultaneously produced, or between successive ones? Of these, the former (is) not (the case), as there is no particular reason for believing that it is so, and on other grounds. Such is the import.—38.
Above continued.

पूर्वापेक्षे उत्तरायोगात् ॥ १ ॥ ३६ ॥

पूर्ववेत पृवा (precedent)-अपाये (passing away), on the passing away of the precedent. उत्तरार्थम् Uttara (subsequent)-a (no)-योगत (connection), because there can be no connection with the subsequent.

39. (The relation of effect and cause cannot subsist between temporary things even though they be successive), because, on the passing away of the precedent, there can be no (causal) connection with the subsequent.—39.

Vṛtī:—(The opponent may reply that) the relation of effect and cause will arise from the mere appearance of the things in prior and posterior times. Hence the author says:

It would be so, if it (the prior or the posterior thing) could extend beyond itself. But that is impossible on account of its momentariness.—39.

Bhāṣya:—The author shows that the latter also cannot be the case:

The relation of effect and cause is not possible on the theory of momentariness, because the production of the 'subsequent,' i.e., the effect, cannot properly take place at the time of the passing away of the 'precedent,' i.e., the cause, inasmuch as the effect is observed only as dependent upon, or being made up of, the material cause. Such is the meaning.—39.

Above continued.

तद्वसाते तद्योगादुभयवध्विषचारविष ॥ १ ॥ ४० ॥

तद्वसाते Tat-bhāve, during the existence of that, i.e., the cause. तद्योगादुभयवध्विषचारविष Tat-ayogādubhyavādevācāravṛti, on account of the non-connection of that, i.e., the effect. वध्विषचारविष Udbhaya (both)-vṛtiḥbhikṣat (violation), because of the violation of both. (N.B. Here 'both' refers to the two rules of positive and negative inference, viz., that if there is a cause, there will be an effect, and that if there is no cause there will be no effect.) ना, not.

40. (The relation of effect and cause is) not (possible on the theory of transiency), because of the violation of both (the rules of positive and negative inference) in consequence of the non-appearance of the effect during the existence of the cause.—40.
Vṛtti:—The author elucidates the above proposition.

The relation of effect and cause is not possible, because of the violation of both, in consequence of the non-existence of the effect during the existence of the relation of the cause and that of which it is the cause. Let aside the question of predication or practical use, uses such as 'This is the cause; this is the effect,' will also be not possible.—40.

Bhāṣya:—The author points out yet another defect by reference to the material cause alone:

The meaning is that the relation of effect and cause cannot subsist, also 'Udbhaya-vyābhichārāt,' because of the violation of (the rule of) positive and negative inference, in consequence of the non-connection of the subsequent during the existence of the precedent. Thus, apprehension of the relation of effect and cause between the constituent and the constituted is possible only by the rules of agreement and disagreement, viz., that where there is production of the constituted there is the constituent, and when there is non-existence of the constituent, there is absence of the production of the constituted. That being so, the relation of effect and cause is not established on the theory of momentariness, because of the violation of the rules of agreement and disagreement, in consequence of the fact, that these two things, the constituent and the constituted, being successive and having only a momentary duration, belong to two different, opposite, moments of time.—40.

पूर्वमात्रवर्गे न नियमः ॥ १ ॥ ४१ ॥

पूर्वमात्रकं पूर्व (prior)-भाव (existence)-मात्रे (mere), in the case of mere antecedence. ॥ Na, no. नियम: Niyamaḥ, uniformity, restriction.

41. In the case of mere antecedence there will be no uniformity.—41.

Vṛtti:—The opponent may argue that the existence of the cause at the time of the production of the effect is inoperative, and that the effect will result by the mere existence of the cause at the preceding moment. Hence the author says:

(Will the effect result by the mere antecedence) of something belonging to a different series, or of something belonging to the same series with the effect? If you say 'of something belonging to a different series,' then the causation will be too remote (i.e., the cause will operate where it exists not). If, on the other hand, you say 'of something belonging to the same series with the effect,' in that case also as (being momentary), it would perish without subsequence (of the effect), it would be similar to
something belonging to a different series, and therefore there will be no uniformity. That there can be no subsequence or agreement between them has already been stated (vide Sūtram 40).

It may be said that the causality of a non-existent cause also is observed. For example, an archer shoots another man with an arrow, and immediately dies of apoplexy; afterwards the man shot with the arrow dies; here the death of the former is the cause of the death of the latter. But it is not so, because the subsequence of the death of the latter, even in the non-existence of the archer, is due to the (physiological) processes which resulted in death.—41.

Bhīṣya:—(The opponent may urge:) Let the causality of the material cause also, like that of the efficient or instrumental cause, arise solely by means of mere antecedence. To this the author replies:

On the admission, again, of mere antecedence, there will be no such uniformity or fixed certainty as ‘It is this that is the material cause,’ because there is no distinctive peculiarity in the antecedence of the efficient causes also. (Whereas) the division of material and efficient causes is recognised by all men. Such is the meaning.—41.

The cause of Bondage really exists. The world is not an idea.

न विज्ञानमार्थ बाध्यवत्तिते: || ११ ॥

* Na, not. विज्ञानमार्थ Vijñānā (idea)-मात्रम (mere), mere idea. बाध्यवत्तिते: Bāhyā (external)-pratīk (intuition), on account of the intuition of external things.

42. (The world is) not a mere idea, on account of the intuition of objective reality.—42.

Vṛtti:—It has been stated that Bondage results from the tintorial reflection cast upon the Self by adjacent external objects. But external reality, says the Vijñāna-vādini, (Bauddha) Idealist, does not exist, since the world is in its essence ideal. The author replies to him:

The world is not mere idea. Had it been so, the intuition would have been ‘I am a water-pot,’ and not ‘This is a water-pot’ (as is the case). It cannot be said that the difference is caused by a distinctive peculiarity in the Viśramā, mental impression or recept; for, in the absence, ex-hypothesi, of external reality, the recept of the water-pot itself can have no existence, and consequently how can there be any such distinctive peculiarity? What, again, is the cause of the mental impression? Is it the mental impression itself or some other impression coming from the outside? In the case of the (second) alternative, that it is some
external impression, something else also would exist, and consequently the same would be an external reality.

But external reality, our opponent may argue, cannot verily exist, by reason of the non-existence of a whole exceeding the parts of which it is made up. For, thus, the parts and the whole being identical, there is the intuition of unity. When the part moves, the whole moves; where the part is small, the whole does not move. By the attribution of the contradictory property, viz., that it does not move, there exists difference (between the part and the whole), and hence there is no unity. In like manner, other defects such as being red and not-red, covered and not-covered, confined-to-a-place and not-confined-to-a-place, and so forth, may be cited in example.

We reply: Granted that the whole (containing properties contradictory to those of its component parts) does not exist; still there is no disproof of external reality, inasmuch as it is of the cluster of ultimate atoms that apprehension or intuition takes place under the characteristic of largeness.

It is not so, rejoins our opponent. For, ultimate atoms have to be inferred (as the cause) by means of the whole as (their) effect; in the case of its non-existence, by means of which are they to be inferred? Ultimate atoms being super-sensible, they cannot also deposit in their cluster something which they themselves do not contain; consequently, 'it is large or bulky,' such intuition is erroneous. Hence follows that the world is mere idea.

Here it is said: (This is not so), because of the difference between part and whole. Moreover, the two being different from each other, the whole does not move when the parts move. Where, however, there is movement or vibration of a larger number of parts, there the whole certainly moves. Similar reconciliation in the case also of the contradiction of red and not-red, etc., may be declared. External reality, therefore, is proved.

In the case of the other alternative, viz., that it is the mental impression itself that is the cause of the mental impression, there would be production of knowledge at all times.—42.

Bhāṣya:—Other unbelievers, again, say: There is no existence of an entity which is not an idea. Therefore, Bondage also is a mere idea, like an object seen in a dream. Hence, it being absolutely unreal, there is no cause of it.
The author sets aside their opinion:

The meaning is that reality is not limited to ideas only, because like ideas, external objects also are proved by intuition.—42.

Nor is the world a Void.

तद्भावे तद्भवाच्छयन्ति तार्थिः || १ । ४३ ||

तत्तत्त्वात् Tat-abhāvā, in the non-existence or absence of that, i.e., external objects. तत्तत्त्वात् Tat-abhāvā, there being non-existence of that, i.e., knowledge. नं सूत्याम् Sūnyam, void. तार्थिः Tarthi, therefore.

43. There being non-existence of external objects, there is non-existence of knowledge: (the world), therefore, is a void.—43.

Vrūti:—Knowledge, devoid of object, is not observed. Therefore, (if the external reality does not exist, then), in consequence of the non-existence of objects to be known, knowledge also does not exist. Thus declares the Sūnyā-vādin, the Buddha Nihilist:

Void follows from the non-existence of knowledge in the absence of objects to be known. If knowledge were its own object, there would be the contradiction of the agent and the patient.—43.

Bhūṣya:—"Well, (the mere fact of intuition does not prove external reality.) The simple and natural form of reasoning is," argue those heretics, "the inference, by means of the examples of dreams and the like, of the unreality appertaining to the object supposed to be the cause of presentation to the senses or sensible appearances. By this inference the sensation of external reality as such should be opposed. On this point there is also the testimony of your Śruti and Smṛiti. For example.

विद्विद्विद् लघुम

Verily all this is consciousness.—Nrisimha-Tāpani Upa., II. 1. 7.

Therefore, only Thought exists, neither creation nor transmigration.—

Linga-Puruṣa (?)

Hence the author points out another defect:

Were it so, from the non-existence of external reality only the Void would result, and not even Thought. Why not? Because, 'Tat-abhāvā,' in the absence of external reality, there being the implication of the non-existence of thought or idea also, the inference is possible that the intuition of idea also, like the intuition of external reality, corresponds to no reality of its object. The infallibility of the evidence of Thought is also sometimes disproved. Furthermore, the proofs of (the existence of)
Thought are also repudiated, because they are derived from external sources. Such is the meaning.

(The Vijnāna-vādin may reply): The fact of intuition is disputed by none whatever, and hence it does not stand in need of any proof. But this is not so, because the Śūnya-vādins themselves dispute that.

If (the Vijnāna-vādin contends): (The existence of) a thing is proved by a non-existent thing also as the means of proof, inasmuch as it is the non-opposition to (the existence of) the object (to be proved) that is the cause of certain knowledge (of its existence), and not the ultimate or absolute reality of the means of proof.

(We reply): It is not so, as, in that case, non-existent things, as means of proof, being everywhere easily available, there would be no (need of) seeking after the means of proof with regard to any object whatever.

Now, (if the Vijnāna-vādin admits): Even amongst non-existent things, a distinction in the form of practical or phenomenal existence is desirable in the case of those which serve as means of proof.

(We say): You have come to the path. What, again, is (the meaning of) this practical or phenomenal existence? If it denotes the characteristic of undergoing change of form, then it is existence of this kind only that is also desired by us in the case of the means of proof of the perceptible and the perceiver, for we exclude from the web of the universe — creation — only its imputed resemblance to the illusory silvery appearance of the oyster shell. If, on the other hand, it denotes mere appearance or manifestation, in that case also, by means of proof exactly similar to those (of the existence of Thought), the proof of (the existence of) external objects also would result. Opposition to proof of existence, by means of the very same kind of haphazard inference under the auspices of simple and natural form of reasoning, (as is raised against the existence of external reality), would equally arise in the case of Thought also.

Hereby is set at rest the opinion of the so-called Vedāntins of the present day, which stands on no stronger basis than the teaching of the Vijnāna-vādin.

On the other hand, the texts of the Sruti and the Smriti (quoted above), demonstrative of the reality of Thought alone, refute only the absolute or transcendental existence of external objects in the form of freedom from change, but not also their practical or phenomenal
existence in the form of the characteristic of being liable to transformation.

वस्तु राशिः बहुसः वर्ण राजस्यास्वकम् ।
तदन्त्यव कृत्तेऽ तु न कर्त सन्धितस्यायम् ॥ ९५ ॥
बस्तु कृत्सन्तेरणिः नाग्नस्यवात्स्यैरिः हैं ।
परिरधारास्वतं नस्यस्तु तुष तथा दिस्म ॥ ९६ ॥

'This entity is the king,' 'These are the king's army,' and so on,—these and such other (predications), O king, are similarly made (i.e., made by reference to the body). Those designations are not real but purely imaginary (94). But the reality is that which, even by the passage of time, does not pass into a different designation derived from change of form and the like. O king, what is it (i.e., how shall I describe it to you)? (95)—Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, II. XIII. 94-95.

From these verses of the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa and from other sources we learn that it is the liability to change of form that is regarded as possessing the characteristic of non-existence. 'Saṁkalpana-mayam,' i.e., invented by the imagination or mind of Ṣiva and others.

Hereby it should be understood that by—

विस्मयमयोपद्योपमयमयः

Know all this, in its entirety, to be constituted by Thought alone.—Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, III. XVIII. 16.

this and other propositions, it was just the truth that was taught, as the story is related in the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, to the Āsuras, the enemies of the Gods, by Viṣṇu in the form of Māyā-Moha (vide Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, III. XVIII), but that they, owing to their unfitness for these instructions and other imperfections, received these instructions in a contrary sense, and thereby became Viṣṇu-vādin Nāstikas or Idealistic Heretics.

All this, however, has been elaborately dealt with by us, in our Commentary on the Brahma-Mīmāṃsā, in connection with the refutation of the Doctrine of Māyā. —43.

Above continued.

शून्यं तत्त्वं भावो विनाशयति वस्तुर्गमेवावर्त विनाशायम् ॥ १०४ ॥

शून्यम्, the void. तत्त्वम्, reality. भावः, existence. विनाशयति, perishes. वस्तु-रिल ब्रह्म (thing)-dharma (nature)-tvat, being the nature of things. विनाशयम्, of destruction.

44. The Void is the reality, existence passes away, it being the nature of things to pass away.—44.

Vṛtti:—(The Śūnya-vādin goes on:)

If reality consisted in the form of existence (as perceived by us), then on the destruction of existence there being destruction of reality.
there would be no emancipation. 'Vastu-dharma-trātvināsasya,' because a thing, (phenomenal being), must necessarily perish.—44.

Bhāṣya:—Let it be so, rejoins the high priest of the heretics, that only the Void is the reality. Then, necessarily, the enquiry into the cause of Bondage is not justified, being altogether useless.

Only the Void is the reality, because all (perceptible) existence whatever perishes, and that which is by nature perishable, is unreal, as a dream. Hence all things, being non-existent at the beginning and at the end, have a temporary existence during the interval, and so Bondage, etc., are creative, incidental or occasional, and not real in the ultimate sense. Consequently, which will be bound by which? Such is their inward significance. The reason, (for the assertion), that existences are by nature perishable, is (given in the words): 'Vastu-dharma-trātvināsasya,' which means that to perish is of the nature of things. And no object can continue to exist after divorcing its nature. Such is the meaning.—44.

Above continued.

व्रत्िः—The author states his own solution (of the doubt raised by the Śūnya-vādins):

Non-existence does not perish,—this is a mere form of speech, and not a real proposition, 'A-buddhi-nām,' on the part of those to whom the Śāstras or sacred writings are unknown. For, the destruction of antecedent non-existence is observed, and on the establishment of the theory of Sat-kārya, i.e., that of the existence of the effect in the cause, even prior to its appearance as the effect, there is non-destruction of existence. Even if the term, destruction, is applied to denote disappearance, there is still non-destruction of Prakṛti and Puruṣa.

(If the Śūnyac-vādin asks): Non-existence itself does not exist, how can arise the consideration of its destruction and non-destruction?

(We reply): How, then, takes place the cognition, the water-pot does not exist on the ground, (lit., the ground is where-the-water-pot-does-not-exist)? If it arises by the help of the ground, the result would be that cognition of the non-existence of the water-pot will take place even when
the water-pot exists on the ground, inasmuch as the ground remains the same in both the cases.

(If the Śūnya-vādīn holds): Cognition of Non-existence arises by the help of the bare ground. But the water-pot being there, the ground lacks bareness.

(We ask): Is bareness a mere part of the nature of the ground, or is it something beyond that? If it constitutes the very nature of the ground, then, inasmuch as it would continue to exist even during the existence of the water-pot on it, cognition of non-existence would take place. If, on the other hand, it is something beyond that, then the same is non-existence.

(If the Śūnya-vādīn argues): The use of (the term), non-existence, is in respect of the aloneness or singleness of the ground. While the water-pot exists, there is no singleness in the ground. Where, then, is the reason for the application of (the term) non-existence?

(We say): Such is not the case. Is singleness the number unity, or something else? The number unity, again, exists in the ground even when it contains the water-pot. In the case of the second alternative, viz., that it is something else, the very same would be non-existence. For, where there is no characteristic difference in the objects, there can be no characteristic difference in the cognitions thereof.

(If the Śūnya-vādīn asks): How can there be cognition of non-existence, when there is no relation between existence and non-existence?

(We reply): As the cognition, this is a water-pot, arises from the agreement and non-agreement, stimulation, and non-stimulation, of the senses, in like manner, the cognition of non-existence also proceeds from a cause. For, the supposition of the cause is made by the observation of the effect, but it is not possible to willfully disregard (the existence of) an observed effect, (e.g., the cognition of non-existence). Moreover, as we hold the theory of an indefinite number of predicables (vide Sātrām 25 and 26 supra), it will do us no harm if there exists some such relation also (between existence and non-existence) as is required.

Non-existence, therefore, is established.—45.

Bhāṣya:—The author discards (the above view):

Existence as such is perishable,—such is 'Aparādā-mātram,' merely a false declaration, of the ignorant. For by reason of the non-existence of destructive causes, the destruction of (simple) substances which are not made up of parts, is impossible. There is also no proof of the destruction of their effects; just as the intuition, the water-pot is worn out,
proves the worn out condition of the water-pot, so intuitions such as, the water-pot is past and gone, prove nothing but the condition of the water-pot, etc., designated as past. The unmanifested state (of a thing) also really enters into our theory on the admission of the past (or unproduced) state of the effect. Further, even if it is conceded that destruction is of the essence of the web of the universe, still it is possible that the destruction of Bondage can properly become an object of desire.

Someone, however, explains (the Sūtram as follows) :—

The Void is the reality,—this is only a coarse theory of the ignorant, while there is no argument in its favour. For it does not bear the alternatives of the existence and non-existence of proof: if you admit that there is proof of the existence of the Void, then, by that very proof, voidness is disproved; if you do not admit this, then, owing to the absence of proof, the void is not proved; and if you say that the Void proves itself, then the implication would be that it possesses the form of consciousness, and the like. Such is the meaning.

It cannot be contended that the void is established as the reality by the Śruti and the Smṛiti also in such passages as—

न निरूपणं न वेत्तिः पद्मनाष न व वाणगः ।
न मयुषयं न वै शुक्ल हृदयं परमार्थं ॥

Neither suppression nor, again, production, neither entangled nor, again, engaged in the pursuit of freedom, neither desirous of release nor, again, released; such is the absolute truth.—Ganapāda’s Mādhyakā Kārikā, I, 32; Brāhma-Upaniṣad, 10.

सर्वरूपं निरूपणं स्वरूपं यथा विप्लवः ।
वनपायिणम् सुप्रतिको वेदास्तां प्रस्मद्यति ॥

Where the pure form (of the soul), devoid of everything else, and having no other support but itself, is meditated upon, that is called Abhāva-yoga, connection with non-existence or communion in non-existence, whereby one fully beholds the Self.—Kāśī-Pūrṇa, II, XI, 8.

For, in similar passages of the Śruti, it is the non-existence of the suppression or destruction, and so forth, of the Pūruṣas that is declared to possess the characteristic of reality, inasmuch as we get it from the preceding and succeeding passages that it is the Pūruṣa that is the subject-matter of discourse there. Besides, in such passages of the Smṛiti as quoted above, it is the firmament or sphere of consciousness in which the universe has found its setting, that is established as the reality, inasmuch as these passages convey the same meaning as the following and like others:—

प्रत्येकवर्षं मनमातारं नामसूत्रं वरुण स्वरूपः ।
विनिरोधाति नाथर्या व्याधाय प्रचिनाय गोपे ॥
The Yogin is regarded as having become Brahman itself, when he contemplates the three-fold world as possessing the form of the sky, his own body as similar to the sky, and his Manas or mind as dissolving into the sky. — (Source not traced.)

Sky and void are synonymous terms. 'Manas' denotes all the inner senses, viz., the principles of Mahat, Ahamkara, and Manas. 'Viyat-gâmi' means dissolved into the firmament of consciousness.

Above continued.

उभयपत्तमानांभमतिविद्यमान || १ || ४६ ||

Udbhaya (both)-paśca (party)-samāna (same)-kṣematvāt (preservation or worth), because it possesses as much worth as both the (other) theories (of transiency and idealism). अयय, this, the theory of the void.

46. This (theory) also (should be rejected), because it possesses no more worth than the other two theories (viz., of transiency and idealism). — 46.

Vṛtti:—The author gives another solution:

This also, the theory of the void, should be set aside, because it possesses as much strength as the theory of momentariness and the theory of idealism. As momentary existence is contravened by the recognition of things previously perceived, as ideal existence is contravened by the perception of external entities, in like manner this also, the theory of the void, should be contravened by the observation of the entire universe in perception itself — 46.

Bhāṣya:—The author points out another defect (in Śunya-vāda):

This theory also fails to the ground, 'Samāna-kṣematvāt,' because the reason for its rejection is the same as that for the rejection of 'Udbhaya-paśca,' the theories that things are momentary and that external objects are mere ideas,—such is the sentence rendered complete by means of words brought over from elsewhere. For, the ground for the rejection of the theory of momentariness, e.g., impossibility or unaccountableness of recognition, etc., is equally applicable to the theory of the void also. Similarly, the ground for the rejection of the theory of idealism, e.g., intuition of external objects, etc., equally applies here also. Such is the meaning. — 46.

प्रपुत्तिर्ममुख्याय || १ || ४७ ||

A (not)-purusa (Purusa)-artha (object)-tvam, the not being an object of desire to the Purusa. उत्ति Udbhaya, in both ways.

47. Either way the void cannot be an object of desire to the Purusa. — 47.
Vṛtti.—The author shows another defect in Śūnya-vāda.

If void means non-existence, (it cannot be an object of desire), for what sober-minded man will strive after a non-existence? Again, the use of the word (bhūrya, release) denoting positive existence, in ‘Release is the object desired by the Purusa,’ will be meaningless. If the void denote, on the other hand, something beyond existence and non-existence, then also it cannot be an object of desire to the Purusa, because also of the non-observation of a thing of this nature.—47.

Bhāṣya.—These heretics again think that voidness itself may become an object of desire to the Purusa, either as being of the form of cessation of pain, or as being the means thereof. But, the author shows, that also is impossible.

For voidness, to be an object of desire to the Purusa, is not possible, intrinsically as well as extrinsically. Because pleasure and the like possess the characteristic of being objects of desire to the Purusa by the very fact of its being inherent in them. Besides (the existence of) a permanent Purusa is not admitted (by these heretics). Such is the meaning.—47.

Nor does Bondage result from particular movements of Purusa.

न गतिविदेशपाल || १ || २५ ||

व, Na, not. गतिविदेश Gati (going)-viśeṣāt (distinction), because of the distinction of movement.

48. (The Void is) not (the reality), because (in the reality) there is the distinction of movement. (Aniruddha). Or, (Bondage does) not (accrue to the Purusa) from (his) particular movements. (Vijñāna-Bhikṣu.)—48.

Vṛtti.—With a view to discard the Śūnya-vādins, the author states the doctrine of the Kaśapaṇkhas (another section of the Bandhas) that the soul is of the measure of the body:

The Void is not the reality, because the Void is not capable of movement. Movement (of the soul) is, on the other hand, observed. For instance, (we find in) the Śruti—

सरुकुमारायण्यश निशोष्यन्ते वशादाद यया।

Yama, the Moral Governor of the World, forcibly extracted the Purusa having the soul of the thumb only.

पापे दर्शन वारि पुत्रते स्वर्गा द्वारेण द्वारातोष्क वारि

By vice, (the Purusa) goes to hell, by virtue to heaven, by knowledge to the world of Brahma.—48.
Bhāṣya.—(The author has done with the unbelievers, Nāstikas, so far as the cause of Bondage is concerned.) Some of the theories of the Āstikas (those who believe in Revelation, etc.) also have been already refuted. The remaining other causes of Bondage that may be possibly attributed by them, are also now going to be refuted:

The word, Bondage, is obtained from the context. The meaning is that Bondage does not accrue to the Puruṣa, also 'Gati-viśeṣā,' from particular movements, such as entering into a body, etc.—48.

For Puruṣa is incapable of movement.

लिखित्यतयं तवसस्मवात् II 1 46 II

लिखित्यत, Niṣkriyasya, of the inactive. तवसस्मवात् Tat (that)-a (im)-sambhavāt (possibility), owing to impossibility thereof, i.e., of movement.

49. Because that which is inactive, is incapable of movement.—49.

Vṛtti.—The author condemns the above view.

The sense of the Sūtram is obvious.—49.

Bhāṣya.—The author gives the reason for the above conclusion:

The meaning is (that Bondage does not accrue to the Puruṣa from particular movements), because movement is impossible for the Puruṣa who is inactive and all-pervading.—49.

Above explained.

मूर्तिवाद्यायतिविस्तरं समानरसोपन्तावपस्तिद्वान्: II 1 40 II

मूर्तिवाद्यायतिविस्तरं, being consolidate or corporeal. ग्हात (water-pot)- differential. अन्त (and the like)-vāt (like), like water-pot, etc. द्रव्य (property)-dharma (property)-अपत्त (implication), in view of the implication of similar properties. अवधिप्राप्ति: Apa (wrong)-siddhāntāḥ (conclusion,) wrong or reverse conclusion.

50. If the Puruṣa were corporeal, (and, therefore, limited or finite), like the water-pot, etc., then he would possess properties similar to those of the latter, and hence the reverse conclusion (would follow).—50.

Vṛtti.—The author explains the inactivity or unchangeableness of the Puruṣa.

Corporeal or finite things, the water-pot, etc., undergo change. If the Puruṣa possess a like property, he would also perish. But the mortality of the Puruṣa is the reverse of truth. Moreover, in the course of
migration into different births, the Puruṣa would have, according to the supposition of his having a finite size, to adapt himself to the size of the body of the elephant and the worm. If he thus undergoes contraction and expansion, he must be a whole made up of parts, and, therefore, non-eternal, (which also is the reverse of truth).—50.

Bhāṣya.—The doubt may arise that only finiteness, and not infiniteness, probably belongs to the Puruṣa, inasmuch as we hear from the Śruti and the Smṛti about his going and not going to this world and to the world beyond. Thus, there is the Śruti also—

अनुपमाचः पुष्करस्तराला

The Puruṣa, of the size of the thumb, the inner Self.—Katha Upan., II. vi. 17, Āvetātāraya Upan., III. 18.

The author removes the above apprehension:

If, again, the Puruṣa is admitted to be 'Mūrta,' divided off from other things, i.e., definite, like the water-pot, etc., then the result would be that he will possess properties similar to those of the water-pot, etc., by being a whole made up of parts, perishable, and so forth. Hence the finiteness of the Puruṣa is a perverso conclusion. Such is the meaning.—50.

Above continued.

gatisthiratipadapitakavadacarita || 1 || 41 ||

गतिस्थितिरस्यपादिक्योपदेशाकायचतुर्दश || 1 || 41 ||

गत्रित: Gati (going), śrutī (text of Śrutī), teaching of the Śrutī about the going of the Puruṣa, āpi, also. अनुपमाचः अवा प्रदेशः (adjunct, investment, condition or limitation)-yogat (connection), in respect of connection with external investment. अका́ः (sky)-vat (like), as in the case of the sky.

51. The teaching of the Śrutī about the 'going' (of the Puruṣa) is in respect of his external investment, as in the case of the sky.—51.

Vṛitti.—(It may be said that), such being the case, there is conflict with the Śrutī, e.g., 'of the size of the thumb,' etc. Accordingly the author explains (those passages of the Śrutī.)

As, according to the division caused by the external investment such as the water-pot, etc., the cognition, viz., that Ghaṭa-ākāśa (the portion of the sky confined within the water-pot) moves, arises while the water-pot moves, likewise arises the intuition, viz., that the Self moves, from the delimitation caused by the bodily vesture, etc.—51.
Bhāṣya:—The author explains the teaching of the Śrutī about the going of the Puruṣa:

There are, of course, Vedic declarations about going with reference to the Puruṣa. But these should be regarded as having been made certainly in accordance with the arguments and teachings of the Śrutī and Smṛiti about the universality or all-pervading character of the Puruṣa, and, therefore, only with reference to his connection with an external investment, in the same way as motion may be attributed to the sky. Such is the meaning.

On this point, the evidence is as follows:

(i) Śrutī: e.g.—

चतुर्विद्याकाराः सोत्यामाने बदेय यथा |
बतो नीचे नाकाराः तन्त्राभ्याः बनोपसम्॥

As the sky, enveloped within the water-pot, (seems to move), while the water-pot is carried (from place to place), (whereas, in reality), the water-pot is removed, and not the sky, so the Jīva, the embodied Self, which is like the sky (in this respect).—Brahma-
Bīdu Upaniṣad, 13.

(ii) Smṛiti: e.g.—

तिष्ठ सर्वं गतः स्वातः
(The Self is) eternal, all-penetrating, immovable, etc.—Bhagavat-Gītā, II. 24.

(iii) Argument: e.g.—

(a) If the Self is held to be of medium size, (i.e., neither all-pervading nor atomic), then, he will be, by necessary implication, a whole made up of parts, and, consequently, perishable.

(b) If, on the other hand, it is said to be atomic in size, then, it will not be possible for it to have cognition, etc., spreading over the whole body.

It is for these reasons, that Prakṛiti alone is specifically mentioned as possessing motion in the form of activity or change, in such passages of the Smṛiti as—

प्रकृति तुष्ये कर्णे शुचायुधस्वामकं |
प्रकृतिः तद्वैतिः चित्रु हैरतेभु कामाः॥

Prakṛiti performs action which contains, as its essence, 'fruits' (consequences), good or bad. Prakṛiti also eats those fruits in the three worlds where she goes, being led by desire.—Mahabharata, Śatā Purusam, 81.
Nor is Bondage caused by Adriṣṭam or Destiny.

52. Nor even by Action (Bondage results), Action not being a property of the Self.—52.

**Vṛūti:** (The opponent may interpose): What will the Upādhi do? Difference will arise from diversity of action.

Hence the author declares:

It would be so, if action were a property of the Self. But no property whatever belongs to the Self, it being devoid of all attributes.—52.

**Bhāṣya:**—Nor even does Bondage accrue to the Puruṣa directly by means of Karma or Adriṣṭam or destiny. Why not? Because it lacks the characteristic of being a property of the Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

Before this (vide Sūtram 16) has been refuted (the theory of) Bondage by means of action in the form of prescribed and prohibited observances. While here (is refuted the theory of Bondage) by means of Adriṣṭam or destiny produced thereby. Hence, owing to this difference in meaning, there is no tautology.—52.

(N.B.—Vijñāna-Bhikṣu, Nāgara Bhaṭṭa, and Mahādva Vedaṇtin, the last of whom, by the way, offers merely to explain the Vṛūti of Aniruddha, read the 53rd and 54th aphorisms in the order adopted by us, while Aniruddha transposes them).

Above continued.

53. If (Bondage and its cause) be properties of different things, the implication would go too far.—53.

**Argument concluded.**
54. (Did Bondage result from any other cause than Upâdhi or external investment, there would be) also conflict with the Vedic declarations such as that the Puruṣa is devoid of attributes and the like.—54.

Vr̥tti:—(The opponent may urge): Action may be just a property of the Self. Where is the conflict?

To this the author replies:

The Śruti—

चतुर्वत्ती धार्म दुर्वः:

For the Puruṣa is unattached.—Bṛhat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣat, IV. III. 1 will be contradicted.—54.

Vr̥tti:—(The opponent may still argue): Granted (that action is) not a property of the Self, (but of something else). Yet a particular action, i.e., change, (that is to say, Bondage), may take place (in the Self), even by means of the property of another thing, inasmuch as the Self, being all-pervading, has connection with all things.

Accordingly the author declares:

(If it were so, then), there being nowhere any peculiarity in the universal connection of the Self, the theory would entail the bondage of the released Selves also.—53.

Bhāṣya:—If it is maintained that Bondage will accrue to one even by the property of another, the author replies:

If Bondage and its cause were properties of different things, ‘Atipraśaktiḥ,’ it would entail the bondage of the released Puruṣa also. Such is the meaning.—53.

Bhāṣya:—What is the use of further prolonging the discussion? The production of Bondage, in the case of the Puruṣa, cannot take place from any of the causes cited above, beginning with nature and ending with Adṛśam; or by any other cause whatsoever, inasmuch as in all these cases, there would be conflict with the Śruti. The author states this general objection:

On (the theory of) the non-reflectional character of the bondage of the Puruṣa, there would be conflict with such Vedic declarations as—

(As it is) the witness, conscious, standing alone, and devoid of attributes.—Bṛhat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣat VI. 11.

Such is the meaning.

The word, Iti, has been used to denote the close of the enquiry into the Cause of Bondage.—54,
BOOK I, SûTRA 55.

Association of Purûsa with Prakriti happens by non-discrimination.

तद्योगोऽयविशेषाः समानत्वम् II १ ५५ II

गौतम: Tat (that)-yogas (connection), connection with that, property and not-property (Aniruddha), Prakriti (Vijñâna-Bhikṣu). Aniruddha also reads the word with the locative inflection. अ पि, also, even. अविचक्त Avivekâ, through non-discrimination. न Na, no. समानत्वम Samânatram, equality, similarity.

55. (Puruṣa’s) connection, with property and not-property (Aniruddha), or, with Prakriti (Vijñâna-Bhikṣu), takes place through Non-discrimination. Hence there is no similarity.—55.

Vritti:—(Our opponent may say quite complacently): In your theory also there is distribution of property and not-property to the Self; for, activity of the entangled Self, for the purpose of attaining release, is observed. What is your conclusion (solution of the difficulty) here, the same will be ours too. Thus (the two cases are) similar.

To him the author says:

Notwithstanding connection with property and not-property, there is no similarity in property between the entangled and the released Self, on account of non-discrimination. If the connection of property and not-property were real to the Self, there would be equality. But, on the other hand, the sense or idea, abhimâna, of the connection of property and not-property arises in the Self on account of non-discrimination. Where, then, is the similarity?—55.

Bhâṣya:—Thus, therefore, in the above minor section beginning with “Nor……of one who is bound by nature” (व स्वमण्डित उच्चित्रः Sûtram 7), it is ascertained, by the exclusion of all other possible causes, that conjunction between Puruṣa and Prakriti, and nothing else, is the immediate cause of Bondage. In that theory there is this apprehension. Well, (an objector may contend), why is not also the conjunction of Puruṣa with Prakriti affected with the qualifications of naturalness, etc.? And if the characteristics of being natural and of having time and the like as its instrumental causes, belong to that conjunction, then, the defects, such as the possibility of Bondage in the case even of the released Puruṣa, etc., are certainly correspondingly the same on both the theories.

The author avoids this very apprehension:

‘Tat-yogas,’ connection with that which has been stated above (Prakriti or Dharma and A-dharma), ‘âpi’ (also), ‘a-vivekâ’ (from non-discrimination) of Puruṣa. For conjunction (of Puruṣa with Prakriti) takes
place only from non-discrimination, which will be presently explained, as its instrumental cause. Hence the defects mentioned do not equally exist in this theory. Such is the meaning. And the same non-discrimination does not exist in the released Puruṣa; hence they do not again enter into conjunction (with Prakṛiti).

Object:—Well, non-discrimination here does not consist in the realisation of non-difference between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, because of its non-existence prior to conjunction, but it consists either in the antecedent non-existence of discrimination or in the vāsana or tendency towards, or sub-conscious latency of, knowledge which is called discrimination. Neither of these is a property of the Puruṣa. But they are surely properties of Buddhi or Understanding. Hence conjunction takes place in one thing (i.e. Puruṣa) by means of the properties of another thing (i.e. Buddhi.) Thus arises the defect of too much implication, in which respect the two theories certainly stand on an equal footing.

Answer:—This is not so, because the characteristic of being a property of the Puruṣa belongs to non-discrimination by means of the relation of its being an object (to the Puruṣa). Thus, for the purpose of showing up all her modifications, Prakṛiti enters into conjunction, by the form of his Buddhi or Understanding, with that very Puruṣa to whom, as her lord, she, having taken the form of Buddhi, has not previously exhibited her body, discriminating every part thereof. Such being the rule, there is not too much implication. So has it been declared by the Kāśika:

\[\text{Puruṣa-Pradhānaṁ कैण्ठवणि तथा प्रधानस्य}\
\text{प्रायोक्षधनुष्कर्म्येण संचारस्य, २१}\
\]

Conjunction of Puruṣa and Pradhāna is, like that of the halt and the blind, for mutual benefit, for the exhibition of Pradhāna to Puruṣa and for the purpose of the isolation of Puruṣa. From this Conjunction proceeds Creation.—Kāśika of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, verse 21.

The meaning is (that their conjunction takes place) in order that Pradhāna may exhibit herself to Puruṣa, her lord, and for the purpose of their separation.

To say that A-viveka, Non-discrimination, is, in form, a function or modification of Buddhi, is a mere figure of speech, and not a real proposition, because, as we shall explain in a future aphorism, of the continuance of the Chitta or mind (after the removal of A-viveka).

A-viveka, moreover, becomes the cause of Bondage only by way of Conjunction, inasmuch as Bondage is not observed during Dissolution, and also as the Jivan-muktas are observed to experience pain even after A-viveka has been destroyed. For this reason, it has not been declared above that A-viveka is directly the cause of Bondage.
Note.—The Jivan (living)-mukta (released) are those who have, before the close of their earthly career, acquired discriminative knowledge, and have thereby obtained release, but who have still to undergo the experiences of life and thereby to exhaust their past Karma.

Objection.—The supposition of the relation without beginning, of the thing owned and the owner, of it, has been made, (between Prakriti and Purusa), as being regulative of the relation of the object of experience and the experience of it. This relation of the thing owned and its owner, or Karma, or the like, may possess the characteristic of being the cause of Conjunction. How, then, A-viveka, Non-discrimination, also is desired to be the cause of Conjunction?

Answer.—There can be no question on this point, as it may be recalled that the conceit or misconception (abhilambana), designated as sahaga or attachment, has been declared to be the cause of Conjunction, in the Gita:

पुरुषे प्रकृतियो वि मुक्ते प्रकृतिज्ञान पुनःकर
carvan puravah*kumay pravidesham lekham \ gita 19\21 \n
For, Purusa, resting in Prakriti, experiences the changes produced from Prakriti. The cause of his births in the pure and impure species, is his attachment to the Guna—Gita XIII. 21.

Besides, Release by means of knowledge, as demonstrated by the Veda and the Smriti, is not explainable otherwise than by the sayings and arguments which will be later on declared, and the like.

Objection.—If it is so, then, the Karma etc., which form the particular Upadhi or investment of Purusa, will also be a cause of Conjunction. Why, then, are these excluded, and A-viveka itself said to be the sole cause thereof?

Answer.—We reply: Karma and the like depend upon A-viveka, and, so, they also are related to Purusa only mediately. In other words, A-viveka alone is capable of being directly cut down by Purusa, while Karma and so forth are so capable only by means of the eradication of their cause, namely A-viveka. For this purpose, A-viveka alone has been declared as being primarily the cause of Conjunction.

And this A-viveka which consists in the knowledge of Purusa and Prakriti without apprehending the absence of attachment between them, is intended by the author just as holding the place of A-vidya, as may be gathered from the following two aphorisms (of the Sankhya Pravachana Sutram):

कादी विषयबादिकाशी 1212
Bondage results from Error (III. 24.) विषयबादिकाशी 1212
Kinds of Error are five (III. 87).
Also in the Yoga Sūtras of (Patañjali)—

A-vidyā is the cause thereof. (II. 24, S, B. H. Vol. IV, page 144).

A-vidyā alone, which contains five-folds, has been declared to be the cause of conjunction of Buddhi and Puruṣa. The distinction of the Sāmkhya from the Yoga on this point should be observed to lie only in the mere non-recognition of anyathā-khyāti, i.e., the mistaking of one thing for another, e.g., of a shining oyster shell for a piece of silver, as a form of A-vidyā.

Neither, again, is A-viveka here mere a-bhāva or non-existence, nor is it the antecedent non-existence of Viveka or Discrimination. Because that would entail the bondage of the released Puruṣa also. It would also entail bondage over again in the case of even the Jīvan-muktas by means of the production of Merit and De-merit, by the antecedent non-existence of future manifestation of Viveka. Moreover, the familiar instance of darkness, given in the next aphorism, would be inapplicable, as it is impossible for non-existence to be the cause of obscuration, like darkness. Furthermore, the increase and decrease also of A-viveka, of which, we hear people speak, would not be justified.

In our theory, on the other hand, it is A-viveka only in the form of vāsanā, aroma or tendency, that is the cause of birth designated as Conjunction, and consequently the causing of obscuration, like darkness, increase, decrease, and so forth, become at once explained. Commenting on the aphorism of Patañjali:

For Puruṣa, resting in Prakṛti, experiences etc., that it is Conjunction designated as abhimāna or conceit or misconception, that is the cause of the Conjunction designated as the resting in Prakṛti. For this very reason Vyāsa Deva has carefully ascertained, in his Commentary on Yoga, that A-vidyā is not Non-existence, but a form of Cognition opposite to Vidyā or Right Knowledge.

A-viveka and A-vidyā being, therefore, similar in every respect, it is established that A-viveka also is a species of Cognition.

Now, this A-viveka becomes the cause of birth designated as Conjunction in three ways: (1) immediately, (2) by the production of Merit.
and De-merit, and (5) by means of ‘visible’ influences such as Desire, and
the like, as observed in the Yoga aphorism:

चति मूले तत्तवाकार || २ ||

‘It ripens into life-state, life-experience, and life-time, if the root remains’ (Yoga
in the Sūtrī:

कर्मसंसारित निवचते

He becomes confined, thinking that he is the agent.
and also in the Nyāya aphorism.

वैतरणामान्यावर्णानात || ३/२ ||

Because of the non-observation of birth of those from whom Desire has fled away.
(Nayāya Sūtras III. 1. 35).
So also has it been said in the Mokṣa-dharma (Māhābhūtvā, Śānti-parvam):

श्राविजयकृति विद्याय अनपस्यतरं ब्रम्हैः ।
द्विन्ध पुनर्बूिति न देवेन पुनर्जीविति ॥
वैशालोपीलानादारामिनां अन्तःकरणं जनं ॥

The powers of Cognition and the objects of the senses do not come near him who is
not-thirsty. And Puruṣa who is devoid of (lit. deserted by) the senses, does not merit a
future body. Beings, therefore, are born from Rāga or attachment in the form of thirst
or desire as the seed of their birth.

Rāga or attachment, again, is the effect of A-viveka or Non-discrimi-
nation. This should be taken to be also the sense of the two aphorisms
of Yoga, on account of the similarity of thought in the two systems. And
these two aphorisms are:

श्राविजयकृति विद्याय || २ || १२ ||

चति मूले तत्तवाकार जालस्वरूपः || २ || १२ ||

The vehicle of actions has its origin in afflictions. It ripens into life-state, life-
experience, and life-time, if the root exists.—Yoga Sūtra of Patanjali, II. 12 and 13,
S. B. H. Vol. IV. pages 104 et seq.
And affliction is the pentad of A-vidyā, etc. (Yoga Sūtra, II. 3, ibid. p. 91.)

The various ways in which A-viveka, or Non-discrimination operates
towards the production of Bondage, etc., have been thus declared in the
Īśvara-Gītā in a collected form:

चन्द्राल्पालविद्याय तत्तवार्थं स्वेतंतरः ।
रागोपचाययो हृदयं सत्त्वान्धित्विन यमः ॥

carnātākāram samreksma purupāpamāritā shruti ||

तत्रृघ्नवेच रघो नवविद्वेदसम्यकः ॥

(A-viveka causes), in respect of the Not-Self, the Cognition that it is the Self. From
this arises pain as well as its opposite, Desire, aversion, and all other passions (lit. faults)
are linked with Error (i.e. A-viveka) as their cause. For, as declares the Veda, the effect
thereof will be fault, viz. virtue and vice. From this fault alone results the incarnation
of all beings into all bodies.—Kārma Pārthā, II. 20, 31.
The very same doctrine has been aphorised in the Nyāya. Of.

Pain, Birth, Activity, Faults, and False Cognition,—after the disappearance of these is turn, on the disappearance of each succeeding one, (in the order of mention), there follows Emancipation.—Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama, I. 1. 2.

It follows, therefore, that A-viveka or Non-discrimination is the root cause of the Avoidable, designated as Bondage, which it effects through birth designated as Conjunction. Thus, then, the cause of the Avoidable is established.—55.

A-viveka is eradicable by Viveka alone.

56. The removal thereof (i.e. A-viveka) takes place from a determinate cause (namely, Viveka); as of darkness.—56.

Vṛitti:—Granted, says an objector, that Bondage accrues from A-viveka; still there is a parity between our theories in this respect, that both of us have to admit or postulate Dharma or Merit for the annihilation of A-viveka, as, otherwise, Bondage would be continuous.

To this the author replies:

If the law of causes and effects established by the methods of agreement and difference, does not hold good, there can be no certainty and expectation in respect of anything. As light is the (sole) cause for the destruction of darkness, so, here too, annihilation of Non-discrimination follows from Discrimination (alone).

And where is the harm in the admission of Merit for the purpose of Discrimination? The purpose may be accomplished by Merit belonging to Prakṛiti.

Now, what is it that is called Darkness? Darkness, according to some, is non-existence. It is not so, as its apprehension arises in a positive way. If it be non-existence, is it the antecedent non-existence of light, or its consequent non-existence? If it be antecedent non-existence, then, as on the water-pot being produced, the antecedent non-existence of the water-pot is destroyed, in like manner, on the appearance of light, there would be the intuition that the antecedent non-existence of light is destroyed. (But), notwithstanding the existing light, Darkness will
remain undestroyed, there being the antecedent non-existence of the future light. On the other hand, if it be consequent non-existence, in that case also, Darkness (as non-existence) being indestructible, there will be occasion for the intuition of Darkness on the appearance of another light, in the same way as, when another water-pot is produced, consequent non-existence of the water-pot that has been destroyed, verily exists. Reciprocal non-existence, again, is found in existences also. Reciprocal non-existence, moreover, is faulty in theory and need not be apprehended.

So has it been said:

न च सारामाचार्य तमसू दुर्भिस्मात्म | छायावती काफ़्यविशेष वे पुरुषः presumption | द्वारस्त्रसाधीयान्ति महद्वसा बच्चाबिवा | वेलालुब्धतियो छाया न वर्तुलाचित्तिया सकेत |

That Darkness is the non-existence of light, is not approved by the elders. We hear of its quality in such passages of the Purāṇas as 'blackness belongs to Darkness.' For, shadow, large or small according as the light is distant or near, moving or not-moving according as the body moves or does not move, could not so possibly, were it not a reality.

That Darkness is a reality, is, however, a mere predication, as it is perceived only where some reality exists.

Objection:—Where light exists, objects are perceived. Where it does not exist, how can objects be perceived?

Answer:—A mere diversity of nature— as the owl sees objects even without the help of light, so also does the perception of Darkness take place even independently of light, from the variety of things in nature.

It, therefore, follows that Darkness is a particular kind of Rāja or form-and-colour, and is perceived, where there is an object to obstruct light, by being referred to that object.

Others opine that Darkness is a different substance. So it has been said:

तम बलु बलक्षीरं परापरविभाष्यत् | प्रखरविलक्ष्येन्यथायेन्यो न चूपामहीत ||

Darkness, moving, blue, and capable of being distinguished as this and that, certainly requires to be divided off from the nine substances, as it possesses attributes different in kind from the well-known attributes of those substances.

Note.—The above verse directly refers to the Yāsेनकारार् Dārśana, S. B. H. Vol. VI, For these nine substances, see ibid. page 17, for darkness, page 18, and for an account of the Theory of Non-existence, pages 237-238.

Now, whether Darkness be an attribute or a substance, it does no harm to our conclusion, as we hold the number of objects to be unlimited.

We would, however, say that darkness is not non-existence,—58.
Bhāṣya:—Henceforward, up to the end of the Sāstra, the author establishes, in great detail, the Means of Avoidance which is the division (of the subject matter) next in order (of mention). In the course of it, he will also dilate upon the divisions discussed before.

‘Niyata-kāraṇa,’ the fixed and determinate cause, in question, is Viveka-sākṣātkaśa, direct apprehension or realisation of the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, as established throughout the world in such cases as where a mother-of-pearl shell is mistaken for a piece of silver; from which follows eradication of A-viveka, as is the case with Darkness. As Darkness is dispelled by light alone as the fixed and determinate cause, and not by any other means, in like manner, A-viveka also is dispelled by Viveka alone, and not directly by Karma and the like. Such is the meaning. So has it been taught in the Yoga Aphorism (II. 26):

विभेक्ष्यतिरिवेद्यत द्वीपापः II 26 II


Note.—The commentator explains the force of the word, directly, used above.

Karma, religious and social observances, and the like, on the other hand, are the instruments of knowledge only, as we find that, by the Yoga Aphorism (II. 28):

थेनाप्राकृतादानविविद्यते व्यवहीतिरिवेद्यतः II 28 II

According as the impurity (in the Soul) wears away, on the performance of the (several) members of (the eightfold) yoga, the light of knowledge shines brighter and brighter till the manifestation of Viveka.—Ibid. page 180.

it has been ascertained that all and sundry acts coming under the several members of Yoga, are instruments for the development of knowledge alone by means of the purification of the Sattva element (of Prakṛti).

The older Vedāntins, on the other hand, declare that in regard to Mokṣa or Baloose also, Karma is a subsidiary part of knowledge; because, in the Śruti:

विद्या यथा ध्यानां यत्तद्विशेषतः सह ।
पञ्चशति मद्युद्ध विषयाः सविशेषतः ।
देशोपनिसत् । । ।

Vidya, Jñāna or knowledge, and A-vidyā, karma, pious observances, who knows—both of them together, he transends mortality by the help of Karma, and attains immortality by the help of Jñāna.—Īsā Upanisat, Verse 11, S. B. H. Vol. I. and in the Vedānta Aphorism (III. iv. 33):

कर्मसारित्सेवया ॥ ॥

(Karma is to be performed) also as contributory (towards knowledge)—S. B. H. Vol. V. page 948.

and also in the Smṛti:

ब्रह्माण्डाण्डका वापि यथा विद्या विद्या वार्ता ।
तत् एवं तत् तत् कर्मेण कर्माणि सुचिते ॥
Whether a man possesses knowledge or does not possess knowledge, so long as he remains saddled with the body, he ought, for the purpose of Release, to perform Karma, enjoined for the different stages of life (śramaṇa) and society (varṣa).

It has been ascertained that Jñāna and Karma are contributory to each other, in the relation of principal and subsidiary. There is, however, another Vedānta Aphorism, (III. iv. 15), which says:

उपमासे च ह || २१२.१६ ||

(Jñāna is pre-eminent, because it causes) the destruction (of Karma) also. —Ibid., page 623.

But it merely recites the fact that one who has ascended on yoga, is rightly entitled to give up Karma, with the object of teaching, that Jñāna is principally the cause of Mokṣa. For, the author (of the Vedānta Aphorisms) intends to say that if Karma, by causing distraction, becomes a hindrance to the cultivation of Jñāna, then, relying on the maxim that, on the disappearance of a quality, the thing of which it is the quality, does not disappear, it is Karma which is merely a part, that is to be given up for the sake of the preservation of the principal object, as was done by Bharata the (deliberate; idiot and others. Therefore, on the theory of these older Vedāntins also, the causality of Karma towards the destruction of A-viveka is surely not proved, without the intermediacy of Viveka. Hence our view does not conflict with theirs.

In this aphorism, darkness has been said to be destructible by light. Darkness also is, therefore, really a substance, and not non-existence of light. In the absence of any cause to the contrary, perceptions arise, for example, that darkness is deeply dark. To characterise them as erroneous, is unjustifiable. Nor can it be said that such perceptions being explained by known realities, the supposition of something additional is redundant, and that, therefore, the law of parsimony is a bar to the hypothesis of darkness being a substance. For, were this the case, then all the events of practical life—being, like dreams, capable of explanation as pura ideas only, a similar redundancy of supposition would be entailed as an impediment to the intuition of external realities also, (which is not desirable). Hence, in the case of darkness, the hypothesis being supported by evidence, redundancy does not count as a fault.

It might be objected that, as even in the absence of the knowledge of Viveka or discrimination between Purusa and Prakṛti, individual instances of that knowledge which is called A-viveka or non-discrimination, must needs be destroyed of themselves at their respective third moments, there is no necessity for intending Jñāna to be the cause of their destruction. But it should be remembered that, in the previous
aphorism, the word, A-viveka, has been explained to mean, not individual acts of non-discrimination, but non-discrimination as a Vasana, an instinct, a tendency, the resultant effect of all individual acts of non-discrimination in the past. We also maintain that A-viveka, in the state of not-yet-come, is capable of destruction.—56.

Discrimination between Purusa and Prakriti includes all discrimination.

प्रथानाविवेकाय विवेकाय तद्दैव द्वारा ॥ १४ ॥

प्रथानाविवेकाय विवेकाय तद्दैव द्वारा ॥ १४ ॥

प्रथानाविवेकाय विवेकाय तद्दैव द्वारा ॥ १४ ॥

प्रथानाविवेकाय विवेकाय तद्दैव द्वारा ॥ १४ ॥

प्रथानाविवेकाय विवेकाय तद्दैव द्वारा ॥ १४ ॥

57. Non-discrimination of Prakriti (from Purusa) (is the cause) of non-discrimination of other things (from Purusa); (therefore), on the annihilation of this, annihilation (of that will take place).—57.

Vritti.—It has been declared that Release comes through Viveka, Discrimination. Discriminative knowledge of a water-pot, a piece of cloth, and so forth, exists in such as ourselves also. Release of all, therefore, is entailed. (Thus argues the opponent.) To this the author replies:

The root of all is Pradhana (Prakriti). From want of discrimination about Pradhana, arises non-discrimination in respect of others. Whether there be want of discrimination, or discrimination, of objects amongst themselves, Bondage or Release does not result by it, but by discrimination and want of discrimination with regard to Pradhana only. Hence, on the annihilation thereof, i.e., on the annihilation of non-discrimination about Pradhana, results annihilation of non-discrimination in respect of all.—57.

Bhanya.—Well, then, it is non-discrimination between Purusa and Prakriti that is the cause of Bondage in this way that it brings about conjunction (in the form of birth or embodiment), and it is discrimination between them that is the cause of Release. Release, therefore, will take place inspite of the misconception (abhimana) that the body, etc., is the Self. And this is contrary to Sruti, Smriti, and reason. To this objection, the author replies:

'Anyavyiveka,' non-discrimination in respect of Buddhi and the like, is produced, in Purusa, from non-discrimination of Prakriti, as its cause. The non-discrimination which is thus produced, is an effect, and has its root in the non-discrimination which is its cause and is itself beginningless. Therefore, the annihilation of non-discrimination of;
Prakṛti (from Puruṣa) taking place, the annihilation of it must follow. Such is the meaning. Just as when the Self has been discriminated from the body, non-discrimination in respect of the form-colour (rāpa) and other properties, which are the products of the body, in other words, identification of the Self with any of these properties, is not possible, so, by parity of reasoning as well as from the disappearance of the cause, when Puruṣa has been discriminated from Prakṛti by means of the characteristics of his immutability, etc., the misconception (abhīmāna) cannot possibly arise that Puruṣa is any of the products of Prakṛti, e.g., Buddha and the rest, which possess the characteristics of undergoing development (parināma), etc. This is the import. So is it recorded in the Smṛiti:

विषयारपपत्तये तथा तस्य वि कोष्ठकः।
प्रक्षेपितं देवयं ज्ञानानां से समस्तवः॥

As on the abandonment of the canvas which serves as the ground for a picture painted thereon, the painting also is necessarily abandoned, similarly in the case of the abandonment of Prakṛti. What are love and the rest to a contemplative man?

‘Virama’ in the śloka means virāma, cessation, i.e., abandonment. By the word, Adi, modifications in the form of substances are also included. Sometimes this also is said that Release takes place through discrimination between Puruṣa and Buddhi. Here Buddhi denotes both gross and subtle Buddhi, and thus includes Prakṛti also (which is the subtle state, the cause, of Buddhi). Otherwise, notwithstanding the discrimination of Buddhi from Puruṣa, there will still remain the possibility of misconception (abhīmāna) that Puruṣa is identical with Prakṛti.

It cannot be objected that, because one and all misconceptions (abhīmāna), such as, for example, ‘I am ignorant,’ etc., have Buddhi and the rest as their subject matter, there is, therefore, no proof of (the existence of such a thing as) misconception in regard to Prakṛti over and above misconception (abhīmāna) in regard to Buddhi and the rest. For, misconceptions (abhīmāna) in such cases as—

शुचा शुचा पुनः शुचि स्वर्गी द्वर्या मा ज नार्जी।

After each succeeding death, as I am born again, may I be a dweller in heaven, and not a dweller in hell.

cannot be accounted for, unless they refer to Prakṛti as their subject matter. For, none of the manifold effects, e.g., Buddhi, etc., after they are once past and gone, are created over again, and therefore, this birth or production after dissolution is of the Pradhāna (Prakṛti), and it consists in modification in the form of other Buddhi, etc., by the giving up of previous modifications in the form of Buddhi, etc.
Neither can it be asserted that the birth and death of Puruṣa also, in the form of conjunction with, and disjunction from, the linga-dārśa or subtle body, are paramārtha or ultimately true or transcendental (as opposed to phenomenal), and that, therefore, the consciousness of birth, etc., arising in the Self, cannot at all be a misconception (abhimaṇa).

For,

न आयते त्रिभूतः या कः बहुविदितः

नार्य भूता भविता या न मृयुःः।

(This, the Self) is never born nor does it ever die. Neither is it such that, once coming into being, it will pass away after a time and will come into being again.—Gita, II, 20.

by sayings like the above, birth, etc., are disproved (in the Self). There was no need of such negations unless these events (birth, etc.) were in some way connected with the Self. It follows, therefore, that the consciousness of birth, etc., arising in the Self, is of the form of abhimāna or assumption or transference to itself of the production and destruction (of something else i.e., the body, the senses, etc.).

Moreover, it is not possible to say that the self-identification (abhimāna) of Puruṣas with Buddhi, etc., is beginningless; because Buddhi, etc., are effects, and therefore, perishable. There must exist, therefore, some determining cause to explain and regulate the multifold cases of self-identification with the effects. Hence it is proved that self-identification with the cause of those effects (i.e. with Prakṛti), is alone the determining cause here desired; because so it is observed in the world, and because supposition (hypothesis) follows facts observed. E.g., from the assumption (abhimaṇa) of ownership of the field, arises the assumption (abhimaṇa) of ownership of the paddy etc., yielded by it, and from the assumption (abhimaṇa) of ownership of a piece of gold, arises the assumption (abhimaṇa) of ownership of the bracelet, etc. made of it, and by means of the cessation of the former, follows the cessation of the latter.

(There is, however, no further necessity for a determining cause of the mistake-abhimāna-about Prakṛti), on account of both the mistake about Prakṛti and the vāsanā or accumulating impression of it being beginningless, like seed and sprout.—57.

The Bondage of Puruṣa is merely verbal.

वास्तवं न हु तथवं चिन्ततेभिः: ॥१०५॥

वाक-मात्रं, more speech. - Na, not. y Tu, and.  onclick reality. सिद्धिः: Chitta-shīlā, because it resides in the chitta or mind.
58. The Bondage, etc. (of Puruṣa) are merely verbal, and not real, because they reside in the mind.—58.

Vṛtti.—Granted that Release comes through Viveka, Discrimination. Is it, Viveka, related (in the sense of inherence) to the Ātmā, Self or Puruṣa, or is it not? If it is related to the Ātmā, an impediment is thereby caused to the Kūṭasthā, undisturbed, or immutable nature of the Ātmā (as postulated in the Śaṃkhya Dārsana). If it is not so related, then, the application (of Viveka, as cause, to Release, as consequence) is too wide, (because Viveka, although it does not exist in Puruṣa, is all the same said to be the means of his obtaining freedom). To these objections the author replies:

(Viveka is) ‘related to the Ātmā’—this is a mere verbal statement. There is no true or material relation between them. And although they are unrelated, still, inasmuch as Viveka resides in the Chitta (Buddhi: Ahamkāra-Manas collectively), the assumption of Viveka as its own takes place, we will submit, in the Ātmā, owing to its close proximity to the Chitta.—58.

Bhāṣya.—Thus the four divisions of the subject-matter of the Śāstra are established. But there still remains this apprehension: Well, our opponent may say, if Bondage (at one time) and Release (at another time), Discrimination (at one time) and Non-discrimination (at another time) are admitted in Puruṣa, then, this is in contradiction to the assertion “Who is by nature, Eternal, and eternally Pure, Enlightened, and Unconfined” (vide aphorism 19 above), as well as to the Vedic declarations such as

न विरोधि न वेदांशिवं बदो न च साधक।
न समुच्चये दै तुष्व ह्येण्यम परमायर्यत॥

There is neither destruction, nor, again, production (of Puruṣa); (he is) neither bound, nor is, again, active (in the pursuit of freedom); he is neither desirous of release nor is, in fact, ever released. Such is the absolute truth.—Gautāpāda’s Māyukhya Kārikā, II. 18, Brahma-Bindu Upanis, 10.

The author removes this apprehension.

Because bondage and the rest reside in the chitta or mind alone, all of them are mere words in the case of, or as applied to, Puruṣa, being mere reflections like the redness (reflected) in the crystal (which is naturally white), and are not ‘tattvam,’ the natural state of Puruṣa, as is the unimputed redness of the China rose. Such is the meaning. Hence there is no contradiction to what has been stated before. This is the
import. On this point there is the authority of Vedic texts such as the following:

स समान रस्तु दुनियाहुरासति क्षतिसी तेषायती

He, being immutable, moves between the two worlds, as it thinks, as it desires, etc.
—Byhat Árayaka Upanisat, IV. iii. 7.

Puruśa is 'samāna' i.e., possesses the same form in the two worlds.
By the two words, 'iva,' as if, the manifoldness of form is declared to be due to upādhis or adjuncts or extraneous causes.

So has it been said:

बन्धनोत्तरी च सुरूवे अंहारपितम माययाः

स्वम् व्यायामः क्षति: सत्तिनः तु वास्तवः

Bondage and Release, Pleasure, Pain, and the Incidence of Bewilderment (Moha) by means of Māyā, are, like the manifestation of the Self in dream; Transmigration (Samsāra) is (due to Māyā and) not real.

"Māyā," by means of Māyā, due to Māyā, in the above, means, caused by the upādhi or external condition which is Prakṛti called Māyā.

Our opponent may ask: How then can the removal of Bondage which thus appears to be of minor importance, be a Puruśārtha, an object desired by Puruśa? How, again, on the admission of Bondage and Release being caused to Puruśa by the properties, namely, Discrimination and Non-discrimination, of another (i.e., Buddhī), there does not follow an absence of regularity, or certainty as in the case of their being caused by Karma, and the like?

Therefore we explain more in detail what has been almost completely explained before. Although Bondage in the form of conjunction of pain, and Discrimination and Non-discrimination in the form of functions, are of the Chitta or mind alone, still Puruśa's bhoga or suffering consists in the mere reflection of pain in him; hence, in spite of its non-reality, the removal thereof is a Puruśārtha, an object desired by Puruśa. So they pray: "Let me not suffer pain."

Similarly, under the influence of his vāsanā or desire for her, Prakṛti binds, by way of conjunction, that Puruśa alone to whom she has exhibited herself in the aspect of non-discrimination, and none else. Again, she sets free, by way of disjunction from her, that Puruśa alone to whom she has exhibited herself in the aspect of discrimination. (Release, then, depends) on the eradication of vāsanā or desire; hence regularity is obtained. While, on the admission of Bondage by means of Karma and the like, such regularity is not obtained. Because Karma and the like...
directly throw their reflections in Puruṣa, inasmuch as they lack the characteristic of being revealed by him who witnesses (sākṣi) them (i.e. Puruṣa).—58.

Bondage is not removable by mere Learning or Reasoning but by Spiritual Intuition of the truth about Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

59. (Bondage) is not to be removed by reasoning also, without direct vision of the truth, as is the case with one perplexed about the points of the compass.—59.

Vṛitti.—Let knowledge of Viveka, distinction of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, be obtained from Śravaṇa (hearing from Scriptures and preceptors) alone. What is the use of transcendental knowledge which can be realized only by the labour of successive births? To this the author replies:

The sense is clear.—59.

Bhāṣya:—But if Bondage etc., as applied to Puruṣa, are mere words, let their removal take place by śravaṇa, learning, or by manana, reasoning, (that such is the case). Why, then, in the Veda and the Smṛti, is there enjoined, as the cause of liberation, the discriminative knowledge (of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti) going the length of sākṣātkāra, or developed into, spiritual intuition of the truth?

* To this the author replies:

'Yuktiḥ' means mananam, thinking or reasoning. The word, 'āpi,' also, is intended to include śravaṇa, hearing, i.e., learning. Even the merely verbal Bondage, etc. of Puruṣa cannot be removed by mere learning and reasoning, without immediate cognition; as in the case of a person confused in regard to the points of the compass, the inversion of the directions in space, even though it is merely verbal, i.e., apparent or illusory, is not removed by hearing or by reasoning, without his realizing for himself, how the points of the compass really lie. Such is the meaning. And in the case of the subject-matter of the discourse, removeability is nothing but the cessation or disappearance of the idea of Bondage, etc. in Puruṣa, and not the immediate cognition of a non-being, because there does not exist even the possibility of the production of such cognition by hearing and the like.
Or, the aphorism may be explained as follows: By the aphorism: The removal thereof takes place from a determinate cause (Aphorism 56), it, discriminative knowledge, has been declared to be the eradicator of non-discrimination. Now, is that knowledge commonly derived from hearing, etc. or is there any peculiarity in it? There being room for this further enquiry, the author enunciates the present aphorism beginning with 'Yuktitaḥ api.' The meaning is that non-discrimination, ‘na bādhyaḥ,’ is not removed, ‘yuktitaḥ,’ by reasoning nor by learning, without direct vision of the discrimination (viveka) of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti; like the confusion about the points of the compass; because it is the perception of a particular intuition that alone can remove an error in respect of that intuition.—59.

Note:—For example, a man with the jaundice perceives white objects as if they were yellow. He may infer that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white; or he may believe the testimony of a friend that it is white; but still nothing will remove his erroneous perception of yellowness in the chalk except a direct perception of its whiteness.—Ballantyne.

Inference also is a pramāṇa or instrument of right knowledge.

60. The knowledge of imperceptible things is by means of inference, as is that of fire by means of smoke, etc.—60.

Vṛitti.—If it be urged that, 'that Prakṛiti and the rest exist or that they evolve in the order of Mahat and so forth, is not seen, (and that they, therefore, neither exist nor evolve); so the author says:

It would have been so, were Pratyakṣa, Perception, the only pramāṇa, means or measure of knowledge, and not Anumāṇa, Inference, etc. For, although Prakṛiti and the rest are not objects of preception, their existence is nevertheless established by the form of inference known as Sāmānyato Dṛṣṭa or generally seen (Vide I. 103. below).—60.

Bhāṣya:—Having thus, then, established that Release results from the direct vision of the discrimination (between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), the next thing to be demonstrated is viveka or discrimination. This being the topic, at the beginning thereof, Pramāṇas or Proofs are being recited, with a view to establish Prakṛiti, Puruṣa, and the rest as different entities.
... 'A-chākṣusāpām' means, of things not cognizable by the senses. There are many objects such as the gross elements, their products, e.g., the body, and so forth, which are verily proved to exist by sense-perception. Of those that are not proved by sense-perception, namely, Prakṛiti, Puruṣa, etc., the knowledge, i.e., cognitive proof, the fruit of which appertains to Puruṣa (Puruṣa-niṣṭha-phala-siddhi), is brought about by that form of Pramāṇa which is called anumāna or inference; as fire is proved to exist (where it is not directly perceptible) by the inference occasioned by the smoke and such other signs. Such is the meaning.

Moreover, it is to be understood that what is not established even by inference, is established by the Revelation or Scripture. It is because this Sāmkhya-Śāstra is principally built on Inference, that Inference alone has been mentioned in this aphorism by way of pre-eminence only, and not that there is no need of Revelation in this Śāstra. For, thus says the Kārikā:

शास्त्रमहतः हृदयविद्विषयाणि प्रतिविद्युतमानं।
तत्त्वाविवर्णा बालिका परेशामातगमाम् सिद्धम्॥

The knowledge of super-sensible objects is obtained from Śāmānyato Driśa Inference; what is not proved even by this and is imperceptible, is proved from Revelation.—Sāmkhya-Kārikā, Verse VI.

From this aphorism it is found that this Śāstra is a Manana-śāstra or a rational system.—60.

The Twenty-five Principals: the order of their evolution and their inter-relation as cause and effect.

स्त्रवज्ञमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृति: प्रत्तेतिहाः स्व-
तोडिकारो सुस्कारत पञ्च तन्मात्रायुपयमिद्विंशियः तन्मात्रस्ते:
स्थ्यज्ञांतानि पुरुष स्वत: इति पञ्चविषयं सति:॥ १।६।१॥

सत्त्व-रजस-तमसार्यं Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, the three essential constituents of Prakṛiti. साम्य-स्थात्त्वात्, the state of equilibrium or quiescence. प्रकृति: Prakṛiti, Prakṛiti, the Prime Cause. प्रकृति: Prakṛiti, from Prakṛiti. भगव महात, Mahat, the Great One. भगव: Mahat, from Mahat. धातृशाक्ती: Ahamkāra, Ahamkara, the I-maker, Egoity. धातृशाक्ती: Ahamkāra, from Ahamkāra. धातृशाक्ती: Pañcha, five. तन्मात्रा: Tan-mātra, Tan-mātras, Essences, Subtle elements. तन्मात्रा: Ubhayam, both. तन्मात्रा: Indriyam, sense, faculty, power. तन्मात्रा: Tan-mātrabhaya, from the Tan-mātras. पुरुष-पुरुष, Spirit, Self. पुरुष: Iti, such. पुरुष: Pañcha-vimāṇa, twenty-five. पुरुष: Gauḍa class, group.
61. Prakṛiti is the state of quiescence of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. From Prakṛiti, (evolves) Mahat; from Mahat, Ahamkāra; from Ahamkāra, the five Tan-mātras and the two sets of Indriyas; from the five Tan-mātras, the gross elements. (Then there is) Puruṣa. Such is the group of the twenty-five (Principles).—61.

Vṛitti.—The author sets forth the order of evolution of Prakṛiti and the rest:

Although Prakṛiti is the state of equipoise of the three, yet, it is conventional to apply the term Prakṛiti to every one of them also. Mahat denotes Buddhi Tattva, the Principle called Buddhi, the substance of Buddhi or Intelligence. Ahamkāra denotes Abhimāna, Self-assumption, Self-attribution, the I-maker, the substance of individual personality. The five Tan-mātras (That-only), essences, or universals, are Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour, and Smell.

Two-fold Indriyas or Instruments are, externally, five Instruments of Action, called Voice, Hands, Feet, Anus and the Genitals, and five Instruments of Cognition, called Ear, Skin, Eye, Tongue, and Nose, and, internally, Manas or mind, of perception as well as of action.

The Sthūla-Bhūtas, gross elements, are Ether, Air, Fire, Water, and Earth. It should be understood that these also are evolved from the five Tan-mātras. The word, Sthūla, is indicative, and includes Sūksma, fine or subtle, elements also. The mention of Puruṣa is for the purpose of completing the number of (the twenty-five) Tattvas, and not for showing the order of evolution, seeing that the Ātma is eternal.—61.

Vedāntin Mahādeva: Sattva, etc are substances, as the qualities of lightness, etc. inhere in them. That the word, Guṇa (which ordinarily means quality), is still applied to them, is because they serve the purpose of Puruṣa. Prakṛiti is this triad of Guṇas, and not a different entity which is their substratum, as it will be declared later on (VI. 39) that Sattva, etc., are not the attributes of ṛapṛiti but her very form. State of equipoise denotes absence of dissolution in the relation of more or less, in other words, existence in the state of producing no effects. So that, it comes to this that the triad of Guṇas, in so far as it stands apart from effects, is Prakṛiti. And this is the definition of Mūla Prakṛiti, Root Evolvent. The definition of Prakṛiti as a general term is that Prakṛiti is that which is the material cause of another Tattva (as Buddhi is of Ahamkāra).
BOOK I, SŪTRA 61.

Bhāṣya:—Now follows an aphorism enumerating together all the Predicables which are subversive of, and subservient to, (the immediate cognition of) the discrimination (between Puruṣa and Prakṛti) established by the proofs stated above: wherein the author also exhibits the relation of cause and effect (amongst them) which will subserve the inference to be stated in the sequel.

Sattva, etc., (i. e. Rajas and Tamas) are substances, and not Guṇas in the Vaiśeṣika sense of the word, i. e., are not qualities or attributes, because they admit of conjunction and disjunction, and also because they possess the properties of lightness, activity, weight etc., (whereas the Guṇas, attributes, of the Vaiśeṣikas do not themselves possess attributes, and are not independent causes of conjunctions and disjunctions, vide Kaṇḍā-Śūtram I. i 16, S. B. H. Vol. VI. page 28). In this, Śāṅkhya, Śāstra and in the Veda, etc., the word, Guṇa, is employed to denote them (Sattva, etc.), because they exist only to serve the ends of Puruṣa (and are, therefore, of secondary importance), and also because they form the cord, (as it were), namely Mahat, etc., which essentially consist of the three Guṇas, and which bind the brute-beast, (so to speak), Puruṣa.

Note.—The different meanings of the word, Guṇa, that are referred to here, are quality, A-pradhāna, not-principal, secondary, subordinate, and cord. It may also be that Sattva etc., are called Guṇas, not-principals, because that which is constituted by them, namely, Prakṛti, is called Pradhāna, the Principal.—Vide Tattva-Śamāsa, Aphorism 5, Commentary.

Of these, i.e., the substances Sattva, etc., (Prakṛti is) "Śāntya-avastha", the state of being neither less nor more, (one than another), in other words, the state of not being combined together in the relation of less and more, that is to say, the state of not being developed into effects. Prakṛti is the genus of the Guṇas characterised by the state of not becoming an effect. Such is the meaning. For, on the appearance of the state of inequilibrium in the genus of the Guṇas characterised by the state of not becoming an effect, there is entailed the disappearance of Prakṛti. And, further, all the Guṇas individually are said to possess the nature of Prakṛti in such texts of the Smṛiti as the following:—

सर्व रजस्तमस्तति पर्नेच्च महत: सत्त्वः।
पर्नेच्च सहस्रविशेषतयाः: पारे परं ज्ञात इ। ॥

Sattva, Rajas, Tamas: it is every one of them that is Prakṛti at every moment. It is every one of them that is the transmigration or worldly life of living beings. Beyond it lies the supreme abode.

The word, genus, in "Prakṛti is the genus...effect" above, is intended to include Sattva, etc. The word, Guṇa, is used in order to exclude Puruṣa from the scope of the definition. And the phrase,
characterised etc. excludes Mahat, etc., for Mahat &c., which are forms of Sattva etc. modified into effects, also become Guṇas or subsidiaries, being subservient to Puruṣa.

Here, then, only the svarūpa, the essential form or intrinsic nature, of Prakṛiti has been declared. The specific forms of Prakṛiti will, however, be stated just now. The effect or product of Prakṛiti is ‘Mahan,’ i.e., the Tattva, Reality or Principle, called Mahat.

The intrinsic nature and the specific forms of Mahat, etc. are being stated.

The product of Mahat is Āhamkāra. The product of Āhamkāra is two fold: the Tan-mātras and the two sets of Indriyas. Of these, the two sets of Indriyas, being divided into external and internal ones, are of eleven kinds. The products of the Tan-mātras are the five gross elements. By the use of the word, gross, it is admitted that the Tan-mātras are the subtle elements. Puruṣa, on the other hand, is characterised neither as effect nor as cause.

Such, then, are the ‘pañchavimśati gaṇaḥ,’ the (twenty-five-fold) array of Predicables. The meaning is that, over and above these, there is no Predicable. Or, the word, gaṇa, declares the infiniteness of the individual manifestations of Sattva, etc.

And these twenty-five members of the class are of the form of substance and nothing else. Attribute, Action, Genus, etc. (i.e., Species, and Combination, for instance, of the Vaiśeṣikas), however, are really included in these, there being no difference between a property and the thing of which it is a property. For, did there exist Predicables in addition to the above, it would have been necessary to discriminate Puruṣa from them also, and consequently the non-enumeration of them would have been a defect.

Hereby it is shown that the wild talk of the stupid that the Sāṃkhya do admit an indefinite number of Predicables, is worth of no serious attention.

Dik, (direction in) Space, and Kāla, Time, again, are nothing but Ākāśa, Ether (?), as we shall find from a future aphorism (II. 12) that Space and Time are determinate forms of Ākāśa.

It follows herefrom that, by means of their inclusion and non-inclusion amongst themselves, the Predicables have been taught to be only one in number in some System (e.g., the Vedānta), six in another System (e.g., the Vaiśeṣika), sixteen in yet another System (e.g., the Nyāya), and by other numbers in other Systems. It should be remarked, however...
that their individual distinction consists merely in the possession of similar and dissimilar properties. Thus has it been declared in the Bhagavatam:

Prakriti

Even in a single Tattva, Principle or Reality, be it anterior or posterior, all the other Tattvas are found to be included. For this reason, the Rigis have made various enumerations of the Tattvas. All are justified, being based on reason. What does not become a learned man?

And these Predicables have been enumerated in the Srutis also:

e.g.,

(a) in the Garbha Upanisat (Verse 3)

There are eight Prakritis and sixteen Vikaras or Transformations.

(b) in the Prasa Upanisat (IV, 8) also:

Earth and the fine part of Earth.

(c) and in the Maitreya Upanisat, etc.

Note:—The entire passage of the Prasaa Upanisat, from which Vijiana Bhikshu has made the above quotation, may be transcribed here with advantage:

X X X X X kramantah sarve samvartitah sarvam II II

X X X X X

yada sa vai vyantah vairita duhsta samvartita II 7 II

pravritti v pravritwam cha bhavacya kramantah va tayas tattvam cha vaasvam kalam vachya kramantah va duuhi prabha yam cha prabha cha yam cha tattvam cha kramantah va
dhruvam vachyam cha vakam vachyam cha vaasvam cha bhavacya kramantah va

dhruvam vachyam cha tattvam cha kramantah va

paribhajita vachyam cha vachyam cha tattvam cha kramantah va

par hare yatra bhavacya kramantah sarva vajrayat vajrayana

par hare yatra bhavacya kramantah sarva vajrayat vajrayana

Question by Gargya: In whom are all things firmly established?

Answer by Pippalada: As the birds, O Calm One, rest secure on their dwelling tree, so does verily all that is existent, rest secure in the Higher Self: Earth and the fine parts (Makara) of Earth, Water and the fine parts of Water, Fire and the fine parts of Fire, Air and the fine parts of Air, Åkkha and the fine parts of Åkkha, the Eye and the object of seeing, the Ear and the object of hearing, the Nose and the object of smelling, the Tongue and the object of tasting, the Skin and the object of touching, the Voice and that which is
to be said, the Hands and that which is to be grasped, the Genitals and the pleasure of love, the Anus and that which is to be excreted, the Feet and the place to go to, Manas and the object of thinking, Buddhi and the object of ascertaining, Ahamkara and the object of Ahamkara, Chitta and the object of consciousness, Light and the object of illumination, Prapa and that, which is to be supported by it.

Verily this Purusa who is knowledge itself, is the seer, touched, hearer, smell, taster, thinker, ascertainer, does. He stands firm on the Supreme, Immutable Self.

Moreover, the eight Prakritis have been explained by the Karika (Verse 3):

मुखमृक्षितविद्यिताद्वया प्रकृतिविद्यतया सतः

वेपुष्कलसु विकारै न प्रकृतिर्न विभिन्न पुरुषः

Prakriti, the Root, is not an evolute. Mahat and the seven following are both evolvents and evolutes. Evolute is sixteen fold. That which is neither an evolvent nor an evolute, is Purusa.

It is, however, a common saying in the Srutis and the Smritis that reality is one and one only, without a second. But this unity is obtained by the absorption of all other realities in Purusa, on the principle of the identity of the energy and that which possesses the energy. Hence there is no conflict (between our teaching and the teaching of the Sruiti and the Smruti).

Absorption (laya), moreover, means involution or existence in a subtle form, and not annihilation. So has it been said:

आधिबीज्ञाननामवायायं वक्षेताविभिक्तक्षिपतम्

There were knowledge and object of knowledge, absolutely one and undivided.

'Avikalpi tam,' unelaborated, means undivided. And this has been established in detail in our Commentary on the Vedanta in connection with the doctrine of Advaita or Non-duality.

There is, however, a difference, and it is this: In the theistic theory, in consequence of the non-differentiation of all other realities therein (i.e. in Isvara, the Lord), it is Isvara-chaitanyaam, Divine Consciousness, that is the only reality. In the non-theistic (nir-Isvara, God-less, i.e. which does not invoke divine intervention in the affairs of man and the world) theory, on the other hand, Mahat and the rest, remaining undivided like the confluence of three streams, are not differentiated in the Kṣetra, the Immutable (i.e., Purusa or Pure Consciousness in which nothing can enter from the outside), in the Sākṣa or subtle form or state called Paurākriti, just as the orb of light is not differentiated in the solar orb and, consequently, it is the Self that is the only one reality. This the author will teach afterwards by the aphorism (L. 154):

वाराहं दिविरेष्य आत्मविद्यताय || २ || १९५ ||

There is no conflict with the Sruiti declaring non-duality, because the reference is to the genus of Self.—61.
Proof of the existence of the Tan-mātras.

62. (Knowledge of the existence) of the five Tan-mātras is (by inference) from the Gross (Elements).—62.

Vṛtti.—For the purpose of the inference of cause from effect, the author takes them in the reverse order.

Knowledge of the five Tan-mātras, is obtained from the gross, i.e., the five gross elements as their effects, and as having the forms of being Śānta, pacific, Ghora, terrific, and Mūḍha, stupid, according to the differences of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas.—62.

Bhāṣya:—The author, by a number of aphorisms, establishes the knowledge, by means of inference, of those amongst the above Predicables, which are not objects of direct observation.

The word, knowledge, comes down from the 60th aphorism above. 'Gross' denotes nothing but whatever is visible, i.e., directly perceptible. And it has been declared to be the effect or product of the Tan-mātras. By the inference of the Tan-mātras as the cause thereof, from the Gross Elements as the effect, knowledge, discriminative of the Gross, arises. Such is the meaning.

In order that it may belong to Ākāśa, Ether, in common (with Earth, etc.), grossness here denotes the possession of an attribute cognisable by the external senses, or the possession of the Višeṣa or distinctions of Śānta, pacific, etc.

And the Tan-mātras are fine substances, the undifferentiated (a-višeṣa) originals of the Gross Elements, which form the substratum of Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour, and Smell, belonging to that class (that is, in that stage of their evolution) in which the distinctions of Śānta etc., do not exist. So we find from the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa and other sources, e.g.,

तिर्यंतित्वर्गस्य तन्मात्रासेवनवस्तप्ता स्वूताः

In them severally reside their parts (mātrās), wherefore the Smṛiti describes them as Tan (their)-mātrās (part). They are neither Śānta, pacific, nor Ghora, terrific, nor, again, Mūḍha, stupifying, but are Indistinguishable.—Viṣṇu Purāṇa, I. ii. 32.

The meaning of the above śloka is this: In all these elements, exist the parts thereof. This being the case, and there being no
distinction between a property and its subject, the Smṛiti speaks of the substances also as Tan-mātras. And these Predicables are devoid of the distinctions of Sound, etc. belonging to the Gross, and called as Śanta, Ghora, and Mūḍha, because they are all of one form. The import, therefore, is that when the Elements appear as the Tan-mātras of Sound, etc. all that the expression means is that they possess Sound, etc. devoid of the distinction of Śanta, etc. Hence they are designated as Indistinguishables.

Śanta means pleasurable, Ghora, painful, and Mūḍha, stupefying. And the Tan-mātras, being enjoyable to the gods and the like alone, are simply pleasurable, as the element of pleasure predominates in them.

Here the process of inference is as follows: The Gross Elements, arrived at the extreme limit of descent, must, on account of their grossness, have, as do a water-pot, a piece of cloth, etc., as their material cause, substances possessing the distinctive attributes of their own. The subject of inference is not at all pushed further than the Subtle, as, otherwise, the result would be non-finality.

An argument favourable to the above inference, is that, in the absence of any counteracting agent, the production of the attributes of the effect according to the attributes of the cause, is irresistible.

The Veda and the Smṛiti also confirm the above inference.

There is, on the other hand, objection to the possession of Sound, Touch, etc. by Prakṛiti; e.g., numerous passages in Viṣṇu Purāṇa, etc., such as the following:

शास्त्रानां धार्मिकानां तद्वपत्तित्वात्।
विषयुर्वं तत्राध्यात्मनिदात्र्यत्न्यः॥

It (Prakṛiti) is devoid of Sound and Touch, and is unconnected with Form and the like. It is constituted by the three Guṇas, is the origin of the world, and is without production, development and destruction.

The impediments to the possession of Sound, Touch, etc. by Buddhi and Ahaṁkāra, again, are the texts of the Veda and Smṛiti which declare that they are the causes of the Bhūtas, gross and subtle elements. For the mark of an element is this, and nothing else, that it possesses a distinctive attribute belonging to the class cognizable by the external senses. Whence it would follow that if Buddhi and Ahaṁkāra possessed Sound, etc., they too would be elements, and consequently the causes of themselves, which is impossible.

In the absence of Form, etc. in the causal substances, what, it may be asked, is the cause of Form, etc. of the Tan-mātras? We would reply
that it is nothing but specific conjunctions in different combinations amongst the causal substances themselves, as we find that the conjunction of turmeric and lime is the cause of redness, etc., appearing in the substance originated by them jointly.

When, in accordance with the facts of observation, it is quite possible for the conjunctions themselves amongst the causes of the substance which give support to them, to be the cause of Form, etc., the supposition of Form in the ultimate atoms made by the Logicians (e.g., the Vaiṣeṣika), is not justifiable. Nor is it a rule with them also that only the attributes of homogeneous causes can originate attributes in the effects. For, we may point out, they also admit that the only cause of the increased volume of a triad of atoms is the plurality of their parts, etc.

The inference of the Indriyas (Powers of cognition and action), again, is, like the inference of Ākāśa, made by means of their functions, e.g., sight, touch, speech, etc. which are directly perceptible. Hence it has not been stated here. The subject under treatment is only the inference of the Tattvas or Principles, one by means of another. Hence the exclusion of the Indriyas is not a defect.

In the matter of the production of the Tan-mātrās, the process described in the Commentary on Yoga should alone be accepted. Thus, the Tan-mātra of Sound is produced from Ahaṃkāra; then, from the Tan-mātra of Sound, accompanied by Ahaṃkāra, is produced the Tan-mātra of Touch, possessing the attributes of Sound and Touch. In a similar order, the (other) Tan-mātras are produced by the addition of one attribute at each step.

In the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (I. ii. 38), wo, however, find:

शाक्तास्तु विकारणं वस्तार्थं सर्वं हि
कस्तवानवस्थायुतस्य स्वाभो भवेत् य यो न एव

While spreading out the modification of Ākāśa, He (the Creator) created pure Touch, (the Tan-mātra of Touch). Vāyu, Air, became dominant, and it is held that Touch is its attribute.

So, it has been declared there that the creation of the Tan-mātras of Touch, etc. proceeds from the four Gross elements of Ākāśa and the rest (excluding Earth). But this is not really the case. For, the creation mentioned there, should be understood in the sense of transformation (paripāmaṇa) by the form of the elements. For, the Gross elements beginning with Ākāśa and ending with Water transform the Tan-mātras appertaining to them individually, by the form of their respective succeeding element, by means of their predominance over them.—62.
Proof of Ahamkāra.

बाह्यान्तरार्थ्य तैशाःकारस्य ॥ ६२ ॥

वैद्यक्यताः—Bāhya (external)-Abhyantara (internal)-bhyāra (by), by the external and internal ones, i.e., Indriyas or Powers of cognition and action. ताः—Taiḥ, by them, i.e., the Tan-mātras. Cha, as well as. अहंकारस्याः, of Ahamkāra.

63. (The knowledge of the existence) of Ahamkāra is (by inference) by means of the external and internal ones as well as by them.—63.

Vṛtti:—Knowledge of Ahamkāra is derived by means of the external and the internal, that is, Indriyas or Instruments, as well as of those, that is, the five Tan-mātras, as its effects.—63.

Bhāṣya:—The meaning is that the knowledge of Ahamkāra arises by inference of it as the cause, by means of the external and internal Indriyas as well as by means of the five Tan-mātras, as its effects.

Now, Ahamkāra is a substance which serves as an antah-karaṇa or internal instrument, and of which the function is abhimāna, thinking with reference to itself, assumption of everything to itself, conceit. It is not merely abhimāna, because, in the world, we find that it is substances only that can be the material cause of other substances. Moreover, in the state of dreamless sleep, etc., because the cessation of the function of Ahamkāra would entail the annihilation of the Elements, the existence, therefore, is proved of a substance called Ahamkāra simply as the seat of vāsanā, desire or the resultant tendency of accumulated experience.

The process of inference here is as follows: The Tan-mātras and the Indriyas have the substance, possessing abhimāna, as their material cause, because they are substances which are the products of Abhimāna; whatever is not thus (i.e., constituted by Ahamkāra), is not thus (i.e., a product of abhimāna), as, for instance, Puruṣa etc.

It cannot be said that a substance possessing abhimāna, self-assumption, is itself unproved; as there is proof of it by its being the material cause of such modifications as, e.g., ‘I am fair’ etc., as is the case with the eye, etc., and, by the same inference, it can be proved that, that which is other than Manas, etc., is the cause of such modifications.

Here there is favourable argument also. E.g.

बहू स्वयं मध्यायेत्

I shall be many, I shall procreate.—Chhāndoga Upaniṣad, VI. 11. 8.
From such texts of the Veda and Smṛiti, it appears that the creation of the Elements and all the rest is preceded by abhimāna or impersonation, and hence abhimāna is proved as the cause of creation which is preceded by acts of intelligence. And, for the sake of simplicity, the causality of abhimāna in creation is conceived as arising by means of mere proximity in the form of combination in one and the same object.

But, if this be the case, (i.e., if objects are made of Āhaṃkāra), then, since the Āhaṃkāra of the potter would be the material cause of the water-pot, the water-pot made by him would disappear, when the potter obtains release, and, consequently, his Antaḥ-karaṇa disappears, and this is not reasonable, because, (after the death of the potter), another Puruṣa recognises that this is that same water-pot.

To this we reply that it is not so, because, on the release of the potter from his antaḥ-karaṇa, there is an end only of that particular transformation which could be the cause of the worldly experience of the released Puruṣa, but not an end of transformation in general, nor of antaḥ-karaṇa in its pure form or essence (svaṛūpā), because, in the Yoga aphorism (II. 22),

इत्यादिप्रति प्रकट वास्मयन्ति सवर्णसाधारकवचात् || २ ||

"Although destroyed in relation to him whose objects have been achieved, it is not destroyed, being common to others."—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. IV. page 138.

it has been proved that the equipment of an emancipated Puruṣa may also become the means of accomplishing the objects of other Puruṣas.

Or, let the Āhaṃkāra of Hiranya-Garbha (the one appearing in the Golden-Cosmic-Egg, i.e., Brahmā, the Creator) be the cause in the case of the water-pot etc., also, and not the Āhaṃkāra of the potter, etc. Even, then, the application of the general law being so extended, there would be no violation of any particular law, because it is collective Buddhī, etc., that has been established, in the Purāṇas and in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga, as being the material cause of Creation, and not distributed Buddhī, etc., which are their parts; as, for example, the characteristic of being the material cause of movable and immovable objects, belongs to the Great Earth (the Element of Earth as a whole) alone, and not to clods of earth, pebbles, etc. which are its parts—63.

Proof of Antaḥ-karaṇa.

तेनान्तःकराणस्य ॥ २ ॥

Note—Tena, thereby. तेनान्तः Antaḥ-karaṇasya, of the inner instrument.

64. The proof of Antaḥ-karaṇa is by means of Āhaṃkāra.—64.
Vṛtti.—Knowledge of the Antāḥ-kāraṇa (the inner sense), that is, Buddhi, is derived (by inference) from that, that is, Ahamkāra, as its effect.—64.

Bhāṣya.—The meaning is that the knowledge of the Antāḥ-kāraṇa, i.e., the principal Antāḥ-kāraṇa, namely Buddhi, called Mahat, as the cause thereof, is by inference by the mark of Ahamkāra, as its effect. The application of the process of inference here is as follows: The substance, Ahamkāra, must have, for its material cause, a substance possessing the function of nischaraya, ascertainment or certainty, because it is a substance which is the product of certainty; that which is not so, is not so, as Purusā, etc.

Here the following argument also should be understood. Every man, without exception, having first ascertained the essential nature of an object, after that, thinks with reference to himself by such forms as, “This is I,” “This ought to be done by me,” etc. So much is quite settled. Now, in the present instance, some cause of the substance called Ahamkāra being looked for, since the relation of cause and effect subsists between the two functions (of nischaraya and abhimāna), it is assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that the relation of cause and effect also subsist between the two substances which give support to them, because the occurrence of a function of the effect follows, as a matter of course, from the occurrence of a function of the cause.

In the Veda also there are texts, such as,

इसौमित्रेः
He looked round etc.—Bṛihat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣat, I, iv. 2.

सत्वीतः
This the same Deity saw etc.—Chāndogya Upaniṣat, VI, ii. 2,
from which we learn that it is from the Buddhi alone, produced at the beginning of Creation, that all subsequent Creation proceeds.

Although the Antāḥ-kāraṇa is one and one only, still for simplicity’s sake, it is treated as being threefold according to diversity of functions. Thus says the Linga Purāṇa:

शुचासैं जाधवने महापां गाहुरूपम् ॥
सोत महाद्विन विधे य पत्रसंविषयेः

Disturbance of the Gupas (Bṛniśva, etc.) having been produced, Mahat came to light. Mahat should also be known as Manas. It is one, but possesses a variety of functions.

In the Vedanta Sūtras (II. iv. 12) also we find:

पञ्चविषयंशमस्मयचकोल्पवेलये ॥ २ । २ ॥ १ ॥

“The chief Prāpa is designated as having five functions like the Manas.”—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V. page 465.
In a similar manner, by taking the case of Prāṇa as an example, the manifoldness of Manas also is proved according to the diversity of functions only.

(The phrase, for simplicity's sake, above, is now being explained.) Otherwise, as by means of the functions of ascertainmment, etc., so also by means of the functions of error, doubt, sleep, anger, etc., etc., quite an infinite number of Antaḥ-karaṇas would have to be admitted, at the rate of one Antaḥ-karaṇa for each function.

Moreover, the use of the words, Manas, etc., irrespective of (the three-fold distinction herein recognised of) Buddhi, etc., cannot be justified on the System of Patañjali or on any other System of Thought. Still, as in the case of the knots in a bamboo, an order of succession as well as the relation of cause and effect have been declared amongst the threefold Antaḥ-karaṇas, by taking the minor distinctions in them into consideration, that is, it should be observed, following the terminology given in those texts of the Veda and Smṛiti which subserves the System of Yoga. Thus is it declared in the Yoga Vāsiṣtha Rāmāyaṇam:

वद्वर्गेऽवश्यः वेपतो विचालम् वेदनात्मकः ।
पत्रारिहतःस्वाद्वादो हीर्यः विशम नहतं ॥
एतस्मात् प्रयोगः ध्वेरृविविधतात्मनावाहिर्वनिर्बस्तिः ।
विध्यालया विनास्कारो दुहनिर्विकस्येव ॥
वस्य बुद्धिमिथात्सर्वं बाहुरस्व प्रसीनता ।
सेतुप्रत्यक्षी तत्वाविषेधोपत्योत्तमिनां ॥

This, that which is called Chitta-ātmā (the Self reduced to the form of Chitta), of which the nature is consciousness or to feel, wherein takes place the manifestation of the object, Ahaś, the "I", know it, O great thinker, to be the seed of this Tree of Chitta. From this, as it first breaks up, issues forth a sprout of quite a novel form; certainty is its nature, and it is formless; it is designated as Buddhi. What appears as the fullness of this sprout of which the designation is Buddhi, which (fullness) possesses the form of asākta or thinking, of this the designations are Chitta, Chotā, and Manas.

The 'object, Aliam,' is a general term for Antaḥ-karaṇa, (i.e., does not denote Ahaṃkāra alone).

In the above extract it has been declared by the maxim of the seed and the sprout, that the different states called Chitta, etc., are, by the forms of functions merely, three successive transformations of the Tree of Antaḥ-karaṇa which is one and one only.

In the Śāṅkhya Śāstra, again, Chitta of which the function is thinking, is included in Buddhi itself. Whereas in the above passage Ahaṃkāra is included in Buddhi,—64.
Proof of Prakṛiti.

65. (The knowledge) of Prakṛiti is (by inference) from Mahat.—65.

Vṛtti:—Knowledge of Prakṛiti is obtained from that, that is, Mahat Tattva, as the effect.—65.

Bhāṣya:—The meaning is that knowledge of Prakṛiti is, by inference as the cause, from that, i.e., Mahat Tattva, as the effect.

That Antaḥ-karaṇa in general is also an effect, is proved, according to the authority of the Veda and Smṛti, in this way that, since cognitions belonging to all the five senses do not appear at one and the same time, therefore, it must be the required intermediate transformation, just like the body, etc.

The application of the process of inference that it is an effect of Prakṛiti, is as follows: Buddhī possessing the properties of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, must be the product of a substance which possesses the properties of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, because, whilst it is an effect, it is of the nature of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment; like lovely women.

The argument favourable to the above inference is this that the attributes of an effect can properly be accounted for only in accordance with the attributes of its cause. The Veda and Smṛti also, it should be observed, support the above inference.

But, our opponent may say, there is no proof that Pleasure, etc. inhere in objects, the feeling being “I am happy” and the like. How then can objects such as a lovely woman, etc., be cited as examples?

Such, we say in reply, is not the case. By the fact that objects are the products of Buddhī the essence of which is Pleasure, etc. as well as by the feeling of “the pleasure of a garland”, “the pleasure of sandal paste”, etc., it is proved that objects also possess the properties of Pleasure, etc. There is besides the authority of the Veda and Smṛti. Moreover, that thing alone is conceived as having Pleasure, etc., as its material cause, which is always found to be present or absent according as Pleasure, etc., are present or absent. To take them as instrumental causes, and then to suppose something else as the material cause, would involve two suppositions which would be superfluous.

Further, a permanent element of Pleasure, common to all Paraśas, is proved to exist in all objects by means of their agreement with one another.
And by the fact of recognition. — For the apprehension of this Pleasure we have made an elaborate supposition of functions, their laws, and the like, which, however, conveys no fault in our System, having been made with reference to the results. Otherwise, a whole consisting of parts would not be proved by recognition, as the supposition of its cause (parts), etc., would be redundant.

The existence of Pleasure, etc., in objects also has been declared in the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa:

तद्यत्र वेतस्वपनापि देहे
सुखालि हुङ्गालि च ्कि ममात् ॥

Let pleasures and pains exist in the mind or in the body; what is that to me?

The perception “I am happy,” etc., again, like the perception “I am rich,” etc., has for its subject matter the relation called the relation of the thing owned and the owner thereof (i.e., an extrinsic relation and not an intrinsic one). For the purpose of dispelling the error that these perceptions have the relation of inference for their subject matter, Puruṣa is differentiated in the Śāstras from the perceptions “I am happy,” “I feel pain,” and “I am bewildered.”

Sound, etc., are treated as having the nature of pleasure, etc., because they combine in one and the same object (e.g., Ether, etc.,) with them. Or, let Pleasure be present immediately in sound, etc., as would follow from the proofs cited above.

The theory that Pleasure, etc., appertaining to the objects, are capable of being apprehended by Buddhi alone, is made on the strength of what actually takes place. What, on the other hand, is manifested in dreamless sleep, etc., when there is no contact with objects, as the Sattvic (consisting of Sātva) Pleasure of tranquillity or peacefulness, the very same is the property of Buddhi, the Pleasure of the Self.

Although the Vaiśeṣika and other Logicians formulate different theories regarding the order of the succession of causes and effects in the fabric of Creation, still the system inferred by us should alone be accepted by those who seek Release, because it is supported by a large number of the texts of the Veda and Smṛiti, and because the inferences of others are weak in consequence of the insecurity of their foundation. For this reason, mere reasoning, on account of the defect of non-finality, involved in it, has been refuted by the Vedānta Sūtra (II. i. 11):

सक्तैतत्स्वपनापि ॥ २ ॥ ११ ॥

(If it be said that) there being no finality about reasoning, (it is always possible to infer the truth of the opposite; we say “no,” for then the undesirable consequences
So has it been declared by Manu also:

चार्पं चर्मावेदिः च बैद्धाचार्याविवेचित्ति ।
व्यर्थः प्राद्वा सांस्कृते पर्यं वेदः सूक्तः ॥ १२ ॥ १०६ ॥

He knows Dharma (Right Conduct, in the widest sense), and none else, who can bring arguments, not in conflict with the Veda and the Sūtras, to bear upon the teachings of the Bhāsya (Sūtra) about Dharma.—Manu Samhitā, Ch. XII., st. 106.

It has been thus declared that it is reasoning which is not in conflict with the Veda, that alone can be the means of ascertaining objects. Therefore, it follows from passages like

ओशोऽ मुद्यिताक्रेयम् मस्तविषयपरमितः ।

(Truth about the Self) should be heard (i.e., learnt) from the words of the Veda, and reasoned out by means of arguments. (And after having been reasoned out, it should be constantly meditated upon. These, hearing, reasoning, and meditation are the causes of the vision of truth.)

that it is manana, reasoning, the object of which is similar to that of dravana, hearing, (i.e., is Vedic), is strong, whereas the reasoning of others in other forms is weak.

The hint is given here that the inference of the existence of Pleasure, Pain, etc., in Puruṣa also, by means of the (seeming) possession of Pleasure, Pain, etc., is, in like manner, weak, on account of its conflict with a large number of the texts of the Veda and Smṛti.

The distinctive peculiarity (vidēṣa) appertaining to Prakṛiti, we shall expound in the sequel.—65.

Proof of Puruṣa.

संहितपरार्थस्वातु पुन्यस्य ॥ १ ॥ ६६ ॥

सम्प्रावता सर्वस्त्रेयम् para (other)-ariha (purpose)-tvāt, from the fact that a compage, a structure of many parts, exists to serve the purpose of another. पुनः Puruṣasya, of Puruṣa.

66. (The knowledge of the existence) of Puruṣa is (by inference) from the fact that a structure of many parts, (that is, Prakṛiti) exists for the sake of another.—66.

Vṛtti:—Knowledge of Puruṣa is not derived from Prakṛiti as the effect, because Prakṛiti is nitya or eternal (i.e., uncaused), and Puruṣa is not a kāraṇa or cause. But because Prakṛiti is a saṃghāta (a whole in which parts combine and co-operate), that is, an embodiment of the three Guṇas, she exists para-ariham, for the sake of another. And this "another" (other than a saṃghāta) is Puruṣa. Hence knowledge of him is obtained,
To avoid infinite regression, it should be stated that Puruṣa is not a combination of many parts.—66.

Bhāṣya:—Well, the discrimination of Puruṣa from everything that is Jāda or unintelligent or unconscious, is alone the cause of Release. For what purpose, then, has the discrimination of material objects from one another been shown here? To this our reply is that there is necessity for such discrimination also, for the purpose of purifying the Sattva element from the taint of Rajas and Tamas, by directing attention to Prakṛti and the other Principles, one by one.

Having exhibited the proof of the Principles ending with Prakṛti, as discriminated from one another, by inference by means of the mark of cause and effect, the author now declares a similar proof by inference, in a different way, of the existence of Puruṣa who is void of the relation of cause and effect that has been mentioned.

Samhanana is originative conjunction. And, since there is no difference between a whole and its parts, it is common to the products of Prakṛti. Thus, the meaning is that the knowledge of Puruṣa is by inference from the fact that Prakṛti and her products, being constituted by combination of parts, exist for the sake of another.

The inference is made in this wise: The subject in dispute, namely, Prakṛti, Mahat, etc., is para-artha, serving-an-external-purpose, i.e., has as its fruit or end the worldly experience and eventual emancipation of some one other than itself, because it is a structure of many parts, like a couch, a seat or the like.

By this inference is proved Puruṣa as other than Prakṛti and only as a non-combination of parts, for, were he too a structure of many parts, the consequence would be infinite regression.

In the Yoga Darsana, the inference made by the aphorist, namely,

(And the mind) exists for another, (also because it is variegated by innumerable residua), inasmuch as it acts by combination.—Yoga Sūtras, IV. 24. S. D. H. Vol. IV. page 302.

is common only to the last member as heard (in ibid IV. 23) i.e. Chittam, mind, because the words “acting by combination” means simply this that it causes objects (artha) and acts (kriya), by association with others. Whereas Puruṣa, since he possesses the form of eternal light, does not depend upon anything else in causing his own objects in the form (i.e., sense) of illuminating objects. For, it is only in the matter of connection with objects, that Puruṣa stands in need of the function of Buddhi. But this connection with object is not an uncommon act of causing objects.
And the favourable arguments (which confirm the above inference) are furnished by texts of the Veda and Smriti, such as, 

न या च वीर्यः कामाय सन्तवः सिंहि समवालमनस्तु कामाय सन्तवः सिंहि समवति।

Nor does everything become dear for the sake of everything, but everything becomes dear for the sake of the Self.—Bṛhat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, II. iv. 5.

Another such argument is as follows: Were Prakṛti, etc., possessing Pleasure, etc., for the sake of their own experience of Pleasure, etc., then, they would be immediately knowable by themselves, inasmuch as the manifestation of Pleasure is not possible without the manifestation of the subject in which it inheres; hence there would be the conflict of the subject and object. For, the manifestation of Pleasure is not possible without the manifestation of the subject of the properties, as would appear from the perception of Pleasure being of this form as “I am happy.”

Moreover, it would be against the law of parsimony to suppose innumerable attributes in the form of consciousness for the manifold Guṇas and their products, i.e., innumerable viśīras or transformations which enter into originitive combination with one another. Hence, for the sake of simplicity, it is proper to make, (in each case), the supposition of a single Puruṣa only, in the form of the light of consciousness, as that which is other than all that is originated by combination of parts.

By the present aphorism, has been stated the inference of Puruṣa as the nimiita or occasional cause, inasmuch as it has been declared that the fulfilment of the object of Puruṣa is the nimiita or occasion for all combination of things. It is for this reason that, after having proposed Puruṣa produced at the beginning of Creation, it is remembered in the Viṣṇu and other Puruṣas.

निमित्तामकमेवाति सुमानां सर्वंकृष्टि।

प्राणायामके वीर्यां ततौ सुमाननन्वय: || १ ४ ७२ ||

शुद्धस्यामकेवतस्मात् श्रेयशक्तिः त्वंविविधिततंतं।

शुद्धायामकृष्ठतरं नवाभावयिन्यन्तं || १ २ २२ ||

He (Puruṣa) is merely the occasion in the matter of the act of creation of all things producible. Whence the powers of producible things come to have Prakṛiti as their cause. Then, from that equipoise of the Guṇas (Prakṛiti), under the superintendence of the Knower of the Field (Puruṣa), O Muni, takes place the production of the (first) manifestation of the Guṇas (Mahat) at the time of Creation, O excellent Brahmā, Viṣṇu Purāṇa, L. iv. 51 and L. ii. 23.

“Superintendence of the Knower of the Field” means mere conjunction of the unfulfilled object of Puruṣa. “Manifestation of the Guṇas.”
means the Principle of Mahat, because it manifests or reveals Pradhâna (Prakriti) constituted by the three Guṇas, as its cause.

Thus, then, it has been declared, in the above manner, that the proof of invisible (i.e., super-sensible) objects is by means of inference.—66.

Prakriti is uncaused.


67. Since the root has no root, the root is rootless.—67.

Vṛtti:—Now, lest it be imagined that there may be a cause of Prakriti, so the author says:

There being no root, that is, no cause, of Mûla Prakriti, the Root Evolvent, the cause which is rootless, is the root (of all). The same is Prakriti.—67.

Bhāṣya:—Now, in order to establish that she is the cause of all, the eternality of Prakriti is being established, for the purpose of proving that Puruṣa is kûṭasâtha or immutable in all circumstances.

The root material cause of the twenty-three Principles, that is, Pradhâna, is rootless, because a further root cannot be possible, as in that case, there would be an infinite regression. Such is the meaning.—67.

Prakriti is a mere name.


68. Even in the case of a succession, there must be a stop at some one point, and so it (Prakriti, the root cause) is merely a name (that is given to such a point).—68.

Vṛtti:—The author states the argument in regard to the above:

There is a different cause of Prakriti, of that, again, there is a different cause, and so on and on. In view of the defect of non-finality which would, otherwise, be thus entailed, an uncaused something at the end should be stated to be the root. The very same is (called here) Prakriti. Moreover, the admission of more than twenty-five Principles would be redundant.—68.
-Bhāṣya:- Well, it may be argued by our opponent, we learn from such texts as,—

तत्सामावध्यक्षः स्मायुः विद्वान् विद्वत्सरः।

Therefrom, O excellent Brahmana, was produced A-vyaktam, the Unmanifested, consisting of the three Guṇas.

that Pradhana also is produced from Purusa. Let, then, Purusa himself be the root of Prakriti. There would, in this case, be no non-finitude, since Purusa is eternal. Nor would any harm be caused to the immutability of Purusa, because the succession of Prakriti and her transformations would issue forth through the gateway of Avidya. So also is it remembered:

तत्सामावध्यक्षः स्मायुः विद्वान् विद्वत्सरः।

Verily, therefore, the saṃskāra, or worldly experience of Purusa has Ignorance for its root.

Apprehending the above objection, the author says:

Even if Purusa be the root cause of the world by a succession of intermediate transformations through the gateway of Avidya, etc., there must be a termination of the succession in some one or other of Avidya, etc., i.e., at some one or other eternal or permanent (nitya) gate, inasmuch as Purusa undergoes no transformation. Hence, where this termination or rest takes place, the same is eternal Prakriti. Here Prakriti is merely a name for the root cause. Such is the meaning.—68.

The Vedanta and the Sāṃkhya view of Prakriti are the same.

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69. (In regard to the origin) of Prakrti, (the position) of both of us, is the same.—69.

Vṛtti:- But, Prakṛiti being supersensuous, how can it be known that she is a cause? To this the author replies.

Both, i.e., the asserter (Sāmkhya) and the disputant (Naiyāyika) fare equally. For, as, notwithstanding that the ultimate atoms (paramāṇu) are supersensuous, the inference of ultimate atoms is made from the observation of their attributes in the water-pot and the like, similarly, here too, from the observation of the world as being made up of, or having the nature of, the three Guṇas, it is inferred that its cause, Prakṛiti, is constituted of the three Guṇas. Thus, to give an example, (showing that everything in the world possesses the nature of the three Guṇas), a woman is pleasurable to her husband, and thus partakes of
the nature of Sattva; through insubordination, she causes pain to him, and thus partakes of the nature of Rajas; she causes hallucination to him, in consequence of separation from her, and thus partakes of the nature of Tamas. All existences should be looked at similarly.—69.

Bhāṣya.—But, then, our opponent (a Vedāntin) may object, the position that there are just twenty-five Principles is not made out, for, in addition to the A-vyakta, Unmanifested, which is the cause of the Principle of Mahat, another unintelligent Principle, called Ajñāna, Ignorance, presents itself. With this apprehension in his mind, the author states the final conclusion about the ultimate root (of Prakriti).

Really, however, in the discussion of the root cause of Prakriti, the Pakṣa or subject of proof is the same for both of us, i.e., the asserter and the opponent. That is to say, as we hear of the production of Prakriti, so do we hear of that of A-vidyā also, from such texts as—


dhikira pahitāraṇča maṇḍūर्तत महालमः ।

This A-vidyā which has five divisions, was produced from the Great Self.

Hence a secondary production must needs be asserted in respect of one or other of them, and, of these two, it is of Prakriti only that a secondary production in the form of a manifestation through conjunction with Puruṣa, etc., is reasonable, as there is a recollection of the secondary production of Puruṣa and Prakriti in the following passage of the Kūrma Puruṣa:


dhuyogasāyānātāśc ca jayate kamāshāyeyo ।

Of action (Karma, Prakriti) and knowledge (Jñāna, Puruṣa) is said to be the production, the characteristic of which is conjunction.

while there is no mention, in any place whatever, of the secondary production of A-vidyā. The texts about A-vidyā having no beginning, should, however, be explained in the same way as the texts which declare that Vāsanā or tendency, etc., are beginningless only in the form of a stream or unbroken succession of Vāsanās or tendencies.

And it has been declared in an aphorism of Yoga that A-vidyā which possesses the form of false knowledge, is a property of Buddhi. Hence the number (twenty-five) of the Principles is not exceeded.

Or, the meaning of the aphorism is that the reasoning in favour of both, i.e., Puruṣa and Prakriti, is the same. For, we hear of the production of Puruṣa also from such passages as—


dvānā pratishthasūrī tathāvaśayakarṣaya ।

from whom are produced Puruṣa and Prakriti, and from whom proceeds this creation, movable and immovable, He, Viṣṇu, the cause of all this, may be pleased to us!

Thus, as of Puruṣa, so also of Prakriti, the production is purely
secondary. Again, both Puruṣa and Prakṛiti are declared to be eternal. Hence there is similarity on this point also.

It is proved, therefore, that Prakṛiti alone is the material cause of the world, and that A-vidyā is the nimitta or occasional cause of the world, and that so also is Puruṣa.

In the Mokṣa-Dharma section of the Mahābhārata, however, we find:

अष्टिधारामाध्यक्षं सर्गमध्यपरिष्ठाः

The sages declare the Unmanifested (Prakṛiti) possessing the property of creation and dissolution, to be A-vidyā, and that which is free from creation and dissolution (Puruṣa), to be Vidyā or knowledge. These make up the twenty-five Principles.

This, no doubt, is a declaration that Prakṛiti is A-vidyā or Ignorance, and that Puruṣa is Vidyā or knowledge. But the declaration has been made only from the practical point of view, in consequence of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa being the subjects of A-vidyā and Vidyā respectively. For, on account of undergoing transformation by nature, Prakṛiti, by comparison with Puruṣa, is a non-being: hence she is said to be the object of A-vidyā or Ignorance. In the very same manner, in the same section of the Mahābhārata, the whole range of effects ending with the Elements, have been declared to be A-vidyā by comparison with their respective causes, and, by comparison with themselves, their respective causes have been declared to be Vidyā.

But Puruṣa’s being the material cause of the world in the form of transformation, is due only to the Upādhi or investment of Prakṛiti. Like agency, etc., such causality has been translated in the Veda and Smṛiti only for the purpose of drawing greater attention to him through easy stages, as, otherwise (were Puruṣa in reality the material cause of the world), it should be observed, there would be conflict with the texts of the Veda such as the following:

चतुष्पलनवर्ष्णहुदयम्

Neither large nor small, neither short etc.—Bṛ. Āraṇ. Up. III, viii, 8.

And by the word Māyā, Prakṛiti and nothing else is denoted, as will appear from the text of the Veda:

मायां तु मकरिति विचाराः

But one should know Māyā to be Prakṛiti, etc.—Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, IV. 16.

Because there is the declaration in the following extract that Māyā which follows from the context, possesses the essential form of Prakṛiti:

वस्त्राणामां सूक्तों विचारेऽकादा

तदनेनेतरा मायत्वं संबन्धः
From this, the Lord of Mâyâ (Paramātman) creates this universe, wherein the other (Jiva-atman) is confined by Mâyâ.—Ibid. IV. 9.

And also from the texts of the Smriti such as,—

सप्तवं रक्षाम हि मात्रं तु युवाचयस्ंः।

दत्तनां व प्रकृतिमाया वा वैयक्तिक स्मृता ॥

वैदित्वकेतुप्रेयति तस्यात्मात्मगुणध्वजः ॥

Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas,—these are the three Guṇas belonging to Prakriti. Prakriti is constituted by them. In the Veda, she is called Valşavi Mâyâ, the Mâyâ of Lord Vîṣṇu. She is red, white, and black. Many such progeny are born from her.

A-vidyā which can be destroyed by Jñâna, cannot be the meaning of the word Mâyâ in the above passage of the Veda, as, in that case, the eternality of Mâyâ would not be established. Moreover, if A-vidyā be a substance, the difference between A-vidyā and Prakriti would be merely verbal; and, if it be an attribute, the existence of Prakriti as its substratum, is thereby proved, inasmuch as Puruṣa is devoid of attributes, etc.

Now, it cannot be asserted by our opponent that A-vidyā is something different in characteristic from Sub stance, Attribute, and Action, because, as has been already pointed out by us (cide Aphorism 24 above), there is no knowledge of any such Predicable.—69.

Only the most competent people can know the truth.

श्रव्यकारित्रेविच्याल नियम: ॥ ॥ ७० ॥

श्रव्यकारित्रेविच्याल नियम: || ॥ ॥ ७० ॥

Adhikāri-traividhyāt, persons competent to reason about the truth, being divided into three classes. Ṣ Na, no. नियम: Niyam, rule,

70. (It is) not a rule (that every one should be able to reason out the discrimination of Puruṣa from Prakriti), because persons entitled to reasoning, are of three descriptions.—70.

Vṛūti:—If Release comes through seeing the discrimination (of Puruṣa from Prakriti), then Release should result at once from only hearing (i.e. learning) that discrimination from the Śāstras. But this is not the case, as we see that some attain Release quickly, and that some, after a length of time. With such an objection in view, the author says:

Those who are adhikāri, i.e., fit for engaging in an enquiry about the truth, fall into three classes, good, middling, and bad. These differences are due to the differences of the attendant causes in the shape of A-vidyā, etc., which, again, arise from the difference of Adriśṭam. Therefore, there is no hard and fast rule (niyama) that Release should result at once from learning the discrimination of Prakriti and Puruṣa.—70.
Bhāṣya:—But, then, if there is (as shown above) a mode of arriving, by inference, at a knowledge of Prakṛti, Puruṣa, etc., how is it that manana or mental realisation of the discrimination (between Puruṣa and Prakṛti) does not take place in the case of all men? In regard to this point, the author says:

As in hearing (i.e., learning or receiving the truth from the Śastra and other reliable sources), so in manana or assimilation thereof in thought also, the adhikāris or persons entitled to engage in the enquiry, are of three descriptions, viz., dull, mediocre, and good. Hence there can be no universal rule that mental assimilation should take place in the case of all men, because it is possible for the dull and mediocre to be confronted with contradictory (bādha, obstruction) and contrary (sat-pratipakṣa, equally valid argument to the contrary) views by means of misleading arguments, etc. Such is the meaning. For, by the dull, the (Śākhya) arguments set forth above are opposed (and altogether set aside) by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the Baudhāyas, etc. By the mediocre, again, these inferences are brought face to face with what appear to be equally valid conclusions to the contrary (and thereby rendered doubtful), by means of fallacious marks of inference, namely, the contradictory and the non-existent, (vide Vaiśeṣika Śūtra, III. i. 15, S. B. H. Vol. VI, page 116.). It is, therefore, the best of the adhikāris only—in whose case such mental assimilation can take place. Such is the import.—70.

By Mahat is meant Manas.

71. The first product of Prakṛti is called Mahat; it is Manas.—71.

Vṛtti:—It may be thought that, in the previous aphorism (i. 61), "From Prakṛti (evolves) Mahat," the relation of cause and effect has been established, but not the order (of the succession of the products of Prakṛti). So the author removes this error:

That which is the first product of Prakṛti, is the Principle of Mahat, that is Buddhī. It is called Manas or the thinking principle, because it thinks (manana).—71.

Bhāṣya:—It has been already declared that the svarūpa or essential or intrinsic form of Prakṛti is the equipoise of the Gupas. The .Subtle.
Elements, etc., again, are too well known for any special mention. Hence, by the next two aphorisms, the author declares the svartivas of the remaining two Principles, viz., Mahat and Ahamkara.

The first product (of Prakriti), which is called Mahat, is Manas, that is, that which has the function of manana or thinking. Manana or thinking here means ascertainment or certainty. That of which this is the function, is Buddhi. Such is the meaning. For, from sayings like,

यदेनविवस्तरं भीचः प्रत्यानन्यप्रात्मकम् ।
महारत्वाभिविधि तोषा कुजित्वम् तद्वैष्ठे ॥

This all-pervading seed which partakes of the Nature of Pradhana and Purusa, the same is called the Principle of Mahat. It is said to be the Principle of Buddhi, we know that it is Buddhi that is the first product of Prakriti.—71.

Note:—Mahat, Manas, and Buddhi are thus synonymous terms.

The next product is Ahamkara.

चरमोष्णसः कारः ॥ ७२ ॥

चरमः: Charamah, last. कारः: Ahamkara, Ahamkara, the Maker.

72. The next (product of Prakriti is) Ahamkara.—72.

Vritti:—The product next to Buddhi, is Ahamkara.—72.

Bhashya:—That which is next to it, is Ahamkara, that is, that which egotises or creates the "I," of which the function is abhimana or self-assumption. Such is the meaning.—72.

The subsequent ones are products of Ahamkara.

तत्त्वायेत्वमुच्चिदाः ॥ ७३ ॥

तत्त्वायेत्वमुच्चिदाः: Tat-karya-tvam-to be the products thereof. उत्तरेः: Uttareham, of the subsequent ones.

73. To the subsequent ones, it belongs to be the products of Ahamkara.—73.

Vritti:—To be the products of Ahamkara belongs to the others, viz., to the eleven Indriyas and the five Tan-matras. Herein it is also declared that the (Gross) Elements which are the products of the Tan-matras, are also the products of Ahamkara, through the chain of causation.—73.

Bhashya:—The author now says that, since Ahamkara possesses the function of abhimana or the making of the "I" (which by supplying the required antithesis, makes knowledge of objective existence possible), therefore, it is established that the subsequent ones are the products of Ahamkara.

The meaning of the aphorism can be easily grasped,
By explaining this set of the three aphorisms in the above way, the apprehension or charge of useless repetition (Cf. "From Ahamkara, etc.,” aphorism 61) is prevented.—73.

The primary causality of Prakriti is not impaired.

आय्येत्तका तथ्यारा पारम्यप्रक्षणप्रत् || १ । ३४ ||

Adyā-hetutā, causality of the Primordial, i.e. Prakrti. Tat-pāramārya, mediately through that, i.e., Mahat. Prāṇās Prāṇamārya, in succession. Api, even. Aupvat, like that of the atoms.

74. Even though the evolution is successive, Prakrti, through that, i.e., Mahat, is still the cause (of all), as are the Atoms (the causes, though not immediate, of water-pots, etc.).—74.

Vṛtti:—Well, if this be the case, says the opponent, then you give up the conclusion that the world is the product of Prakrti. To meet him, the author says:

As the ultimate Atoms are, by a number of successive stages, the causes of a water-pot which is directly the product of a lump of clay, so also is Prakrti the root cause.—74.

Bhāṣya:—Well, if this be so, then there would be contradiction of those texts of the Veda and Smṛti which declare that Prakrti is the cause of all. Apprehending such an objection, the author says:

‘Prāṇamārya api,’ although she is not immediately the cause, still, ‘adyāyāh,’ of Prakrti, ‘hetutā,’ causality, in regard to Ahamkara, etc., exists through Mahat, etc., in the same way, for example, as, in the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, the causality of the Atoms, in regard to water-pot, etc., exists through di-atoms, etc. Such is the meaning.—74.

Why Prakrti, and not Purusa, is the cause.

पूर्वेभाविते दूरोपरकृतरस्य हानेन्द्यतयायोगः || १ । ३५ ||

Pūrvabhāvīte, being pre-existent. Drayah, of the one, i.e., Purusā and Prakṛti. Ekataraya, of the one, i.e., Purusā. Hāne, on the loss. Anyatara-yogāḥ, application of the other, i.e., Prakṛti.

75. While both (Purusā and Prakṛti) pre-exist (all products), on the loss of causality of the one, follows the application of the other as the cause.—75.

Vṛtti:—In consequence of the eternality of Prakṛti and Purusā,
the question arises as to whom belongs the causality in creation, etc. The author removes this curiosity:

Causality does not arise by mere antecedence, but by (invariable) agreement (anvaya) and difference (vyatireka). Of the two, the fitness of the one, i.e., Puruṣa, for association with causality, is gone, there being Vedic declarations that he undergoes no modification. Hence conjunction with causality is of the other, i.e. Pradhāna.—75.

Bhāṣya:—But, when Prakṛti and Puruṣa are both of them eternal, what is there, it may be asked, to determine that Prakṛti alone is the cause? So the author says:

Although both of them, Puruṣa and Prakṛti, are antecedent to all products, still, because the one, i.e., Puruṣa, undergoes no transformation, and, therefore, lacks causality, causality appropriately belongs to the other (Prakṛti). Such is the meaning.

Now, the argument in favour of Puruṣa's never undergoing any transformation, is, in a seed form, as follows: If Puruṣa act by entering into combination, his existence would be for the sake of another, and infinite regression would be the result. If he act not by entering into combination, the production of Mahat, etc. would take place every moment. If, on the other hand, it be supposed that Puruṣa undergoes transformation through (the intervention of) Prakṛti, then, for the sake of simplicity, let transformation be of Prakṛti alone.

Because Puruṣa is the lord (in the sense of ownership) of Creation, the characteristic of being the Creator is attributed to him, in the same way, for example, as victory and defeat, present in the soldiers, are attributed to the King, because he, being the owner of the army, experiences the pleasurable and painful consequences of victory and defeat.

Moreover, by the evidence (i.e. hypothesis, in the logical sense) recognises the subject of proof as possessing a particular property, having been proved under the characteristic of causality alone, no necessity for looking for any other cause, as, on the other hand, by similar evidence, Puruṣa having been proved as the On looker, there is no necessity for looking for any other on-looker.

Further, were the nature of Puruṣa to undergo transformation, he would at times commit failures, like the eye, Manas, etc. With the result that even actually existing Pleasure, Pain, etc. would not be recognised, and, consequently, doubts would arise such as "whether I be happy or not," etc. Hence it is proved, without detriment (and this is the reason for the inference) to his essential form of having the nature
of unfailing light, that Puruṣa is not by nature subject to transformation. Thus has it been declared by the Yoga Sūtra (IV. 18):

सदा ध्यायितवर्ज्यं दृष्टवयः सुरुष्यवयापरिवर्त्तिताः ॥ १५ ॥

"To its lord, the Puruṣa, the modifications of the mind are always known, on account of (his) unchangeability."—S. B. H. Vol. IV. page 294.

And also by the comment thereon:

सदा ध्यायितवर्ज्यं सुरुष्यवयापरिवर्त्तिताः परिपूर्वाय

While their being always the object of knowledge clearly brings out the unchangeable nature of Puruṣa.

We shall later on show why Puruṣa does not at one time illuminate the world, although he is intrinsically of the form of ever shining light—75.

Prakṛti is all-pervading.

परिपूर्वाय न सर्वापवानं ॥ ॥ ७५ ॥

सर्वापवानं Parichchānandam, circumscribed, limited. Na, not. Sarva-upādānam, material cause of all things.

76. What is limited cannot be the material cause of all things.—76.

Vṛtti:—But, then, (when there is so much dispute about the causality of Prakṛti), let, (some one may say), the Ultimate Atoms be the causes, since there is no dispute about their causality. So the author says:

That which is limited, cannot be the material cause of all things, as, for example, threads cannot be the (material) causes of a water-pot. Consequently, separate causes would have to be asserted for all objects severally, whereas it would be simpler to assume one (universal) cause (namely, Prakṛti);—76.

Bhāṣya:—In order to establish the simultaneous causality of Prakṛti, the author demonstrates her universality also.

Pradhāna, the material cause of all things, is not limited, that is, is all-pervading. Such is the meaning. "The material cause of all things" is an adjective, containing the reason (for the inference of universality), namely, that this is not possible in the case of what is limited.

But the unlimitedness of Prakṛti is not made out, objects our opponent; for, Prakṛti is nothing more than the triad of the Guṇas, Sattva, etc., as would appear from the future aphorism (VI. 39):
Satva, etc., are not the properties of Prakriti, being the very essence of her.
and as has been clearly and definitely declared by the Yoga Sûtra and the Comment thereon. Now, of these, Sattva, etc., lightness, mobility, weight, etc., are, you are going to say, the properties. But they would be contradicted by the (suggested) universality of Prakriti. Moreover, conjunction, disjunction, etc., which are causes in creation, would not also be established.

To this, our reply is as follows: Limitedness here denotes the characteristic of being confined to a part, which (characteristic) serves to determine the characteristic of being the counter-opposite of spatial non-existence (that is, in plainer language, the occupation of a portion of space which would have otherwise been empty); and the non-existence of this (limitedness) is universality. So that, it comes to this that the universality of Prakriti is nothing but the characteristic of not serving to determine the counter-oppositeness of spatial non-existence. As the characteristic of Prãna (the vital principle), namely, of being pervasive of all bodies, movable, immovable, etc., is denoted by the genus Prãsata (the generic characteristic of being Prãna), on account of the relation of the individual manifestations of Prãna to all bodies; similar is the universality of Prakriti.

The other characteristics of Prakriti, e.g., inactivity (akriya), unity, etc., we shall demonstrate in connection with the aphorism on her resemblances and differences (Vide l. 124 below).—76.

The Veda also supports the Theory of Prakriti.

77. (Prakriti is the cause of all things, and not the Atoms), also because there are Vedic declarations of the production of limited things.—77.

Vṛitti:—The author shows that there is Vedic evidence also on this point:

Argument has already been stated. The Veda also declares that Pradhâna is the cause of the world. Thus,

The world is produced from Pradhâna.—77.
Bhāṣya:—Not only because she is the material cause of all things, but:
also because the Veda speaks of the production of limited things.
Thus, we learn of the production of limited things, as we find that they
are by nature perishable, as declared in such texts of the Veda as,

That which is finite, is perishable.—Chhāndogya Upaniṣat, VII. xxiv. 1.
and in other texts. Such is the meaning.—77.

Ex nihilo nihil fit.

नावस्तुनो वस्तुसिद्धि: ॥ १ ॥ ७८ ॥

Na, not. वस्तुन: A-vastunah, from non-entity, non-existence. वस्तुसिद्धि: Vastu-siddhi, production of entity or existence.

78. From a non-entity, an entity cannot be produced.

—78.

Vṛitti:—Production of a water-pot which was non-existent before,
is observed. Let antecedent non-existence, then, be the cause, since it is
the invariable antecedent of all things. To this the author replies:

The production of an existence is not from non-existence. (If it
were not so, then), as the effect is found to be of the same nature as the
cause, the world also would be a non-entity.—78.

Bhāṣya:—Now, in order to establish the causality of Prakṛti, the
author sets aside the causality of Non-existence, etc.

‘A-vastunah,’ from non-existence, is not ‘vastu-siddhi,’ the produc-
tion of an existence. Because (1) by deriving the world from the horns
of a bare, Rācēṣa, etc. cannot be established, and (2) such production is
never observed. Such is the meaning.—78.

The world is not unreal.

अवाभासवुधकारणजन्यत्वाय नावस्तुनम् ॥ १ ॥ ७६ ॥

A-badhat, from the absence of any contradiction to its reality.

A-duṣṭa-kārana-janya-tvāt, from its not being the product of depraved
causes. न A, and. न Na, not. वस्तुत्रम् A-vastutram, unreality.

79. (The world is) not unreal, because there is no
fact contradictory to its reality, and also because it is not
the product of depraved causes.—79.
Vṛitti:—Let the world also be a non-entity, what harm is that to us? one may ask. So the author says:

The knowledge that it is not silver, is the contradiction of the silver in the (wrong) cognition, in regard to a shell of pearl-oyster, that it is silver. But, in the present instance, it has never been the cognition of any body that this world is not of the form of existence, whereby there would be contradiction of its having the form of existence.

Again, a thing is inferred to be unreal, if it is the product of depraved causes; as some one's cognition of a conch-shell as yellow, through such a fault as jaundice, etc. But, in the present case, there is no such depravation of the senses, because all men at all times cognize the world as a reality. Hence it follows that the world is not a non-existence.—79.

Bhāṣya:—If it be said that the world also may be an unreality, like dreams and the like, so the author says:

There is no contradiction of the reality of the fabric of the world by means of Vedic and other proofs, as there is of the objects seen in a dream. Nor can it be said that the cognition of the reality of the world is the result of depraved senses, etc., as it is in the case of the yellowness of a conch-shell; because there is no reason for the supposition of such depravation; hence the effect, i.e., world, is not unreal. Such is the meaning.

It cannot be said that there is contradiction of the reality of the fabric of Creation by such texts of the Veda as,—

वाचार्यमेव विद्वान नामवेय नृत्येऽतिस्कृतेऽव सत्यम्

Modification (e.g., a water-pot) is a creation of speech, a mere name; (while, “It is clay,” only this much is the truth.—Chh. Upan., VI. 1. 4.

and that, there being this contradiction, the fault called A-vidyā also exists in the cause of the world. For, such passages are directed to show the non-existence (of those modifications) in the form of duration dependent upon their cause, because it is not possible otherwise to prove the example of the clay. Also, if the import of those passages were otherwise, it would conflict with the passages on creation, etc. Moreover, the contradiction of the reality of the fabric of creation by the Veda would involve the fallacy of “atma-ādāraya,” i.e., would depend for its validity on the authority of the Veda itself (which is fallacious), and, again, the Veda also being included in the fabric of Creation, and its reality being consequently contradicted by itself, there would be room for doubt as to the truth of what is made known by it. For this very reason, on account of the characteristic differences of contradiction, non-contradiction, etc., and also
on account of our being aware of them as existent, the (imputed) resemblance of the world as seen in the waking state, to a dream, a flower in the sky, etc., has been refuted with great care and earnestness by the following two aphorisms of the Vedânta:

तत्त्वज्ञान सत्याविद्या || २।२।२८॥

चौपार्श्वकम्य सत्याविद्या || २।२।२९॥

"The external things are not non-existent, because our consciousness bears testimony to their existence."—II. ii. 38.

"The ideas of the waking state are not like those of the dream state, because they are of a different nature."—II. ii. 39.—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V., pages 308, 310.

Passages such as भेति भेति Neti Neti, "Not this," "Not this" (Bri. Āraṇ. Upa. II. iii. 6) are intended simply for the purpose of viveka or discriminative knowledge, and not as negations of the reality of the world in its ultimate and essential form, as would appear from the Vedânta Sûtra (III. ii. 22):

भ्रस्तितायत्वं हि प्रतिचेताः

"(The śruti, Neti Neti) denies the previously mentioned limitation (only with regard to Brahma), for it declares (him to be) more than that."—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V., page 482.

We have similarly explained many other such passages in our Commentary on the Vedânta.—79.

Why nothing can come out of nothing.

भावे तथोऽनि तत्सिद्धिरभन्दे तद्भवात् इतस्तरी तत्ति: || १।२।८०॥

विभावे, being existent, भवत्योगेन Tat-yogena, by union with that, i.e., existence. भवत्योगेन: Tat-siddhi, production of that, i.e., existent effect. यथावृत्त भावे, being non-existent. भवत्योगेन Tat-abhavat, on account of the absence of the effect. कुसान्तात तारा, how then. भवत्योगेन: Tat-siddhi, production of an effect in the form of an entity.

80. If the cause is existent, then, by union with existence, takes place the production of an existent effect; if it is non-existent, then, on account of the non-existence of any effect, how can there be the production of an effect in the form of an entity?—80.

Vṛttī:—Well, our opponent may say, let non-existence be the cause (of the world), still, the world will not (necessarily, therefore) be a non-entity. In regard to this the author says:

"Bhāve," in the material cause, "tatt-yogena," by union with existence, according to the principle भावसंगमर्यादां --80. "The attribute of the
cause passes into the effect," "tat-siddhiḥ," there is proof that the effect is an entity. "Abhāve," if the material cause of the world were a non-entity, "tat-abhāvāt," then, since the non-existence of the world must necessarily follow, "kutas tat-siddhiḥ," (whence can there be proof of the reality of the effect)? Since non-existence is of the form of non-existence.—80.

Note:—In translating the latter part of the Vṛttī we have followed the text of the edition (1808 Śaka Era) of Pandita Kāśyapa Vedānta-Vāgīśa. According to the reading of the Vṛttī edited by Dr. Garbe (Calcutta, 1888) abhāve jagato abhāvātve etc.—the translation would be. If the world were a non-entity, then, since the non-existence of the world must necessarily follow (by the law of its nature),—which apparently is not very clear nor quite correct.

Bhāṣya:—It has been stated above that an entity cannot come out of a non-entity. The author here gives the reason why this is so.

"Bhāve," the cause having the form of existence, "tat-yogena," by union with existence, the production of an (existent) effect takes place. "A-bhāve," the cause having the form of a non-existent thing, however, "tat-abhāvāt," on account of the non-existence of the effect also, how can there be production or proof of an effect in the shape of an entity? As an effect can appropriately be only of the same essential form as the cause. Such the meaning:—80.

Karma (Action) cannot be the material cause of the world.

न कर्मेण उपाभाबान्त्योगात् ॥ ११ ॥

Na, not. कर्म: Karman, from Karma or Action. उपाभाबान्त्यoगात्, on account of non-adaptation to material causality.

81. (Production of an entity can) not (take place from Karma also), because (Karma has) no fitness for material causality.—81.

Vṛttī:—Let Karma itself be the cause of the world, what need have we of the hypothesis of Prādhāna? (if it be asked), so the author declares:

Let Ādhyātman be the nimitta or instrumental cause (in creation). But material causality is never found in Merit and Demerit. When it is established that Release results from seeing the distinction (Viveka) between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, the existence of Prakṛti is admitted.—81.

Bhāṣya:—But still, when Karma is a necessary factor in creation, let Karma alone be the cause of the world, what is the use, it may be asked, of the hypothesis of Pārādhāna? In regard to this the author says:

Production of entities is not possible from Karma even. Root causality does not belong to Karma, because the attributes have no fitness
for being the material causes of substances. For, a legitimate hypothesis is only that which is in accordance with the facts of observation. And it is nowhere found that material causality belongs to the attributes mentioned by the Vaidêśikas. Such is the meaning.

The word “Karma” is here indicative of A-vidyâ, etc. also. Since they equally possess the nature of attributes, they too are not adapted to be material causes. If it is said that like jaundice, etc. of the eye, A-vidyâ is a substance appertaining to the conscious principle, then its difference from Pradhâna is in name only.—81.

Ritual observances are not the cause of Release.

Na, not. Anûsravikat, from (performance of) Vedic rites and ceremonies. Api, even, also. Tat-siddhî, accomplishment thereof, i.e., of Release. Sadhyatvena, being a product. Avritti-yogat, on account of liability to recurrence. Purusa-artha-tvam, not the characteristic of being Purusa-artha or the chief end of man or the supreme purpose of life.

82. The accomplishment of Release is not from scriptural observances also, because, being the result of Karma, it would be liable to repetition, and would thus lose the character of the supreme purpose of Purusa.—82.

Vritti: —Since Release can be obtained through the performance of the rites and ceremonies enjoined in the Veda, what, it may be asked, is the use of Prakriti? To this the author replies:

‘Anûsravika’ is that which is heard from the Veda, through the mouth of the preceptor, that is, sacrifice, etc. From that also is not the accomplishment of Release, because the Release, so obtained, being a product of temporary causes, is not permanent, and hence the released person is liable to revert to transmigration. Therefore, such Release is not the supreme purpose of Purusa.—82.

Bhâsya: —Thus, then, has been exhibited the discrimination between Purusa and Prakriti by the characteristics of being liable to transformation and of not being liable to transformation, of existing for the sake of another and of not existing for the sake of another. Now, by the next five aphorisms, the author explains, at some length, what has been already stated by the aphorism—
BOOK I, SUTRA 82.

(As regards the temporary character of their effect, i.e., cessation of pain), there is no distinction between the two (i.e., visible means, on the one hand, and religious performances, prescribed in the Veda, on the other).—Vide page 35 supra.

namely, that it is only the knowledge of the discrimination between Purusa and Prakriti that, by causing of the destruction of A-viveka or non-discrimination, becomes the means for the attainment of the supreme purpose of Purusa, and that the Vedic performance have no immediate causality therein.

The word "Api" includes the visible means mentioned before, that is, in

न हृदासु सिद्धिः ॥ १ ॥ २ ॥

The realisation of that (i.e., permanent cessation of the experience of pain) cannot take place by ordinary means, such as men and money.—Vide page 19 supra.

"Anusrarika" karma means action such as sacrifice, etc., enjoined in that which is heard from the mouth of the preceptor, i.e., the Veda. From that also, does not take place the accomplishment of the object of Purusa mentioned before (vide aphorism 1, above). Because, being the result of action, it has connection with repetition and is thus lacking in the characteristic of being the supreme purpose of Purusa. Such is the meaning.

That the result of Karma is not permanent, is proved by the Veda:

तद्यथे कर्मसिद्धिः सिद्धिः पुनःस्वरूपते धर्मसिद्धिः सिद्धिः

As here the world conquered by action wears away, so there too the world conquered by Merit wears away.—Chhândogya Upanishat. VII. 1. 6.

By the aphorism (I. 10).

नकलस्यायमेवस्यायात् ॥ १ ॥ २ ॥

Nor (is Purusa bound) by Karma, because Karma is the property of a different object. —vide page 34 supra.

Bondage by Karma has been refuted before. And now Release by Karma is refuted. Hence there is no tautology.

It cannot be said that by the reason given above, namely, that Karma is the property of a different object, the causality of Karma towards Release, as towards Bondage, has been practically refuted before, and that therefore, the very apprehension of any misconception in this respect does not arise again, (so that the refutation in the present aphorism is superfluous). For, A-viveka or non-discrimination having been established as the cause of Bondage, it is possible to regard Karma as being the property of Purusa, because it is the result of the A-viveka belonging to him while in bondage.—82.
The Vedic texts on non-reversion in regard to Karma refer to those who have attained to discriminative knowledge.

तत्र प्रात्मिकवेशायानां अस्तित्वात्: || 1 1 83 ||

Tatra, in regard to Vedic Karmā (Vijñāna), between Prakṛti and Puruṣa (Aniruddha). व्यासरूपः Prāpta-viveksya, of one who has attained to discrimination. अन्वयन्तः: An-anvayantah, Vedic text on non-reversion or non-repetition of births and deaths.

83. The Veda declares the non-reversion of one who has attained to discriminative knowledge, from amongst those who have risen to higher worlds by virtue of the performance of Vedic Karma (Vijñāna) or, of Puruṣa and Prakṛti (Aniruddha).—83.

Vṛtti.—The author shows what does constitute the supreme purpose of Puruṣa.

“Tatra”, of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, “Prāpta-viveksya”, from knowledge of the discrimination, “an-anvayantah”, e. g., the Vedic text.

र तस्मानावधिते

He does not revert again.—Kāṭāgara Rudra Upaniṣad, 2.—83.

Bhāṣya.—But, then, how do you account for the Vedic declarations on the non-reversion of one gone to the world of Brahmā by virtue of action called worship in the form of Pañcha-Agni-Vidyā or the penance of five fires, as well as by virtue of action in the form of death at a sacred place, etc.? In regard to this the author says:

The Vedic text that there is, in connection with the Vedic Karma, about the non-reversion to this world of those who have gone to the world of Brahmā, should be taken as referring to those who, while residing in the world of Brahmā, have attained to discriminative knowledge. For, otherwise, there would be conflict with those other texts of the Veda which establish reversion to this world even from the world of Brahmā. Such is the meaning. Still, it should be observed that non-reversion also is the result of discriminative knowledge alone, and not directly of Karma. And this point will be elaborately treated in the Sixth Book. In our Commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras, we have quoted and explained the passages relating to them.—83.

Freedom from Samsāra (transmigration) is not the result of Karma.
84. Pain (result) from pain; like the affusion of water which does not give relief from chilliness.—84.

Vṛtti.—The author points out the defect in the opposite view.

Were Release the result of Karma, then, since Karma involves a large element of pain, Release, the product thereof, would also involve a large element of pain. At any rate, it would cause pain by being, at least, perishable. For, relief from chilliness is not given to one afflicted with chilliness, by the affusion of water, but, on the contrary, additional chilliness is thereby caused to him.—84.

Bṛdṛya.—If it be said that the non-reversion mentioned above is the result of Karma, so the author says:

From the pain which follows from the performance of Vedic Karma, by reason of its entailing the defects of killing, etc., and by means of the painful experiences consequent thereon, results nothing but an unbroken series of pains, and not "relief from chilliness", i.e., the sure case of Aviveka or Non-discrimination; while freedom from pain lies at a great distance. As, for example, by the affusion of water, it is non-relief from chilliness that is caused to one distressed with chilliness, and not certainly relief from chilliness. Such is the meaning.

So has it been said:

यष्टा पक्षेन पुत्रासारा पात्रया वा पुत्राक्षतदः
पुत्रहमुख तवेधारा न यह्मैंसैंहृदम सत्विता

As turbid water cannot be made pure by means of mud, and as rains due to drinking wine cannot be expelled by means of wine, in the very same way, a single sin of killing a living creature cannot be expiated by a hundred of sacrifices.—Bhāgavata, I. viii. 82.

It is also heard that even Jaya, Vijaya, etc., the attendants of Viṣṇu, and residents of the worlds of Brahmā, had to undergo a succession of painful existences in the race of the Rākṣasa (as Ṣiraṇyākṣa, Ṣiraṇyākṣa-Kaḍipu, etc).

And this has been said by the Kārikā also:

हरसीधाजुरालं शाक्तिप्रबंधिततिष्ठतुनुसः

Like the visible, the scriptural performances also are affected with the defects of impurity, waste, excess.—Kārikā, Verse II, 84.

The result of Nishāma Karma also is equally transitory.

कान्तेकान्ते वितीयसाधुक्षिपात् ॥ ९ ॥

Kārma, (karma) being performed with the object of securing desirable consequences thereby. कान्तेकान्ते, not being so performed, being disinterested. ते Api, even. वितीयसाधुक्षिपात्, on account of the absence of any difference in respect of Release being producible by Karma.

Note.—For kārmaḥ kānyo, Aniruddha reads kāmyākānyo.
85. (Release cannot be attained even by disinterested Karma), for, whether Karma be interested or disinterested (Vijñāna), or, though in disinterested Karma there is some difference from interested Karma, (Aniruddha), it produces no corresponding difference in the characteristic of Release being something producible (and, therefore, perishable).—85.

Vṛtti:—The cause of the existence of a large element of pain in the Release accomplished by Karma is not, it may be argued, this that it is the product of Karma, but the cause is that it is the product of kāmya or interested Karma, because niṣkāma or disinterested Karma is capable of accomplishing Release, as the Veda declares:

कर्मभ्रमितं लघुवषयो निशिद्धं भजावतो द्वियामित्यमाना: ।
प्रयायपे क्रिया मनोविध: परे कर्मभ्रमित्यमानान्तनः॥

The sages endowed with progeny and greedy of wealth, entered into death by their Karmas. While other sages, possessing wisdom, obtained immortality through higher (disinterested) Karmas.

In regard to this the author says:

Granted that pain is not the consequence of niṣkāma or disinterested karma, but still, notwithstanding the difference of niskāma karma from the kāmya, the characteristic of release being the product of Karma remains undifferentiated. Because if it would be a product, it would be perishable, and, consequently, there would again be pain. The Vedic texts which declare that niṣkāma karma is the means for the attainment of Release, are for the purpose of knowledge, and Release comes through knowledge, so that niṣkāma karma is the means of Release through the intermediation of knowledge.—85.

Bhāṣya:—It is be it said that, not Pain, but Release is heard to be the fruit of niṣkāma karma in the form of internal sacrifice, silent recitation of the mantra, etc., so the author declares:

In respect of karma, kāmya as well as akāmya, pain results from pain. Why? "Śiddhyatva-na-videśāt", i.e., both being alike producible, because the knowledge which arises through the purification of the Sattva brought about by karma, is essentially of the form of pain, since the threefold Guṇas are its very essence. Such is the meaning. The import is that the Veda also bears testimony to the truth of the statement that Release is not directly the fruit of Karma. Thus,

Neither by Karma, nor by progeny, nor by riches, but by renunciation, one attained to immortality.—Kaivalya Upaniṣat, I, 2.
"By renunciation," i.e., by giving up abhimâna or self-assumption. "Some," i.e., some only, "attained to" or obtained immortality, and not all, because the renunciation of abhimâna is a very rare thing, being the result of tattva-jñâna or knowledge of truth. Such is the meaning.—85.

Release producible by knowledge is not perishable.

निजपुष्कस्य बन्ध्वन्धसमार्थं परं न समानत्वम् || 1 || 86 ||

निजपुष्कस्य Nija-muktasya, of one who is released (free) by himself. द्वारा Dhvanasa-mâtram, the mere annihilation of bondage. परं Param, sufficient, absolute, permanent. ना Na, not. समानत्वम् similarity, parity.

86. The mere annihilation of bondage is final in the case of one who is free by nature; hence, there is no parity (between the theories of Release by Knowledge and Release by Karma).—86.

Vṛtti:—Supposing that Release may result from the knowledge of the discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa, still, on account of its perishableness, samsāra or transmigration may again take place. Thus, one may say, the (Sāṃkhya) assister and his opponent are on an equality. To this the author replies:

"Nija-muktasya," of him who is released by nature; "bandha-dhvanasaḥ": Bandha is A-viveka or Non-discrimination; dhvanasa or destruction of A-viveka takes place by means of the opposite thereof (i.e., Viveka or discrimination). And how can there be a return of samsāra when the destruction of A-viveka is (what is technically called) Pradhmânas or non-existence after annihilation, that is, is final? Hence there is no such similarity, (as is imagined, between the two cases).—86.

Bhâṣya:—But, even on your own theory, how is it, may ask our opponent, that painfulness does not belong to (release which is) the product of knowledge, when you do not claim any peculiarity in its producibility? To this the author replies:

"Nija-muktasya," of him who is released by nature, the mere succesce of bondage, in the manner stated, by means of the annihilation of the cause thereof called A-vidyā, is "param" final. The destruction (of bondage) which is the result of the knowledge of discrimination (of Puruṣa from Prakṛti), is imperishable, and not, like the fruit of Karma, something in the form of an existence, e.g., Pleasure, etc., whereby, on account of its perishableness, it might give pain. Karma, again, cannot become the immediate cause of the destruction of A-vidyā, without the help of
Adriṣṭam as an intermediate cause. Hence, knowledge being imperishable, there is no parity between Knowledge and Karma. Such is the meaning.

And, on account of knowledge, return to transmigration is not possible, in consequence of the destruction of the cause (of such return) called A-vidyā. This is proved.

Thus, then, it is declared that it is discriminative knowledge that alone is the immediate cause of the annihilation of pain.—86.

Definitions of Pramā or right cognition and Pramāṇa or proof.

द्वयोरेकतरस्य वाप्पताधिविरिचिति: प्रमा तद्दलापकं\|9\| ८७\| यत् तत् त्रिभवं प्रमाणाध्य यत् तत् त्रिभवं प्रमाणाध्य

Thus: Dvayob, of both, Buddhī and Puruṣa. समर्थ Ekatarasya, of one of the two. या Va, or. N. B.—Aniruddha reads cha instead of vā. भी Api, even, also, अविक्रमित: A (not)-sannikriṣṭa-(drawn near to, adjacent)-artha (object)-parichhitiḥ (determination), determination or ascertainmnet of distant objects. यथा Pramā, right knowledge. तत्सत्तित: Tat-suddhakam, the instrument of that. यथा Tat, which. यथा Tat, that. त्विभव Trividham, threefold. प्रमाण Pramāṇam, proof, evidence. N. B.—Aniruddha omits the words, trividham pramāṇam, from this aphorism, and reads them at the beginning of the next aphorism.

87. By Pramā we mean the ascertainmnet of objects which have not yet approximated both (i.e., Buddhī and Puruṣa), or, even one or other of them; that which is the instrument thereof, is Pramāṇa which is threefold. (Vijñāṇa Bhikṣu).

Or, Pramā, that is, the determination of distant objects, is (in the case of Perception), the result of both (i.e., sense and objects), and, (in the case of Inference or Verbal Cognition), of one or other (i.e., of the inferential mark or word, as the case may be). That which is the best instrument thereof is (Pramāṇa).—(Aniruddha).—87.

Vṛtti:—It has been mentioned that the group of Principles is twenty-five-fold. Their proof is not possible without Pramāṇa. Accordingly the author shows what Pramāṇa is.

“Dvayob”, of Sense and Object, which are existent; in the case of Perception. “Ekatarasya cha api,” of existent mark or word; in the case of Inference or Verbal Cognition. “A-sannikriṣṭ-artha-parichhitiḥ”, determination of objects not previously determined, “Pramā”, right cognition,
the result. Hereby it is declared that Pramāṇa or proof is that which reaches to objects, not previously got at. That which is the best instrument of Pramāṇa, is Pramāṇa;—such is the definition of Pramāṇa in general.—87.

Bhāṣya:—Now, the Pramāṇas which are the immediate means of discriminative knowledge, are going to be examined. Knowledge of the Self is acquired by means of the threefold Pramāṇa—this we learn verily from such texts of the Veda as,—

वस्तु वा वेदं प्रृक्तं: भौतिको मन्त्रम्।

Verily the Self is to be seen, to be heard about, to be reasoned about.—Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, II. iv. 5, IV. v. 8.

Karma, etc., on the other hand, are the means of causing the purification of the other instruments such as Manas, etc.

“Asannikriṣṭa”, i.e., not lodged in, that is to say, not got at by, the ascertainer (Pramātāra). Of such objects, i.e., entities, ‘parichelhitiḥ’ i.e., ascertainment, is Pramāṇa. And it may be the property of both, i.e., Buddhī and Puruṣa, or of only one or other of them in both ways. That which is the best instrument of that, i.e., Pramāṇa,—“the best instrument”, i.e., the cause which is never dissociated from connection with effect, in other words, is unfailing in its effect,—the same is Pramāṇa, and it is threefold under the forms presently to be mentioned. Such is the meaning.

In the above comment, the term “not got at” has been used for differentiating (Pramāṇa) from Smṛiti or Memory, “entities” for differentiating it from Error, and “ascertainment” for excluding Doubt.

Now, if it is said that the result in the form of Pramāṇa rests in Puruṣa alone, then, the modification of Buddhī is the only Pramāṇa; if it is said to rest in Buddhī alone, then the contact of Buddhī and the Sense etc., is the only Pramāṇa, while Puruṣa is only the witness, and, not the maker, of Pramāṇa or Right Cognition. If, again, the cognition belonging to Puruṣa as well as the modification of Buddhī, both of them, are said to be Pramāṇa, then both of them are Pramāṇa, according to the differences of Pramāṇa, while the application of the word, Pramāṇa, to the eye, etc., is only secondary or in an intermediate sense in all cases. Such is the import.

In the Commentary on the Yoga Sūtras, on the other hand, the revered Vyāsa Deva has declared that Pramāṇa is the cognition resting in Puruṣa; for, since the instruments (Senses) operate or become active only for accomplishing the object of Puruṣa, it is but proper that the result of
their activity should rest in Puruṣa. Hence here too the very same (cognition resting in Puruṣa) is the principal conclusion. Nor can it be asked that, since the cognition of Puruṣa is eternal in its intrinsic form, it cannot, therefore, be a result of causes; for, notwithstanding that it is eternal in its pure or absolute form, it can yet bear the character of being an effect, when tainted or coloured with the reflection of external objects; or, it may be that the result in question is nothing but the colouration or taint received from the chief end of Puruṣa.

Now, the process of knowing rightly is as follows: By means of the contact with objects, through the channels of the Senses, or by means of the knowledge of the (inferential) mark etc., is at first produced a modification of Buddhi in the form of the object (to be cognised.) Of these, the perceptual modification produced from the contact of the Senses, is dependent upon Buddhi together with or affected by the Senses, seeing that modifications in the form of the bile, etc., arise in consequence of the depravity of the bile, etc., appertaining to the eye, etc; this is the difference. And the same modification, tinged with the object, enters upon (the field of vision) of Puruṣa by the form of a reflection, and shines there, inasmuch as Puruṣa, since he is not liable and capable of transformation, cannot possibly be modified into the form of the object. And it is only modification into the form of the object that can apprehend objects; it is difficult to say this in respect of other things. Thus the author will declare later on by the aphorism (VI. 28):

अपरागावधान केशवदान विन्दस्मानः॥ २८॥

As between the China rose and crystal, (there is) no uparaga or actual transference of ‘colour’ (from Buddhi to Puruṣa), but (only) abhimana or an assumption of such transference.

There is also the Yoga Sūtra (I. 4);

वृत्तिसाक्ष्यस्मितः॥ १॥ ॥


Smṛiti too:

ताहिंश्रवष्ये स्तारे समक्ष वस्तुः॥

इमाश्च मर्यादिवत्ति सरस्वते तद्युक्तः॥

All these same appearances of things are reflected in that large mirror of the mind, (as are reflected) in a lake, the trees that stand on the banks.—Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇa.

Also the Commentary on Yoga:

इत्ये: मर्यादिवत्ति पुरुषः॥

Puruṣa is the re-cogniser from Buddhi.—Yoga-Shāṇya, I. 7, S. B. H. Vol. IV p. 15.

"Re-cogniser" (prati-sanvedi), that is, the seat of prati-sanveda or echo-like reflection of cognition. Such is the meaning.
Hereby it is shown that, although Purusās are immutable, universal, and of the form of consciousness, still, it does not follow that they will illumine (i.e. cognise) all things at all times, because while they are asāñga, free from attachment, they cannot by themselves be modified into the form of the object, and, in the case of supersensuous objects, it has never been observed that there has been apprehension of objects by means of mere conjunction, without modification into the form of the object.

The supposition of the capacity in Purusas, of having thrown into them the reflections of the modifications of their respective Buddhis only, and not of others, is made from the force of the result (i.e., from seeing that this is actually the case). As only things possessing rūpa or form-and-colour, and not others, have the capacity of casting reflection in water, etc.

The possession of form-and-colour is not the underlying cause of reflection in all cases, as we observe the reflection of sound also in the form of echo. It cannot be said that echo is nothing but a sound produced from another sound; for, in that case, it would follow that the redness, etc. of the crystals also are produced from the proximity of the China rose, and, consequently, the conclusion of the unreality of reflections (which appear as, but are not, entities) would be lost. Reflection (pratibimba), again, is a particular transformation of Buddhī itself, while the form of the reflected (bimba) is what is seen in the water, etc.

Some thinkers, however, are of opinion that Chaitanya or Consciousness, being itself reflected in the modification (of Buddhī), illuminates the modification, and that, likewise, it is the very reflection appearing in the modification that is the object of consciousness in the modification, and that it is not the case that the reflection of the modification is thrown in consciousness. But this is an incorrect view of the case. For, by reason of its contradiction to the Śāstra (e.g., Yoga-Viśiṣṭha-Itāmāyaṇa above) exhibited above as authority (for our view), their mere reasoning is perfectly useless. Secondly, without causing divorce from our conclusion, it is proved, by means of their having the form of the relation called the relation of being the object of each other, that the modification of Buddhī and Consciousness throw their reflections in each other. Thirdly, in the case of external perception, when it is established that it is modification in the form of the object that is the form of being the object of cognition, congruity requires that, in the interval also, modification into the form of those objects which appear in the interval, should also be the object of cognition. Those logicians, however, who do not desire that a cognition should be the object (of cognition), think that, since individual manifestations (i.e., ātman) of
cognition do not have the property (Anugamaka dharma) of being the form by which things are cognised, the use of language like "Cognition having a water-pot as its object," "Cognition having a piece of cloth as its object," etc., which proceeds from the assumption that they do possess such property, is improper.

Some other logicians, again, declare that by reason of the above impropriety or unjustifiability, it is an additional Predicable to be the object of Cognition. This view also is incorrect. Because there is redundancy in the supposition of a different objectivity (which is not perceived), leaving aside the modification into the form of the object, which is being perceived.

But still, it may be contended, let the mutual objectivity of the modification and of Consciousness consist only of the form of their respective Upâdhis or adjuncts, the Anugama or leading to the cognition of things being possible by means alone of its being of the form of the modification of their own Upâdhis or adjuncts; there is no use of having two reflections, called form of the object. The position, however, is not a tenable one. Because, without reflection, ownness (i.e. subjectivity) is hard to assert. For, ownness or subjectivity is the possession of the Vâsanâ or tendency or residual potency of the modification experienced by the subject itself. Experience is cognition. So that, the characteristic mark of objectivity being constituted by the substance of the object, there is involved the fallacy of Atma-Asraya or dependence upon itself. Therefore, is proved the mutual reflection of the conscious and the unconscious, in each other, in the form of their being the object of each other. More on this point, we may give the hint, will be found in the Yoga Vârtika.

The division of the cogniser, etc., here is as follows:

The pure intelligent one is the Pramâta or the maker of right cognition. Pramâna is just the function (Vîrtti) of us. Pramâ or right cognition is the reflection in the intelligent one of the modifications in the form of the objects. Meyâ or the knowable is the subject matter of the reflected modifications. Saksitva or the being the witness which is of the form of immediate vision, the author will himself declare. Hence, on account of the absence of the cause, the intelligent one will be merely the witness of the modifications. Of Visnu, etc., the being the witness of all things, is secondary, as it lacks the characteristic mark etc. of being the witness.—87.

* The form by which takes place the apprehension of objects, the very same form, is, in the Nyâya System, the anugamaka or leader or the means of reaching those objects. Anugama or the leading or reaching is its notion.
No more than the above three Proofs are required.

ततुतिद्वारा सर्वसिद्धान्तविचारतिद्विद् ॥ ॥

तत्तत्त्वसिद्धान्त, on the establishment of that, i.e., the three Proofs. सर्व: सिद्धांत, on account of the proof of all objects. न ना, not. अधिक्या-सिद्धान्त, proof of more.

88. These three Pramāṇas being established, all can be established; hence no additional Pramāṇa is established,—88:

Vṛtti:—How many Prṇaṇas are there? To this the author replies:

The Pramāṇas are Perception, Inference and Word. Should not Comparison, Presumption or Implication, Non-existence, Comprehension, and Tradition (for an account of which see the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra IX. ii, 5, S. B. II. Vol. VI, pages 310-310) also be Pramāṇas? In reply to this, it is declared: “These three Pramāṇas being established etc.” The admission of Pramāṇa is for the purpose of establishing the Īrṣye or provable. The three kinds of Pramāṇa being established, since the purpose of establishing the provables of all the Pramāṇas is served, there is, therefore, no establishment of anything as an additional, i.e., separate Pramāṇa, because all these so-called additional Pramāṇas are included amongst the three kinds of Pramāṇa mentioned above. Inasmuch as the scholars include them in Perception, etc., as the case may be, according as they are based on the contact of the objects with the Senses, agreement and difference, etc., only additional differences of name have been created. Hence there is no establishment of additional Pramāṇa. —88.

Bhāṣya:—But our opponent may ask, in regard to the discrimination of Puruṣa from Prakṛti, Comparison etc., have been given out as Pramāṇas, in such passages as,—

यथा प्रकाशयेकं इत्यहेकमेव रत्न: ।
लेवं लेभं तथा इत्यव्यं प्रकाशयेकं मात्रं ॥

As the single sun illuminates all this world, so does, O Bhārata, the Owner of the Field (Puruṣa) illumine all the Field (body).—Gītā, XIII. 38.

How, then, can it be said that Pramāṇa is only threefold? To this the author replies.

As, the threefold Pramāṇas being established, there is the establishment of all objects whatever, more Pramāṇa is not established, as there
would then be rédundant. Such is the meaning. For this very reason
Manu also has laid down the triad of Pramâñas in—

"\textit{Prakāram} \textit{karm} \textit{vidyānam};
\textit{shāstra} \textit{shāstra} \textit{vidyānam};
\textit{karm} \textit{sûcibhitam} \textit{karm} \textit{pramānadrinkasattam}.
"

Perception, Inference and śāstra or word are the means of getting at objects. The
triad should be made thoroughly known by one who intends purity of Dharma or Pious
Conduct.—Manu Sanhitâ. XII. 105.

Comparison, Tradition, etc. come under Inference and Word, and non-
perception, etc., come under Perception. In the passage quoted from the
Gîtâ, this Inference (which includes comparison, etc.) is intended. The
whole (Field), from the foot to the head, is to be illuminated by the one
different from itself, as it is not illuminative of itself Illuminativeness
is the Tejas or light common to consciousness. (The knower of the Field)
of whom fullness is the Upâdhi or adjunct, is established as the regulator
of the phenomena of illumination.—88.

\textit{Definition of Perception.}

\textit{Yad samvâd satt tu tva-kârotibhis vijnâna tattvâdham}. 1. 6.

\textit{Yat, which. Sambaddham, connected. Sat, being. N. B.—For,
sambaddham sat, Aniruddha reads sambaddha-siddham, meaning, proved, i.e.,
produced by connection or relation. Tattvâkâra-ullekhi, portraying the
form thereof, i.e., of the thing cognised. Vijnânam, cognition. Tat, that.
Pratyaksham, sense-perception.}

89. Perception is that cognition which, coming into
relation to the thing cognised (Vijnâna Bhikṣu), or, being
produced by means of relation to the thing cognised (Ani-
ruddha), portrays the form thereof (i.e., of the thing cognised)
—89.

\textit{Vrûti}.—The author gives the particular definitions of the three
Pramânas.

By the phrase, “That which is produced through relation,” Inference
and Word are excluded. “Tattvâkâra-ullekhi,” that which portrays the
form of (the thing cognised), e.g., a water-pot. That is perception. Savi-
kalpaka, discreet or sensuous perception also is herein included.

The Baudhâjas, however, describe that perception should be nothing but
nirvikalpaka, indiscreet or supersensuous cognition. But perception, they
say, is kalpanâ or mental elaboration, which is free from doubt and free from
error. “Kalpanâ” is the mental act, intuition, (Prati) consisting in the appli-
cation of name, gender, etc. It is present in savikalpaka or discreet cognition.
No. Hence, they argue, Perception is no Pramāṇa or Proof. But their argument is wrong. Perception is the cognition produced from the materials and conditions (sāmārgī) which cause Pramāṇa or right notion, obtaining direct vision of things, and not vitiated by any defect. It is both, i.e., savikalpaka, discreet, and nirvikalpaka, indiscreet. The consciousness (samvit) of name, genus, etc. is, however, produced by memory by means of the revival of impressions or recepts (saṃkalpāra) through similarity. For this reason only, on account of the presence of an additional element in it, a special name, savikalpaka or discreet, has been created. Nor, by the presence of Memory, is any fault created, or any damage done to the materials of sensation.

Now, if it is maintained by them that, because it is accompanied by Memory, therefore, Perception is no Proof, we can only admire their argumentative skill which finds display in the proposition that a co-operative cause obstructs the validity of the principal instrument of proof. Thus,

\text{लाख \ दि \ सन्मयांसापि \ प्रदानतवं \ न \ बायले।}
\text{संतकः का \ सतखः दि \ न अत्याधुनानहम।}
\text{ततः \ परेः \ दुनविन्तु \ घर्मेऽज्ञविन्दियथा।}
\text{दुनविन्तिले \ सारी \ प्रकाशस्वेन \ समता।}

For, a name, even though it is supplied by Memory, does not oppose the authority of Perception. For, it is the accidental or secondary mark of the thing bearing the name, and is not capable of obscuring the intrinsic form of the thing. Besides this, again, that by which an entity is completed or perfected in Buddhi by means of the properties such as genus, etc., is also recognised as having the characteristic of perception.—89.

\textit{Bhdāya:}—Pramāṇa or right cognition is judged in Puruṣa,—with the help of this principal conclusion, the author proceeds to state the specific definitions of the Pramāṇas.

That “cognition,” i.e., modification of Buddhi, which being related or connected, assumes the form of the thing with which it is connected, is perception. Such is the meaning. Here, the phrase ending with “being (sat),” is an adjective conveying the reason. So that the purport is that perception is the modification of Buddhi which is the support or seat of the (sensible) form produced from contact with its own object. As there is a future aphorism laying down that the modification of Buddhi moves to the object with which it is in relation, the being the product of contact does not belong to the modification; hence it has been taken as the seat of the form of object. While it is not impossible that the modification of Buddhi arising by means of the eye, etc., should, like the flame of the lamp, portray the form of the thing cognized immediately after the contact with the external objects—89.
The definition is not intended to apply to perception by the Yogins.

90. (It is) no fault (in the definition in that it does not apply to the perception of the Yogins), because that of the Yogins is not an external perception.—90.

Vritti:—If it be said that this is not the definition of perception, because it does not cover the perception of the Yogins, so the author says:

The definition given above is that of ordinary (laukika, popular), external perception, whereas the perception by the Yogi is not-external and extraordinary (alaukika). Hence the fault of being too narrow is not present in the definition.—90.

Bhūtya:—But, then, some one may object, on account of the absence of the form of the object connected or in contact, the definition does not extend to the perception by the Yogi of things past, future, and screened from view. Apprehending this, the author reconciles, by pointing out that the Yogic perception is not aimed at in this definition.

External sense-perception alone is the object of the definition here, and the Yogins do not perceive through the external senses. Hence the fault mentioned does not arise, that is, the definition is not too narrow for their perception.—91.

Or, the definition is intended to, and does, apply to the perception of the Yogins.

91. Or, (there is) no fault (in the definition), on account of the contact (of the Yogi’s mind) which has attained exaltation (by the practice of Yoga), with things in their enfolded state.—91.

Vritti:—Or, by this definition, the perception of the Yogins also is included. The author sets forth this alternative view.
Effects remaining always existent (according to the Sāmkhya Sarāna), even that which is destroyed or has disappeared, exists enfolded in its own cause, by the characteristic of being past and gone, and that which is yet to be produced, also exists in its own cause, by the characteristic of being not-yet-come. The Yogin alone who has acquired excellence through favourable influence of the virtue born of Yoga, can have connection (i.e., contact through mind) with Pradhāna (the root cause of all mundane existences), and hence, connection with all places, times, etc. Hence the definition is not too narrow.—91.

Bhāṣya:—The author gives the true solution of the case.

Or, that (Yogic perception) also is the scope of the definition, still there is no fault in it, i.e., it is not too narrow. Inasmuch as connection of the Yogin's mind which has attained exaltation produced by the virtue born of Yoga, takes place with objects in their enfolded state. Such is the meaning.

The word, līna, or enfolded, here denotes objects not in contact as intended by the opposite party. In the view of the sat-kārya-vādins (the Sāmkhyas who hold the Theory of Existent Effects), things past, etc. also verily exist in their essential forms. Contact with them is, therefore, possible. Hence the adjective, eiz, "that which has attained exaltation," has been used to point out the cause by means of which contact takes place with objects concealed and distant. "Atiśaya," excess or exaltation, is pervasiveness, and the surcease, etc. of the Tamas or obscurity hindering the modification of Buddhi into the form of the object.

And, in this matter, the following should be attended to: From the statement "which being connected" in the previous (I. 89) aphorism, we have it that it is contact of Buddhi with the objects that is the cause of perception, and, consequently, that, in the case of Perception in general or commonly of all external objects, the contact of Buddhi and object is the cause. Contacts with the Senses, on the other hand, are the specific causes in the cases of visual and other perceptions. It would not, however, follow that, such being the case, perception of external objects would take place by means of Buddhi even in the absence of contact with the Senses, the virtue born of Yoga, etc. For, on account of the obstruction caused by Tamas, it is impossible that there should at that time be any modification of the Sattva element of Buddhi. And this Tamas or obscurity is removed, sometimes by the contact between the sense and the object, and sometimes by the virtue born of Yoga, in the same way that the dirtiness of the eye is removed by the eye-paint. It
cannot be said that, then, on the maxim: "Let that be the cause thereof," contact with the Senses, etc., should be the cause of the perception in general of external objects; because, in the states of dreamless sleep, etc., it is proved that Tamas does obstruct the modification or function of Buddhi. From passages of the Sûnûti, e.g.,

सत्याकारणं विषाजम्: स्वसागरिष्ठं।
प्रस्थापनं तु तमससु तुद्यं विषु श्च्चस्मातृ॥

The waking state is, one should know, caused by Sattva; dreaming, one should refer to Rajas as its cause; dreamless sleep is caused by Tamas; the fourth state runs through the three. it, moreover, appears to be impossible that there should be any other cause of obstruction of the modification of Buddhi in the states of dreamless sleep, etc. Besides, in the case of ocular modification also, it is found that Tamas causes obstruction. Hardened logicians, however, imagine that the cause of cognition in general is the conjunction of the skin and Manas, in order to account for the non-production of modification in the state of dreamless sleep. But this is wrong. For, it is heard that even prior to the evolution of the skin-sense, Svayam-bhû (Causa sui, Brahmā) had perception of all things by the help of pure Buddhi. Besides, we intend to say that, in regard to the non-production of the conjunction of the skin and Manas also, Tamas itself is the instrumental cause. While mere reasoning (as that of the logicians) is attacked with the fault of having no secure foundation. Such is the line of our argument in reply to the above. —91.

The existence of Isvara or a Lord is above proof.

ईश्वरालिकः || १ || ६२ ||

वल्लभि: Isvara-a-siddheb, on account of non-proof of Isvara or Lord.

92. (It is no fault in the definition of Perception that it does not extend to the perception of Isvara), because Isvara is not a subject of proof.—91.

Vṛtti: —The perception of Isvara, some one may say, is not covered by the definition (given above.) So the author says:

If there were evidence or proof to establish (the existence of) Isvara, then, the consideration of the perception of Him would properly arise. But no such proof exists. If it be urged that such proof does exist in the form, namely, that Earth, etc., must have a creator, because they are products, we enquire whether he be embodied or un-embodied. Either way even, agency is impossible, because in the theory of the particularists
(the upholders of special creation), effects are mere appearances. This point has been elaborately discussed elsewhere.—91.

Bhāṣya:—But still, an opponent may say, the definition does not extend to the perception of Isvāra, because, being eternal, the perception of Him is not produced through contact. To this the author replies.

On account of the absence of proof in regard to Isvāra, it is no fault, the last four words following from the 90th aphorism (as the complement of the present one). And this negation of Isvāra is, as has been already established, only in accordance with the prāṇa-vāda or proud assertion of certain partisans. For, if it were not so, the aphorism would have been worded thus: On account of the non-existence of Isvāra (and not, on account of the non-existence of proof of Isvāra, as we have it).

It is, however, desired by us that perceptual cognition does arise in regard to Isvāra. The characteristic of perception in the present case is constituted by homogeneity with what is produced through contact, and homogeneity is constituted by the jāti or class directly pervaded by the quality or characteristic of cognition. Such is the import.—92.

Why the existence of Isvāra cannot be proved by evidence.

कुक्तवस्योन्नतरामावान् ततः सिद्धिः || ९ १ ६ २ ॥

कुक्तव: Mukta-buddhayoh, of the released and the confined. अन्यान्-तार-ाभावात्, owing to the non-existence of something different. ना, not. सिद्धिः: Tat-siddhib, proof thereof.

93. Proof of His existence is not possible, because He can be neither free, nor bound, nor something else.—93.

Vṛtti:—The author adduces a further reason.

Is He (Iśvāra) bound or is He free? If bound, He cannot be Iśvāra, owing to conjunction of Merit and Demerit. If free, He cannot be the agent or doer, on account of the absence of particular cognitions and desire to act and effort. Hence Iśvāra is above proof. If, again, you say that your Iśvāra is of a different description altogether, then, there being no example (i.e. nothing to compare with him), He would be something very extraordinary.—93.

Bhāṣya:—There is still room for the enquiry how the existence of Iśvāra is not proved by the Veda and the Smṛiti. So the author points out that it is the popular conflict of arguments that is the impediment to such proof.

Is the desired Iśvāra free from afflictions, or is He bound by them? (He can be neither). Nor is it possible that he should be of a different character. Hence there is no proof of Iśvāra. Such is the meaning.—93.
Reasons for the above view.

उभयप्रायस्ततः कलस्य ॥ १ ॥ ए४ ॥

Ubbhayathâ, either way. अपि, also. अतस-करतवम्, incapacity to effect anything.

94. Either way also He would be inefficient.—94.

Vritti:—The author explains the very same position.

This aphorism has been already explained above—94.

Bhâsya:—If He were free, He would be unequal to the task of creation, etc., as He would not possess the abhimaṇa or the will-to-be and the will-to-do, desires, etc. which instigate to creation, etc. And, again, if He were bound, He would be under delusion, and so, unequal to the task of creation: Such is the meaning.—94.

Texts which declare Īśvara, explained.

मुक्तात्मनः प्रशंसा उपासातिधिष्य वा ॥ १ ॥ ए५ ॥

Mukta-atmanah, of the free Self (Vijñâna Bhikṣu), of the released-like or quasi-free Self (Aniruddha). भवेत् Praśaṇa, laudation, glorification. भवेत् Upaśa, worship, homage. भवेत् Siddhasya, of the perfected one. N. B.—Aniruddha reads Upaśa-siddhasya as one word, meaning, accomplished by the cultivation of Yoga. व वा, or.

95. (The sacred texts which speak of Īśvara, are) either glorification of the free Self or homages paid to the Perfect Ones (Vijñaṇa Bhikṣu), or, glorifications either of the free-like Self, or of one made perfect by Yoga.—95.

Vritti:—If this be the case, then, there would be contradiction to such texts of the Veda as,—

स हि सर्वक्षेत्रोपवेष्य करतां

He is verily the Knower of all, the Creator of all.

To this the author replies.

“Mukta-atmanah” means, of the Self resembling the released Self by not having attachment, etc., and not of the released (Self), as the released Self cannot have volition, agency, etc. (to which the texts refer). The texts are glorifications of such free-like Self made for the purpose of lending support to the injunctions (vidhi); "Upaśa-siddhasya vā": Of the Yogi who, by worship (i.e., the practice of Yoga), has attained exaltation, and has acquired perfections in respect of animal or minute, etc., the glorification is for the purpose of making the practice of Yoga more attractive.—95.
Bhāṣya:—But, then, one may ask, what becomes of the Vedic texts which establish Īśvara? To this the author replies.

Accordingly as the case may be, some such texts of the Veda are, for the purpose of declaring the knowableness, "mukta-ātmanah," of the pure Self universal, intended in the form of glorifications to serve as incentives by means of its āśvarya or lordliness which consists in mere proximity (to the knowing Puruṣa); while some other texts, demonstrative of creatorship, etc. preceded by volition, are intended as extolments of the (comparative) eternity, etc. of the perfected non-eternal Īśvaras, such as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Iśvara, etc. (the Lords of Creation, Preservation, and Destruction, etc.), inasmuch as they, although they possess abhināma, etc. (and are therefore liable to perish), still possess eternity in a secondary sense (i.e. cyclic or aeonic immortality). Such is the meaning.—95.

The superintendence of Puruṣa over Prakriti is through proximity.

तत्स्तत्त्वाविवेकात्

96. The superintendence (of Īśvara or Puruṣa over Prakriti, etc.) is through proximity to Prakriti.—96.

Vṛtti:—Nor is proof of Īśvara, declares the author, from the argument that the non-intelligent cannot act without the superintendence of the intelligent.

As when a jewel containing the reflection of the body, moves, the abhināma or self-assumption arises that, the body moves, in respect of the body which does not really move; similarly "tatu-sāndhiḥnāt," through the self containing the reflection of Prakriti, the agency, experiencership, superintendence of Prakriti are attributed to, or assumed by, the Self. Therefore, it is an error to think that the intelligent Principle is the superintendent. Thus has it been declared (Gītā, III. 27):

प्रहते: निरप्रकाश: गुण: कामोषि सच्च:।
चारुपुरुषकर्मस्त विकाराणिरस्यमेव:।

While acts are everywhere being performed by Prakriti, by means of the Guṇas, the Self, being galloped by Kāraṇa, thus: "I am the door."

Bhāṣya:—But still, our opponent, may say, the superintendence of Prakriti and all the rest, of which we hear in the sacred books, will not
be explained, because, in the world, we find the use of the word superintendence only in the case of transformation by means of resolution or volition, etc. To this the author replies.

If it were alleged that superintendence consists in creativeness by means of volition, then this would have been a fault in our theory. But it is, on the other hand, desired by us that superintendence in the form of creativeness, etc., is through proximity, as is the case with the loadstone. As the loadstone acts as the attractor of iron by mere proximity, and not by volition, etc., similarly, by the mere conjunction of the Original Purusa, takes place the modification of Prakriti into the form of Mahat. And it is this alone in which consists His being the creator of His own upadhi or adjunct. And so has it been declared:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{nirichchāṃ śāṅkhyāte \ raste \ yadā \ tathā \ prabhute} & \text{ ।} \\
\text{śāntamātāṃ śāyena \ tatha \ jñātā} & \text{ ।} \\
\text{pratikhrutāṃ karūrykṣatāṃ \ ca \ śāṅkhyāte} & \text{ ।} \\
\text{nirikhyasākṣatāṃ katuṣāṃ śāṅkhyātā} & \text{ ।}
\end{align*}
\]

As the iron acts while the gem (loadstone) which is devoid of volition, stands nearby; so does the world proceed under the influence of a Deva or deity who is mere existence. Thus, both agency and non-agency are lodged in the Self: being devoid of volition, it is not agent, and it is an agent through mere proximity.

Texts of the Veda, such as—

\text{তত্ত্বজ্ঞান বদ্ধ স্থায়ম।}

It looked up, "I shall be many."—Ohändyogya Upāniṣat VI ii. 8.

have, however, a secondary import, as when we say that a plum is going (lit., desiring) to fall down, owing to the fact that Prakriti has conjunction with a number of proximate attributes. Or, it may be that all such texts have the creation preceded by Buddhi as their subject, and do not refer to Original Creation, inasmuch as the Smriti speaks of it as being not preceded by Buddhi. Thus we find in the Kūrma Purāṇa (IV. 66):

\begin{align*}
\text{तत्त्वज्ञान। सत्यं \ संकोचवालं \ कार्यं \ मय।} \\
\text{विनितिर्युक्तिनवविनितिः \ सुन्दरिः \ लिखितं} & \text{ ।}
\end{align*}

Such, then, is the Prakriti sarga or the creation of Prakriti or Original Creation, as briefly related by me. It is not preceded by Buddhi. Now listen to the creation of Brahman.

It would be redundant to restrict the meaning of this passage by interpreting "abuddhi-pūrvaka" as meaning not produced by the Buddhi of the Ādi Purusa or Original Purusa.
The Jivas or Embodied Purusas also are agents only through proximity.

97. (The superintendence) of the Jivas, in the case of particular effects also, is through Proximity.—97.

Vṛitti: — If no intelligent superintendence were required, then a dead body would show the act of eating, etc. To this the author replies.

Buddhi, etc. (the Sūkṣma or subtle body), associated with Vāyu or Prāṇa, make up the Jiva, and not that the Ātmā or Self is the Jiva. In particular acts, such as, for example, of eating, etc., the agency is of the Jivas alone, and not of Ātmā, because Ātmā does not undergo transformation.—97.

Bhāṣya: — Not only in creation, etc. alone there is creativeness of Puruṣa by merc proximity, but in other, i.e., all sorts of particular effects, namely, the Elements, etc., the creation of which is preceded by volition, etc., there is a similar agency of all Puruṣas. This the author declares.

(The words) Superintendence through proximity (which form the complement of the aphorism) follow (from the preceding aphorism).

In the Sixth Book, the author will declare the denotation of the term, Jiva, to be that which is marked out by the possession of the Antaḥ-karaṇa or the internal instrument of cognition. (Vide VI. 63).

The aphorism, therefore, means that "Videśa-kārye," in regard to particular effect called Visarga or specific creation, i.e., the creation of individual (Vyaṣṭi) things, also, "Jivāṇaṃ," of the Intelligences reflected in the Antaḥ-karaṇa, the superintendence is through proximity alone, and and is not by means of any activity whatever on their part, inasmuch as they are of the form of the Inmutable (Kūṭāstha) Consciousness itself.—97.

The Great Saying of the Vedanta: "Thou art That," is not useless.

Siddhānta-vidhi-dhātu-dhātukṣara-paṇḍeyas || Ā || Ā || Ā ||
98. The teachings of the Veda about cultivation of knowledge are not invalid, because they declare the true forms of the Realities.—98.

Vṛttī.—If knowledge does not exist in the Self, why, then, it may be asked, is instruction given for the cultivation of knowledge? To this the author replies.

The word “Antah-karanaśya,” of the Antah-Karana, appearing in the following aphorism, should be added on to this aphorism.

The meaning thereby is this: “Siddha-raupa-bodhhrītvāt,” because the Antah-Karana Mahat is the knower of the true form of Reality, therefore instructions have been given for learning the meaning of the sayings of the Veda. And because Purusa is reflected in the Mahat, the transference (Abhimāna) of the characteristic of being the knower takes place in him.—98.

Bhāṣya.—But, then, one may say, if an Eternal, Omniscient Īvara did not exist, then the teaching of Discrimination which is the meaning of the Great Saying of the Vedānta, would become unauthoritative, through the apprehension of its coming down as a blind tradition. To this the author replies.

The teaching of the meaning of the Sayings of the Veda is authoritative, (and this is the complement of the aphorism), because Brahma, etc. are the knowers of the true forms, i.e., of objects as they are; and because their authority is established beyond doubt by the authoritative-ness of the Ayurveda or the Science of Life, etc., of which they are the speakers.—98.

Actual superintendence belongs to the Antah-Karana.

99. (Actual) superintendence is of the Antah-karana, because it is lighted up by Purusa, as is the case with the iron.—99.

Vṛttī.—The author makes the very same point clear.

Superintendence belongs to the Antah-karana, because the apparent transference (Abhimāna) of the characteristic of being intelligent
BOOK I, SUTRA 99.

takes place in it as it is lighted up by the intelligence of Purusa, through the incidence of his shadow in Buddha. "Lohavat". As the iron which attracts, though it is inactive, still attracts through mere prox-imity.—99.

Bhāṣya:—But, if the superintendence of Purusa, by mere proximity, in a secondary sense of the term, then, it may be asked, to what does the primary superintendence belong? The author removes this curiosity.

Unimputed (actual) superintendence by the way of volition, etc., should be held to belong to the Antaḥ-karaṇa.

But, if it be said that superintendence cannot properly belong to unintelligent things like a water-pot, etc., so he says: "Loha-vat tat-pijvī latyātāt:" For the Antaḥ-karaṇa is lighted up with the light of intelligence, as is the iron with fire. Hence, inasmuch as it is, in a manner, invested with intelligence, its superintendence, which, for the reason given, cannot be present in a water-pot, etc., is justified. Such is the meaning. But, if this be so, then, it may be objected, in the lightening up of the Antaḥ-karaṇa by Consciousness, the intelligent Principle would be associated with the Antaḥ-karaṇa, (which is not desired by the Śāṇkhya's), in the very same way as fire, in lightening up of the iron, becomes associated with it. This, however, is not the case, we reply. For, the illumination of the Antaḥ-karaṇa consists merely in a particular conjunction with Consciousness which is eternally shining, that is, in nothing but the reflection of Consciousness produced through a particular conjunction. And not that Consciousness passes into the Antaḥ-karaṇa, whereby associatedness would be the result. The light, etc., of the fire also do not pass into the iron. But it is only a particular conjunction with the fire that is the lightening up of the iron.

It cannot be said that even then Purusa would be transformable through conjunction; for, we speak of transformation only when properties in addition to the general attributes are produced.

And the particular conjunction mentioned above takes place through the transformation of the Antaḥ-karaṇa alone in the form of the predominance of the Sattva element present in it. This hypothesis is made for the explanation of actual facts, namely, a peculiarity in the conjunction of which it is impossible that Purusa should be the instrumental (nimitta) cause, inasmuch as he does not undergo transformation.

And this same particular conjunction is the cause of the mutual reflection of Buddha and Ātmā in each other.
But when a particular conjunction is required as the cause of reflection, our opponent may say, the reflection theory, then, is useless, for the results obtained through reflection, e.g., cognition of objects, etc., can be had from the particular conjunction alone. We reply that such is not the case. The supposition of the reflection of Consciousness in Buddhi has been made for the purpose of seeing Consciousness, in the same manner as is seen the reflection of the face in the mirror. Otherwise, on account of the contradiction of the subject and the object (i.e., that one and the same thing cannot be both subject and object at the same time), it would not be possible for consciousness to have immediate vision of itself.

And it is this reflection of Consciousness in Buddhi that is also called Chit-chhya-āpatti or the falling of the shadow of Consciousness, Chaitanyā-adhyāsa or the super-addition or super-imposition of Consciousness, and Chit-aveda or the possession by Consciousness.

And that which is called the reflection of Buddhi in Consciousness, the same is desired for the manifestation of Buddhi together with the objects that have ascended to it. For, inasmuch as it is found that, in the case of Buddhi, the apprehension of objects takes place only by means of Buddhi assuming the forms of the objects, it is not reasonable to hold that, without the help of this, the manifestation of objects can appear in Puruṣa, by a mere particular conjunction. Moreover, the phrase, apprehension of objects, literally means assumption of the forms of the objects. And such transformation in the form of the objects is not possible in the case of Puruṣa. The meaning of the phrase, form of the object, therefore, comes to be the form of the object in the form of reflection. Such is the line of our argument.

And this theory of mutual reflection has been conclusively established by the revered Vyāsa in his Commentary on Yoga in the passage beginning with—

चतुष्कीर्तिपरिवारामपरिसंक्षेपच विद्यामिति सत्यमपि तद्विन्द्रवाच प्रसन्नवर्तिति।
श्रवणवचाचारस्वाच्यविभवत्रप्रहस्याय विद्ययेवतुकारभास्वाय विद्ययेवविभविश्वय विद्ययेवतुकारभास्वाय।

The power of Consciousness which is unchangeable and does not pass into the objects, imitates the modifications of changeful objects, as if it had passed into them. And because the modification of Buddhi which is endowed with the form of the influence of Consciousness, is mere imitation, so it is said that the modifications of Jāna or cognition or consciousness are those that are not qualified by the modifications of Buddhi. Vide Yoga Sūtra, II, 30, 4, 22. S. B. H. Vol. IV, pp. 134 and 390.

In the Yoga Vārtika also this point has been elaborately made out by us.
Some one, however, thinks that Buddhi alone is the knower of all objects by means of the shadow of Consciousness reflected in it, inasmuch as it is perceived that cognition has the same substratum or place of inference with desire etc., and, secondly, it is not reasonable that one should be moved to action by the cognition of another. But this view should be disregarded, as it is based on the assumption of the absence of cognition from Ātmā. For, did the characteristic of being the knower by buddhi alone, there would be contradiction of the two future aphorisms (I. 10 and I. 143), which declare that experience ends with discrimination and that the experinence is Purusā; and there would also be an absence of proof of the existence of Purusā, on account of the inferential mark of Purusā, namely, experience, being taken as belonging to buddhi alone.

Nor can it be said that, there being no other explanation of their reflection, Purusā will be proved to be the thing of which it is the reflection; because the argument involves the vicious circle: the proof of the consciousness lying in buddhi as a reflection is dependent on the proof of a separate thing reflected, and, on the proof of it as a reflection, depends the proof of the thing reflected by way of the counter-opposite thereof. In our theory, on the other hand, when, after the proof of Purusā as the knower, we prove the reflection of him in buddhi on the ground that his being knowable is not otherwise explainable, there is no such argument in a circle.

Now, if it be said that a conscious entity of the form of a thing reflected is proved by means of the characteristic of being the witness of the modifications of buddhi; we reply that this is not proved, since, in that case, the witness itself should properly be the knower also, as the supposition of two knowers would be redundant, and, secondly, as we perceive that the cognition of the modification of buddhi in the form of the water-pot and the cognition of the water-pot reside in one and the same substratum. Moreover, if this were the case, then, buddhi itself being the experiencer, the proof of Purusā as the experiencer, by the subsequent aphorism (I. 143.): “Through experiencership,” would be contradicted.

Now, if the import of the above proposition is described to be only this that cognition of a thing reflected takes place only through the relation in the form of the falling of shadow of the Consciousness in Buddhi, and not that the reflection of Buddhi is traced out in Consciousness; we reply that this view too is wrong. For it is not observed that the sun, etc., by the relation of the form of casting their own reflections, become the illuminators of the water, etc., as well as of
the things (reflection) lying in them. It is by the rays of the sun, etc. that both of them are illuminated. In the case of mirage in the desert, and other optical illusions, reflection of light has been verily found to be illuminative of the water, etc. super-imposed upon it. Pursuant to this observation, we have made the theory that it is the reflection of Buddhi in consciousness that is the relation which is the cause of the manifestation of all objects.

And, next, the statement that one is not moved to action by the cognition of another,—that also is wrong, i.e., not a fact, inasmuch as it will be established by means of an illustration that cognition and activity may lie in different substrata, by the future aphorism (I. 105): Even who is not the agent, may be the enjoyer or experiencer of the fruit, as in the case of rice, etc. For, as Buddhi regulates the action of the body by means of resolution, so, here too, particular conjunctions, etc., alone regulate the relation of the sower and the reaper.—99.

Definition of Inference.

Prātiṣṭhāṇya: Prātiṣṭhāṇyaṁpratibuddhāsūryānusannam. II 1 100 II

Pratibandha-dṛṣṭāḥ, of one who sees the invariable accompaniment.

Pratibuddhā-jñānam, knowledge of the accompanied. Ānumānānam, an inference.

100. An Inference is the knowledge of the accompanied by one who sees the accompaniment.—100.

Vṛtti:—The author states the definition of Inference.

Inference is the knowledge of the pervader (vyāpaka, the major term), following the knowledge of the pervaded (vyāpya, the middle term), on the part of one who sees the relation of a-vinā-bhāva or of one not being without the other. Hereby all forms of Inference, Anvayi or by agreement, Vyatireki or by difference, Anvaya-vyatireki or by agreement and difference, Pūrva-vat or from cause to effect, Śeṣa-vat or from effect to cause, and Sāṃvayato dṛṣṭām or from the general to the general, are included. The inferential marks mentioned by the logicians are also included herein. Thus say they:

A mark of inference is that which is connected with that which is to be inferred, is well-known in what is attended with it, and which is absent where it is absent.—100.

Bṛhāya:—Having defined the Proof called Perception, the author defines Inference.
“Pratibandha” means pervasion (vyāpti or invariable accompaniment of one thing, e.g., fire, by another thing, e.g., smoke). The knowledge of the pervader (vyāpakā) or what is so accompanied, which results from seeing the pervasion, is the Proof called Inference. Such is the meaning. While anumiti or the result of inference, i.e., the knowledge produced by inference, is knowledge belonging to Puruṣa.—100.

Definition of Word or Verbal Testimony.

शब्दः || १ || १०१ ||

शब्दः: Apta-upadesāb, appropriate (Vijñāna Bhikṣu) or received (Auddhika) declaration. स: Sabda, Word or Testimony.

101. Word is an appropriate or received declaration.—101.

Vṛtti:—The author defines Word.

The received, i.e., revealed, declaration is Word, and not one made by an Apta or trustworthy person, because the Veda is a-pauruṣeya or not composed by a Puruṣa. That the Veda is not the work of any Puruṣa, we shall establish in the Fifth Book in the aphorism (V. 46) which declares that it is not the work of any Puruṣa.

The word, sabda, in the aphorism, declares the cause or instrument of verbal cognition, while the result obtained from the use of the instrument, namely, cognition produced by Word as a Proof, is also called Sabda, through the transference of the nature of the cause to the effect.

The sayings of Buddha, etc., are mere appearances of truth, because, on account of their contradiction to the Veda, they are not supported by any authority.—101.

Bhāṣya:—The author defines the Proof called Word.

“Vyāpti” here means fitness, competence, intrinsic worth, inasmuch as it will be declared in the Fifth Book that the Veda is not the work of any Puruṣa. Thus, then, Word is that which possesses intrinsic worth, and cognition produced by it, called Word, is the Proof. And the result of this Proof is verbal knowledge belonging to Puruṣa.—101.

The object of setting forth the Proofs in this Śāstra.

उपयोगितः: प्रमाणात तद्द्विपेशः || १ || १०२ ||

उपयोगितः: Udbhaya-siddhi, establishment of both, i.e., the Self and the Not-Self. प्रमाणं: Pramāṇa, from Proof. तद्विपेशः: Tat-upadesāb, declaration thereof.

102. The establishment of both (Puruṣa and Prakṛiti) is from Proof; (hence) the declaration thereof.—102.
Vṛti:—The beginning of this Śāstra is for the purpose of discrimination between Puruśa and Prakṛti. And there is no Proof to establish them. Apprehending such an objection, the author declares.

"Siddhi," knowledge, of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, is through the Proof presently to be mentioned (side next aphorism). Therefore, instruction for the purpose of Discrimination is justified.—102.

Bṛṣya:—The author himself declares the object of establishing the above Proofs.

The establishment of both, i.e., the Self and the Not-Self, by way of discrimination from each other, follows from Proof alone. Hence, declaration, for the purpose of instruction, has been made thereof, i.e., of Proof. Such is the meaning.—102.

Proof of Puruṣa and Prakṛti is by Śāmānyato Dṛṣṭa Inference.

सामान्यतो दृष्टादुभयसिद्धिः ॥ १ ॥ १०३ ॥

Śāmānyato dṛṣṭat, from the inference called as such. समान्यता: Udbhaya-siddhiḥ, proof of both.

103. Proof of both (Puruṣa and Prakṛti) is from the inference called Śāmānyato Dṛṣṭa.—103.

Vṛti:—What, then, is that Proof from which knowledge of Puruṣa and Prakṛti is obtained? To this the author replies.

Prakṛti being not an object of Perception, knowledge of Prakṛti is obtained, in a general way (sāmānyena), as follows: That which is an effect, is preceded by the attributes of its cause; every effect in nature is essentially of the form of the three Guṇas; hence, something constituted by the three Guṇas, exists; and that is Prakṛti.

Ātmā or the Self also not being an object of Perception, it is proved as a different entity, not formed by combination of parts, by means of the argument that what is a structure of manifold parts (that is, Prakṛti) must be for the sake of another. The author also will declare later on (I. 140): (Puruṣa is proved), from the fact that a combination of parts must exist for the benefit of another.—103.

Bṛṣya:—The author describes the particular form of inference by which, as Proof, amongst those mentioned above, Puruṣa and Prakṛti should be established by being discriminated from each other.

All inference is of three kinds: Pūrva-vat, Śeṣa-vat, and Śāmānyato Dṛṣṭa. Amongst these, Pūrva-vat is that which infers an object belonging to the class of objects perceived; as, e.g., the inference
of fire by means of smoke, for, objects of the class of fire have been before perceived in the kitchen room and other places.

Sēsa-vat is inference by the method of difference. "Sēsa-vat" means that which has sēsa or an object not known before as its subject matter (s. e., residual). In other words, it is inference in which the object to be inferred (sādhyā) does not belong to the class of any known objects. E. g. the inference of the difference of Earth from all other things by means of Earth-ness. For, the difference of Earth from all other things was not established before.

And Sāmānyato Dṛiṣṭa is inference which is neither Pūrva-vat nor Sēsa-vat. It is where from the apprehension of the vyāpti or pervasion (or the general proposition which forms the major premise), by generalization (sāmānyataḥ) from the cases of object belonging to perceptible classes, etc., an object of a different class, i.e., an imperceptible object, etc., is established by the force of the mark of inference being a property of the subject of the inference. E.g., the inference of an instrument of cognition in the case of knowledge of form, etc., by means of its being an act. For here, after apprehending the vyāpti or invariable accompaniment of an act and its instrument, by taking into consideration, or by generalization from the axe, etc., which belong to the class of Earthy objects, etc., as instruments of the acts effected by them, an object of a different kind from Earthy objects, etc., i.e., an imperceptible object, namely, Indriya or the Sense, is established as the instrument of knowledge of form, etc.

Amongst these kinds of inference, from the Sāmānyato Dṛiṣṭa inference is the proof of both Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. Such is the meaning.

Of these two (Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), the Sāmānyato Dṛiṣṭa inference is of Prakṛiti; e.g., the Principle Mahat must have for its material cause a substance possessing the properties of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, for, while it is an effect, it possesses the properties of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, as is the case with the ear-ring, etc., made of gold, etc.

In the case of Puruṣa, on the other hand, although there is no need of inference to prove his existence, his existence being admitted on all hands, still, in the matter of his discrimination from Prakṛiti, etc., it is the Sāmānyato Dṛiṣṭa inference that is required. The inference is made thus: Pradhāna exists for the benefit of another, because it acts by combination of parts, as is the case with a house, etc. For, here, after apprehending the fact which is proved by Perception, namely, that a house, etc. exist for the benefit of the body etc., inference is made of Puruṣa who belongs to a class different from the class to which body, etc., belong, as one other than
Prakṛiti etc., for the benefit of whom the latter exists. Body, etc., were before taken to be the experiencer in consequence of Non-discrimination. For this reason has it been said: "Proof of both."—103.

The end of Bhoga or experience is in Consciousness.

विद्वस्तानो भोगः ॥ १ ॥ १०४ ॥

विश्लेषः—Chit-avasānaḥ, of which the end or completion, or cessation is in Consciousness. भोगः: Bhogaḥ, experience of the joys and sorrows of the world (Aniruddha), attainment called Pramāṇa or Right Cognition (Vijñāna Bhikṣu.)

104. Bhoga ends in Consciousness.—104.

Vṛtti:—Prakṛiti being eternal and by nature active, perpetual Bhoga or experience, one may say, will be the result, and, consequently, there will be no Release. To this the author replies.

"Chit" means Ātmā. Bhoga ends with the discrimination of that. As antecedent non-existence, although it is from eternity, disappears, so does eternal Prakṛiti continue to procreate till discriminative knowledge arises.

If it be said that such is the case in regard to non-existence and not in regard to existence; we reply, no. Here the characteristic of Non-existence is not instrumental, inasmuch as it is not so observed in the case of consequent non-existence.

Now, if it is asserted that theories should be in accordance with observation, we say that this is so even in the present case.—104.

Bhāṣya:—Attainment (siddhi) called Pramāṇa or Right Cognition, has been declared to be the result of Proof. This, one may think, will entail the transformation of Puruṣa. To remove this apprehension the author declares the true nature (svārūpa) of that attainment.

("Chit-avasānaḥ" means) that of which the action is completed in consciousness which is the svārūpa or essential form of Puruṣa. Of this description is "Bhoga" or siddhi or perfection or attainment. Such is the meaning.

The word "chit-avasānaḥ" has been used to exclude Bhoga from Buddhi; the term "avasāna" for removing the apprehension that transformability, possession of properties, etc., may belong to Consciousness. Bhoga being reduced into its true form in Consciousness, there is no harm caused to the immutability, etc., of Puruṣa. Such is the idea.

Thus, Puruṣa, Prakṛiti, and other provables, having risen into the modification of Buddhi called Proof, shine in Puruṣa, being reflected there along with the modification. Hence it is only Consciousness in itself,
determined in finite forms by the reflection of the modifications of Buddhī which is coloured by objects from the outside, that is what is called bhāna, Illumination or manifestation of objects, the experience of Puruṣa and the fruit or result of Proof. And thence follows that the modifications are instruments, because they, by the form of reflection, serve as gateways through which connection with objects takes place. Accordingly it has been declared in the Viśṇu Purāṇa:

युद्धिलिनिष्ठेऽपि वानास्य याः प्रवचनितः ।
प्रत्यक्षविविधायत प्रकर्ष्य किमविभास्य नमः ॥

He who makes over the objects, taken in by the Senses, to the indwelling Self, I bow down to that Universal Self in the form of the Antaḥ-karaṇa.—Viśṇu Purāṇa, I. xiv. 35.

For it is found that the instruments or agents of a king make over all enjoyables to their master.

The word "Bhoga" means eating, in other words, appropriation to oneself. It applies commonly to all things beginning with the body and ending with the Conscious One. There is, however, this difference. On account of his not being transformable, the experience of objects by Puruṣa means merely the reception of the reflections of objects; while, through their being transformable, growth, etc., takes place in the case of the rest.

And it is this absolute or primary (pāramārthika) bhoga in the form of transformation, that is denied in Puruṣa by the sloka:

कुर्जे भोगं न विभास्य ॥

Like the experience of Buddhī transferred to the Self, etc.—Viśṇu-paśa-Vadham, II. 59.

In this aphorism it is proved that the fruit or consequence pervades or affects Puruṣa also, inasmuch as it is only of the ending in Consciousness that the being the proof of both is declared——104.

He who does not act, may still enjoy the fruit.

प्रकटार्या प्रज्ञाययावां तत्क्षययतः ॥ १ । १०५ ॥

वचन्: Akartuḥ, non-agent's. के Api, even, also. कल्लेण: Phala-upabhogāḥ, enjoyment of fruits, experience of consequences. अभावस्य आन्न-अध्या-वत, as in the case of food, etc.

105. Experience of consequences may belong even to him who is not the agent, as in the case of food, etc.—105.

Vṛūti.—If Pradhāna be, as you say, the agent, and Puruṣa the experiencer, then, the result would be that another would be the experiencer of the fruits of the acts done by a different one. To this objection the author replies.
As the cook is the agent in the preparation of food, etc., and his master is the experiencer of the fruits of his action, so is the case here also. If it be said that the master also is an agent (Cf. the final cause of Aristotle), because the food is intended for him, we reply that even so is the production of Prakṛiti also intended for the Self.—105.

Bhāṣya:—But, our opponent may say, in the world, the agent alone is observed to experience the fruits of acts, e.g., the experience of the Pleasure and Pain arising from movement is of him alone who moves. How is it, then, asks he, that the experience of the fruits, that is, the properties produced by Buddhi, namely the pleasurable, painful and deluding modifications of Buddhi coloured with the reflections of objects, takes place in Puruṣa? Such being the apprehension in his mind, the author declares.

Experience of the fruit of the action of Buddhi, namely the modification of Buddhi, by Puruṣa, although he is not the agent, is reasonable or possible. “Anna-ādya-vat,” as the enjoyment of the food, etc., prepared by others, belongs to the King, similarly. Such is the meaning.

Having admitted that Pleasure, Pain, etc., are the fruits of action, it is declared that Puruṣa experiences the fruits of action inhering in Buddhi.—105.

The notion that Puruṣa is the experiencer, is due to A-viveka.

| विवेकाद्वारा तत्सिद्धे: कर्त्त: फलावगमः || १ । १०६ || |
|---|---|
| अविवेकत् | through non-discrimination. वाः or मद्यः: Tat-siddhaḥ, from proof thereof, i.e., of the notion of experiencership. कर्त्तः: Kartuḥ, of the agent. फलावगमः: Phala-avagamah, knowledge of fruit. |

106. Or, the declaration made in the Śāstras that fruit belongs to the agent, is due to the non-discrimination of the production called experience. (Vijñāna Bhikṣu.) Or, the notion of experiencership in Puruṣa being derived from non-discrimination, it is known that fruit belongs to the agent. (Āniruddha.)—106.

Vṛtti.—Having stated the popular or practical conclusion, the author declares his own conclusion.

Neither is Puruṣa the agent nor the experiencer, but the abhimāna or assumption of experiencership arises in him through his being reflected in the Mahat Principle. “A-vivekāt vā”: through non-apprehension of
The distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. "Tat-sidheḥ" there being proof of the abhimāna on the part of the pseudo-agent that he is the experience of the fruit.—106.

Bhāṣya.—Now, admitting that it is only the experience belonging to Puruṣa that is the fruit of action, the author declares the principal conclusion that it is in Puruṣa himself that the fruit is produced by the action of Buddhi.

Or, it may be, that the fruit does not really accrue to the agent, inasmuch as, by such desires as "May I experience Pleasure", etc., it is indicated that it is experience alone that is the fruit of action. Hence it follows that the fruit is what inheres in the experiencer, and nothing else. On the other hand, the information that the fruit accrues to the agent, given in the Śāstras, in such passages as,

शास्त्रविचित्रता फलमुखादाति

The fruit laid down in the Śāstra accrues to the performer.

is due to non-discrimination, in the idea of the agent, "tat-sidheḥ," of the production called experience inhering in the non-agent. Such is the meaning. For, the popular belief is: "I who act, the very same I do experience".

And the prayer that there is, namely, "May Pleasure result unto me", etc., the same can be accounted for only as the means of securing the fruit, like the prayer, "May a son be born unto me". Bhoga or experience, on the other hand, is not the means of securing anything else. Hence it follows that it (experience) alone is the fruit. Such is the principal conclusion.

Although Bhoga is the svarūpa or very form of Puruṣa, still, according to the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, it should be understood that it is as much an effect as the ear, because they hold that it is nothing but consciousness determined or conditioned by Pleasure, etc., that constitutes Bhoga. In this theory, if Bhoga is admitted to be the fruit, then, it should be further understood that it is nothing but the non-existence of the experience of Pain that constitutes Apavarga, the Grand Fulfilment or Release. Or, let the non-existence of Pleasure and Pain alone be the fruit by means of the relation of ownership, in the form of the capability of being experienced, seeing that by means of that relation, Pleasure, etc., also, like Buddhi, etc., may possess the characteristic of being inherent in Puruṣa.—106.
Fruit of knowledge is absence of Pleasure and Pain.

नोभयन्त तत्त्वायप्याने || १ १ १०७ ||

Na, not. उभयम् Ubhaya, both, Pleasure and Pain. Cha, and. तत्त्वाक्याये Tattva-akhyâne, on the manifestation of the Tattva or Principle.

107. And when the Tattva is made known, there is neither agency nor experiencership (Aniruddha), or, neither Pleasure nor Pain (Vijñâna Bhikṣu).—107.

Vritti.—The author declares the result of the absence of A-viveka.

The Tattva or Principle, i.e., Puruṣa, being known, through Viveka or discrimination, "as ubhayam", (the wrong notion of; neither agency nor experiencership (exists).—107.

Bhâsa.—Thus, having in the above manner established the Pramâṇas or proofs and the knowledge or proof of the Prameyas or Provable, which constitutes the fruit or result of Pramâṇa, the author declares also the fruit of the knowledge of the Provable.

"Tattva-akhyâne": On the immediate vision of the truth about Puruṣa and Prakriti by means of Pramâṇa (i.e. Samânyato Driśṭa Inference), "ubhayam," Pleasure and Pain, also do not arise again, as established by reasoning and the Veda, e.g.,

विचार द्वैशोकै ज्ञाति
Ho who knows, escapes joy and grief.—Kaṭha Upaniṣat, II. 12.

Such is the meaning.—107.

Mere non-perception cannot prove non-existence, as it is due to other well-known causes.

विषयोविषयप्रदृष्टेऽद्वैतेऽपि निरपावानायामिनिमित् || १ १ १०८ ||

Viṣayā, an object of perception. a-viṣayā, no object of perception. अयुत्तुप्त: Āyutpâtha, on account of long distance, and other causes. आषाभदलीयं Bhâma-upâdâlabhâyaṁ, through incapacity or capacity, through impairment or application. अनुज्ञ अनुज्ञ (Indriyas) of the Indriya or Sense.

108. What is an object of perception (at one time) may be (at another time) not an object of perception, because (there are conditions, such as) a great distance etc., which cause impairment or application, (as the case may be), of the Senses.—108.
BOOK I, SUTRA 108.

Vṛtti.—Having stated the Pramanās, the author states the distribution of the Prameyas or the Provables.

A "thing" is "visaya" or an object perceptible, through "upādāna" or connection, of the Sense. It is "a-visaya" or not an object perceptible, through "hāna" or absence of connection, of the Sense. And non-connection is due to unfitness for conjunction of objects lying at a long distance, etc. e.g., on account of extreme distance, a bird flying far away in the sky is not perceived; on account of extreme proximity, the collyrium applied to the eye is not perceived; on account of intervention of another thing, a thing placed inside a wall is not perceived; on account of mental distraction, a person afflicted with grief, etc., does not perceive the thing that lies at his side; on account of its extreme fineness, an Atom is not perceived; on account of suppression or overpowering, e.g., by the sound of a drum, the sound produced from a conch shell is not perceived; and so on.—108.

Bhāṣya.—Puruṣa and Prakṛti have been established by inference, briefly showing their discrimination from each other. There are minor differences in the manner of the inference of the two, viz., Puruṣa and Prakṛti. These minor differences are the subject matter of discussion from this place up to the end of the Book. Amongst them, at the beginning of the discussion, the author removes the impediments which cause non-cognition in the case of the inferences of Prakṛti, etc.

The Chārvikas (lit. Sweet-sayers) or Sensationalists cannot prove, by means of perception, the non-existence of Prakṛti etc., like the non-existence of a waterpot etc., from the mere fact of their not being apprehensible by the Senses; inasmuch as even an existent object may be an object, or may not be an object, of the Senses, according to difference of time, on account of the impairment and application of the Senses, in consequence of the fault of its lying at a great distance, etc. Such is the meaning. Where all the materials or causes of the sense-perception of an entity exist, the cause of perception of the non-existence thereof, is nothing but failure of the Senses to reach that object. In regard to the sense-apprehension of Prakṛti, however, full attention to all the causes of such apprehension cannot be possible, owing to the presence of the counter-agents presently to be mentioned. Such is the import.

The faults, viz., extreme distance, etc., have been specifically enumerated by the Kārikā:

antarṣa guṇa-bhāvānām kāśyoḥ kāsy ca samānyo vā atyātāt ca.
SAMKHYA-PRAVACHANA-SUTRAM.

(Non-apprehension of objects by the Senses arises) from extreme distance, extreme nearness, impairment of the Senses, non-presence of the mind, extreme fineness, intervention, suppression by others, and combination with likes.—Sāṃkhya Kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, Verse VII.

"Samābhihāra" or combination with likes, in the above, means association with things of the same class; e.g., through mixing the cow's milk with the milk of the buffalo, arises non-apprehension of the buffalo's milk as such.—108.

Non-apprehension of Puruṣa and Prakṛti by the Senses is due to their extreme fineness.

सौद्याचारदत्तलिकि: || १ || १०६ ||

शेखराण्य व शेखराण्याः सा कर्मकर्म: सातायत्त आश्चर्यत एवं बुद्धियो नोन-प्राणप्राणा—पूर्वप्राणप्राणा, प्रा कुबे और त्रिकृतीया।

109. Non-perception of Puruṣa and Prakṛti is due to their extreme subtlety.—109.

Vṛtti.—If it be asked, whence does arise the non-perception of Prakṛti? So the author says.

"Subtlety" means difficulty of investigation, and not that Prakṛti is of the size of an Atom, because Prakṛti is all-pervasive or universal.—109.

Bhāṣya.—But, it may be asked, which of the faults mentioned above, viz., extreme distance, etc., causes obstruction to the perception of Prakṛti, etc.? To this the author replies.

The non-perception thereof, i.e., of the two mentioned above, viz., Puruṣa and Prakṛti, is, however, due to their subtlety. Such is the meaning.

"Subtlety" here does not denote atom-ness, because they pervade the whole universe; nor does it signify difficulty of investigation and the like, because it can be hardly predicated of them in that sense. But it denotes a class or general attribute which opposes the right cognition of them by means of Perception. The right notion about Puruṣa, Prakṛti, etc., that is, however, derived, (in special cases), from Perception, is due to the excitation caused by the virtue born of Yoga. And the limitation thus put on the general attribute is not faulty. Or, it may be that subtlety here denotes only the characteristic of being partless substances. And the virtue born of Yoga is the excitant to their perception.—109.
Proof of the subtlety of Prakriti, etc.,

कार्यदर्शनात्त्वपलब्धे: || १ १ १२० ||

करणेन Kārya-darśanā, from seeing the effect. तत्परम: Tat-upalabdheḥ, there being apprehension thereof, i.e., of subtlety (Vijñāna Bhikṣu) or of Prakriti, etc., (Aniruddha).

110. Because the apprehension thereof arises from seeing the effect.—110.

Vṛtti.—How, then, it may be asked, is the existence of Prakriti established? To this the author replies.

As the knowledge of (the existence of) the Ultimate Atoms is derived from seeing the water pot (which is their product), similarly is derived the knowledge of the existence of Prakriti from seeing the products of the three Guṇas.—110.

Bhāṣya.—But, it may be asked, when their non-apprehension is quite likely to be due to their non-existence, what for is the supposition of subtlety made? Otherwise, again, why would not the non-apprehension of the horns of a hare, etc., be referred to subtlety as its cause? To this the author replies.

The existence of Prakriti, etc., having been already established by means of the fact that the effects which we observe in the world, cannot be explained otherwise than as produced from them, the supposition of their subtlety is made in order to account for their non-perception. And, prior to their inference, their non-existence cannot be ascertained, there being room for the doubt whether their non-perception may not be due to their subtlety, etc. Hence the inference is justified. Such is the meaning.—110.

Objection: Conflict of opinions is a bar to the existence of Prakriti.

वादविविधत्वेऽत्तत्सामसिद्धिरिति चेत || १ १ १२१ ||

वादविविधत्वे: Vādi-vipratipattheḥ, on account of the contradictory views of thinkers of different schools. नप्रिहि: Tat-niddhiḥ, non-proof thereof, i.e., of the existence of Prakriti (Aniruddha), or, of the theory of existent effects (Vijñāna Bhikṣu). चेति च इति chet, if this be said.

111. If it be said that this is not proved in consequence of the contradictory theories of different thinkers.—111,
Vṛitti.—Some—the Vedāntins—say that the world has Brahma for its cause, while others, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, say that it has the Ultimate Atoms for its cause, and the elders (of the Sāṁkhya School) say that it has Prakṛti for its cause. The author raises the doubt involved in these contrary theories.

"Tat-asiddhiḥ" means the non-proof of the existence of Prakṛti.

—111.

Bhidya.—In regard to the inference of Prakṛti, the author apprehends an objection.

Well, if the effect existed prior to its production (as maintained by the Sāṁkhyaśāstra), then, of course, an eternal Prakṛti would be proved to exist as its substratum, inasmuch as it will be declared afterwards (Vide I. 133, page 191) that the inference of the cause is made only as being always the accompanier of the effect. But, in consequence of the disagreement of different thinkers, an existed effect itself is not proved. If such be the objection.—111.


112. (Admitting, for the sake of argument, that there is no proof of the theory of Existent Effects), still, when by the observation of the one (i.e. the effect), the existence of the other is proved, there can be no negation (of the existence of Puruṣa and Prakṛti).—112.

Vṛitti.—The author states his conclusion with regard to the above objection.

If the subject of inference, on one side, were disproved by the mere disagreement of theorists, then, since such differences of opinion exist in regard to the alternative or opposite side, how could there be proof of what they propose to be the cause? If they reply that it would be proved by the cognition by inference of that which pervades, from the cognition of that which is pervaded, on the strength of their not ever being one without the other, then, it is the same with us also. Hence our inference of the cause from the effect is not to be contradicted.—112.
Bhāṣya.—Admitting the validity of the above objection, for the sake of argument, the author avoids it.

Granting that the effect is not eternally existent, still by the observation of the one, i.e., the effect, the existence of the other, i.e., the cause, being proved, there is really no contradiction of our inference. Hence an eternal cause (Prakṛti) is verily established.

Herefrom also is made the deduction of Release by means of discrimination of Puruṣa as not undergoing transformation, from this very cause (Prakṛti) which undergoes transformation. Such is the meaning.

On this, very Abhyupagama-vāda or doctrine of admission of counter-theories for the sake of argument, proceed the positive or āstikā Śāstras, e.g., the Vaiśeṣika, etc. Hence, it should be remarked that although they are in (apparent) conflict with the declarations in the Veda and Smṛti of the Theory of Existent Effects, yet they are not unauthoritative in their other portions.—112.

Proofs of the Theory of Existent Effects: (a) Its denial would entail contradiction of the threefold aspect of things.

трёхчастоведущий || २ || ११२ ||

विविधविरोधायापन्न || २ || ११२ ||

विविधविरोधायापन्न: Trividha-virodha-āpateh, on account of the entailment of a contradiction to the threefold aspect of things. Cha, and.

113. (Denial of the Theory of Existent Effects) would entail contradiction of the threefold aspect of things (Vijñāna Bhikṣu). Or, (the inference of any other cause than Prakṛti), would etc. (Aniruddha.)—113.

Vṛtti.—Let a cause be inferred from the observation of the effect, but how can you say that the said cause is Prakṛti? To this the author replies.

The Guṇas are threefold: Sattva, Itājas, and Tamas. There would be contradiction thereof, (if Prakṛti were not the cause), i.e., the world would be devoid of them; but it is not found to be so.—113.

Vedāntin Mahādeva: Were Brahman or the Ultimate Atoms the cause of the world, it would lack the characteristic, but which, we perceive, it does possess, of having the nature, and thereby being the cause, of Pleasure, Pain, and Bowldorment.

Bhāṣya.—The author states the true refutation of the objection. Now, all effect has, as admitted on all hands, a threefold aspect, viz., past, future, and present. If the effect is not desired to be always
existential, then, its threefoldness would not be established. For, by the
non-existence of the water pot, etc. in times past, etc., the absence
of the properties of being past, etc., would not be established in the case
of the water pot, etc., since there can subsist no connection between what
is existent and what is non-existent.

Note.—A connection or relation involves two terms. When we say that a water
pot lies on the ground, we assert a relation to exist between the ground and the water
pot. The two terms of the relation are the ground and the water pot. Both of them are
necessary to determine the relation, and, as, their general name is Nirupa or deter-
mensant. Specifically, the ground is called Anuyogī or that to which something is joined
afterwards, and the water pot is called Pratiyogī or the counter-opposite which fills up
and, thereby, destroys the blank caused by its non-existence until then.

Moreover, if counter-opposite-ness consist in being of the form of the
counter-opposite, then, the same defect remains, because it would then be
the same as the non-existence of the water pot. If it be the very form
(svārdpa) of non-existence itself, then, the non-existence of the cloth,
etc., would be the non-existence of the water pot, etc., because of the
absence, on the supposition, of any distinctive peculiarity in non-existence.
And, if any distinctive peculiarity is admitted to exist in the intrinsic
form of non-existence, then, non-existence would lose its character as
such, and be a mere technical name.

It cannot be said that the counter-opposite itself will be the dis-
inctive peculiarity of the non-existence; since a non-existent counter-
opposite cannot possibly be the distinction in the case of antecedent non-
existence, etc.

It should, therefore, be said that the past, future and present are nothing
but different states of the effect which is really eternal; since, it is but
reasonable that the intuitions, viz., “The water pot is past”, “The
water pot is present”; and “The water pot is coming-to-be”, should have
similarity of forms; and not that one of them should have existence as
its object, while the other two, non-existence as their object.

And it is these two states, viz., the past and the not-yet-come-to-
pass, that cause the use of the expressions, consequent non-existence and
antecedent non-existence; since there is no proof of two more non-
existences different from them. Such is the hint. More on this point
may be found in the Yoga Sūtrām of Patañjali.

Likewise, absolute non-existence and reciprocal non-existence also
are nothing but the essential forms of their substrata. It cannot be
said that, such being the case, even during the existence of the counter-
opposite, since the essential form of the substratum does not depart.
it, there would, therefore, at that time, arise the intuition of absolute non-existence; because our opponents also admit the presence of absolute non-existence thereof in a place containing the counter-opposite, and, further, because it is in the case of the past and the not-yet-come-to-pass states only, that the connection of the counter-opposite can become the absolute non-existence for the time being. Therefore, in our conclusion, Non-existence is not an additional principle.

Moreover, some one thing being looked for, as determining or regulating such intuitions as, "The water pot is destroyed", "The water pot will come to be", "The water pot does not exist here," etc., it is just something having the form of existence, that is conceived by us, for the sake of simplicity; while, it should be observed, there would be redundancy and intricacy in the supposition of Non-existence which is nowhere observed.—113.

(b) There can be no production of what did not exist before.

नासिद्धात्मि नष्कृतम् ॥ १ ॥ ११४ ॥

Na, no. असिद्धात्मि: Asat-uptadah, production of what was non-existent. नष्कृतम् Nisi-sringa-vat, like the horn of man.

114. (There can be) no production of what did not exist before, as a man's horn.—114.

Vṛtti.—The author repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect is that of what existed before or of what did not exist before.

Things of a purely non-existent nature are a man's horn, etc. Things of a purely existent nature are Ākāśa (Ether), etc. Things which partake of the nature of both the existent and the non-existent, are a water pot, etc. Hence, one may ask, how can there be comparison with a man's horn? We reply that there can be no such doubt. For, (according to the theory of the opponent), a water pot, etc., would be non-existent during the period of their antecedent non-existence (i.e., so long as they were not produced), while the non-existence of a man's horn, and the like is perpetual; what is the difference between the two? If it be replied by the objector that the observation of the production of a water pot, etc., constitutes the difference; we can only admire his argumentative skill, for he puts forward in reply the very fact which is the subject of discussion.—114.

Bhāṣya.—The author states that the Theory of Existent Effects is established by the following argument also.

The very production of that which, like a man's horn, is a non-existence, is impossible. Such is the meaning.—114.
(a) For every production, there must exist some material cause.

उपाधि-नियमम् ॥ १ ॥ ११५ ॥

उपाधि-नियमम् Upādāna-niyamā, owing to the regulation of material causes.

115. Because there must be some determinate material cause for every product.—115.

Vṛtti.—The author sets forth an argument in support of the existence of effects even prior to their production.

The connection of the effect follows from the connection of the cause. And connection can take place only between things existent. Otherwise, production of effect would take place everywhere and at all times—115.

Bhāṣya.—The author gives the reason for the above conclusion.

A water pot can be produced from earth alone, a piece of cloth from threads only, etc. Thus it follows that there is a uniformity in regard to the material cause of effects. This would not be possible, (if effects were non-existent prior to their production). For, prior to production, the effects being non-existent in the cause, no such peculiarity or principle of differentiation is found to be present in the cause whereby it would produce some particular non-entity only, and not any other else. And if the existence of some such peculiarity is admitted, then, in consequence of the existence of an entity (in the shape of the peculiarity) thus entailed, the (theory of) non-existence is gone. And it is this very same peculiarity that is declared by us to be the not-yet-come or future or potential state of the effect.

Hereby is also refuted the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas that it is the antecedent non-existence or non-existence prior to production that determines the production of effects in particular forms. For, the supposition of an entity is simpler than the supposition of a non-entity. Further, entities are visible, and are independent of others. Moreover, on the existence, (if it is so asserted), of a distinctive peculiarity in non-entities themselves, the non-entities would no longer remain non-entities but would become entities; while a peculiarity in the form of the counter-opposite does not exist during the non-existence of the counter-opposite.

Hence non-entities having no distinctions of their own, it is not reasonable to hold that they can determine the production of effects.—115.
(d) Else anything might occur any time anywhere.

सर्वेऽ शर्वा सर्वसम्भवात् || १ || ११६ ॥

कर्ता Sarvatra, in all places. कर्ता Sarvadvā, at all times. कर्त्तव्यं Sarva-asam-

bhavāt, on account of non-production of all things.

116. Because all things are not produced in all places, at all times.—116.

Vṛtti.—The author continues the very same argument. The meaning is quite manifest.—116.

Bhāṣya.—The author lays down a proof of the uniformity of the material cause.

The meaning is easy to grasp. On the absence of uniformity of the material cause, on the other hand, everything would be possible everywhere, always. Such is the import.—116.

(c) Everything cannot be produced from everything else.

शक्तस्य शक्तिकरणात् || १ || ११७ ॥

कर्ता Śaktasya, of the capable or competent. कर्त्तव्यं Śakya-karṇaḥ, because of the execution or production of what is possible.

117. Because the production of what is possible, can be only from what is competent to cause such production.

—117.

Vṛtti.—But, even in the absence of any particularity in the material cause (for determining the production of particular effects), their production will be regulated, says our opponent, by this that what is capable of production from another thing, the same can be produced from that thing alone. For, the thread does not certainly become the (material) cause of a water pot. Whence, then, can there be production of all things (I. 116)? To this the author replies.

“Śaktasya,” of the competent: Śakti or competency or potentiality: does it have the śakya or the possible as its subject or does it not? we ask. If it has the possible for its subject, then, the existence of the possible should be affirmed. If, on the other hand, it has not, then, there would be the production of a water pot, from the thread, and the position would be the same (as discussed in I. 116 supra).—117.
Bhāya.—The author states that production of a non-entity cannot take place, for this reason also, namely:

Material causality is nothing but the possession of the power to become the effect. It can hardly be said to denote anything else. Besides, our interpretation is the simplest possible.

That power or potentiality is nothing but the not-yet-come-to-pass or undeveloped state of the effect. Hence, because that which is competent, can produce the effect that is capable of being produced from it, production of a non-entity cannot take place. Such is the meaning.—117.

(f) Cause and Effect are identical.

कारणभावाच | ॥ १ ॥ ११ = ॥

कारण-भावात, from the effect having the nature of the cause Chs, also.

118. And also because the effect possesses the same nature as the cause.—118.

Vṛttī.—The author states another argument.

Because the cause and the effect are one and the same. Even though modified into the form of the water pot, (it) does not cease to have the nature of earth. On the other hand, there can be no identity between what is existent and what is non-existent.

But, if they are identical, then, one may say, water should be carried by means of a lump of earth, as it is done in a pitcher. We reply that such would have been the case, were their identity atyanta or absolute. But it is not absolute.

In the case of their identity in difference, as maintained by us, there is, however, no fault. Thus

प्रस्ख्याति संबन्धः कारण: सत्त्वंगिति: ॥
प्रस्ख्यवृद्धय वैरणिषिमिष्टाः न व्यवस्थितः ॥
नास्ति विद्यते मावे मायाः विद्यते सतः ॥
अस्यात्माति हृद्योजनस्यवयोत्सब्धविद्धिमि: ॥

No connection takes place, from non-existence, with causes which attach themselves to existence. And with him who desires the production of what is not connected (with a cause), there is no regularity.

There is neither the production of what is non-existent, nor is there non-existence or destruction of what is existent. Those who have found out the Tattva or Reality, have seen the end of both of these.—Gītā II. 16.—118.

Bhāya.—From this also (follows the non-production of the non-existent).
The Veda declares the non-difference of the effect from the cause, even prior to its production. From this too, (eternally) existent effects being proved, production of what is non-existent, cannot be maintained. Such is the meaning. For, were the effect non-existent (prior to production), identity of the existent and the non-existent, as declared in the Veda, would be disproved.

On the identity of the effects with the causes, prior to their production, the declarations of the Veda are:

तत्तत्त्वं तत्त्वमात्मात्मानि

That the same as this, was, then, unmodified.—Bṛ. Āraṇ Upan. I. iv. 7.

सद्वेद सैवेद्वम ज्ञातीत

This (the world), O peacefiul one, was verily existent at the beginning.—Chh. Upan. VI. ii. 1.

सैवेद्वम ज्ञातीत

This, (the world), was verily the Self at the beginning.—Mātrī Upan. V. 2.

यह ज्ञातवे ज्ञातुः

This, (the world), was verily waters at the beginning.—Bṛ. Āraṇ. Upan. V. v. 1.—118.

Note:—In this connection (aphorisms 115-118), compare Kārikā IX:

अस्तुतं शाक्यनिवारणात् करणामान्तरं सत्यं कार्यं \| कारिका \| 9 \| 11

The effect is always existent; because that which is non-existent, can never be brought into existence; because there must be a determinate relation of the cause with the effect; because all things are not produced in all places, at all times; because a competent cause can do that only for which it is competent; and also because the effect possesses the nature of the cause.

A doubt:—How can that which exists, be said to be produced?

न भावे भावयोगश्रेष्ठं \| 1 \| 116 \|

न Na, not, भावे Bhāve, in existence. भावयोग bhāva-yogāḥ, conjunction of existence. भ्रेत Chet if.

119. If (it be objected that there can be) no adjunction of existence (i.e., production) to an existence, (you reply as in the next aphorism).—119.

Vṛtti.—The author apprehends an objection.

If, "bhāva-yogāḥ" or production of the effect existent, "bhāve" be from the existent cause, then, there would be no such predication as "A water pot will be produced, is being produced, is destroyed."—119.

भावयोग—The author apprehends an objection.

But, then, the effect being thus eternal, "bhāva-yogāḥ," adjunction of production, is not possible, in the case of the effect which is already of the form of an existence. Because we speak of the production of the non-
existent from the existent only. If this be the objection. Such is the meaning.—119.

Answer:—Production is only manifestation.

Na, not, nay. अभिव्यक्ति-निबन्धनां Abhivyakti-nibandhanau, occasioned by manifestation (and non-manifestation). व्यवहारात्मिके Vyavahara-avyavahara, use and non-use (of the term ‘production’).

120. Nay; the application and non-application of the term ‘production’ to an effect are occasioned by the manifestation (and non-manifestation of the effect as such).—120.

Vṛtti.—The author states the established tenet on the subject.

As the whiteness of a white cloth which had become dirty, is brought into manifestation by means of washing, etc., so is the water pot brought into manifestation through the operation of the potter; whereas through the impact or blow of a mallet, it is made to disappear.

And manifestation is a fact of daily observation; e.g., of the oil, from the sesame-seeds, by pressure; of milk, from the cow, by milking; of rice, from paddy, by threshing; etc.

It is established, therefore, that the use of language (such as production, etc.) as well as the difference in the denotation and function or use of the things are dependent on their manifestation.—120.

Bhāṣya.—The author repels the above doubt.

The employment or non-employment of the expression “production of an effect,” has the manifestation (or non-manifestation) of the effect for its occasional cause. The predication of production depends on its manifestation, and the absence of the predication of production depends on the absence of manifestation; but not on the coming into existence of a non-existence. Such is the meaning.

And manifestation is not a (subjective) cognition, but the present (actually existing) state of the effect. The operation of the cause also produces only that transformation of the effect which is characterised as being present (as distinguished from the past and the future). In the world also it is observed that it is only the manifestation of an effect which was existent from before, that takes place from the operation of the cause. As, for example, it is the manifestation only of the statue inherent in a block of marble, that takes place from the operation of the sculptor; of oil inherent in sesame-seeds, by pressure; of rice grains in the paddy, by threshing.
So has it been declared in the Yoga-Vādiśṭha Rāmāyaṇa:

सुपत्तायम् चक्रचक्रं विक्षोत्तरे।
यथा किता विशेषरुत्तेषयं जनवरकी।

As the outlines of the discus and the lotus lie dormant in a block of marble, so does the system of the world lie within the mind or consciousness in a dormant state.

"In a dormant state," i.e., not the manifested world, but the world lies within the mind through Prakṛti, i.e., in the causal state.—120.

Destruction is disappearance in the cause.

नाश: कारणलय: || १।१२१||

नाश: Nāśa, disappearance, destruction. कारणलय: Kāraṇa-layaḥ, dissolution into the cause.

121. Destruction (of a thing means) the dissolution (of the thing) into its cause.—121.

Vṛtti.—But, (some one may say,) if production is due to the occasion of manifestation, to what occasion is due the predication of destruction? To this, the author replies.

From the blow of a club occurs the dissolution of the water pot into its cause (i.e., the particles of earth from which it was produced); and this dissolution is the occasion for the predication of destruction about it. Thus arise the differences in the use of words (e.g., production, destruction, etc.) and the object denoted (e.g., water pot, etc.) and its use (for bringing water in, etc.)

But, (some one may say), if destruction is disappearance merely, reappearance should be observed, but it is not observed. To this we reply that reappearance is not observed by the stupid, but is observed by those who can discriminate. Thus, for example, when a thread is destroyed, it is changed into the form of earth; and the earth is changed into the form of the cotton-tree; and this transforms into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread. So is it with all existences.—121.

Bhāṣya.—Well, granted that the existent, (as supposed by you), somehow or other, may have an origin prior to its ‘production’ (as a manifested effect): but how can there be ‘destruction’ of an existence continuing from eternity? Thero being room for this enquiry, the author says.

"Laya," according to the teaching of its derivation from the root Lata in the sense of enfoldment, means absence of disjunction from the causes, in consequence of subtlety. This very same state, called the
past, is said to be destruction or disappearance. Such is the meaning. And the Laya that is called not-yet-come-to-pass (future) state, is said to be antecedent non-existence. Thus the answer is complete.

Of the (very same) effect which, having once been manifested, has passed into dissolution, there can be no re-manifestation, since it would entail the recognition, etc. (of the re-produced effect), which is never found to occur. On these grounds the suggestion of re-manifestation has been refuted in the Aphorisms of Patañjali. (Vide Yoga Sūtras.)

Besides, in common with our opponents, we too hold that the not-yet-come-to-pass or potential state, called antecedent non-existence, is the cause of the manifestation (of an effect).

But, where is the evidence, may ask our opponent, to show that what is past and gone, does also exist? For, the Veda, etc., are not found to declare in plain terms the existence of what is past, as they do in the case of the existence of what has not-yet-come-to-pass.

Such is not the case, we reply. For both the past and the not-yet-come-to-pass are the objects of perception by the Yogi, which they could not be unless they were existent; hence the existence of both of them is proved. For, it is the object that is the cause of perception in general; as, otherwise, the consequence would be that a present or actually existing object also would not be proved by perception. Therefore, when it is established beyond doubt that cognitions or ideas or percepts are adventitious, i.e., caused by transference of forms of objects from the outside, and when no obstruction or cause of aberration exists, it is proved, by the perception of the Yogi, that the past object also exists. And the evidence of the Veda, Smṛiti, Itihāsa, etc., on the perception by the Yogi of things past and not-yet-come-to-pass, has been set forth in detail by us in our Yoga-Vārtika. Such is the hint.

Thus, then, is made out the predication of production and destruction in respect of the effects in consequence of their manifestation and dissolution.

Well, our opponent may ask, is this manifestation also existent from before, or is it non-existent from before? If it be existent, then, by means of the manifestation of the effect even prior to the operation of the cause, it would by itself be the cause of production of the effect (which is not desired by you), and, consequently, the operation of the cause would be ineffectual (which also is not desirable). If, on the other hand, it be non-existent, then, in the very admission or fact of manifestation, your doctrine of Existent Effects is lost; inasmuch as you then admit the manifestation of a non-existent manifestation.
To this our reply is as follows: By the admission of the constant existence of all effects prior to the operation of the cause, no room is left for the raising of such a dilemma. As in the case of a water pot, manifestation of the manifestation of the effects, (so long as it, the first manifestation, is not actually manifested as the manifestation of the effect), in the state of antecedent non-existence in its present or actual manifested form, and, therefore, for the termination of that antecedent non-existence, it depends upon the operation of the cause. While its non-existence by the not-yet-come-to-pass or potential state, causes no harm to the doctrine of Existent Effects.

Neither is in this view the contradiction of Existence and Non-existence involved; for, the difference between them has been declared to be in-mode or manner of appearance only, and not real.

Nor can it be argued that, even so, by the non-admission of antecedent non-existence, the non-existence itself of the effects prior to the operation of the cause (i.e. the antecedent non-existence of effects) can hardly be asserted; for, it is the state of the effects past, future, and present, which constitute the forms by which one state is non-existent, in relation to the other states.—121.

The Theory of Manifestation does not entail infinite regression.

122. (There is no infinite regression), because they seek each other, as is the case with the seed and the sprout or plant. (Aniruddha.) Or, their reciprocal pursuit (is quite logical), like that of the seed and the plant. (Vijñāna Bhikṣu.)—122.

Vṛtti.—But, some one may ask, is this manifestation something existent, or is it something non-existent? If it be existent, then, apprehension of the effect should occur at every moment. If it be something non-existent, then, the theory of Existent Effects falls to the ground, because, of this also there would be another manifestation, of that also, in, yet another, and so on, and consequently, non-finality would be the result.

To this the author replies.

Let there be thousands of manifestations; still it is no fault, as the succession is coming down reciprocally, from eternity, without beginning, like the reciprocal succession of the seed and the plant.—122.
Bhāṣya.—But, then, the opponent may say, a manifestation also of the manifestation should be desired for the purpose of maintaining the net of Existent Effects, and, accordingly, infinite regression would be the consequence. Apprehending this, the author says.

Manifestation should be followed up, "paramaparyatam," only by the form of one after the other, and vice versa. And such eternal succession, or, rather, rotation, being, like that of the seed and the plant, quite logical (pramāṇika or authoritative), is faultless. Such is the meaning.

And from the case of the seed and the plant, there is, in the present case, this difference that, in the case of the seed and the plant, the non-finality arises by means of successive reciprocity, while in the case of manifestation, it arises by means of simultaneous reciprocity. The validity of the inter-dependence is, however, the same in both the cases. The revered Vyāsa also has recognized this non-finality as valid or logical, while observing in his Commentary on the Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali:

सर्वारां तद्वर्त्तिद्रव्यात्मकादिभिः नाभितू स ।

All effects are eternal in their intrinsic forms, and are perishable in their manifested states. Vide R. B. II. Vol. IV. page 38, Sūtra IV. 12.

And here the example of the seed and the plant has been adduced from the popular point of view. In reality, however, it stands for Jánma-karmavat, like that of birth and action, and signifies that, as birth leads to karma and karma leads to birth, so do one manifestation lead to the other, and vice versa. Although, therefore, the succession of seed and the plant is terminated by the original creation, and consequently, cannot be said to be infinitely regressive, still there is no harm to the present illustration.

And it is well known in the Veda and the Smṛiti that at the time of the original creation, even in the absence of the plant, the seed is produced at the will of Hīranyāgarbha or Brahmā from his body, etc.; e. g. it is declared to be so in the following passage of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, amongst others.

यथा ति पापयो मृत्युस्मृतांवागिनिसंयुक्तः ।

यमो विद्यते प्रचाण्डमार्गति योगान्यथापि वै ततः ॥

For, as the plant consisting of the root, the stem, the branches, etc., takes its rise from the original seed, so do many other seeds also from it.—Viṣṇu Purāṇa, II. vii. 82—122.
Objection to the Theory of Manifestation retorted.

उत्पत्तिवादः II.123

उत्पत्ति-वादः, like the Theory of Production or Creation (of the object).

123. Or, (at all events), (our Theory of Manifestation is) as faultless as that of production.—123.

Vṛtti.—The author states another argument.

Is 'production' produced, or is it not? If it be produced, then, of this (production) also there must be another production; and hence the result is non-finality, (the same as is alleged against our Theory of Manifestation). If it be not produced, then, is this because it is non-existent, or because it is eternal? If, because it is non-existent, then, production there is never at all, and, consequently, it would never be perceived, (a result which, of course, you do not desire). Again, if it be not produced because it is eternal, then, production of effects should take place at all times, (which, however, is not the case). Now, if you say: production itself being of the form of production, what need have we of supposing an ulterior production (of production)? then, in the same manner, we ask: since manifestation itself is of the form of manifestation, what need have we of supposing an ulterior manifestation (of manifestation)? So that the two theories are on a par with each other. What is your conclusion on this point, is ours also, (and thus all the objections alleged against our theory apply with equal force to yours also).—123.

Bhāṣya:—In reality, however, non-finality also is not entailed. This the author declares.

As, on the ground of simplicity, it is desired by the Vaiṣeṣika and others who hold the Theory of the Production of the Non-existent, that production of the production of a water pot, for example, is essentially of the same form as the very form of it (production of the water pot), (so that the two productions are really one and the same thing and hence there is no infinite regression); in like manner, on the ground of simplicity, should it also be desired by us, that manifestation is the essential form of the manifestation of a water pot, for example. Hence, as in the Theory of Production, so also in the Theory of Manifestation, the fault of non-finality does not lie. Such is the meaning.

Now, it cannot be said that, manifestation of the manifestation being thus not admitted, the Theory of Existent Effects would be lost in.
consequence of the impossibility of the existence of the manifestation prior to the operation of the cause. For, the idea is that, in the view we now express, the Theory of Existent Effects does not go further than saying that it is of the existent alone that manifestation can take place. It does not, in consequence, come to be the same as the Theory of Non-existent Effects, even though there be the non-existence of the manifestation prior to the operation of the cause on account of the non-existence of the manifestation of the manifestation.

But, our opponent may say, in like manner, the antecedent non-existence of Mahat, and the rest themselves may be desired (instead of that of their manifestation); what need of supposing their existence in the state called fitness for manifestation or potentiality? We reply that the question does not at all arise; the manifestation of those effects only which do exist in the Avyakta or unmanifested state, being established by such texts of the Veda as

तबौवः तबौ ब्रह्मतत्तताम्

That, the same as this, was, then, unmodified—Brij. śāra. Upa I. iv 7.

But still, may continue our opponent, it (denial of manifestation of manifestation) would entail the admission of the antecedent non-existence etc. of the manifestation. We reply, it would not; because, as has been already pointed out, the three states, not-yet-come-to-pass, etc., are of the form of the non-existence of one another mutually and because it is by the termination of the non-existence of this kind only that the operation of the cause can be fruitful.

For, the difference of the authors of the Theory of Existent Effects from the authors of the Theory of Non-existent Effects consists in this only that what are declared by them to be the antecedent non-existence and consequent non-existence, are declared by the authors of the Theory of Existent Effects to be the states, not-yet-come-to-pass and past respectively, of the effects having the form of existence. And the state of manifestation called present existence, is desired to be other than the (effects, e. g.,) the water pot, etc. (of which it is the state), because it is seen that the water pot, etc., possess the three states. In other respects, however, the two theories are similar. Hence there is no room for greater doubt in regard to our theory. Such is the hint.—123.

Points of resemblance in all products or effects.

Hetumadhitvānāyāpi tasyāyuktaṁātmanāntāṁ vikram ॥१२१ २४॥

BOOK I, SUTRA 124.

124. Effect (in general) is caused, non-eternal, non-pervasive, changeable, multitudinous, dependent.—124.

Vṛtti.—The author states the similarity in property amongst the effects or products of Prakṛti mutually.

“Hetu-mat,” having a cause. “Anityam,” perishable. “Sakriyam,” giving up the body previously assumed; the earth and the bodies have internal molecular movements also. “Anekam” (multitudinous), in proportion to the multiplicity of different Purusas. “Aditam,” (dependent) on the cause. “Līṅgam” (merged), that which sets or is dissolved into its own cause.—124.

Vedānta Mahādeva.—The word, Vyakram, the manifested, i. e., the products, should be supplied as the complement of the aphorism.

Bhāṣya.—By the aphorism (I. 110 supra), “Because the apprehension thereof arises from seeing the effect,” it has been declared that the Root Cause should be inferred by means of the effect. Now, in regard to that, with a view to determine how far the range of effects extends, the author states the resemblance in property of all the effects, (in other words, gives the definition of the effect).

“Līṅgam,” mark of inference, or that which undergoes dissolution, denotes the whole class of effects, because they serve as the marks of inference of their causes, or because they pass into dissolution. Here it is not intended to denote the Principle Mahat alone, inasmuch as the characteristics of having a cause, etc., are common to all effects whatever. For this very reason, in the Kārikā also, all effect without exception, called the manifested, has been declared to be “Līṅgam.” Thus,

देवमक्तीस्वक्षेत्र सक्षमस्तोभूति लिङ्गम्

सर्वव्रतः परत्तम् व्यति विवर्तमानविकयः कारिका ॥ २० ॥

The Manifested is producible, perishable, finite, mutable, multiform, dependent, serving as the mark of inference, a combination of parts, subordinate. The Unmanifested is the reverse of this.—Kārikā, Verse X.

Thus, that (the Manifested), the “Līṅgam,” possesses the properties of being caused, etc. Such is the meaning of the sentence.

Of these (properties), that of being “hetu-mat” denotes the having a cause; “anityam,” destructibility; “a-vyāpi,” the opposite of the pervasiveness previously mentioned as belonging to Prakṛti; “sakriyam,” the habit of constant activity, of the form of making ascertainment (in the
case, for example), etc.; while Prakṛiti, being the cause of all acts in general, cannot be said to act in merely a part of an effect. Nor can it be said that activity or acting is nothing but karma or act; because in that case, activity would belong to her also, inasmuch as it follows, from the hearing from the Veda that Creation proceeds from the disturbance of Prakṛiti, that she too possesses acts (in the sense of giving birth to them).

"Manifoldness" consists in diversity according to the difference of creation, that is to say, that they are not the same in any two creation, and not the inclusion of, or extension to, many individuals of the same kind (jāti), as it would then be too wide and extend to Prakṛiti, because Prakṛiti also has many forms such Sattva, etc., as would appear from the subsequent aphorism (VI. 3d): Sattva and the rest are not the properties of Prakṛiti, because they are the very form thereof.

And "dependence" is on the parts of which they are made of.—124.

Proof of existence of effects as separate from the cause.

श्राज्ञयाब्येक्षता वा युक्तामान्याब्येक्षस्तत्ततिष्ठित: प्रधाना-
व्यपेयश्च वा ॥ १२५ ॥

श्राज्ञयाब्येक्षता, essentially (Aniruddha), easily, by perception (Vijñāna Bhikṣu). केन: A-bheda-tāta, from identity. केवल: Guṇa-sāmānyatādah, of the common attributes, e. g., knowledge, pleasure, etc., of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (A), of the genera of Guṇa and karma or act, etc. (V). तत्सत्ततिष्ठित: Tat-siddhi, proof of existence in them, i. e., the twenty-four Principles (A), proof of the existence of the Liṅgam or effect as other than the cause (V): युक्तान्याब्येक्षता Pradhāna-
व्यपेयश्च, from the use of the term pradhāna. केवल: Vijñāna Bhikṣu, or.

125.—There is proof of the existence of these (common attributes of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School which you mention, e. g., cognition, pleasure, etc.), in the twenty-four Principles, from the fact that they are essentially identical with them as well as from the use of the term Pradhāna (which medially is the cause of them all).—Aniruddha.

Or, there is proof of the separate existence of the Liṅgam or effect, in some cases by preception, in some, from its identity with the genera of Guṇa, Karma, etc., and in some, from the very use of the term Pradhāna which necessarily implies a separate effect.—Vijñāna Bhikṣu.—
VRITTI.—But, some one may say, if the principles be the twenty-five, then, are such common acts as cognition, pleasure, etc., absolutely non-existent? If you say that it is so, then you give up what you see.

To this the author replies.

“Annasyast,” essentially. “Abheda,” (non-difference), i. e., from the twenty-four Principles, because the common attributes, etc., possess the character of these (twenty-four). “Tat-siddhi,” proof of their existence through their inclusion just in these (twenty-four). The word “vā” indicates an alternative reply. “Pradhāna-vyapadesāt vā”: the proof of the existence of these ordinary common attributes, knowledge, etc., is from the very use of the term Pradhāna, inasmuch as, since there is non-difference or identity between cause and effect, these attributes are not different from Pradhāna, being the effects thereof mediatly through Mahat, etc. So that the non-enumeration of them by the author is not due to their non-existence.—125.

BHĀYA.—The characteristics of being caused, etc., (mentioned in the preceding aphorism) can be established on the proof of the difference of the effect from the cause. For this reason the author sets forth the proofs which establish the existence of effects as contra-distinguished from the cause.

“Tat-siddhi,” proof of the existence of the effect called Lingam, as other than the cause, is, in some cases, “Annasyast,” easily from Perception itself: e. g., by means of the grossness, or bulkiness, and other properties, a piece of cloth, etc., are proved to be separate from their causes, the threads, etc. In some cases, it is by means of inference by the mark, “Gunasamāny-sidhe abhedataḥ,” of their having the nature of the Guṇas, etc., in general: e. g., that of Mahat, etc., by means of their difference in property from their causes, which difference is of the form of their having the nature of the attributes such as ascertainment, etc.: also that of the earth, etc., by means of their difference in property from the Tan-mātras, which difference is of the form of the Tan-mātras having the nature of such higher genera as the being the Great (Element of) Earth, etc. In some cases, again, it is by means of the difference in property constituted by having the nature of karma or action, etc., alluded to by the word “Adi”: as e. g., that of the one with the members of the body moving, as other than the one with the members of the body remaining still.

So, again, existence of the effect as other than the cause, is proved also, “Pradhāna-vyapadesāt,” from the use of the term Pradhāna in the Veda. For, it is called Pradhāna because all effect whatever, pradhyate, i.e.
founded in it. And this cannot possibly take place without the relation of identity-and-difference between the cause and the effect, inasmuch as, if they were absolutely non-different, it would be the foundation or substratum of itself, which is impossible. Such is the meaning.—125.

The common properties of Prakriti and her products.

**गृहस्था च न्यायविद्यादिनः सः ॥ १२६ ॥**

गृहस्थानिष्ठः Triguna-achetanatva-Adi, the being constituted by the three Guṇas, the being unconscious, etc. द्वायोऽत्स: Dvayoh, of both, i. e., the cause Prakriti and the effects, her products.

126. To both (Prakriti and her products) (belong) the characters of being constituted by the three Guṇas, being unconscious, etc.—126.

**वृत्ती.**—The author declares the resemblances between Prakriti and her effects or products.


**भाष्य.**—By the two preceding aphorisms have been shown the character of the effects consisting of the community of properties amongst themselves and also the evidence to prove the existence of the effects other than their cause. Now, for the purpose of the inference of the cause (Prakriti), by means of its having properties similar to those of the effects, the author displays the similarity of properties also between the cause and the effects.

Similarity of properties, e. g., the being constituted by the three Guṇas, etc., “dvayoh,” belong to the cause and the effect only. Such is the meaning.

And the other properties included by the word “ādi” have been declared in the Kārikā, namely,

**गृहस्थानीयसंबंधितपः सामान्यपद्धिअधि- प्रथविभिः ॥ १२ ॥**

The Manifested (i. e., the effect) is constituted by the three Guṇas, is non-discriminative, objective, common, unconscious or non-intelligent, prolific. So is also Prakriti (Prakriti). Puruṣa is the reverse of them both in those respects, and yet is similar to Sātvatā in those other respects mentioned in Kārikā XI) Kārikā XI.

“Tri-guṇam,” that in which the Guṇas consisting of the forms of the substances Sātvat, etc., lie. Of these two, the inference of Sātvat,
etc., in Mahat and the rest, is by the form of (being their cause, while the
inference of Sattva, etc., in Pradhāna is by the form of a collection of
the three Guṇas, as that of the individual trees in a forest. Or, since the
words Sattva, etc., also denote Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, the
cause and the effect may be said to be constituted by the three Guṇas in
one and the same sense.

"A-viveki-visayāḥ," visible or perceptible by the ignorant only. If
the compound is split up into the two words "a-viveki" and "visayāḥ,"
than, the being "a-viveki" would mean co-operative iness or acting by
combination for the sake of another, and the being "visayāḥ" would
mean the being the object of experience.

"Sāmānyam" common to all Puruṣas, that is to say, undifferentiated
even in the case of Puruṣas being different.

"Prasava-dharmī" undergoing transformation.
"Vyaktam" the effect or product.
"Pradhānaṃ" the cause.

Such is the meaning.

The mutual difference in properties of the cause and the effect has
also been displayed by the Kārikā.

The Manifested is producible, perishable, finite, mutable, multiform, dependent,
serving as the mark of inference, a combination of parts, subordinate. The Unmanifested
is the reverse of this.—Kārikā X.

In this verse, okatvam, oneness, in "amokam," more than one,
denotes not-different-ness or identity even in different creations. Hence,
although Prakṛti covers lots of individuals, there is no harm caused
thereby to her unity. That Pradhāna comprises a multitude of individuals
is proved from the declaration of its innumerable in the following
passage of the Viśu Purāṇa (II. vii. 25-26).

Mahat the Supamukh Pradāna Samapallitam.
Bhūmika N taśyaṇāsūryāya bhāri vibodyate
Vishṇurājakam ॥ २१४३ ॥

Pradhāna lies intact, unfolding Mahat. As it is infinite, there exists neither the
end of it nor any enumeration.—126.

Points of dissimilarity amongst the Guṇas.

Priti-aprti-vidāda-ādyāh, by means of pleasantness, unpleasant-
ness, dullness, etc. Guṇāṇaru, of the Guṇas. Anuvannam, from one
another. Vaidharmyam, difference in properties.
127. The mutual difference in property of the Guṇas arises by means of their pleasantness, unpleasantness, and dullness, etc.—127.

Prūtī.—The author states the mutual differences of character amongst the three Guṇas which are the constituent parts of Prakṛti.

"Prūtiḥ" is Pleasure. By the word, ādi, is denoted the light and illuminating Sattva Guṇa. "Aprutiḥ" is Pain. By the word, ādi, he denoted the exciting and restless Rajas Guṇa. "Viśādaḥ" is Bewilderment. By the word, ādi, is denoted the heavy and enveloping Tamas Guṇa.—127.

Bhāṣya.—For the purpose of the mutual discrimination of the Guṇas which are the causes of the world and are collectively called Pradhāna, the author establishes their minor differences of character also. An establishment of their dissimilarities is also necessary for the purpose of explaining how the three Guṇas can be the causes of this diversified world, inasmuch as variegated effects cannot possibly be produced from the same kind of causes.

"Guṇānām," of the three Substances, viz., Sattva, etc., mutual dissimilarity is caused by their being of the nature of Pleasure, Pain, etc., because these qualities are observed in their effects. Such is the meaning. And, it has been declared, Pleasure, etc., are the properties of also the water pot, etc., just as Form-Colour, etc., are their properties, since the other effects (those which come after the production of the Antāḥ-karaṇa), have the Antāḥ-karaṇa for their material cause.

The properties included in this aphorism by the word, ādi, have been thus declared by Āchārya Pañcāśikha:

सवं नाम प्रसाध्यवासिप्रेमित्वतिविक्षास्तोपोपविचारनस्य समासतः
कुष्ठास्य कागुणानामेव समासतः कुष्ठास्य कागुणानामेव समासतः
वृत्तावेदनाय वृत्तावेदनाय

What is called Sattva, is of infinite variety under the forms of purity or clearness, lightness, lovo, agreeableness, pronunciation, contentment, etc., which are summed up by the word Pleasant. Similarly, Rajas also possesses many varieties, such as, great, etc., which are summed up by the word Painful. So, also, does Tamas possess many varieties, such as, sleep, etc., which are summed up by the word Bewilder.

Whereas in the present aphorism pleasantness etc., are declared to be the properties of the Guṇas, and whereas in the next aphorism lightness etc., are going to be similarly declared, the substances of Sattva, etc., is thereby established. That the Guṇas partake of the nature of Pleasure, etc., is, however, justified according to the maxim that the
Subject and its (essential) property are identical, as is the case with the lānas partaking of the nature of volition; and not that it is Pleasure, etc., just the same as mentioned by the Vaiśeśikas, that are the qualities of Sattva, etc.

The triad of Sattva, etc., again, are also infinite according to the diversity of individuals. For, the alternative tenet that while the Guṇas are universal merely, diversity of effects would follow from the diversity of their confluence with one another, would not be a reasonable one, since, in a case of confluence, there is no possibility of the appearance of minor or secondary differences.—127.

Assimilation and differentiation of the individual manifestations of the Guṇas.

128. By means of the properties of Lightness, etc., arise the similarity and the dissimilarity of the Guṇas.—128.

Vṛtti.—In the course of describing their dissimilarity, the author states their similarity.

(“Laghu-Adī-dharmāḥ”), by (the property or) of Lightness (Sattva), Restlessness (Rajas), and Heaviness (Tamas). Hereby their dissimilarity is declared. Similarity is indicated by the word “adī.” And it consists of existence for the purpose of accomplishing the end of Puruṣa, and mutually predominating over one another, producing one another, and consorting together.—128.

Bhāṣya.—Were the Guṇas each a single manifestation only, their increase, decrease, and the like would not be reasonable. So, again, if, (for the purpose of accounting for the increase, decrease, and the like in the infinite number of individual manifestations—objects—in the world), they are said to be conditioned, determined or divided into parts by means of limiting conditions, then, in consequence thereof, their collective form, Pradhāna, would be similarly determined (which is not desirable), and, consequently, the simultaneous existence of innumerable worlds, etc., as proved in the Veda and the Smṛiti, would not be explained. Hence (the manifestations of) the Guṇas being proved to be innumerable, the author, for the purpose of accounting for the application of the number three to
them as well as for the purpose of their mutual discrimination, establishes
their similarity and dissimilarity.

The meaning is this:—The expression “Laghu-ādi” points to the
state (of being Light, i.e., Lightness, etc.,) as the chief import. By
means of the properties of Lightness, etc., arises the similarity of all
individual manifestations of Sattva, as well as their dissimilarity from
(those of) Rajas and Tamas. So that, as that of the individual manifesta-
tions or products of Earth, by means of the characteristic of their being
of earth, earthy, likewise are justifiable the oneness of the individual
manifestations of Sattva, by means of their being of one and the same
kind, as well as their increase, decrease, and the like, by means of the
excitation or motion caused by the predominance of their likes. Such is
the import. Similarly, by means of the properties of Restlessness, etc.,
arise the similarity of all the individual manifestations of Rajas, as well
as their dissimilarity from Sattva and Tamas. The rest is as before.
Similarly, again, by means of the properties of Heaviness, etc., arise the
similarity of all individual manifestations of Tamas, as well as their
dissimilarity from Sattva and Rajas. The rest is as before.

Dissimilarity having been stated before, the repetition of it here
is only incidental.

In this aphorism the reading “Vaidharmam cha” is clearly
erroneous.

In this aphorism, it is established that each of the causal substances,
Sattva, etc., has manifold individual manifestations. Because, otherwise
it would not be reasonable to say that Lightness, etc., are similarities, since
it is the property of similars that alone constitutes their similarity. It
cannot be said that Lightness, etc., would be the similarity in consequence
of the manifoldness of Sattva, etc., as effects; because, in that case, since
a water pot, (which is not light but is heavy), etc., also, being essentially
made of the three Guṇas, are of the form of Sattva, etc., as effects, the
similarity of Sattva, etc., in respect of Lightness etc., would not be proved.
It follows, therefore, that it is of the Guṇas as causes only that similarity,
etc., are declared here.

And the Lightness, etc., of Sattva, etc., have been declared by the
Kārikā.

नर्तते ‘नुभुधापरिनिपटितां च चां च रक्ष ॥
तुष्ट तथ्यथतथ सर्वसंस्वर्धतोष्टिः || कारिक ॥ ११ \।

Sattva is considered to be Light and Illuminating, and Rajas, to be Exciting and
Restless, and Tamas, Heavy and Enveloping. Like a lamp (consisting of oil, wick, and
fire), they co-operate for a purpose (by union of contraries)—Kārikā, Verse XIII.
"Arthatah," in the above verse, means: because the fulfilment of the end of Purusa is the nimita or occasion or the instrumental cause of their action.

But, some one may ask, what is the difference (of the Sankhya) from the Vaisheshika doctrine in regard to the innumerable conditioned or finite individual manifestations of the Root Causal? We would reply that it is just this that the Causal Substance (of the Sankhya) is devoid of the attributes of Sound, Touch, etc., as taught in the Visnu Purapa, etc. Thus,

The Combination of the three Gunas (Prakriti) is devoid of Sound and Touch, and unconnected with Form, etc. That is the origin of the world, and is without beginning, reuction and destruction.—Visnu Purapra I. ii. 30-21.

And this point has been elaborated by us in the Yoga Vartika (on the Aphorisms of Pataanjali.)—128.

Proof that Mahat, etc., are effects.

Udbhaya-anyatvat, being different from both, i.e., Purusa and Prakriti. कार्याः कार्यत्वम्, effectiveness. यथा: Mahat-Adeh, of Mahat, etc., अविनष्ठ Ghaḍa-adi-vat, like a water pot, etc.,

129. Since they are different from both (i.e., Purusa and Prakriti—the only two uncaused entities), Mahat, etc., are effects, like a water pot, etc.—129.

Vritti.—By the aphorism "Hetumata etc." (I. 124 supra), Mahat, etc., have been declared to be effects. The author now gives the proof of this.

("Udbhaya-anyatvat"): because they are other than Purusa and Prakriti, the eternal ones. The rest of the aphorism is clear.—129.

Bhavya.—But, some one may say, that, although Mahat, etc., may be said to be established (by what has been stated above), so far as their svarupa or essential form (i.e., subtle, causal or Prakritic state) is concerned, still, when their production is not seen by Perception, there is no proof that they become effects, whereby the being caused (hetumatta, I. 124 supra) would be their similarity in property. In regard to this, the author says.

The Principles beginning with Mahat and ending with the five (Gross Elements,) which form the subject of dispute, by no means, belong
to the category of Puruṣa, because they are the objects of experience (bhoga). Neither do they belong to the category of Prakṛiti, because, since they are perishable, Release would not result otherwise, (that is, if they belonged to the category of Prakṛiti, they would not be perishable, and, consequently, Release would not be possible. The fact that Release can be attained, is one of the reasons for the conclusion that Mahat, etc., are perishable. Hence it follows that everything other than Puruṣa and Prakṛiti is, in consequence of their very otherness, an effect, as is the case with a water pot, and the like. Such is the meaning.—120.

A second proof.

परिमाणात् १११३०१।

परिमाणात् Parimāṇaḥ, from measure, delimitedness, finiteness.

130. Because of their limitedness.—130.

Vṛitti.—The author states another reason.

(Mahat, etc., are effects), because they are of a limited size.—130.

Bhāṣya.—But Release, etc., being possible by the very means of burning, etc., (i.e. counteracting, and not destroying) the powers of the Transformations, their perishableness also is not established. With this apprehension, the author gives other reasons to show that they are effects.

("Parimāṇaḥ") : because they are conditioned or circumscribed, that is to say, because they possess the jāti or class or general characteristic which serves to determine their being the counter-opposite of spatial non-existence or emptiness in space. Such is the meaning. Therefore, although some of the manifestations of the Gunaṣ are of a finite measure, still there is no violation of the rule in regard to them (that is, they are not imperishable).—130.

A third proof.

समन्वयात् १११३१।

समन्वयात् Samanvayāt, from conformity, agreement, correspondence.

131. Because of their correspondence (with Prakṛiti), (Aniruddha). Or, because of their assimilation. (Vijñāna-Bhikṣu).—131.

Vṛitti.—The author states another argument.
Because of their complete correspondence with Pradhāna, as it is observed that the attributes of Pradhāna exist in all objects.—131.

Bhāṣya.—Moreover:

For, the principle Buddhi, etc., which had become weak on account of fast and the like, grows strong again by means of food, etc. “samanvayaḥ,” through the complete assimilation of the food with it. Hence from assimilation, it is inferred that they are effects. Such is the meaning. For, in the case of that which is eternal, and consequently partless, assimilation in the form of the entering of parts from the outside does not take place.

In regard to assimilation, there is the evidence of the Veda, with reference to Manas:

प्रत्येक ो देरायो वायुक्तिका कर्तव्यदेधेशु कालुप्रविधानाय सा नेपायनस्तिकान्रति प्रभवती ॥

Likewise, O peaceful one, only one kāla (sixteenth part) among the sixteen kālas of yours, was left in you. Being nourished with food (rice), it was kindled up again.—Chh. Upa. VI. vii. 6, S. B. H. Vol. III.

There is also the testimony of the Yoga Sūtras (IV. 2):

योजन्त्रस्परिपथाय नृत्यार्पायताः ॥१४२॥

Transformation into other life-states, (e.g., from man to god), takes place through assimilation of parts of the body and the senses taken from the all-pervading Prakriti.—S. B. H. Vol. IV. p. 280.—131.

A fourth proof.

शक्तिस्वाभासित ||१६||

कैक्य:—Saktitah, through the power of Prakriti (Aniruddha), through their being the instruments of Purusa (Vijnāna Bhikṣu). नृत्यार्पायताः, Cha, and. कैक्य, finally.

132. And, finally, because they energise through the power of Prakriti (Aniruddha), or, because they are the instruments of Purusa (Vijnāna Bhikṣu).—132.

Vṛtti.—The author continues the same chain of arguments.

An effect energises through the power of the cause. Accordingly, Mahat, etc., being powerless themselves, produce their effects by drawing upon the power of Prakriti or through being filled with power by Prakriti. Otherwise, since it is their habit to be active, they would at all times produce their effects, (which however is not the fact).—132.

Bhāṣya.—Furthermore:

Also because they are instruments. Such is the meaning. That which is a karaṇa or instrument of Purusa, is an effect, as is the case with the eye, etc. Such is the import.
It is not the case that Prakṛiti directly hands over objects to Puruṣa. Therefore, Prakṛiti is not the instrument of Puruṣa.

Hence the principle Mahat being established as an effect by means of its instrumentality, it necessarily follows that the rest also are effects.

The word “iti” indicates the end of the series of the arguments.—132.

Note:—With reference to those four aphorisms, (123-132), compare Kaṭhā XV.;—

अद्वैतं परिप्रेक्ष्यति सम्बन्धात् सत्यतिक्रिया "प्रदृष्टं ।
कारककार्यविभागात् विभागं वेदन्तम् कारिका II १७ II
(The Unmanifested cause exists): since specific objects (Mahat, etc.) are finite; since they possess a certain similarity in form as a general characteristic; since they energise through power which they themselves do not possess; since there is the division of cause and effect; since there is undividedness or reunion of the universe at the time of dissolution.

Negative proof that Mahat, etc. are effects.

तद्भावे प्रकृतिः पुरुषे वा II १३२ ३३॥

चध्ये Tat-hāne, on the quitting or elimination thereof, i. e., of the condition of the effect. सत्यतिक्रिया: Prakṛitiḥ, Prakṛiti, पुरुष: Puruṣaḥ, Puruṣa. वा Va, or.

133. On the elimination of the character of the effect, what remains must be either Puruṣa or Prakṛiti.—133.

Vṛtti.—The author gives a negative proof (by showing what becomes of Mahat, etc., when they pass away from the state of being effects).

Effect and not-effect, these are the two alternatives. So that when Mahat, etc. give up the condition of effect, they necessarily enter into the category of either Puruṣa or Prakṛiti.—133.

Bhāṣya.—And even if it be admitted that, among Mahat, etc., there may be some which are not effects, still then the same must be either Puruṣa or Prakṛiti, and thereby our object will be accomplished, because the whole scope of our philosophy is just this that, after establishing the existence of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, they should be discriminated from each other by means of their transformability and non-transformability. This the author declares.

“Tat-hāne,” on the elimination of the condition of effect, if it is transformable, then it is Prakṛiti, and if, on the other hand, non-transformable experiencer, then, Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.—133.

What is not an effect, and, at the same time, is neither Puruṣa nor Prakṛiti, is a void.

तयोरत्वते तुष्क्तवस् II १३२॥

स्म: Tatōh, from them, अन्यास्व, being different. तुष्क्त Tūṣkta, nothingness, voidness.
134. If (a non-effect is) other than these two (Puruṣa and Prakṛti,) it would be nothing.—134.

Vṛtti.—If it be said that Mahat, etc. may very well be quite outside the pair of alternatives mentioned above: so the author declares.

If Mahat, etc. be other than these, i. e., effect and non-effect, they would be nothing, i. e., of the form of non-existence.—134.

Bhāṣya.—But, it may be said, even an eternal entity may very well be different from both (Puruṣa and Prakṛti). To this the author replies.

If a non-effect be other than Puruṣa and Prakṛti, it would be void, like the horn of a hare, on account of absence of proof of its existence. For, a non-effect is proved either as the cause (Prakṛti) or as the experiencer (Puruṣa), and not otherwise. Such is the meaning.—134.

Ground of inference of cause from effect.

कार्यत्व कारणानुमानं तद्भविष्यताः । १३५ ॥

Kāryat, from effect. Kāraṇa-anumānam, inference of cause.

Tat-sāhityat, through accompaniment thereof, i. e., of the effect by the cause.

135. The inference of the cause from the effect is made through the accompaniment of the effect by the cause. —135.

Vṛtti.—But why should Mahat, etc., be the inferential marks of Prakṛti, by means of the characteristic of being effects thereof, (i.e. through causation)? They will be the mark of inference, some one may say, merely through the relation of a-vinā-bhāva or of one not being without the other (i. e. co-existence.) In regard to this the author says.

This may be the case, (that is, a-vinā-bhāva may be the ground of inference), where the form or nature of the cause is not seen in the effect, as, e. g., in the case of the inference of the swoleness of the ocean from the rising of the moon. In the present case, on the other hand, from seeing the form or nature of Pradhāna in Mahat, etc., it is the inference of the cause that is made from the effect.

"Tat-sāhityat": from seeing the form or nature of Prakṛti in Mahat etc.—135.

Bhāṣya.—Thus, then, after establishing the character of effect as belonging to Mahat, etc., the author now points out a peculiarity, not mentioned before, in the inference of Prakṛti by means of them as the inferential marks.
The inference, Sāmānyato Dṛṣṭa, that has been stated above (vidē aphorism I. 103 supra), of the cause (Prakṛti) through the effects, Mahat Tattva, etc. as marks, that, in order to prevent its being of an external character as that of the inference of two independent things only externally related, should be made "tat-sahityāt", just by means of the relation of the cause accompanying the effect, in accordance with the teachings of the Veda, e. g.,

सद्यैं सैत्येवेदम आसीत

This, O peaceful one, was verily existent at the beginning.—Chh. Upaniṣad, VI. ii. 1.

तम पैदेवेदम आसीत

This was verily Tamas or Darkness at the beginning.—Maitr. Upaniṣad, V. 2.

And that (process of inference) is as follows:

Mahat, etc. have for their material cause a substance constituted by the three Guṇas which are super-imposed upon them,

Because they are effects,

As is the case with the statue inherent in a block of marble,

As is also the case with the oil, etc. present in oil-seeds, etc.

Such is the meaning.

Argument favourable or in support of the above inference has been set forth before.—135.

The Manifested is the mark of inference of the Unmanifested.

अन्यकं त्रिगुणात्मकातः १११२ ३६११

व्यक्तम् Avyaktam, the Unmanifested, Prakṛti. त्रिगुणम् Trigunam, made of the three Guṇas. लिंगम् Lingam, from the effect.

136. The Unmanifested must be inferred from the Līṅgam or effect in which the three Guṇas are present.—136.

Vṛtti.—But, (it may be objected), if it be so (i. e., that the nature of Prakṛti is present in Mahat, etc.), then, let the Principle Mahat itself be the cause of the world; what need of Pradhāna? To this the author replies.

Pradhāna should be inferred from the Līṅgam, etymologically that which goes to dissolution, namely, the Principle Mahat, containing the three Guṇas. And it is established by Perception that the Principle Mahat which is of the form of ascertainment, is a manifested entity, and is perishable. By means of it is made the inference of that (viz. Prakṛti) of which it is the Līṅgam, effect or mark.—136.
Bhāṣya.—For the purpose of discriminating the difference in property of this Prakṛti from the effects, the author says.

The Root Cause, the Unmanifested, is subtler than even the manifested Principle Mahat made of the three Guṇas; because the attributes of the Principle Mahat, e.g., Pleasure, etc., are directly perceived, while no attribute of Prakṛti is directly perceived. Prakṛti is absolutely unmanifested, whereas, by comparison with her, the Principle Mahat is a manifested entity. Such is the meaning.—136.

The existence of Prakṛti cannot be ignored.

तद्कार्यतस्त्वतिलक्षिणोपालयः । । १२१२ ॥

तत्कार्यतत्स्तत्वतिलक्षिणोपालयः: Tat-kāryataḥ, from the effect thereof, i.e., of Prakṛti. तत्: Tāt: tāt, because there is proof thereof, i.e., of Prakṛti. Na, no. तत्कार्यतत्स्तत्वतिलक्षिणोपालयः: Apalāpah, denial, ignoring.

137. There can be no denial of Prakṛti, because the existence of Prakṛti is established through her products. —137.

Vṛitti.—But, some one may say, something quite different may be the cause of the world; what need of Prakṛti? To this the author replies.

The cause in question must be either an effect or a not-effect. If it be an effect itself, then the same being the case with its cause, there would be infinite regression. If it be the original or root or primordial effect, then, this itself is that, namely, Prakṛti. “Tat-kāryataḥ”, from the effects of Prakṛti, existence of Prakṛti being established, there can be no ignoring of Prakṛti.—137.

Bhāṣya.—But, some one may say, if Prakṛti were transcendentally subtle, then, it deserves to be ignored altogether. There being room for this doubt, the author reminds of what has been stated before.

The aphorism is easy to understand.—137.

Existence of Puruṣa requires no proof.

सामान्येन विवारावाचारादर्शवस्त्र साधनस्या ॥ १२१३ ॥

सामान्येन Sāmānyena, in a general way, as to the existence of Puruṣa. विवारावाचारादर्शवस्त्र Vivāda-abhāvat, there being no dispute. दर्शवस्त्र Dharma-vat, as is the case with Dharma or Merit. Na, no. विवारावाचारादर्शवस्त्र Sādhanam, means of proof, ground of inference. Aniruddha reads tat, that, between ‘na’ and ‘Sādhanam’. This ‘tat’ refers to the relation of cause and effect which is the ground of inference in the case of Prakṛti.
138. No means of establishing (the existence of Puruṣa is required), because there is no dispute on the general question (that Puruṣa exists), as is the case with Dharma.—138.

Vṛtti.—Granted, may say our opponent, that the existence of Prakṛti is established; but the existence of Puruṣa cannot be established, because Puruṣa does not, according to your theory, produce any effect. In regard to this the author says.

There is no dispute whatever in regard to the Self on the general question (of its existence, for everybody is agreed that there exists such a thing as Self); for, the dispute is as to its particular character, that is, whether it be manifold or one, all-pervading or not all-pervading, etc. As, for example, in all systems of philosophy, there is no dispute that such a thing as Dharma exists, and opinions differ only as to its particular nature.

"Na tat-sādhanaṃ"; the relation of cause and effect is not the means of proof of the existence of Puruṣa. "I will mention some other means"—such is the intention.—138.

Bhāṣya.—The peculiarities belonging to the inference of Prakṛti have been discussed in detail. Henceforth, until the end of the Book, the peculiarities belonging to the inference of Puruṣa are the subject of discussion. From among them, the author mentions one peculiarity which presents itself at the beginning.

The establishment of a thing in its essential form (svārūpa) or in the form of an existence merely, is not looked for, where there is no dispute in respect of the thing in its universal or general aspect of being existent: as of Dharma. Such is the meaning.

The idea is as follows: As the establishment of Prakṛti was looked for even under the general aspect of her existence, because there was dispute as to the existence of something which might be taken to be the subject of properties (viz., Pleasure, Pain and Bewilderment) actually observed, so is not looked for the establishment of Puruṣa, inasmuch as on the ignoring of the existence of a conscious being, the world would become dark, and also because even the Baudhāyas do not dispute the existence in general of something of which the "I" may be predicated, as the experiencer. As is the case with Dharma: For Dharma is generally (though not in the particular characters given to it by thinkers of the orthodox schools) admitted by the Baudhāyas also, when they admit
BOOK I, SUTRA 138, 139, 140.

that the power of walking upon heated stones is due to Dharma or Merit. Hence, in respect of Puruṣa, should be made the inference only of his eternality, discrimination, etc.

Also, by the previous aphorism (I. 66 supra): “Samhata-para-artha-tvāt”, it is only the inference of the discrimination of Puruṣa, that is intended; and it is not intended there that Puruṣa is by no means an object of Perception. — 138.

Puruṣa is different from Prakṛiti and her products.

শरीरविविधतिरिक्तः पुरुषं युमानं ||२१५॥

सत्तविविधतिरिक्तः सत्रित्र-अद्व-वियतिरिक्तः, different from, other than, the body, etc.

पुरुषं प्रकृति, Puruṣa.

130. Puruṣa is something other than the body, etc.— 130.

Vṛtti.—But, it may be said, it is the body, the senses, and the like, that is the Self; what need of imagining anything else? In regard to this the author says.

The meaning is quite plain.— 139.

Bhāṣya.—Of these, (eternality, discrimination, etc.), at the opening of the present discourse, the author lays down an aphorism enunciating the discrimination of Puruṣa.

Puruṣa, i.e., the Experiencer, is other than the things, beginning with the body and ending with Prakṛiti, which are made of the twenty-four Principles. And experiencership consists in being the witness of the changes in the products of Prakṛiti.— 139.

The discernible is subservient to the indiscernible.

सङ्केतपर्यायलावण ||२१६॥

सम्बन्धस्वरुपमणस्य Samhata-para-artha-tvāt, because a structure made up of parts exists to serve the purpose of another who is not so made.

140. Because a structure formed by a combination of parts, exists for the benefit of another not so formed.— 140.

Vṛtti.—The author states an argument in support of the above proposition.

That which is formed by a combination of parts, exists to serve the purpose of some other not formed by a combination of parts. If it were

* Garbe, Hall, and Jivánanda all read this passage as part of the introduction to the next aphorism. This, however, is wrong, as the sense and context would at once show.
said to exist for the benefit of some other formed also by a combination of parts, the result would be infinite regression.

And the being formed by a combination of parts means the production of effects by the Guṇas by means of the relation of their consorting with one another. Or, the being formed by a combination of parts denotes the possession of fluidity (including liquidity) and solidity. And this (the being formed by a combination of parts) lies hidden in Prakṛti, etc., as, otherwise, the consequence would be the non-observation of the condition of being formed by a combination of parts in their effects.—140.

Bhāṣya.—Now the author gives the reasons for the above proposition in the following aphorisms.

Inasmuch as all that is formed by a combination of parts, e. g., Prakṛti, etc., is for the benefit of some other not so formed, as is the case with a bed, etc.; hence is established something other than the body, etc., which are formed by combinations of parts, that is, something not formed by a combination of parts, that is Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

And this argument has been explained under the aphorism: “Samhata-parartha-tvāt Puruṣasayā” (1. 66 supra). The repetition of the argument which has been already stated before, is for the purpose of collecting all the arguments in one place.—140.

A second argument

बियुक्ताविविचारयां न ११४१॥

Triguna-ādi-viparyayāt, from the absence of the properties of the three Guṇas, etc.

141. (Puruṣa is different from the body, etc., also) because there is in him the reverse (of the properties) of the three Guṇas, etc.—141.

Vṛtti.—The author elucidates the same point.

“Triguna-ādi-viparyayāt”: from the non-observation of the properties of the three Guṇas, etc., in Puruṣa. The word “ādi” implies the non-observation of the other properties also of Prakṛti.—141.

Bhāṣya.—Moreover:

From (seeing in Puruṣa) the reverse of the characteristics of partaking of the nature of Pleasure, Pain and Bewilderment etc. Such is the meaning. For, the property of partaking of the nature of, and thereby being the cause of, Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, which belongs to the body, etc., cannot belong to the experient of Pleasure, etc., since, in that case, Pleasure, etc., being the experiencer of themselves, there would be the
contradiction of the act and the agent; since the perception of Pleasure,
takes place only by seeing them reflected in the subject of the proper-
ties, i.e., Buddhi in which Pleasure, etc. inhere.

But, our opponent may say, Pleasure, etc. (which according to him
would be the properties of Puruṣa), being reflected in the modifications of
Buddhi, may be received by Puruṣa, as is the case with himself (i.e., cogni-
tion of himself through reflection in Buddhi). We reply that it cannot be
so; as, in that case, it would be but proper to suppose Pleasure, etc., to be
properties of Buddhi itself, because of redundancy in the supposition of
his reflection in Buddhi of Pleasure, etc., belonging to Puruṣa.

Intuitions, again, such as “I feel pleasure,” “I feel pain,” “I am in
illusion,” etc., do not prove that Pleasure, etc., inhere in Puruṣa, because
they can be attributed to the fact that Pleasure, etc., belong to Puruṣa in
the sense in which a thing belongs to its owner, as well as to the fact that
pleasure, etc. reside in Buddhi. For, Buddhi also must be the subject of
the idea of the “I” current among the common people, because the faults
in the shape of false knowledge, tendency or desire, etc., re-appear or enter
into it, and, further, because there would be redundancy in the supposition
of these intuitions being only reflections in Buddhi.

By the word “ādi” here are to be included non-discriminativeness,
te. declared by the Kārikā beginning with

विमुक्तताविवेकि

The Manifested (i.e., the effect) is constituted by the three Guṇas, is non-discrimi-
native. — Kārikā, verse X (vide page 182 supra, under aph. 120).

Similarly should also be included the properties of the body, etc.,
namely, Form (Rūpa), etc. — 141.

A third argument.

अष्टिष्ठानावृत्ति ||१२५५||

अष्टिष्ठानत् Adhīṣṭhānāt, from superintendence or governorship. — Chā, and,
also. कि Iti, finally.

142. And, finally, (Puruṣa is different from the body,
etc.), because of his superintendence (over them). — 142.

Vṛtti. — The author states another argument.

For, a superintendent must be an intelligent being, while Prakṛti is
non-intelligent. Such is the meaning. — 142.

Bhāṣya; — Furthermore:

From the fact that the experience is the superintendent, it follows
that be is other than the entities that are superintended over, i.e., those
ending with Prakṛti. Such is the meaning.
For, superintendence consists in the conjunction of the experiencer. And this conjunction is the cause of the transformations of Prakriti, etc., which (transformations) cause experience, as will appear from the future aphorism (V. 114):

From the superintendence of the Experimenter, takes place the building of the house of experience (i.e., the body).—Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram, V. 114 infra.

And conjunction is possible only where there is difference (of the things conjoined). Such is the import.

The word “iti” marks the end of the series of arguments.—142.

A fourth argument.

भोक्त्र-भावत् ॥ ११४॥

Bhoktri-bhāvat, from being the experiencer.

143. (Puruṣa is other than the body, etc.), because of his being the Experimenter.—143.

Vṛitti.—The author states another argument.

The object of experience is Prakriti, the experiencer is Puruṣa. Although experiencership does not properly belong to the Self on account of its remaining immutable in all ages, still it is attributed to it, as has been already explained (vide aphorism 58), because of the fact that the reflection of Buddhhi occurs to it or that it casts its reflection in Buddhhi, and thereby comes in contact with the objects of experience.—143.

Bhāṣya.—By the next two aphorisms the author sets forth favourable arguments confirming the above inference of the discrimination of Puruṣa from Prakriti.

For, were the experiencer to be essentially of the same form as the body, etc., and nothing else, then experiencership itself would be contradicted and disproved, on account of the contradiction of the act and the agent; since there is no proof that a thing can directly be the experiencer of itself. Such is the meaning. The absence of proof just now alluded to has been already explained.

In the present aphorism, it should be remembered, it is admitted that experience belongs to Puruṣa. And the experience of Puruṣa who does not undergo transformation, has been explained in the aphorism (I. 104 supra.) “Chit-avastho bhogah”: The end of experience is in Consciousness.—143.
A fifth argument.

कैवल्यार्थम प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १४४ ॥

Kaivalya-artha, for the purpose of the absolute independence or isolation of Puruṣa. अरोरा: Pravritteḥ, exertion or activity being. तथा: Oha, and.

144. (Puruṣa is other than the body, etc.), because all activity is for the purpose of the isolation of Puruṣa.—144.

Vṛtti.—Activity is with a view to Release. Now, is this activity for the benefit of the Self or of Prakṛiti? To this the author replies.

Since she partakes of the nature of the three Guṇas, there can be no lapse or deviation of nature (as, for instance, by means of isolation) in the case of Prakṛiti. Futher, because that would entail her non-ternality. Isolation (kaivalya) is possible of that of which the attributes are adventitious and not constitutive; and that is the Self.—144.

Bhāṣya.—Still further:

If it be said that the experiencer is nothing but the body, etc., then, for the purpose of the isolation, i. e., for the purpose of the absolute or permanent eradication of pain, activity on the part of any one whatever would not be reasonable or possible, seeing that the body, etc., are by nature perishable. In the case of Prakṛiti, again, isolation is not possible, because Prakṛiti is established as having Pain for its essence, by “dharani-grāhaka-māna” (i. e., the evidence of observed but otherwise unexplained facts leading to the supposition of something as the subject, and thus the cause, of those unexplained properties, in other words, by hypothetical inference); and absolute eradication of nature never takes place. Such is the meaning.

The reading of the present aphorism as “Kaivalya-arthaṃ Prakṛiteḥ” is erroneous and, as such, should be discarded. The reading “Kaivalya-śānam Pravṛttaśeṣaḥ” is obtained from the Kārikā also:

कैवल्यार्थम प्रवृत्तेश्च स्वरूपधिकारिः शास्त्रान्तरिता ।
पुरुषोद्धतः त्रिपदार्थ सक्षात् कैवल्यार्थम प्रवृत्तेश्च कारिका ॥ १९ ॥

Puruṣa exists: since a structure of manifold parts (which the world is), is for the benefit of another of a different character; since the reverse of the nature of the three Guṇas must exist; since there must exist a superintendent; since there must be an experiencer; since activity is with a view to isolation.—Kārikā, Verse 17.

The other reading should be rejected also because it is not in harmony with the sense intended to be expressed.—144.
145. Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent, light (must be the nature of the intelligent, i.e., Puruṣa).—145.

Vṛtti.—Of what form or nature is this Self? To this the author replies.

It is a settled point that the unintelligent does not throw light on, i.e., manifest, objects. If the Self also were to be unintelligent, then there must exist something else to illuminate it. (And in this way the result would be non-finality.) And also, on the ground of simplicity, let the Self itself be of the form of light. The Veda also bears testimony to the Self being of the nature of light. Thus

चेतस्य सर्वं विज्ञानाति स केन विज्ञानीयताः ।
विज्ञाततः केन विज्ञानीयताः॥

Wherewith shall one cognize that wherewith one cognizes all this? Wherewith Lo, shall one cognize the cognizor?—Bṛh. Arāy. Upan. IV. iv. 14—145.

विद्याके नानास्माद विद्यापारमात्माः॥

Śāṅkya.—Puruṣa has been established as being other than the twenty-four Principles. Now, with a view to make this discrimination more manifest, the peculiarity appertaining to Puruṣa is going to be inferred.

The Vaiśeṣikas say: Through conjunction of Manas, is produced the light, called cognition, of the Self which was unintelligent and of the form of not-light before. But this is not the case, because connection of light cannot take place in what is unintelligent, as, in the world, we never observe the production of light or illuminativeness in a clod of earth, etc., which are unintelligent and non-illuminative. It follows, therefore, that Puruṣa is, like the sun and the like, truly and essentially of the form of light. Such is the meaning.

Thus says the Smṛti:—

यथा प्रकाशमेऽस्मि समेतो भोजयते ।
तत्रवैधे व हृदायम् प्रक्ष्यवापििमानं ॥

As no relation can take place between light and darkness, do not likewise suspect the unity of the fabric of the world and of the Supremo Self.—Kālikā Purāṇa, II. ii. 18.

And also

यथा दीर्घं प्रकाशास्मि हुस्येऽव पर्वतं वा भूमिनं ।
हानललं तथा बिजातु पुरुषं स्वर्गदेशमु ॥

As the lamp is of the nature of illumination; no matter whether it be large or small; likewise, one shall know Puruṣa, in all creatures, to be of the nature of cognition.
And lightness is not an attribute, but the essence, of Purusa.

**निर्गुण्तव्यः चिकित्सा १२२६॥**

Nirguna-tvāt, being devoid of attributes. **Na, not. Chitdharmaḥ, that which has consciousness or intelligence as a property.**

146. Intelligence is not a property of Purusa, because he is free from attributes.—146.

**Vritti.**—But, our opponent, the Naiyāyikas, may say, let the Self be unintelligent, and although it is unintelligent, as they hold, still have intelligence as a property. Thereby it will illumine the world. But it cannot be of the form of intelligence. To this the author replies.

If the Self were to be connected with a property, then, it would be liable to transformation, and, consequently, would never obtain Release, (its transformation going on eternally).—146.

**Bhāṣya.**—But, it may still be asked, even though Purusa be essentially of the form of light, does the relation of the property and the subject of the property exist in the present case, as it does in the case of Tejas or 'fire,' or does it not? To this the author replies.

The meaning is quite plain.

When, it being established that Purusa is of the form of light, other uses of Purusa are made possible by means of this relation of identity with light, it would be redundant to imagine that Purusa possesses a property having the nature of light. This should also be understood.

Of Tejas or 'fire,' again, although a particular form called light is not perceived, still, since it is perceived through Touch, the difference of light and fire is established. Of the Self, on the other hand, there is no knowledge or apprehension at all during the non-apprehension of the light called cognition. Hence, on the ground of simplicity, the Self is conceived as a substance absolutely of the form of light and devoid of the relation of the property and the subject of the property.

And the Self is not an attribute, since it possesses conjunction, etc., and is not dependent upon anything else as a support. So is it recollected in the Smriti.

**Karma-viśālasya chaṁ na duṣṭam eva kṛpaṣyam !
Kṣatrasvlo vadhāma vikṛta pūtra śvata śīvam !**
Consciousness is in no sense a property of the Self nor an attribute. The Self is just constituted by cognition as its essence, is eternal, entire, and blissful always.

But, what, it may be asked, is the reason for the statement itself that the Self is devoid of attributes? To this we reply as follows: It is not possible to say that the desire, etc., of Puruṣa should be eternal, because they are found by perception to be producible; and, if you admit a producible attribute in the case of Puruṣa, it would entail his liability to transformation. So that, redundancy would be the result on the supposition of both of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti as the cause of transformation. And since a blind transformation would sometimes entail Puruṣa not being the knower, the result would be the doubt as to whether cognition, desire, etc., be within the cognizance of Puruṣa. Similarly from what has been already stated, namely, that the unintelligent has no fitness for association with light, it is impossible to have cognition of the eternal as non-eternal.

Again, by the methods of agreement and difference, desire etc., are, on the ground of simplicity, established in Manas alone; since the supposition that the conjunction of Manas as well as the Self are the causes of desire, etc., would be redundant.

And the word “guṇa” in “nir-guṇa”, it has been already stated, signifies particular attributes, and not the universal guṇas, Sattva, etc.

It follows, therefore, that the Self is devoid of attributes.

Moreover, with those Logicians who desire the agency of the Self, there can be no proof or possibility of Release, since it is this modification of Buddhi, namely, “I am the agent,” that has been declared in the Gītā (vide III. 27 for instance), etc., as being the cause of the production of Adṛśṭam or Merit and Demerit. Again, as, in their opinion, such modification of Buddhi or idea does not possess the nature of false knowledge, it is impossible that it should be removed by knowledge of truth. Hence, seeing that the Release taught in the Veda is not possible on any other theory, it is desired by us that the Self is not the agent. And, from its not being the agent follows the non-existence of pleasure, etc., in the shape of Adṛśṭam. And thereafter Manas having to be conceived as the cause of deeds to be done, etc., the supposition is made within the limitations imposed by attributes internally or occultly visible.

It follows, therefore, that the Self is devoid of attributes.

In the Yoga-Viṣṇu-Prāṇa, the svarūpa or essential form of the absolutely subtle and pure Self, as shown above, has been described as
nearly as an Amanāta (Cymbio myrobolan) in the hand, and established discriminatively. Thus

That shall be the pure form of the Light (i.e., the Self), which exists in the Illuminable shape of Space, Earth, Ether, during their non-production.

When the three worlds, you and I, all the Illuminable vanishes out of existence, then would be the isolated state of the beholder; similar is the state of the Pure Self. —146.


The Veda is higher evidence than Perception.

Thy Veda is higher evidence than Perception.

The Veda is higher evidence than Perception.

The Veda is higher evidence than Perception.

The Veda is higher evidence than Perception.

The Veda is higher evidence than Perception.

147. There can be no ignoring of what is established by the Veda, because of the contradiction by the Veda itself of the perception of attributes, etc., in the Self.—147.

Vritti.—The author points out that the theory of the Logicians is in contradiction to the Veda.

The text of the Veda in question is

It would be contradicted if there were any association of attributes in the Self. —147.

Bhāṣya.—But, the Logician may urge, from the perception of the relation of the property and the subject of the property between Consciousness and Puruṣa in such cases as "I cognize," it is established that Consciousness belongs to Puruṣa as a property. If there is any redundancy here, it is no fault, being authoritative or valid. To this the author replies.

Your objection could stand, if we established that consciousness, etc., are not properties of Puruṣa, because, by mere reasoning, we find that he is free from attributes. But we do so by the help of Vedic texts also. Hence contradiction of Puruṣa's being devoid of attributes, etc., as established by the Veda, is not possible, because of the contradiction of the
perception thereof, i.e., of attributes, etc., by the Veda itself, as of the perceptions. "I am fair," etc. Such is the meaning. For, otherwise, on the strength of the perception "I am fair," would be contradicted or obstructed also the arguments which establish the Self as other than the body; and triumphant would be the Nastikas or Nihilists.

As to Purusā’s being devoid of attributes, the texts of the Veda are, for example:

**साधृैैः वैद्यतः निस्तूव नैद्यः**

The Self is the Witness, Intelligent, Pure, and Attributeless.—Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad VI. 11.

As to Purusā’s being mere or pure consciousness, the texts of the Veda are, for example:

**वाच्यमेय विच्याय निदिष्टेच्छरथे हाययाल्ला**

For this Self is Non-agent, Consciousness, Pure Intelligence, of the form of the uniform and unmixed flow of Existence and Consciousness.—Vedānta-Sūtra, 168.

The texts of the Veda, on the other hand, which declare Omniscience etc., in regard to the Self, are mere translations of the empty imaginations of the common people, which convey no more sense than that of "the head of Rāhu" (Rāhu being all head). For, these texts being in conflict with those cited above, authoritativeness belongs to the latter and not to the former, according to the accepted rule of interpretation that, among Vedic texts, prescriptive and prohibitive, it is the negative texts, that are the stronger of the two; there being such negative texts of the Veda as the following:

**चचिति चाचयिस नेति नेति न ह तस्त्यादिति तेहस्तत्तु परमतिष्ठ**

Now, then, the direction "Neti!" "Neti!" Not, Not, for does not something other than, and beyond, this (viable world) not exist?—Bṛ. Āraṇ. Upa. II, iii. 6.

Moreover, the very supposition that the intuition of the ignorant in the form of "I cognize," is a valid or right cognition (pramā), is redundant, since, when the fault of eternal Nescience or Ignorance pursues all mortals, to err is the ordinary rule. Hence, as it falls in the midst of hundreds of errors and is thereby attacked or affected with the apprehension of unauthoritativeness, inference (apart from the declaration of the Veda) supported by considerations of simplicity, etc., is alone sufficient as a confutation of such intuition as "I cognize."

But, it may be asked, what sort of simplicity there is in the conception of the Self as having eternal knowledge as its essence? To this, we reply as follows: By the Naiyāyikas, etc., four Padārtas or Predicables are conceived, viz., Antah-kāraṇa or the internal instrument, Vyavastya,
certainly, Anu-व्यावस्था or pro-certainty (or subsidiary processes), and a substratum thereof; while, by us, three Padārthas or Predicables are received, viz., Antahkaraṇa, the function or modification thereof in the place of certainty as well as in the place of the infinite instances of pro-certainty, and the Self in the form of eternal and uniform cognition.—147.

Puruṣa is merely the witness of the states, dreamless sleep, etc.

**191**

Sūrya-व्यावस्था Sūrya-व्यावस्था. The being the witness of the states of dreamless sleep, etc., (Vījñāna Bhikṣu). Sūrya-व्यावस्था Sūrya-व्यावस्था, the ex being the witness etc., (Aniruddha).

148. (If Puruṣa were not intelligent, he would) not be witness of the states of dreamless sleep, etc. (Aniruddha.)

Or, Puruṣa is merely the witness of the states of dreamless sleep, etc., (hence Puruṣa's being of the nature of light does not affect them).—(Vījñāna Bhikṣu).—148.

**Vṛitti.**—The author points out another defect in the opposite theory.

If the Self were unintelligent, then, in dreamless sleep, etc., it would be the witness, i.e., the knower, of those states. But this is not the case, because of the recollection on awakening, in the form of "I slept pleasantly."

By the word "ādi," dreaming is included.—148.

**Bhāṣya.**—But, it may be argued, if the Self be absolutely of the form of light, then, the difference of the states of dreamless sleep, etc., would not be justified, because of this that the light would never for a moment depart. In regard to this the author replies.

Puruṣa is merely the witness, and, nothing more, of the three states of dreamless sleep, (dreaming and waking) which pertain to Buddhi. Such is the meaning. So has it been declared:

अस्मि त्वं त्स्तं च, त्स्त्वं ह दुर्गुपस नुक्रियतेषां ।
तत्र तत्र तस्ते तेषां त्स्त्वं नुक्रियतेषां।

The states of waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep are modifications of Buddhi according to differences of the Guṇas. The Jīva or transmigratory Self which is of a different character from them, is established as their witness.

The Jīva who is "Tat-vilakṣaṇa" i.e., bereft of the waking and the other states, has been ascertained as being the witness, "tāsām" of these modifications of Buddhi. Such is the meaning.«
Among these states, that is called the waking state in which takes place the modification of Buddha into the form of the objects through the channel of the Senses; and dreaming is that state in which such modification is produced from samskāra or impressions merely. And dreamless sleep is twofold, according as the laya or passing into latency is partial or complete. Of these, in the state of half latency, modification of Buddha into the form of objects does not occur, but Buddha is modified into the shapes only of the Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment inhering in it; since, otherwise, it would not be possible for one rising from sleep to have remembrance of Pleasure, etc., experienced during dreamless sleep, in such forms as "I slept pleasantly," etc. Accordingly it has been declared by the aphorism of Vyāsa (Vedānta Sūtras, III. ii 10):

In the swooning condition, the Jīva is in half combination with Brahman; because the rule of the remainder shows this.—S. B. H. Vol. V, page 465.

In the state of complete latency, on the other hand, there is absence of the modification in general of Buddha, as in the case of death and the like; as, otherwise, there would be no justification for the future aphorism,

Modification into the form of Brahman takes place in the states of Tranquility, Deep Sleep and Release.—V. 110 infra.

And since this complete deep sleep is of the form of the non-existence of the modifications of Buddha, Puruṣa does not become the witness of it, because Puruṣa is the witness of the modifications merely. For, if it were not so, then Samskāra or impression and other properties of Buddha also would be the objects to be illumined by the witness.

We will, however, say that the being the witness of the states of dreamless sleep, etc. consists in the illumination of similar transformations of Buddha reflected in Puruṣa. Hence, for the purpose of cognition, the transformation of Puruṣa is not needed.

It might be so, says our opponent. If modification of Buddha, cognizant of Pleasure, Pain, etc., is desired, in deep sleep, then, it is but proper to admit, that, in the waking and other states also, all the modifications are capable of being apprehended by the modifications themselves. And this being admitted, the supposition of Puruṣa as the witness of these modifications is useless, since it is more easy generally to say that they are the cause of their own uses or phenomenal appearances, not by means of their being the modifications, which are within their own cognizance.
We reply that the case is not thus. On the supposition that, as a rule, the modifications are the objects of cognition by themselves, the consequence would be non-finiteness and redundancy. Moreover, since pleasure, etc., are distinctive peculiarities in such modifications as "I am pleased," etc., indiscrete or abstract or absolute cognition of these modifications is in the first instance looked for. And in regard to that, supposition is made by us of cognition which forms the essence of the Self and is eternal and absolutely one and undivided, since it is simpler and more natural than an infinite indiscrete modification. In order to account for such discrete or particular cognitions as, "I am pleased," etc., we hold that it is the modification of Buddhī that assumes similar forms; for, since the admission of even a nominal similarity in form of Puruṣa with the modification of Buddhī would amount to a non-admission of a form of Puruṣa other than the form of the modification, the consequence would be the transformation of Puruṣa by an independent form different from his own.—148.

Proof of Plurality of Puruṣas.

Janmāvidvyavasthā: Puṣṭhavāhuṃ || 11 24 11

Janmāvidvyavasthā: Jana-mādī-vaśyasthā-taḥ, from the several allotment or disposition or distribution of birth, etc. Puṣṭhavāhuṃ Puruṣa-bahutvam, multiplicity of Puruṣas.

149. Multiplicity of Puruṣas (is proved) from the several allotment of births, etc.:—149.

Vṛtti.—The Self is one and one only, thus say the Vedāntins. Thus

Bhāṣa:  Saṁṣaśsāḥ śakticchātra āryavat a bhavāt: ||

For, the Self is eternal, omnipresent, immutable, and free from blemish. Being one, it is divided (into a seeming multiplicity) by Māyā, its energy, but not through its own nature or essence.

In regard to this the author says.

Were the Self one only, then, one being born, all would be born.—149.

Bhāṣya.—Now, when the unity of Puruṣa is also thus made out by his being merely the witness of the states of deep sleep, etc., the doubt arises whether he be one or many. In this Adhikaraṇa, a case or topic, the

Adhikaraṇa is the complete statement of a case, and consists of five members: visarga or thesis, e.g., Puruṣa are manifold; hampiya or doubt, e.g., whether Puruṣa be many; Purvā-nātha or antithesis, e.g., Puruṣa is one; Siddhānta or synthesis or conclusion, e.g., Puruṣas are manifold; and Gāgati or connection or agreement of the

Adhikaraṇa with other parts of the system.
Pūrva-pakṣa, the objection or prima facie view, is this: From texts of the Veda declaring non-division or non-duality, which are supported by the argument that this is the simple and natural view of the case, the Self is established as being one and one only; while the dissimilarities or differences in the form of the states of waking, etc., may be attributed to Buddhi as its properties. Although this single Self thus comes to be the witness of all Buddhis, still, according as a modification takes place in a Buddhi, it is that Buddhi alone, that, by means of its being thus particularized with the possession of that modification, apprehends the witness by such forms as "I cognize the water pot," etc. Hence, while the modification, viz., "This is a water pot," appears in a particular Buddhi only, the intuition, viz., "I cognize a water pot" does not arise by means of the modifications of the other Buddhis.

In regard to this Pūrva-pakṣa, the author states the demonstrated conclusion or Siddhānta.

Since there is no other reason for the "Vyavasthā," i.e., distribution or differentiation of Purusās made in the Veda and the Sūrīti, namely, that a virtuous Purusā is born in heaven, that a vicious one in hell, that an ignorant Purusā is bound, that a knowing one is released, etc., it follows that Purusās are manifold. Such is the meaning.

Birth and death, however, do not here signify production and destruction, since they do not pertain to Purusā, but conjunction with, and disjunction from, a particular structure or combination of body, sense, etc., which determine Experience, and the absence thereof.

As regards the distribution of births, etc., the text of the Veda is

चक्राद्योक्तः कदाचिअक्षुण्या वाल! पञकं गन्तान्तसंह्रणः।

चक्रावते हरे द्रुपादिसमश्वेते जाताये गुहाभग्नात्स्मयः॥

The one Unborn (Puruṣa), for enjoyment, consorts with the one Unborn (Prakṛti) having the colours of red, white, and black, the progenetrix of manifold progeny like unto herself. The other Unborn deserts her, after she is enjoyed.—Śvētāṣṭāra-Upaniṣad, IV. 5.

एते तद्विविद्वताते इवन्द्र्येपेते दुःखशीलापितहः॥

They who know this, become immortal, while others come in for a share of pain only. Iṣṭa. III. 10.—149.

The Vedānta view: That the apparent multiplicity of Puruṣa is due to the multiplicity of upādhi or investments.

उपाधिनियोज्यकृत्य नानायोग भ्राकायश्वेष उपद्रा-

विचित्रः ॥ २३४॥

उपाधि-भाष्य, there being difference of upādhi or investments. Ave, also, even. नाम-योग, connection or appearance or production of
multiplicity. अक्ष्या, of Akṣa or Ether. या Iva, as. अति: Gṛha-adhih, by reason of water pots, etc.

150. (The Vedāntins maintain that) from difference of upādhis or investments also arises the appearance of multiplicity of the one Self; as of Akṣa, by reason of water pots, etc. (which divide it into many parts). (Aniruddha.)

Or, even in the case of differences of upādhis or investments (as maintained by the Vedāntin), the appearance of multiplicity will be of the one Self only; as of the Akṣa, by reason of water pots, etc., (and consequently the same defects will remain, e.g., when one is born all would be born). (Vijñāna Bhikṣu).—150.

Vṛtti.--The author apprehends the view of an opponent (the Vedāntin) as an objection to his theory of multiplicity of Puruṣas.

Just as, in consequence of the difference of Upādhis, e.g., water pot, etc., it is predicated of the one Akṣa that the water-pot-Akṣa (i.e. the portion confined within it) is destroyed, when the water pot is destroyed; similarly, in the case of the unity of the Self also, in consequence of the determination or delimitation caused by the body, it is mere predication or form of speech to say, when the body is destroyed, that the Self is destroyed. In the case of the multiplicity of the Self, again, since the Self is otherwise eternal, (as the Sāṁkhyas hold), how can there be the allotment of births and deaths?—150.

Bhāṣya:—But, it may be said, even in the case of the unity of Puruṣa, distribution of births, etc., will be possible by means of the difference of the determining conditions in the form of the upādhis. In regard to this the author says.

Even in the case of differences of upādhis, connection with manifold upādhis would be really of the one Puruṣa only; as, for example, connection with manifold upādhis such as the water pot, walls, etc., is of the one Akṣa only. Hence, by means of the difference of determining conditions, it is of the one Self only that diverse births, deaths, etc. would take place, as in the case of the physical organisms, etc. So that distribution of births, etc.; such as one Puruṣa is born and not another, would not be possible. Such is the meaning. For, by means of the difference of determining conditions, in respect of one and the same tree possessing conjunction with a monkey and with the absence thereof, distribution
or differentiation is not possible, as it is in such cases as when we say that one tree possesses conjunction with a monkey, while another does not.

Moreover, since a portion of the Self which has been freed from one upādhi, would be still liable to be confined by other upādhis, the irregularity of Bondage and Release is also in the same state (of defectiveness); that is, as a portion of Ākāśa, freed from a water pot, is again established as the water-pot-Ākāśa through connection with another water pot, similarly.

It must not be said that the texts of the Veda on the distribution or allotment of Bondage and Release are also mere translations of popular errors; since Release (is not a subject for discussion by ordinary people, but) is alaukika or above the conception of the ordinary people. Besides, (if the Veda held up an error as the supreme object of life, then), by establishing a false object of desire to Puruṣa (Puruṣa-artha), the Veda would be guilty of deception, etc. (a charge, however, for which there does not exist the slightest justification).—150.

The Vedānta view further criticised.

उपाधिभिषिष्ठते न तु तद्वात् "४६४७"

वांछi: Upādhib, the adjunct, investment. भिषिष्ठते Bhidyate, is different. न Na, not. तु Tu, but. तद्वात Tat-vān, the possessor or holder thereof.

151. The Upādhi is different, but not the holder thereof (i.e. Puruṣa)—151.

Vṛtti.—The author gives the solution of the difficulty created by the above view of the Vedāntin.

"The upādhi is different." Nor, from the destruction of one thing (upādhi), can there be the predication of destruction in respect of another thing (Puruṣa), since the predication would be too remote. And, in the case of the unity of the Self (as held by the Vedāntin), there is the imputation or attribution (adhyāśa) of contradictory properties, e.g. Bondage and Release (to the same Self), when he says that one man is bound and that another man is released, because Bondage and Release cannot simultaneously exist in one and the same Self. Of Ākāśa, on the other hand, conjunction and non-conjunction with smoke and the like, are not contradictory to each other, because conjunction does not reside in a thing by wholly pervading it, (while it would be absurd to say, that Bondage affects one part of Puruṣa, while Release abides in another part).—151.
But, the Vedántin may urge, even on the theory of the unity of Consciousness, distribution of Bondage and Release can be established by admitting (the popular conception of) the separate existences of the one Self, under the particular forms given to it by the several upádhis. To this the author replies.

It is the upádhi that is manifold; "but not the holder thereof," that is, that also which possesses the upádhi as a distinctive peculiarity, should not be admitted to be manifold; since, were that which possesses a distinctive peculiarity, a separate existence, then, it is only the manifoldness of the Self that would have to be admitted in the other Śśstra (the Vedánta) also, (a result which the Vedántin would not certainly accept). Such is the meaning. There are also other defects in the theory: e. g., if that which undergoes Bondage were a Viśista or thing particularized; with a specific distinction, then, since, on the separation of the distinction from it, the thing particularized would also vanish, Release would not be established (as a positive state of the thing, but as a void, in which form Release is conceived by none).

But the Vedántin may interrupt by saying that the author of the (Sāmkhya) aphorism is himself going to declare in the Sixth Book that it is that alone which is particularized with Ahamkāra as a specific distinction, that constitutes the character of the Jiva or the mundane Puruṣa, by the aphorism (VI. 63):

विविक्त जीवगतेष्वपरिवर्जितत्वम् ॥ १ ॥

The character of the Jiva belongs to that which is particularized, because Agreement and Difference prove this.

But this is not so, we would reply; because it is the character of the Jiva in the form of being the supporter of Prána or Life, that only has been declared there to be inherent in that which is particularized. It will not be declared there that the distribution of Bondage and Release is dependent upon, and is regulated by, the thing particularized, inasmuch as the thing particularized has no existence at the time of Release.

And what a few moderns who pose as Vedántins, say, namely, that the Jivas and Jávaras are the reflections of the one and only one Self, thrown into the upádhis in the form of effects and causes, and that through the mutual difference of the reflections, the distribution of births and all the rest is established;—this too is erroneous, because it does not stand the test of the alternatives of difference and non-difference. If the reflected and the reflection were different in character from each other, then, since the reflection would be unintelligent, Experiencership,
Bondage, Release, etc., would not be established, and also the tenet, held by them, of the identity of the Jiva and Brahman would be impaired, and, further, the existence of a Self different from the Jiva and Brahman would be invalid. In the case of the non-difference or identity of the reflected and the reflection, on the other hand, promiscuity, i.e., simultaneous presence of contradictory properties in one and the same thing, cannot be avoided. While, on the admission of their identity-and-difference, the above tenet would be lost, and, further, the contradiction inherent in the conception of the simultaneous identity and difference of two things, would be entailed. In our theory, on the other hand, non-difference or identity is characterized as non-division, and difference means reciprocal non-existence (as that of the nature of the cow in the horse, and vice versa), and hence there is no contradiction. And as regards the passages giving illustrations of the reflections, determinations or divisions, etc., we will explain them in the sequel.

It might be so, may say those so-called Vedántins, but what we say is only this, that, imagining the difference of the reflected and the reflection as if it were present in the case of the Jiva and Brahman, the Veda has imagined the distribution of Bondage and Release, and not that the condition of the reflected, the difference of the reflected and the reflection, Bondage, Release, etc., are desired as being transcendentally true. But this interpretation of the Vedic texts cannot be allowed. For, when matters stand thus, it is proper, for the sake of simplicity, to restrict the scope of the texts declaring pure identity or simply the non-difference of the Jiva and Brahman, by interpreting them as signifying the non-division or non-disjunction of the Jiva and Brahman, rather than to contradict, and thereby to render null and void, both those groups of texts which declare the distribution of Bondage, Release, etc., and also the difference of the Jiva and Brahman. There is also this further reason in support of the position we take up, that the non-division of the Jiva and Brahman has been established by other Vedic writings and the Śāntitā.—151.

Conclusion of the criticism of the Vedánta view.

एवमेकाकत्वे परिवर्तितमात्रेऽ विभिन्नार्थोऽवस्था: ||१०१ ५२||

Evam, thus. स्त्रेण्यः Ekatvam, by unity. परिवर्तात Parivartamānasya, of (the Self) existing everywhere. नः Na, no. विभिन्नार्थः Viruddha-dharma-adhyāsaḥ, imputation or imposition of contradictory properties.

152. Thus, (i.e. on the Theory of the Multiplicity of Purusa, as held by the Sāmkhyas), (there is) no imputation
contradictory properties, (as is entailed in the case) of one universal Self (of the Vedântins). (Aniruddha.)

Or, the imputation of contradictory properties, in the way indicated above, to a Self present everywhere by its unity, (as imagined by the Vedântins), is not reasonable. (Vijûâna Bhikṣu).—152.

Vrûti.—What is gained by this? To this the author replies.

Attribution of contradictory properties does not take place.—152.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—“Evam,” it being thus, that is, there being multiplicity of Puruṣa.

Bhâṣya.—The author concludes the consideration of the defects alleged against those who hold the theory of the Unity of the Self.

In this way, it is found to be not reasonable to introduce the instantaneous presence of contradictory properties in the form of birth, death, etc., in the case of the Self present everywhere by reason of its unity. Such is the meaning.

Or, there may be a stop after “ekâtve,” (so that the letters e, k, u, t, v, e, u, a, would make up two words “ekâtve” and “na,” instead of one “ekâtvena”). The unity of the Self being admitted, would not the imputation of contradictory properties to the Self, “paritâh” or everywhere, present, i.e., penetrating all upâdhis, be not entailed? On the contrary, co-existence of contradictory properties would by no means be avoidable. Such is the meaning.

Our opponents may urge that, when Puruṣa possesses no attribute at all, and when we also admit that all properties inhere in the upâdhis, how do we bring it about that on their theory, there is, in Puruṣa, a promiscuous presence of contradictory properties such as birth, death, bondage, release, etc.? We would reply that the properties mentioned, are admitted as belonging to Puruṣa by reason of their being of the forms of conjunction, disjunction, experience, and non-experience; it having been already declared that only properties which possess the form or nature of transformation, and none else, are denied in regard to Puruṣa.—152.

Imputation proves nothing.

अन्यायपरीपरी नातोपत्त तद्विश्वित्रोकत्वात् ॥ १५२॥

Anâya-dharmatve, being the property of another. अ Pi, even. न, not. अरोपत्, from imputation or superimposition. तत्: Tat-siddhât.
establishment thereof, i. e., of the distribution of birth, etc., as well as of pleasure, etc. एकत्वः एकत्वां, from unity.

153. Even though the properties of other things be imputed to the Self, the imputation does not prove that it really possesses them, because of its being one and absolutely simple. (Aniruddha.)

Or, even though they be the properties of other things, the distribution of pleasure, etc., in regard to Purusa, cannot be established from the rule of imputation, in consequence of the unity of Purusa. (Vijñana Bhikṣu.)—153.

Vritti.—It may be contended by the Vedāntin that the attribution of the property of a thing of quite a different nature, to another, is actually observed; as, for example, the agency of Prakriti is attributed to Purusa who is different from Prakriti. To this the author replies.

The agency of Purusa is erroneous. The truth in the matter is that Purusa is not the agent, the imputation not being objectively true. Nor can the connection between the true and the not-true be real. Being free from all association or attachment, the Self can have no possible connection with birth, death, etc., in a true sense.—153.

Bhāṣya.—As there is a well regulated distribution of the properties of redness, blueness, etc., appearing in the crystals, although these properties are only superimposed upon them, likewise, in the case of Purusas also, there is, in the Śāstras, a well regulated distribution of the properties of Buddhi, cīrā, pleasure, pain, etc., as well as also of the properties of the body, etc., cīrā, Brahmānādhiḥ, Kṣatriyādhiḥ, etc., although these properties are only imputed to them. As, for example, in the Viṣṇu Purīṇa.

As, in the case of a single Ghaṭa-Ākāśa or Ākāśa confined within a water-glass, which is covered with dust and smoke and the like, all these epithets are not applied, so are the Jīvas not possessed of Pleasure, etc.

And this distribution (of pleasure, etc.,) also, just like the distribution of birth, etc., is not established on the theory of the Unity of the Self.

This the author now declares.

Although they are the properties of other things, e. g., Buddhi, etc., still, the distribution mentioned above would not be established in the case
Puruṣa, through the superimposition of the properties of pleasure, etc., upon him; because of the unity of Puruṣa (as supposed by the Vedántas) who is the subject or substratum of the superimposition. Such is the meaning. In spite of the unity of Ākāśa, distribution of adventitious (coming from upādhis) properties takes place in it by means of the differences of the portions of Ākāśa (Ākāśas) determined by (being confined within) water pots, according to the difference of the water pots. The characters of being the Self, of being the Jīva, etc., do not, however, belong to what are determined and conditioned by means of upādhis or external investments; since, by the destruction of the Self, the Jīva, etc., which would necessarily follow, like the destruction of the Ghaṭa-Ākāśa, on the removal of the upādhi, there would be contradiction to the texts of the Veda which declare that the Jīva does not perish, etc. But, as it has been already stated, these characters belong to Pure Consciousness.

It is simply without understanding this non-establishment of the distribution of bondage, release, etc., which is too nice a subject for them to comprehend, that the moderns who style themselves as Vedántins, say that the distribution of bondage and release is possible, even on the theory of the Unity of the Self, by means of the differences of upādhis. They too are silenced by the present aphorism.

Those, again, forming a section of them, who having seen this very non-establishment of the distribution of pleasure, bondage, etc., say that it is only of the reflections of Consciousness fallen on the upādhis, that bondage, etc., occur;—they are very greatly mistaken; because of the defect mentioned before (page 211), namely, that their theory does not stand the test of the alternatives of difference and non-difference, etc., and, rather, because of the defect pointed out by the aphorism (I. 99, q. e.): actually superintendence is of the Antānt-karana, because it is lighted up; as is the case with iron.

Moreover, in the Vedānta Sūtrām, (S. B. H. Vol. V), the absoluteity of all the Selves is nowhere found declared. On the contrary, their difference has, in fact, been declared by the aphorisms, for example:

अन्यं सत्यं ज्ञातवर्णम् । २ ॥ २ ॥

"The being above mentioned is other than Jīva. Because there is a declaration of its being separate from Jīva."—Vedānta Sūtrām, I. 1. 21.

धर्मशास्त्रो ने प्रवृत्तिविधानम् । २ ॥ २ ॥

"But Brahman is greater than Jīva, because the scriptures declare His difference from the Jīva."—Ibid, II. I. 22.
The soul is a part, because the Lord is described as having manifold relations with the soul etc."—Ibid, II. iii. 41.


Hence it is established that the doctrines of Avachcheda or partial limitation, (namely, that the Jīva is an undisj oined portion of the one, all-pervading Brahman, cabined, cribbed, and confined by the upādhi), of Pratibimba or reflection, (namely, that the Jīva is only a reflection of Brahman into the upādhi), and the like, are nothing but perverse conclusions. There is this further reason also that, in regard to objects about which doubt has arisen and which have not been dealt with in one's own Śāstra, it is the conclusion of a sister Śāstra that should be accepted as the established tenet. All this has been demonstrated by us in our Commentary on the Brahma-Mimamsā (the Vedānta Sūtram).—153.

The Sāmkhya Theory is not in conflict with the Vedic declarations.

154.—There is no contradiction, (by the Sāmkhya Theory of the Multiplicity of Puruṣas), of the Vedic declarations of Non-duality (of Puruṣa), because the reference (in these declarations) is to the genus (of Puruṣa).—154.

Vṛtti.—But, this being so, the Vedāntin may say, there would be contradiction of the Veda. For, says the Veda:

एकमात्रवाहितार्यं भज ॥

Brahman is one only, without a second.—Chhândogya Upaniṣat, VI. ii. 1.

मेह्न्याणि विन्यातन,

There exists nothing diverse here. From death unto death he goes, who sees as if things were diverse here.—Kaṭha Upaniṣat, IV. 10, 11.

To this the author replies.

The sense is quite obvious.—154.

Bhāṣya.—But, then, the Vedāntin may say, there being thus a multiplicity of Puruṣas, the declarations of the Veda and the Smṛiti which demonstrate the Unity of the Self, would not be established. Such declarations are, for example:

पद्म यदि दृष्टमस्मि नौ हि स्वतं व्यवहितम ॥

पद्माच्छ श्रुति स्व श्रवणेन संवेद्यां संवितादान ॥
For, the mundane or creatural Self, which is one and one only, is situated in every \textit{\textsc{Bh\textsc{\textasciitilde}}}\textit{\textsc{\textasciitilde}ta} or creature severally. Like the moon reflected in water, it is seen sometimes as one and sometimes as many.—\textsc{Brahma-Binda Upa.}, 12.

निम्नः सर्पवतः दमाः दूरत्यो दैववनां देववनां।
एकः द्वितीयस्तिं दर्शनया न स्वमावत्॥

For, the Self is eternal, all-penetrating, immutable, blameless. Being one, it is diversified by means of \textit{M\textsc{\textasciitilde}y} which is its energy, and not from its own nature.

To this the author replies.

There is, however, no contradiction to the Vedic declarations on the Unity of the Self, because of their being directed to the genus, \textit{i.e.}, because of the reference of the Vedic declarations on Non-duality being only to the genus (of Self) which consists of oneness of form in general, (in other words, of the general characteristic of being the Self), and not to its entireness, since there is no reason or necessity for reading such a reference in them. Such is the meaning.

And that the word \textquoteleft\textquoteleft \textit{jātī} \textquoteright\textquoteright denotes oneness of form or uniformity, is obtained from the subsequent aphorisms.

If preference is given to (the meaning of) the word \textquoteleft\textquoteleft \textit{jātī} \textquoteright\textquoteright as heard, (i.e. in the sense of genus), then, the aphorism should be explained just as corroborating or demonstrating the texts of the Veda on Non-duality, such as:

\textit{स्वरला इत्येकं प्राच्य दावीद्।}
\textit{एकः द्वितीयस्तिं दर्शनया न स्वमावत्॥}

\textit{Verily, in the beginning, all this was a single Self.—\textsc{Al tapay}, I. I. I.}

\textit{मेहेक देवेदेवयाम दावीद्।}
\textit{एकः द्वितीयस्तिं दर्शनया न स्वमावत्॥}

\textit{In the beginning, O peaceful one, this was verily existent; one and one only, without a second.—\textsc{Chāndogya Upani\textsc{\textasciitilde}ṣa}, VI. II. I. N. B. II, Vol. III.}

\textit{\textquoteleft\textquoteleft \textit{Jātī-para-tvāt} \textquoteright\textquoteright meaning, because (these texts of the Veda on Non-duality) are intended as negations of the duality that would be caused by the existence of something \textit{heterogenous} to the Self. Such is the meaning.}

Of these, the import of the first interpretation (\textit{i.e.}, Non-duality of many Selves in the sense of their being non-different in form), is as follows: In the texts of the Veda and \textsc{S\textsc{\textasciitilde}r\textsc{\textasciitilde}ti}, on the unity of the Self, the words one and the like are intended to denote oneness of form or uniformity, and the words difference and the like to denote difference characterised by difference in property. Because the meaning or sense of oneness of form is unavoidable in such passages as:

\textit{परं प्राच्यभक्तो वामसत्स्वागुरितज्।}
\textit{सत्यात्माकया दृष्टिः दर्शनया न स्वमावत्॥}
The Self should be regarded as being one and one only in the states of waking, dreaming and sleeping. Who has passed beyond the three states, of him there is no rebirth.—Brahma-Sūtra Upaniṣad, II.

Otherwise, by means of the cognition of the mere unity of the Self even in all the three states, it is impossible that cessation of the fancy or assumption of the three states, declared by the phrase “which has passed beyond the three states,” should result; while it is by means of the establishment of oneness of form or uniformity alone that it can be possible to elucidate the svārūpa or essential form of all the Selves by means of the discrimination and elimination of all upādhis or external investments whatever. For, otherwise, it is not possible even for Brahmā to demonstrate the svārūpa or essential form of the Self, as a particular entity possessing the distinction of freedom from properties, directly by means of words, since words can comprehend only the genus.

While, on the other hand, when the uniformity of the Self is established from Brahman down to a stalk, then, with a view to demonstrate the truth so taught, the disciple goes on discriminating till he arrives at the essential form of the Self devoid of all particular distinctions and within the comprehension of words, and, thereafter, becomes fulfilled by means of the cessation of abhimāna or self-assumption to its utmost end.

If, again, the declarations of Non-duality had reference to undividedness merely (of one entire self), then, the cessation of abhimāna would not be possible from them; because, as is the case with the various sounds produced in Ākāśa or Ether, so, in the undivided Self also, the production of Pleasure, Pain, and the absence thereof, and so forth, can be accounted for by means of the differences of determining conditions (which, in a manner, oppose undividedness and which keep up abhimāna as long as they remain).

And if one and the same text is said to refer to both undividedness and absence of difference in property, then, the text becomes ambiguous. And also the supposition of its reference to undividedness becomes fruitless, inasmuch as cessation of all abhimāna takes place from the cognition of the absence of difference in property alone.

Hence the declarations of Non-duality do not refer to undividedness (of one entire, all-pervading Self); further, because of their contradiction, (in that sense), by texts of the Veda and Smṛiti which comprehend multiplicity of the Self, and which are corroborated and strengthened by Reason. But their reference is simply to non-difference characterised as non-difference in property; since their import must be the same as that of the texts of the Veda and Smṛiti, teaching oneness or equality of Selves, and also because of the Vedānta Sūtra (III. ii: 33), viz.,
"But (the word bliss is applied to human joy, merely) on account of generic resemblance (and not because the two blisses are of the similar nature)."—B. B. H. Vol. V. page 485.

Of these texts on the point of similarity of Selves, the Vedic texts are, for example,

यथाद्वृष्टे द्रुष्ये द्रुष्यसारिक्यःः ताहात्र भवति ।
प्रथं सुमेरविषाण्वं दास्य भवति गैतेन ॥

As water sprinkled on a pure substance, becomes just as pure as that substance, likewise, O Gautama, becomes the Self of the Minni who knows the truth.—Kaṭha Upaniṣat, IV. 15.

निर्मलः परमं सत्त्वपूर्तिः ।
The stainless Self attains to supreme equality.—Mundaka Upaniṣat, III, 1, 3.

And the texts of the Śrmrī are, for example,

ञेतिराग्मकं नायत्व सर्वं श्रूवेदू तद्वसम्पु ।
सबं ब श्रव्यते द्रव्यं द्रुष्यसारिक्यते स्ततसा ॥
यावानांगमं वेदवास्ते तात्वानांस्वतं परामलिः ।
य यथं सत्तं बेद ज्ञनव्यायं ते सुपरमेऽक्तिः ॥

Light is in the Self, and nowhere else. It is the same in all beings. And it can be seen, by itself, by one whose mind has been steadied well by means of meditation.

As great a Self in the form of knowledge is in one's own Self, so great is it in another's Self. He who knows this constantly, is not bewildered, even if he be in the midst of the multitude.

In the Vedic texts quoted above, since there is the declaration of equality constituted by, or rising out of, diversity (of individuals), even in the state of Release, it is established that, among Selves, there is also difference of essential form (svarūpa). And the reference to non-difference in the form of non-difference in property, (i.e., absolute identity) is, in our opinion, to be observed of such sayings as "I am Viṣṇu", "I am Siva", etc., but not also of sayings like "Thou art That", "I am Brahma", etc.; for, among such passages, the phrase, for instance, "Thou art That", as heard, expresses, in the theory of the Sāṃkhya, the sense of a passage like this that thou art Eternal and eternally Pure and eternally Released, since, in the theory of the Sāṃkhya, it is the Perfect Self existing at the time of Pralaya or Dissolution, that alone is the object denoted by the words "That" and the like.

But, if it is contended that it is the Puruṣa produced at the beginning of Creation and called Viṣṇu, that is the only object denoted by the word "That," then, let the reference of the sayings also, e.g., "Thou art That," be to non-difference in property (from him).
It cannot be said that, since there is no need of it, therefore, the Vedic texts cannot possibly refer to difference or diversity; for, the establishment or explanation of Release itself is the need for such reference; for when Creation and Dissolution, by the form of ever flowing succession, never come to a termination, there could be no (meaning of) Release, if there were but one Self.

Now, don't say, please, that the diversity of Selves being thus known to the world, it cannot be that the Vedic texts should have reference to this matter; because (the fact is just the other way, that is), in the Veda, etc., has been made the negation of the unity of the Self, entailed in the popular mind, by inference from the example of Akasa, by reason of its being the simple and natural view of the Self, and because the difference between one's own Consciousness and that of another is not an object of perception (and therefore must be taught in, and learnt from, the Veda, etc.), and because the popular preception of the Self is in respect of the body, etc.

Diversity of Selves has, however, been condemned in such passages, as

य पतितिमुखः देवस्व देवते ्य तदय मयं सत्ति।

He who creates a brooch within this (Akasa), now, of him is the fear.—Taittiriya Upanisat, II. 7.

But it refers to the one or the other of difference in property and division, (i.e., to heterogeneity of Selves or to division of one and the same Self into different parts, and not to the multiplicity of Selves essentially alike one another, but different as distinct complete individuals, as held by the Sankhyas).

But, this being the case, what will be the fate of the Vedic texts which take the Selves as separations or reflections? If this be asked, we reply as under: As in the case of the solar sphere consisting of many Tejas or 'fires,' so, by making one mass, undivided and of the same quality in every part, of the sphere of the sun of Consciousness consisting of many Selves, it is innumerable divisions in innumerable apadhis that alone is established, by the examples of the reflections, etc., by means of innumerable Purusas who, ray-like, form the parts, as it were, of the sphere, in order to teach that the otherness or separateness characterised or created by the divisions, is merely a creation or fabrication of speech; but not to teach the undividedness of one single Self, because there is more force, as they are supported by reason, in those other texts of the Veda which employ the example of parts in relation to a whole.
made up of them, in the case of the many Purusas forming a sphere of Consciousness) as in the following:

As the one Vayu (Air), penetrating into the world, became, in every form (of things) individually, their counterpart—Katha Upanishat, V. 10.

It is also recollected in the Smriti:

Of which, the character of forming one mass is not impaired, even though it is made up of all the Selves.

In the Brahma-Mimamsa (i.e., Vedanta Sutram), however, Nonduality has been declared also by way of non-division in the form of the laya or dissolution of all other Consciousness into the eternally manifested Consciousness of the Supreme Isvara or Lord, by the aphorism (IV ii. 16):

"(The merging of the permanent atoms of Prag and the rest, is by way of identity, for there is no separation, as is stated by an authoritative text.)"—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V, page 717.

More on this point has been said by us in our Commentary on the Vedanta Sutram. Such is the hint.

On the second interpretation of the aphorism, again, the import is as follows: At the time of Pralaya or Dissolution, all that is different in kind (Jati, genus) from the Self, is, without exception, non-existent; because of the non-existence in it of the character of an entity (such as what might be called a water pot or the like) and of the capability of being put to any use (such as bringing water in, etc.). Of Purusas, by reason of their being immutable, objectivity and use themselves are facts altogether unknown. Hence, as at the time of Creation, so, also, at the time of Dissolution, existence belongs to them. Hence, at that time, the Selves are free from the duality of Selves of a different kind from them. Similarly, at the time of creation also, since nothing else possesses transcendental or absolute existence in the form of immutability, and, consequently, the Selves are free from the duality of Selves of a different kind from them, the Vedic texts on Nonduality at the time of Creation are also explained.

—154.

Multiplicity of Purusa further established.

Vidita-bandha-karaṇasya, of one to whom the cause of Bondage has become known (A). Of one in whom the cause of bondages is manifestly present (B). The Drisya, by seeing, in the sight. A-tat-rupyam,
not being of the form thereof, i.e., oneness or similarity of form. Aniruddha reads tat-rūpam, meaning, that form, instead of atat-rūpam.

155. One to whom the cause of Bondage (i.e., Non-discrimination) has become known, attains to that form (i.e., isolation), by seeing (the discrimination of Puruṣa and Prakṛti).—Aniruddha.

Or, there is absence of oneness of form in the sight of only one in whom the cause of Bondage is manifest.—Vijñāna Bhikṣu—155.

Vṛitti.—But, the Vedāntin may contend, even with the upholder of the theory of manifold Selves, the bondage and release of the same Self are quite contradictory. To this the author replies.

“Tat-rūpam,” the form of isolation, “dṛṣṭya,” through knowledge of the discrimination (of Puruṣa and Prakṛti), is of him to whom the cause of Bondage, i.e., non-realisation of the discrimination (between Puruṣa and Prakṛti), has become known.—155.

Bhāṣya.—But, the Vedāntin may contend, as in the case of the Unity of the Self, Uniformity also is contradicted by the perception of the Self as having diversity of form: how, then, can it be said “because the reference is to the genus” (vide preceding aphorism)? To this the author replies.

(There is) “a-tat-rūpam,” i.e., diversity of form, in Puruṣas, only in the sight of one in whom the cause of Bondage, namely, Non-discrimination, is “viditam” or manifestly present. Such is the meaning. Hence, (the conclusion is), diversity of form is not established by erroneous seeing.—155.

Those who have eyes to see can see the Uniformity of the Self.

नान्यानाम् च चतुर्ब्धातात्मनुलभं || ॥ १ ॥ १५६ ॥

Na, not. अनपलंभ Anupa-lambha, by reason of non-seeing by the blind. चक्षु-मत्त Chakṣu-mattam, of those who have got eyes. अनुपलंभ Anupalah, non-perception.

156. Because the blind do not see, (it does) not (follow that) those who have got eyes, also cannot perceive.—156.

Vṛitti.—Bondage, (you say), rejoins the Vedāntin, is occasioned by the non-perception of the discrimination (between Puruṣa and Prakṛti), and is not real. And it is a maxim that non-perception comes to cease through perception. Such being the case, we see it to be reasonable
only in the theory of the Unity of the Self, and not in the theory of the Plurality of Selves. In regard to this the author says.

The blind do not see:—Is this any reason that even he who has eyesight, cannot also see? There are many arguments in favour of the upholders of the Plurality of Selves. Such is the meaning.—156.

Bhāṣya:—But still, may rejoin the Vaiṣṇavins, the Uniformity of Selves will be disproved from the non-perception thereof. So the author says.

Non-perception itself is not established; because of the seeing of Uniformity by the wise, although the ignorant fail to see it. Such is the meaning.—156.

Non-duality disproved by recorded cases of release.

वामदेवाद्रित्यक नात्रेत्तम् ॥ १ ॥ १५७ ॥

Na, not. अद्वैतम्, Non-duality.

157. Vāmadeva, as well as others, has been released; (hence) Non-duality (is) not (a fact).—157.

Vṛtti.—The author declares that, for the following reason also, the Selves are many.

In the Purāṇas, etc., it is heard, “Vāmadeva has been released,” etc. If the Self were one and one only, since on the release of one, there would be the release of all, the mention of diversity (as in the case of separate and successive releases) would be contradicted.—157.

Bhāṣya:—After showing that the Vedic texts on Non-duality are not established (in the sense attributed to them by the Vaiṣṇavins), the author brings forward other impediments to the theory of undivided Non-duality.

Vāmadeva and others exist (in the condition of) being released; still, at the present moment, bondage is proved by perception in ourselves. Hence, non-duality of an undivided or entire Self is not a fact. Such is the meaning. Further, non-duality of this form is in contradiction to hundreds of such sayings as:

स वाधि अतिसर्वकर्माणि तत्वं कपायतानिपि

And he too, having recovered knowledge about the Self, through recollection of previous births, attained to release in that very birth.

Such is the complement of the aphorism.
Nor should such bondage and release be regarded as being only of the upādhi or the external condition or investment of the Self, because of contradiction to the established tenets of the Veda and the Smṛti, and because, when we see people make such prayers as "May I not suffer pain", it is quite clear that the release of Puruṣa alone constitutes the supreme purpose of Puruṣa, designated as Release.

And, as is the case with the son and the like, the removal of pain of the upādhi becomes an object of desire to Puruṣa, only mediatelty, being subservient to the chief end of Puruṣa.

And what is contended by the present-day Māyā-vādins, namely, that, through contradiction of the Vedic texts on Non-duality, the texts of the Veda on Bondage, Release, Creation, Dissolution, etc., are also contradicted: this too is an unfounded allegation. Because, when, at the very moment of the hearing (of absolute Non-duality as maintained by them) from the Veda, there must arise the certainty of the non-existence of the fruit or result also, called Release, their contention would entail the unauthoritativeness of the Veda, characterised by uselessness of the observance (as instructed therein) of the injunctions about Manana or reasoning, etc., subsequent to śravaṇa or hearing. And, further, since there would be contradiction to the (reality of) the Vedānta also which is included within the fabric of Creation, by means of the Vedic texts on Non-duality, doubt would again arise in respect of Non-duality also as learnt from the Vedānta; in the same way as, when there is contradiction in the waking state of the words uttered in the state of sleep, doubt, in turn, arises in respect of the import of the words uttered in that state, (i. e., of the contradiction itself).

Moreover, from the teaching,

शिखानुबिध्यलिखिता॥

Belief in Unreality is Unbelief (Nastikā).—Amarā-kosā, i. i. 4. 18.

it is seen that those who see dream-like unreality in Dharma, etc., are merely a sect of the Baudhāyas, because by the word "Samvrittikā" or caused by Samvṛiti or Concealment, they recognise that the fabric of the world is the creation of Ā-vidyā or Nescience. Such is the hint.—157.

Release of Vīmānadeva is not relative, but absolute.

अनावरण यावरभावविव्यव्येकः॥१॥१५॥

Anādān, in the beginningless world (Aniruddha), time (Viśālaka Bhiṣka).

Adyā, to-day. Yāvat, up to. Ābhāvāta, because of non-existence. Bhāvā†, the future. Api, also. Eviṃ, similar.
158. If, in the world which has been coming down from eternity, void has not been the result up till to-day, the future also will not be so. (Aniruddha.)

Or, in the time, continuing from eternity, if no release has taken place up till to-day, no release will take place in the future also. (Vijñāna Bhikṣu).—158.

Vṛtti.—On the theory of the plurality of Selves, since the world (Samsāra) is coming down from eternity, and since, at one time or another, one or another is released, gradually, in this wise, on the release of all, the whole (world) would become a void, while, on the theory of the unity of the Self, (such a contingency cannot arise), as release takes place only on the passing away of the upādhi or adjunct (of which there is no end). (If this be the objection), so the author says.

In the world which has been from eternity, when, up till to-day, void is not seen to have been the result, there is no proof that, in the future, release (of all would take place, and leave a universal void behind it).—158.

Bhāṣya.—But, the Vedāntin may join, it should be believed that, in the case of Vāmadeva and others also, absolute or permanent release has not been produced. To this the author replies.

In time eternal, if, up till to-day, release has not been produced (as you say) in the case of anybody whatever, the time to come also would be the same, i.e., absolutely without release taking place in it, since the thorough cultivation of the means for the attainment of release will be the same in the future as it has been in the past. Such is the meaning.—158.

As it has been, so will it be.

इवानीभिव सर्वत्र नात्यन्तोस्तवः || ९ || १४६ ||

दक्षिण Idānīm, now. स Iva, as, सर्वत्र Sarvatra, at all times. Na, not. अत्यन्त्-उच्च-हेदाः Atyanta-uchchhedāḥ, absolute eradication or cutting short.

159. As now, so, for ever, (the course of transmigration will) not come to an end. (Aniruddha).

Or, (for, the inference is that), as now, so, for ever, there would be no final release. (Vijñāna Bhikṣu.)—159.

Vṛtti.—The author states another solution of the case.

Because of the infinity of Selves, release will take place by degrees, and, at the same time, an end (of the course of the world will) also
not (be the consequence). As now, so “sarvatra”, in time to come, also, release will take place; but, hence, absolute termination (of the course of transmigration) would not result, because of the eternality of its flow.

On the theory also, that release consists in the passing away of the upādhi, there is the implication of universal voidness; hence the charge lies equally against it. Just as there would be an end of all things, on the successive release of manifold Solves, similarly the world would be a void in consequence of the destruction of all upādhis on the exhaustion of all karma (which is the cause of the Self coming into contact with the upādhi, i.e., body, etc.).

Now, (if the Vedāntin says), there will not be a void, because the upādhis are infinite in number, then, it is the same on the theory of the multiplicity of Solves also. Thus.

Bṛhatasya śadviveśe mukhyārthāya sāntahpūrṇam
bhāṣyadāśamānāya mahābhāṣyādāśamānāya
dūrdhanyam

For this reason, therefore, while the knowing (Solves) got released, (the process of the world runs) incessant; voidness does not result, because of the infinity of the Cosmic System and of the worlds in which the Jivas experience the consequences of their karma.—159.

Bhāṣya.—The author shows the process (by which the above inference has been arrived at).

At no time will absolute removal of bondage be possible in the case of any Puruṣa whatever, as is the case with the present time, (according to the rejoinder of the Vedāntin mentioned in I. 158),—such an inference would be possible. Such is the meaning.—159.

Puruṣas are never uniform.

Puruṣa不定形: 160

कृतिक: Vyāvrittā-abhaya-rūpaḥ, that from which double, i.e., different (Vijñāna Bhikṣu), both, i.e., bound and released, (Aniruddha), forms are excluded.

160. Puruṣas are never multiform.—160.

Vyāvrittī.—But, is the Self (essentially) bound or is it essentially released? If it is (essentially) bound, then, since, the essence cannot slip away, non-release (is the consequence); for, if it slipped away, (the Self would be) non-eternal, (as loss of essence amounts to annihilation of the thing itself, vide aphorisms 7 and 8 above). If, (on the other hand, it is said to be essentially) released, then, useless are meditation and all the rest (enjoined as means for the attainment of release). To this the author replies.
It is not bound, nor is it released, but it is eternally released. While destruction of Ignorance is effected by means of meditation, etc., (which are, therefore, not useless).—160.

Bḥdya:—The uniformity of Puruṣas, that has been ascertained to be the import of the Vedic texts establishing their "unity,"—does this uniformity arise at the moment of release, or does it exist at all times? There being room for this enquiry, the author declares.

And that Puruṣa is ("vyāvṛitta-ubhaya-rūpaḥ, i. e.,) one from whom difference of form has departed; because of the establishment of constant uniformity from the testimony of the Veda, Smṛti, and Reason. So is it said:—

बहुप्रकोप्तति मायाः बहुप्रकोप्तः
रम्मातोऽयोंश्च भवति भयते ||

By means of Māyā which shows a variety of forms, (Puruṣa) looks as if he were multiform. Reveiling in its Gajas, he is bound in such wise as “(This is) mine,” “I do, feel, etc.,”

Further:

अनुरूपस्यातः स्वातः स्वातः प्रजाः
रुपं व्यवस्ति न शालात ब्रह्म शालातथे हितस्व ॥

In this long dream, designated the world, while passing on from dream to dream, the Peaceful Brahman which is the elaboration or expression of peacefulness, does not give up its own form. - 160.

Character of witness is compatible with uniformity.

The Bhāsya

Aniruddha reads Akṣa-sambandhāt, through connection with the Senses, Sākṣitvām, the being the witness.

161. Puruṣa is the witness through connection with the Senses (Aniruddha), or, through immediate connection (Vijñāna Bhikṣu).—161.

Vṛtti.—It has been declared that it belongs to the Self to be the witness. But if it belongs to be the witness, even to one who has attained to discrimination (of Puruṣa and Prakṛti), non-release would be the consequence. (If this be the doubt), so the author says.

"Akṣa" means the Senses. Through connection with that, Puruṣa is the witness. And where will be the connection with the Senses, when discrimination has been attained? (i. e., it will be nowhere).—161.

Bḥdya.—But, since the character of being the witness is not permanent, how, then, can there be constant uniformity of Puruṣa? To this the author replies.
The character of being the witness, that has been asserted of Puruṣa, is through immediate connection merely, but not through transformation. Such is the meaning.

It is found that, by immediate connection, Puruṣa is the witness of Buddhi alone, because the derivation of the word “sākṣi” is अक्षेरित्वा वस्त्रवर्ति i.e., as the name of one seeing immediately (Pañini V. ii. 91). And the character of seeing immediately means the character of seeing without intermediation. And immediate connection (in this sense) with a Puruṣa takes place only of the modification of the Buddhi pertaining to that Puruṣa. Hence, it is of Buddhi alone that Puruṣa is the sākṣi or witness, while of others he is merely the Draṣṭā or seer; such is the division, (i.e., distinction made) in the Sastras.

And the connection which determines the production of cognition, is of the form of reflection only, which takes the place of the modification into the form of the objects cognised: but not, in the least, of the form of conjunction, as we have submitted more than once, because, in that case, the supposition would not be warranted by the facts of the case.

In the case of Viṣṇu, etc., on the other hand, the character of being the witness of all things, belongs to them in a secondary sense, because of the very non-existence (in their case) of the intermediation of the Senses.

Where the reading is “Aksa-sambandhat sākṣītvam,” “aksa” there means Buddhi, as it is equally an instrument of knowledge (like the Senses), and “Aksa-sambandhat” means, through connection of Buddhi in the form of reflection as declared before. Such is the meaning.—161.

Puruṣa is for ever released.

विन्दुमुक्तवस् ॥ १ ॥ १६२ ॥

विन्दुमुक्तवस् Nitya-mukta-tvam, constant freedom.

162. It belongs to Puruṣa to be released for ever.—162.

Vṛitti.—Constantly of what form is the Self? To this the author replies.

The meaning is quite plain.—162.

Bhāṣya.—For the purpose of establishing the absence of multiplicity of Puruṣa, the author points out two other distinctions of Puruṣa, by the next two aphorisms.
It is, at all times, that freedom from bondage, called Pain, belongs to Puruṣa, since Pain, etc., are transformations of Buddha. Such is the meaning. Puruṣa-artha or the supreme object of Puruṣa, on the other hand, is, as has been established before, the cessation of the experience of Pain, or, in other words, the cessation of Pain in the form of reflection.—162.

Puruṣa is indifferent.

163. And, finally, Indifference also (belongs to Puruṣa).—163.

Vṛtti.—The meaning is quite plain.—163.

Bhūṣya:—“Aūḍāśiniyaḥ,” (indifference), is inactivity or non-agency. And hereby the being free from desire, i.e., disinterestedness, and other distinctions also should be suggested, since there is the text of the Veda:

काम: सकृद्गो विचिन्तिता धुवायुषया
ध्येयस्यावतारिष्यति सर्वं मन पव

Desire, Willion, Curiosity, Faith, Unfaith, Retentiveness, Unretentiveness, Fear,—all this is verily Manas.—Upair. Āraṇā. Upa. I. v. 3.

The word “iti” marks the end of the establishment of the character of Puruṣa.—163.

Seeming agency of Puruṣa is due to influence of Buddha.

164. (Seeming) agency (of Puruṣa) is from influence (of Prakṛiti), through proximity to Intelligence, through proximity to Intelligence.—164.

Vṛtti.—But, some one may say, we hear of the agency of the Self from the Scripture ; how is this? To this the author replies.

“Agency” of the Self, i.e., the fancy or assumption of agency, is from the influence of Prakṛiti by means of her proximity to Intelligence.

The repetition of the expression “through proximity to Intelligence” is meant to indicate the completion of the Book, the same practice having been observed in the Veda.—164.

Here ends the First Book, of Topics, in the Vṛtti on the Sāṁkhya-Pravachana-Sṭram of Kapila.
But, some one may ask, the mutual discrimination of Puruṣa and Prakṛti being thus established by means of their dissimilarity in property, how can the declarations made in the Veda and the Smṛiti, namely, that Puruṣa is the agent, and also that Buddhī is the knower, be justified? To this the author replies.

Here the syntactical connection of the words is according to their appropriateness.

The agency that is attributed to Puruṣa, arises from the influence of Buddhī, and the intelligence that is attributed to Buddhī, arises from the proximity of Puruṣa: neither of them is real. Such is the meaning. As in the case of fire and iron, the attribution of their properties to each other mutually, arises from particular conjunction between them, (i.e., when an iron bar is heated to redness, it may be said that the iron burns, as well as that the fire is so much long and so much broad, etc.), and is, therefore, only accidental or caused by upādhi: or, as in the case of water and the sun, the imputation of their properties to each other mutually, arises from the conjunction of water and the sun, and is, therefore, only accidental; the very similar is the case with Puruṣa and Buddhī. Such is the import.

And this has been stated by the Kārikā also: viz.,

वस्त्र स्वतं दयादेवता तेजोपायति विस्मयम्
आगवेत्र तथा विभ्र विश्ववर्तते विषाणीः कारिका २२

Therefore, through conjunction with that (Puruṣa), the unintelligent Liṅgag (Buddhī, etc.) looks as if it were intelligent; and, although agency is of the Gupta, the Indifferent (Puruṣa) appears, in the same way, as if he were verily the agent. — Kārikā, Verse 22.

The repetition of the expression “through proximity to Intelligence” is for the purpose of indicating the close of the Book.—164.

The Avoidable, the Avoidance, the Cause of the Avoidable, and the Means of Avoidance,—the four principal objects of the Śāstra,—which form the four divisions of the System, have been successively discussed and elaborated in this Book.

And, because it gives an elaborate account of the contents of the condensed or abridged Śāmkhya Sūtram (Kapila Sūtram), therefore, like the Yoga (Sūtram of Patañjali, which also is an exposition of the Śāmkhya Thought, and is, on this account, similarly described), this Śāstra, is designated the Śāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram.

Here ends the First Book of Topics, in the Commentary, composed by Vijnāna Āchārya, on the Śāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram of Kapila.
Book II.

OF THE EVOLUTIONS OF PRAKRITI.

INTRODUCTION.

Vṛtti:—Now, after the ascertainment of the Topics, is made the composition of the Second Book for the purpose of the ascertainment of the products of the Pradhāna.

Bhāṣya:—The Topics of the Sāstra have been ascertained. Now, in order to prove that it belongs to Puruṣa not to undergo transformation, the author will, in the Second Book, explain, in very great detail, how the procession of Creation proceeds from Prakṛti. Therein the intrinsic nature of the products of Prakṛti will be declared very fully, with a view to the very clear discrimination of Puruṣa from them also. It is for this reason that, in the verse:

विज्ञारप्रकृतिं लौह पुरुषं च समानतमः ।
ये वधायबि विज्ञानार्ति स विद्वेषो विद्वेषते॥

Transformation as well as Prakṛti and also Puruṣa the eternal,—whose knoweth them as they are in themselves, he, thirsting no more, is released.—Mahābhārata, XII. 7879.

of the Mokṣa-Dharma Section of the Mahābhārata, and in other places, it has been declared that all the three (things mentioned in the above verse) are objects which require to be known.

The Purpose of Creation.

विकृतामोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं वा प्रधानस्य। २ । १ ।

विकृतार्थं विकृतामोक्षार्थं, for the purpose of the release of the released. स्वार्थं विकृतार्थं, for its own sake. अ वा, or, प्रधानस्य, of Pradhāna or Prakṛti.

1. Of Prakṛti, (the agency or the becoming the procreatrix) is either for the release of the released or for her own sake.—165.

Vṛtti:—The Self is free by nature. Of the Pradhāna, the becoming the procreatrix of the world is for the purpose of the release of the Self from Abhimāni or assumed or imagined bondage.

In regard to creation which is painful, since Dispassion naturally grows towards it, Puruṣa at once strives to obtain release. And in regard
to creation which gives pleasure, since, it being tainted with painfulness, pleasure also is thrown on the side of pain, it is Dispassion only that ultimately is produced towards it.

This Dispassion is fourfold, being distinguished under the names of Yatamāna, Vyātireka, Ekendriya, and Vaśikāra.

Note:—These technical terms require explanation. “Dispassion, Vairāgya, is the extinction (or absence) of rāga, (litt. colour, or passion, which, like dyes of various hues, tintorers the soul.” The various stages of its unfoldment have been described as Yatamāna or Striving, Vyātireki or Discriminating, Ekendriya or Longing, and Vaśikāra or Supreme. Vāchaspatī Mīrā has explained them in his commentary on the Śāmkhya-Kārikā, Verse XXIII, and, in his gloss on Vyāsa’s commentary on Patañjali’s Yoga-Sūtram, I. 15. We give the following extract from the former:

रागायुक्तं सन्नायामयस्वाधिनायः, तैरित्रिकयुक्तं व्यापस्व विषयेयं सततकथयते। सतमात्र विशेषतयुक्तं शिविरस्वाधिनायं तत्तदद्विपथवार्तम: प्रवर्तितं यत्तातिसहस्य। परिपालने वा बुद्धिमाने अनुदेशकारीं वक्ता:। परवर्तये बुद्धिमाने। तत्रैव पूर्वस्वरूपमेव विद्या विशेष:। विद्या: यथान्युक्तत्तचारणं विद्यार्थिन:। तत्तदुमयुक्तत्तचारणं यथान्युक्तत्तचारणं। वैत्तिकायुक्तं विद्यायुक्तं विद्यायुक्तं। वैत्तिकायुक्तं विद्यायुक्तं।

Passion and the like, which act like dyes of different hues, reside in the Chitta or the Retentive Faculty. By them the Indriyas, the Powers of Cognition and Action, are employed on their respective objects. Now, the endeavour, i.e., the putting forth of energy, for the purpose of boiling down and dissolving them, with the desire that the Indriyas may not go out to the objects, is designated as Yatamāna. And when the boiling is once begun, some passions will become boiled, while others will be in the course of being boiled. In that stage, the relation of before and after thus coming into existence, the ascertainament of the boiled by means of their discrimination from those that are in the course of being boiled, is designated as Vyātireki. They being thus disabled to excite the Indriyas to activity, the persistence of the boiled passions in the mind in the form of mere longing, is designated as Ekendriya. The source of even the mere longing in regard to sensible and scriptural objects of enjoyment, even though they be near at hand, which, in its appearance, is subsequent to the first three stages, is designated as Vaśikāra: which the terrestrial divinity, Patañjali has described as

इन्द्रानुभूतिविषयविश्वास्य चित्तार्थस्य वैद्यमायम्। वैद्यमायम्।

Dispassion, designated as Vaśikāra, is of him who has no thirst for sensible as well as scriptural objects.—Yoga-Sūtram, I. 15.

“The Avoidable,” i.e., Pain not-yet-come, is of twenty-one varieties, six, the Body, the six Indriyas or Senses, the six Objects, the six Buddhis, Pleasure, and Pain. Among them, the Body is a form of Pain, because it is the seat of Pain. The Senses, Objects, and Ideas (are so), because they stand in the relation of being instrumental to its production. Pleasure (is a form of Pain), because of its close association with Pain. Pain is the Avoidable par excellence, because it contains affliction, uneasiness, and anguish as its very essence.
BOOK II, SŪTRA 1.

That which accomplishes it, that is, its uncommon or specific cause, is A-vidyā, Trṣṇā, Dharma, and A-dharma. A-vidyā consists in contrary cognition (i.e., in knowing a thing to be different from what it really is). And the Śaṅkārę or impression thereof has been declared, by those who know, to be the uncommon cause of Trṣṇā or thirst, etc.

And "the Avoidance of Pain" (aimed at in this śāstra) consists in that cessation of the production of Pain, which is absolute or final.

The means thereof is the knowledge of the truth in respect of the Self, inasmuch as the cessation of A-vidyā or unreal Cognition takes place from it. Accordingly it has been declared:

द्वारा वा प्रत्येको भवति मात्र विद्यासितव्: ।
भवति भ्रमित्वपश्चास्त्रे मात्र विद्यासितव्यः ।
मत्वा च सर्वं चेत्ते परं दुरावहेव: ।
तत्रति शोकमालवितः ॥

Lo! the Self verily requires to be seen, heard, thought, and contemplated.—Sphatikāranyaka-Upaniṣat, IV, iv. 5.

(The Self) should be heard from the declarations in the Veda, thought by means of arguments, and, after being thought, should be constantly meditated. Those are the ways of seeing.

The knower of the Self transcends grief.—Chhāndogyā-Upaniṣat, VII, 1, 8.

It (i.e., the Self) is twofold: Higher and Lower. Thus has it been declared:

च भर्ती देवित्वपि परं द्वारसेव च ॥

Two Brahmans have to be known: the Higher as well as the Lower.

The Higher Self is the Lord Mahādeva, possessed of the power of Real Cognition and Lordliness; not in the least touched by, or associated with, the virtues which cause transmigration; the All-knower, the Providence, as all creation proceeds from Him.

How is He to be known? Either through Anumāṇa or inference, or through Śama or tranquility of mind.

Note:—In the place of "Anumāṇāt vā kṣamāt vā" (either through inference or through tranquility of mind), as read by Dr. Garbe, which we have adopted, the text of Pāṇḍita Kālīvara Vedāntavādīya, is "Anumāṇāt vā śamāt (through Revelation) vā."

Thus, the subject of discussion, that is, the thing perceived, must have a cause, because it, being non-existent before, has come into existence, as is the case with a picture. This is inference. Thereafter of what is, (through inference), known in a general way, knowledge in particular is obtained by means of Yoga.
Of the lower (self), i.e., the Jīva, the proof is from self-perception itself.

And the activity of Prakṛti is for the purpose of the discriminative knowledge of these two, the Higher and the Lower Self. Herein she is declared to be altruistic.

And her selfishness consists in this that she keeps aloof from that Puruṣa to whom she has exhibited her form by means of discrimination.

(It may be asked), how activity can arise in Prakṛti who (ex hypothesi) is non-intelligent? (To this our reply would be that) the activity of even non-intelligent things is seen, e.g. of trees, by way of producing fruits, etc.—1.

Bṛṣṭya:—The word "agency" is brought in from the last aphorism of the preceding book.

The Pradhāna becomes the maker of the world for the purpose of the release of Puruṣa who is by nature free from the bondage of pain, from pain in the form of reflection, or, in other words, for the purpose of release from pain which is connected with Puruṣa by the relation of a reflection.

Or, it is for her own sake, that is to say, for the purpose of her own release from pain which really belongs to her (vide Aphorism II. 7 post).

Although Bhoga or Experience (of Pleasure and Pain) is as much a purpose of Creation as Release, yet Release alone is mentioned (in this aphorism), inasmuch as it is the principal one.—1.

The Cause of Successive Creation.

विरक्षत्व मन्तुरिष्ये: || २ || २ ||

विरक्षत् viraktasya, of the dispassionate. नैवेद्य: Tath-āttiḥ, because the accomplishment of this, i.e., release, is.

2. (Successive Creation is necessary), because the accomplishment of Release is of him (only) who has become free from passion.—166.

Vṛtti:—Now, in regard to who are adhikārins or entitled to Release, the author declares.

So also says the Brūti:

पुनर्जीवनाय निर्तिनवाच देवताय धर्माय निर्तते वरिष्ठ ||

Having put forth activity out of desire for son, desire for wealth, and desire for better worlds, men thereafter live the life of mendicants.—Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, I III, v. 1.

“प्रकृति बुद्धि व्यक्तिनात्मकः समाहितो नृत्यागतयेवाच प्रथितः ||
Being tranquil in mind, controlling the external Senses, withdrawing from the 
world, being ready to renounce everything, and being steady in meditation, one sees the 
Self within oneself.—Bṛhat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣat, IV. iv. 23.—2.

Bhāṣya:—But, if Creation were for the purpose of Release, then, 
Release being possible by means of one Creation only, there would be, 
one may say, no Creation again and again. To this the author replies:

Release does not take place (for all) through creation once only. 
But the production of Release occurs in the case of him who has been 
intensely tormented by the various pains of birth, death, sickness, etc., 
repeated many times, and has, in consequence, Higher Dispersion pro-
duced in him by means of the knowledge of the discrimination between 
Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Such is the meaning.—2.

Dispersion cannot grow in one creation.

3. It (Dispersion) does not arise from the mere hearing 
(i.e., learning about it from the Śāstras), because of the for-
cibleness of the eternal Vāsanā.—167.

Vṛtti:—If Release were to result through Dispersion immediately 
after the hearing, then, there would be, some one may say, the release of 
all immediately after they receive instructions from the Guru or precept-
or, but such is not observed to be the case. To this the author replies:

Release does not take place immediately after the hearing. But, in 
the case of one whose eternal Vāsanā has become weak, Release appears 
quickly, and, in the case of others, it is late in appearance.—3.

Bhāṣya:—The author tells the reason why Dispersion does not grow 
by means of one creation only:

Even the hearing takes place by means of the merits acquired in 
many births. Even then the occurrence of Dispersion is not from the mere 
hearing, but through immediate cognition (sākṣātkaśa). And immediate 
cognition does not take place at once, because of the false Vāsanā which 
has existed from eternity. But it takes place through steadiness in Yoga. 
And in Yoga there is an abundance of obstacles. (Vide Yoga-Sātram
of Patañjali, Book II.) Hence, it is only after many births that Dispersion as well as Release take place, at rare intervals, in the case of a very few only.—3.

The Rule of Individuals.

बहुमृत्यवद्र प्रेक्षम् ॥ २ ॥ ॥

वहु भृतिवात्, as is the case with many dependants (of one householder). ते वा, or प्रत्येकम्, every one.

4. Or, as is the case with the many dependants (of a single householder), every individual (Puruṣa) (has his own lot, and hence the stream of creation flows eternally.)—Aniruddha.

Or, as a single householder has many dependants under him, so every one of the Guṇas has innumerable Puruṣas to liberate, and hence the stream of creation, etc.—Vījñāna Bhikṣu.—188.

Vṛtti:—The author states another argument.

As a man may have many servants some of whom are released through faithful attendance, some share in his grace, while some are killed in consequence of their faults; so Prakṛti is one, while Puruṣas are many. Among them, for those who have got clear knowledge of the discrimination of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, there is speedy release; for those who have risen up to the level of mere worship, it is gradual; and for others, there is none.—4.

Bhādaya:—The author gives another reason in support of the theory of a stream of successive creations.

As, in the case of the householders, every one of them has to maintain a good many dependants in the persons of the wife, the son, and the like; likewise also, in the case of the Guṇas, Sattva and the rest, every one of them has to set free Puruṣas without number. Hence, even when a certain number of Puruṣas have obtained Release, the stream of creations must still continue for the purpose of securing Release to other Puruṣas, inasmuch as Puruṣas are infinite in number. Such is the meaning. Thus there is the Yoga-Sūtram:

इति प्रक्रिया ॥ तद्ववत्वापौर्भव| ॥ २ ॥ ॥

"Although destroyed in relation to him whose objects have been achieved, it (the sensible world) is not destroyed, being common to others."—Fide Yoga Aphorisms of Patañjali, II, 22, A. S. H. Vol. IV, p. 193.—4.
Proof of the Theory of Adhyāsa or fictitious attribution (e.g., of bondage, release, creativeness, etc.) in regard to Puruṣa.

5. And when (it is established that bondage, creativeness, etc.) really belong to Prakṛti, proof (is thereby obtained) of their being fictitious attributions to Puruṣa. —109.

Vṛti:—The Self, being kūṭastha or immutable, one may say, Bondage (real or fictitious) does not verily belong to it, and, therefore, the question of Release does not arise, and consequently there is no scope for this Śāstra). In regard to this, the author says:

Release consists in the inactivity of Prakṛti towards that Puruṣa to whom she has fully exhibited herself. She catches the reflection of, and also casts her shadow in, that Puruṣa towards whom she becomes active. The change thus appearing in Puruṣa is merely an adhyāsa or superimposition, and is in no sense real. So has it been said:

Yadāme prakṛto 'stucchena bhākārī stvādā sravathā |

Vṛtta:—But how can it be asserted, it may be asked, that creative-ness belongs to Prakṛti alone? when the creativeness of Puruṣa also is proved from such Vedic texts as

Patasāvakām chaikātaḥ: samiṣṭaḥ |

From this Self has Ākāsa been evolved.—Taṅtirīya-Upaniṣat, II. 1.

To this the author replies:

When, further, the reality of creativeness is established (vide II. 6 post) in the case of Prakṛti, it follows that in the Vedas has been made only a fictitious attribution (adhyāsa) of creativeness to Puruṣa, fur, upāsanā or worship is the primary object of the Vedas, and nothing else. That creativeness belongs to Prakṛti in a real sense is proved by such other texts of the Veda as the one beginning with Ajām ekām, the Unborn One, (Śvētāmbaratā Upaniṣat, IV. 5). Moreover, were the attributions of creativeness to Puruṣa, made in the Vedas, real, then these texts would contradict those other texts of the Veda which declare that Puruṣas are mere unchanging consciousnes. Such is the meaning.
And this adhyāsa or attribution, in the form of transference of epithet, is, in fact, one of the current figures of speech amongst mankind. As, e.g., victory and defeat, (really) present in the soldiers who make up the force of the king, are transferred or attributed to the king; in like manner, are creativeness, etc., (really) present in Prakṛiti, the Energy of Puruṣa, attributed to Puruṣas, the possessors of that Energy, on the strength of the maxim of the non-difference of energy and the possessor thereof. So has it been said in the Kūrma Purāṇa:

वाचित्यालकिमसमूः पदवर्ति परमार्थेः ।
प्रेमेः बाहुपञ्च के निम्नलिखितकाः ॥

The Yogins who contemplate the Tattvas (Prakṛiti, etc.), see the difference between the energy and the possessor thereof, and, again, they discern their ultimate non-difference.—Kūrma-Purāṇa, XII. 28.

"Bhedam," "difference," means anyonya-abhāvam or mutual non-existence (as, e.g., in the case of the non-existence of the nature of the cow in the horse, and vice versa); "abhedam," "non-difference," means non-difference in the form of avibhāga or non-division. These are seen by the worshippers of Prakṛiti and the other Tattvas. Such is the meaning.

Examples of both these cases may be found in the following:—

नत्त्रत नादेशो नत्त्रत नेति ॥

Now, then, is the direction "It is not," "It is not," etc. Brihat-Āranyaka-Upaniṣat, II, iii. 6.

वर्णमायेत सर्वम् ॥

Verily all this is the Self.—Chāndogya-Upaniṣat, VII. xxv. 2.

Such is the import.—5.

The reality of Prakṛiti’s creativeness is proved from the products.

कार्यतस्ततस्ततितिदेव ॥ २ ॥ ६ ॥

कार्यत: kāryatab, from the products. तत्त: tat-siddheḥ, because of the proof thereof.

6. Because it (the reality of Prakṛiti’s creativeness) is proved from (the reality of) the products.—170.

Vṛtti:—The author adduces evidence to show that bondage really belongs to Prakṛiti, and not to Puruṣa.

From seeing the unbroken succession of Mahat and the rest, the products of Prakṛiti, there is proof of the bondage of Prakṛiti.—6.

Bāṣya:—But how can it thus be taken for certain, rejoins our opponent, that creativeness is real even in the case of Prakṛiti, when we
also hear from the Vedas that creation is like a dream and so forth? In regard to this, the author says:

Because, the meaning is, whereas the reality of the products arises by means of their producing impressions and exhibiting acts, therefore, from the products themselves, there is establishment of the real creativeness of Prakṛiti, by means of dharmi-grāhaka-pramāṇa, i.e., the kind of proof which cognises the subject of inference as possessing a particular property (as, here, for instance, Prakṛiti as the seat of the power which created those products).

The texts of the Veda, on the other hand, which declare the resemblance of creation to a dream and the like, should be understood to bear merely on the aspect of (unreality or) non-existence of creation in the form of its non-eternity, or, on that aspect of it in which it is (fictitiously) attributed to Puruṣa; for, otherwise, there would be contradiction of the texts demonstrating (the reality of) creation. Moreover, the things which we call dreams, are not absolutely non-existent, inasmuch as they are transformations of Manas.—6.

Knowledge and Ignorance are the sole determinants of Release and Bondage.

वेतनोशास्त्राविषयः कायतकमोचवतः ॥ २ १ ७ ॥

वेदः chetana-uddeśā, with reference to one knowing. नियम: niyamaḥ, the rule, why some escape Prakṛiti while others do not. कपटका-मक्ख-वतः, as in the case of the release of (or escape from) a thorn.

7. The rule is with reference to one knowing, as in the case of the release of a thorn.—171.

पृत्ति: — It might be objected that, since activity is of the very nature of Prakṛiti, she will cause activity in all Puruṣas without distinction; what, then, is the use of seeing the discrimination and non-discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa? In regard to this, the author says:

Just as, on seeing a thorn, some one warns another by saying, "Do not come by this way," and does not warn all persons indiscriminately: so the rule is that, according to adhikāra or degree of excellence or stage of evolution, the activity of Prakṛiti takes place in regard to a particular conscious entity (i.e., Puruṣa), and not in regard to all.—7.

भाग्य: — Now, on the alternative view (vide II. 1 ante) that the activity of Prakṛiti is for her own benefit, she, it may be said, would be active with reference to the released Puruṣa also. To this the author replies:

By reason of its derivation from the root "chit" in the sense of full knowledge, "chetana" here means one who knows well. Just as one
and the same thorn is released only by one who is “chetana,” i.e., knowing, that is to say, does not become a cause of pain to him alone, but certainly becomes so to others; so too the “rule,” i.e., arrangement of things in the world, is that Prakṛti is released by him only who is “chetana,” i.e., knowing, and having all his objects fulfilled, that is to say, she does not become a cause of pain to him alone, but certainly becomes a cause of pain to others who are not knowing. Such is the meaning.

Hereby takes place Prakṛti’s own release, although she is in bondage by nature. And hence she does not become active with reference to the released Puruṣa.—7.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—“Chetana” is one who knows, i.e., one who possesses immediate vision of viveka or the discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. “Uddeśat,” with reference to him, i.e., towards him. “Niyamat,” i.e., (restraint, cessation, or) absence of the activity of Prakṛti. As there is release (of the thorn from its own activity of causing pain) with reference to one who is aware of (the existence of) the thorn. For, it should be understood that the activity of Prakṛti is for the purpose of her own release from the pain inhering in herself. And thus release is verily effected on her coming into contact with a Puruṣa possessing discriminative knowledge. Because Prakṛti is of the form of pain in this sense and to this extent only that she is the efficient cause of the experience of pain, appertaining to Puruṣa, and consisting of the reflection of Buddhhi which contains pain as its essence. And that (efficient causality) is certainly gone on the absence of the experience of pain for a Puruṣa who possesses discriminative knowledge. Owing to the absence of any particular purpose regarding herself, she does not become active towards the released Puruṣa, but does so towards the unreleased Puruṣa alone. Such is the idea.

The Theory of Adhyāsa further argued.

8. Even though there is conjunction with the other (i.e., Prakṛti), this (bondage, creativeness, etc.) does not exist.
(in Purusā) immediately, just as is the case with the burning action of iron.—172.

Vritti:—Bondage, it has been declared, does not belong to the Self. The author argues the point.

It is the characteristic of exciting to activity (or efficient causality) that makes for the bondage of Prakṛiti. Notwithstanding that there is conjunction of Prakṛiti (with Purusā), (it does not follow that the bondage of Purusā is real, but) that the abhimāna, conceit or misconception of bondage arises in Purusā by means of the falling of the shadow of Prakṛiti upon him.

"Na āṇjasayena," not really. (That is, even the conjunction of Purusā with Prakṛiti is not real, but only reflectional.)

"Ayo-dāhā-vat: " as, where conjunction takes place with a piece of hot iron, it is felt as if the iron causes burning, while, in fact, the power to cause burning does not belong to iron, but comes, through conjunction, from fire alone.—8.

Bhāṣya:—Well, one may say, what has been stated, namely, that, in the case of Purusā, the creative character is merely a fictitiously attributed one,—that is not reasonable, for it is but proper that, by the conjunction of Prakṛiti, Purusā also should be transformed as Mahat, etc., because it is observed, that by the conjunction of earth, etc., transformation of wood, etc., similar to, or resembling, earth, etc., takes place. In regard to the position thus taken up, the author says:

"Even though there is the conjunction of Prakṛiti, still it is not proved that creativeness belongs to Purusā "Āṇjasayena" or immedially. An example of this is: "ayo-dāhā-vat." As the burning power does not directly belong to iron, but is merely fictitiously attributed to it, being borrowed from the fire conjoined with it; such is the meaning.

In the example just mentioned, however, transformation of both (the fire and iron) is admitted, it being proved by sense-perception; while in the instance in question, since the case is explained by the transformation of one only (i.e., Prakṛiti), there would be cumbrousness in supposing the transformation of both; as, otherwise, transformation of the colour of the crystal would result from the conjunction of the China rose.—8.

The instrumental cause of Creation is Rāga, Passion or Desire.
9. Creation (results) from Passion; Release, from Dispassion.—173.

Vṛtti:—What, it may be asked, is the object of creation? To this the author replies:

Bhoga or worldly experience proceeds from passion or desire; Release, from dispassion. In reality or ultimately, however, nothing but dispassion results from passion or attachment also, through seeing the defects of the object of the senses in the course of Bhoga or experience.—9.

Bhṛtya:—It has already (vide II. 1 ante) been stated that the fruit of creation is Release. Now the author states the chief occasional or instrumental cause of creation.

When there is Passion, there is creation; and when there is Dispassion, there is “yogāḥ,” i.e., the abiding of the Self in its own essence (svarūpa), that is to say, Release, or, in other words, the suppression of the modifications of the Chittam or the thinking principle (vide Yoga Aphorisms, I. 2). Such is the meaning. And thus it is proved, by the methods of agreement and difference, that Rāga or Passion is the cause of creation. This is the import. And, thus, the Veda also, after declaring the goals in the form of Brahma-hood, etc., attainable by the performance of the various Karmas or actions, declares:

हस्ति हु ज्ञापवषो शाखाम बन च मान्य उपानानं ||

Thus, however, (fare) those who desire. Of him who is desireless, the Prāgas or life-breaths do not go out (into other living forms).—Bṛhat-Araṇyaka-Upaniṣat, IV, iv. 8.

Passion and Dispassion also are but properties of Prakṛti.—9.

The order of creation.

महत्वाविक्षेपेन वेदभूतानाम || २ १ १० ||

mahat-ādi-kramena, by the series of Mahat and the rest. pachas-bhūtanām, of the five Bhūtas or gross elements.

10. The creation of the five Bhūtas is in the order of Mahat and the rest.—174.

Vṛtti:—The twenty-five Principles have been declared by the aphorism beginning with “Sattva, Rajas, Tamas” of the first book (vide I. 61, page 93). Now the author declares the order of their evolution along with all other details.

The word “creation” completes the sentence. The order will be stated in the sequel.—10.
Bhāya:—After this the author begins to describe the process of creation.

“Creation”—this follows from the preceding aphorism. Although from the texts of the Veda such as

पत्तसाधारण चारकायोऽसम्भूतिः॥

From this, Self, was evolved अक्षेत्र:—Taittiriya-Upaniṣat, II. 1.

it is heard that the creation of the five Bhūtas took place at the very beginning, still the creation of the five Bhūtas, just in the order of Mahat and the rest, is desired. Such is the meaning.

As in the Vedic texts on the creation of Fire, etc., the creation of अक्षेत्र and Air has to be supplied, or is pre-supposed, so too, in the Vedic texts quoted above, the creation of Mahat and the rest, previously to that of the five Bhūtas, has to be supplied. Such is the idea.

And in this matter, as in the case of the creation of the water-pot, the proof (of the aforesaid order of succession) consists in the inference that the creation of all the rest, other than the Antah-karaṇa or the Inner Sense, must have been preceded by the function or modification of the Antah-karaṇa. Moreover, the creation of Mahat and the rest, prior to the creation of the five Bhūtas, is known for certain by having regard to the order of their mention appearing in another Vedic text, viz.,

पत्तसाधारण मनों संवेदित्वात् च।

अं वायुपरीतिरायं श्रवणविवेकयास्तः॥

From this (the Self) was produced प्राप्त:; Manas and all the Indriyas; Ether, Air, Fire, Water, and Earth, the supporter of the Universe.—Mundaka-Upaniṣat, II. 1. 3.

and also by means of the other Vedic text beginning with

त प्राप्तसाधारण मनोभावमकरोऽश्रवणविवेकयास्तः॥

He created प्राप्त:; from प्राप्त:, Śraddhā or Faith, Ether, Air, etc.—Praśna-Upaniṣat, VI. 4.

And Prāpa is, as the author will later on (vide II. 31) declare, a particular modification of the Antah-karaṇa. Hence, in this text of the Veda, “Prāpa” itself is the Principle of Mahat.

Likewise does the Vedānta-Sūtra also describe creation just in the order of Mahat and the rest. Thus

स्त्रे सह विद्यानवस्थविक्षेपी तत्तथायुक्त॥

In the interval, Viśūkṣa and Manas,—in this order; because of the infra-soul mark thereof.—Vedānta-Sūtras, II. iii. 14, S. B. H. Vol. V, page 349.

(“In the interval,” i.e.,) between the existent (Self) and Ether, should
be produced Buddhi and Manas,—in this order; such is the meaning. Ahamkāra is included in Manas.—10.

Note:—See the Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V, page 845. The full translation of the Vedānta-Sūtram in question from which Vījñāna Bhikṣu has quoted the Pūrvapakṣa only, as given there according to the Govinda Bhāṣyam, is as follows: "If it be objected that the organs of cognition and mind, occurring between Prāṇa and the elements, in the Mūḍhaka-Upaniṣad, are mentioned in their order of succession, owing to an inferential mark of this; we say, no, because on account of non-difference." It will at once be seen from this that the Vedānta-Sūtrakāra reads a separate purpose altogether in the Mūḍhaka text (II, 1, 3), also cited by Vījñāna Bhikṣu in his support, and throws away the pūrvapakṣa on which the latter apparently relies. It need not be feared, however, that there is, therefore, necessarily a conflict and contradiction of views between the two high authorities such as Vyāsa and Vījñāna are. "The order of the origin of the various Tattvas hold authoritative in this (Vedānta as also in the Sāṃkhya) system is that which is laid down in the Scriptures like those of Subhāka, etc., namely, Pradhāna, Mahat, Ahamkāra, Tan-mātras, Senses, and the Gross Elements beginning with Ether." The origination of all these Tattvas has been shown in the third Pāda of the second Adhyāya of the Vedānta-Sūtras, and the order of succession, as we find laid down in the Tattvirlīyana-Upaniṣad and the rest, has also been discussed there, in order to show that there is no real conflict between these texts of the Subhāka and the Tattvirlīyan and others.

But it would appear that there is a real conflict between the teachings of the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta as to the immediate source of the origin of the Tattvas severally. For, according to the Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram, I, 61, etc., Mahat, etc., take their rise, the succeeding from the preceding one; while, according to the Govinda-Bhāṣyam, "all the various Tattvas mentioned in the Mūḍhaka-Upaniṣad, beginning with Prāṇa and ending with earth, are taught as coming out directly from the Lord,... In fact, the word "Ekaṃtā" of that text is to be read along with every one of these Prāṇa, Manas, etc. Thus, from Him is born Prāṇa, from Him is born Manas, from Him are born the Indriyas, etc." The idea seems to be, as elsewhere (under Vedānta-Sūtram, II, iii, 13) observed in the Govinda-Bhāṣyam, that "the Tattvas like the Pradhāna and the rest being insentient, cannot modify themselves into their succeeding Tattva, without the co-operation of an intelligent cause," namely Brahman. If this be so, then, there would be no real conflict, and the two theories can be easily reconciled.

The origination of Mahat, etc., is not for their own sake.

The Ārāmītvāt (Priyātātvāt) being for the sake of the Self. Sā: sāriṣṭa, of creation. Na, not. Ekaṃ, of these, Mahat, etc. Ārāmī: Ārāmy-ārtha, for the sake of themselves. Ārāma: Ārambhā, origination.

11. Since creation is for the benefit (i.e., deliverance) of the Self, the origination of these (i.e., Mahat, etc.) is not for their own sake.—175.

Vṛtti:—Is their origination for their own sake, or is it for the sake of another? To this the author replies.
Since creation is for the sake of Puruṣa, the origination of these, viz., Mahat and the following, is not "atmā-arthe," for the sake of themselves.

Prakṛiti being eternal, creative activity, for a self-regarding object, is justified in her case. But, since Mahat, etc., perish by being dissolved into their cause, in their case, it is mere creation (without reference to any self-regarding object).—11.

Bhāṣya:—Of Prakṛiti alone, the creativeness is for the purpose of her release (vide II. 1 supra), she being eternal. But of Mahat, etc., the being the creators of their respective modifications, is not for their own release, they being non-eternal. This difference (between the creative character of Prakṛiti and that of her products), the author points out.

"Eṣāṃ," of Mahat, etc., the creative character "atmā-artha-tvāt," being for the purpose of the release of Puruṣa, their "aṃraṃbhaḥ," creative character, is not for their own sake, on account of their unfitness for release in consequence of their perishableness. Such is the meaning.

(But why is it asserted that their creative activity is for the benefit of Puruṣa instead of for that of Prakṛiti? This question the Bhāṣya-kāra next answers.)

And when the release of another must be the end, it is but proper that the release of Puruṣa should alone be the end in question and not that the release of Prakṛiti should be the end, inasmuch as she is "gūṇa" or subservient to Puruṣa.—11.

Theory of Space and Time.

विक्रान्ताकालाकाःशब्दाय: || २ || १ २. ॥

दिक्कालां, space and time. अकाद्य-अदिभयाः, from अकाद्य, etc.

12. Space and Time come from अकाद्य and the Upādhis.—176.

Vṛtti:—Space and Time are well-known entities. How is it, then, that they are not heard of in the enumeration (of the Tattvas, I. 61, p. 93)? To this the author replies.

It is अकाद्य itself that, according to the distinction of this and that Upādhi or external condition, is denoted by the terms Space and Time. They are, therefore, included in अकाद्य.

The word "ādi" in the aphorism has come by sampāta or accident.
The use of the fifth case-ending in "akáśa-ādi-bhyāh" is in the sense of the locative.—12.

Vedántin Mahádeva:—By the word "ādi" the Upádhis are comprised. (Vide Bháṣya below.)

Bháṣya:—The author describes the creation of limited space and time.

Those space and time which are eternal, are of the form of the Prakriti or root-cause of Ākáśa, and are nothing but particular Guṇas or modifications of Prakriti. Hence, the universality of space and time is established. The universality of Ākáśa also, as alluded to by such Śrutis as

Like Ākáśa, all-penetrating and eternal.

is hereby explained.

But those space and time which are limited, are produced from Ākáśa through the conjunction of this or that Upádhi or limiting object. Such is the meaning; as the word "ādi" comprises the Upádhis.

Although limited space and time are (in reality, not the products of Ākáśa, but) Ākáśa itself as particularised by this or that limiting object, still they have been stated here to be the effects of Ākáśa, similarly as, in the Vaiśeṣika System, the sense of hearing has been stated to be the effect of Ākáśa, following the custom admitting the thing particularised as a separate and additional entity.—12

Definition of Buddhi.

प्रभवत्सायो बुद्धिः ॥ २ । १३ ॥

वप्पम: adhyavasāyāh, judgment, ascertainment, determination of a thing in its true form. बुद्धि: buddhiḥ, Buddhi, understanding.

13. Buddhi is ascertainment.—177.

Vr̥tti:—The author states the characteristic mark of Buddhi called Mahat.

"In this way only and in no other way,"—certainty or ascertainment in this form is "adhyavasāyāh."—13.

Bhāṣya:—Now the author exhibits the Tattvas alluded to by the phrase "in the order of Mahat and the rest" (in II. 10 above), one by one, with reference to their svarūpa or intrinsic form as well as with reference to their properties (dharma).

"Buddhi," this is a synonym of the Mahat Tattva. And "adhyavasāyāh," called ascertainment, is its general function. Such is the meaning.
The mention (of the function and the functionary) in the relation of non-difference (made in the aphorism in which adhyavasaya and buddhi stand in apposition to each other), is according to the maxim of the non-difference of the property and the thing of which it is the property.

And this Buddhi possesses "greatness" (and is called Mahat, Great), because, it should be understood, it pervades all effects whatever other than itself and because it is of great aśvarya or power. On this point, says the Śrīmāti:

-सत्विकारात् प्रभावाच महस्तमवायतः
| महात्मिलि यतः वायतिरौजास्तना जायते सवर

From the Pradhāna, undergoing modification, was produced the principle of Mahat; wherefrom is always produced in the minds of men the illumination that "(It is) great."

There are, again, texts of the Veda and the Śrīmāti such as

वन्य महते स्वरूप्य ब्रह्मविशिष्टमेवतुष्टेषु

Of this Great Being, is the breathing, this, the Rig Veda.—Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, II. 4v. 10.

But in them the application of the term "Great" to Hiranya-garbha (the Golden-Egged Brahmā whose breathing the Rig Veda is), even though he is chetana or sentient, has been made only on account of his conceit (abhimāna) of, or of his identifying himself with, Buddhi; in the same way as is made the application of the term "Earth" to the sentient entity (the deity presiding over earth) which has the mistaken belief (abhimāna) that it is earth. In the very same way also should be understood the application of the terms Ahamkāra, etc., to Rudra and others. And of one and all the deities without exception, commencing from the one possessing the abhimāna of (i.e., the belief of identity with) Prakṛti and ending with those possessing the abhimāna of (i.e., the belief of identity with) the Bhūtas or Elements, the regular and constant Upadhis in the forms of their respective Buddhis, are nothing but parts of the Principle of Mahat itself.—13.

Products of Mahat.

-सत्तक्य परमाविरु ॥ २ ॥ १४ ॥

तत्त्वं tattvam, its product. धर्मव धर्मव धर्मव or virtue, etc.

14. Virtue, etc., are its products.—178.

Vṛtti:—Wherein are Virtue, etc., included? To this the author replies.

Virtue, Knowledge, Dispassion, and Power,—by their being the products of Mahat, is refuted the theory that they are the properties of the Self.
Since there is non-difference between effect and cause, the place of their inclusion (in Mahat) has hereby been shown.—14.

_Bhāṣya:_ The author states the other properties also of the Principle of Mahat.

Virtue, Knowledge, Dispassion, and Power also have Buddhi as their material cause, and do not have Ahamkāra, etc., as their material cause; because Buddhi alone is the product of transcendental Sattva (i.e., the purest form of Sattva, absolutely free from the admixture of Rajas and Tamas).—14.

*How the same Mahat is modified into the form of Demerit, etc., also.*

भदुपरागाधिपरितपः ॥ २ ॥ १४ ॥

बहुः महात्, महात्। ज्ञातृं सर्वं सर्वं, अपराधाः, through adjacent tincture; through the influence or interpenetration. विपरितः विपरितः, the reverse.

15. The (same) Mahat (gives rise to) the opposite (products) through the adjacent tincture (of Rajas and Tamas).—179.

_Vṛtti:_ The author states the (other) particular modifications of Buddhi.

These are Demerit, Ignorance, Passion, and Impotence. For, difference of products, according to difference of contributory causes, is seen. Just as the calamus seed (by itself) produces the calamus shoot, and, in co-operation with the conjunction of fire, produces the plantain stem, so does Mahat, in co-operation with Sattva, produce Virtue, etc., and, in co-operation with Tamas, produce Demerit, etc.—15.

_Bhāṣya:_ But, then, it may be asked, how can the predominance of Demerit in the parts of Buddhi inhering in man, beasts, etc., be accounted for? To this the author replies.

The very same "Mahat," the Principle of Mahat, through the tincture received from the adjacent Rajas and Tamas, becomes also "the reverse," i.e., small (the opposite of great), i.e., endowed with the properties of Demerit, Ignorance, Passion, and Impotence. Such is the meaning.

Hereby is explained also the tradition current in the Veda and the Smṛiti that all Puruṣas are, without exception, Īśvaras or Lords; inasmuch as it shows that the innate lordliness of their Upādhis (i.e., of the Buddhic parts-appertaining to them) suffers obscuration by Rajas and Tamas, (whereby they appear to be less and lower than Īśvaras).

But, then, it may be urged, for the purpose of the inherence of virtue, etc., Buddhi also must be eternal; how, then, can it be a product of
Prakriti, as declared before? The author replies by saying that such is not the case; because, seeing that the residue or aroma of Karma, and the like resides in the Principle of Mahat in the seed-state, which is then only a particular modification of Sattva, still forming a part of Prakriti, we admit the production only of this seed of Mahat as a sprout during the causal state of knowledge. So that, just like Akasa, Buddh is of the form of both the eternal and the non-eternal. And just as Akasa, in its causal state, is spoken of as Prakriti, and is not spoken of as Akasa, on account of the non-existence, in that state, of Sound which is the distinctive mark of Akasa, similarly also is Buddh in the causal state spoken of only as Prakriti, and is not treated as Buddh on account of the non-existence, in that state, of adhyavasaya or ascertainment, etc., which is the distinctive mark of Buddh.—15.

Definition of Ahamkara.

Ahamkara is self-conceit.—180.

Vritti:—The author states the definition of Ahamkara, etc., which are the next in order.

"I am,"—such is abhimana or self-consciousness.—10.

Bhatya:—Having defined the Principle of Mahat, the author defines its product, Ahamkara.

"Ahamkara" is that which makes the "I," just as, for instance, "Kumbhakara" jar-maker, is one who makes the jar. It is the substance called the Antah-kara, the Inner Sense. And this, inasmuch as a property and the thing of which it is the property are indivisible, has been spoken of as abhimana or self-consciousness, in order to give the hint that self-consciousness is its uncommon or specific function or modification.

It is only in regard to an object which has previously been ascertained by Buddh to be this or that, that the making of the "I" and the making of the "Mine" take place. Hence, by following the relation of effect and cause between the functions or modifications (viz., abhimana, self-consciousness, and adhyavasaya, ascertainment), the existence of the relation of effect and cause also between those of which they are the modifications, (viz., Ahamkara and Buddh), is inferred;—this has been stated long before. It has also been stated long before that the Antah-kara is one and one only, and that, according to the three-fold distinction of mere
states, as in the case of the seed, the sprout, and the huge tree, etc., it falls under the relation of effect and cause. It is for this reason that Manas and Buddhi have been spoken of as synonymous terms in such passages of the Vāyu and the Matya Purāṇa as

मन्त्र महाय सतीप्रव दी व्यासितीश्वर ||

Manas, Mahat, Mati (Intelligence), Brahmi, Paur (the City), Buddhi, Khyati (Illumination), Ishara (are synonymous).—Vāyu-Purāṇa, IV. 35.—16.

Products of Āhamkāra.

एकािश पञ्चतन्त्रां तत्कार्यः ॥ २१ १७ ॥

काड़ा, eleven. पञ्चन-तन्त्रां, the five Tan-mātras. तत-कार्यम्, its product.

17. The eleven (Indriyas) and the five Tan-mātras are its products.—181.

Vṛitti:—The author states its product.

The eleven Indriyas, the five Tan-mātras—these sixteen are its products.—17.

Bhāṣya:—The author mentions the product of Āhamkāra, which has arrived in order.

The eleven Indriyas as well as the five Tan-mātras are the products of Āhamkāra. Such is the meaning.

"By this Indriya this Rūpa (Colour and Form), etc., should be enjoyed by me; it is this that is the means of accomplishing pleasure,"—it is from abhirmahā or self-affirmation such as this, that, in the primary creations, were produced the Senses and their Objects; hence Āhamkāra is the betu or the instrumental cause of the production of the Senses, etc.; inasmuch as it is seen in the world that only by persons having abhirmahā for, i.e., given to, enjoyment, there is, by means of their Rāga, attachment, desire, or passion, the making of the materials of their enjoyment; and inasmuch, moreover, as it is recollected in the Mokṣa-Dharma Section of the Mahā-Bhāṣya, by such passages as

कष्टतालमूलतः ॥

From Rāga or passion for Rūpa or Colour-cum-Form, was produced the Eye.—Mahā-Bhāṣya, XII. 7792.

that only from the Rāga or passion of Hiranya-Garbha (the Golden-Eggèd Brahmi) was produced the samaṣṭi, collective or universal, Eye or the Sense of Vision. Such is the idea.

And from this the difference of the Sāmkhya teaching is this that, amongst the Būtis and the Indriyas, it is Manas of which Rāga or passion
is the property, that is, according to it, first of all, produced from Ahamkāra; inasmuch as the Tan-mātras, etc., are the effects of Rāga.—17.

**Origin of Manas**

तात्त्विकमेकादसंक प्रवर्त्तेत वेद्यताविंकारात् || २ । १८ ॥

सत्त्विका सत्त्विका, consisting of Sattva; sattvic. सापेक्षा नीवानिक, the eleventh. अवज्ञा pravartate, proceeds. वैक्रिया vaikritat, from the vaikrita (modificational), i.e. Sāttvic (Ahamkāra). आहंकारण ahāmkārān, from Ahamkāra.

18. The Sāttvic eleventh (Indriya, i.e., Manas) proceeds from the Vaikrīta Ahamkāra.—182.

**Vṛtti:**—But do the insentient and the illuminating both come from one and the same cause? To this the author replies.

From Ahamkāra which is (vaikrita) a modification of Mahat, proceed "ekādaśaka," the eleven senses, "sattvikānu," being attended with Sattva, and the Tan-mātras, being attended with Tamas.—18.

**Bhāṣya:**—Even in this (i.e., the manner of their evolution), the author points out a distinction.

"Ekādaśaka," the completer of the eleven, (the eleventh, i.e.) Manas, is, amongst the sixteen-fold group, the "sattvikānu" (Sāttvic or Sattva-relating). Hence it is produced "vaikritat ahamkārāt," from the Sāttvic Ahamkāra. Such is the meaning.

From this it should also be understood that the ten (remaining) Indriyas are produced from the Rājasa Ahamkāra, and the Tan-mātras, from the Tāmasa Ahamkāra; as is ascertained from the Smṛritis themselves, such as:

वैक्रियस्यस्वतादसकम् तामसात् श्वाश्चिता विष्णु ।
ब्रह्मलक्ष्मिनिविस्तरपि वैक्रियकादसकम् ॥

वैक्रियाः वदेष विनासितिविवाच्य पदः ।
रैविस्तरविविवाच्य स्वभावस्यवाच्यव्रतः ॥

तामसो भूस्वास्तीविपयति कलस्तुत्सत्त्व ॥

Valkārika, and Taljasa, and Tāmasa,—thus is Ahamkāra threefold. From the Valkārika Aham-Princípio, undergoing modification, was Manas; as also the Devas Valkārika, from whom is the manifestation of Objecta. And from the Taljasa (Ahamkāra) (sprang) the Indriyas themselves, constituted by Jñāna, Cognition, and Karma, Action. Tāmasa are the Bhāța-sākhya or Subtile Elements (the Tan-mātras), etc., from which is Ākāsa, its own inferential mark.—Śrīmad-Bhāgavataam, III. v. 20—31.

Hence verily, following the Purāṇa, etc., it has been stated in the Kārikā also:

सापेक्षा नीवानिकाः जन्माते वेद्यताविंकारात् ।
अवज्ञात्वेव व तामसात् वेद्यताविंकारात् ॥
The Sāttvīc Eleventh proceeds from the Vaiśkṛtā Ahaṃkāra; the Tan-mātra of the first of the Elocution,—it is Tāmāsa: both (the Indriyas of Cognition and Action), from the Rājas.-Sāmkhya-Kārikā, XXV.

"Taijas" means Rājas. "Both" denotes the Indriyas of Cognition and Action.

But, then, it may be asked, in the future aphorism (II. 21) beginning with Devatālayadrutāḥ, the author will speak of the Devas (the presiding Deities) of the Indriyas; why, then, by the Kārikā also, has it not been stated that the Devas are the products of the Sāttvīc Ahaṃkāra? In reply to this, we say: Of the Being possessing the Collective Eye, etc., as the body, it is the chetanā or sentience of Sūrya, etc., says the Śruti, that is the Deva of the Eye, etc. And from this it results that of the discrete or individual Indriyas, the Devas are the concrete or collective Indriyas. So that, intending to draw attention to the unity of the discrete and the concrete, the Devas have not, in this Sāstra (the Sāmkhya-Kārikā) been mentioned separately from the Indriyas. Hence the concrete Indriyas, containing, as they do, less Sattva than Manas, have been mentioned just as being the products of the Rājas Ahaṃkāra; while in the Smṛritis, they have been stated as being the products of the Sāttvīc Ahaṃkāra on account of their containing greater Sattva as compared with the discrete Indriyas; thus, it should be found, there is no contradiction.

Thus, from this threefoldness of Ahaṃkāra, should be understood the threefoldness of Mahat also, the cause thereof; as there "is the Smṛiti:

Sāttvīc, Rājas, and Tāmāsa,—thus is Mahat threefold.—Mārkanda-Purāṇa, 45. 88—18.

Of the Eleven Indriyas.

विनियुक्तविद्यानयेतानामेकादशकम् ॥ २ । १६ ॥

कर्म-प्रिया-भूतिः कर्म-प्रिया-भूतिः, together with the Indriya of Action and the Indriya of Cognition. अन्तः अन्तः, the inner. अन्तः, ekādaśa-kam, the eleventh.

19. Together with the Indriyas of Action and the Indriyas of Cognition, the Inner (Indriya, Manas) is the eleventh.—183.

Vṛtti:—The author mentions the threefold division of the Indriyas. "Antaram," Manas, along with the five Indriyas of Action, viz., Speech, etc., and the five Indriyas of Cognition, viz., Smell, etc.,—these are the eleven Indriyas.—19.

Bhāṣya:—The author shows the eleven Indriyas.
The Indriyas of Action, namely the Organ of Speech, Hand, Foot, Anus, and the Genital, are five in number; and the Indriyas of Cognition, namely the Eye, the Ear, the Skin, the Nose, and the Tongue, are five in number; along with these ten, "āntaram," Manas, is "ekādaśakām," the elevenfold Indriya. Such is the meaning.

"Indriyam" is that which is the karaṇa or instrument of Indra, the Lord of the Body. Thus, the characteristic mark of the Indriya is that, while it is a product of Ahamkāra, it is, at the same time, an instrument (of Action or Cognition).—19.

The Indriyas are not formed out of the Bhūtas or Elements.

The Indriyas are not formed out of the Bhūtas or Elements.

I will be many, etc.—Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, VI. ii. 8.

Well, it may be urged, there is Vedic evidence also for the theory that the Indriyas are formed of the Bhūtas; e.g.

Verily, O Calm One, is Manas formed of food, etc.—Chh. U. VI. v. 6.

But such, we say, is not the case. Inasmuch as it is but proper and necessary that the material cause of the Antaḥ-kāraṇa should bear resemblance to that which possesses the power to cause illumination (i.e.,
manifestation of objects), the Śruti that the Indriyas are formed of Ahamkāra, is alone the principal one (between this and the contrary Śruti).
And, further, since the Bhūtas also are produced by the will (samkalpa) of Hiranya-Garbha (the Golden-Egg Brahmā), food itself is a product of Manas. The Śruti, on the other hand, that the Indriyas are formed of the Bhūtas, is of less authority, and speaks of the formation of the Indriyas in a figurative sense, pointing, as it does, to the mere manifestation (abhivyakti) (as contradistinguished from formation or creation) from out of the Bhūtas, of the discrete Manas, etc., which, until then, were lying only as associated with the Bhūtas (and had no separate, manifest existence of their own).—20.

A doubtful Śruti explained.

21. Since there is the Śruti declaring the dissolution (of the Indriyas) into the Devas, of the (supposed) originator (i.e., the Bhūtas) is not (the causality).—Aniruddha.

The Śruti declaring the dissolution (of the Indriyas) into the Devas, does not (refer to the Devas as their) originator.—Vijñāna-Bhikṣu.—185.

Vṛitti:—The author gives a further reason.
Dissolution of the effect is in the cause; this is established.
Dissolution into the Deva is heard from such texts as

- Varṣṭi:—The Eye goes (back) to Āditya.—Maṭrī-Upanīṣad, VI, 6.

It follows, therefore, that the causality in question is not "ārambhakasya," i.e., of the Bhūta supposed to be the originator.—21.

Bhāṣya:—But, still, it may be argued, the ascertainment of their being formed of Ahamkāra is not possible; because by means of the declaration, made in the Śrutis such as

Of this Purāṇa, the Speech returns to Agni, Prāpa to Vāyu, the Eye to Āditya.—Maṭrī-Dhruvyānha-Upanīṣad, III, II, 13.
of the dissolution of the Indriyas into the Devas, it is possible also to hold that the Devas are the material causes of the Indriyas; inasmuch as it is in the cause only that the dissolution of the effect takes place.

Pondering over this doubt, the author says:

The Śruti that there is, regarding the dissolution into the Devas,—the same is not "ārambhakasya," i.e., does not refer to the originator as its subject; such is the meaning; because we see the disappearance of a drop of water into what notwithstanding is not its originator, namely, the ground; and also because we hear of the disappearance of the Self into the Bhūtas, notwithstanding that they are not its originators, from such Śrutis as

विज्ञान-भूमाः सङ्केतम् समुक्तवाय तत्त्वेवादाद्विनिरपि

Vijñāna-Abhamsa itself (the Cloud of Pure Knowledge, i.e., the Self), after having sprung up from those Bhūtas, disappears into those very Bhūtas again.—Bṛhat-āraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, II. iv. 12.

Such is the import.—21:

The Indriyas are not eternal.

तत्वत्त्विस्तुतोनिर्धार्यवेष्टनां || २ १ २ ॥

This is the reading of Vijñāna-Bhikṣu. Aniruddha reads tat-uttaptiḥ ārdhyate, we hear of their production. vināsā-darśanāt, from seeing their destruction. cha, and, also.

22. (The Indriyas are not eternal), because, in the Śruti, we hear of their production, and also because their destruction is seen.—186.

Vṛtti:—The Indriyas are eternal, such is the view of some. In order to reject this, the author says:

We hear of their production from Ahamkāra. And destruction of what is produced is also inevitable.—22.

Bhāṣya:—Manas, included amongst the Indriyas, is eternal, such is the opinion held by some. (Cf. Kaśāda-Sūtram, III. ii. 2. S. B. H. Vol. vi, p. 126.) The author rejects it.

Of these, i.e., of every one of the Indriyas, there is production, as we learn from the Śrutis such as

विभासापदो यथे नमं सर्वदिनक्ति यो ||

From Him are produced Prāpa, Manas, and all the (other) Indriyas.—Mṛgābhīṣṭa-Upaniṣad, II. 1. 3.
Moreover, by means of the fact that, in old age and like other conditions, Manas also, like the eye, and the rest, undergoes decay, etc., it is ascertained that there is also destruction of Manas. Such is the meaning. So also has it been said:—

\[ दुस्मेषेन विनिष्ठेऽते मयः सर्वतिथियापि च \]

Manas together with the ten,—that is, all the Indriyas come to cease.

The declarations (made in the Śrutis and elsewhere) about the eternity of Manas, are, however, directed (not to Manas manifested as such, but) to the seed (of Manas) called Prakṛti.—22.

The Indriyas are not the same as their physiological counterparts.

\[ भ्रस्तिनिहितं भ्रस्त्तानामचिह्वते \]

The Indriya is supersensuous; of mistaken persons, (the notion of the Indriya is) in respect of (its physiological) site.—187.

Vṛti:—From seeing the difference of the powers belonging severally to the Eye, etc., it might be concluded that the Indriyas are sensuous. This the author prevents.

Of mistaken persons, the notion of the Indriya is in respect of its site, for instance, the eye-balls, etc. Were the notion not a mistaken one, then, hearing would not be possible for one whose ears have been cut off, while, on the other hand, apprehension of ālāpa (Colour-cum-Form) would be possible for one whose eyes are jaundiced.—23.

Bhāṣya:—The author repels the Nāstika or heretical opinion that the Indriya is, for example, just the sets of eye-balls.

The Indriya is, in all the cases, supersensuous, and not an object of sense-perception; it is, on the other hand, with mistaken persons only that the Indriya exists in the condition of identity with its site, for example, the eye-ball. Such is the meaning. The more correct reading, therefore, will be “adhiṣṭhānam,” (that the Indriya is the site, instead of that it is in the site).—23.

There is not one, but many, Indriyas.
24. A difference being established, even if a difference of power (be admitted), there is not a oneness (of the Indriyas).—188.

Vṛtti:—The Indriya is only one in number; plurality attaches to it from a difference of Upādhis or extrinsic limitations;—in regard to this opinion, the author says:

Let there be a difference of Upādhis; still a difference of powers must be affirmed; and this difference is genuine; hence, plurality also is genuine.—24.

Bhāṣya:—The author rebuts the opinion that one single Indriya performs different functions through diversity of powers.

Even by the admission of a difference of powers of one single Indriya, a difference of Indriyas is established, inasmuch as the powers also possess the character of the Indriyas; hence there is not a oneness of the Indriya. Such is the meaning.—24.

Rules of Thought must not be allowed to stand against the Evidence of the Senses.

न कल्पनाविरोधः प्रमाणहृदयम् || २ || २५ ||

न: not, कल्पनाविरोधः: kalpanā-virodhaḥ, contradiction to thought, प्रमाणहृदयम्: pramāṇa-hṛdayam, of that which is “seen” or known or ascertained by means of evidence.

25. There can be no contradiction to thought, of that which is established by evidence.—189.

Vṛtti:—Lest it be said that the case being explained by a oneness only (of the Indriyas), the supposition of (their) plurality is redundant; so the author says:

(The meaning) is clear.—25.

Bhāṣya:—But, then, it may be urged, in the supposition of the production of diverse Indriyas from one and the same Ahamkāra, there is a contradiction of the Rules of Thought (Nyāya). To this the author replies.

This is simple.—25.

Definition of Manas.

उभयालक्ष मनः || २ || २६ ||

उभया—ubhaya—possessing the character of both, मन:—manas, Manas.

Laird Şīla reads a “cha” between “ubhaya-ātmakāra” and “manas.”
26. Manas (partakes) of the character of both (Cognition and Action).—190.

Vṛtti:—The author states the definition of Manas:

Manas possesses the character of the Indriya of Cognition and the character of the Indriya of Action, because its operation is in both directions, according to site.—26.

Bhāṣya:—The author declares that of Manas, the one leading Indriya, the other ten are the different powers.

Manas possesses the character of the Indriyas of Cognition and Action. Such is the meaning.—26.

Vedāntin Mahādeva.—Inasmuch as, without the application of Manas, the Indriyas are incapable of performing their respective offices, Manas itself is, therefore, designated as the Indriya of Cognition and as the Indriya of Action.

Diversity of Manas explained.

युक्तिपरिशामनेवार्थानासात्स्मवस्त्यावत् ॥ २ ॥ २७॥

युक्तिपरिशामनेवार्थानासात्स्मवस्त्यावत् ॥ २ ॥ २७॥

The diversity (of Manas) is owing to the difference of the transformations of the Guṇas, Sattva, etc. युक्तिपरिशामनेवार्थानासात्स्मवस्त्यावत्, diversity. युक्तिपरिशामनेवार्थानासात्स्मवस्त्यावत्, diversity.

27. The diversity (of Manas) is owing to the difference of the transformations of the Guṇas; as is the case with the (diverse) conditions (of one single man).—191.

Vṛtti:—But how can more than one Indriyas come from one and the same Ahaṁkāra? To this the author replies:

By reason of the differences of the transformations of the Guṇas, Sattva, etc., acting in co-operation with Dharma, Merit, and A-dharma, Demerit, (there is the production of) more than one; “Avasthā-vat:” as, of one single body, are caused infancy, youth, and old age.—27.

Bhāṣya:—“ Of the character of both” (vide II. 26 above),—of this phrase the author himself explains the meaning:

Just as one self-same man puts on a variety of characters according to the influence of association: being, through association with his beloved, a lover; through association with one indifferent to the world, dispassionate; and through association with some other, something else; so Manas also, through association with the Eye, etc., becomes manifold, by being particularised (or specifically differentiated) with the function of seeing, etc., by reason of its becoming one with the Eye, etc. The cases...
of this diverse modification is “Guna, etc.,” that is, that the Gunas, Sattva, etc., are capable of various transformations. Such is the meaning.

And this is inferred from the incapability of the Eye, etc., to perform their functions without the conjunction of Manas,—a fact established by such Srutis as

I was with my Manas diverted elsewhere; I did not hear.—Brihat-Ārasyaka-Upaniṣad, I. v. 8.—27.

What are the Objects of the Indriyas.

�ुपाकिरसमलानात् उभयोः: II २ २५ II

रुप-अदि-रासा-मला-अंताह, beginning with Colour and ending with the dirt of the juices. उभयः: ubhayoh, of both.

28. Of both, (the object is) that beginning with Colour and ending with the dirt of the juices.—192.

Vṛtti:—The author mentions the object of both the Indriyas.


The objects of the Indriya of Cognition are Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, and Sound. The objects of the Indriya of Action are Speech, Prehension, Movement, Pleasurable Excitement, and the dirt of the juices.

“Rasa-mala” is the name of a particular kind of dirt. The number of objects ends with it.—28.

Bhāṣya:—The author mentions the object of the Indriyas of Cognition and of Action.

The dirt of the juices of food is the ordure, etc.

Thus, the ten objects of both, namely, the Indriyas of Cognition and of Action, are (respectively) Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Sound, the Speakable, the Prehensible, the Approachable, the Excitable, and the Excretable.

“The Excitable” which is the object of the Genitals, is something within the Genitals.—28.

Puruṣa is different from the Indriya.

श्रुत्ताथापलम: करङकर्त्तित्रिथायाम् II २ २६ II

मद्वात्रि-त्रि-दी, the being the seer, etc. अत्मसां अत्मां, of the Self. इत्त्रि-करसा-त्रम, the being the instrument. इत्त्रि-ित्रियापाम, of the Indriyas.

29. The being the seer, etc., is of the Self; the being the instrument is of the Indriyas.—193.
Vṛitti:—The author points out the characteristic difference between the Self and the Indriya.
This is clear.—29.

Bhāṣya:—Of what Indra (Samghāta-Iśvara, Embodied Consciousness, vide II. 19, Bhāṣya), by what service, these are termed the Indriyas, Instruments,—both these things the author declares.

The pentad beginning with the being the seer, the pentad beginning with the being the speaker, and the being the thinker are “Atmanah,” of Puruṣa; while, in the operations of seeing, etc., the instrumentality is of the Indriyas. Such is the meaning.

But, it may be urged, when the being the seer, the being the hearer, etc., may sometimes develop into anubhava or immediate cognition, it is just possible that they should belong to Puruṣa, notwithstanding that he is unchanging; but the being the speaker, etc., is merely an act (which is nothing but a change); how can it be possible in the case of the Immutable (Puruṣa)? We reply that such is not the case; because here the meaning of the terms the being the seer, etc., is nothing more than this that it belongs to Puruṣa to cause the performance of the functions of seeing, etc., (by the Indriyas), by his mere proximity (to them); as is the case with the loadstone. For, as an emperor, even without himself actively operating, becomes a warrior through his instrument, the army, inasmuch as, by his orders simply, he incites them into action; so Puruṣa, though immutable, through the instruments of the Eye, and all the rest, becomes the seer, the speaker, the thinker, and such like, inasmuch as he incites them to action simply by his mere proximity (to them) which is called “Samyoga” or Conjunction; as is the case with the loadstone (which moves the iron by mere proximity to it, without actively exerting any force itself).

And here “kārtṛtvā,” agency, (in “to cause the performance of the functions of seeing, etc.” above) consists in being that which sets in motion (kāraka-chakra) the wheel of all that helps towards the accomplishment of the action; and “karaṇatvā,” instrumentality, in the possession of the operation which is the cause of the action, or in being the most efficient means of accomplishing it; as is the case with the axe, etc.

The agency in seeing, etc., which is prohibited in the Śāstras in the case of Puruṣa,—that consists in the possession of action favourable to those acts (i.e., seeing, etc.), or in the possession of those acts themselves. So has it been said:

सिरिधात्मकं कार्यः कर्मचक्रवर्त्तं संबंधितम्।
प्राणिर्वाहिकवर्त्तितं भास्य साधितवर्त्तितम्॥
Hence agency as well as non-agency is established in the Self: being free from desire, it is a non-agent; (it is) an agent through mere proximity.

For the very same reason, since the power to set in motion the "kāraka-chakra" or all that helps towards the accomplishment of an action, is of the svarūpa or intrinsic form of the Self, the being the seer, the being the speaker, etc., eternally belongs to the Self,—this is heard from such Śrūtis as

\[ \text{व पुरुषं विपरीतलोके विद्यते न वस्तुं वेदेष्विपरीतलोके विद्यते} \]

Of the Seer, there is no absolute loss of vision; of the Speaker, there is no absolute loss of speech, etc.—Bṛhāt-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, IV. III. 25, 26.

But, it may be urged, in the division of Pramāṇa (vide I. 87 ante), instrumentality has been mentioned only of the functions or modifications of sense-perception, etc.; how is it, then, that the same is here predicated of the Indriya? To this we reply that such is not the case; because here instrumentality is ascribed to the Indriyas only in respect of the modifications that, in the form of vision, etc., take place in Buddha through the gateways of the Eye, etc.; while there the instrumentality of the functions (of sense-perception, etc.) has been declared in respect of the result (lit. fruit) called Bodha or Knowledge, appertaining to Puruṣa.—29.

The Internal Indriyas distinguished.

\[ \text{त्रयाणां स्वालकाःयम् II २ I ३० II} \]

त्रयाणां, of the three Internal Indriyas. स्वालकाःयम्, possession of distinctive characteristics of their own.

30. The three (Internal Indriyas) have their own function as their distinguishing characteristics.—194.

Vṛtti:—The author points out the difference in character of the three Internal Indriyas mutually.

Of Mahat, Ahaṃkāra, and Manas, there is "śvālakṣaṇyaṃ," individual or specific characteristic: of Mahat, there is adhyāvasāya or ascertainment; of Ahaṃkāra, abhimāna or self-consciousness; of Manas, samkalpa or deliberation.—30.

Bhāṣya:—Now the author mentions the distinctive functions of the three Internal Indriyas.

"Trayaṇām," of Mahat, Ahaṃkāra, and Manas, there is "śvālakṣaṇyaṃ," that is, the condition or state of being 'śvālakṣaṇa' which is a compound word with the middle term elided, meaning things of which the respective definitions are their uncommon or distinguishing functions. Such is the meaning.
In the popular view also the mark of a great man is the possession of adhyayasāya or certain knowledge and other higher qualities; of a conceited man, the attribution to himself of the qualities which do not exist in him; and of a strong mind, the resolution, "This must be."

And so it follows that the modification of Buddhi is adhyayasāya or ascertainment; that of Abhimāna is self-conceit; that of Manas is samkalpa or deliberation and vikalpa or doubt. Samkalpa is the will to do, as follows from the teaching:

संकल्पः कर्म आचारम्॥

Samkalpa is an action of Manas.—Amara-kośa, l. l. 4. 11.

And Vikalpa is doubt, or the so-called particular kind of error mentioned in the Yoga-Darsana (vide Yoga-Aphorisms of Patañjali, l. 6, S. B. H. Vol. IV, page 21), but not the cognition of a thing as possessing a particular property, because that is a function or modification of Buddhi.

30.

The Resemblance amongst the Internal Indriyas.

सामान्यकरणविद्: प्राथाया वायवः पन्च:॥२१॥

समयवर्तमानं सामान्य-करण-वृत्तिः, the common modification of the Internal Instruments, अवर्तः: प्राण-अद्यात्, Prāṇa and the rest. भूषणः: वायु-वायु, airs, भूषणो च पालिता, five.

31. The five beginning with Prāṇa, (familiarly known as) Airs, are the common modifications of the (three Internal) Instruments.—195.

Vṛtti.—The author points out the similarity in character of these (Internal Indriyas).

The five "Airs" beginning with Prāṇa, are supported by the three (Internal Instruments).—31.

Bhāsya.—The author mentions the common modification also of the three (Internal Instruments).

The five in the form of Prāṇa, etc., which, from their air-like movements, are familiarly known as airs,—these are "sāmānya," common "vṛtti" kind of transformation, "karaṇasya," of the three Internal Instruments. Such is the meaning.

Accordingly, has this been declared by the Kārikā:

कारिकः सूत्रिक्यते केवल भस्मभास्माः।
बोधानकदर्शनार्थं मात्रेय सावलय भव॥
Of the three, the modifications are their respective characteristics; these are uncommon; the common modification of the (internal) Instrument is the five, beginning with Prāṇa, known as the Aīra.- Śāṅkhya-Kārikā, XXIX.

Some think that Prāṇa, etc., are nothing but particular kinds of Air, and that they are made to operate (as they do) by the modification of the Internal Instrument in the form of volition, the source of vitality, and so they say that, in the present aphorism, there is the statement of their non-difference in the form that Prāṇa, etc., are the modifications of the (Internal) Instrument. But it is not so; for, by the Vedānta Aphorism:

शाक्तिके पृथक् पदेवेचारत् ॥
(The chief Prāṇa is) neither air, nor any function of air, because the text enunciates it separately (from air)— Vedānta-Sūtra, II, iv, 8, 8. H. H. Vol. V, p. 401.

the characteristic of being air and the characteristic of being a transformation of air have expressly been denied to Prāṇa, and it is but proper that the present aphorism also should have the same import as the one in question of the Vedānta-Sūtra. Moreover, since the property of Manas, e.g. cupidity, etc., becomes the cause of disturbance in Prāṇa, it must needs be that they have a common substratum.

The Śrutis, however, in which there is separate enunciation of Air and Prāṇa, are, for instance:

तत्स्माताश्च यात्रा मनस: सत्वं द्विविधं च ।
ए वायुवेदोत्तराय पृथ्वी विभवत्य चारिभी ॥

From Him is produced Prāṇa; Manas and all the Indriyas; Ether, Air, Fire, Water, and Earth, the supporter of the universe.—Mūḍh. Upa., II, 1, 8.

(But, it may be asked, when Prāṇa, etc., are thus a modification of the Internal Instrument, how is it that they have not been counted among the component parts of the Linga-Sūtra or Subtle Body? To this the Commentator next replies.)

It is for this reason that, notwithstanding the non-enumeration of the as within the Linga-Sūtra (vide III, 9 post), there is no defect, be-Buddhi itself, by reason of its power of action, takes the names of Sātmā, Prāṇa, etc.

(But, again, when Prāṇa is a modification of the Internal Instrument what is the justification for speaking of it as air? To this the Commentator now replies.)

Although it is a modification of the Internal Instrument, still the use of the term, air, is accounted for by the fact of its having peculiar movements like those of air, and also of its being presided over by the Deva, Vāyu.—31.
The modifications of the Indriyas are simultaneous as well as successive.

32. The modifications of the Indriyas (take place) successively as well as simultaneously.—196.

Vṛtti:—The author mentions the modifications of the Indriyas.

"Kramaśas cha," and successively: after seeing a thief in dim light, a man first judges of the thing by the help of the Indriyas, then with the help of the mind forms the judgment, "It is a thief," next, by means of Ahaṃkāra, becomes self-conscious, reflecting "He steals money," and then, with the help of Buddhī, makes certain in the form of "I will catch the thief."

"A-kramaśas cha," and also simultaneously: after seeing a tiger at night under the flash of a lightning, a man instantly runs away. In this case there is the simultaneous modification of all the four (viz., Indriyas, Manas, Ahaṃkāra, and Buddhī). Although it being impossible for the modifications to arise all at one and the same moment, here also their appearance is really successive, still it has been stated to be not-successive on account of their non-manifestation as successive, according to the maxim of utpala-dāta-patra-vyatītheda or the piercing through of one hundred petals of the water-lily, (in which case the petals are, in fact, pierced successively, one after another, but the whole thing seems to take place in a single moment of time).—32.

Bhāṣya:—It is not a fixed rule with us, as it is with the Vaiśeṣikas (vide Kaṇḍa-Sūtra, III. ii. 3, S. B. H. Vol. VI, page 126), that the modifications of the Indriyas take place only successively, and not simultaneously. This the author declares:

This is easy to understand.

Inasmuch as promiscuity of classes is not a fault in our view, given the required collocation of materials, there is nothing of an obstruction to the production of modifications at once and the same time by more than one Indriyas. Such is the idea.

The division of the modifications of the Indriyas have also been explained by the Kārikā:
In respect of Sound, and the rest, the modifica-
tion of the five (Indriyas of Cognition is
desired to the alocohana or simple awareness or observation of particular kinds. Of the
dise (Indriyas of Action, the modifications are) speech, prehension, movement, excretion
and exaltation.—Sāṇkhya-Kārikā, XXVIII.

“Ālochana” also has been explained by the ancient teachers, thus:

चर्चा हालोचना ताम्र प्रथम निर्विकृतव्रतम्।
परं पुनःतथा वस्तुद्वाकाराविभिन्नतम्॥

For, first, there arises “ālochana,” that is, nirvikalpaka or objectless cognition
afterwards, again, it is made discrete by means of the properties of the object as well as
by means of its class, etc.—Sāṇkhya-Tattva Kaumudi on Sāṇkhya-Kārikā, XXVII.

And “Param,” the subsequent cognition, again, which is savikal-
paka or discrete “vastu-dharmaś” or by reason of the properties of the
thing as also “jāti-ādi-bhīṣ” or by reason of the class, etc., is “tathā,”
called by the name “ālochana.” Such is the meaning.

So that, it is obtained that sensuous cognition in the form of
nirvikalpaka or indiscrimate and savikalpaka or discrete, is, in both of its
forms, designated by the name of “ālochana.”

According to some, however, the above verse means that nirvikalpaka
cognition alone is alocohana and is the product of the Indriya, while
savikalpaka cognition is the product of Manas only. But such is not the
meaning of the verse; because, in the Commentary on Yoga, it has been
established by the revered Vyāsa that visiṣṭa-jñāna or the cognition of a
thing as possessing a particular character is also a product of the Indriyas;
and, further, because there is nothing of an obstruction to the cognition,
by the Indriyas, of a thing as possessing a particular character.

The same authority (cf. Aniruddha also) explains the meaning of the
aphorism also in this way: The modification of these, beginning with the
external Indriyas and ending with Buddhi, ordinarily takes place by suc-
cession; but occasionally, for instance, at the moment of seeing a tiger and
the like, on account of special fear, modification takes place simultaneously
in all the Instruments (Vide II, 38), like the flash of a streak of lightning;
such is the meaning. This too is incorrect; because in the aphorism there
is mention of the successive and simultaneous appearance of the modifications of the Indriyas only; there is not the remotest allusion to the modi-
fication of Buddhī and Ahaṅkāra. Moreover, since a divergent opinion is
held by our opponent only in respect to the simultaneity of the modifications of the several Indriyas, it is but proper that the aphorism should be
directed only to the establishment of such simultaneity, with a view
to repel the atomicity of Manas (vide Vaiśeṣika-Sūtram, S. B. H. Vol. VI,
page 230), but not that it should be directed to make search for the tooth
of a crow.—32.

Note.—Aniruddha, however, accepts the Vaiśeṣika theory of the atomicity of Manas.
33. The modifications are fivefold, and are painful and non-painful (cf. Yoga Aphorisms, I. 5).—197.

Vṛtti:—How many are the modifications? To remove this curiosity, the author says:

(The fivefold modifications are) Pramāṇa, Viparyaya, Vikalpa, Nidrā, and Smṛiti. Sense-perception, Inference, and Word, are the Pramāṇas or Proofs, i.e., Sources of Knowledge. (Vide Yoga Aphorisms, I. 6, and 7, S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 14). Viparyaya is unreal cognition, resting on a form not possessed by that which is its object (vide Yoga Aphorisms, I. 8, S. B. II. Vol. IV, p. 18). Vikalpa is cognition swinging between both the alternatives (cf. Yoga Aphorisms, I. 9, S. B. II. Vol. IV, p. 20). Nidrā (Sleep) is cognition supporting on Tamas (cf. Yoga Aphorisms, I. 10, S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 22). Smṛiti (Memory or Reminiscence) is cognition of the past.(Cf. Yoga Aphorisms, I. 11, S. B. II., Vol. IV, p. 24).

"Kliṣṭāh" means attended with pain, that is, constituted by Rajas and Tamas; "a-kliṣṭāh" means having the painful in it burnt up, that is, constituted by Sattva.—33.

Bhāṣya:—Lumping together the modifications of Buddhi, the author, in the first place, exhibits them, with the object of showing that they are the cause of Samsāra or worldly existence.

Whether they be painful or non-painful, the modifications are "pañchatāyāyāh," of five kinds only, and not more. Such is the meaning. "Kliṣṭāh," that is, pain-giving, are the worldly modifications; "a-kliṣṭāh," that is, the opposite thereof, are the modifications taking place at the time of Yoga.

The fivefoldness of the modifications has been declared by the (Yoga) Aphorism of Patañjali:

**Pramāṇa, Viparyaya, Vikalpa, Nidrā, and Smṛiti (are the modifications).—Yoga-Sūtras, I. 6.**

Amongst these, the modification called Pramāṇa has also been similarly described in this (Sāmkhya-Śāstra, vide I. 87 ante). But Viparyaya, in our view, consists only in the non-apprehension of viveka.
or the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakriti, because we reject the theory of anyātā-khyāti, that is, that a thing can be seen in a light different from its own. Vikalpa, again, is cognition such as "The head of Rāhu" (when Rāhu is all head), "The consciousness of Puruṣa" (when Puruṣa is nothing but consciousness), even at the time of the observation of the peculiarity. And Nidrā is the modification of Buddhi taking place during the state of dreamless sleep. And Smṛiti is cognition produced from Sanskāra or previous impressions. All this has been aphorised in the System of Patañjali.—33.

The svarūpa of Puruṣa indicated.

तत्त्वज्ञानसत्तातोपरां सक्षु: || २ || ३४ ||

तत्त्वज्ञानसत्तातोपरां सक्षुः: tat-nirvittau, on the cessation of these (modifications). सुभदाचितता upadānta-parāgabh, having the tincture subsided. अन्य: sva-sthathā, self-seated.

34. On the cessation of these (modifications), as the colour reflected (on him by them) disappears, (Puruṣa remains) self-seated.—198.

Vṛitti:—The author says that, on the cessation of the modifications, there results Release.

On the cessation of the modifications, Ignorance, Egoity, Desire, Aversion, and Love of Life (side Yoga Aphorisms, II. 3, S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 91) having been exhausted, (Puruṣa) "sva-sthathā," recovers his svarūpa or intrinsic form.—34.

Bhāṣya:—These modifications of Buddhi that have just been mentioned—it is entirely due to them as Upādhis, and not to himself, that Puruṣa seems to have a form other than his own; and on the cessation of these, Puruṣa becomes fixed in his svarūpa. From this side (of the question) also the author makes us acquainted with the svarūpa of Puruṣa.

In the state of repose of these modifications, their reflections having subsided, Puruṣa becomes self-seated, just as he is, at other times also, in the state of aloneness. So also say the three Yoga Aphorisms:

योगिकस्यबुद्धिमित्रोऽि: ||
तत्त्वज्ञानसत्तातोपरां सक्षुः: ||
प्रतिसत्तातैवपरां सक्षुः: ||

Yoga is the suppression of the modifications of the Chitta, Then is the resting of the on-looker in his own form.

And the being self-seated, in the case of Puruṣa, denotes nothing else than the cessation of the reflection of the modifications of his Upādhi (i.e., Buddhī).

A similar condition of Puruṣa has been shown by means of an illustration, in the Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇam:

चन्द्रानातिभिन्नदौत्रिपरितिहास दृष्टी ।
स्वादर्प्पेषु दृष्टिक्षेत्रस्तुद विश्वयमेव ।
चिह कृम अबानिभासः प्रवाहले दृष्टियतम्मृत ।
स्वातात्त्विः केतकला विभुते दृष्टियत्वीकरण ॥

For, in a mirror which has not received the reflections of the hills and hundred other objects, the single nature that there is, of being a mirror, consisting of its own intrinsic form alone, the same onlooker, when he stands not seeing, the panorama of scenes showing the "I," the "You," and the "World," etc., having gone down.—34.

Above illustrated.

कृष्णव्य सन्धि: ॥ २ । ३५ ॥

कृष्णः kusuma-vat, like the flower. चा, and. चिह: manib, the jewel.

35. And as (is the case with) the jewel, in relation to the flower.—199.

Vṛtti:—The author gives an illustration.

As redness appears in the crystal (which is naturally of a white colour), through its association with a China-rose flower, and, after its removal, the crystal stands by its own intrinsic form; so does he also.—35.

Bhāṣya:—The author elucidates this by an illustration.

The word "cha" denotes the cause; so that the meaning is that as the jewel is by means of the flower.

As the crystal, by reason of the China-rose flower, becomes red, i.e., not standing by itself, and, on the removal thereof, becomes red-less, i.e., standing by itself; similarly does Puruṣa. So has it been stated in the Kārma-Purāṇa:

यथा सेवनस्त्यानृत्या केतकी स्पर्शनां आः ।
रस्त्राकापुरुषायेऽस्य स्वरूपमेव दृष्टा ॥

As the pure crystal is seen by men to be red by reason of something which makes it look red, lying near about it, so in the case with the Great Puruṣa.—Kārma-Purāṇa, II. 11, 36.—36.
What moves the Indriyas to operate.

36. The Instruments also rise into activity, for the sake of Puruṣa, from the development of Adṛṣṭam.—200.

Vṛtti:—Let it be thought that, the Instruments being on a par with one another, they will always have similarity of forms; so the author says:

There can be no such similarity, on account of the difference of the development and non-development of the Instruments into activity. And this difference comes from the development of Adṛṣṭam which is the stronger factor in the case.—36.

Bhāṣya:—But, it may be asked, by whose effort or volition the aggregate of the Instruments come into operation, when Puruṣa is immutable, and when (the intervention of) Īśvara is denied? To this the author replies:

Like the activity of Prakṛiti, "karaṇa-udbhavaḥ," the activity of the Instruments, which also is for the sake of Puruṣa, proceeds only from the manifestation of the Adṛṣṭam of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

And Adṛṣṭam is (really) of the Upādhi itself (of Puruṣa) (vide II. 46, Bhāṣya).—36.

Above illustrated.

37. As does the cow for the calf.—201.

Vṛtti:—The author gives an illustration.

As, although cows resemble one another in being cows, the milch one nourishes the calf.—37.

Bhāṣya:—The author gives an illustration of spontaneous activity for another’s sake.

As the cow, for the sake of the calf, quite spontaneously distils milk, and awaits no other effort, in the very same way do the Instruments come
into operation quite spontaneously for the sake of Puruṣa, their lord. Such is the meaning. And it is also seen that, from deep sleep, Buddha quite spontaneously wakes up.

The very same thing has been stated by the Kārikā also:

स्वः स्वः प्रतिपाद्यते परस्पराक्षतात्स्युकं इति
पुक्तायं यज्ञेऽवयं स्त्रेति कायते करणां ॥

(The instruments) go into their respective modifications, occasioned by mutual sympathy; the purpose of Puruṣa is the only cause (of it); by none is an instrument moved to action.—Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, XXXI.—37.

The number of the Instruments.

कर्णं प्रयोदशविधवान्तरमेवादि ॥ २ ॥ ३८ ॥

वर्णं karagn, Instrument. त्रयोदशा-विद्वहं, thirteen-fold. त्रैयोदशा- avāntara-bhedāt, through subsidiary division:

38. The Instrument is of thirteen kinds, according to subsidiary differences.—202.

Vṛtti:—Through external and internal division, how many are the Instruments? To this the author replies:

The internal (Instruments) are Buddha, Ahamkāra, and Manas; the external ones are the ten Indriyas.—38.

Bhāṣya:—There being room for the enquiry as to how many the Instruments are, with the external and the internal ones combined; the author says:

The three internal Instruments and the ten external Instruments being combined, are thirteen. The word "vidham," kinds, has been used in order to show that amongst these (thirteen), again, there is an infinity through the difference of individuals. The expression "according subsidiary differences" has been used with this in mind that Buddha is the principal Instrument; the meaning being that the Instruments of the one single Instrument called Buddha, are more than one.—38.

Why the Indriyas are called Instruments.

इन्द्रियेऽषु साधकत्मश्योपयोगात् कुञ्जरकर्व ॥ २ ॥ ३६ ॥

indriyeṣu, in the Indriyas. साधकत्मश्योपयोगात्, sadhakatama-tva-guna-yogāt, from conjunction of the quality of the most efficient means of accomplishing the object of Puruṣa. कुञ्जरकर्व, kushāra-vat, like an axe.

39. (There are thirteen kinds of Instruments), because in the Indriyas (excepting Buddhi), there is conjunction of
the quality of the most efficient Instrument (viz., Buddhi) as in the case of the axe.—203.

Vṛtti:—How does instrumentality belong to the Indriyas? To this the author replies:

As instrumentality arises in the axe, it being the most efficient means of accomplishing the act; so also in the case of the Indriyas.—39.

Bhāṣya:—But Buddhi itself, because it makes over objects to Puruṣa, is the principal Instrument, while the instrumentality of the others is due to their possessing the quality of the former; what, then, it may be asked, is that quality (here required?) There being room for such an enquiry, the author says:

In the Indriyas, there exists, mediatly, the quality of the Instrument, Buddhi, in the form of being the most efficient means of accomplishing the purpose of Puruṣa; hence thirteen kinds of Instruments are made out; such is the connection with the preceding aphorism.

"As in the case of the axe": As, although the principal instrumentality, in the act of cutting, is of the blow alone, since it cuts off our non-connection with the fruit or result, yet instrumentality belongs to the axe also, through its conjunction with the quality of being an excellent means; similarly. Such is the meaning.

Bearing in mind the oneness of the internal Instruments, it is not declared here that instrumentality in a secondary sense belongs to Ahamkāra.—39.

Pre-eminence of Buddhi illustrated.

द्वयोः प्रधानं मनो लोकचन्त्रमृत्युक्तिः प्रः ?? २ ० ४ो ??

द्वयोः: dvayoh, of the two. प्रधानम्: pradhānam, principal. मनोः: manoḥ, Manas. लोकचन्त्रमृत्युक्तिः: as some one person (Vijñāna), as in the world (Aniruddha). प्रः: bhūtā- vargeṣu, among a troop of servants.

40. Of the two, the principal is Manas, as is some one person, among a troop of servants.—204.

Vṛtti:—The author describes the action of the thirteen Instruments.

"Dvayoh," of the Indriyas of Cognition and the Indriyas of Action, the principal is Manas, because the activity of the others proceeds only from its superintendence over them; as, in the world, is the master among the servants.—40.
Bhāṣya:—Specifying how the case stands in regard to the relation of the secondary and the principal, the author says:

“Dvayōḥ,” among the external and the internal, “manas,” Buddhī alone is “pradhānam,” the principal, in other words, the immediate Instrument, because it is that which makes over the object to Puruṣa. Just as, among a host of servants, some one person alone becomes the prime minister of the king, while the others are, as his subordinates, the governors of villages, and the like; similarly. Such is the meaning.

Here the word “manas” does not denote the third internal Instrument (vide II. 30); because it is impossible for anything other than Buddhī to be, as will later on (vide II. 42) be declared, the receptacle of all the numerous Sāṃskāras or past impressions, or, even if it were possible, because, (in that case), the supposition or conception of Buddhī would be futile.—40.

Why Buddhī is the principal.

Buddhiḥ, a-vyabhichārāt, from not wandering away.

41. (Buddhī is the principal), because it never wanders away.—205.

Vṛttī:—The author gives the reason for the above.

This is clear.—41.

Bhāṣya:—The author gives, in three aphorisms, reasons why Buddhī is principal.

Because it pervades all the Instruments, or because it never fails to produce the fruit (in the shape of knowledge).—41.

A second reason.

Sāṃskāra-ādhyātman eva tathā, so too. Sāṃskāra-ādhyātman eva tathā, from being the depository or receptacle of infinite Sāṃskāras or past impressions.

42. So, too, because it is the receptacle of infinite Sāṃskāras.—206.

Vṛttī:—The author gives another reason.

Because there are seen to survive the sāṃskāras, receptacles or impressions of even lost Indriyās.—42.
BOOK II, SUTRA 42, 43, 44.

Bhāṣya:—It belongs to Buddhi alone to be the receptacle of all the samskāras, and not to the Eye, etc., nor to Ahamkāra, nor to Manas, inasmuch as the recollection, by the blind, the deaf, etc., of objects previously seen, heard, etc., cannot otherwise be explained or be possible. Moreover, it is seen that, even after the dissolution of Ahamkāra and Manas by means of Tattva-Jñāna or Knowledge of Truth, there remains recollection. Hence, by reason also of its being the depository of infinite samskāras, Buddhi alone possesses pre-eminence over all. Such is the meaning.—42.

A third reason.

स्वतःसुमनााचः ॥ २ ॥ ४३ ॥

स्मृत्या, by memory, reminiscence, or recollection. अनुमानभेत, from inference. च, and, also.

43. And also because (there is) inference (of its pre-eminence) by means of reminiscence.—207.

Vṛtti:—The author shows the reasoning.

From seeing that recollection takes place even in the absence of the Indriya, Manas is inferred.—43.

Bhāṣya:—Also because, “Smṛtyā,” by means of the modification in the form of chintā or thinking, there is inference of the pre-eminence (of Buddhi). Such is the meaning. For, the modification of the chintā or thinking, called dhyāna or contemplation, is the noblest of all the modifications; and, by being the seat thereof, Buddhi itself, otherwise named chitta or the thinking principle, is nobler than the Indriyas possessing modifications other than this. Such is the meaning.—43.

Recollect is not spontaneous to Puruṣa.

सम्भवेत स्वतः ॥ २ ॥ ४४ ॥

सम्भवेत, is possible. न, not. स्वतः, from Puruṣa.

44. (Recollection) cannot come from Puruṣa.—208.

Vṛtti:—Least it be thought that Samskāra has its receptacle in the Self; so the author says:

“Svataḥ,” from the Self, it cannot be possible, owing to the fact that the Self is immutable and has no direct relation to the Guṇas.—44.

Bhāṣya:—But, it may be said, let the modification called thinking or contemplation belong to Puruṣa himself. To this the author replies:
"Svataḥ," of Puruṣa, recollection cannot be possible, on account of his being immutable. Such is the meaning.

Or, the aphorism can be explained in the following manner:

Well, then, it may be objected, let Buddhi alone be the Indriya, and do away with the subsidiary Indriyas. Apprehending this, the author says: Sambhavet na svataḥ; the meaning being that, without the intervention of the Eye, etc., the instrumentality of Buddhi in all its operations, cannot arise spontaneously, since, in that case, it would happen that the blind, etc., also would see Colour, etc.—44.

Relativity of the Condition of Principal and Secondary.

śrīpāṇḍita śuraprabhānāma: kriyāvivekṣāt ॥ २ ॥ ४५ ॥

वैत्तिकः: अपेक्षीय, relative, mutually respective. गुणप्रधानव हिर्यविशेषत्, the relation or condition of secondary and principal. विशेषत्, owing to distinction of function.

45. The condition of secondary and principal is relative to the distinction of function.—209.

Vṛtti:—But when they are all equally instruments, to what cause, it may be asked, is due the condition of their being secondary and principal? To this the author replies:

This is clear.—45.

Bhāṣya:—But, then, it may be asked, Buddhi alone thus being the principal, how has it been declared before (cide II. 26) that Manas partakes of the character of both (the Indriya of Cognition and the Indriya of Action)? To this the author replies.

The condition of being secondary and principal among the Instruments is relative towards (the performance of) particular acts. E.g., in the operations of the Eye, etc., Manas is principal; in the operation of Manas, again, Ahaṅkāra is principal; and in the operation of Ahaṅkāra, Buddhi is principal.—45.

Why one particular Buddhi, and not another, acts for the benefit of one particular Puruṣa, and not another.

tattvāndhāniṣṭa-pravarta-sat-sambhāṣa-loka-vat ॥ २ ॥ ४६ ॥

तत्त्वानिष्टतयः tat-karma-arjita-vat, having been acquired or purchased by the Karma or deeds of that (particular Puruṣa). tattartham, for his purpose. abhicchāt, activity towards another. loke-vat, as in the world.

46. The other-regarding activity (of one particular
Buddhi), for the benefit of one particular Puruṣa, is due to its having been purchased by the Karma of that particular Puruṣa;—just as in the world.—210.

Vṛtti:—When there is the absence of any adjustment of aim, why does not, it may be asked, a different one act or energise for the sake of another? To this the author replies:

Having been acquired by the Karma of Puruṣa as reflected in Buddhi, the other-regarding activity of Buddhi, etc., is for the benefit of Puruṣa; as, in the world, a servant does the work of the person by whom he has been purchased.—46.

Bhāṣya:—Well, it may be asked, what is the cause of the arrangement that of this Puruṣa is this Buddhi alone the Instrument, and not another? To this the author replies:

Because the Instrument is originated from the Karma of a particular Puruṣa, “abhicheṣṭā,” all its operations are for the sake of that Puruṣa, just as in the world. Such is the meaning. Just as, in the world, whatever axe, etc., has been acquired, by the act of buying, etc., by whatever man,—the operation (of that axe, etc.) such as cutting, etc., is only for the sake of that man; such is the meaning. Hence is the specific distribution of the Instruments. Such is the idea.

(But how can it be said: “Karma of Puruṣa,” when Puruṣa is incapable of action? This point is next considered in the Bhāṣya.)

Although, by reason of his being immobile or immutable, there is no Karma in Puruṣa, still, inasmuch as it, being the means of bhoga or experience, is related to Puruṣa as its owner, therefore Karma is said to belong to Puruṣa, in the same way, for example, as victory, etc. (really achieved by the army, is said to belong) to the king (because he is the owner of the army.)

But what is there to determine the particular adjustment of Karma itself to particular Puruṣas? To this we reply that it is nothing but other Karmas similarly related. In saying this we do not commit the fault of anavasthā or nothing-to-stand-upon (i.e., non-finality), because Karma is without beginning.

What, on the other hand, some one (Aniruddha, vide Vṛtti), not possessing discrimination, says, namely that Karma is of Puruṣa reflected in Buddhi; that is not so; because, the very same relation (of Karma to Puruṣa) as has been mentioned by us, having been mentioned in the Commentary on Yoga, no other relationship is creditable; and also because, by reason of the fact that a reflection is not a Vastu or independent
objective existence, Karma, and the like are impossible for it, for; otherwise, on the admission of Karma and the experience thereof as appertaining to the reflection, the supposition or conception of Puruṣa, admitted by him also to be the substance casting reflection into Buddhī, would, as has already been established by us, be futile.—46.

The topic of the pre-eminence of Buddhī concluded.

47. Although they perform like offices, principalship belongs to Buddhī, just as in the world, just as in the world.—211.

Vṛtti:—The author declares that everywhere principalship belongs to Buddhī.

Just as in the world, the governor of the state is superior to the governor of the village, and superior to him, again, is the king, so, because Manas operates for the sake of Buddhī, Buddhī is the principal of all; “samānaka-arma-yoge,” although all of them perform acts equally for the purpose of Puruṣa.

The repetition of the expression “just as in the world” is to indicate the close of the book.—47.

Here ends the Second Book, of the Evolutions of Prakṛti, in the Vṛtti on the Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram of Kapila.

Bhāṣya:—In order to bring out prominently the principalship of Buddhī, the author concludes:

Although, the function of all the Instruments is just the same, in being for the purpose of Puruṣa, still principalship belongs to Buddhī alone, just as in the world. For, in the world, as pre-eminence belongs to the prime minister alone among the governors of villages and the rest, even although there is no particular distinction in their being (workers) for the benefit of the king; similarly. Such is the meaning.

Hence it is that in all Śāstras, Buddhī alone is celebrated as Mahat or the Great One.

The repetition (viz. “just as in the world,” “just as in the world”) marks the end of the Book.—47.
The components of the Līṅga-Deha, the subtle body, which are seventeen in number,—these subtle products of Prakṛiti have been examined in this Book.

Note.—The components of the Līṅga-Deha are "Mahat-ādi śākṣa-paryantam" (Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, XL. 9 u.): Mahat, Ahāpāra, Manas, the five Indriyas of Cognition, the five Indriyas of Action, and the five Tan-mātras, which would be eighteen in number. Vījñāna-Bhikṣu follows Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtra, III. 9, which reduces the number to seventeen, by taking Buddha and Ahāpāra as one.

Here ends the Second Book, of the Evolutions of Prakṛiti, in the Commentary composed by Vījñāna Āchārya, on the Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtra of Kapila.
Book III.

OF DISPASSION.

INTRODUCTION.

Vṛtti:—Now, after the ascertainment of the Evolutions of Prakṛti, is made the beginning of the Third Book, for the purpose of discussing Vairāgya or Dispassion.

Bhāṣya:—From here forward the gross products of Prakṛti, e.g., the Mahā-Bhūtas or Great Elements and the duad of bodies, are to be described, and after this, the going into the various wombs, and the like; with the object of evoking that lower dispassion which is the motive to the performance of acts which are the means of knowledge; and, thereafter, with a view to higher dispassion, all the means of knowledge are to be told. So the Third Book commences:

Origin of the Gross Elements.

 Serializer... II 6 I II

a-viśeṣāt, from the indefinite homogeneity. viśeṣa-Arambhaḥ, origination of the definite heterogeneity.

1. From the indefinite homogeneity (there is) the origination of the definite heterogeneity.—212.

Vṛtti:—"A-viśeṣāt" from the subtle elements, there is the origination "viśeṣasya", of the Great Elements.—1.

Bhāṣya:—In which do not exist the distinctions in the form of calmness, fierceness, dulness, and the like,—such is "a-viśeṣa" (indiscernible or indistinguishable), the subtle (parts) of the Elements, called the five Tanmātras or mere somethings or the measures thereof; from them there is the origination of the gross Great Elements, which are "viśeṣaḥ" (discernible or distinguishable), inasmuch as they possess the distinctions in the form of the calm and the like. Such is the meaning. For it is only in the Gross Elements that the character of having pleasure, etc., in their essence, in the form of the calm and the like, is manifested by the degrees of more and less, and not in the Subtle Elements, because their manifestation in the mind of the Yogins (where alone, if anywhere, they are ever manifested) is only by the one single form of the calm.—1.
Origin of the Body.

2. Therefrom, of the Body.—213.

Vṛtti:—One grows dispassionate to the body through a consideration of it being composed of the flesh and the like.—2.

Bhāṣya:—Thus, then, commencing from the first book, up to this place, having described the production of the twenty-three principles, the author declares therefrom the production of the duad of bodies.

"Tasmāt," from the twenty-three principles, is the origination of the pair of bodies, gross and subtle. Such is the meaning.—2.

Origin of Samsāra.

3. From the seed thereof, is Samsāra.—214.

Vṛtti:—Production has been shown; wherefrom is disappearance? To this the author replies:

From the cause thereof, i.e., of the origination of the Elements, namely Dharma and A-dharma, is going out, i.e., disappearance or destruction.—3.

Bhāṣya:—Now the author proves that Samsāra or worldly existence (of Puruṣa) cannot be accounted for otherwise than by means of the twenty-three principles.

From the seed, i.e., the subtle causes in the form of the twenty-three principles, of it, i.e. the body, takes place "samsṛiti," i.e., the going and coming, of Puruṣa, inasmuch as spontaneous going, etc., is impossible for the immutable on account of his universality. Such is the meaning. For, (only) Puruṣa, residing in the twenty-three principles, by means of that or investment alone, moves from body to body, for the purpose of doing the Karmas previously done; because, by such Śrūṣṭis as

Verily with the Manas, does Puruṣa experience the Karma, good and bad, done with the Manas; with the Speech, the Karma done with the Speech; and with the body only, the Karma done with the body.—Manas-Sūtrā, XII, 8.
it has been established that experience in other lives takes place quite naturally, by means of the materials consisting of the Karmas performed in the previous lives. For this very reason, the Brahman-Śūtram concludes:

"(In order to obtain another body, the soul goes) accompanied (by permanent atoms; as appears from the question and answer in the Chhāndega text.)"—Vedānta-Śūtram, III. i. 1; S. B. H. Vol. v., page 428.—8.

Limit of Samsāra.

प्रवर्तनमविशेषांशाम् II ३ १४ II

वा विवेकाच वा विवेकाच, तति Viveka or discriminative knowledge. वचा, and. बीसमत्रम् pravartanam, activity, operation. अत्योपेक्षान्त a-viśeṣāntam, of the Indistinguishables or Indiscernibles; of the A-viśeṣas, Tan-mātras (Aniruddha); of Puruṣas (Vijnāna).

4. And till there is Viveka, there is the operation of the Indiscernibles.—215.

Vṛtti:—Lest it might be thought that, since the originators of the Gross Elements are existences, there would be origination at all times, and, that, consequently, there would be no Release; so the author says:

Till the development of the Knowledge of the distinction between Prakṛti and Puruṣa, the characteristic of being of the nature of originators belongs to the Tan-mātras and the Bhūtas.—4.

Bhāṣya:—The author states the limit of Samsāra.

Of all Puruṣas whatever, devoid of the distinction of being an Īśvara, not being an Īśvara, and the like, "Pravartanam," samsāra or transmigratory existence, is inevitable or necessary, till only the appearance of Viveka, and after the appearance of Viveka, it is not. Such is the meaning.—4.

The reason for the above.

उपभोगावितर्स्य II ३ १ ४ II

सप्तेवस्य, upabhogat, on account of the experience. सप्तेवस्य itarmaya, of the other, viz., who has not Viveka.

5. On account of the experience of the other.—216.

Vṛtti:—When the characteristic of being the originators is in respect to one not possessing Viveka or Discrimination, this characteristic of being the originators will persist, one may say, even at the time of Mahā Pralaya or the Great Dissolution;—this is what the author denies.
After (the undergoing of) experience by one not possessing Viveka or Discrimination, his body does not exist during Mahā Pralaya, and, consequently, how can there be experience in that state? Hence in respect to him, the Subtle Elements do not possess the characteristic of being the originators.—5.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—“Itarsya,” of the one not possessing Viveka, “upabhogā,” after the completion of Experience, there being the destruction of the previous Karma causing Experience, Pralaya takes place. Hence in the absence of Experience, for what purpose will there be a Body? Such is the import.

Bhāṣya:—The author states the reason of this:

Because of the inevitableness of the experience of the fruits of his own karma, “itarsya,” only in the case of the one not possessing Viveka or Discrimination. Such is the meaning.—5.

Puruṣa is ever free from experience.

सम्प्रति परिमुक्तो द्रष्ट्याम् || 3 || 6 ||

सम्प्रति sampratī, now; during Pralaya or Dissolution (Aniruddha); at the time of creation (Mahādeva); at the time of transmigration (Vijñāna). परिमुक्तः pari-muktaḥ, entirely free (Vijñāna); bound (Mahādeva). Aniruddha reads "pariṣvaktāḥ" meaning overpowered, enveloped, instead of "parimuktaḥ." द्रष्ट्याम् dvābhyaṁ, by the pair (Aniruddha and Mahādeva); from the pairs of contraries (Vijñāna).

6. Now (Puruṣa is) entirely free from the pairs.—217.

Vṛitti:—But when, as a general rule, they cease to be the originators during Mahā Pralaya, from what particular cause, again, they become the originators in regard to one not possessing Viveka? To this the author replies:

(“Dvābhyaṁ,” i.e.) by Dharma, Merit, and A-dharma, Demerit. Embracing going and coming, the Self remains bound, even in Pralaya, in as far as it drags behind it the load of Dharma and A-dharma; hence is origination over again in respect to it. Not so in the state of Release.—6.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—At the time of creation, again, how do they come to possess the characteristic of being the originators? In reply to this, the author says:

“Sampratī,” at the time of creation. “Dvābhyaṁ,” by Dharma and A-dharma. “Pari-muktaḥ,” that is, bound; because the root much (from which, joined to the prefix pari, the word, parimukta, is derived), joined to the prefix pari also, as when joined to the prefix ad, conveys the sense of
binding. When Dharma and A-dharma, lying dormant in Pralaya, are, at the time of creation, about to bear fruits, the body is originated. In the state of Release, on the other hand, there is verily the destruction of Dharma and A-dharma. Such is the import.

Bṛhadāy:—The author states that, even while there is a Body, at the time of transmigrating, there is no experience.

“Samprati,” at the time of transmigration, Puruṣa becomes entirely freed, “Dvābhyyam,” from the pairs of contraries such as cold and hot, pleasure and pain, etc. Such is the meaning.

So has it been stated by the Kārikā.

(पूर्वोद्योगसमस्तं निःस्तं महाधिविनयपथयतम्)
संहिताय निर्विशेषगता मातृविज्ञातिः स्वस्तम्

[(Puruṣa, residing in) the Liṅga-Śarīra, the one prudentially produced, unconnected constituent, composed of the principles beginning with Mahat and ending with the Subtle Elementa], transmigrates, free from Experience, and tinged with the Bhāvas or Dispositions of Dharma and A-dharma, and the like. —Śāmkhya-Kārikā, XL.

“Bhāvas” are Dharma and A-dharma, Vāsanā or Desire or Inclination, and the like.—6.

The Gross and the Subtle Body distinguished.

मातापितुजयं स्यौल्ल प्रायशा हंतत्रशः तथा || २ ४ ७ ॥

तत्साति माता-पित्रजयं, produced from father and mother. पूर्वो धितालम्,
gross body. Ṛṣya: प्रायशच, for the most part, usually. इतरत, the other, i.e., the subtle body. नम्, not. तथा, so.

7. The Gross (Body) is the one usually produced from the father and mother; the other is the one not so produced.—218.

Vṛtti:—But, the Self being eternally free,6 how is it said to be dependent, for its release, on the destruction of Dharma and A-dharma? To this the author replies:

“Prāyashc,” usually: because so is it seen to be the case. “Itarat,” the Subtle Body, is not so, because of the difficulty of its conception.—7.

Bṛhadāy:—Hereafter the author proceeds to describe the dual of bodies with reference to their specific nature.

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6 We adopt the reading of Padātī Kālīvarn Vedaṅga-gītā's edition of 1800 Saka Era Calcutta. Dr. Garbe's reading, viz., Nityatvo tu mukto katham pārakāntyam,—the Self being eternal, how there can be dependence of Release upon something else,—does not seem to be quite satisfactory.
The Gross (Body) is the one produced from the father and mother, "Prâyadsh," for the most part, because there is recollection (recorded in the Smritis) also of a Gross Body not born of a womb. (cf. Vaiñēṣika-Sātrām, IV. ii. 5-10, S. B. H. Vol. VI, pages 159-162). And "itarat," the Subtle Body, "na tathā," is not one produced from the father and mother, because of its having been produced at the beginning of creation. Such is the meaning.

So has it been stated by the Kārikā:

पूर्वेऽत्पत्तिः ब्रह्मचं महाबृहि समस्यवतस्तु \nसंसर्वनि निर्देशने सा सर्वायकं बिनित्तुः \n
The Ājñā or Merged Body, the one primordially produced, unconnected, continuant, composed of the Principles beginning with Mahat and ending with the Subtle (Elements), transmigrates, free from Experience, tinged with the Bhāvas or Dispositions,—Śāṅkhyā-Kārikā, XL.

"Niyatam," "continuant," means eternal, lasting for a period of two parārthas, that is, secondarily or relatively eternal; because of the redundancy in the supposition of the production of a Ājñā Body for every Gross Body. Its destruction at the time of Pralaya is, however, admitted, following the authoritative declarations of the Veda and Smriti.

Mention of the absence of Experience at the time of transmigrating has been made (in the above Kārikā), intending to lay down the general proposition. Occasionally, however, through entrance into an aerial body, Experience takes place even at the time of transmigrating. Herefrom are explained the declarations about the Experience of pain on the way to the Judgment Seat of Yama, the Controller.—7.

The Subtle, and not the Gross, Body causes Experience to Puruṣa.

पूर्वेऽत्पत्तिः भोगावेक्षणं नेतृत्वस्य ॥ १ ॥

पूर्वेऽत्पत्तिः पूर्वप्रत्ययं, of that of which the production is primordial,
तत्कायया त्रिप, the characteristic of having that, i.e., experience, as the

* A Parārtha stands, in mathematics, for the number, laksya-laksya-koti, that is, for 1,00,00,00,00,00,00,00. But here it has a different meaning. For, from the text:

बिलेव तत्स भावेत वायुवर्त्तस्तु स्वातः।
सत्तकार्य तद्वर्य च पत्ता ते पार्थक्यतीयते॥

And His (i.e., of Brahmā) life-time is recollected to be one hundred years by His own measure. That is called (व) Puruṣ; and the half of it is designated as Parārtha (Puruṣa-half).

—Karma-Puruṣa, Ch. V.

It appears that the life-time of Brahmā makes the measure of two Parārdhas. This is the period of one Great Cycle of Creation and Dissolution, throughout which the Ājñās are prevalent.

And, the one hundred years of Brahmā is equal to 31,10,40,00,00,00,00 human years. A. Parārtha, therefore, indicates 15,56,20,00,00,00 human years.
effect. ब्होगत, owing to experience. एकस्य, of the one. न, not. इतरस्य, of the other, i.e., the Gross Body.

8. To that of which the production is primordial, it belongs to have this (pleasure and pain) as its effect, because the experience of pleasure and pain is of the one, and not of the other.—219.

Vṛtti:—Between the two Bodies, to which does Bhoga or Experience belong? To this the author replies.

"Pūrva-utpatteṣu," of the Subtle Body; "ekasya," of this, being the Experience, and not "itarasya," of the Gross (Body); is the characteristic of having that, Experience, as its effect. Experience, in a secondary sense, belongs to the Gross Body, because of the non-observation of experience in a dead body.—8.

Bhāṣya:—Among the Bodies, (Gross and Subtle, due to which as the Upādhi or the external investment, is the conjunction of Puruṣa with the pairs (of contraries)? This the author ascertains.

Of which the production is "pūrvam," at the beginning of creation, i.e., the Subtle Body, of this alone is "tat-kārya-tvam," the characteristic of having pleasure and pain as its effects. Why? Because the experience called pleasure and pain, belongs, "ekasya," only to the Subtle Body, but not "itarasya," to the Gross Body, because all are agreed that pleasure, pain, and the like do not exist in a dead body. Such is the meaning.—8.

Constitution of the Subtle Body.

सत्तवरेण्यं लिङ्गम् II ६ 6 11

क्षण sapta-dāsa, seventeen. एकम, and one (Aniruddha); made into, combined as, one (Vijñāna). लिङ्गम, mergent, Liṅga; Subtle.

9. The seventeen, as one, are the Subtle Body.—220.

Vṛtti:—By means of how many principles is the origination of the Subtle Body? To this the author replies:

Seventeen and one more, that is, eighteen; by these, the Subtle Body is produced. (They are) Buddhi, Ahamkāra, and Manaæ, the five Subtle Elements, and the ten Indriyas.—9.

Bhāṣya:—The author describes the svarūpa or the intrinsic form of the Subtle Body mentioned above.

The Subtle Body, again, by being the container and the contained, is two-fold. Among them, the seventeen, combining together, are the
Book III, Sūtra 2.

Līṅga-Śātra, and that, at the beginning of creation, is, in the form of an aggregate, but one. Such is the meaning.

The seventeen are the eleven Indriyas, the five Tanmātras, and Buddhi. Ahamkāra is really included in Buddhi.

Because of the proof to be mentioned under the third following aphorism (III. 12), it is these seventeen only that should be understood to be the Līṅgam; and the present aphorism should not be construed so as to make their number eighteen by taking "saptadaśikam" to mean seventeen and one more (as has been done by Aniruddha); also because, since the distinction of individuals is the subject of demonstration by the next aphorism (III. 10), it is thereby ascertained that, in the present aphorism, the significance of the word, Eka, is to declare the oneness of the Līṅgam; and because, moreover, that the Līṅga-Śātra is made up of seventeen elements only has been established in such passages of the Mokṣa-Dharma Section of the Mahābhārata, etc., as

कम्भज्जवं दक्षिणेश्वरी कस्मभीति प्रजुयते 
स वस्तुसंकेतार्थिरा राख्या गुम्यते च चः 

He who is the Karma-Ātma Puruṣa, that is, Puruṣa enveloped by Karma,—the same is predicated of with Bondage and Release; he is also attended by the seventeen-membered mass.—Mahābhārata, XII. 18756b-18758a.

Seventeen parts or members exists in it,—such is what has been called "the seventeen-membered mass." Such is the meaning. By the use of the word "rāse," mass, has this been excluded that, like the Gross Body, the Līṅga-Deha is a system containing distinct organs; because, (whom we have got such a system in the shape of the Gross Body), there would be redundancy in the supposition or postulation of another substance under the form of a system containing distinct organs. And, in the case of the Gross Body, the supposition that it is a system containing distinct organs, is made in conformity with the sense-perception of (the several parts) as one, two, etc.

And with the idea that in this, the Līṅga-Deha, it is Buddhi that is principal, Experience was stated before (vide III. 8) to be of the Līṅga-Deha.

Pṛāṇa, again, is a kind of modification of the Antaḥ-karaṇa or Internal Instrument itself (vide II. 31). Hence, in the Līṅga-Deha, there is inclusion of the penta of Pṛāṇa also.

That this seventeen-membered thing is a Body, the author will himself declare by the aphorism: Līṅga-Śātra-nimittaka iti Sanandana Śeṭhāryaḥ (VI. 69). Hence, that it is the House of Experience,—this only
is the principal or primary definition of a Body; while, by reason of being its container, the other (i.e., the Gross) is, as will, later on (vide III. 11), become clear, treated as a Body. It is of this that the definition has been made in the aphorism of Nyāya:


"Body is the site of gesture, senses, and sentiments."—Nyāya-Sūtram, 1. i. 11, S. B. H. Vol. viii, page 5—6.

How from one single Lingam, manifold Individuals arise.


10. Differentiation of Individuals (proceeds) from distinction of Karma.—221.

Vṛtti:—The Subtle Body being alike in all cases, how can, it may be asked, the production take place therefrom of the vastly dissimilar bodies, e.g., of the honey-bee and of the elephant? To this the author replies:

This is clear.—10.

Bhāṣya:—But, then, if the Linga-Sarira be one, then, how could there be experiences of different characters according to difference of individuals? In regard to this the author says:

Even although, at the beginning of creation, the Linga exists as one and one only, in the form of the Upādhi or external investment of Hiranya-Garbha or the Golden-Egged Brahma, yet afterwards takes place "vyakti-bhedah," manifold division into parts by the forms of individuals; just as at present there is of the one single Linga-Deha of the father, a manifold division into parts in the forms of the Linga-Deha of a son, a daughter and so on.

He states the cause of this: "karma-videśat;" meaning, owing to the karma, the cause of experience, of other Jivas or Incarnate Puruṣas.

From the mention here of "videśa," distinction, that is, distinctive peculiarity, of Karma, it is obtained that the samsāti-ariṣṭi or collective creation of the Jivas takes place by reason of the common Karmas of the Jivas.

And this differentiation of Individuals has also been declared in the Smritis of Manu and others. For example, in Manu’s work, after the
BOOK III. SūTRA 10, 11.

description of the production of the six Indriyas of the samaśti-puruṣa or Collective Puruṣa, we find:

\[ \text{ते हों तदविषया संसारात् प्रक्रियायमितीज्ञसाम्} \]

\[ \text{तत्तपैवेतायमात्र तवचूता तिन्द्रे} \]

Engrafting the subtle parts of those six, again, of immeasurable energy, into portions of the Self, He made all the beings.—Manu, I. 16.

The word “saṃpām,” of the six, is indicative of the entire Liṅga-śārīra. “Atma-matrāsu,” into portions of consciousness; conjoining; such is the meaning.

Similarly, there is, again, in the same Sāstra, another passage, viz.,

\[ \text{तत्तत्त्वदस्यमुदार्थ: कार्यं तथा स्वद्} \]

\[ \text{स्मा श्रमावता गात्मेन्द्रत्य दीर्घम्} \]

From the Body of that Intelligible Being, were born the Kṣatra-jñānas (the Knowers of the Fields, that is, the Incarnate Puruṣas), by means of the effects produced from His Body, together with those instruments.—10.

Why the Gross Organism is called a Body.

\[ \text{तत्तत्त्वात् बले तदावात् तद्यव: II 3 1 9 II} \]

\[ \text{तत्तत्त्वात् तत्स्थानमात्र: शान्ति शाव कर्तव्यं तथा स्वद्} \]

\[ \text{तत्यो स्मा श्रमावत् गात्मेन्द्रत्य दीर्घम्} \]

11. From its being predicoted of it, it is predicaced of the (Gross) Body which is the tabernacle of the abode thereof.—222.

Vṛtti:—If the Self be the other, how does, then, the abhimāna or self-conceit arise in respect to the Body, that this is “I”? To this the author replies:

From the attribution of the term Self to the Body, the tabernacle of the abiding of the Self, on account of Experience taking place in it, there arises the application of the abhimāna or self-conceit, viz., that this is “I,” to the Body.—11.

Bhāṣya:—But, then, since the characteristic of being a Body would thus belong to the Liṅga alone by reason of its being the House of Experience, why is the Gross (Organism) regarded as though it were a Body? To this the author replies:

To the receptacle of the pentad of Bhūtas or Elements presently to be mentioned, which are the adhiśthānas, i.e., vehicle, of that, i.e., the
Līṅga, that is, to the (Gross) Body consisting of six sheaths," "tat-vādaḥ," the application of the term Body, "tat-vādaḥ," is due to the application of the term Body to "tat," i.e., to what is denoted by the word adhiśthāna, i.e., vehicle (of the Līṅga, viz., the pentad of Elements presently to be mentioned). Such is the meaning.

It comes to this, therefore, that, through relation to the Līṅga, the vehicle thereof is treated as a Body, and that, through its being the receptacle of that vehicle, the Gross also is treated as a Body.

Adhiśthāna-Śarīra, again, the author will declare (vide III. 12), is constituted by subtler forms of the five Elements. So, then, the threefoldness of the Body is established.

What, on the other hand, we learn from the Śāstras, such as:

वात्तिष्ठानक पदार्थस्तर देवोज्योतिरविद्यमानिकः ।
सर्वाणि पूर्वजातिनां महाकल्वक स्व विद्यमः ॥

Of the whole host of beings, there is the one Body, the Ādi-vāhika, the Vehicular, while the other is the Adhi-Bhaṭṭārka, the Gross-Elemental; but how is it that only one Body belongs to Brahma?

namely, that there are only two kinds of Body,—that statement is intended to show the oneness of the Līṅga-Śarīra and the Adhiśthāna-Śarīra, by reason of their constantly accompanying each other, and also by reason of their alike being subtle.—11.

Proof of the Adhiśthāna or Vehicular Body.

न खातास्यातु तत्ततात् भायाविष्णविवस्थः ॥ ३ । १२ ॥

na, not. स्वातान्त्र्यत, by the rule of its own nature; of itself; independently. तत्, that, the Adhiśthāna-Body. स्वेत, without. च्हावय-व, like a picture. च, and.

12. (The Līṅga-Śarīra stands) not, by itself, without it (the Adhiśthāna Śarīra), just like a shadow and like a picture.—223.

Vṛtti: —On this point, the author gives an illustration.

Did the intuition, viz., "This is I," take place in reference to the Body; irrespective of the Self, then, the intuition, viz., "This is I," would arise in respect of a dead Body; and such is not the case. Just as

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Six Sheaths: vide Tatāvya-Kaumudi on Śāṅkhya-Kārikā, XXIX, where Viśheṣaṁ Viśeṣaṁ: "(Bodies) produced from father and mother " are the six sheaths (ones).

... from the mother (are produced) the hair, blood, and flesh; while from the father, bone, nerve, and marrow—these are the six sheaths.
a shadow does not stand without something to obstruct light, a picture without a wall, so it is the case here also.—12.

Bṛhadāraṇyaka:—But what proof there is of the existence of another Body as the adhiṣṭhāna, seat or vehicle of the Līṅga-Śartra, other than the one of six sheaths? There being room for such an enquiry, the author says:

That Līṅga-Śartra, “tāt pite,” without adhiṣṭhāna or something to stand upon, i.e., independently, does not exist; just as a shadow or a picture does not stand without a support. Such is the meaning. So that, the existence is established of another Body to serve as the vehicle of the Līṅga-Deha for the purpose of its going to another world, after leaving the Gross Body. Such is the import.

And its svarūpa or intrinsic form has been described in the Kārikā:

कुलमा मालारिक्याल पद प्रदूरक विश्रामः स्थूः।
स्वामार्थां निप्रत्यामा मालारिक्या विश्रामाने॥

The Subtle (Bodhes), (Bodies), produced from father and mother, together with the Great Elements, will be the Vīśeṣa (distiguishables, or Discriminable, vide III. 1 ante); amongst them, the Subtle (Bodies) are continuant, or, in a sense, eternal (vide Bṛhadāraṇyaka III. 7); (Bodies) produced from father and mother cease (to entangle after death).—Śākhya-Kārikā, XXIX.

In this verse, the product of the Tānmātraras (i.e., the adhiṣṭhāna-śartra, and not the Līṅga-śartra) is (the designate of the word) “Subtle,” by comparison with the Body produced from father and mother. (But in this view of the matter the doubt may arise whether the above Kārikā really says that it is this Tānmātraric Adhiṣṭhāna-Śartra that is co-existent with the Līṅga-Śartra. Vijnāna proceeds to remove such a doubt.)

The same aggregate of Elements that has been declared to endure as long as the Līṅga lasts,—the very same is the Body which is the adhiṣṭhāna of the Līṅga. This is obtained from another Kārikā, six,

विच यथासाध्यस्य अध्यविषयः बिधा यथा कारा।
तत् तत्तात्त्व तत् तत्त्तकारणं विद्यम्॥

As a painting stands not without a support, nor a shadow without a stake, etc., so neither does the Līṅga stand supportless, without the Vīśeṣa.—Śākhya-Kārikā, XII.

“Vīśeṣa” in the above Kārikā means the Gross Elements which may be called subtle, (i.e., the subtler forms of the Gross Elements), that is to say, a sub-species, a subordinate variety, of the Gross.

By reason of the knowledge in this Kārikā of the difference of the Gross Elements denominated as subtle from the Līṅga-Śartra, it cannot be the sense of the Kārikā, cited before (vide under III. 7), beginning with
(The Body), primordially produced, unconnected, discontinuous, beginning with Mahat, ending with the Subtle (Elements).

that the characteristic of being the Liṅga belongs to the Principles ending with the Subtle (Elements), but that, that which is the Liṅga in the form of Mahat, etc., transmigrates, extending up to its own receptacle, the Subtle (form of the Gross Elements), that is, (the meaning is), along with them.

Well, if this be so, how can it be ascertained, it may be asked, how many the Padārthas or Nameables are which go to form the Liṅga? To this we reply that it can be ascertained from passages in the Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇam, etc., such as:

Śaśaṇa mūrtasaṃśaḥ ca karmaścide tvayē ca
Vidyāvādā seva bāhiraśca saṁvedīthān ca

Vāsam or Desire, the Tan-mātras, and so also Karma and Knowledge, the ten Indriyas, Manas, Buddhī,—these the wise know to be the Liṅga.

In this verse, by reason of the intention that by the very establishment of the Liṅga-Saṁśra, the eight Cities (of Puruṣa) should also be explained, there has been made separate mention or introduction of even the properties of Buddhī, viz., Desire, Karma, and Knowledge. And “the Subtle of the Elements” here denotes the Tan-mātras. The ten Indriyas, further, according to their division into the Indriyas of Cognition and the Indriyas of Action, make up two Cities. Such is the idea.

Note.—That is to say, in the above verse, have been declared both the components of the Liṅga-Saṁśra and the eight Cities of Puruṣa. Thus, the former are Buddhī, Manas, the ten Indriyas, and the five Tan-mātras; while the latter are Buddhī, Manas, the Indriyas of Cognition, the Indriyas of Action, Desire, Karma, Knowledge, and the Tan-mātras.

The Māyā-vādins, on the other hand, interpolate the pentad of Prāṇa, and the rest, in the place of the Tan-mātras of the Liṅga-Saṁśra, and imagine the eight Cities in a different way. But this is unworthy of credit.—12.

An objection considered.

Mūrtavaṁpi na sannyasvaye muktimandaḥ tattvabhāvam 1 1 1 1

mūrtavaṁ, though it is mūrti, i.e., possessing a definite shape of its own, or corporate, or ponderable. Kṛṣṇa, even. V na, not. Kālamavasam saṁghata-yogat, on account of association with a mass or body. Tārāpi-vas, like the sun.

13. Even though (the Liṅga-Saṁśra) is a corporate or ponderable substance, (it does not stand independently), on account of (the necessity of) association with a mass, as in the case of the sun.—224.

Vṛttī.—Let it be imagined that the Subtle Body itself will be the Self; so the author says:
Being a mass, it is corporate; being corporate, it is for the sake of another (Vide I. 140). "Tarāṇi-vat," just as, notwithstanding that it causes illumination, on account of its being corporate or ponderable, the sun cannot be the Self.—13.

Bhāṣya:—But since it is a ponderable substance, let the Liṅga, it might be said, have Ākāśa itself as its (not inseparable) substratum, without association with it, as in the case with Air, and the rest; useless is the supposition of its association elsewhere. In regard to this the author says:

Even though it is a ponderable substance, it cannot stand independently, by being free from association; because of the inference of its, just as of the sun's, association with masses by reason of its being of the form of light or that which illuminates. Such is the meaning.

All Tejas or Lights, such as the sun and the rest, are seen as standing only by association with earthy substances. The Liṅga, again, is constituted by Sattva which is Light; hence it must be associated with the Bhūtas or Gross Elements.—13.

Size of the Liṅga-Sātra is atomic.

ब्रह्मपरिमाणं तत्र कृतीभुवे: || २ || १४ ||

कृत्यादिति anu-parimāṇam, of the measure of an atom. तत, that, the Liṅga-Sātra (Vijñāna); Manas (Aniruddha). कृतिभुवे: kṛiti-sruteḥ, because of the śruti about its acting. Aniruddha reads "tat" and "kṛiti-sruteḥ" as one word.

14. It is of atomic size, because of the Śruti that it acts.—225.

Vṛtti:—If it be thought that Manas will be the Self; so the author says:

Manas is of the size of an atom, because, we see, there is a Śruti that it acts. The characteristic of being an Indriya does not belong to that which is all-pervading and without an Upādhi or external investment; (but Manas is an Indriya); hence an Upādhi or external investment must be affirmed of it. (What is then the Upādhi of Manas?) If a fixed and permanent organ only were to be its Upādhi, as is the cavity of the ear in the case of Hearing, then its function would be confined to that much only, and would not extend elsewhere, as is the case with Hearing. And, therefore, it should be affirmed that the Body as such is the Upādhi of Manas. So that it being obtained that the function or modification of Manas takes place under the local limitations imposed upon it by the Body, there arises, by reason of the intuitions such as "There is pain in my head,"
"There is pleasure in my body," the (apparent) contradiction of its being (all-pervading and) not-all-pervading.

From the simultaneous non-production of cognitions also, they, e.g., the Vaiṣešikas, cf. Kaṇḍā-Sūtram, VII. i. 23, S. B. H. Vol. VI, page 230) infer the atomic magnitude of Manas. The reasoning for this inference has been shown in detail in another place.—14.

Bhāṣya:—The author determines the magnitude of the Liṅga.

"Tat," the Liṅga, "anu-parīmaṇāṃ," that is, finite or limited, but not absolutely an atom merely, because its being made up of parts has already (by III. 9) been declared. Wherefore (is it finite)? "Krīti-sūteḥ," because we hear of its acting, that is to say, because from Śrutis such as:

विज्ञाने यह तदुत्ते सत्तफळ पत्रावृक्ष छ॥

The Liṅga propagates Sacrifice, and propagates Karma also.—Taittirīya-Upaniṣat, II. 5.

we hear that all Karma belong to the Liṅga which is called there Viśiṇāna, because of its having Buddhī, called Viśiṇāna, as principal (among its components). Where there is all-pervadingness, action cannot be possible, (for action is motion). The reading "tat-gati-sūteḥ," meaning, from the hearing of its motion, however, is more in accordance with the sense desired. And the Śruti on the movement of the Liṅga-Śūtra is:

दत्तवाणम् भावातुत्तानाति भावस्तुतानं सब्दवाणस अहं तदवानानं शुद्धकाटित

Following it going out, Prāpa goes out; following Prāpa going after, it becomes attended with Buddhī (Saviṇāna); it comes down just as attended with Buddhī.—Bṛhat-Ārāṇya-Upaniṣat, IV. iv. 2.

"Saviṇānaḥ:" is born verily being attended with Buddhī, and migrates also in such a manner as to be attended with Buddhī. Such is the meaning.—14.

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*Body: We have adopted the reading of Pandita Kālīvaras Vedānta-Vāgīśa. Dr. Garbe reads Pāde, meaning, in the leg, instead of Dehe, meaning, in the body. Dr. Garbe's reading, of course, falls in line with the theory of the atomic size of Manas based on the localisation of its functions in different parts of the body; but it does not help us, at the same time, to understand the force or import of the phrase "A-ryāppa-vṛtti-tva-praṭīti-virodha," meaning, contradiction to the intuition of Manas being of not-all-pervading function; for, instead of contradiction, there is only confirmation, of such intuition, by the intuition, viz., "There is pleasure in my leg." Aniruddha, on the other hand, clearly mentions a contradiction, among the different modifications or functions of Manas, such as, for example, "There is pain in my head" (which is local), and "There is pleasure in my body" (which is all-pervading, and as such is in contradiction to the not-all-pervading character of the function of Manas),—a contradiction which, as he would say, but unfortunately has not said, and Dr. Garbe very well know that Aniruddha has left many things unsaid, as his preface to The Sūkhyya-Sūtra-Vṛtti, can be explained and reconciled by the atomic magnitude, implying and including swift movement also, of Manas, which the aphorism puts forward as an argument against the theory of Manas being the Self which is all-pervading.
Another proof of the finiteness of the Linga-Sarira.

तत्सन्त्पवच्छप्पलः || २ || २५ ||

तत्सन्त्पवच्छप्पलः: tat-anna-maya-tva-skute, from the Sruti about its being formed of food. cha, and.

15. And because there is the Sruti declaring that it is formed of food.—226.

Vritti:—The author gives a further reasoning.

There is Sruti that that, i.e., Manas, is formed of food. And by means of its being constituted by food, has been shown its Saumyatva. And Saumyatva consists in being of the form of the Moon. And neither is the Self the Moon.

And the Sruti in question is:

चतुष्कोणे प्रायः

The food verily is the Prapan.

Prapa, again, should be known to be formed of the Moon. The Moon is produced from Manas. Therefore, Manas is atomic, and not (Atma, the Self which is) all-pervading.—15.

Bhashya:—The author states another argument for the finiteness of the Linga-Sarira.

There being the Sruti that it, i.e., the Linga, is, partially, formed of food, all-pervadingness cannot possibly belong to it; because if it were all-pervading, it would thereby be eternal. Such is the meaning.

And that Sruti is:

यथासतर्यि दे संयम मय दापितः प्रायः देवसुपरियि वानिलारि

Verily, O Calm One, is Manas constituted by food. Prapa constituted by Water, the Vedas constituted by Fire, etc.—Chhandogya-Upanisat, VI. v. 4.

Although Manas and the rest are not formed of the Elements, still it should be understood that they are considered as being constituted by food and the rest, because they are nourished with their homogeneous particles lying associated with, or attached to, food and the rest.—15.

Cause of Migration of the Linga-Sarira.

पुण्यां रस्तुतिविष्कासा सुपकारवच्छसः || २ || २५ ||

पुण्यां पुरुष्य-सर्वा, for the sake of Purusa. सृष्टि: saṃpratiḥ, migration. पुरुषाः, of the Purusa. सुप्पकारवच्छस, like the cook. सृष्टि: saṃpratiḥ, of the king.
16. Of the Liṅgas, the migration is for the sake of Puruṣa; just as is that of the king’s cook.—227.

Vṛtti:—Of Mahat and the rest, the activity is for the sake of Puruṣa; but, it may be asked, for what purpose is their migration? To this the author replies:

"As is the case with activity, so is it with migration. In migration also there is the pain of death;—so thinking, one gets dispassionate."

"Sūpa-kārava-vat:" that is, the activity (of the cook) is only for the sake of another (i.e., the king).—16.

Bhāṣya:—Wherefore, it may be asked, is the migration, i.e., the going from one body to another, of the Liṅgas, when they are insentient? The author removes this curiosity.

Just as the movement of the king’s cooks among the kitchens is for the sake of the king, so is the migration of the Liṅga-Sariras for the sake of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.—16

Origin of the Gross Body.

पात्थमौतिको वेषः || २१ १७ ||

पात्थमौतिको वेषः: pātchha-bhaṭṭikāḥ, formed of the five Elements. वेष: dehaḥ, Body.

17. The (Gross) Body is formed of the five Elements.—228.

Vṛtti:—There being differences of opinion as to the composition of the Gross Body, the author first states his side.

This is clear.—17.

Bhāṣya:—The Liṅga-Sarira has been considered in reference to all its details; now the author similarly considers the Gross Body also.

The (Gross) Body is the transformation of the five Elements combined together. Such is the meaning.—17.

A Different Opinion stated.

चातुर्भातुतकमित्वेषेकं || २२ २८ ||

चातुर्भातुतकमित्वेषेकं: chātur-bhaṭṭikam, formed of four Elements. ती: iti, thus. एकः eka, some. For "eka," Aniruddha reads "anye," meaning, others.

18. Some say that the Gross Body is formed of four Elements.—229.

Vṛtti:—What is the difference of opinion? This the author mentions.
By the giving up of Ākāśa, the Body is formed of the other four Elements;—thus think others. —18.

Bhāṣya:—The author states another opinion.

This view is held, intending to imply that Ākāśa is not an originator (of anything).—18.

Another Opinion stated.

एकमौतिकमित्यपरे || ३ || १६ ||

ेकाबहुतिकम्, formed of one Element. तत्त्वाद विद्यते, thus. वर्ते अपरं, others.

19. Others say that the Gross Body is formed of one Element.—230.

Vṛitti:—The author mentions another opinion.

Of Earth (alone) is the Body.—19.

Bhāṣya:—The Body is of Earth only, while the other Elements are mere sustainers. Such is the import. (Cf. Viśeṣika-Sūtra, IV. ii. 2-3, S. B. II. Vol. VI, pages 157-158.)

Or, the meaning of “eka-bhautikam” is, formed of one or other of the Elements. By reason of the predominance of the particles of Earth in the Body of Man, etc., and by reason of the predominance of Tejas, etc., in the worlds of the Sun, etc., Bodies are said to be of Earth, of Tejas, etc., just as it is the case with gold, etc.;—it is this very theory that the author will take up as an established tenet in the fifth book (vīde V. 102 and 110).—19.

Chaitanya or Consciousness is not a natural product of the Body.

न सांस्कृतिकं चेतनं प्रथेककाष्टे || ३ || २० ||

व न, not. एकसांस्कृतिकं, innate; natural product; necessary result of the organisation of the Body. चैतन्यं, Chaitanya; Consciousness; Sentience; Intelligence. प्रथेककाष्टे: prati-eka-a-driṣṭeḥ, owing to not being seen in each apart.

20. Chaitanya is not a natural product (of the Elements), because it is not seen in each separately.—231.

Vṛitti:—The author repels the Theory of the Chaitanya of the Body.

Because, after the Elements have been separated from one another, Consciousness is not found, therefore, Consciousness is not natural to. 
them. For the same reason also, it need not be apprehended that they will give rise to Consciousness, when combined together (vide III. 22 post). For, animals, each possessing strength enough to subdue smaller animals, subdue the elephant also, when united together; but not so the Elements. Hence there is no (natural) Consciousness in the Body.—20.

Bhāṣya:—The author mentions what is proved by the fact of the Body being formed of the Elements.

The Elements having been separated from one another, since Consciousness is not found in them, therefore Consciousness is not natural to the Body formed of the Elements, but is due to Upādhi or external influence. Such is the meaning.—20.

Theory of Consciousness Innate in the Body further refuted.

प्रपन्धमरणाययमावशः ॥ ३ । २१ ॥

प्रपन्धमरणाययमावशः: prapañcha-marana-adh-abhāvaḥ, non-existence or non-occurrence of death, etc., of anything in the world. Aniruddha reads Prapañchatva-adh-abhāvaḥ, meaning, the absence of the character of being a production. य च, and.

21. (Were Consciousness innate in the Body), there would, further, not be the death, etc., of anything in the world.—232.

Vṛtti:—The author mentions another defect in the theory that Consciousness is innate in the Body.

Were Consciousness a property of the Body, there would be non-existence of the being a prapañcha or an elaboration or phenomenon, that is, of death, because of the eternality of that which is chetana, i.e., has Consciousness as its property.

Now, if it is asserted that even of the conscious Body there would be death, then, we rejoin that the same is release.—21.

Bhāṣya:—The author mentions another impediment to the theory of Consciousness being innate in the Body.

Were Consciousness to be natural to the Body, then there would not be the death, dreamless sleep, and the like of anything whatever in the whole of creation. Such is the meaning. For, death, dreamless sleep, and the like constitute the non-consciousness of the Body; and these would not be possible, if Consciousness were natural to it, because the nature of a thing remains as long as the thing endures (cf. I. 8).—21.
An objection to III. 20 disposed of.

ṣadyuktaḥ pratyekaparidrśte sāṁśye tathābhyāḥ

madasaṃkṣeyat, like the power of something intoxicating.  

22. If it is said that (the production of Consciousness in the elemental Body) is like (that of) the power in an intoxicating mixture; (we reply that, in the mixture in question), there is the development thereof (i.e., of the power to intoxicate), on the combination (of the several ingredients) in each of which it is seen, by close observation, to exist, (in a subtle or minute form).—233.

Vṛtti:—The author points out yet another defect in the above theory.

Just as the power of physical vigour is found in every man in a minute form; but, on their combination, owing to the development of vast strength, men carry even the hugest block of stone. But neither is, in the Elements severally, subtle Consciousness seen; whereby, on combination, Consciousness would appear in the Body.

In the aphorism, viz., "Chaitanya is not a natural result of the organisation of the Body" (III 20), the thing denied has been shown from the negative point of view (i.e., from the side of how it cannot be), and in this aphorism, from the positive point of view (i.e., from the side of how it could have been); hence there has been no useless repetition. —22.

Bhāṣya:—Apprehending an objection to what has been stated, viz., "because it is not seen in each separately" (III. 20), the author removes it.

Well, it may be objected, as the power to cause intoxication, although it may not be present in a manifested form in each of the several ingredients, yet is present in the mixture compounded of them; similarly will it be with Consciousness also. We reply, no. The development thereof, (i.e., of the power to intoxicate), on the combination (of the ingredients), would be possible, were it found to exist, in a subtle form, in each of them. In the case under consideration, on the other hand, the characteristic of being observed in each does not exist. Therefore, in the
illustration, the power to cause intoxication being proved, by the Sāstras and
the like, to exist, in a subtle form in each of the ingredients, it follows that,
in the state of their combination, there takes place only a manifestation of
the power to cause intoxication; while in the case illustrated, by no kind
of evidence whatever has Consciousness been proved to exist in a subtle
form in each of the Elements severally. Such is the meaning.

But, by means of the observation of Consciousness in the collected
whole (i.e., the Body), should be inferred, may rejoin our objector, the
existence of a subtle power of Consciousness in each separate Element.
No, we reply; because, by reason of the redundancy or cumbrousness
entailed in the supposition of manifold powers of consciousness existing in
the manifold Elements, it is proper, for the sake of simplicity, to make the
supposition of one and only one entity having the svārdha or essential
form of eternal Consciousness.

Well, then, may still contend our objector, as the effect such as the
(greater) magnitude, usefulness for carrying water in it, etc., although such
effect is absent in its constituent parts, is yet seen in the case of the water-
pot and the like; even so will there be Consciousness in the Body. We
reply that it cannot be so; because, since the particular attributes belonging
to the Elements, are produced from the attributes of their homogeneous
causes, the appearance of Consciousness in the Body is impossible, when
there is no Consciousness in those causes (i.e., the Tan-mātras which
are produced from the Insentient Prakṛiti).—22.

Why the Linga-Sastra takes a Gross Body : the cause of Release.


Why the Linga-Sastra takes a Gross Body : the cause of Release.


Vṛtti:—It has been described above how Dispassion and the like
serve, through one another, to be the means of Release. The author
(now) mentions the direct means of Release.

This is obvious.—23.

Bhāṣya:—It has been stated that the migration of the Lingas is for
the sake of Puruṣa (III. 16). In reference to that, the author shows, by
(the next) two aphorisms, what objects of Puruṣa are accomplished, by
what operations, from the birth of the Lingas which, namely, is their
going into Gross Bodies.

By means of birth, due to the transmigration of the Linga, takes
place (or, rather, is made possible) viveka-saṅkṛttāra or the immediate
cognition of the discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa; and thence, the object of Puruṣa in the form of Release.

And Knowledge, etc., have been technically termed as Pratyaya-sarga or emanations of Buddhī in the Kārikā:

एव प्रत्ययमेव विपर्ययाणिकृतुदस्यवर्चः॥

This is Pratyaya-sarga, called Viparyaya or Fallacy or Mistake or Doubt, A-daktil or Incapacity, Taṣṭi or Complacency, and Siddhi or Perfection.—Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, XLVI.

Viparyaya and the rest will be explained hereafter.

And, in this Śāstra (Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram), it is the very same Emanation of Buddhī that is described, along with its purpose, by a number of aphorisms (vide below). Such is the distinction.—23.

Cause of Bondage.

बन्धो विपर्ययात् ॥ ३ । २४ ॥

कः: bandhaḥ, Bondage. विपर्ययात्, from Viparyaya or the reverse of knowledge, that is to say, error or doubt.

24. Bondage is from Mistake.—235.

Vṛitti:—The author mentions what happens in the absence of knowledge.

(“Viparyayaat” means, from ignorance (ajñāna).—24.

Bhāṣya:—Through transmigration of the Līṅga, caused by Mistake, takes place the object of Puruṣa, in the form of Bondage, containing pleasure and pain as its essence. Such is the meaning.—24.

Knowledge is the sole and independent cause of Release.

नियतकारणत्वसः समुचचयविकल्पसः ॥ ३ । २५ ॥

नियतकारणतः niyata-kāraṇa-tvāt, from the being the precise or determinate cause. qa: na, no. समुचचया-विकल्प, co-operation and alternation.

25. Since (Knowledge) is the precise cause, there is no contributiveness, nor alternativeness.—236.

Vṛitti:—Release does not, it might be thought, come from knowledge alone, because Karma also is a means of Release; as, for instance, the Gṛuti says:

तं विद्यानमेव सम्बन्धी गृहीतहे बुद्धि य ॥

In pursuit of it (Release), Vidyā, Knowledge, and Karma. Action, are undertaken.

Previous Knowledge also (is a means of attaining it).—Bṛhat-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, 17, iv. 2.
In regard to this the author says:

The cause is the determinate only: viz., from Knowledge, Release; from Action, Experience. Where, too, contribution of unselfish (akāmik) karma is heard, there, too, it is for the sake of knowledge (and not of Release immediately); hence there is no co-operation (really). Neither is there such alternation as that Release takes place sometimes from knowledge and sometimes from action. The Śruti also says the same thing. Thus,

केदारमेव पुरुषं महात्मार्थतरस्वं समस्तं परतादात ।
सत्येऽविवर्धतामुपयुक्तो नान्यय: पण्या विद्येष्यनाम ॥

I know Him, the Great Purusa, of the colour of the Sun, (standing) beyond Tamas or Darkness. By knowing Him alone, one passes over Death. No other path there exists for going.—Svetāvatara-Upaniṣat, III. 8—25.

Bhāṣya:—Release and Bondage have been stated to be caused by Knowledge and Action. Among them, the author first discusses the subject of Release from Knowledge.

Although we hear

विद्याचारिण्यम् ज्ञयते यत्सदृशेऽमरमयं सह ।
(वचनपुरुषे संवेदौ विच्छाचृततमहते ॥)

Knowledge and Action,—who knows both of them together, (i.e., passing Death by the help of Action, enjoys immortality by the help of Knowledge).—Īśa-Upaniṣat, XI.

yet, since Knowledge is established in the world as being the determinate and sufficient cause for the termination of non-discrimination between Prakriti and Purusa, there is neither co-operation nor alternation, with Knowledge, of Action, called (in the above Śruti) Avidya, towards the production of Release. Such is the meaning.

It follows also from the Śrutis such as:

सत्येऽविवर्धतामुपयुक्तो नान्यय: पण्या विद्येष्यनाम ॥

By knowing Him alone, one passes over Death; no other path there exists for going.

Svetāvatara-Upaniṣat, III. 8.

व क गमया न प्रकटा च गमेऽऽस्मात्यथागतमन्नन्तः ॥

Neither by Action, nor by progeny, nor by wealth, (but) by renunciation, some attained immortality.—Mahābhārata-Upaniṣat, X. 8.

that Karma or Action is not the direct cause of Release.

The performance of Action, in co-operation with Knowledge, has been admitted into the Śrutis under the relation of principal (Knowledge) and subsidiary (Action), and the like.—25.

* Dr. Garbe’s reading of this sentence is somewhat different. It is as follows: Samaññahayas-anavahi-srutis tu aṣāg-aṣāg-ākāśa-vā-ādī-bhrī api yupadaya; meaning, the light on the institution (of Knowledge and Action) in co-operation, is, on the other hand,
An Illustration of the above.

स्मार्जागरणात्मक्ष्यात्मक मात्राकारानां नोमयोमुक्ति:

पुरुषोऽेक्तः ॥ ३ ॥ २६ ॥

स्मार्जागरणस्वप्न-िजागरण-अभ्यास, ब्यलो व स्वर्गि व मंहन्।

व्यायामस्थलम्यकामाम्यकामयकालभ्याय, ब्यलो व अन्य-लो व

व्यायाम-उभयोऽ, ब्यलो व मंहन्।

पुरुष, ब्यलो व मंहन्।

पुरुषाय्य, ब्यलो व मंहन्।

26. Just as (the same object is not fulfilled) through sleep and the waking state, (whether in co-operation or in alternation), (which are respectively) illusory and not-illusory, similarly the Release of Puruṣa (does not come) from both (Knowledge and Action).—237.

Vṛtti:—The author points out one more defect in the above theory.

Dream is illusory; the waking state is not-illusory. Action is comparable to dream; Knowledge is comparable to the waking state. Now, co-operation is of things belonging to the same time. But dream and the waking state cannot be referred to the same time. Hence there is no co-operation of Knowledge and Action.—26.

Bhāṣya:—On the absence of their co-operation or alternation, the author states an illustration:

Just as the accomplishment of one and the same end of Puruṣa cannot be possible by means of the mutually contributive operation of what are designated by the terms dream, and, the waking state, respectively illusory and not-illusory; in like manner also Release of Puruṣa cannot properly come from the joint performance of both Action and Knowledge which are respectively illusory and not-illusory. Such is the meaning.

explained also by their being related as, for instance, principal and subsidiary. But the reading of Mr. F. E. Hall, which we have adopted, seems to be preferable. For, in the first place, the word "also" in Dr. Garbe's reading is obviously out of place, having no reference anywhere else in the other portion of the Bhāṣya. Secondly, the reading of Mr. F. E. Hall makes out a case of abhyapagama-vāda, i.e., of admission of, as concession to, a popular belief; which seems to be the natural view of the case in question, by making the sense to be that the script on the institution (of Knowledge and Action) in co-operation, in a concession to the popular belief that Action which, in fact, becomes a means of Release, mediately through the production of Knowledge by means of purification of the Chitta or the thinking principle, is itself a direct means of Release, a belief which is due to the failure of the common people to catch the nice distinction of mediatness and immediateness.
And illusoriness consists in being unreal, that is to say, unstable; and this characteristic exists in an object seen in a dream. What is designated as the waking state is, by comparison with dream, certainly real; the unreality that is sometimes predicated of it, consists in its unstableness only by comparison with the immutable Puruṣa; and it is that which is the doer of such acts as bathing, etc., whereby it is distinguished from dream. In like manner, Action also, not being durable, and also being the product of Prakṛiti, is illusory. The Self, on the other hand, being stable, and not being a product, is not-illusory. Hence it is unreasonable that they, i.e., Action and Knowledge, being undertaken, would yield similar fruits; hence dissimilar effect alone is consistent.—26.

An objection considered: Our Conception of the Object of Worship is faulty.

इतरस्यार्थानात्यन्तिकम् ॥ १ ॥ २७ ॥

िदं itarasya, of the other; of dream (Aniruddha); of the other Self which is the object of Worship (Vijñāna). कर्म api, also. न not. अत्यन्तिकम् Atyantikam, absolute.

27. Of the other also, (the not-illusoriness is) not absolute.—238.

Vṛtti:—It might be said that, both being alike intuitions, like the intuition of dream, the intuition of the waking state also may be unreal. In regard to this the author says:

Even the intuition of dream is not absolutely unreal, like a flower in the air. Neither is there unreality in one's own Self also; otherwise, "This is a dream,"—this itself would not be possible. Neither can there be dream of an object absolutely unseen, but, on the contrary, of an object seen in the waking state.—27.

Bhāṣya:—Well, even if this be so, it may be urged, there may still be association and alternativeness of the Knowledge of the Tattvas or Principles discriminatively, with the knowledge called the Worship of the Self, since there can be no illusoriness in the Object of Worship. In reference to this, the author says:

"Itarasya api," of the Object of Worship; "na Atyantikam," (not absolute) not illusoriness, because superimposed ideas also enter into (our conception of) the Self which is the Object of Worship. Such is the meaning.—27.
BOOK III, SŪTRA 28.

Wherein the Conception of the Object of Worship is faulty.

संकल्पितस्य व्यवस्था || २८ ||

संकल्पितस्य, in the part conceived or imagined by Manas (Vijñāna); in the case of objects which are the mental creations of the Yogins (Aniruddha).

28. Similarly, moreover, what is conceived by Manas is (not absolutely unreal,—Aniruddha; not absolutely real,—Vijñāna).—239.

Yātiḥ:—(It has been stated that “neither can there be dream of an object absolutely unseen.” If this be so, then, one may say), since there are no visible causes at work here, there would be no production of objects, in the case of the Yogins, by the force of the mere mental conception of those objects, (which, however, is contrary to fact). To this the author replies:

Production through the mental conception of men like ourselves and others, does not take place. But that is no reason why it should not take place in the case of the Siddhas or Perfected Ones also, who are endowed with the power born of Yoga. Hence, (their mental creations are) not unreal.—28.

Bhāṣya:—The author states in which part of the act of Worship, the unreality lies.

“(Manas) sanākālpīte,” in the part containing the object to be meditated upon, “evam api,” there is unreality also. Such is the meaning.

We have adopted the reading of Pandita Kālīvāra Viṣṇu-vāgīśa. Dr. Garbe’s reading is “samā-siddhī,” meaning, non-production of all things, instead of “sva-siddhī,” meaning, production of all things. Now, the matter stands thus: The doubt set at rest in the previous aphorism (III. 27), was whether, like the intuition of dream, the intuition of the waking state also was not unreal. It was there pointed out that the objects seen in a dream were not absolutely unreal, inasmuch as they had their prototypes in the objects seen in the waking state. The doubt that is, therefore, next raised in the present aphorism, is as to whether, “dṛṣṭa-kāraṇa-abhāvaḥ,” on account of the non-existence (in mental creation) of causes seen in the waking state, “sanākālpam-ātmanaḥ,” by the mere mental conception, “Yoginām,” of the Yogins, (there does) “na,” not, (take place), “sva-siddhī,” the production of all things. “Atra,” in regard to this parācyapha, “ātha,” (the author) says (as in the aphorism, III. 28). It would clearly appear from this that the reading, not-production of all things, for the reading, production of all things, is altogether beside the mark, unless, of course, the sentence is read with a sense of interrogativeness, in which case the two negatives, not, and non-production, would imply the affirmative required by the context.
For, in the Object of Worship as declared, for instance, by such Shruti as:

रश्च सत्वस्य नद्य

All this verily is Brahma.—Chhandogya-Upanishat, III. XIV. 1.

unreality certainly belongs to the part consisting of the “All,” i.e., the web of the world.—28.

Fruit of Worship.

भावनोपचापाच्छुद्द्य सर्वं प्रकृतिवत् ॥ २ ॥ २६ ॥

bhāvānā-upachāryat, through the accumulation or ascension of meditation or thought. सुधा सुधासय, of the pure or sinless. सर्वम् sārva, accomplishment of all things. प्रकृति Prakṛti-vat, as in the case of prakṛti.

29. Through ascension of meditation, all (power) comes to the pure, as in the case of Prakṛti.—240.

Vṛtti: The author continues the same subject.

As Mahat and the rest are, in the production of their effects, dependent upon those that precede them; while, in the case of Prakṛti, there is, in the production of the effects, dependence upon nothing else whatever; so, even though there is no cause previously known, yet, for the Yogins, through ascension of meditation, all is achieved.—20.

Bhāṣya: What, then, is the fruit of Worship? There being room for such an enquiry, the author says:

“Suddhasaya,” of Puruṣa rendered sinless by the performance of Worship called Bhāvanā or spiritual re-formation, just as of Prakṛti, there is all power. Such is the meaning. Just as Prakṛti causes creation, preservation, and destruction; so does the Sattva of the Buddhi of the Worshipper also cause creation and the like.—20.

The Means of Knowledge. (1) Dhyāna or Meditation.

रागोपहितिस्थितिनम् ॥ ३ ॥ ३० ॥

रागं, removal of (adventitious) “redness” (Vijñāna), cessation of the action of Rajas. ध्यानं dhyānam, meditation; dhyāna.

30. Cessation of Rāga, is Dhyāna.—241.

Vṛtti:—The author says that Dhyāna is for the sake of Bhāvanā or spiritual re-formation.

“Rāgat,” that is, from the Gupa called Rajas, comes restlessness; the cessation thereof, that is, steadiness, is Dhyāna.—30.
Bhāṣya:—It is settled that Knowledge alone is the means for the accomplishment of Release. Now the author mentions the means towards the accomplishment of Knowledge.

Dhyāna is the cause of the removal of that taint of the Chitta caused by the external objects, which is an obstruction to Knowledge. Such is the meaning. The mention of the effect (cessation of taint) and of the cause thereof (Dhyāna), by way of identity, has been made by a process of transference, because it is impossible that the cessation of taint should itself be Dhyāna.

Here, by the word Dhyāna, should be comprehended all the three, (means) mentioned in the Yoga-Sūtra, viz., Dhārāṇī, Concentration, Dhyāna, Meditation, and Sañādhi, Contemplation, because we hear in the Yoga-Sūtras of Patañjali that every one of the eight Āṅgas or limbs of Yoga is a cause of the immediate intuition of Viveka or Discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. And, of these (three), the subsidiary differences should be looked for in that work also. (Vide S. B. H. Vol. IV.) The remaining five Āṅgas or limbs, the author will himself explain.—30.

How consummation of Dhyāna is reached.

श्रवण-इति : ॥ २ ॥ ३१ ॥

सत्तिर्द्धिः vṛtti-nirodhāḥ, through inhibition of modifications. तत-सद्धिः, the production or perfection thereof.

31. Through inhibition of modification, is the production or perfection thereof.—242.

Vṛtti:—How does the production of Dhyāna take place? To this the author replies:

The modifications are the five, viz., Pramāṇa, and the rest. (Vide II. 33 and Yoga-Sūtram, I. 6). Through the restraint of these, is “tat-riddhiḥ,” that is, the accomplishment of Dhyāna.—31.

Bhāṣya:—Only by means of the perfection of Dhyāna, can there be the production of Knowledge, and not by means of its mere commencement. Intending to show this, the author mentions the distinguishing mark of the perfection of Dhyāna.

By means of the Cognitive (Samprajñāta*) Yoga, in the form of the

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*Samprajñāta Yoga: The two primary divisions of Yoga have been distinguished by Vyāsa in his Commentary on Yoga-Sūtram, I. 1, as follows:

वासना समप्रज्ञात | च व सार्वभौमविद्याम् | चिन्ता शून्य विद्याविद्याम | विज्ञान-विचारोऽविद्वाराः | समाज्ञा वेदव्यास करते |
inhibition of modifications other than the object of meditation, (takes place) “tat-siddhibh,” that is, the consummation of Dhyāna in the form of conferment of the fruit called Knowledge. Such is the meaning. Hence what the author wishes to teach is that the course of Dhyāna should be followed only up to that point.

It is only when there is restraint of the other modifications, that, on account of the passing away of the obstruction, called the movement of the mind into other objects, there takes place the immediate intuition of the object of meditation. And as it effects this, Yoga also should be understood to be a cause of Knowledge, just like Dhyāna and the other Āngas or limbs of Yoga; because we know that this is so from texts of the Śrutis and Smṛitis such as:

धार्मिको सत्यतिर्थण देवेम भवे श्रवणो दहो तोहे ज्ञाति

Having known the Deva by the acquirement of Yoga relating to the Embodied Self, the wise abandon joy and grief. — Katha-Upaniṣad, II. 12.—81.

Practices conducive to Dhyāna.

धार्मिको सत्यतिर्थण देवेम भवे श्रवणो दहो तोहे ज्ञाति

Having known the Deva by the acquirement of Yoga relating to the Embodied Self, the wise abandon joy and grief. — Katha-Upaniṣad, II. 12.—81.

32. By means of Dhāraṇā, Āsana, and Sva-karma, is the accomplishment of Dhyāna.—243.

Yoga is Samādhi or Contemplation. And it is a dharma or property of the Chitta or the thinking principle, penetrating all its planes. The planes of the Chitta are: the Kṛṣṇa or unsteady, the Mātā or dull, the Viśūpta or steady-and-unsteady, the Ekaṇa or one-pointed, and the Niruddha or restrained. Among these, in the steady-and-unsteady Chitta, the Samādhi or occasional contemplative mood, which but serves to support the character of steadiness-in-unsteadiness, does not lie within the category of Yoga. What, on the other hand, in the one-pointed Chitta, directly illuminates the whole essence of the object as existing by itself, takes away the power of the Afflictions, loosens the bonds of Karma, and brings Restraint within the aim.—that is called Saṃprajñāti Yoga or cognitive contemplation. And this, we will afterwards submit, follows Viśarja or doubt, Viśākha or siddhārtha, Āsana or bliss, and Āsmita or equity (III, I-am-nan). But when there takes place the restraint or suppression of all the modifications (of the Chitta), the Samādhi is called Saṃprajñāti or non-(I.e., ultra)-cognitive.
Vṛitti:—How is the restraint thereof (i.e., of the modifications) effected? To this the author replies:

Dhāraṇā is the holding the Chitta in a particular part such as the navel. Āsana, that is, Posture, is such as the Svastika, etc. (Vide S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 170). Hereby Yama, Restraint; Niyama, Observances; Prāṇa-ayāma, Prolongation of Breath; and Pratyāhāra, Abstraction are implied. Svā-karma is the performance of acts prescribed for one's own exist. From these, results the accomplishment of the restraint of the modifications.—32.

Bhāṣya:—The author mentions the various means of Dhyāna also.

Dhyāna is effected by means of the triad beginning with Dhāraṇā, which will be presently described. Such is the meaning.—32.

Dhāraṇā described.

निरोधक्षणिविघातास्यायम् || 33 ||

śrī: nirodhā, restraint of Prāṇa, Prāṇa-ayāma (Vijñāna); restraint of modifications (Aniruddha). chhardi-vidhāraṇā-ābhyām, by means of expiration and retention of breath.

33. Restraint (of Prāṇa), by means of expiration and retention of breath, (is Dhāraṇā).—Vijñāna.

Restraint (of the modifications is effected also) by means of expiration and retention of breath.—Aniruddha.—244.

Vṛitti:—The author mentions another means of restraint.

“Chhardi” means expiration, the breathing out. “Vidhāraṇa” means the retention of breath. The term “Chhardi-vidhāraṇa-ābhyām” is illustrative. Pūraka or inhalation or the breathing in, should also be understood.—33.

Note:—In Dr. Garbe's edition, Aniruddha transposes this and the next aphorism.

Bhāṣya:—By means of a triad of aphorisms, the author characterises, in order, the triad beginning with Dhāraṇā.

“Of Prāṇa,” this is obtained by means of its notoriety in this context, because it is Prāṇa-ayāma that has been explained by the Commentator in the Yoga aphorism, viz.,

अनलक्षविशाराप्यायो वा अनस्व

* “The Svastika is that in which the left foot is placed, a little downward inclined, between the right thigh and shank, and the right foot is placed, in a similar position, between the left thigh and shank.”
On, by means of expiration and retention of Prāṇa (breath), (steadiness of the mind is to be effected).—Yoga-Sūtram, I. 34, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 60.

"Chhardhi," again, is throwing out, that is to say, the expulsion of the retained (air). Hereby both inspiration and expiration are obtained. And "vidhāraṇā" is retention of breath. So that, the meaning is that what is the "Nirodhaḥ," that is, the bringing under control or regulation, of Prāṇa or the life-breath, by means of inspiration, expiration, and retention,—the same is what is called Dhāraṇā.

(But, it may be asked, if the aphorism was intended to be a characterisation of Dhāraṇā, why has not the word Dhāraṇā been specifically mentioned in it? And, further, when there is no such mention, why should it be taken to refer to Dhāraṇā only and not, at the same time, to Āsana and Sva-karma also? In order to remove any such curiosity, the Commentator proceeds.)

Āsana and Sva-karma will afterwards be the subject of characterisation, being referred to by their own words; hence, Dhāraṇā alone is left; because, from this very reason, Dhāraṇā is gathered as being the subject of characterisation in the present aphorism, the term Dhāraṇā has not been incorporated in it.

The Dhāraṇā of the Chitta, that is, the holding the mind in a particular locality, has, on the other hand, already been stated to be comprehended, like Samādhi or Contemplation, by the very word Dhyāna (in III. 30 q. v.)—33.

N.B.—In this aphorism, Vījñāna takes "Dhāraṇā" to be another word for "Prāṇa-prāyāma."

Āsana described.

सिं hari-sukham ॥ २ ॥ ३ ॥

सिं hari-sukham, steady and easyful. असानम्, āsana, posture.

34. What is steady and easyful,—that is Āsana.—245.

Vṛtti:—Among diverse Āsanas, the author states the Āsana approved by himself.

Whereby steadiness as well as ease will be obtained, that Āsana should be undertaken.—34.

Āśaya:—The author characterises Āsana which comes next in order. Which, being steady, at the same time, is a promoter of ease, such as, e.g., the Svasāti, etc., that is Āsana. Such is the meaning.—34.

Svakarma described.

35. Sva-karma is the performance of acts prescribed for one's own Stage of Life.—246.

Vṛitti:—What that Sva-karma is? To this the author replies.

This is clear.—35.

Bhāṣya:—The author characterises Sva-karma.

This is easy.

Here, by the word Karma, there is apprehension of Yama, Restraints, and Niyama, Observances. Pratyāhāra, Abstraction, in the form of having the Indriyas under subjugation, since it is commonly prescribed for all the Stages of Life, should also be included within Karma. So that we obtain here (in the Śāṅkhyā-Sāstra) also the eight Āgās or limbs of Yoga mentioned in the aphorism of Patañjali as being the means of accomplishing Knowledge. That aphorism, namely, is:

Yama, Restraint; Niyama, Observance; Āsana, Posture; Prāpyāma, Regulation of Breath; Pratyāhāra, Abstraction; Dhāranā, Concentration; Dhyāna, Meditation; and Samādhi, Contemplation; are the eight Āgās.—II. 29, 8. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 154.

And the svārūpa or essential form of these should be looked for in that Sāstra itself. —35.

Other Means of Dhyāna.

36. And also through Dispassion and constant practice (is Dhyāna produced).—247.

Vṛitti:—The author states other means of the inhibition of modifications.

"Vairāgyāt;" i.e., from the two kinds of Dispassion; namely, from the lower, that is, from the sense (of satisfaction) that "this is enough," and from the higher, that is, from the mere clearness of Knowledge.
“Abhyāsā,” that is, from meditation over and over again. The word "cha" is in the sense of collection or co-operation (of the two means).—36.

Bhāṣya:—For the principal Adhikārins or Initiates, there is no need of, or dependence upon, the external Ațgas, viz., the pentad of Yama and the rest. In their case, Knowledge as well as Yoga are accomplished from Saṃyama alone, i.e. from complete self-control in the form of the triad merely of Dārāpanā, Dhyāna, and Samādhi.

This is the conclusion established in the System of Patañjali. In the case of Jaḍa Bharata, and others, such is also seen to have been the case. Hence, in accordance to those facts, the Āchārya (Kapila) also says:

Through the mere practice alone in the form of meditation, accompanied by Dispassion, Knowledge and its means Yoga also take place in the case of the best Adhikārins. Such is the meaning. So has it been said in the Gauḍa-Purāṇa also:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{शास्त्रव्यवहारोऽने देवस्य वल्लाक्षः} & 1 \\
\text{बिच्छेस्वद्या सवै बिस्तरता परिचितित्वा} & 2 \\
\text{धिशुपादः सिद्धिर्सेव व्यवहारमध्यवर्तित्वा} & 3
\end{align*}
\]

The rules about posture and place are not the instruments of Yoga. All these details have been said to be causes of delay. Sirupāla attained success or perfection through the accession of the constant practice of Smaraṇa or remembrance (of the Lord).

Or, here Dispassion and the practice of Dhyāna have been stated as being the causes of Dhyāna itself, and the word, cha, has been used for the purpose of adding Dārāpanā to them.

Thus, then, is explained that Release comes through Knowledge.—36.

Nature of Viparyaya described.

विपर्ययेभेऽऽतः पुष्प ॥ १ ॥ १७ ॥

वत्सी: viparyaya-bhedāḥ, the divisions of Viparyaya or Mistake. we pañcha, five.

37. The divisions of Mistake are five.—248.

Vṛtti:—The author states the subsidiary differences of the modifications.

“A-vidyā,” Unreal Cognition; “Asmitā” (Egoity), Self-Conceit (abhiṣājana); “Rāga,” Desire; “Dveṣa,” Anger; “Abhisiveṣa,” Fear;—these are the cognitions called Viparyaya or Mistake; and so, by these, have been indicated the cognitions of which they are the objects.—37.
BOOK III, SŪTRA 37, 38.

Bhāṣya:—After this, will be explained Viparyaya stated to be the cause of Bondage by the aphorism, “Bondage is from Mistake” (III. 24). At the opening of this discussion, the author mentions the svarūpa or essential nature of Viparyaya.

A-vidyā, Asmitā, Rāga, Dveṣa, and Abhinivesā,—these five, mentioned in the Yoga, (vide Yoga-Sūtram, II. 3, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 91 q. v.), are the subsidiary divisions of Viparyaya or Mistake, which is the cause of Bondage. Such is the meaning. There is no harm even in the non-inclusion hereby of the mistakes in the form of the cognition of silverness in respect of a mother-of-pearl shell, and the like.

Amongst the above, A-vidyā, Unreal Cognition, consists, as has been declared in the Yoga (vide Yoga-Sūtram, II. 5, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 95), in the manifestation or illumination of the non-eternal, the impure, the painful, and the Not-Self, as the eternal, the pure, the pleasurable, and the Self. Similarly, Asmitā also is the intuition of the identity of the Self and the Not-Self; that is, it is of this form, namely, that there is no Self other than the Body, etc. A-vidyā, on the other hand, is not of this form; because, even when the Self is of both the forms of the Body and the not-Body, the idea of the “I” in respect of the Body can be accounted for. Rāga and Dveṣa, again, are too well-known. And Abhinivesā is the fear of death and the like. Itāga and the rest, being the effects of Mistake, are called Mistakes. —37.

The cause of Mistake is Incapacity.

श्राकिरिदाविशालिताः तु || ३ || ३५ ||

वक्तव्य: साक्तिब, incapacity. श्राकिरि विशालिताः अष्टाविशालितादः, of twenty-eight kinds. tu, as is well-known.

38. Incapacity, as is well-known, is of twenty-eight kinds.—249.

Vṛtti:—The author states Incapacity. —38.

Bhāṣya:—Having stated the essential nature of Mistake, the author states the essential nature of Incapacity also which is the cause of it.

This is easy.

This too has been explained by the Kārikā:

पञ्जाबरोगिनयः सदा बुद्धिययाकिष्ठिरितिः
सत्वस्व बच्चा दुष्कर्षेश्वयादि तुषिलिमित्यात् ||

Injuries of the eleven Indriyas, together with injuries of Buddhi, are pronounced to be Incapacity. The injuries of Buddhi are seventeen, through inversion of Compliances and Perfections.—Śākhya-Kārikā, XLIX.
The eleven Incapacities of the eleven Indriyas are:

Deafness, Leprosy, Blindness, Paralysis of the Tongue, Loss of Smell, and Dumbness, Contraction of the Hand, Lameness, Impotence, Constipation and Dullness.

And of Buddha itself there are seventeen Incapacities. For example, as there are nine (Incapacities of Buddha itself in the form of the) counteractives of the nine Complacencies presently to be mentioned, so there are eight (other Incapacities of Buddha itself in the form of the) counteractives of the eight Perfections presently to be mentioned. And, by combining these, coming from within itself and from others, form the twenty-eight Incapacities of Buddha. Such is the meaning.

The word "Tu" has been used to declare their special notoriety. — 38.

Note.—"Tu" is not read by Aniruddha. Vedântin Mahâdeva reads it.

Complacency is ninefold.

सिद्धिरूपः II ३ ३६ II

मृ: tuṣṭiḥ, Complacency. द्वीग्र: nava dhā, of nine kinds.

39. Complacency is of nine kinds.—250.

Vṛtti:—The author mentions Tuṣṭi or Complacency.—39

Bhāṣya:—By a couple of aphorisms, the author mentions those two, Complacency and Perfection, on the prevention or impairment of which arise the two kinds of Incapacities of Buddha.

The author will himself explain their ninefoldness (vide III. 43).—39.

Perfection is eightfold

सिद्धिरूपः II ३ ४० II

मृ: siddhiḥ, perfection द्वीग्र: aṣṭa-dhā, of eight kinds.

40. Perfection is of eight kinds.—251.

Vṛtti:—The author mentions Siddhi or Perfection.—40.

Bhāṣya:—This too the author will himself explain (vide III. 44).—40.

Further sub-division of Mistake.

प्रवान्तरसेवः पूर्ववत् II ४१ II

मृ: avāntara-bhedāḥ, minor differences. द्वीग्र: pūrva-vat, as of old.

41. The minor divisions of Mistake are as of old.—252.

Vṛtti:—The author mentions the differences of Mistake, among the our (viz., Mistake, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection).
"Pûrva-vat: " mentioned by the ancient teachers; that is, the divisions of Mistake are sixty-two in number.

A-Vidyā, viz., the idea of the Self in respect of Prakṛti, Mahat, Ahamkāra, and the five Tan-mātrās, which is technically called Tamas,—is, since its objects are eight, of eight kinds.

The Devas, verily, look, through self-conceit, upon Ānīma or Attenuation and the rest (of the eight kinds of lordliness, viz., Laghima or Lightness; Mahima or Magnification; Garima or Heaviness; Prāpti or Attainment of all objects; Prākāmya or Unrestrained Desire; Īśita or Supremacy; and Vāśitva or Commanding Position), as their permanent belongings; this is Āsmitā; and it, which is technically called Moha, is, since its objects are eight, of eight kinds.

In respect of the five Tan-mātrās, viz., Sound and the rest, divided or characterised as heavenly and not-heavenly, Rāga or Desire, which is technically called Mahāmoha, is, since its objects are ten, of ten kinds.

The ten, viz., Sound and the rest, are accompanied by the superimposition of the eight "powers," viz., Ānīma and the rest, and these are met in opposition by another; wherefrom arises Dveṣa, technically called Tāmisra, which is, since its objects are eighteen, of eighteen kinds.

The Devas, verily, while enjoying them (viz., the ten of Sound, etc., and the eight "powers"), are met in opposition by the Asuras; wherefrom arises Abhinivesa or fear, technically called Amla-Tāmisra, which is since its objects are eighteen, of eighteen kinds.

Thus there are sixty-two (minor varieties of the five kinds of Mistake mentioned before).—41.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—(Dveṣa:) The ten beginning with Sound, and the eight beginning with Ānīma,—these, by coming into collision with one another, become irritable; they, then, come to be the objects of Dveṣa or Aversion, technically called Tāmisra, which is, since its objects are eighteen, of eighteen kinds.

Bhāṣya:—Since there is room for an enquiry into the particulars or distinctions of Mistake, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection, mentioned above, there proceed, in order, a quaternion of aphorisms.

The subsidiary divisions of Mistake which generally has been stated (III. 37) to be five, should be taken distinctively to be "pûrva-vat," that is, the same as have been stated by the ancient teachers; for fear of prolixity, they are not mentioned (in the aphorism). Such is the meaning.

And the same, A-vidyā and the rest, have been explained by me also.
in a general way, as being only five. But, in respect of their peculiarities, they are of sixty-two varieties. So has it been stated in the Kārikā:

नेवलम्बोद्धिबिषेः महामहोऽर ब्रह्मचिं तद्हामभिः ।
तामिर्ज्ञादशत्या तथा स्वमन्यतामिकः ॥

The distinctions of Tamas (A-vidyā) are eightfold, as also of Moha (Amitā); Mahāmoha (Rāga) is tenfold; Tāmiśra (Dveṣa) is eighteenfold, so also is Andha-Tāmiśra, (Abhinivesa).—Śāṅkhya-Kārikā, XLVIII.

Of this, the meaning is as follows:

In respect of the eight Prakritis, viz., the Avyakta (Unmanifested), Mahat, Ahamkāra, and the five Tan-mātras, that is, in respect of the not-Self, the idea of the Self, that is, A-vidyā, technically called Tamas, is eightfold. By reason of the non-difference of the effect and the cause,* there is inclusion herein also of the idea of the Self in respect of the mere Vikritis or Transformations.

Similarly, as there is eightfoldness of A-vidyā according to the distinction of its objects, so there is eightfoldness of Asmitā, technically called Moha, which has the same number of objects.

Because sensible objects, viz., Sound and the rest, are, being divided as heavenly and not-heavenly, ten in number, Rāga, technically called Mahā-moha, of which they are the objects, is tenfold.

What are the eight objects of A-vidyā and Asmitā, and what are the ten objects of Rāga, in respect of the eighteen counter-actives of these arises eighteenfold Dveṣa, technically called Tāmiśra.

Similarly, from seeing the destruction, etc., of the above eighteen, arises eighteenfold Abhinivesa, fear, technically called Andha-Tāmiśra.

Of these, again, the designations, Tamas and the rest, are because they are the causes of Tamas and the rest.—41.

Further sub-division of Incapacity.

पश्चिमतर्स्यः || ॥ ३० ॥

च च evam, similarly. सर्वः itarsaṁ, of the other, i.e., Incapacity.

42. Similarly, (there are further sub-divisions) of the other.—253.

Vṛti:—The author states the distinctions of Incapacity.

"Itarsaṁ" that is, of Incapacity, there is similar manifoldness, i.e., twenty-eight-foldness.
Thus, there are injuries of the eleven Indriyas; viz.,


Deafness, Leptony, Blindness, Rigidity of the Tongue, Loss of Smell, and Dumbness, Contracture of the Hand, Lumeness, Impotence, Constipation and Dullness.

Having these as objects, there are eleven (Incapacities) of Buddhhi.

Complacencies are nine, and Perfections, eight; by the inversion thereof there are seventeen (other Incapacities) of Buddhhi.

Thus there are twenty-eight (Incapacities of Buddhhi).—42.

 Bhāṣya:—"Evam" that is, just according to the statement of the ancient teachers, of Incapacity also, the minor divisions should be understood distinctively to be twenty-eight in number. Such is the meaning.

"Incapacity, as is well-known, is of twenty-eight kinds." (III. 38):—in this very aphorism has been explained by me the twenty-eight-foldness of Incapacity.—42.

Divisions of Complacency explained.

आध्यात्मिकादिभेदाय तुषिः || ३ १ ४३ ||

आध्यात्मिकादिभेदाय तुषिः, through the distinction of the आध्यात्मिकोर internal and the like. नवध, ninefold. तुषिः, complacency.

43. Through the distinction of the internal and the like, Complacency is ninefold.—254.

Vṛtti:—The author states the distinctions of Complacency.

Those that are active under the idea of the Self in respect of the Not-Self, are "आध्यात्मिकः," there are four of them. From the word, अदि, come the external five.

If Release comes through the seeing the discrimination of Prakṛiti (from Purusa), then, she alone is to be worshipped; what is the need of the Self?—this is one kind of Complacency, deriving its name (Complacency) from its reference to Prakṛiti; it is called Ambhas.

Even through the Knowledge of the Discrimination, Release cannot come directly, because it has never been seen to be the case, but it will come through the observance of a vow;—such is the second kind of Complacency, deriving its name from its reference to the Upādāna or the means and materials employed; it is called Salila.

Even through a vow, Release cannot come directly, but it comes through time;—such is the third kind of Complacency, deriving its name from its reference to time; it is called Oga.
Even through the influence of time, Release cannot come in all cases but it does, through luck alone;—such is the Complacency, deriving its name from its reference to luck; it is called Vṛṣṭī.

These Complacencies are “Ādhyātmika,” that is, with reference to the Self.

The (other) five, because they arise from, or relate to, abstinence from external objects, are called external.

In abstinence, in view of the pain or trouble of acquiring objects, there is one kind of Complacency, which is called Pāra.

In abstinence, in view of the pain or trouble of preserving objects of enjoyment, there is a second kind of Complacency, which is called Supāra.

In abstinence, in view of the pain arising from the thought of waste, there is a third kind of Complacency, which is called Pāra-pāra.

In abstinence, in view of the pain arising from the thought of the defects in enjoyment, there is a fourth kind of Complacency, which is called An-uttama-ambhas.

In abstinence, in view of the pain arising from the thought that the enjoyment cannot be complete without killing animals, there is a fifth Complacency, which is called Uttama-ambhas.

Thus is Complacency ninefold.—43.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—Complacencies are two fold: Ādhyātmika and bāhya. Among them, the Ādhyātmikas, that is, those that proceed by referring to the Self, as differentiated from Prakṛti, are four in number, having the names of Prakṛti, Upādāna, Kāla, and Bhāgya. Among them, Prakṛti Tuṣṭi is, for example: When the Self, as differentiated from Prakṛti, has been known, in that stage, from the instruction of some one, such as, “Immediate intuition of the discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa is verily a transformation of Prakṛti, and this Prakṛti herself will produce; to this end, useless is the practice of Dhyāna by you; therefore, remain just where you are,” there is Complacency of the disciple; it is this that is called Ambhas. Upādāna Tuṣṭi is, for example: “Even though the manifestation of discrimination be a product of Prakṛti, it does not result from Prakṛti only, because there is no distinction in the relation of mere Prakṛti to all beings. But that manifestation has renunciation of the world for its cause. Therefore, you should resort to renunciation; enough of your practice of Dhyāna,”—from such instruction, there is Complacency; and it is called Salila. Kāla Tuṣṭi is, for example: “Renunciation does not then and there give Release, but, by abiding time.
Therefore, success will come to you through time; you need not be agitated about it."—from such instruction there is Complacency called Ogha. Bhāga Tuṣṭi is, for example: "Even through time, Release does not come to all, but, on the contrary, to some, through luck alone. Hence it was that, even in their boyhood, the sons of Madālasā attained Release, by means of the acquisition of the manifestation of discrimination, through the mere instruction only of their mother. Therefore, luck is the sole cause and nothing else,"—from such instruction there is Complacency called Vriṣṭi.

The external five take place on the abstinence from the objects of enjoyment, just as in the case of one who, through abhīmāna or self-conceit, regards the Not-Self, viz. Prakṛti, Mahat, Ahaṅkāra, etc., as the Self. For, thus there are five kinds of abstinence having their origin in the seeing the defects in the acquisition, preservation, waste, enjoyment, and killing, in respect of all the five objects, viz., Sound and the rest. And in them there are five Complacencies. One is the Complacency found in abstinence, by means of Knowledge, by one who inquires into the manifold pains or troubles in the acquisition of the objects of enjoyment, such as a garland, sandal paste, woman, etc. A second is the Complacency found in abstinence from objects by one who thinks that there is great trouble in the preservation of even the acquired riches and the like which are liable to be lost through the cupidity of the king and the like. A third is the Complacency found in abstinence from objects by one who thinks of waste, in this way, namely, that even what is acquired and preserved with great effort, will waste away in the course of enjoyment. A fourth is the Complacency found in abstinence from objects by one who thinks of the defect in enjoyment itself, namely, that on the unattaining of their objects, desires cause pain to the desirer,—desires which increase through habitual enjoyment, according to the saying:


Never does Desire cease through the enjoyment of the objects desired. Like fire, by means of clarified butter, it most assuredly increases—Manu-Rādhītā.

A fifth is the Complacency found in abstinence from objects by one who sees the defect of killing, namely, that there is no enjoyment without killing or causing pain to other beings. And these Complacencies are respectively called Pāra, Supāra, Pāra-pāra, An-uttama-ambhaś, and Ambhas.

These are the nine Complacencies.
Bhāṣya: —This aphorism has been explained by the Kārikā, namely:

"वाभ्यामिकाकाश: प्रकृतिपादुपादकाकाञ्चाध्वित्या:ः
बप्पा विषयोपमात् पूण्य नम तुष्यंभिहिता:॥"

The nine Complacencies are propounded: the four internal ones called after Prakṛti, Upādāna, Kāla, and Bhāgya; the external five, through abstinence from objects.—Śāṅkhya-Kārikā, L.

The meaning of this is as follows:

"Ādihyātmikāḥ," that is, which exist or take place by relating to Ātmā or the Embodied State (Saṅghāta) of one who possesses the Complacencies. These Complacencies are four in number.

Among them, the Complacency which is called after Prakṛti is, for example: All transformation whatsoever, up to the direct vision of the difference between Prakṛti and Puruṣa, is of Prakṛti alone; and it is Prakṛti that produces that direct vision; whereas I am immutable and all-full;—from such contemplation of the Self, there arises contentment or satisfaction; this Complacency is called Ambhas.

Thereafter, the Complacency that arises by means of the upādāna or material cause in the shape of retirement from the world, the same, named after Upādāna, is called Salīla.

Thereafter, the Complacency that arises by means of the performance of Saṃādhi or spiritual contemplation for a long time in the state of retirement,—that Complacency, named after or relative to Kāla, is called Ogha.

Thereafter, the Complacency that arises on the accomplishment of the Saṃādhi known as the Cloud of Virtue (śūdra Yoga-Sūtra, IV. 29),—that, named after Bhāgya, is called Vṛiṣṭi.

These are the four Ādihyātmika Complacencies.

The five external Complacencies are produced from abstinence from the five external objects of enjoyment beginning with Sound, caused or occasioned by the defects involved in acquisition, preservation, waste, enjoyment, killing, etc. And these Complacencies have respectively been given the technical names of Pāra, Supāra, Pāra-pāra, An-uttama-ambhas, and Utama-ambhas.

Some one (cf. Vedāntin Mahādeva), on the other hand, has explained this Kārikā in a different manner. It is thus: That is called after Prakṛti, which is the Complacency found in the abandonment of Dhyāna, etc., in some such view as that the direct vision of Discrimination is nothing but a transformation of Prakṛti, and that, therefore, there is no need of the practice of Dhyāna. That is called after Upādāna, which is the Complacency
consisting in the attitude of mind, namely, that by the extraneous means of retirement alone there will be Release, and that, therefore, there is no need of Dhyāna, etc. That is called after Kāla, which is the Complacency consisting in the attitude of mind, namely, that even of one who has done renunciation, Release will take place by means of time alone, and that, therefore, there is no need of anxiety. That is called after Bhāgya, which is the Complacency found in some such misleading argument as that Release will take place by means of luck alone, and not by the help of the means laid down in the Śāstras on Release. Such is the meaning. But it is not so; because, since the non-existences of the Complacencies expounded by him, would be favourable to knowledge, it is improper or not right to give them the technical name of Incapacity (cīrīm III, 38 and 42).—43.

**Divisions of Perfection explained:**

उद्दाविभिः सिद्धि: || ॥ २ ॥ ४४ ॥

उद्दाबिभिः: ुहा-अदि-धिब, by means of reasoning and the rest. सिद्धि: siddhiḥ, perfection. (स्म अष्ट-धिब, eightfold.—Aniruddha only.)

44. By means of reasoning and the rest, Perfection (is of eight kinds).—255.

Vyrtti:—'The author states the distinctions of Perfection.

"Chah," argumentation, thinking (manana),—this is one Perfection, called Tāra. Verbal Cognition is the second Perfection, called Sutāra. Study is the third Perfection, called Tāra-tāra. Acquisition of or companionship of the Guru or spiritual teacher, Brahmachārin or student celebratēs, and the like, is the fourth Perfection, called Hamyaka. External and internal purity is the fifth perfection, called Sadā-muditā. Prevention of pain ādhyātmika or attendant upon the embodied state of the Self, is the sixth Perfection, called Pramodā. Prevention of pain adhibhautika or caused by the Elements and the elemental creations, is the seventh Perfection, called Muditā. Prevention of pain ādhipadaivika or caused by the Devas and like other Beings, is the eighth Perfection, called Mudamāṇā. Thus they are eightfold.

Principally, Mistake, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection,—these are the four varieties (of modifications of Buddhi). Through minor distinctions, there are fifty (of them).—44.

**Vedāntin Mahādeva:**—ोठोठ And they—the eight Perfections—are Uṇa, Saḍha, Adhyayana, the three Preventions, Companionship of Friends,
and Dāna. Now, intending to show that the order of things is stronger than the traditional or scriptural order of their mention, they are being explained in a different order.

Among them, the first Perfection is what is called Adhyayana; that is, the receiving, according to prescribed rules, from the mouth of the teacher, of the inner sense of the letters of the viḍyās or truths about the adhyātma or the Incarnate Self; this is called Tāra. The second Perfection is Śabda or Sound; that is, cognition of the sense or object produced by it; this is called Sutāra. The third is Uha, reasoning, that is, the examination of the meaning of the Āgama or Veda by means of arguments not conflicting with the Āgama; it is what they say is Manana or thinking; this is called Tāra-tāra. Companionship of friends is the fourth. One pays no respect even to the object examined by arguments, so long as one has not discussed it with the Guru, his disciples, and other student celebrants; hence companionship of friends is necessary. This is called Ramyaka. The fifth Perfection is Dāna, and dāna is the purity of the Knowledge of the discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, because the word, Dāna, is derived from the root, daip, meaning purification. As Patañjali has said, *viz. ,

विवेकव्यातिरिक्तविद्या हानोपाय! II

Undisturbed manifestation of Viveka, is the means of avoidance.—Yoga-Sūtram, II. 26, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 147.

"A-viplava" means purity, and this consists in the existence of the immediate intuition of discrimination, in the shape of a transparent stream, by means of the avoidance of doubt and mistake together with desire. But this cannot be possible except through the maturity of abhyāsa or constant practice, for a long time, without interruption, and, with ardour. Hence, by the act called Dāna, that, abhyāsa, also is included. This is called Sadā-muditā.

And these five are secondary Perfections, because they are the means; while the principal Perfections, principal, because they are the fruits, are prevention of Adhyātmanika pain, prevention of Ādhībhaṅgika pain, and prevention of Ādhīdāivika pain, of which the names are respectively Pramodā, Muditā, and Modamānā.

Thus, the divisions of Mistake are five, Incapacity is twenty-eightfold, Complacency is ninefold, and Perfection is eightfold;—these are the fifty Pādārthas or Nameables or Predicables.

. Bhāga:—By the divisions of Uha and the rest, Perfection is eightfold. Such is the meaning.
This aphorism too has been explained by the Kārikā; viz.,

अहं शास्त्रस्वयम् हुः अचिन्तकान्तः सुदृढ्मातिः।  
दाने च सिद्धयो दिशे॥ पूर्वेणकृष्णसिद्धिः॥

Argumentation, Word, Study, the triad of Prevention of Pain, Acquisition of Friends, Charity or Purity, are the eight Perfections. The three mentioned before Perfection (viz., Mistake, Incapacity, and Complacency) are the goads (to Ignorance and Suffering).—Sāṅkhya-kārikā, I. I.

The meaning of this is as follows:—

Here the three preventions of pain are the principal perfections, because they are the counter-opposites of the threefold pains, Adhyāt-mika and the rest; while the others, because they are the means towards their accomplishment, are secondary Perfections.

Amongst these, Ča is, for example, the finding out, or the guessing at, the truth, for oneself, through the force of the ābhyāsa or practice done in a previous state of existence (in other words, the instinctive guess at the truth), even without the help of instructions and the like. While Word is, for example, the knowledge that is produced from hearing the reading of another or from reading the Sūtras for oneself. And Study is, for example, the Knowledge derived from the study of the Sūtra as a student sitting at the feet of a teacher. Acquisition of Friends is, for example, the Acquisition of Knowledge from a person so exceedingly compassionate as to have come to one's house for the purpose of imparting Knowledge. And Charity is, for example, the acquisition of Knowledge from another) through satisfaction caused (to him) by the gift of money and the like.

And, amongst these, the first threefold, viz., of the form of Instinct, Word, and Study, are the "ātkusa," that is, the attractors, of the principal Perfections. This has been said with a view to show that Acquisition of Friends and Charity are inferior means as compared with the triad beginning with Instinct. Some one, however, explains (the passage as meaning) that, of these eight Perfections, "ātkusa," that is, the curb or impeder, is the first threefold, viz., of the form of Mistake, Incapacity, and Complacency, inasmuch as these cause obstruction (to the attainment of Perfection). But this explanation is not a correct one; for, since the characteristic of the non-existence of Complacency to be the contradictory of Perfection, is obtained through its being an Incapacity like deafness and the rest, it is impossible that both Complacency and Non-complacency should be the contradictory of Perfection.—44.

Note.—The same one alluded to by Viśāma is no other than Gauḍapāda, the famous Commentator of the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā.
The other so-called Perfections are not real.

The author states that Perfection comes through the abandonment of the preceding by means of the succeeding (among Mistake, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection).

Vṛtti:—There is no Perfection without "itara-hānena," the removal of Mistake, "itarāt," through Incapacity. Similarly, there is no Perfection without the removal of Incapacity through Complacency. Similarly, without the removal thereof.—45.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—The author says that Mistake, Incapacity and Complacency are to be avoided.

Without the avoidance of the others, viz., Mistake, Incapacity and Complacency; "itarat," through the other, viz., non-avoidance (i.e., employment of the other prescribed means herein laid down); Perfections do not result,—such is the complement of the aphorism; because those are obstacles in the path of Perfection,—such is the import.

Bhāṣya:—But, pray, why is it said that Perfections are attained by means only of Instinct and the rest, when it is established in all the Śāstras that the eight Perfections beginning with Ānīma, are obtained by means also of the force of Mantras, austerity, contemplation, and the like? In regard to this the author says:

"Itarāt," that is, through the means different from the pentad beginning with Instinct, that is to say, through austerity, etc., does not result real Perfection. Why? "Itara-hānena vinā;" because that Perfection results even without the removal of the "other," namely, Mistake; therefore, not being an antagonist to samsāra or worldly existence, that is merely a semblance of Perfection, and not a real Perfection. Such is the meaning.
So has it been stated by the Yoga aphorism; viz.,

ते संवादुपस्तः झुठाने सिद्धः

They are obstacles in the state of Contemplation, and Perfections during (the stage of) worldly activity.—Yoga-Sūtra, III. 36. S. B. H. Vol. iv. p. 256.

Thus, then, beginning with this that, through Knowledge comes Release, (III. 23) (and ending with the present aphorism), has been mentioned, in detail, the pratyaya-sarga, that is, the intuitional creation, having the form of the Guna or subsidiary states of Buddhi, including its effect, viz., Bondage, together with the purpose of Puruṣa in the form of Release.

And these two creations, that is, of the form of Buddhi and of its subsidiary states or modifications, are, by the form of continuous succession, the causes of one another, just like the seed and the sprout. So there is also the Kārikā:

न विना सवैलिप्तप न विना लिप्ति न सवैदिपिसः

बिल्ल्हण्या भाववल्लोद्विविचारः प्रवर्तने सर्गः

Without Bhāvas or dispositions, there would be no Līṅga; without Līṅga, there would be no succession of Bhāvas; wherefrom a twofold creation proceeds; the one called after the Līṅga, the other called after the Bhāvas.—Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, I. 11.

"Bhāva" is Buddhi, having the form of Vīsanā or tendency, of which the Gupas or subsidiary modifications are Knowledge and the rest.

Līṅga" is the Principle of Mahat, that is, Buddhi.

The samaśṭi or collective creation as well as the pratyaya or intuitional creation are completed. — 45.

Individual or Specific Creations divided.

७५५

२ १86

वाक्येविष्कृतं दैवा-अदि-प्रभेदः, of which the fixed or marked divisions are the Daiva or Divine and the rest,

46. (Vyaṣṭi or Specific Creation is that) of which the marked divisions are the Divine and the rest. — 257.

Vṛtti: — If there be Creation, there would be Dispersion. How many, then, are the divisions of Creation? To this the author replies.

From the word adī, six divisions are obtained. Thus, they are:

दैवात्त्वत् कव्यद्वारा स्वा तत्त्वसंसारः कार्यसंसारः

सुरालामुर तेष वेदां नात्सन्नियत्वृक्ताः

And among the Divine and the other Creations, there would be a sixfold samāpāra or worldly existence, arising from Karma; viz., as a god, a demon, a man, a departed spirit, a denizen of hell, as well as a grovelling creature.
The immovables are included among the denizens of hell.—46.

Bhāṣya:—Now the vyaśti or specific or individual creation, which was briefly mentioned as “Division into Individuals is through distinctions of Karma” (III. 10), is shown in detail.

Such as that of which the “prabheda” or sub-divisions are the Daiva or Divine and the rest; is Creation,—such is the complement of the aphorism.

So has it been explained by the Kārikā:

चह विकलो दैवस्तेयविमोक्ष फलवा मवति

मानुष्यधू भविष्य: समासलो भैतिक: समाः: ∥

The Daiva is of eight kinds; and the Grovelling Species is of five kinds; and the Human is of a single kind;—this, briefly, is the Bhautika Sarga or the creation of beings or elemental creation.—Śaṅkhya-Kārikā, LIII.

The eightfold Daiva Sarga is the Brahma, Prajāpatya, Ainдра, Paitra, Gāndhāra, Yaks, Rakṣa, and Paisītha. The fivefold Grovelling Species are the beasts, domestic animals, birds, reptiles, and immovables. The human creation is of a single kind. “Bhautika,” that is, the creation or emanation of the Bhūtas or the individual beings from the side of the Virāt. Such is the meaning.—46.

Note:—Virāt is, as explained in the Vedānta-Sāra, the Consciousness superimposed upon, that is to say, the Conscious Being presiding over, the Gross Bodies collectively:

(सूक्तमार्गस्य-प्रवचनं कौन्तेयम् ∥)

Bhautika Sarga also is for the sake of Puruṣa.

आन्तरिकस्तम्भयते तत्कते स्तुतीर्थ विवेकात् ∥ ३ । ४७ ∥

A-brahmāstambam-paryantam, from Brahmā down to a stock.

तत्क्रिते, for the sake of him, i.e., Puruṣa. कृत: स्रीशिभ, creation. अविवेकश, till there be Discrimination.

47. From Brahmā down to a stock, the creation is for the sake of Puruṣa, till there be Discrimination (between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa).—258.

Vṛitti:—Since activity is the very nature of Prakṛiti, there would be creation at every moment, and, consequently, no Release. In regard to this, the author says:

“Tat-krītē,” for the sake of Puruṣa, that is to say, for the purpose of Release, is creation. “Till there be Discrimination,” that is, because the essential nature of a thing does not depart from it, this (to create) is the habit of Prakṛiti so long as Discrimination does not arise.—47.
Vedāntin Mahādeva:—It is the nature of Prakṛti to energise only till there be Discrimination.

Bhāṣya:—The author says that the subsidiary creation, just mentioned, is also for the sake of Puruṣa.

Vyaṣṭi or individual creation, beginning with the Four-Faced (Brahma) and ending with the immovables, is also, just like the collective creation of Virāt or Mahat, for the sake of Puruṣa, that is to say, till there be manifestation of the Discrimination (between Prakṛti and Puruṣa) to the several Puruṣas concerned or affected. Such is the meaning.—47.

The Higher World described.

उष्णं सत्त्वविशालं ॥ ४ ॥

Aloft, (it is) abundant in Sattva.

48. Aloft, (it is) abundant in Sattva.—250.

Vṛitti:—In which region, how is Creation made? To this the author replies.

"Aloft," i.e. in the Deva-Loka or the World of the Devas.—48.

Bhāṣya:—The author mentions the divisions in Individual Creation also, in the following three aphorisms.

"Aloft," that is, above the world of the earth, the creation has a prevalence of Sattva in it. Such is the meaning.—48.

The Lower World described.

तमोविशालं भूलतः ॥ ६ ॥

Towards the foot, (it is) abundant in Tamas. matala, towards the foot.

49. Towards the foot, (it is) abundant in Tamas.—260.

Vṛitti:—The author describes the creation in the world of the Nāgas. (Matala, i.e.) in the Pātāla.—49.

Bhāṣya:—"Matala," i.e., below the world of the earth. Such is the meaning.—49.

The Middle World described.

सष्यं रजोविशालं ॥ १ ॥

In the middle, (it is) abundant in Rajas.

50. In the middle, (it is) abundant in Rajas.—261.

Vṛitti:—The author describes the creation in the world of the mortals.

"Vishāla" means, developed or predominant.—50.
Bhāṣya:—"Madhye," that is, in the world of the earth. Such is the meaning.—50.

Note:—Compare Kārikā:

उच्चम् सत्याविविधातामाविविषालत्र शुच्य।
सत्ये रूपरूपायः महाविविषालिङ्गम्।

Above, the creation is abundant in Sattva; below, it is abundant in Tamas; and, in the middle, it is abundant in Rajas;—(such is the creation) from Brahma down to a stock.

—Sāmkhya-Kārikā, LIV.

Cause of the differences of the above creations.

कर्माविविधताः प्राणनाचेष्टा गर्भवात्वत् ॥ ३१ ॥

कर्मविविधता karma-vaiṣṭityat, through diversity of Karma. प्राणनाचेष्टा prāṇa-acheṣṭa, operation or behaviour of Prakṛiti. गर्भवात्वत् garbhā-dāsa-vat, just like a born slave.

51. Through diversity of Karma, is the (diverse) operation of Prakṛiti, just like a born slave.—262.

Vṛtti:—But, then, it may be asked, when her own several Guṇas or subsidiary states do consort with one another, how does diversity appear in the creation of Prakṛiti? To this the author replies.

Just as a born slave, if he is skilful or smart enough, performs a variety of works, for the sake of his master, so does Prakṛiti produce diverse creation, for the sake of Puruṣa, through diversity of Karma, that is, through getting diverse works to do according to the different lots of individual Puruṣas.—51.

Bhāṣya:—But, then, for what reason, are there, from one single Prakṛiti, creations diversified as being abundant in Sattva, etc.? There being room for such an enquiry, the author says:

It is only by reason of a diversity of Karma, that there is the operation of Prakṛiti, as aforesaid, in the form of a variety of products. An illustration of this diversity (is afforded by the example:) “just like a born slave.” Just as of a person who is a slave from the embryo state upwards, there, through smartness or maturity of the vēsāṇā or instinctive tendency to serve, a variety of operation, that is, service, in the interest of his master; similarly. Such is the meaning.—51.

The Higher Worlds cannot be the Summum Bonum.

प्राप्तिस्वतन्त्रवर्तीकरणवृत्तिभोनितागदेव ॥ ३२ ॥

वृत्तिः Avritti, reversion, return. ततः tatra, in the going to the higher regions.

अपि api, even. उत्तराचार्य of uttara-uttara-yoni-yogā, on account of connection with successive lower births. वेयः heva, to be avoided or shunned.
52. Even there, there is return, and, therefore, on account of connection (even after that) with successive lower births, (the higher world also) is to be shunned.—263.

Vritti:—But what will Release do for him, It may be asked, whose objects have been achieved through successively reaching the higher worlds? To this the author replies:

Even after the attainment of successive superior births, there is return to Samsāra or transmigratory existence. Therefore, Samsāra has to be avoided.—52.

Bhāṣya:—But, then, if there be aloft creation abundant in Sattva, then, since the purpose of Puruṣa would be fulfilled from (the attainment of) that alone, what, it may be asked, is the need of Release? To this the author replies:

"Tatra api," that is, even where there is the going to the higher world, there is a return; hence "uttara-uttara-yoni-yogāt," that is, on account of birth in the successive lower wombs, that (higher) world also is to be shunned. Such is the meaning.—52.

There is Pain in the Higher Worlds also.

53. The pain produced by decay, death, and the like is the same (in the higher as in the lower world).—264.

Vritti:—The author says the very same thing.

The pain produced by decay, death, and the like is the same everywhere) from Brahmā down to a stock.—53.

Bhāṣya:—Moreover:

Common alike to all, without exception, those that are gone aloft and those that are gone beneath, beginning with Brahmā and ending with a stock, is the pain produced by decay, death, and the like. For this reason also it (the higher world) is to be shunned. Such is the meaning.—53.

Even Dissolution into Prakṛti is not the Summum Bonum.

न कारणविवादम् कुलक्षयता मनवधूस्यानात् || ३ || ५३ ||

na, not. बृत्तिः kāraṇa-vivāda, through dissolution or absorption into the cause, i.e., Prakṛti. स्वतः kṛita-kriyā-ta, accomplishment of the end. येन maṇasa-vat, as in the case of one who has dived. N. B.—Some read स्वतः.
for अस्वात्मन meaning, as in the case of bathing. रुद्र-उत्थान, on account of rising.

54. Not through dissolution into the cause, is there the accomplishment of the end; because, just as in the case of one who has dived, there is a rising again.—265.

Vriti:—But what will Release do for him, it may be asked, whose object has been fulfilled through dissolution into the cause, riz., Prakriti? To this the author replies:

It would have been so, had there been no return to samsāra of the one absorbed into Prakriti. But such is not the case, as we hear of the return to samsāra. Thus, then:

द्वारा मन्यतंत्रकीह तिष्ठतीनिर्गतिचिन्तका ।
शैवालि दुःखिन 'पूर्वः सह्य 'नविनासिनिका ॥

Here remain, for ten Manvantaras, those that are the contemplators of the Indriyas; the worshippers of the Elements, for full one hundred Manvantaras; those that are self-conceited, for one thousand Manvantaras; the worshippers of Buddha remain, for ten thousand Manvantaras, being freed from all feariness; for full one hundred thousand Manvantaras, stay the contemplators of the Unmanifested. On attaining to the Nirguna or Immutable Purusa, one transcends the number of time.

Note:—A Manvantara is equal to 30,07,20,000 years.

Just as in the case of one who has dived for the purpose of bathing, there is a rising again, so is it in the case of one absorbed into Prakriti. Such is the meaning.—54

Bhāṣya:—What need of more? There is no accomplishment of the end even through dissolution into the cause. This the author declares.

In the absence of the knowledge of the discrimination between Prakriti and Purusa, when, by means of the worship of Prakriti, Dispassion arises in respect of Mahat and the rest, then, absorption into Prakriti takes place, as will be seen from the declaration:

वैराम्यात् प्रकटिक्यः

Through Dispassion is absorption into Prakriti.—Sāmkhya-Kārikā, XLV.

Even from that, i.e., absorption into the cause, there is "no accomplishment of the end." "Because there is a rising again of one who has dived;" just as a person who has dived into water, rises up again, in the very same manner, do Purusas absorbed into Prakriti, re-appear in the condition of Iśaras or Lords, because it is impossible that one's Faults should be consumed without the manifestation of the
discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa,—impossible, in consequence of the fresh evolution of Passion by reason of the non-destruction of the samākāra or tendencies previously acquired. Such is the meaning.—54.

Re-birth after Absorption into Prakṛiti accounted for.

श्रकार्येविषयं तथोऽकालः पारवस्यां ॥ २ ॥ ५४ ॥

a-kārya-tve, not being directed by another to act; not being an effect.

55. Although (Prakṛiti is) not an effect, yet (her) connection with Bondage (takes place) through (her) being subordinate. (Aniruddha). Although (Prakṛiti is) not directed by another to act, yet the rising again takes place through (her) being subordinate (Vijñāna).—266.

Vṛitti:—As, on account of its eternity, there is no Bondage of the Self, so, it may be said, of Prakṛiti also. In regard to this the author says:

The not being a product is inoperative, but the being under the rule of another is operative; and this characteristic exists in Prakṛiti. And through association with that, there is her association with Bondage.—55.

Bhāṣya:—But the (root) cause (i.e., Prakṛiti) is not, by any one whatever, made to act. How does she, who is thus self-governed, one may ask, cause again the rising, which is the source of pain, of her own worshipping? To this the author replies:

Although Prakṛiti is not made to act, that is, is not directed to act, in other words, although she is independent of the will of another, yet there is "tat-yogāḥ," that is, the necessity of the rising again of one absorbed into her. Whence? "Pāra-vādyāt," that is, through her being under the rule of the object of Puruṣa. Under the influence of the object of Puruṣa in the form of the manifestation of the discrimination (between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa), one absorbed into Prakṛiti is raised up again by her. Such is the meaning.

The object of Puruṣa and the like are, however, not the active instigators of Prakṛiti, but are (merely) the nimittas or occasions for the activity of her, whose nature it is to be active. Hence her independence remains unimpaired: So also there is the Yoga aphorism, viz.,
The occasional cause does not actually move the Prakriti or creative causes into action, but merely pierces through the obstacles (to their operation);—just like a husbandman.—Yoga-Sūtram, IV. 3, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 378.

"Varaṇa-bhedah" means the removal of obstacles. — 55.

Proof of Re-appearance after Absorption into Prakriti.

स हि सर्वत्वत सर्वकर्ता || २ || ४६ ||

saḥ, he, one absorbed into Prakriti in a previous creation (Vijñāna); the Supreme Self (Aniruddha). वि हिः for. सर्वत्वत, sarva-vit, the all-knower. सर्वकर्ता, sarva-karta, the doer of all.

56. For He becomes the all-knower and the all-doer. — 267.

Vṛtti: — Of what form, one may ask, is the Supreme Self? To this the author replies:

Such abhimāna or self-conceit (as, e.g., "I am the knower and the doer of all things") arises (in the Supreme Self) through its being reflected in Prakriti (that is, in that modification of her which is called the Internal Instrument and which is the true agent in all knowledge and in all action). — 56.

Bhāṣya: — The author gives the proof also of the rising again (śide III. 54 above) of Puruṣa after his absorption into Prakriti.

For, he who was, in a previous Creation, absorbed into the Cause, (i.e., Prakriti), becomes, in another Creation, the Ādi or Original Puruṣa, (bearing the character of Īśvara or the Lord, all-knowing and all-doing; because, by reason of his absorption into Prakriti, it is but fitting that he alone should reach the status of Prakriti (the Primal Evolvent); asserted in the Sūtras such as:

तदेव सकः तस्कर्मेति किंच अत्र विषयमयः ꦕ
( मायात्सः कर्मेवत् परिक्षेत फर्तवियः ꦕ)

Being attached to Karma, the Self gets at that very Liṅga Śariṇa on which its Manas is fixed. (And, reaching the end of that Karma, it performs whatever is here done by it).—Nīrán-Āranyak-Upanīṣat, IV. 4v. 6.

Such is the meaning. — 50.

Vedāntin Muhddeca: — In the present aphorism the author discredits the view that there must exist some Intelligent Being as the superintendent of the Non-Intelligent Prakriti, and that He must be all-knowing and all-doing.

"Saḥ hi," that is, the thing called Prakriti, and that alone. Such is the meaning.
Because, as it belongs to Prakṛti to undergo transformation, it is quite possible for her to transform as the modification of knowledge. Such is the idea.

In what sense, the Sāmkhya denies Īśvara.

In the Sāmkhya, Īśvara is admitted (Vijñāna).—268.

Vṛttī:—Let the agency (of the Supreme Self) be just real (instead of being reflective): what need, one may ask, of the supposition of its being a reflection? It follows, therefore, that the very Īśvara that is conceived in the Nyāya Darsāna, exists.

In regard to this, the author says:

If (you mean to say that) the Self, as conceived by us, is the Īśvara, let it be so. But there is no evidence in favour of (the existence of an Īśvara as) conceived in the Nyāya Darsāna. And this has been declared in the aphorism (1. 92): “Because Īśvara is not a subject of proof”, of the first book, and also in the Aphorism (11. 1): “(Of Prakṛti, the agency or the becoming the procraetrix is either) for the release of the released for her own sake,” of the Second Book.—57.

* The reading in Dr. Garbe’s edition is: Dvitiya-ādyāyo ‘vinuktā-vimokṣya-artham’-īti sūtra sva-arthaḥ para-arthaḥ cha pradhāna- pravṛttiḥ iti uktam: atra sva-artha-ya gaṇga-tvaṃ. Para-artha-tvaṃ eva āha. It may be translated thus: “In the second book, in the aphorism: "*** for the release of the released ***", for her own sake as well as for the sake of the other—the activity of Prakṛiti—this has been stated; here her own sake is secondary or subservient. (Now the author) declares her acting solely for the sake of the other.” This last sentence Dr. Garbe makes to be the introduction to the aphorism III. 58, and he includes the rest of the above in the Vṛttī to the aphorism III. 57. Now, there can be but little doubt that the Doctor has made a sad mistake. For, since (in the above reading), there is no connection of thought or of language between them, the passage in question cannot, without violence to reason, be tagged on to the Vṛttī to III. 57. The correct reading of the text is, however, found in Pañcālī Kalīvara Vodanā-Vāgīsa’s edition of the Vṛttī. It runs thus: Dvitiya-ādyāyo ‘vinuktā-vimokṣya-artham’-īti sūtra. Sva-arthaḥ para-arthaḥ cha pradhāna-pravṛttiḥ iti uktam. Atra sva-artha-ya gaṇga-tvaṃ. Para-artha-tvaṃ eva āha. If may be thus rendered into English: “... and also in the second book, in the aphorism *** for the release of the released ***. For her own sake as well as for the sake of the other in the activity of Prakṛti—this has been stated. But here (out of these two) her own being is secondary or subservient. (The author) declares her acting solely for the sake of the other.” According to this reading, the first sentence completes the Vṛttī to III. 57, and the rest of the passage forms the introduction to III. 58. Dr. Garbe found this correct reading in
Bhāṣya:—But, then, one may object, if that be so, the denial of Īśvara is not established. To this the author replies:

It is verily agreed on all hands that, of the existence of an emergent Īśvara previously absorbed into Prakṛti, there is proof from the śrutis such as

Ś: स्वभावः स्वविभाषय भानमयः तपः ।

Ho who is all-knower, all-wise, whose prononce consists in knowledge.—Mundaka-Upaniṣat, I. 1. 8.

for the subject of dispute (between the Sāṃkhyaśas and the others) is the existence of an eternal Īśvara. Such is the meaning.

Or, the two aphorisms (III 56 and 57) may be interpreted in the following way:

(Prakṛti’s) subserviency also the author establishes by the aphorism “Sa hi etc.” (III. 56 which means:) for, he, the Supreme, that is, the generic, universal or collective Puruṣa, possesses the power of knowing all, and also possesses the power of being the doer of all, being, like the loadstone, the mover to activity by means of mere proximity. Such is the meaning. So that, although she is not subordinate to the will of another, still, through the proximity of a Puruṣa, whose objects have not yet been fulfilled, the activity of Prakṛti becomes necessary for his sake.

But, if that be so, one may say, then there is a contradiction to the denial of Īśvara. To this the author replies:

“Such a proof of Īśvara is admitted,” that is, the proof of Īśvara by means of proximity is, on the other hand, universally admitted in the Śrutī and the Smṛti. Such is the meaning.

And to the existence of such an Īśvara the proof is such Śrutī and Smṛtis as:

पुनः संवभुबनिविद्वारि ।
ईशावे वृत्तरूप्यम् न ततो विद्वालयपि ॥
क्रते व गुञ्याति सर्वं क्षेत्रस्य दुःखस्यं दुःखस्यं ॥

Puruṣa, of the size of the thumb, dwells in the cavity of the body, the lord of the past and the future; (he who knows Him) does not thereofforth fear.—Kuṭṭaka Upaniṣat, IV. 13.

(Prabhūkṛti) creates all the Gogas, while the Knower of the Field (Puruṣa) looks on; Īśvara, as if indifferent, causes all the Gogas to be transformed.—Source not traced.—57.

MS. In the library of the Government College, Benares, on 46 leaves and apparently about 100 years old, and deliberately rejected it. He has been more careful to select between the various Mukta and Vinukta (both of which mean the same thing—released) than to try to interpret and the force and necessity of the little word ‘Api’, and has thereby made a mess of the whole thing. And this is the less excusable in an editor whose edition refuses to be a perfectly correct one” and who does not even hesitate to ridicule a Papita like the late Jyotirmāna Vidyāśākta of Calcutta by summing him as Vidyābindu for his "worthless reprint" of the Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Bhāṣya.
Creation by Prakriti is for the Release of Purusa.

58. Creation by Prakriti, even though it be spontaneous, is for the sake of Purusa, because she is not the experimenter, as is the case with the carrying of saffron by the camel (for the enjoyment of its master).—269.

Vritti:—For her own sake as well as for the sake of the other (i.e., Purusa) is the activity of Prakriti,—this has been stated (by II. 1). But herein her own sake is secondary or subservient. (The author now) declares her acting solely for the sake of the other.

Activity for the sake of another is seen even in the case of an intelligent being; for example, the camel carries saffron (for its master). But the energising of Prakriti who is non-intelligent, is indeed for the sake of another (i.e., Purusa), because she is not the experimenter.—58.

Vedantin Mahâdera:—The word “api” has the sense of “even,” the meaning being, for the very reason that she does not herself suffer experience.

Bhâṣya:—By the array of aphorisms beginning with the first aphorism of the Second Book and ending with the preceding one, the topic of creation by Prakriti has been completed. Hereafter, for the purpose of the proof of Release, is to be declared the absolute cessation, designated as atyanta-laya or final dissolution, of the creation by Prakriti, in regard to the wise or knowing Purusa. For the purpose of the demonstration thereof (i.e., of the final dissolution of the creation by Prakriti), the author, at the outset, establishes, in a detailed manner, the purpose of the creation by Prakriti, which was briefly hinted at in the first aphorism of the Second Book.

Although the creation by Prakriti proceeds from herself alone, still it is “for the sake of the other,” i.e., for the sake of the Bhoga or experience and Apavarga or release of the other; just as the carrying of saffron by the camel is for the sake of its owner; why? “not being the
experimenter," i.e., because, since she is non-intelligent, experience and release are impossible to her. Such is the meaning.

But one may urge that, by the declaration: "for the release of the released or for her own sake" (II. 1), creation has been stated to be also for the sake of Prakṛti herself. To this we reply that that is true. Still, but for her acting for the sake of Puruṣa, her activity for her own sake is not established. For the one purpose or object of Prakṛti is the release of herself from the Puruṣa whose Bhoga or experience and Apavarga or attainment of the final end have been accomplished.

Well, it may be objected, if Prakṛti is just like a servant, how is it that she proceeds to act also for the purpose of causing the experience of pain to her lord? (We reply that the objection is) not (effectual), because, either, by the very fact that her activity is for the sake of Puruṣa’s pleasure, no room is left for the appearance of intervening pain, or because she behaves like a wicked servant.—58.

Prakṛti acts Spontaneously for the Benefit of Puruṣa.

Pratītavitvaṁ bhairabhāvitaṁ prāptaṁ || 2 || 59 ||

a-chetana-tve, being non-intelligent. api, even. kṣetra, kṣetra, as in the case of milk. cheṣitam, activity. pradhāna-saya, of the Pradhāna or Prakṛti.

59. Even though she be non-intelligent, the activity of Prakṛti is (quite spontaneous),—just like that of milk.—270.

Vṛitti:—Activity is seen, it may be objected, (only) of what is intelligent, (and) not of what is non-intelligent. In regard to this the author says:

Just as milk which is non-intelligent, oozes out for the sake of the calf, even so does Prakṛti operate for the sake of Puruṣa.—59.

Bhdsa:—Well, spontaneous creativeness itself, one may object, is not possible in the case of Prakṛti who is non-intelligent, because the operation of a cart and the like is seen to take place only through the exertion of something quite different (i.e., intelligent.) To this the author replies:

Just as milk transforms into curd, quite spontaneously, without depending upon human efforts; in like manner takes place the transformation of Prakṛti, in the shape of Mahat and the rest, even without the effort of an intelligent being, notwithstanding that she be non-intelligent. Such is the meaning.
BOOK III, SŪTRA 59, 60.

There is no tautology of this aphorism with the aphorism (II, 37): "As does the cow for the calf," because, in that aphorism, it is the operation of the Instrument that has been discussed (whereas here it is that of the principal agent), and also because cows are intelligent, (whereas milk is non-intelligent).—59.

Note.—On the subject of Prakṛti’s acting for the sake of Puruṣa and of her spontaneity, compare Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, Verses LVI, LVII, and LVIII;

This creation, beginning with Mahat and ending with the discrete Elements, performed by Prakṛti, for the sake of the other, as though for her own sake, is for the purpose of the release of each Puruṣa respectively.—66.

Just as is the activity (i.e., the oozing) of the milk, an unintelligent (substance), due to (the final cause of) the nourishment of the calf, so is the activity (i.e., creation) of Prakṛti due to (the final cause of) the release of Puruṣa.—67.

Just as people engage in acts to relieve anxiety or wish, so does the Unmanifested (i.e., Prakṛti) energise for the purpose of the release of Puruṣa.—68.

Spontaneous Activity further illustrated.

Karmavṛttāantarā kālaaye: || 3 || 60 ||

Karma-vat, like the acts. दृष्टे: dṛṣṭe, from seeing. वा va, or. लोकोऽdeśe, of time and the like.

60. Or, (the spontaneous activity of Prakṛti is proved), because (spontaneous) acts of time and the like are seen.—271.

Vṛitti:—The author applies another illustration:

Just as the act done by an agriculturist, e.g., transplantation of paddy, etc., bears fruit in course of time only, nor are the plants intelligent.

From the word "Ādi," "and the like," is to be understood Adṛśaṃ or the unseen result of past karma.—60.

Bhāga:—By the exhibition of another illustration the author explains the reason for the statement made above.

Or, like the action of time, etc., spontaneous operation of Prakṛti is established, because it is seen. Now, one season passes away, another sets in,—action of time, etc., in such form, takes place quite spontaneously; in like manner, let there be the operation of Prakṛti also; because supposition or inference follows observation. Such is the meaning. 60.
Activity of Prakriti is natural, and not the result of deliberation.

61. The activity of Prakriti is from nature, because there is no conscious adjustment of means to an end,—as is the case with the servant.—272.

Vṛtti:—The camel (vide III. 58) also, one may say, is seen to act from thinking of the fear of being beaten, etc.; nor can the non-intelligent Prakriti have such intention. In regard to this the author says:

Just as a dependent who has been a slave from the womb, being devoid of any conscious regard for his master, does his appointed acts from nature alone; so does Prakriti.—61.

Bhāṣya:—But still, may say the objector, in the absence of such deliberation as “This is the means of accomplishing my enjoyment, etc.,” the stupid Prakriti can never possess activity even, or will possess activity in the wrong way. To this the author replies:

Just as, of a perfect servant, ‘from nature,’ i.e., from Samskāra or habit or instinct alone, proceeds the thoroughly regulated and necessary service to the master, and not with a view to his own enjoyment; very similarly (does) the operation of Prakriti (proceed) from Samskāra or habit or instinct alone. Such is the meaning.—61.

Spontaneity of Prakriti is necessary.

62. (The activity of Prakriti is necessary), because of attraction by Karma from eternity.—273.

Vṛtti:—The author states another view:

Owing to the beginninglessness of Samsāra or transmigratory existence, through attraction by Dharma or Merit and Adharma or Demerit, Prakriti operates; just as, under the influence of men’s Karma, even insentient trees yield fruits.—62.

Bhāṣya:—Here the word “Va” has been used in the sense of adding together.
Since Karma is beginningless, hence, also through attraction by Karma, the activity of Prakṛti is necessary and pre-determined. Such is the meaning.—62.

Cessation of the activity of Prakṛti is also spontaneous.

विविक्तः बोधात् सृष्टिनिर्विद्यः: प्राणस्य तुम्रवत् पारे ॥ ३ । १ ॥

विविक्तः: vivikta-bodhā, through discriminative knowledge. सृष्टिनिर्विद्यः: sṛṣṭi-nirvidyā, cessation of creation. प्राणस्य pradhānasya, of the Pradhāna, i.e., Prakṛti. तुम्रवत् tumravat, as in the case of the cook. विविक्तः vivikta, in the matter of cooking.

63. Through discriminative knowledge, is there (spontaneously) cessation of Prakṛti’s creation,—just as is the case with the cook when the cooking has been performed.—274.

Vṛitti:—Since it is full of reasonableness, its repetition does not count as the fault of tautology;—hence the author says:

Creation is for the end of Puruṣa. But the cessation thereof is from the knowledge of the discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa;—just as the cook ceases to act after performing cooking.—63.

Bhāṣya:—Thus, then, it being established that Prakṛti is creative with reference to the end of the other, i.e., Puruṣa, it follows that Release is capable of accomplishment, because there must be cessation (of the activity) of Prakṛti, quite spontaneously, on the fulfilment of the purpose of the other;—this the author declares by the following section.

On the fulfilment of the purpose of Puruṣa, by means of Higher Dispersion (which results) from the knowledge of the discriminated Puruṣa (i.e., of Puruṣa discriminated from Prakṛti), there ceases the creation of Prakṛti; just as, when the cooking has been performed, the operation of the cook ceases. Such is the meaning.

It is this which is called Atyantika Pralaya or Final Dissolution. Thus there is the Śruti:

(सर्व प्राणस्य तुम्रवत् हि
सर्वालक्ष्याते देव परः ॥)

सप्तरत्नमथ्यायोजनाः पञ्च्रमायां
सप्तरत्नादृश्याद्विमयानामपि ॥

(The perishable is Prakṛti, the Immortal and Imperishable is Nara; one Deva rules the Perishable and the Self).—From contemplation of Him, from joining oneself to Him, from constantly realising the state or condition of Him, there is, at the end, the cessation of the all-pervading Māyā.—Śvetāvatāra Upaniṣad, I. 10.—63.
Release of one does not involve release of all.

इतर इतरवत त्योष्पात २ १ ६४ ॥

The other than the Indriya, i.e., Puruṣa (Aniruddha); the other than the Indriya, i.e., Puruṣa (Aniruddha). Aniruddha reads "itārat jahāti"; itārat, the other, i.e., Prakṛti; jahāti, separates, abandons. This reading is peculiar to Aniruddha. तत्तद्वा, through her fault.

64. The Self shuns Prakṛti from seeing her faults. (Aniruddha). One devoid of discriminative knowledge remains just like one in bondage, (even when another is released), through the fault of Prakṛti (Vijñāna).—275.

Vṛti:—Even when there is discriminative knowledge, through instruction, Release, one may say, is not seen (to result). In regard to this the author says:

It is not that Release takes place through mere knowledge anyhow. But "itārat", the other than the Indriya, i.e., the Self, by means of meditation and the like, "jahāti," abandons "itārat", i.e., Prakṛti, "tattva", from seeing the faults of Prakṛti, such as fickleness, etc.—64.

Bhāṣya:—But, if that be so, then, one may object, when there is cessation of Prakṛti’s creation, by means of discriminative knowledge, in respect of the Upādhi or investment of one single Puruṣa, it would entail the Release of all (Puruṣas). To this the author replies:

"Itārat", one devoid of discriminative knowledge, "itārat-vat", just as one bound by Prakṛti, remains. Whence? "Tat-doṣat," through the fault of Prakṛti herself, namely, the fault of non-fulfilment of the object of that (i.e., non-discriminative) Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

So has it been declared in the Yoga Sūtram:

नामस्यप्रायं तद्यथास्तत्कावर्षात २ २२ ॥

"Although destroyed in relation to him whose objects have been achieved, it (the sensible world) is not destroyed, being common to others."—Yoga Aphorisms, II. 23, S. B. R. Vol. IV, page 138.

So that the cessation (of the activity) of Prakṛti that has been declared in the preceding aphorism, that is only towards the Puruṣa possessing discriminative knowledge. Such is the import.

The Śrutī (Svētāsvatāra Upāṇiṣad, I. 10 quoted above, under the preceding aphorism) too, about the “all-pervading Māyā,” should be understood with reference only to one who knows, because it is identical in thought with the Śrutī “Ajām” (Śvetāsvatāra Upāṇiṣad, IV. 5, quoted under I. 146; see q.v.)—64.
Vedāntin Mahādeva: — "Itarab", one merely possessing discriminative knowledge, is also "itara-vat", like one devoid of discriminative knowledge, on account of the fault, in the form of doubt and mistake, of discriminative knowledge. So that, the import is, for the purification of discriminative knowledge, pains should be taken by one for the cultivation of the Tattvas or Principles.

Release consists in what.

65. The aloofness of both (Prakṛiti and Puruṣa) or of either, is Release.—276.

Vṛitti: — The author declares the essential form of Release.

"Dvayoh", of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa: the aloofness of Prakṛiti is her non-activity towards one who possesses discriminative knowledge; the aloofness of Puruṣa is his non-attachment to Prakṛiti. "Ekatarasya", of the Self, because it alone is the principal.—65.

Bhāṣya: — The author declares the result of the cessation of (Prakṛiti’s) creation.

"Dvayoh", of both Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, “audāsinyam”, aloveness, that is to say, separation from each other,—the same is Release. Or, (it is) the kuivalya or solitariness of Puruṣa alone, because, “I may be released”,—such only is seen to be the object desired by Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.—65.

How Prakṛiti affects one and not another.

66. (Prakṛiti) does not desist from creative activity towards others also,—(just as is the case with the mistaken) snake (which ceases to affect) only one awakened to the truth in regard to the rope.—277.
Vritti:—On (the theory of) the aloofness of Prakṛti whose nature is activity, Release of all, one may say, will be the consequence. In regard to this the author says:

Aloofness there cannot be of (Prakṛti) whose nature is activity, as there would then be the fault of giving up nature. But while she does not operate towards one possessing discriminative knowledge, she does not, "virajyate", not engage in creation, "śrīṣṭi-uparājyaṃ", also in forming creation in regard to the non-knowing or ignorant. Just as, where a rope has been mistaken for a snake, "uragaḥ", the mistake of snake ceases only in the case of one awakened to the truth in regard to the rope, and not in the case of one to whom the truth in regard to the rope is not known.—66.

Bhāṣya:—But, when immediately on the Release of a single Puruṣa, Prakṛti becomes indifferent by reason of her modification in the form of Discrimination, how can she, it may be objected, re-engage in creation for serving the purpose of another Puruṣa? Nor can you say that this is no fault on account of the division or differentiation of the parts of Prakṛti, because it is seen that the creation of the objects of experience of another (i.e. Puruṣa in bondage) is made also out of the same earth, etc. which were before the ingredients of experience to the Puruṣa who is now released.

To this the author replies:

Prakṛti, even though, in respect of one Puruṣa, she has become indifferent, in consequence of discriminative knowledge, does not remain indifferent as regards her creative activity towards another Puruṣa, but does verily create in respect to him; just as the (mistaken) snake does not cause fear, etc., only in the case of one awakened to the truth in regard to the rope, but verily does produce it in respect of one who is ignorant of the truth. Such is the meaning.

Note.—Garbe’s reading of the above portion of the Bhāṣya is not only entirely different from, but is contradictory to, the reading of F. E. Hall, adopted by us in our translation. In the aphorism also, instead of “na virajyate prabhūda-rajya tattvasya,” Garbe reads “na virata prabhūda-rajya-tattvasya.” He has probably given his own reasons in his German translation of the Bhāṣya, but these, if any, are not known to us. We therefore reserve criticism for the present.

The following is a translation of Garbe’s reading of the Bhāṣya:

Even though withdrawn from one Puruṣa, Prakṛti verily energies towards another Puruṣa; in regard to this, (the author) exhibits an illustration.

As the snake, even though withdrawn in respect of the knowing (Puruṣa), does not desist from the operation of creating fear, etc., in the case of one who has not awakened to the truth regarding the rope, in the very same way does not Prakṛti, even though
withdrawn in respect of the knowing (Puruṣa), desist from the operation of creating
Buddhi, etc., in the case of another, non-knowing (Puruṣa). Such is the meaning.
Where the reading is 'Virājyate,' there also 'virāga' means supineness.

And the likeness to a snake is here of Prakriti, because of its attribution
to, or super-imposition upon, Puruṣa who is likened to a rope.

Certain unintelligent persons, calling themselves Vedāntins, having
altogether failed to grasp that such is the drift of the illustrations of the
rope, snake, etc., draw from the comparison the absolute nothingness or
the mere imaginary or mental existence of Prakriti.

By the help of the above illustration offered by the Sāṃkhyaśas who
maintain the reality of Prakriti, are to be understood the matters declared
in the Śruti and the Smṛiti.—66.

Note:—The Rope-Snake Theory: Suppose a man, walking about in dim moon—light,
is suddenly seen to run away from the place where he had been, crying out "Snake,"
"Snake". His neighbours come out to him and enquire what the matter is. He tells
them that he was almost bitten by a snake. He then takes his friends to the spot where
he had seen the snake, so that they may kill it. But when they look at it more closely,
they find that there is no snake there and that what was supposed to be a snake,
is only a piece of rope.

Now, in this story, the rope is the reality and the snake is the unreality,—a fragment
of the imagination. And some so-called Vedāntins make use of the example in the
following manner: Just as the rope is the reality, so is Brahma or Puruṣa the reality, and
just as the snake is an unreality, so is the world or Prakriti an unreality,—a fragment
of the imagination. Vijñāna Bhikṣu, on the other hand, explains the metaphor in another
light. He looks not so much at the object, rope, snake, Puruṣa, Prakriti, etc., them-
selves, as at their operation or influence. This is also the Sāṃkhyas view of the mat-
ter. In creation the snake is as much a reality as is the rope. So is the case with
Prakriti. And while this is so, mistake may occur at every moment: the mistake of
rope for snake, the mistake of Puruṣa for Prakriti, the mistake of Brahma for the world.
So that, when Puruṣa is compared to a piece of rope and Prakriti to a snake, the com-
parison does not show that Puruṣa is the reality, and Prakriti the unreality, but it shows
that just as, when the rope which had been so long mistaken for a snake, is
known to be a rope as distinguished from a snake, the snake ceases to frighten a man, so
does Prakriti cease to bind Puruṣa, when the latter who had so long been mistaken for her,
is known to be Puruṣa as distinguished from Prakriti.

Dual character of Prakriti supported.

कर्मिनिमित्तयोगाक् ॥ ॥ ६७ ॥

Karma-nimitta-yogā, from connection or association with, or
presence of, Karma which is the efficient cause. N.B.—For 'Yogā,' Aniruddha
reads 'a-yogā,' meaning from non-connection. Ch, and.

67. And (Prakriti does not cease to act) also because
of connection with Karma which is the efficient cause.—278.

Vṛitti:—The author gives the reason for the above (that Prakriti
does not cease to act in respect of others).
Because, in respect of one possessing discriminative knowledge, there is the absence of Karma which is the efficient cause (of activity on the part of Prakṛti). There can be no sprout without a seed.

Says the Śruti also:

निलचे हृदयप्रभविकाचारी सर्वेष्णाश्च
श्रीयो ज्ञात्वा कर्मोऽक्षतद्वितियं हस्ते परावरे

The knot of the heart is pierced, all doubts are cut down, and his Karmas also wear away, when that Supreme is beheld.—Maṇḍuka Upaniṣat, II. II. 8.—67.

Bhāṣya.—Not* only is this sense (that Prakṛti ceases to act in respect of some, and continues to act in respect of others) established by means of its having an example parallel to it, (as adduced in V. 66), but also:

Prakṛti creates objects for other Puruṣas also through association with that Karma which is an efficient cause in creation. Such is the meaning.—67.

Prakṛti's selection how determined.

नैरपेक्षेयप्रकृतिप्रकृतीपारेरविवेको निरिच्छयः ॥ ३ ॥

नैर-पेक्ष्यो, नैर-प्रचारो, संतानाय प्रकृतिप्रकृतीपारेरविवेको निरिच्छयोः ॥

Nair-apeksya, there being indifference (Vijñāna) or independence (Aniruddha). ब्रि Api, even. श्रीवक्ष्य Prakṛti-upakāra, in respect of Prakṛti's service. निरिच्छय: A-vivekaḥ, non-discrimination, want of discrimination. निरिच्छय: Nimittam, the efficient cause.

68. Though there is (equal) indifference (on the part of all Puruṣas), Non-discrimination is the efficient cause of Prakṛti's service.—279.

Vṛitti:—Since Adṛśa or Karma is a product of Budhi, let there be the contribution of Adṛśa in the production of Aham-kāra and the rest; but where is the contributoriness of Adṛśa, may ask our opponent, in the performance of her own act by Prakṛti? In regard to this the author says:

Even though there is this non-dependence on Adṛśa, Non-discrimination is the auxiliary of Prakṛti.—68.

Bhāṣya.—But then, even though Purushas are equally indifferent, being all alike unsolicitous, what is, it may be asked, the principle of determination here whereby Prakṛti proceeds to act in regard to one, and ceases to act in regard to another? Nor can Karma or Adṛśa be

* This introduction to the present aphorism, F. B. Hall reads, of course, wrongly, as the concluding portion of the Bhāṣya on the preceding aphorism.
the required principle of determination, because there is nothing to
determine what Karma belongs to which Purusa.

To this the author replies:

Even though there is this indifference of Purusas, yet Prakriti, simply
through the Non-discrimination, namely, “He is my lord, I am verily
he,” serves Purusas by creation, etc. Such is the meaning. So that, to
what Purusa there exists her Vasana or the tendency to exhibit herself
without discriminating, just in respect of that Purusa only, Prakriti
proceeds to act. It is this which is the principle of determination.
Such is the import. — 68.

Note.—Here the question is as to how Prakriti, at the very beginning of a Creation,
that is, prior to her transformation as Mahat, is enabled to exercise her creative activity
or to perform “her own act,” as Aniruddha would say, in which consists her service to
the uncreated Purusas, and which is essential for their ultimate release. Activity, of
course, is her very nature. But an occasion or efficient cause is wanted. Now, Purusas,
by their very nature, are unenlightened of Prakriti, so that the latter cannot approach them
that way. Adrishtam is yet unproduced, because, being a product of Mahat, it appears
subsequent to the initial action of Prakriti. Adrishtam, acquired in the previous Creation,
is of no help; since it is different for each individual Purusa and because, moreover, it
cannot, at the time, be determined what Adrishtam, belongs to which Purusa. Therefore,
the spring of action in Prakriti is just the Vasana or tendency of her nature to exhibit
herself, in every detail, to those Purusas who do not yet recognize their difference from
her and whom she is consequently identified.

How Prakriti ceases to act.

नर्तकीवरुण प्रकृत्स्थाने किंवत निन्द्रित्स्थानित्स्यार्थायं
सर्वकक्षे नर्तकी-वरुण, प्रकृतस्थाने निन्द्रित्स्थानि
तित्स्यार्थायं, किंवत नर्तकी-वरुण, प्रकृतस्थाने
सर्वकक्षे निन्द्रित्स्थानि

69. Just as is the case with a dancer, (there is)
cessation of the activity (of Prakriti), though (she had been)
engaged in activity, through the end having been attained.

Vritti:—The author explains the cessation of the activity of Prakriti by
means of an example.

Just as a dancer, after the end of entertaining an assembly has been
accomplished, desists, so too does Prakriti, after the end of Purusa, namely,
discriminative knowledge, has been attained, desists from creation.—69.

Bheda:—But, since activity is her nature, how can, it may be asked,
cessation of activity be possible even when Discrimination has taken
place? To this the author replies:

Prakriti’s nature to energize is only with reference to the purpose
of Purusa, and not universally. Hence is explained the cessation of the
activity of Prakṛti, even though she had been engaged in activity, when the end of her activity has been attained in the form of the accomplishment of the object of Puruṣa. Just as, there is the cessation of the activity of a dancer, engaged in activity for the purpose of showing her dance to an assembly, when that end has been attained. Such is the meaning.—69.

Note.—Ref. Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, Verse LIX:—

\[
\text{रक्षस्य दर्शिवित्वा निषिद्धे ततः कथवाद ।}
\]

\[
\text{पुरुषस्य तथासाय प्रकाश्य निलगिते प्रक्तिः॥}
\]

As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectators, desists from the dance, so does Prakṛti desist, having exhibited herself to Puruṣa.

Above continued.

\[
\text{वोषोबोधपि नोपर्यं च ज्ञानस्य कुलविश्ववृत्॥ ३०॥}
\]

\[
\text{प्राप्ते दोष-बोधे, तत्र ज्ञातस्य कुलस्तेऽत्सवः॥ ३१॥}
\]

Having knowledge of faults, he, also, has, at once, Upasāparpaṇam, approach. Kapal Pradhānasaya, of Prakṛti. Kula-vadhāvat, like a woman of noble family.

70. Moreover, on the knowledge of her faults (by Puruṣa), there is no approach of Prakṛti (to him),—just as in the case of a woman of noble family.—281.

Vṛttī:—It may be said that Prakṛti, even though she has desisted, will yet proceed to act again from some cause or other. In regard to this the author says:

Because of the clear knowledge of her own faults by means of Discrimination, there is no more approach of Prakṛti (to Puruṣa); just as a woman in a noble family, having been seen by a third person, shrinks within herself, saying, "May I not be seen by him again."—70.

Bhāṣya:—The author gives another reason for the discontinuance of the activity of Prakṛti.

Being ashamed, moreover, at Puruṣa's having seen her faults such as to undergo transformation, to be essentially painful, etc., Prakṛti does not again venture near Puruṣa. Just like the woman of family: just as a woman of family, being ashamed at ascertaining that her faults have been seen by her husband, does not approach her husband; similarly. Such is the meaning.

So has it been declared in the Nāradya:—

\[
\text{सत्विकारायं मैत्रेयं न हिंदुः पुरुषस्य गुद्वेष्मिः ।}
\]

\[
\text{प्रकटिर्भूतादिके न सम्प्रग्रहिते प्रक्ति:॥}
\]

Even though attended with modifications, after having, by reason of non-discrimination, being experienced objects by means of her Guna-body, this Prakṛti, when her faults have been known, desists through sheer modesty.—Nārada-Puruṣa (?)
The very same thing has been declared by the Kārikā also:

शास्त्रवेदरूप न किंचित्वसलिति में मतिनवविति।
या हृदासलिति पुनः द्वारासुभृति पुलस्य॥

My opinion is that nothing exists which is more delicate than Prakriti who, knowing that “I have been seen”, comes no more within the sight of Puruṣa.—Sūkṣmavākya-Kārikā, Verse LXI.—70.

Relation of Bondage and Release to Puruṣa.

नैकान्ततो वन्धनोऽभिथो पुलस्याविवेकानाले॥ २ । ७१॥

Na, not. तत्वतः: Ekāntataḥ, absolutely, really. वन्धनः Bandha-mokṣaḥ, Bondage and Release. पुलस्य Puruṣasya, of Puruṣa. अविवेकः A-vivekāt, from Non-discrimination. वार्ता Rite, except.

71. Bondage and Release do not absolutely belong to Puruṣa,—(and would not be), except through Non-discrimination.—282.

Vṛtti:—Whose is Bondage, his is Release; and they, one may say, do not belong to Puruṣa. In regard to this the author says:

From the non-discrimination of Prakriti and Puruṣa, arises the mere abhimāna or conceit of Bondage and Release.—71.

Bhāṣya:—But then, if the activity of Prakriti be for the purpose of Puruṣa, the consequence, therefore, one may say, would be the transformation of Puruṣa by means of Bondage and Release (which is not desired.) To this the author replies:

Bondage and Release, in the form respectively of conjunction and disjunction of pain, do not belong to Puruṣa, “absolutely”, i.e., really, but result from non-discrimination only, in the manner mentioned in the fourth following aphorism (III. 74.) Such is the meaning.—71.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—“Ekāntataḥ” means natural.

Bondage and Release really belong to Prakriti.

प्रकृतेऽर्ज्जुस्वात तसम्भवात पशुभावं॥ ३ । ७२॥

प्रकृतिः. Prakritiḥ, of Prakriti. अनुजयत Ānusya’yāt, really. ससंगत Sa-sangataḥ, through being consociated. पशु. Paśuvat, like the beast.

72. (Bondage and Release are) really of Prakriti, because of her being consociated (with Adriṣṭam),—just as is the case with the beast.—283.
Vṛitti:—But since unreality must be preceded by reality, of whom are Bondage and Release real? To this the author replies:

"Ānjasyāt", really. "Sa-saṅga-tvāt" through connection with Guṇa. As a beast, saṅgat, i.e., through connection with rope, is bound. Therefore, Prakṛti’s Bondage and Release are real. Bondage is nothing but activity towards one not possessing discriminative knowledge; Release is non-activity towards one possessing discriminative knowledge. And hence the fault of deviation from nature (vide Vṛitti on III. 66) does not arise.—72.

Bhāṣya:—The author declares that Bondage and Release, as described above, belong, in a real sense, to Prakṛti herself.
Bondage and Release are, by reason of her really suffering pain, (really) of Prakṛti herself, “through being consociated”, through her being attached to Dharma or Merit, etc., which are the causes of pain. Just as a beast, because of its being attached to a rope, undergoes Bondage and Release; similarly. Such is the meaning.

This has been declared by the Kārikā:

तत्समायु वच्चतेन न गुप्ते नापि संस्कारित पुरुषः।

संस्कारितवच्चतेन मामाधिरय योग्यतः॥

Therefore, verily, no Puruṣa is ever bound, nor is released, nor transmigrates; Prakṛti, the support of manifold creations, is bound, is released, and transmigrates.—Sāmkhya-Kārikā, Verso LXI—72.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—Of Bondage and Release, even though inhering in Prakṛti, there is connection with Puruṣa, through non-apprehension of the discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa.

How Prakṛti binds and releases herself

हुँये: सत्तभिवाल्मणं बलातिः प्रधानं कोशकारविद्रिमोचयते—

कर्पेश॥१॥७३॥

हुँये: rūpāḥ, by means of forms. सत्तभिवाल्मण: saptabhiḥ, seven. अत्मानं atmanam, herself. बलातिः badhnāti, binds. प्रधानं prabhānām, Prakṛti. कोशकारविद्रिम kosa-kāra-vat, like the maker of cocoons, i.e., the silk-worm. विमोचयति vimochayati, releases. कर्पेश eka-rupas, by one form.

73. By seven forms does Prakṛti bind herself, like the silk-worm,—by one form does she release herself.—284.

Vṛitti:—By what form does Prakṛti bind herself, and by what form does she release herself? To this the author replies:

By seven forms, viz., Dharma or Merit, Vairāgya or Dispassion, Aśvārya or Lordliness, A-Dharma or Demerit, A-Jñāna or Ignorance,
A-Vairāgya or Non-Dispassion, and An-Aidvārya or Non-Lordliness, she binds; she releases by one form, viz., Jñāna or Knowledge.—73.

Bhāṣya: — Here, by what means is there Bondage, and by what means, again, is there Release? There being room for such an enquiry, the author says:

By Dharma, Vairāgya, Aidvārya, A-Dharma, A-Jñāna, A-Vairāgya, and An-Aidvārya,—by these seven “forms”, i.e., properties which are the causes of pain, Prakṛti binds herself with pain. “Like the silk-worm”; just as the worm which makes the cocoon, binds itself by means of the dwelling which it itself constructs; similarly.

And that same Prakṛti releases herself “by one form”, i.e., by means of Jñāna alone, releases herself from pain. Such is the meaning. —73.

Non-discrimination itself is not Bondage nor Release.

निदित्त्वमर्विचेष्टाय न दुर्दशानि: || ३ || ७४ ||

निदित्त्वम, occasional or efficient causality. विचेष्टाय a-vivekasaya, of A-viveka or Non-discrimination. After “A-vivekasaya” Aniruddha reads “Iti,” meaning Hence. न, no. दुर्दशानि: dṛṣṭa-hāniḥ, loss of “visible”, results or fruits.

74. Non-discrimination is the Nimitta or efficient cause,—(so that) there is no loss of the “visible”. —285.

Vṛtti: — By means of karma or acts, performed for the attainment of a specific object of desire, and not so performed but performed from a sense of duty only, are attained respectively Enjoyment and Release; on the giving up thereof, there will be, one may say, loss of “visible” fruits. In regard to this the author says:

Of Adṛṣṭam or Merit and Demerit produced by acts,—through Jñāna or Knowledge,—therefore, immediately,—is the causality in the production of Release; but, of Samsāra or worldly existence, the cause is A-viveka or Non-discrimination. Therefore, there is no loss of “visible” fruits.—74.

Vedāntin Mahādeva: — Of Samsāra, the cause is A-viveka. With a view to its cessation, endeavour should be made only in respect of the manifestation of Discrimination. Thereby there will not be the loss of the fruit, namely, Release, of the “visible”. From karma, however, through the purification of the Chitta or thinking principle, there results Release as the fruit; wherefore it (karma) is called the “visible”.

Bhāṣya: — But then, that which has been asserted, namely, that Bondage and Release result from Non-discrimination, is, one may object,
improper; because Non-discrimination is (with men) neither a "heya," a thing to be avoided, nor an "upâdeya," a thing to be secured, that is, is not an object of volition at all; for, in the world, only pain, and the absence thereof, i.e., pleasure, etc., are, in themselves, the objects of aversion and desire. Otherwise, there will be loss or repudiation of what is (actually) seen.

Apprehending such an objection, the author himself explains what was asserted in the fourth preceding aphorism (III. 71).

What was asserted before was this, that Non-discrimination was only the occasion or efficient cause of Bondage and Release in Purusas, and not that Non-discrimination itself was these; hence there is no repudiation of what is (actually) seen.

And this is clear in the aphorisms of the First Book. Due to the occasion of Non-discrimination is the conjunction of Prakriti and Purusa: and while from that conjunction, pain relating to Prakriti is being produced, it casts its reflection in Purusa; the very same (reflection) is the experience of pain, that is, (Purusa's) connection with pain; and it is its cessation that is the end desired by Purusa (Purusa-artha), which is called Moksa or Release.—74.

How development of Viveka or Discrimination is possible.

75. Through habitual cultivation of the Principles, in the form of the abandonment (of abhimana or conceit), expressed as (that the Self is) not (Prakriti), (that it is) not (Mahat, etc.), (there takes place) the perfect development of Viveka or Discrimination.—286.

Vritti:—And how can there be Viveka? it may be asked. To this the author replies:

It is clear.

Says the Sruti also:

स एव बेति केवलासाधारणो न वि पुक्तात्मायेऽवि वि विद्वैते हृद्यति

This, the same, is not (this), is not (that); the Self, therefore, is not apprehensible,
BOOK III, SŪTRA 75.

for it is not apprehended; it is not decaying, for it is not decayed, etc.—Bṛhat Ārāpyaka Upaniṣat, III. ix. 26—75.

Note:—The section of the Bṛhat Ārāpyaka Upaniṣat here referred to is transcribed below:

Kāsaṅkha, Sūkṣma, etc. Āstika, Āstika, Pratīṣṭhit Hātayāna āśrayāt Pratīṣṭhit Hātayāna; Pratīṣṭhit Hātayāna Āstika, et cetera.

(Śākalya to Yājñavalkya : ) Wherein, O, do you as well as the Self stand grounded?
(Yājñavalkya to Śākalya : ) In Āpāna.
(Śākalya : ) Wherein, O, is Āpāna grounded?
(Yājñavalkya: ) In Āpāna.
(Y.) In Vyāna.
(Śk.) Wherein, O, is Vyāna grounded?
(Y.) In Udāna.
(Śk.) Wherein, O, is Udāna grounded?
(Y.) In Samāna.

It, the same,—(the Self)—is not (this), is not (that). Therefore, the Self is not apprehensible, for it is not apprehended; it is not decaying, for it is not decayed; it is free from attachment, for it cannot be attached; it is black; it does not suffer; it is not killed. The eight abodes (mentioned before, viz., Earth, Will, Beauty, Ādātta, Form, Waters and Sound), the eight worlds (viz., Agni, Heart, Eye, Ear, Heart, Eye, Heart, and Heart), the eight Devas (viz., Śānti, Yama, Varuṇa, Soma, Agni, Food, Prāṇa, and Vāyu), the eight Puruṣas (residing in the eight abodes)—he who by obstructing and prevailing over these Puruṣas, transcends,—about him, the Upaniṣadic Puruṣa, I ask.

If thou dost not wish to tell me of him, thy head will drop down.

Śākalya did not heed him, and his head dropped down. And theeless stole away the bones, thinking that those were something else.

Bhāṣya:—So then it has been elaborately discriminated, by means of two Books, that, commencing with the primeval creation and ending with the final dissolution, all transformation whatever is of Prakṛti and of her modifications only, and that Puruṣa, on the other hand, is simply pure Consciousness, full and immutable. Now, among the various means conducive to the development of that Discrimination, the author mentions that which is the essence of them all, namely, Abhyāsa or practice or habitual cultivation.

Development of Discrimination takes place through the habitual cultivation of the Tattvas or Principles, in the form of the abandonment of abhimāna or conceit or self-identification, expressed as (It is) not (this), (it is) not (that), in respect of all jāda or non-intelligent things ending.
with Prakriti. All other means are merely (lit. limbs) auxiliaries to Abhyasa or habitual cultivation (of the Tattvas.) Such is the meaning.

Thus, says the Shruti:

Bhayasth bhagavato maitri maitri na ca tattva vrata pramadita

Now, then, the direction “Neti” “Neti”—Not, Not,—for does not something other than, and beyond, this (visible world) not exist ?—Br. Ar. Ut. II. iii. 8.


Note :—We give below the whole (third) Brahmaṇa to make the meaning of the above extracts appear more clearly.

हे वाच ब्रह्मेन, ये सुन्दरःवामुद्रकः सर्वेनवामुद्रकः बिषयतः यथा सत्यम्।।।२।। तत्तवसूत्रः यद्यन्दन्तयादितात्तसत्यानां सर्वेनवामुद्रकः बिषयतः सत्यम्।।।२।। यथामूलः वान्दन्तः तस्य व्रत्यदत्तश्च शरणश्च व्रत्यदत्तश्च।।।३।। व्रत्यदत्तश्च ब्रह्मात्मानं सह वान्दन्तः यथात्मनम्।।।३।। यथामूलः प्राप्य व्रत्यदत्तश्च शरणश्च शरणश्च।।।३।। तस्य मूलः प्राप्य व्रत्यदत्तश्च शरणश्च।।।३।। तस्य मूलः प्राप्य व्रत्यदत्तश्च शरणश्च।।।३।।

Two, my child, are the forms of Brahman : ponderable or finite and imponderable or infinite, mortal and immortal, immobile and mobile. Sat (Earth, Water, and Fire) and Tysat (Air and Ether).—1.

It is this (which is) finite,—that which is other than Air and Ether. This is mortal. It is immobile. It is “Sat”. Of this, the same, the finite,—of this, the same, the mortal,—of this, the same, the immobile,—of this, the same, the “Sat”,—he is the Rasa or Chief,—the same who heats,—of the “Sat” verity is he the Chief.—2.

Now, the infinite is Air and Ether. It is immortal. It is mobile. It is the “Tysat”. Of this, the same, the infinite,—of this, the immortal,—of this, the mobile,—of this, the “Tysat”,—he is the Chief,—the same Purusa, who is in this Sphere,—of the “Tysat” verity is he the Chief. Thus (is finished) the Adhib-Davitam.—3.

Now, Adhib-Ātman : It is it that is finite, that which is other than Prāṇa, he who is in the heaven (Ākṣas) of the microcosm. It is mortal. It is immobile. It is the “Sat”. Of this, the same, the finite,—of this, the mortal,—of this, the immobile,—of this, the “Sat”,—he is the Chief, who is Chaksun (the Deity presiding over the Eye),—of the “Sat” verity is he the Chief.—4.

Now, the infinite is Prāṇa,—he, the same, who is in the heaven of the microcosm. It is immortal. It is mobile. It is the “Tysat”. Of this, the same, the infinite,—of this, the immortal,—of this, the mobile,—of this, the “Tysat”,—he is the Chief, he who is the Purusa (presiding) over the right Eye,—of the “Tysat” verity is he the Chief.—5.
Of this, the same, Purusa, the Rāpa or form—as the Kuṣumbha flower dying a piece of cloth, as the blue dying a piece of blanket, as the worm called Indra-Gopa, as the flame of fire, as the white lotus, as a series of lightning flashes compared with a single flash of lightning—even so is its beauty.—(he) who knows thus (knows).

Now, then, the direction “Neti,“ “Neti!”—Not, Not,—for does not something other than, and beyond, this, not exist? Now, its name: Truth of Truth. Prāpa verily are the Truth. Of them is He the Truth.—6.

That is called knowledge which is the knowledge of the difference of the intelligent and the non-intelligent among the modifications that have been described here, beginning with the A-vyakta or Unmanifested (Prakṛiti), and ending with the Visēṣas or the discrete products.*

For example:

प्रतिस्वरूपं स्नायुतं मांसोऽपितकथेयं।
वर्गाधिश दुर्गच्चित पूर्वं सुमुखिशये॥

समानस्यासाधित रूपासाधनसामाय।
सन्तोषलक्षणं सुदृढः ईश्वरं वासुकिणः॥

तथा र्यावज्ञिमं दैवं कुर्ष्यात् भयायिनः॥

Framed with bones, united with sinews, overlaid with flesh and blood, covered over with skin, emitting bad smell, full of urine and excreta, a prey to decay and grief, the home of disease, inconstant, dirty, resting on what is not-permanent, the abode of the elements,—it (the body) one must abandon. As a tree (removing itself) from the bank of the river, or as a bird (flying away) from the tree, so is he who forsakes this body, saved from a painful fate.—Manu Samhitā, Vi.

This very thing has been declared by the Kārikā also:

पद्मः तस्मायात्सामात्सरितस्मि
विपच्चित्वाहँकरः केतकः नरपघाते भागम्।

So, through the cultivation of the Principles, is produced the final, pure, because free from doubt, and the one single knowledge that neither does agency belong to me, nor is attachment mine, nor am I (identical with the body, etc.).—Śāmkara Kārikā, Verse LXIV.

“Naasti” negates the agency of the Self. “Na me” negates attachment. “Na abam” negates identity. “A-viparyayāt visuddham” is the description of “Kevalam”. (Kevala, i.e., pure, i.e., Visuddham or purified, A-viparyayāt, i.e. because of the absence of doubt). Hence (knowledge) in the intermediate stage is affected with doubt. Such is the meaning.

* In the text this passage appears in verse. Dr. Garbo takes it to be a quotation, probably from the Mātya Purāṇa. We suspect, however, that this is a portion of the Bhāṣya, only written in verse. For there is nothing in the Bhāṣya itself to indicate that the passage in question is a quotation. The drift of the Bhāṣya rather goes to show that it is not a quotation.
It is this pureness that has, in the aphorism, been declared by the word “siddhi” or development. For it is knowledge of this description that has been established as being the cause of Release, by the Yoga aphorism:

विशेषबद्धति विवधया हानीपाय: || 2 || 29 ||

Discriminative knowledge undisturbed is the means of avoidance—Yoga Sūtra, II. 26, S. B. H., Vol. IV, page 147.—75.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—“Neti Neti iti Tattva-abhyāsāḥ”: through constant contemplation of the Self by means of its characteristic difference from the body, the Indriya, etc.; “Tyāgāt”: through renunciation; (is reached) “Viveka-siddhiḥ”: the direct vision of the Discrimination.

An exception to the above rule pointed out

श्रेष्ठाकारिप्रमेयोऽवनिमित्त: || 3 || 76 ||

वाविष्कारितं Adhikāri-prabhedāt, owing to the difference (of excellence) in the Adhikārins or persons who are eligible for the cultivation of the Principles.

76. Owing to the division of the eligibles (into classes), (it is) not a (general) rule.—287.

Vṛitti:—If Release is attained by means of the cultivation of the Principles, and the like, then, one may object, there will be Release in the case of all the disciples after they have once received instructions about these things, because the cultivation (of the Principles) will be the same in every case. To this the author replies:

Because of the differences of ‘power’ or competence, good, middling, and bad, it cannot be a rule that Release (of all the disciples will take place) at one and the same time.—76.

Bhāṣya:—In respect of the development of Discrimination, the author points out a distinction.

Since there exist differences among the Adhikārins or eligibles for the cultivation of the Principles, such as bad, etc., even though cultivation of the Principles be pursued, there is no rule that, in this very birth, perfect development of Discrimination will be accomplished (in all cases). Such is the meaning. Therefore, one should, by skill in the cultivation of the Principles, carry one’s competency to the highest degree of excellence. Such is the import.—76.

“Pure” Discrimination alone is the cause of Release.

शाखालक्रस्य सत्याविवेकतोपुष्पमोऽवनिमित्त: || 3 || 77 ||

वाविष्कारितं Bādhita-anuvṛityā, by reason of the return of what has been repelled. Aniruddha reads the word with the fifth case-ending.
madhya-vivekatabh, in the stage of medium (and still imperfect) Discrimination.

Vṛtti:—If Release results through Discrimination, how is it seen, one may ask, that Experience occurs to one possessing Discrimination? To this the author replies:

Of one possessing strong Discrimination, there is no Experience, of one of medium Discrimination also, the Experience is a mere return of Viasanā or the previous tenendency to experience, since, in his case, there being an absence of desire for experience, it is repelled by means of the knowledge expressed as "Enough of it". One undergoes experience, thinking "Let me through experience wear away the Karma which is about to yield fruits".—77.

Bhāṣya:—The author declares that, only by the perfect development of Discrimination, there can be Release, and not otherwise.

One attains to the state of medium Discrimination immediately after the immediate cognition of the Self by means of Sampcrajñāta Yoga or Cognitive Trance on a single occasion. Even when medium Discrimination has taken place in Purusa, Experience still occurs by the return into Purusa, in the form of reflections, through the influence of Prārabdha or Karma which has commenced to operate, of pain, etc., even though these had been previously repelled. Such is the meaning.

Perfect development of Discrimination, on the other hand, takes place only through the A-Sampcrajñāta Yoga or Ultra-Cognitive Trance from which there is no rising (into waking consciousness) again. Hence, in order to establish that when that has taken place, there is no more Experience, the expression "Madhya-vivekatabh," in the stage of medium Discrimination, has been used (in the aphorism).

While bad or sluggish Discrimination, prior to direct cognition, is merely of the form of Hearing, Thinking, and Meditating.

Such is the division (of Discrimination into bad, middling, and good).—77.

Vedāntin Mahādēva:—Madhya-tvam or mediumness indeed is the containing of the residuum of the Prārabdha or the Karma which has been in operation, which is an obstruction to the attainment of Videha-Mukti or Release in the disembodied state. Of the Purusa who possesses

* Vide pp. 305-306, foot-note, where the term has been fully explained.
this (i.e., mediumness), after Discrimination, Experience still takes place,—such is the (syntactical) connection. Owing to the non-existence of Desire and Aversion; “Of what has been repelled,” i.e., of what does not lead to joy and sorrow, that is to say, of even what is not the cause of the production of desire for objects of enjoyment; “by the return,” i.e., by its being rendered necessary by reason of its being the fruit of Prārabdha or Karma which has been in operation. So that, the idea is, there is a very great difference between the Discriminating and the Non-discriminating.

Case of Jivan-Mukta considered.

पील्वत्रेण्य रक्रीष्टीमीति पुनम्
स्मर्यं कस्य कामम् तारेतमुलकर्तवर्

Says the Śrutī also:

Should Puruṣa realise the Self in this way that “I am it,” then, wishing for what, for desire for what, will he decay along with the body?—Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Upanīṣat, iv. iv. 12–13.

Bhāṣya:—The Jivan-Mukta also is just in the condition of one of medium Discrimination. Such is the meaning.—78.

Proof of Release during life.

उपेश्योत्सत्त्वाचत्तत्त्तिद्विगः

From the relation of the instructed and the instructor, is the proof of the Jivan-Mukta.—290.

* This sentence is not found in Dr. Garbe’s edition of Aniruddha Vṛtti.
Vṛti:—There is no proof, it may be said, that there can be Release of one while one is living. So the author says:

Of one possessing strong Discrimination (and, therefore,) not cognisant of external affairs, the very character of being the instructor does not exist. To one, again, possessing sluggish Discrimination, the character of being the instructor does not belong, because of his ignorance; on the contrary, he himself is the person to be instructed. The instructor (therefore) must be the person possessing medium Discrimination. Hence is “tat-siddhiḥ,” i.e., the proof (of the existence) of the Jivan-mukta.—79.

Bhāṣya:—The author states the proof in regard to the Jivan-mukta.

From the mention, in the Śāstras, on the subject of Discrimination, of the relation of the preceptor and the disciple, there is proof of the Jivan-mukta. Such is the meaning. Because to be the instructor is possible only for one released during life.—79.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—Because of the non-existence in him of Desire, etc., the Jivan-mukta cannot be the person to be instructed; but the person of sluggish Discrimination is the one to be instructed. Therefore, there is proof of the Jivan-mukta as being the instructor of the person of sluggish Discrimination.

Another proof.

श्रुतिक || ५ ||

भूत: श्रुतिः, श्रुति, वैदा. च चा, असो.

80. There is, moreover, Śruti, (on the subject).—291.

Vṛti:—The author shows the evidence on this point.

Said:

श्रीवचे ति विद्धा एवैवैञ्चालाया विमुच्यते ||

For the wise, even while living, is released from joy and pain.—80.

Bhāṣya:—There is also Śruti in respect of the Jivan-Mukta.

वैरोधी वर्तन मुच्येत तितृत्वशुकोतीर्थिविद्धे ।

विद्याकामक्षात्वा दिनिक्षोद्धीविद्धे घटान ||

Man can be released by means of initiation (Dikṣa) only; even the released can stay in the figure or body. Lying within the wheel of the potter, the jar may still revolve, even though disjoined from it. (Source not traced).

श्रीपति तथा विद्या वि

Being Brahman itself, (he) reaches even Brahman.—Br. Ār. Up. IV. 4. 6.
Says the Nāradya Smṛiti also:

वृत्ति न भूता न भूतान्तः स दूर्वतः ।

स्वरूपानां स्वरूपाक्षो श्रीव्यूढः स उच्चाये ॥

He is called the Jivan-mukta who looks upon all things as the Self, who is above virtue and vice, and who, through the force of previous practice, follows, in his acts, neither the Society nor the Scripture.—80.

· Sluggish Discrimination cannot qualify for preceptorship.

इतरव्याख्यानस्तरम् ॥ २ ॥ ४१ ॥

तत्र इतर-था, otherwise. अन्ध्याभाषण Andha-parampara, a procession of blind persons, blind tradition.

81. Otherwise, (there would be) the blind leading the blind.—292.

Vṛtti:—Even a man of sluggish Discrimination, it may be said, may be an instructor. In regard to this, the author says:

Were the ignorant to be the preceptor, the disciple, a fortiori, would remain ignorant.—81.

Bhāṣya:—But, then, by means even of mere Hearing, it may be said, the qualification of being an instructor may be acquired. To this the author replies:

"Itara-thā," otherwise, i.e., on the supposition that the character of being an instructor may belong even to a man of sluggish Discrimination, there would be the consequence of "Andha-parampara," i.e., of the blind leading the blind. Such is the meaning. Not knowing the truth about the Self in all its entirety, were one to instruct, then, by reason of one's own error in some portion of the subject matter, one would make the disciple also commit the same error; he, in his turn, will again mislead another; the latter, yet another; and, in this way, there would be a tradition or procession of blind persons.—81.

Worldly existence even after Release, explained.

चक्रभ्रान्तवृत्तशरीरः ॥ २ ॥ ४२ ॥

चक्रभ्रान्तवृत्तशरीरः, like the whirling of the (potter's) wheel. द्वेषतार्थ, having the body supported.

82. Having the body (still) supported, (the Jivan-mukta continues living),—just like the whirling of the (potter's) wheel.—293.
Vritti:—As regards instruction, because Release results through Knowledge, one, it may be said, should be released immediately after instruction; what need of delay? In regard to this the author says:

Just as, after the removal of the whirling rod, through the force of Sāmkāra or momentum the wheel revolves, in like manner, even in the case of those who possess Discrimination, because of the Karma or Adhikāram which supports, creates as well as preserves their bodies, not having been worn out or exhausted, there is no immediate Release; but their Release takes place after the exhaustion of their Karma by means of Experience and the like.

So also says the Sruti:

दैत्यशीर्ष मने सुधेशिर्षेः मुखो विचारे ।
कु तंत्रानन्दकरिकी विग्नेऽधरी समेद गदः॥

Man can be released by means of initiation only; even the released can stay in the figure or body. Lying within the wheel of the potter, the jar may still revolve, even though disjoined from it.—82.

Bhāṣya:—But then, when Karma has been exhausted by means of knowledge, how, it may be asked, can there be life? To this the author replies:

Even after the cessation of the act of the potter, through the momentum imparted by the previous act, just of itself, for some time, the wheel revolves. Similarly, does the Jīva-muktā remain, carrying the body which performs its functions by virtue of the force of the Prārabdha Karma or former Karma which has been in operation, even though no fresh Karma has been produced after the growth of Knowledge. Such is the meaning.—82.

How retention of body, even after Release, is rendered unavoidable.

संस्कारलीतात्सात्सातिशः॥३॥

व्याख्या: sāmkāra-leśābra, through the merest trace of Sāmkāra or previous impressions which originate the body. तत्सिद्धिः tat-siddhiḥ, effectuation thereof, i.e., of the retention of the body.

83. Through the least trace of Sāmkāra (takes place) the retention of the body.—294.

Vṛtti:—Therefore, there is the Jīva-mukta;—this the author states.

("Tat-siddhiḥ" means) the proof of the Jīva-mukta.—83.
Bhāṣya: — But then, it may be objected, when there has been the exhaustion of the Vāsanā or tendency towards Experience, etc., by means of the Cognitive Trance (Samprajñātā Yoga) which is the cause of Knowledge, how can there be the retention of the body? Neither can it be contended that there is no evidence to show that Yoga can overpower the Sāmkhyas, because that is proved from the Yoga aphorism:

The modification or transformation of the Chittam or the thinking Principle, known as Nirodha or Inhibition of all other modifications, is the conjunction of the Chittam with the moment of inhibition when take place respectively the disappearance and appearance of the Sāmkhyas or Impressions of outgoing modification and of inhibition.—Yoga Sūtras, III. 9, S. B. H., Vol. IV., p. 185.

and also because everybody knows that the influence of a different object, coming after a long interval of time, is able to overpower the impressions of other objects.

To this the author replies:

Of those impressions of objects which are the cause of the carrying of the body, because a small remnant is left, there is the effectuation of the retention of the body. Such is the meaning.

Now, here the existence of a trace of the impression of A-vidyā or false knowledge is not required. Because A-vidyā is the cause of just the origination of the outcomes of Karma in the form of birth, etc. In the Commentary on Yoga, moreover, it has been similarly explained by the revered Vyāsa. There is, furthermore, the argument in the Nyāya Darśana:

Because the birth of one from whom all Passion has fled away, is not seen.—Nyāya Sūtras, III. i. 36, S. B. H., Vol. VIII., p. 69.

Nor, again, is the existence of A-vidyā necessary even in the experience of Karma which has the Prārabdhā or Karma which has begun to operate, as its fruit.

Where, on the other hand, there is, as a rule, dependence upon A-vidyā,—that Experience, which is of the form of a particular exertion, occurs to the stupid only; while, in the case of the Jīvan-muktas, there is, as has been stated before, just the semblance of Experience.

Some one, however, has said that, in the case of the Jīvan-muktas, there remains also a trace of the impression of A-vidyā. But that is not so, since it would entail the production of Dharma or Merit and A-dharma or Demerit. It would, moreover entail a “progression of blind persons.” And, further, there is no necessity for the supposition of the existence of a trace of the impression of A-vidyā.
And all this has been elaborately discussed in the Commentary on Brahma-Mimamsa (the Vedanta-Sutra).—33.

Vedantic Mahideva:—"Samskara," impression, is of Desire, etc. The very same is "Lesa," a trace, that is, the semblance of Desire, etc. Such is the meaning. Therefrom is "Tat-siddhiḥ," the establishment of Experience. It is hence that even when Desire, etc. are seen in those who possess Discrimination, they are not really Desire, etc., but are merely the semblances of Desire, etc. Such is the import.

**Conclusion:** Discrimination is the only means of Release.

**विवेकार्थः शेषाद्वनिवृत्तो क्रुद्धार्थत्ता नेत्राऽरास्तरांतः ॥ २ ॥**

विनाश Vivekāt, through discrimination. विनिवृत्तिनिबन्धः Nib-desa-duṣkha-nirvrittau, on entire cessation of pain. क्रिया Kṛita-kritya-tā, the condition of one for whom what was to be done, has been done, न Na, not. इतः Itāt, from anything else.

84. On the entire cessation of pain, through Discrimination, (is reached) the condition of one for whom what was to be done, has been done, and not through anything else,—not through anything else.—295.

Vrtti.—When, it may be asked, is the supreme Release attained? To this the author replies:

When there is absolute cessation of the threefold pain,—cessation so as to leave no remainder,—one becomes "Kṛita-krityāḥ," fulfilled, because of the attainment of supreme or ultimate Release. "Na itarāḥ," not from any other, Karma or act—such is the complement.

The repetition of the phrase "Na itarāḥ" is to indicate the close of the Book.—84.

Here ends the Third Book, of Dispassion, in the Vrtti on the Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram of Kapila.

Bhāṣya:—The author recapitulates the sense of the declarations in the Sāstra.

When all pain, whether it be obstructed or unobstructed, ceases, so as to leave no remainder, by reason of the inhibition of all the modifications (of the mind), by means of the Higher Dispassion, resulting from the above-described development of Discrimination, it is then only that Purusa becomes fulfilled; and "not through anything else," i.e., not even through Release during life. Such is the meaning.
The repetition of “Na jīrāt” is to indicate the close of the Book.—84.

It has, in this Book, been declared that all effect, ending with the final dissolution, is of the A-vyakta, the Unmanifested, i.e., Prakṛiti, and not of the Self. Similarly, it has here been declared that Discrimination is the means of accomplishing Higher Dispassion.

*Here ends the Third Book, of Dispassion, in the Commentary composed by Vijñāna Bhikṣu on the Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram of Kapila.*
INTRODUCTION.

Vṛitti:—Next to (the Book of) Dispassion, is made the origination of the Fourth Book, for the purpose of telling stories for the awakening of the disciple.

Bhāṣya:—The means of accomplishing the knowledge of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti should now be exhibited through a number of fables well-known to the Śāstras:—for this purpose is commenced the Fourth Book.

Instruction of the Truth: Story of the Abandoned Prince.

राजपुत्राः तत्त्वोपदेशाः ॥ ८ ॥

वर्षयुगः राजपुत्राः तत्त्वोपदेशाः, as in the case of the king’s son. तत्त्वावपदेशाः, through instruction of truth.

1. (Discrimination-Viveka-arises) through instruction of the truth,—as in the case of the king’s son.—296.

Vṛitti:—A certain prince was born under an inauspicious conjunction of stars. So he was removed from the palace. A hunter chief adopted him as his son, and he acquired merely the manners and customs of his adoptive father. Now, when the king died sonless, the ministers brought him back to the palace, and enlightened him by saying: “You are not a hunter, but the son of a king.” So told, he forthwith recovered the manners and customs of a prince through the force of previous Sanskritas or impressions.

(Moral): Similarly, instruction is to be given for the enlightenment of even those who are dull.—1.

Bhāṣya:—Here follows the word, Viveka or Discrimination, which appears in the last aphorism of the preceding Book.

The meaning, then, is that, as in the case of the king’s son, Discrimination is produced through instruction of the truth.

Here the story is as follows: A certain king’s son, by reason of his being born under the conjunction of stars known as Gopā, is expelled
from the city and reared by a hunter. So he remains under the conceit that "I am a hunter." Having learned that he is alive, a certain minister enlightens him by saying "You are not a hunter, but a king's son." Just as he then and there abandons the conceit that he is a Chaṇḍa or outcaste, and adopts his true royal state, thinking "I am a king," in the very same way, through the instruction of some kind person who informs him by saying: "Produced as you are from the Ādi or Original Puruṣa,—the All-Full, Pure Consciousness manifested,—you are a part thereof," the Incarnate Puruṣa abandons the conceit of his being a product of Prakṛti, and re-assumes his own intrinsic form, realising "Being the son of Brahman, I also am Brahman itself; by no means am I different in characteristic from Brahman, nor am I subject to transmigration." Such is the meaning.

Thus we find in the Garuḍa-Purāṇa:

\[
\text{यथैक्षेपमभिन सर्वं हेमसंथं जगत्} \\
\text{त्यैव वातमस्य वातस्यकिर्कं महेद्व} \\
\text{भाविन्द्रो हिसा जहिस्तत्रांद्रिमिति भवते} \\
\text{प्रहनादायु : स्वीयं भास्त्रणं मन्यते यथा} \\
\text{मायाविस्तारायेव नदेहुत्तमिति मन्यते} \\
\text{मायानामादिरुपन : स्वीयं करं भ्राम्सिम मन्यते} \]

Just as, by means of a single golden gem, all the world looks golden, exactly so, by means of the Lord being known, all is known. As some twice-born, being possessed by a planetary power, thinks that "I am a Sudra," and after the expulsion of that power, becomes conscious again of his Brahmā-sīla, similarly does the Jīva, being possessed by Māyā, thinks that "I am the body," and after the destruction of Māyā, becomes conscious again of his own true form, realising that "I am Brahman."—1.

\[
\text{Inśtruction need not be direct: Story of the Piśācha.} \\
\text{पिशाचवचवान्यःपदेशोपि} \; 8 \; 2 \; \text{॥} \\
\text{विष्णु स्वामि, like the piśācha or goblin. \text{न्यूयसे anya-artha-upadeśe, the instruction being for the sake of another. कि त्रि, even.} \; \text{॥}} \\
\text{2. (Discrimination results), as in the case of the Piśācha, even though the instruction was for the sake of another.—297.} \\
\text{Vṛtti:—The author relates another story.} \\
\text{A certain preceptor, remembering the injunction): "Receive instruction in a lonely place," took his disciple out with him, entered a forest, and imparted instruction to him. It was overheard by a Piśācha concealed behind a bush. He too attained Release.} \]
The moral, therefore, is that, from knowledge about the Self, even though it be casually received, there is Release.—2.

Bhāṣya:—Even women, Śūdras, and the like may attain their end by hearing the instruction of one Brāhmaṇa by another Brāhmaṇa;—with a view to show this the author exhibits another story.

Although the instruction in regard to the Tattvas or Principles was being delivered by Śri Kṛṣṇa for the benefit of Arjuna, discriminative knowledge was produced in a Pāṇḍita standing near by. Similarly, it may be in the case of others also. Such is the meaning.—2.

Inculcation also is necessary.

आवृत्तिः Avrutiḥ, repetition. अ-सक्रित-उपदेशक् a-sakrit-upadeśak, through frequent instruction.

3. (In some cases there is necessity of) inculcation (of the truth) through frequent instruction.—298.

Vṛtti:—Herein the author mentions a distinction.

Of those in whom Dispersion is very strong, let there be Release through the mere hearing (of the truth). But, in the case of the sluggish, inculcation should be done through unremitting instruction.—3.

Bhāṣya:—In case knowledge is not produced through a single instruction, then also a repetition of the instruction has to be made;—this the author declares by means of another story.

Also a repetition of the instruction should be made, since there is the history of the frequent instruction of Śvetaketu, etc., by Āruṇi and others, recorded in the Chhāṇḍogya Upanisāt, etc.—3.

Dispersion: All is fleeting.

पितापुत्रवहुमयोहहहस्त्वात् || २१ २१ ||

पितारा pitā-putra vaṁ, as of father and son. उभयोह ubhayoh, of both. नै-विस्त्रम् nai-vistram, it having been seen.

4. Since, as of father and son, (so of oneself also), both (death and birth) are seen (and inferred), (there arises Dispersion).—299.

Vṛtti:—The author relates another story.

A certain Brāhmaṇa, on account of poverty, left his pregnant wife in the house of her father, and went to another country for the purpose of receiving alms and charities. After a long interval of time, he returned...
home, and, on seeing his son, could not know him. The son's mother informed her husband and son. Then there was knowledge of both of them.

The meaning, therefore, is that, even without the help of a preceptor, knowledge of the Tattvas or Principles may be acquired even through instruction by a friend.—4.

Bhāṣya:—For the purpose of Dispassion, the author establishes, by putting forward an example, the fragility, etc. of the frame of the Self.

As of one's own father and son, so of oneself also, because death and birth are seen and inferred, there arises Dispassion, and, by means thereof, Discrimination. So has it been declared:

बाल्यन् विधुज्ञायामस्यामेव सबावशी

Of oneself, the birth and death can be inferred from the case of one's father and son.—4.

All worldly pleasure is alloyed with pain: Story of the Hawk.

स्वेनवतः सुलभः स्वतः स्वाधिकोगामाम् ॥ १ ॥

स्वयं स्वेना-वतः, like a hawk. सुलभः सुक्ष्म-धुङ्क्ष्मः, pleased-and-pained. स्वाधिकोगायाम् by reason of abandonment and separation.

5. From abandonment and (consequent) separation, (one becomes) both pleased and pained at the same time, just like a hawk.—300.

Vṛtti:—The author relates another story.

By a certain person, a young hawk was picked up, and reared, with uniform care, by means of such food as cakes, sugar, etc. In course of time, it attained its youth. It was then abandoned in a forest by the man, thinking "Why do I make it suffer pain?" The hawk also was pleased owing to the abandonment of its bondage, but, at the same time, was sorry owing to its separation from the man.

(The moral, therefore, is that), because pleasure is alloyed with pain, both of them are equally objects which are fit to be avoided.—5.

Bhāṣya:—Hereafter, the author exhibits, by means of the examples given in the stories, the subserviency to the development of Knowledge in the case of one in whom knowledge has (just) been produced and who has become dispassionate.

Acquircment of things should not be made, since, by voluntary abandonment of things, a man becomes pleased, while, by (forcible) separation (from them), becomes pained,—just like a hawk. Such is the meaning. For a hawk, carrying a bit of flesh, is made painful if some one else suddenly falls upon it and forcibly separates it from the flesh, while, if it
voluntarily abandons the flesh, it is freed from the pain. So has it been declared:

सामिनि कुर्य अचन्दित्वन्ते मिरारिपि ।
तदनिनि परिवर्त्य सुखं समविहित ॥

Other and more powerful hawks, possessing no flesh, attacked one hawk possessed of flesh. Abandoning that flesh, he gained pleasure.—Srimad Bhagvata, XI. ix. 2.

So has it been declared by Manu also:

नीकूलं यथा वृक्षं वृक्षं वा शहुरियोऽः ।
तथा त्यथापरं देवं हस्यादुभाग्युपयते ॥

Like a tree (removing itself) from the bank of the river, or like a bird (flying away) from the tree, he who forsakes this body, is saved from a painful fate.—Manu-Samhita, VI. 75. 5.

Abandonment of that which is fit to be abandoned: Story of the Snake and the Slough.

श्रायनिर्वयनीचतू ॥ ८ ॥ ६ ॥

पहिन्निर्वयनि आहि-निर्वयन-वद, like the serpent's skin.

6. Like the serpent's skin, (things avoidable, should be abandoned).—301.

Vṛitti:—The author relates another story.

"Nirvayan" means the slough.

A certain snake, having cast off its coat, at the door of its hole, is grieved to see it besmeared with dust and clay, thinking "It is mine," and, through affection, does not throw it away. It is afterwards seized by a certain snake-charmer following the skin.

The meaning, then, is that the feeling of mine-ness, affection, etc., should not be cherished.—6.

Bhāṣya:—Just as a snake quite easily abandons its old skin from a sense that it ought to be shaken off, even so should a person desirous of Release, abandon Prakriti, enjoyed for long and effete, from a sense that she ought to be abandoned. Such is the meaning. So has it been said:

द्राय त्यथापरािमवा

Like a serpent, its old skin.—Rāmdyana, III. ix. 32.—6.

Prakriti, once abandoned should not be taken back again: Story of the Amputation of the Hand.

क्षिणहस्तवान्द्रा ॥ ४ ॥ ७ ॥

किङ्कस्या Chhinna-hasta-vat, like an amputated hand. Va, and.

7. And, moreover, like an amputated hand, (she should not be taken back again).—302.

Vṛitti:—The author relates another story.
A certain Muni, entering the hermitage of his brother, gathered fruits, etc. And he was told by his brother, "Thou art a thief." He said, "Tell me what the penance is". His brother also said, "There exists no other penance except the amputation of thy hand." And he, informing the king, cut off his own hands.

Therefore, (the moral is), prohibited acts should not be done, and, if done through inadvertence, steps must be taken for obtaining freedom from the consequences thereof.—7.

*Bhāṣya* :—The author declares that Prakṛti, etc., once abandoned, should not be espoused again.

Just as no one whatever takes back an amputated hand, even so, once it (Prakṛti, etc.) has been abandoned, one should not espouse it again. Such is the meaning.

The word "vā" has been used in the sense of "āpi" or moreover.—7.

*Thoughts uncongenial to Release to be avoided : Story of Bharata.*

8. Contemplation of that which is not a means, (works) for Bondage, —as in the case of Bharata.—303.

*Vṛtti* :—The author relates another story.

The King, by name Bharata, though Release was almost at his hand, seeing a female deer die as soon as delivered, began to rear up the young deer. Leaving it, he never directed his mind to any other thing. At the moment of death, he gave up the vital airs, having his mind resting on it. In consequence of attachment to it, he did not attain Release.

The meaning is that thought which is uncongenial to Release, should not be cherished.—8.

*Bhāṣya* :—What is not an internal (or direct) means of Discrimination, though it be an act of duty,—this is a description of A-sādhana—its "anu-chintanam", i.e., the devotion of the mind towards its performance, should not be made; because it leads to Bondage by means of its being the cause of making one forget Discrimination; as in the case of Bharata: i.e., as did the royal sage Bharata's rearing a poor and orphan fawn, even though this was in accordance with duty. Thus, then, on the
subject of Jāda Bharata or Bharata the Incr or Stupid, we find in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa:

रक्षसं वपुष्ये तात्त्वेऽर्षे दूरगं दूराग्रामिनीं
प्रालोच्यते सनातनं तदिन्द्र हरिवर्षः

Rakṣasam vapṣyey tattvārṣe dūragaṃ dūragraṃmīṃ
prālocchate sanātanaṃ tadindraḥ harivarṣaḥ

Restless when it was restless, far-going when it went afar,—in such wise was his mind attached wholly to that young deur.—Viṣṇu Purāṇa, II. xiii. 30a and 22b.—8.

Company is to be avoided : Story of the Girl and her Bracelets.

बहुमितोषि विवेचने रागाविषि: कुमारीशक्तिवत् ॥ ५ ॥ ५ ॥

bahumītōṣhi vivechane rāgaavish: kumāriśaktivat
dhī: Bahubhīḥ, with many. dhī: Yoge, in association. dhī: Virodhab, conflict, quarrel. dhī: Rāga-ādi-bhiḥ, by means of desire or passion and the like. dhī: Kumārīśa-kṣakha-vat, as in the case of the shell-bracelets of a girl.

9. In association with many, there is wrangling, by means of the manifestation of passion, etc.,—as in the case of a girl's shell-bracelets.—304.

Vṛitti:—The author tells us that one should not make company with many.

With many, conflict is inevitable,—just as a jingling is produced by the mutual contact of a girl's shell-bracelets.—9.

Bhāṣyā:—Association should not be made with many. For in association with many, by the manifestation of passion and the like, there arises quarrel which is destructive of Yoga or concentration; just as, by the mutual contact of a girl's shell-bracelets, a jingling is produced. Such is the meaning.—9.

Company even of two is equally bad.

द्वाभ्यामं तयेव ॥ १ ॥ १ ॥

dvābhyaṁ, of two. api, even. tathā, the same. eva, verily.

10. In association of two even, (it is) the very same.—305.

Vṛitti:—The author tells us that company of two even should not be made.

Because of the fault of conversation, etc., (which draws the mind away from Concentration).—10.

Bhāṣyā:—In association of two even, the very same, i.e., conflict or wrangling, takes place. Hence one should remain by oneself alone. Such is the meaning.
So has it been said:

वाहे कुमारे क्षणो भयोऽतः वातो इत्यादि
एह एव वरेश्वरादु कामार्गं द्वय विचारादु

In the residence of many together, there would be quarrel. In that of two even, there would be conversation. One is, therefore, to go about alone;—just like the bracelet of the girl.—10.

Hope is to be abandoned: Story of Piṅgalā.

निराम: सुल्लि पिङ्कलावतः ॥ ६ ॥ १९ ॥
निराम: nirāmaḥ, hopeless. सुल्लि sukhl, happy. पिङ्कलावतः piṅgalā-vat, like Piṅgalā.

11. He who has no hope, is happy; just like Piṅgalā.
—306.

Vyūtī:—The author relates another story.

The courtesan, named Piṅgalā, being sleepless through waiting, for an embrace, for the arrival of Bhujangā (her lover), experienced pain. Once, however, she, being disappointed through extreme suffering, gave up all expectation, making up her mind that “I will not do so again”. Thus, no more having any expectation, she sleeps happy.—11.

Bhāṣya:—There being the saying:

प्रायोजितकत्रिये विचे समाप्तिप्राप्तिे
समये वचनविनिर्देशौ न वानं प्रतिविद्यति

In a mind rendered dry through overpowering hope and devoid of contentment, knowledge does not cast its reflection, just as does not the face in a dirty mirror, the author declares that the habit of having no hope should be cultivated by the Yogi.

By giving up hope, let a Puruṣa be possessed of the pleasure called contentment, just like Piṅgalā; that is to say, in the same way as the courtesan, Piṅgalā by name, wishing for a lover, not obtaining a lover, being despondent, became happy when she had left off hoping.

So has it been said:

वाहे रि परम सुपुष्करो नैरुत्तमो परम सुकुमारो
पवल केष्व मातातां सुपुष्करो विनेकतां

For, hoping is a great pain, not-hoping is a great pleasure. E.g., having cut down all hope for a lover, Piṅgalā slept happy.—Mādh-Bhāratam, XII., 6520, 6547.

But granting, it may be objected, that, by the cessation of hope, there may be cessation of pain; but how can there be pleasure, when the causes of it do not exist? To this it is replied: The pleasure, natural to the Chittam or mind by reason of the predominance of Sattva in it,
which remains obscured by means of hope,—the very same pleasure, on
the departure of hope, of itself resumes its own function, just like the
natural coolness of water which had been obstructed in its manifestation
by the action of heat. Hence there is no need of a positive cause or
means of its production. It is this very same that is also called the
pleasure of the Self.—11.

Exertion is needless: Example of Snake dwelling in another’s house.

Exertion is needless: Example of Snake dwelling in another’s house.

Bhāṣya.—The author declares that, since it is a hindrance to Con-
centration, no exertion whatever, for the purpose of enjoyment, should
be made, as this can be effected just otherwise.

“Let one be happy”,—such is the complement of the aphorism.
The rest is easy.

So has it been declared:

The building of a house is for pain, and is, by no means, for pleasure. Entering a
house made by another, a snake enjoys pleasure.—Mukh-Bhidrata, XII. 3849.—12.

In study, discrimination: example of the bee.

13. Though one apply to many Sāstras and many preceptors, a taking of the essence (is to be made),—as is
the case with the bee.—308.

Vṛtti.—In the Sāstra, there are “expositions,” “overthrow of
opponents,” etc., which are not essential. These, the author says, are to
be rejected.
As the bee, leaving aside the flowers, gathers the honey only, similarly should one, wishing for Release, reject A-vidyā or false knowledge.

Bhāṣya:—From the Śāstras as well as from the preceptors, only the essence is to be accepted; since, otherwise, it will be impossible to fix the attention on one point only, through there being, by reason of “admission of foreign doctrines for the sake of argument,” and the like, mutual contradiction among unessential parts, and also multiplicity of meanings. So the author says:

“Is to be made”,—such is the complement of the aphorism. The rest is easy.

So has it been declared:

महायोगे स्वयम् योजयो युधिष्ठिर नरः।
सर्वेन्द्र सर्वाध्यायं परमेस्वरं दवत्वः।

From śāstras, small as well as great, the skilful man should take the essence from all quarters, as does the bee from the flowers.

Also in the Mārkandeya Purāṇa.

सर्वाध्यायेऽपि विद्याय सर्वाद्यायार्थम्।
श्रमानं च ध्यात स्थाभिविभक्तिकरिः सा।

dhāraya से यथास्तुः से यथास्तुः यथास्तुः

A man should devote himself to knowledge reduced to the form of the essence; it is that which is the means of accomplishing one’s end. The manifoldness of knowledges that there is,—that is a cause of hindrance to Concentration. “This is to be known”, “That is to be known,”—he who goes about thirsting in this way, will never attain knowledge even in a thousand of Kalpas—Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, XII. 18, 19.—13.

Vedāntin Mādhūcā. —In pursuance of the maxim:

सर्वेन्द्र स्वयम्बुधास्य हि कार्यनः।

One should pick out the essence from all quarters, as one does the gold from the ore, even from the Śāstras, only the essence is to be accepted, but no particular effort should be made with a view to gain a victory over opponents. Moreover, Sama or Control of the Internal Instruments and the like, inhering in the preceptor, are to be welcomed, but not, however, the rare defects of desire, aversion, etc.—13.

One-pointed-ness of the mind necessary: example of the arrow-maker.

इष्टां ते किर्त्ये विनाशः समाधिहानिः।

सिष्टते इष्टां ते किर्त्ये विनाशः।

The state of having a perfectly straight object, as in the case of the arrow-maker. sa, not. स्का-एग्रा-चित्तस्यa-samādhih, failure or interruption of Samādhi or Meditation.
14. Of one whose mind is one-pointed, there can be no interruption of Samādhi or Meditation,—as in the case of the arrow-maker.—309.

Vṛtti:—The author mentions for whom there is Samādhi.

Just as an arrow-maker, having his mind wholly absorbed in the arrow, did not know that the king had passed near by, even so, in the case of a man whose mind is one-pointed, there is no failure of Samādhi.—14.

Rājaśya:—Be the other means what they may, by means of maintaining Samādhi through one-pointed-ness of mind alone, direct intuition of Discrimination should be accomplished. So the author says:

Just as in the case of a maker of arrows, with his mind concentrated, for the purpose of making an arrow, the suppression of the other modifications of the mind is not interrupted even by the passing of a king at his side, in like manner, in the case of a man, with his mind one-pointed, there is, by no means, “Samādhi-hāniḥ,” or failure of the suppression of all other modifications of the mind. In consequence whereof, in the absence of the mind’s straying into other matters, direct intuition of the object of meditation necessarily takes place. Hence one-pointed-ness of mind is to be sought. Such is the meaning.

Thus has it been declared:

तदृशमालयपकाचितो न वेद किरिकुरुबिनिरूपे या।
तथोषुकरो वृत्तिं मयात्मा हृदं गतात्मा न दूरं दूर।

So, then, with his mind confined to the Self, he did not know anything, either external or internal; just as the arrow-maker, with his soul wholly gone into an arrow, did not see the king passing at his side.—14.

Rules are not to be transgressed.

क्रत्तनियमविहारान्तर्यक्यं लोकवत् ॥ ४ ॥ १४ ॥

क्रत्ताक्रत्तान्तर्यक्यं krita-niyama-ārgha, through transgression of enjoined rules. N. B. For “Krita,” Aniruddha reads “Brata,” a vow. अनन्तर् anarthakaṁ, failure of the object. लोका-वत् loka-vat, as in the world.

15. Through transgression of enjoined rules, (there is) failure of the object,—just as in the world.—310.

Vṛtti:—The author declares that transgression of Vratas or austerities for the attainment of particular objects of desire, etc., which are intended for the purification of the Sattva, should not be made.

Just as in the world, every one abandons him who has broken the engagements made by him with most of them, so, through transgression
of Vratas, etc., a man becomes (lit. outside) incompetent to grasp the sense of the Veda.—15.

_Bhāṣya_ :—So long there is ability, if a Yogin, relying upon the power of knowledge, needlessly transgresses the rules enjoined in the Śāstras, then, in his case, there is failure of the object in the shape of the perfect development of Knowledge;—this the author states.

The rule that has been made in the Śāstras for the Yogins,—if there is a violation of it, then the object, called the perfect development of Knowledge, does not appear. "As in the world": just as in the world, where there is a transgression of the dietetics, etc., prescribed in medical treatises, etc., the respective objects aimed at are not produced; similarly. Such is the meaning.

In the case of transgression, on the other hand, on account of inability or for the purpose of preserving knowledge, there is no obstruction to knowledge; as is learnt from the Mokṣa-Dharma Section of the Mahā-Bhārata, etc. For example:

अपेतात्सतत्त्वो तु केवलः प्राप्ति िततः।
प्रायमृुद्धरम् केवलेप्राप्तार्थिः कथये॥

But he who, leaving off the performance of austerities and pious acts, resting purely in Brahman, being like Brahman, moves in the world—he is called Brahman-Chārin (one living, moving, and having one’s being in Brahman).—Mahā-Bhārata.

_Note:_ As to the sources of this and the following quotation, the readings of F. E. Hall and of Dr. Garbe are different. The former does not read the verse “Neither did he etc.” at all, and reads iti Mokṣa-Dharmādibhyāḥ. Iti Vāśīṭhādīsmṛitiḥ ibhyāḥ. The latter reads the two quoted verses together, and reads Ityādi Amṛtādīdvādeśāh. We have, however, tried to reconcile these readings in the translation in what seemed to us to be the most reasonable manner.

There are, moreover, similar declarations in the Smṛiti of Vāśīṭhā, etc.; for example:

न परित्यागिता क्लोपदवमाहे श्रुतिम्।
न ददुर्धः च कर्मिकूदं शास्त्राय स च॥

_Neither did he, after being invested with the sacred thread, read the Veda (as it was) dictated by the preceptor, nor did he “see” the acts prescribed, nor did he receive the Śāstras._—Viṣṇu Purāṇa, II. xiii. 89.

It is for this reason that, in the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, etc., only those who abandon karma or prescribed acts quite needlessly, that have been denounced as being Pāṇḍās or heretics, by such expressions as:

पूर्वः अद्याविषयवच्चं सवेव
मेघप्राप्तामिनिमिलाकाशिन्द्रातनाम।
सिद्धांविनिमिलाबिनिमिलविशालानाम।
कस्मात्साधनि चतुर्वर्तव्रतः प्राप्तिः॥

"Priorly the utterance of the words of the past"—_Mahābhārata._
Even through addressing men who needlessly carry matted looks on their heads, whose hopes are fruitless, who are excluded from all acts of purifcation, who have abandoned the offering of obsequial cakes and water to their deceased ancestors, men go to hell.—Vīśa Pudra, III. xlviii, 103.—15.

**Forgetfulness of rules also is harmful:** Story of the She-Frog.

तद्विस्मरते। तत-विस्मरणे, in the forgetting thereof, i.e., of the rules. तच्छापि, also. भोक्त-वत, as in the story of the she-frog.

16. In the forgetting also of the rules, (there is the same harm),—as (in the story of) the she-frog.—311.

*Vṛtti:*—The author tells us that by reason of the forgetting of the knowledge of the Principles, pain necessarily takes place.

A certain king, going out on a hunting excursion, saw a beautiful maid in the woods. He asked her, “Who are you?” “I am a king’s daughter,” replied she. The king said, “Marry me.” “Very well,” said she, “but make this rule that water must not be shown to me by you.” “Let it be so”—so saying, he took her hand. In this manner, as time went on, one day, she, being fatigued with sport, asked the king, “Where can I get water from?” The king, too, forgetting his promise, through haste, showed her water. And she, who was the daughter of the king of frogs, was, through touch of water, transformed as a she-frog. The king, on the other hand, searching for her by means of nets, etc., and, not regaining her, experienced much pain.

Therefore, interruption of the cultivation of the Principles should not be made.—16.

*Bhāṣya:*—The author tells us that there is failure of the object even in the forgetting of the rules,

This is easy.

Here the story of the she-frog is this: A certain king, who was out a-hunting, met with a fair damsel in the forest. And she, being sought by the king to be his wife, made this engagement: “Whenever water will be shown to me by you, I must go.” But, on one occasion, being wearied with sport, she asked the king, “Where is water?”? The king, too, forgetting the engagement, showed her water. Thereupon she, who was the daughter of the king of frogs and who could assume forms at will, becoming a she-frog, entered the water. Then the king, though he sought her by nets, etc., could not regain her.—16.
Vedāntin Mahādeva;—"Tat" (in the aphorism)—by this word is denoted knowledge of the Principles, because that was in the mind of the author.

Instruction is to be supplemented by reflection: Story of Indra & Virochana.

नोपवेश्यभवणस्य प्रतिकृत्यत प्रामशृद्धते विरोचनवत् ||41||

: न न, not. अपेश्यभवणे upadesa-iravane, in the hearing of instruction. क्रि.api, even. क्रित्यत kriṭa-kriyā-tā, the state of having what was to be done, done.
परामर्ष्ट च ते parāmarśṭa rite, without reflection or consideration. विरोचनवत as in the case of Virochana.

17. Not even in the hearing of instruction (is there) fulfilment of the end, without reflection,—as in the case of Virochana.—312.

Vṛtti:—The author relates another story.

Not through mere hearing is there Release, but only through reflection. As, for example, Indra and Virochana went to the world of Brahmā for the purpose of knowledge of the Principles, and were both instructed by Brahmā. Virochana, after hearing the knowledge of the Principles, came back to his home and did no reflection, etc. Hence he was not released. While Indra, showing devotion to Brahmā for a long time, did reflection.—17.

Note:—For an account of the student life of Indra and Virochana, see the eighth Prapāṭhaka of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

Bhāṣya:—The author mentions a historical instance, showing the necessity of an intelligent consideration also of the sayings of the preceptor, like that of their hearing.

"Parāmarśa" is a consideration determinative of the significance or import of the sayings of the preceptor. Without it, even from the hearing of the sayings of the preceptor, there is no certainty that knowledge of the Principles will result; since it is heard that, even though there was the hearing of instructions from Prajāpati (Lord of Creation, Brahmā), Virochana, out of Indra and Virochana, erred by reason of the absence of reflection. Such is the meaning.

Hence reflection also is to be made of what is instructed by the preceptor.

It is, moreover, seen that, even now, of the self-same instruction:

तत्स्यदिक: 

Then act that,
there is the possibility of being so interpreted as to convey manifold meanings, such as undivided-ness, non-difference characterised by non-possession of divergent properties, and non-division. (Vide Introduction.)—17.

Reflection also is seen.

द्यस्तयोरिन्द्रस्य II ११= II

द्रिष्टं, seen. तयोऽ, of those two. इंद्रस्य, of Indra.

18. Of those two, (reflection was) seen (in the case) of Indra.—313.

Vṛitti:—What happened to Indra?—it may be enquired. So the author says:

Out of those two, in the case of Indra, knowledge was seen, that is to say, through his pleasing Brahmā, by means of long-continued cultivation, his was the success, through reflection, meditation and immediate intuition.—18.

Bhāṣya:—Hence is it that reflection also is seen;—this is the author states:

By the word "tat" in “Tayoḥ” there is reference to the one mentioned (in aphorism 17) and the one now mentioned. Of those two, i.e., out of Indra and Virochana, reflection was seen in the case of Indra. Such is the meaning.—18.

Time also is a factor in attaining Release.

प्रथमतःब्राह्मचर्यपर्यायानि क्लवा सिद्धिःसिर्वाकालाचतुर्वत् II 314 II

प्रथमतः, performing. ब्राह्मचर्य, n. asceticism. अदस्य, duties of a student-ascetic, and attendance upon the preceptor. क्लवा, success. सिद्धिः, success. सीता, bahu-kālāt, through a long period of time. तत्-vat, as in his, i.e., Indra’s, case.

19. By performing obeisance, duties of a student-ascetic, and attendance upon the preceptor, success (comes) after a long interval of time,—as in the case of Indra.—314.

Vṛitti:—And how, it may be asked, does the attainment of knowledge take place? To this the author replies.

Of a person who is not obedient and not a student-ascetic, there is no success (for knowledge of the Principles). “Tat-vat”, as in the case of Indra: As by means of devotion to Brahmā, knowledge was attained by Indra, so, by means of devotion to the preceptor, it may be by others also.—19.
Bhāṣya:—And by one who wishes to have complete knowledge, attendance upon the preceptor, for a long time, has, says the author, to be performed.

"Tat-vat", as in the case of Indra, so of another also, only by performing obeisance to the preceptor, study of the Veda, service to the preceptor, etc., "Siddhih", manifestation of the truth about the Principles, takes place, and not otherwise. Such is the meaning.

And thus says the Śruti:

यद्य देवे परा सक्तियथा देवे तथा छुटे
सोहेते कपिता द्वारांः प्रवासान्ते महासन: ||

Who has supreme devotion to the deity, and, as to the deity, so to the preceptor, to him, of high soul, do those objects or realities, just now mentioned, manifest themselves.—Śvetādvatara Upaniṣad, VI, 28.—19.

There is no rule as to the limit of the time required.

न कालनियमो बालकवचर् || ४ || २० ||

w na, no. कालनियमः: kāla-niyamaḥ, rule or limit of time. बालकवचर् vāmadeva-vat, as in the case of Vāmadeva.

20. (There is) no limitation of time,—as in the case of Vāmadeva.—315.

Vṛtti:—Is it that Release depends upon a rule of time and place? If that were so, then, there would not be, one may say, the relation of late and prompt release. In regard to this the author says:

The rule of time is for the sake of attendance upon the preceptor, and not for the sake of release, because release was seen to take place promptly in the case of Vāmadeva through the knowledge of the Principles (without any preliminary practice).—20.

Bhāṣya:—In respect of the arising of knowledge, there is no such rule of time as that it must take place through the means pertaining to the present existence only. "As in the case of Vāmadeva": as, in the case of Vāmadeva, through the means pertaining to a previous existence, there was the arising of knowledge, even while he was still in the womb, so it may be in the case of another also. Such is the meaning.

So, then, there is the Śruti:

तेन तत्तयम्मृत्वमात्रेय तत्तयामेव भवानस्मिति ति त्रिविन्दमपवै देवे सत्तायि।

And seeing this the Seer Vāmadeva recovered memory that "I had been Manu and Śākyś also". So, then, therefore, he who knows wisdom that "I am Brahman", becomes all this, etc.—Brāhma Upaniṣad, I, iv. 10.
Expressions such as "I had been Manu" are directed to establish non-difference characterised by non-possession of divergent properties, or are directed to establish Brahma-hood called the character of being the pervader of all things, as it is remembered in the Smriti:

शयं समाप्रोचि ततैसादिस्यथं

Thou reachest up to all things; so art Thou the All.—Gitâ, XI. 40.

While the expression "He becomes all this" is directed to show the absolute eradication of limitation caused by the Upadhi or adjuncts.—20.

Note:—A fuller account of the history of Vâmanâvâ has been found in the fourth part of the fifth chapter of the Aitareya Upanishat.

Inferior means also are useful in their own way.

II. 11. 21.

अध्ययः पुपातानात् पारस्यर्यम् च नुपातानात्मिभिः

Through devotion to attributed or superimposed forms, Pâram-paryêna, by degrees; intermediately, Yajna upāsakānām, in the case of those who devote themselves to sacrifices, etc., like.

21. Through devotion to attributed forms (of the deity, success may result) intermediately, as in the case of those who devote themselves to sacrifices.—316.

Vritti:—But certainly one can reflect upon a thing only if it is known; whereas the Self has been seen by none whatever. And if it were seen, what need of reflection?

Apprehending such an objection, the author says:

But by whom has Dharma or Merit been seen? Yet, with a view to the acquisition of Merit, people undertake devotion to sacrifices, since they pour out clarified butter, "Pâram-paryêna", i.e., by reference to the deities. In our case also, through devotion to forms, similar to those that are attributed, these forms gradually manifest themselves. It is seen also that recollection of similar takes place when there is a thought upon similar objects. Thus has it been said:

सहायत्वाधिकारादद्यत् स्मृतिविजयं विपर्या

Similes, Adjâstam, thinking, etc., are the germinators of the seed of memory. Hence, in dream and the like, there is no going too far, since there is the force of latent thought.—21.

Bhâgya:—But, then, one may object, when it is heard that the worship of Saguna Brahman, or Brahman as endowed with attributes or Brahman in manifestation, also is a cause of the development of knowledge, knowledge will result just from that; what is the necessity, then,
of the practice of a hard and subtle process of Yoga? To this the author replies:

The word "Siddhi" or success is understood from what has gone before. Through devotion to such Puruṣas as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Hara, etc., by means of the forms attributed to them, "Pāram-paryego", i.e., in the order of the attainment of the world of Brahmā, etc., or, by means of the purification of the Sattva, there arises the perfect development of knowledge, and not immediately; as in the case of those who devote themselves to the sacrifices. Such is the meaning.—21.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—In Dhyāna or Meditation, the seeing or immediate cognition of truth is not required, but only knowledge. And that is easy to gain gradually through the preceptor. Such is the import.

Other means fail to secure permanent Release.

leştirāmamāyaśādhirjyāyāyogāto janmāṛṣṭe: || ४ || २२ ||

śūchām Itarā-lābhe, when there is attainment of other ends. की api, even also. वर्तित: avṛttīḥ, return. अविनाश: nāśa-agni-yogatāh, through the Five-Fire Yoga. जन्माः: Janmā-śrutēḥ, because there is the Śruti about birth.

22. Moreover, after the attainment of other ends, there is a return to birth, (as we hear) from the Śruti of birth after the performance of the Five-Fire sacrifice.—317.

Vṛtti:—What is the need of knowledge of Self, it may be asked, for one whose end has been fulfilled through the attainment of the world of Brahmā, etc.? To this the author replies:

Attainment of the world of Brahmā is by means of the sacrifice of Agni-Hotra, etc. And what is produced by performance, decays. Hence there is Śruti on re-birth; e.g.,

पदेश कर्मसिद्धि धोका शोयदे एवमेन्तमुच पुनसिद्धि धोका: नै पूर्वायते

As here the world conquered by action, is exhausted, so there too the world conquered by virtue, is exhausted.

न कर्मसंयोगाय च नै

to नै नैति एवमेन्तमुच नैति

Neither by action, nor by progeny, nor by riches, but by renunciation, some attained immortality.—Mahaṇḍaṛṣṭa Upanisat. X, ५,—22.

Bhāṣya:—By means of the successive attainment, moreover, of the worlds of Brahmā, etc., there is no certainty as to the perfect development of knowledge. So the author says:

Even after the attainment of what is other than the attributeless Self, i.e., of the attributed forms, ending with the world of Brahmā, there.
is a return. Whence? Since, even in the case of one gone to the world of Brahmā by the Devayāna path, there is Śruti on re-birth from making five invocations or offerings to the five fires in the form of Heaven, Cloud, Earth, Man and Woman. Thus in the fifth Prapāṭhaka of the Chhāndogya Upanisāt:

That world, O child, is the fire—It is the Sun that is its fuel; the rays, the smoke; the daylight, the flame; the Moon, the embers; the stars, the sparks. 1.

In this, the same, fire, the Devas invoke Śraddhā; from that invocation arises the King Soma. 2.—Here ends the fourth Khaṇḍa.

The Cloud, my child, O Gautama, is the fire,—It is the Air that is its fuel; the vapour, smoke; the lightning, the flame; the thunder, the embers; the thunder-flashes, the lances. 1.

In this, the same, fire, the Devas invoke the King Soma; from that invocation arises rain. 2.—Here ends the fifth Khaṇḍa.

The Earth, my child, O Gautama, is the fire,—It is the full year that is its fuel; the wood, the smoke; the night, the flame; the quarters, the embers; the intermediate quarters, the sparks. 1.

In this, the same, fire, the Devas invoke the rain; from that invocation arises the food. 2.—Here ends the sixth Khaṇḍa.

Man, my child, O Gautama, is the fire,—It is the Speech that is its fuel; the lips, the speech, the tongue, the flame; the eye, the embers; the ear, the sparks. 1.
In this, the same, fire, the Devas invoke the food; from that invocation arises the
sexual fluid. 2.—Here ends the seventh Khāṇḍa.

Woman, my child, O Gautama, is the fire,—it is the........1.

In this, the same, fire, the Devas invoke the sexual fluid; from that invocation arises
the embryo. 2.—Here ends the eighth Khāṇḍa.

The saying, again, about the non-return from the world of Brāhma, has
reference to such Puruṣas as have, in that very world, knowledge
produced in them almost perfectly.—22.

Dispersion is the only means of knowledge: Story of the Swan and Milk.

विज्ञान विरक्तस्य हेयद्वनुषा योपायोपायां इत्यतिरिक्त ॥ २ ॥ २२ ॥

Viraktaśya, of the dispassionate, Haya-hānam, avoidance of
the avoidable. Upādeya-upādānam, acquisition of the acceptable.
Hamsa-kuṭa-vat, like the swan and milk.

23. In the case of the dispassionate, there is
avoidance of what is to be avoided and acceptance of what
is fit to be acquired,—as in the case of the swan and
milk.—318.

Vṛitti:—What is the characteristic of the dispassionate?—one may
ask. So the author says:

Although there is, with everybody, the avoidance of the avoidable
and the acceptance of the acceptable, yet, it is to be observed that,
according to the subject under consideration, Samsāra is the thing to be
avoided, and Release is the thing to be accepted.—23.

Bhāṣya:—Perfect development of knowledge takes place in the
case only of the dispassionate. In regard to this the author mentions
an illustration.

Of the dispassionate only, there is the avoidance of things to be
avoided, such as Prakriti, etc., and the acceptance of that which is to be
accepted, i.e., the Self. Just as, out of milk and water, formed into a
mixture, by giving up the unessential water, the taking of the essential
milk is possible for the swan only, but not for the crow, etc. Such is the
meaning.—23.

Benefit of excellent company.

कार्यातिशीलयोगायत्रा सहित ॥ २ ॥ २४ ॥

labdha-ātiśaya-yogat, through association with one who has
attained excellence. योग तत्वत, like that.

24. Or (this results) through association with those
who have attained excellence,—as in the case thereof.—319.

Vṛitti:—The author gives the reason for this.
As in the case of the swan,—only to the swan belongs the exceeding power whereby it drinks the milk, though it is mixed with water, and gives up the water. So by a man who has attained excellence, Samādhi is avoided and Release can be acquired.—24.

**Bhāṣya**:—Both these (i.e. avoidance of the avoidable and acceptance of the acceptable) may also, says the author, take place through association with those who have attained excellence.

Also through association with him by whom “atīśya” or the extreme limit of knowledge has been attained, the above-mentioned may take place, just in the same way as in the case of the swan. Such is the meaning. For example, in the case of Alarka, Discrimination of itself appeared in him, simply through his association with Dattātreya.—24.

**Association with worldly-minded people is not to be made:**

*Story of the Parrot.*

न कामचारिलं रागोपहृते युक्तवि || ४ || २५ ||

व na, not. कामचारिलं kāma-chāritvam, conduct springing from desire, रागोपहृते rāga-upahate, in respect of one overpowered with desire. सुका-वत् Sukā-vat, like the parrot.

25. Wanton association with those who are overpowered with passion, is not to be made,—as is the case with the parrot.—320.

**Vṛtti**:—It may be thought that, even of one struck with Desire, there will be Release. So the author says:

Of one struck with Desire or Attachment there is not even (such a lower yogic perfection as) the power of free movement; how, then, can there be Release? For example, of Vyāsa, who had Attachment in him, there was no Release; while, in the case of his son, Śuka, because he was dispassionate, Release took place. So will it be in other cases.—25.

**Note**:—“Kāma-chāritvam”: Aniruddha takes the word in its technical sense of the power of free movement which is one of the eight Siddhis or supernatural powers one may acquire by the practice of Yoga. “Śuka” according to Aniruddha does not mean the parrot here, but denotes the celebrated Śuka, the son of Vyāsa, and narrator of the Śrimad-Bhāgavatam.

**Bhāṣya**:—The author tells us that association with those who possess Attachment is not to be made.

With a person influenced by Attachment, association out of desire should not be made. As is the case with the parrot: Just as the parrot, thinking “I possess a beautiful form”, does not move about at random, out of the fear of confinement by those who are covetous of beautiful objects, similarly. Such is the meaning.—25.
Metaphor of the parrot further continued.

युक्तयोगाल्पः सुकबत्ति ॥ ३ ॥ २६ ॥

युक्तयोगाल्पः Сука-योगाल्पः, through connection with Сука. N. B. Here there is a pun on the word Сука, which means the Сука, Саттва, etc., and also a rope. सुकवत, bound. सुकवत, like the parrot.

26. Through connection with Сука, (one is) bound, like the parrot.—321.

Vṛtti:—Wherefore is Bondage?—in regard to this, the author says:

Just as the bird, parrot, obtains bondage through connection with a cord, so too does man obtain bondage through connection with the Сука, Саттва, etc.—26.

Bhāṣya:—In association with those who have Attachment in them, there is, on the contrary, harm, as the author says:

In association with them, on the contrary, “Сука-योगाल्प”, through connection with Attachment, etc., belonging to them, one will be bound. Just “like the parrot”: As the parrot becomes bound by the Сука or cords of the hunter, similarly. Such is the meaning.

Or, the meaning may be that, by reason of his possessing qualities, he may be bound by those who are covetous of qualities.

On this very subject has it been said by Saubhari:

स में समाभिस्त सभासृष्टि-
मस्म सकस्तु सहविन नहै ॥

परिमाह: सकस्तु समाउधर
परिमाहेवाय नवांधिकिताः ॥

That Meditation of mine, through association with the fish whom I met as a friend during my residence under water, has, all of a sudden, deserted me. This acquisition (of a family) by me, was caused by association. And all great exertions of mine sprang from acquisition.—Vishnu Purana, IV, ii, 48.—26.

Means of appeasing Passion : not through experience.

न मोगाद्रागगान्तिन्विन्वतः ॥ ४ ॥ २७ ॥

ना, not. कुष्ठ bhogā, through Experience or enjoyment. कुष्ठिनः:
रागशंभिः, appeasement of Passion or Attachment. मुनिवत, as in the case of the Muni Saubhari.

27. Not through Bhoga is the appeasement of Passion, as (it was not) in the case of the Muni.—322.
**Vṛtti:**—Through Bhoga itself, it may be said, there will be Dispassion under the influence of time: what need of knowledge? In regard to this the author says:

Not, even in the case of a Muni, is there appeasement of Passion, through Bhoga; not to speak of others. The cases of Kaṇva, Saubhari, etc., are instances in point.—27.

**Bhāṣya:**—The author determines the means also of Dispassion by the two aphorisms:

Just as in the case of the Muni, Saubhari, there was no appeasement of Passion through Bhoga, so in the case of others also, it is not. Such is the meaning.

So has it been said by Saubhari himself:

चा स्वपुष्टे नैव मनोरथानान-  
सतोजित विद्वतानियं मयाया।  
मनोरथासिद्धीस्य विचारं  
न सापते वेपरमार्पयति॥

It has been learnt by me to-day that, even unto death, there verily is no end of desires. Verily does not the mind of one absorbed in attachment to desires, grow associated with transcendental objects.—Vigraha Purusha, IV, ii. 47—27.

*But through seeing the faults of Prakriti.*

वेष्वर्षनादुमये: ॥ ४ ॥ २८ ॥

चेष्वर्षनादु दोष-दर्शनाम, through seeing the faults. उभयोः: ubhayoḥ, of both Prakriti and her products.

28. (Appeasement of Passion takes place) through seeing the faults of both (Prakriti and her products).—323.

**Vṛtti:**—In the case of worldly people (who are attached to the things of the world), how, it may be asked, will Dispassion arise? To this the author replies:

“Ubhayoḥ,” of the Self as well as of the Object. The fault of the Self is such as falling into hell through association, dwelling in the womb, etc. Fault of the Object is such as transformation, dryness, etc.—28.

**Bhāṣya:**—Moreover:

Only through seeing the faults such as of being transformable, of being essentially painful, etc., “Ubhayoḥ”, i.e., of Prakriti and her products, does the appeasement of Passion take place, as in the case of the Muni. Such is the meaning. For, in the case of Saubhari, it is
heard, dispassion towards association took place only through his seeing the faults of association. Thus:

\[
\text{हुँके यदैवेकदीररजम}
\]
\[
\text{शतां दलव्य तदेवं प्रखलम् ॥}
\]
\[
\text{पराक्षेष भृगियामानाः}
\]
\[
\text{सुहर्ष्टं कन्हेन पुरुषम् तद् ॥}
\]

What was in itself a single pain, namely, birth in a body, that has now given birth to one hundred and fifty pains, by means of (Suvarna's) marrying the (same number of) girls of the fish-king, and that, again, has been multiplied by means of innumerable sons.—

\textit{Viṣṇu Purāṇa}, IV. ii. 49.—28.

\textit{Faults disqualify even for instruction: Story of King Aja.}

न संविणेच्छेतस्यापदेशबीजारोहस्तोऽजवत् ॥ ४१ २६ ॥


29. Neither does the seed of instruction sprout in a man of impure mind,—as in the case of Aja.—324.

\textit{Vṛtti:}—The author declares the man who is incompetent to receive instruction.

Just as, in an undressed field, the seed does not sprout, so, in a mind rendered impure by means of Passion, etc., the seed of instruction does not sprout. "Ajā-vat": just as in the king, named Aja, while he was afflicted with grief at the loss of his wife, the instruction given by Vasiṣṭha, did not stay.—29.

\textit{Bhāṣya:}—The author tells us that one who is influenced by Passion and other faults, is unfit even to receive instruction.

What is, in the form of instruction, the seed of the tree of knowledge, of that, even the sprout is not produced in a mind rendered impure by Passion and the like. "Ajā-vat": Just as in the case of the king, Aja by name, whose mind was rendered impure by grief at the loss of his wife, the sprout was not produced of the seed of instruction even when it was given by Vasiṣṭha. Such is the meaning.—29.

Faults further condemned.

नानास्मात्त्वमापिङ्ग मलिन्यार्धावत् ॥ ४१ २० ॥

N, not. \textit{नानास्मात्त्वमापिङ्ग}, mere reflection. \textit{अपि}, even. \textit{मलिन्यार्धावत्}, malina-darpaṇa-vat, as in the case of a rusty mirror.

30. Not even a mere reflection (of the instruction is produced in an impure mind)—just as in the case of a rusty mirror.—325.
Vṛtti:—The author states that in a mind rendered impure by Passion and the like, not even a reflection of knowledge appears.

Just as, in a dirty mirror, not even a semblance of the face is reflected; so, because the Self is reflected in Prakṛti, knowledge of the Self is an effect of Prakṛti.—30.

Bhāṣya:—What need of more?

Even a superficial knowledge is not produced, through instruction, in an impure mind, on account of the obstruction arising from its wandering into other objects, etc. Just as, on account of the obstruction caused by means of dirt, an object is not reflected in a dirty mirror, similarly. Such is the meaning.—30.

Knowledge is not necessarily perfect knowledge.

न तज्ज्ञापि तदृशता पक्षज्वलः || १-१ ३१ ॥

* Na, not. तत्त्वतः Tat-ja-sya, of what is produced therefrom. तत्र Api, even. तत्ततः Tat-rupa-tā, similarity of form therewith. पक्षज्वल वत्, as in the case of the clay-born lotus.

31. Moreover, what is produced from another thing, may not have similarity of form with that thing,—as in the case of the clay-born (lotus).—326.

Vṛtti:—But, then, let Mahat itself, it may be said, because it is of the form of the cause, be the Self. In regard to this the author says:

An effect itself cannot be the same as the cause, because there is a difference. For, the clay-born (lotus) itself is not the clay.—31.

Vedintin Mahādeva—Just as the characteristics, e.g., of being the creator of the elements and the elementals, belonging to the products of Prakṛti, constitute Samsāra or mundane existence, so, it may be said, will it be the case with Release also which too is a product of Prakṛti. In regard to this the author says:

Just as the lotus, though it is produced from the clay, is not of the same form as clay, so Release, though it is a product of Prakṛti, is not of the form of Samsāra, because there is a distinction by means of the touch of pain being absent from it.

Bhāṣya:—Or, if, by some means or other, knowledge be produced (in an impure mind), yet it may not be, says the author, in accordance with the instruction.

Though produced therefrom, i.e., from the instruction, knowledge does not (necessarily) possess similarity of form with the instruction, because (of the possibility) of its not being understood in its entirety.
"Paṅkaja-vat": Just as, in spite of the excellence of the seed, on account
of the fault of the clay, the lotus which springs from the clay, does not
possess the form in exact accordance with the seed, similarly. Such is
the meaning.

Here the mind of the disciple is compared to the lotus-bed or
clay.—31.

Release is above Lordliness.

32. Not, even on the attainment of lordliness, is the
fulfilment of the end,—as is the case with the success of the
objects of worship, as is the case with the success of the
objects of worship.—327.

Vṛitti:—Even in the case of those who have been successful in the
attainment of the supernatural powers of Attenuation, etc., there is, says
the author, no ultimate success.

As there is the ultimate success on account of non-return to the
world, in the case of one who has become successful (siddha) by reason of
the attainment of the knowledge of the Principles by means of attendance
upon the preceptor, so is it not the case by reason of connection with, or
attainment of, supernatural powers, because of coming back again to the
world.

The repetition of "As is the case with the success of the objects of
worship" is to indicate the close of the Book.—32.

Here ends the Fourth Book, of Fables, in the Vṛitti on the Sāṁkhya-
Pravacana-Sūtram of Kapila.

Bhāṣya:—But, then, since the object desired by Puruṣa is accom-
plished just by the attainment of lordliness in the world of Brahmā, etc.,
to what purpose, it may be asked, is the development of knowledge, with
so much toil, for the sake of Release? To this the author replies:

Though there is the attainment of lordliness or power, yet there is
not "Kṛita-kṛita-tā," the state or condition of having the object fulfilled,
since it (the attainment of power) is affected by waste, excess, and pain.

"Upāsya-siddhi-vat": Just as in the case of the objects of worship,
namely, Brahmat and others, though there is attainment of success or perfection, yet there is not the condition of having the object accomplished, because it is heard that they too, in the state of the sleep of Yoga, etc., continue the practice of Yoga; even so is it the case also with those who, by worshipping them, have attained the lordliness or power appertaining to them (and which was consequently all that they could bestow on their devotees).

The repetition of "As is the case with the success of the objects of worship" is to mark the close of the Book.—32.

In the present Book has been briefly mentioned, by means of fables, the intimate associates of Discrimination which has been declared in the (first) three Books.

Here ends the Fourth Book, of Fables, in the Commentary composed by Vijñāna Bihya on the Sāṁkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram of Kapila.
Book V.

OF THE DEMOLITION OF COUNTER-THEORIES.

INTRODUCTION.

Vṛtti:—After the Fables, for the purpose of the refutation of opposite doctrines, is made the origination of the Fifth Book.

Bhāṣya:—The doctrines of the author's own system or Śāstra have been completely established. After this, with a view to refute the Pārva-Paksas or prima facie objections thrown by others into his own Śāstra, the Fifth Book is commenced. Therein, at the outset, he meets the allegation that the Maṅgala or suspicious observance that has been performed by means of the word "Atha" in the first aphorism (I, I, q. v.), is useless.

Performance of Maṅgala is necessary.

Maṅgalāchāryaṁ śiśṭātāraṅaṁ phala-dhyānaśyaktātām Bhāṣyaṁ || 5 1 9 ||

Maṅgala-ācharanam, performance of the Maṅgala or suspicious observance. śiśṭa-āchārāt, according to the practice of the cultured. phala-darśanāt, from seeing the fruit. śrutī-taṅ, from the Sruti. cha, also. iti Iti, the end.

1. Performance of Maṅgala (is established) from the practice of the cultured, from seeing the fruit, and also from the Sruti.—328.

Vṛtti:—Hereby is discarded what is maintained by those by whom it is said that Maṅgala is perfectly useless when it is seen that, (in some cases) though the Maṅgala was performed, the book is not completed and that, (in other cases) though no Maṅgala was performed, the book is completed.—1.

Note.—For a fuller statement of what is here briefly hinted at, see Valāpikā śīrṣa, I. 1. 1, Upanāhāra.

Bhāṣya:—Performance of Maṅgala that has been made—of that the necessity of being performed is proved by means of these evidences. Such is the meaning.

The word "Iti" has been used with the object of removing expectation of any other reason for it.—1.
Isvara as the Creator of the World, is not proved.

2. Not because (the cause is) directed by Isvara, (that there is) the resulting of fruits, because the production thereof (takes place) by means of Karma.—329.

Vṛtti:—The non-existence (a-sattvam) of Isvara has been established before. The author now states the argument (nyāya):

Were Isvara an independent creator, he would create even without (the aid of) Karma, (but that is not so). If you say that he creates, having Karma as an auxiliary; then let Karma itself be the cause, what need of Isvara? Nor can an auxiliary obstruct the power of the principal agent, since, in that case, there would be a contradiction of its independence.

Moreover, activity is seen to proceed from egoistic and altruistic motives. Neither can any egoistic motive belong to Isvara. And were his motives altruistic, then, he being compassionate, there would be no justification for a creation which is full of pain. Nor is there any activity which is purely altruistic, because such activity proceeds from a desire for selfish gain even by means of doing good to others, etc.

Therefore, let Karma alone be the cause of the world.—2.

Bhāṣya:—There are Pūrva-pāksins or opponents who maintain that what has been declared before, namely,

Isvara-adhipitam Phala-nispaṭitiḥ, production or resulting of fruits or consequences of acts. Karmasya, by means of Karma or Adhiṣṭhānam. Tat-siddheḥ, because of the proof of it.

Because Isvara is not a subject of proof.—8. P. S. I. 92.

—that is not justified, because there is proof of Isvara by means of his being the giver of the fruits of acts.

The author refutes them.

When the cause is superintended by Isvara, there is the resulting of the transformation in the shape of the fruit of acts,—this is not proper, because of the possibility of the resulting of fruits by means alone of the necessary Karma. Such is the meaning.—2.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—When the cause is superintended by Isvara; there is the production of the effect, since it is seen that in clay, etc., superintended by the potter, etc., there is the production of the jar, etc.

This view the author discredits.
Does Īśvara create by depending upon Karma or does he create by not depending upon it? In the former case, let Karma alone be the cause, and not Īśvara. In the latter case, there will be contradiction to his independence. Further, is the activity of Īśvara egoistic or is it altruistic? It is not the former, because it is postulated (in the very conception of Īśvara) that all his desires have been fulfilled. It is not the latter, since there is no reason for his activity in a painful creation, when he is compassionate.

Īśvara, as the Moral Governor of the World, is not proved.

3. Because of his own benefit, (Īśvara’s) superintendence (will be) like that of man.—330.

Vṛitti:—The author shows this (that all activity is ultimately selfish).

Nor does personal benefit exist consistently with him who is eternal.

—3.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—The author, moreover, shows that whoever superintends the cause, does so only for his own benefit, and that, similarly, it will be so also in the case of Īśvara.

In “Sva-upakārāt” which is the fruit (of superintendence), the fifth case-ending has been used in the sense of cause or reason.

Bhāṣya:—By a number of aphorisms the author shows that even to be the giver of fruits is not possible in the case of Īśvara.

Were Īśvara to be the superintendant, since it would be only for the sake of subserving his own end, the superintendence will be like that of man. Such is the meaning.—3.

Above continued.

4. Otherwise, (Īśvara will be) like the human lord.

—331.

Vṛitti:—But the opponent may say that there will be no harm if (Īśvara’s) own benefit be the motive of his superintendence. In regard to this the author says:

(Īśvara, in that case, will be) non-omniscient (which is not desirable).

Such is the meaning.—4.
Vedántin Mahádeva:—"Itara-thá," on the admission of his own
benefit, "Laukika-Isvara-vat," as in the case of the human lord, there
will be the implication of his not having attained all his desires.

Bhāṣya:—Let there be the benefit of Isvara also; it may be said;
what is the harm?

Apprehending such a rejoinder, the author says:

On the admission of the benefit of Isvara also, he too, like the human
lord, will be Sáṃsára, i.e., revolving on the wheel of the world, because,
by reason of his desires not having been fulfilled, there will be the im-
plication of pain, etc. Such is the meaning.—4.

Above continued.

5. (Otherwise, Isvara will be like the human lord),
or nominal.—332.

Vṛtti:—The author points out another defect in the opponent’s
view.

By reason of the falling of the shadow of Prakṛti, through her
being the doer, arises the idea: It is the Self that is the doer. Hence is
its name of Isvara. This is a form of nomenclature.—5.

Vedántin Mahádeva:—Were Isvara different in character from the
human lord, then he will be just the technical Isvara of the Sámkhya
System;—this is what the author says.

"Vā" has been used in the sense of “Eva” or certainty.

Bhāṣya:—Just so let it be, it may be said. Apprehending this the
author says:

Inspite of the existence of worldly life, were he still to be Isvara,
then “Isvara” will, as with us, so with you also, be a mere technical
name to denote the Puruṣa who is produced at the beginning of Creation;
because, owing to the contradiction of being worldly and of having
unobstructed will, eternal Isvara-hood will not be proved. Such is the
meaning.—5.

Above continued.

न रागाभृते तत्तिथिः: प्रतिनियतकारकस्वात् || ४ ५ ६ ॥

Na, not. एवं रागाभृते Rāgātrite, without passion or attachment. तस्दीदिः Tat,
siddhi, accomplishment of it, i.e., superintendence. प्रतिनियतकारक Pratî-niyata-
kāraṇa-tvāt, being the invariable and unconditional cause.
6. Without Råga or passion, superintendence is not established, because Råga is the invariable and unconditional cause in all activity.—333.

Vr̥tti:—The author adduces another reason.

In the case of the wandering away or failure of the cause which never exists without relation to the effect, there will be the negation of expectation everywhere. And Råga is the efficient cause of activity. Hence, without it, how (can it be possible for Isvara to be the maker of the world? Nor does Råga belong to one who is released (such as the supposed Isvara must be).—6.

Bhāṣya:—The author mentions another hindrance to Isvara’s being the superintendent.

Moreover, without Råga, to be the superintendent is not established, because Råga is the invariable cause in the case of activity. Such is the meaning.

“Upakāra” (in V. 3) is the accomplishment of the object desired. Whereas “Råga” is intense desire. Thus there is no tautology.—6.

Råga cannot exist in Isvara.

तथोत्योगसि न निल्मुक्तः || ॥ ७ ॥

तथा Tat-yoge, in the case of connection with that, i.e., Råga. अभि, even, again. न न, not. निल्मुक्तः, eternally released or free.

7. On (the admission), again, (of) connection with Råga, (he will) not (be) eternally free.—334.

Vr̥tti:—Certainly Råga will exist (in Isvara), it may be said. In regard to this the author says:

(“Tat-yoge’pi”), on the connection of Råga, again.—7.

Bhāṣya:—Well, that being so, let, it may be said, there be Råga also in Isvara. To this, the author replies:

While, again, the connection of Råga is admitted, he will not be eternally free; and thence also is your doctrine injured. Such is the meaning.—7.

The condition of Isvara cannot arise through connection with the power of Prakriti.

प्रधानशाक्तियोगाचेत् सहायत: || ॥ ८ ॥

सहायता Pradhāna-sakti-yogā, through connection with the power of Prakriti. चेत, if. सहायता: Sanga-apattih, implication of association or attachment.
8. If (you say that the condition of being Īśvara arises) through connection with the powers of Prakṛti, (then there will be) the implication of (his) attachment.—335.

Vṛtti:—Through connection with the powers of Prakṛti, it may be said, there will be the agency (of the Self). In regard to this, the author says:

(Says the Śruti).

अस्त्येऽनन्यं पुरुषः

Verily is this Puruṣa free from attachment.—Bṛhad Aranyaka Upaniṣad, IV, III. 16.

Of this there will be the implication of contradiction.—8.

Bhāṣya:—Moreover, the condition of being Īśvara, in regard to Prakṛti, cannot be possible by means of desire, etc., which are just the transformations of Prakṛti; since, in that case, there will be the fault of mutual dependence: the energising of Prakṛti after the production of desire, and desire, etc., after the activity of Prakṛti. Eternal desire, etc., on the other hand, are not appropriate in the case of Prakṛtī, as, on that supposition, there will not be established her state of equilibrium, as proved in the Śruti and the Smṛti. Hence two other modes (in which the condition of being Īśvara may appear in the Self) are left. They are: (1) Does the condition of being Īśvara arise just through direct connection with the Chetana or the intelligent principle, of desire, etc, which are admitted by us as being the attributes or properties of Prakṛti? Or, (2) does it arise through her being the mover to activity merely by means of her proximate existence, as in the case of the loadstone? *

Of these two, the author discards the first alternative.

Through connection, with Puruṣa, of the powers of Prakṛti, viz., desire, etc., there will be the implication of attachment of attributes in Puruṣa also; and so there will be contradiction of such declarations in the Śruti as:

ह स यदृच वृत्तयतामात्स्ततानं भवति

अस्त्येऽनन्यं पुरुषः

Whatever he sees here, cannot enter into him, for he, Puruṣa, is free from all attachment.—Bṛhad Aranyaka Upaniṣad, IV, III. 16.

Such is the meaning.—8.

* P. E. Hall reads the whole of this paragraph as forming the concluding portion of the Commentary on the preceding aphorism. Garbe reads half of it there, that is, “Moreover, the remaining half at the beginning of the Commentary on the present aphorism. None of these readings is correct. The passage “Moreover, ............ Smṛti” has no more textual relevancy under the preceding aphorism than has the other passage beginning with “hence”.
The condition of being Īśvara cannot arise through vicinity of Prakṛti.

सत्तारूपारूपेन सर्वारूपेयं || ५ || ६ ||

Sattā-mātrā, through mere existence. Sat, i.e. Sarvānīśvara-rūpa, condition of being Īśvara in all cases.

9. If (it be said that the condition of being Īśvara may arise) through the mere existence (of Prakṛti by the side of Puruṣa), (then) the condition of being Īśvara (will belong) to all (Puruṣas).—336.

Vṛtti:—Not that association with Prakṛti (is desired), it may be said; but by the mere existence of Prakṛti there will appear agency in Puruṣa. In regard to this the author says:

Since there is no distinction in the existence of Prakṛti in relation to all Selves, all Selves will be Īśvaras.—9.

Bhūtya:—In regard to the second alternative, the author says:

Were the condition of being Īśvara to arise by the mere existence of Prakṛti in the vicinity, just as in the case of the leadstone, then, is established exactly what is intended by ās, namely, the condition of being Īśvara belonging, without distinction, to all whatever, that is to say, to Puruṣas who are the experiencers in respective creations; because it is only through conjunction with the whole lot of experiencers that Prakṛti creates things beginning with Mahat. And thence, “There is but one Īśvara”—this tenet of yours is lost. Such is the meaning.—9.

There is no proof of an eternal Īśvara.

प्रमाणाभावं तत्सत्तवित्र: || ५ || १० ||

Pramāṇa-abhāvā, on account of non-existence of proof. Na, no. शर्तिः: Tat-siddhiḥ, establishment thereof, i.e., of an eternal Īśvara.

10. On account of the non-existence of evidence, (there is) no proof of an eternal Īśvara.—337.

Vṛtti:—But, then, there are means (of proving the existence) of (one eternal) Īśvara. How, then, it may be asked, can this be so (that all Selves are Īśvaras)? In regard to this the author says:

On account of the non-existence of perceptual proof or evidence of sense-perception.—10.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—“Tat-siddhiḥ”, proof of the existence of Īśvara. Because the non-existence of the evidence of sense-perception is well-known.
BOOK V, SūTRA 10, 11.

Bhāṣya.—It might be so, rejoins our opponent, but, by reason of their conflict with the proofs demonstrative of Īśvara, these are nothing but invalid arguments; otherwise, the existence of Prakṛti also is capable of being obstructed by means of thousands of similar invalid reasonings.

To this the author replies:

"Tat-siddhiḥ", the establishment of an eternal Īśvara. In respect of Īśvara, to be sure, there is no evidence of sense-perception. Hence Inference and Testimony must be intended to be the proofs supposed here, and they are not possible. Such is the meaning.—10.

Inference of Īśvara is impossible.

Sambandha-abhāvāt, owing to the non-existence of the relation, i.e., the pervasion (vyāpti) of one thing by another, that is to say, the general proposition. "Na, no. सम्बन्धः Anumānam, inference.

11. Owing to the non-existence of the Vyāpti or pervasion, (there is) no inference (of Īśvara).—338.

Vṛtti.—It may be said that there will be inference (of the existence of Īśvara). In regard to this, the author says:

Since Vyāpti or the general proposition as to the pervasion of one thing by another or their universal going together, must have sense-perception to precede it, in the absence thereof (as stated in the preceding aphorism), how can there be the apprehension of the universal relation? Neither can there be the apprehension of the universal relation in the case of an uncommon thing.—11.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—"Sambandha-abhāvāt": on account of the non-existence of vyāpti.

Bhāṣya:—By means of two aphorisms the author demonstrates their impossibility.

"Sambandhaḥ" is Vyāpti or pervasion; "Abhāvāḥ" is non-establishment. So that, by reason of the fact that Īśvara's being the thing to be pervaded, (that is, the middle term of the syllogism), is not established, inasmuch as he (i.e., knowledge of him) is not required to cause inference in such cases as "Mahat and the rest must-have-a-cause, because they are effects", etc., there can be no inference in respect of Īśvara. Such is the meaning.—11.

Note.—Vyāpti is the principle of inference. Its operation may be seen from the following illustration:

Pratīti:—The mountain contains fire;
Hetaḥ:—Because there is smoke in it;
Udāharaṇa:—Whatever possesses smoke, possesses fire, e.g., such as the kitchen hearth;

Upānaya:—The mountain also possesses smoke which is pervaded by fire;

Nigamana:—Therefore, it contains fire.

Now let us put the ontological argument in favour of the existence of Īśvara into the form of the above syllogism, and see what is wanting.

Thus,

Pratijñā:—The Creation must have Īśvara as its cause;

Heitu:—Because it is an effect;

Udāharaṇa:—Whatever is an effect, has Īśvara as its cause;

Upānaya:—The Creation also is an effect which is pervaded by a cause;

Nigamana:—Therefore, it must have Īśvara as its cause;

It will at once be seen that the argument is defective. The Vyāpti which is the principle of inference in the present case, is that whatever is an effect has Īśvara as its cause. But such a principle can never be established, because an instance of it (i.e., an effect being actually created by Īśvara) has never been observed. And if the principle of inference fails, the whole argument, of course, necessarily falls to the ground.

There is no Śabda in regard to Īśvara as Creator.

### Sūtrāpari Prābhāskāryatva

12. The Śrutī also (speaks of the web of creation) being the product of Prakṛti.——339.

Vṛtti:—It may be said that there will be Śabda or Word proof (of the existence of Īśvara). In regard to this, the author says:

There is the Śrutī:

Prākṛtasya pradhana-tva-padaḥ

From Prakṛti is the world produced.—Source not traced.

Therefore, the proofs demonstrative of the existence of Īśvara are apparent and not real.—12.

Bhāṣya:—Nor is there Śabda or Verbal Testimony, also, says the author.

In respect of the web of creation, there exists Śrutī or Vedic declaration of its being the product of Prakṛti, but not of its having an Intelligent being as its cause. For example:

Prākṛtasya bhāvita-pradhanaḥ vadi: prakṛta: upadharma: śabda:।

(प्राकृतिक्षण सौंभवित-धर्माणां वटी: प्राकृत: उपदर्म: शब्द:)

॥
BOOK V, SūTRA, 12.

(One Unborn (Puruṣa), for enjoyment, consorts with) One Unborn (Prakrīti), having the colours of red, white, and black, the procreatrix of manifold progeny like unto herself. (The other Unborn deserts her, after she has been enjoyed.) — Svetāsvatara Upaniṣat, IV. 5.

तत्यते तत्त् वायुक्तपालिन तत्त्वादनुपूर्व्य व्यक्ति

Verily, that, the same, was then undifferentiated; it is differentiated by means of name and form. — Brihadārya Upaniṣat, I. iv. 7.

Such is the meaning.

What Śruti, on the other hand, exists about an intelligent entity's being the cause; viz.

तत्त्वज्ज्ञत तथृ स्वाम

It looked up, "I shall be many." — Chhāṇḍogya Upaniṣat, VI. ii. 3.

that has reference (not to the innate and eternal knowledge of an eternal Īśvara, but) to the knowledge which is capable of being produced in the Mahā Puruṣa or Great Puruṣa produced at the beginning of creation and having the Principle Mahat as his Upādhi or external investment. Or, having regard to the being many, the Śruti may be said to have a secondary reference to Prakriti herself; as is the case with "The banks of the river are desiring (about) to fall down"; since, otherwise, will not be proved in Puruṣa that character of not undergoing transformation which is declared by such Śrutis as:

तत्त्वज्ज्ञतेऽश्च श्रुतां निद्रेषु वाक

(Puruṣa is) the witness, intelligent, alone, and devoid of attributes. — Svetāsvatara Upaniṣat, VI. 11.

And it has been already explained (cide pages 6 and 113 ante) that this denial of Īśvara is a mere Praudhi Vāda or bold assertion made with the object of evoking dispassion in respect of the condition of being Īśvara, and also with the object of demonstrating that there can be Release even without the knowledge of Īśvara. Otherwise, there would be redundancy in the supposition of the secondariness of the eternity, etc., of Īśvara, as differentiated from those of the Jiva or Incarnate Puruṣa; because Puruṣa's characteristics of being immutable, etc., are proved by the admission of the eternal knowledge, desire, etc., caused by the Upādhis or external investments, as well as of the transformations beginning with Mahat. All this should be looked for in the Brahma-Mimāṃsā or Vedaṇā-Sūtram.—12.

Note:—The last portion of the Bhāṣya would seem to require an explanation. In order to maintain the character of immutability, etc., in regard to the Jiva, you have got to admit that eternal knowledge, will, etc., do not in reality belong to the Jiva, but are only adventitions to him, and are, in reality, the transformations of Mahat, etc. Now, were the disputed denial of Īśvara a real one, then with Īśvara must also go eternal knowledge, will, etc., which would be contrary to fact as well as to theory. Therefore, you will have to distinguish between Īśvara and Jiva as regards the characteristics of eternal knowledge, will, etc., and to suppose that, while these are primary in the case of the Jiva, they are secondary in the case of the supposed Īśvara. etc.
Bondage is not due to A-vidyā.

13. No connection with the power A-vidyā (there is) of him who is devoid of attachment.

Vṛtti:—Some say that the agency of the Self arises through the connection of A-vidyā. In regard to that, the author says:

It is clear.—13.

Bhāṣya:—It has been established, as a tenet, in the first Book, that Bondage does not result from A-vidyā (Vide aphorism I. 20). Now, by a section, the author discredits the opposite view in the matter, in a detailed manner.

Others say: Pradhāna or Prakṛti does not exist, but in the intelligent principle rests a power called the beginningless A-vidyā, which is destructible by Knowledge. From this alone is the bondage of the intelligent, and, on the destruction of it, is Release.

In regard to this it is said: By reason of his being devoid of attachment, connection of the intelligent with the power of A-vidyā directly is not possible. For A-vidyā consists in being of the form of that in respect of what is not it; and this is a particular modification (of the mind) and so, cannot possibly take place without attachment or association in the form of the conjunction which is the cause of modification. Such is the meaning.—13.

Above continued.

14. In (the supposition of) the establishment of A-vidyā through connection with A-vidyā, (there will be the fault of) mutual dependence.—341.

Vṛtti:—The author mentions another defect.

Without A-vidyā, there is no creation, without creation, no A-vidyā; hence is the characteristic of being mutually dependent.—14.
Vedántin Mahādeva:—Moreover, when connection with A-vidyā is established, there will be the characteristic of being mutually dependent, “Tat-yoge,” in connection with agency, because the establishment of connection with agency is through connection with A-vidyā. Such is the meaning.

Bhāṣya:—But then, it may be said, just through the influence of A-vidyā, should connection of A-vidyā be stated to arise; so that, A-vidyā not being ultimately or absolutely real, there can be no attachment to it.

In regard to this, the author says:

Were A-vidyā to be established through connection of A-vidyā, there will be the fault of mutual dependence or self-dependence, that is to say, non-finality, such is the complement.—14.

Above continued.

न बीजास्तुकरत साविसंतारस्मु: || ३५ ||

Na, not. बीजास्तुकरत: Bīja-aṅkura-vat, as in the case of the seed and the sprout.

स्वयंसर: Sādī-samsāra-sūrab, because of the Śruti on Samsāra or mundane existence being limited at the beginning.

15. (Non-finality here is not not-a-fault) as in the case of the seed and the sprout, because there is the Śruti on Samsāra being limited at the beginning.—342.

Vṛtti:—(Samsāra) being beginningless, as in the case of the seed and the sprout, there can be, it may be urged, no mutual dependence. In regard to this, the author says:

It would be so, were Samsāra beginningless. But Samsāra is with a beginning. Also says the Śruti:—

विभवतचालितं विभवतोप्युतो
विभवतचालितं विभवतस्तु॥
सं बाहुध्यं चमत्के देवते
दाहावृत्ति अवयवन्ते॥

One Deva, of universal eyes, of universal mouth, of universal arms, of universal feet, producing the heaven and the earth, sets fire to them with the arms and wings.—Suṣṭhavatara Upaniṣad, III. 8.

Whence it follows that there is a breach of continuity in the stream of Samsāra during Pralaya.—15.

Vedántin Mahādeva:—Nor is it the case, says the author, that agency and A-vidyā are without beginning.
That Samsāra has a beginning is proved from knowing the non-existence of Samsāra during Pralaya, from such Śruti as:

सत्तेष स्वायत्तम भास्तिकृते-कालाविनाशित

Only this, the existent, there was, O Calm One, at the beginning, one, without a second.—Upaniṣad VI. ii. 1.

Bhyāya:—Well, as in the case of the seed and the sprout, non-finitiness, it may be contended, does not count as a fault here.

Apprehending this, the author says:

Non-finitiness, as in the case of the seed and the sprout, is not possible (in the present case), because of the Śruti on the limitedness at the beginning of Purusās' Samsāra which consists of the form of all the evils beginning with A-vidyā; that is, because we hear of its non-existence in the state of dissolution, deep sleep, and the like. Such is the meaning. For, by Śruti such as:

विद्यांत्यत्वं यैतत्वं भूतेऽय: समुद्वया तत्त्थेवाहुविन्दुपरिति॥

Upaniṣad Ghaṇṭa (the Cloud of Pure Knowledge, i.e., the mind, after having sprung up from these sāttvika or Elements, disappears into these sāttvika again,—Upaniṣad Upaniṣad, II. iv. 12.), it is established that, because in the states of Pralaya or dissolution, etc., there is non-existence of Buddhi and all the other modifications, therefore, belongs to Purusās the characteristic of being mere intelligences, devoid of all Samsāra or worldly traits, such as A-vidyā, Vidyā, etc., which are caused by, and so depend for their existence upon, the modifications as their external conditions (Upādhis). Therefore, it is a mere empty phrase to say that "A-vidyā also is caused by A-vidyā."—15.

The nature of A-vidyā discussed.

विद्यांत्यत्वं व्रतभाषवभाषस्तः॥ २ ४ ४ १ ६॥

विद्यात्तप: Vidyātā, from Vidyā or Right Knowledge. द्वेः Anyatve, being other. ब्राह्मबाधव-प्रसांगात: Brahma-bādhva-prasaṅgah, the implication of obstruction to, or contradiction of, Brahman.

16. In (the supposition of A-vidyā) being what is other than Vidyā, (there is) the implication of the contradiction of Brahman.—343.

Vṛtti:—The author declares the essential form of A-vidyā.

(If A-vidyā be) what is different from Vidyā, (that is, not-Vidyā), then Brahman, too, which is different from Vidyā, will be affected by the characteristic of A-vidyā. And thence will be contradiction to its being Brahman.—16.
Vedántin Mahádéra:—The author mentions the fault in supposing that A-vidyā is what is different from Brahman.

"Vidyáṭāḥ," from Brahman of which Knowledge is the essential form, A-vidyā being different, there is the implication of the contradiction of Brahman, because of the admission by you that Brahman is devoid of the three-fold limitation, (i.e., limitation by time, place, and thing). When A-vidyā is different from Brahman, Brahman also will be different from A-vidyā; so that the consequence will be limitation, by thing, in the form of being favourable and unfavourable to such difference.

Bhāṣya:—But, then, may contend the opponent, our A-vidyā has a special definition of our own, and is not of the form declared in the Yoga, namely, that of the cognition or idea of the Self in respect of the Not-Self, etc. So that, just as in the case of your Prakṛiti, so also in the case of our A-vidyā, even though it, being undivided and without beginning, be attached to Puruṣa, still there is no impairment of his being free from attachment.

There being room for such an apprehension, the author, by bringing forward an alternative meaning of the word A-vidyā as previously interpreted by him, proceeds to point out its defect.

If the meaning of the word A-vidyā be just that it is other than Vidyā, then, because A-vidyā is capable of being destroyed by Knowledge, the "bādha" or destruction, "Brahmaṇāḥ", of the Self also is entailed, inasmuch as Brahman also is other than Vidyā (i.e., not-Vidyā). Such is the meaning.—16.

Above continued.

अभाषेन नैष्फल्यम् ॥ १७ ॥

अ-बद्धे, in the case of non-obstruction. नैष्फल्यम्, fruitlessness, futility.

17. (While), in the case of non-obstruction (of A-vidyā by Vidyā) (there is) fruitlessness (of Vidyā).—344.

Vṛtti:—The author adduces another reason.

If, by Vidyā, A-vidyā is not obstructed, then, it will not be Vidyā at all.—17.

Bhāṣya:—If, on the other hand, the form of A-vidyā also is not to be obstructed by Vidyā, then Vidyā will be useless, on account of the non-existence of the characteristic of being the preventor of A-vidyā. Such is the meaning.—17.
Above continued.

विद्याभाष्यते जगतोपर्येष्यम् \( \square 4 \) \( \square 1 \) \( \square 1 \)

विद्याय-बध्यत्वे, in the case of its being what is preventible by Vidyā.

अपि: जगातः, of the world. एवम् also, एवम् Evam, the same.

18. (On the alternative theory of A-vidyā) being what is preventible by Vidyā, the world also (will be) the same (i.e., A-vidyā).—345.

Vṛitti:—But, it may be said, A-vidyā is certainly obstructed by Vidyā. In regard to this, the author says:

The characteristic of A-vidyā will belong to the world also.—18.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—Moreover, is there non-obstruction, or is there obstruction, of A-vidyā by Vidyā? In the first case, the result will be that Vidyā is fruitless. In the second case, as of A-vidyā, so of the world also, there will be obstruction; so that the world will not be perceived. Such is the import.

Bhāṣya:—The author discredits the alternative theory.

If, again, it be said that the characteristic of being A-vidyā is nothing but the characteristic of being obstructed, in the intelligent principle, by means of Vidyā; then, that being so, "Jagataḥ", of the whole panorama of Prakṛiti, Mahat, and all the rest, also will be "Evam"; the nature of being A-vidyā; because, just like Wrong Cognition, Prakṛiti, etc., also have been excluded from the Self by such Śrutis as:

पञ्चत प्राशयो नैति नैति

Now, then, the direction "Neti! " Neti! "

पञ्चसूत्रमनस्तु

Not large, not small, etc.—Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣat, III, viii. 8.

Such is the meaning.

So that, the whole panorama of creation being, without exception, of the nature of A-vidyā, after the destruction of A-vidyā, by means of knowledge, in the case of one person, by others too the panorama would not be seen. Such is the import.

Neither can it be said that to be A-vidyā is to be destructible by Vidyā, because, on account of the fallacy of self-dependence or reasoning in a circle, it is not possible to infer what is destructible by Vidyā by means of the characteristic of its being destructible by Vidyā.—18.
In any case, A-vidyā cannot be without beginning.

तदृपले सारिखम् ॥ ४ । १६ ॥

सूत्रसे Tat-rūpapatve, in being of that form. कालिन्यक Sāditvam, the nature or state of having a beginning.

19. If (A-vidyā) be of the form thereof, it must have a beginning.—346.

Vṛtti:—The nature of A-vidyā, it may be said, belongs to the world also. In regard to this, the author says:

Beginningless is this A-vidyā, "Tat-rūpapatre", in the case of the world being of the form thereof (i.e., of A-vidyā), A-vidyā will be limited at the beginning (like the world).—19.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—In the case of its being, again, of the form thereof, that is to say, on the admission that the world, (after it has once been destroyed by Vidyā), will be produced anew, the production of a new A-vidyā also must be affirmed. So that A-vidyā will be limited at the beginning. And that being so, no absolute Release will be the result. Such is the import.

Bhāṣya:—Or, granted that to be A-vidyā is just the characteristic of somehow or other being preventible by Vidyā; still it is the characteristic of being finite at the beginning, that will, in regard to Puruṣas, belong to a thing of this description, but it will not be possible for it to be without beginning, because by the Srutis, already cited, such as:

विद्यानाथ वेष हवाहि

Vijñāna-Ghana itself etc.,

it has been established that, in the states of Pralaya or dissolution, etc., Puruṣa exists as mere intelligence. Such is the meaning.

While, in our theory, though, in the state of Pralaya or dissolution, Puruṣa does not undergo Samsāra, yet subsequent bondage is established through conjunction with Prakṛti, who has an independent existence and is eternal. Similarly, though there is conjunction with Prakṛti, it is the A-viveka or Non-discrimination belonging to a previous state of worldly existence, that, as has also been already stated, by means of Vāsanā or tendency, Adhīṣṭham, and the like, becomes the efficient (nimitta cause (of bondage). Therefore, other than the one mentioned in the Yoga Darśana, there does not exist A-vidyā, which is destructible by Knowledge. And that, it has been established, is only an attribute of Buddhi, and is not an attribute of Puruṣa.—19.
Karma is the efficient cause of Creation.

न धम्मिलापः प्रकृतिकार्यवैचित्र्यस्य || ४ || २० ||

Na, not. धम्मिलापः: Dharma-apalāpaḥ, repudiation of Dharma or Merit. प्रकृतिकार्यवैचित्र्यस्य: Prakṛiti-kārya-vāchitryāt, owing to the diversity of the effects of Prakṛiti.

20. Repudiation of Dharma (is) not (involved), owing to the diversity of the effects of Prakṛiti.—347.

Vṛtti:—It does not belong to Karma, it may be said, to be the cause of the world; the world is produced through Svabhāva or (the necessity of its own) nature. In regard to this, the author says:

Since Prakṛiti is eternal, and since Svabhāva is one only, diverse effects will not be produced in the absence of Dharma. Therefore, by reason of the difference of Dharma, there is diversity of effects; and hence there is no repudiation or failure of Dharma.—20.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—Now the author discusses the causality of Dharma in creation.

Diversity of effects cannot possibly arise by means of mere Prakṛiti, since she is of a uniform nature. But it arises by means of diversity of Dharma. And by the word, Dharma, is here denoted Adṛṣṭam (which includes A-Dharma or Demerit as well).

Bhāṣya:—In this very Book, what has been declared, namely, that the activity of Prakṛiti is due to the efficient cause of Karma,—in regard to that, the Pūrva Pakṣa or primā facie objection of the opponent, the author reconciles by means of a section.

Repudiation of Dharma, by means of its not being perceptible by the senses, is not possible, because of the inference of it by means of the fact that diversity in the effects of Prakṛiti cannot otherwise be accounted for. Such is the meaning.—20.

Dharma is proved by Śruti also.

श्रुतिलिङ्गादिभिं सत्सद्देहि: || ५ || २१ ||

श्रुतिलिङ्गादिभिं: Śruti-linga-Adi-bhīb, by means of the Śruti, marks (of inference etc. तत्सद्देहि: Tat-siddhēh, proof of it, i.e., Dharma.

21. By means of the Śruti, marks of inference, etc. there is proof of it.—348.

Vṛtti:—The author mentions the proof in regard to the establishment of Dharma.
By "Śruti", is exhibited the Verbal Proof; by "Litga", Inference. Through the word, "Adi", is shown the perception of the Yogi. By means of these is the establishment of Dharma.—21.

Bhāṣya:—The author mentions other proofs also.

From Śruti, such as:

पुनः वै पुनः पवित्र शरीरं पवित्र: पायेन

(In a subsequent birth, one) becomes virtuous by means of virtuous Karma, and vicious by means of vicious Karma.—Bṛhat Āranyaka Upaniṣad, III. ii. 12.,

and from mark of inference in the form of injunctions, such as

स्वर्गवात: अवस्थितं यहेत

One desires of heaven shall perform the Asvamedha sacrifice,

and also by means of the perception of the Yogi, etc., there is proof of it, i.e., Dharma. Such is the meaning.—21.

An objection answered.

न नियम: प्रमाणान्तरावकाशात् || ४ || २२ ||

Vṛtti:—If place and time have no causality, how is it, then, it may be asked, that saffron grows in Kaśmir (only) and that mango flowers appear in the spring (only)? To this, the author replies.

Adriṣṭam alone is the cause,—such is not the rule. But Adriṣṭam is an auxiliary cause. Causality belongs to others also, since there exists proof of this.—22.

Bhāṣya:—The author shows that the reason advanced by the opponent, namely, that there is non-establishment of Dharma, on account of the non-existence of its perception, is fallacious.

Because there is no popular perception of a thing, therefore the thing does not exist,—such a rule does not exist, because, by means of other proofs also, things can be made the objects of cognition. Such is the meaning.—22.

Proof of A-Dharma.

उपयोगार्थवादम् || ४ || २३ ||

Udbhaya-tra, in both cases. Api, also. Evam, similarly.

23. In the case of both also (the proofs are) the same.

—350.
Vrtti:—From seeing Samsara to be full of pain, let, it may be said, there be only evil Adrisram. In regard to this, the author says:

Since pleasure also is seen, there must be Adrisram which is good. —23.

Vedantin Mahadeva:—"Ubbhaya-tra": in this world and in the other world. "Evan": pleasure produced by Adrisram is pain, that is to say, is alloyed pleasure.

Bhaya:—The author proves the existence of A-Dharma or Demerit also, like that of Dharma or Merit.

As in the case of Dharma, so in the case of A-Dharma also, there are similar proofs. Such is the meaning.—23.

An objection answered.

Arthata, Sikhisvratn Samanam, Ashatra, from explication of the sense, Siddhiḥ, proof. Chet, if.

24. If you say that the proof of Dharma is) through Explication of the Sense, (we reply that it is) the same in the case of both.—351.

Vrtti:—Because of the conceit (abhimana) of pleasure in respect of the non-existence of pain, the application of the word 'Adrisram' there is primary, and in the case of the cause of pleasure, it is secondary. In regard to this, the author says:

On account of the possibility of the reverse of it, both are equal.—24.

Vedantin Mahadeva:—"Arthata": from supru-mundane object, in the form of celestial girls, etc., "siddhiḥ", production, of pleasure,—in the other world, such is the complement of the sentence. So that, if it is the case that pleasure is alloyed with pain, then this applies equally "ubhayobh", i.e., in the case of this world and of the other world. For, in this world also, there do exist objects which serve as the cause of pleasure. But towards the production of pleasure Dharma is the cause. And that, being mixed with killing, etc., does not prevail to produce pleasure unalloyed with pain, but, on the contrary, produces only pleasure alloyed with pain. Such is the import.

Bhaya:—Well, the proof of Dharma is by means of Artha-apatti* or Implication or presumption in the form that the injunctions cannot be otherwise explained; but this does not exist in the case of A-Dharma;

* For a full account of Artha-apatti and various other methods of proof, see Valmiki-Sukram, S. B. II  Vol VI, pages 517-518.
hence how can there be an extension of the Vedic mark to the case of A-Dharma?

If it is thus objected, we reply that such is not the case. Because "Samānam ubhayāḥ", that is, proof in the form of Artha-āvatī exists equally in the case of both Dharma and A-Dharma; as, otherwise, prohibitive injunctions such as:

वर्धाराच गच्छे

One shall not approach other people’s wives,

will remain unexplained. Such is the meaning. —21.

Dharma etc., are attributes of the Antah-Karana.

अन्ताःकरणान्तर्गतं धर्मात्मलं परमीनाम || ४ || २४ ||

Antah-karana-dharma-tvam, to be the attributes of the Antah-Karana or the Inner Instrument. धर्मादिनम Dharma-ādīnām, of Dharma, etc.

25. It belongs to Dharma, etc., to be the attributes of the Antah-Karana.—352.

Vyāti.—The author denies that Dharma, etc., are the attributes of the Self.

They are attributes of Buddhi. If they were attributes of the Self, there would be contradiction of the Śruti on the freedom of the Self from attachment.—25.

Bhāṣya.—Well, then, if Dharma, etc., are admitted, then the result will be, may contend our opponent, that Purusās will undergo transformation by reason of their possessing Dharma, etc.

This apprehension of an objection, the author avoids.

By the word “Ādi” are included all the special attributes of the Self mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika Śāstra. (Vide S. B. II., Vol. VI, Introduction, pages xxiv-xxv).

Neither can it be asked: If this be so, then, in the state of Pralaya or dissolution, when the Antah-Karana no longer exists, where should Dharma, etc., rest? For, as in the case of Ākāśa, there is no absolute destruction of the Antah-Karana. For, the Antah-Karana is, as has already been explained, of the form of both a cause and an effect. Hence, in the Antah-Karana, existing in a causal state, as a particular portion of Prakṛti, will rest the impressions of Dharma, and A-Dharma.—25.

An objection answered.

गुप्तानां च नात्मताभयं || ४ || २६ ||

गुप्तादिनाम Gupa-ādīnām, of the Gupas, etc. Oha, and. ना, not. atyanta-bādhab, absolute exclusion or obstruction.
26. And of the Guṇas, etc., there is not absolute exclusion.—353.

Vṛitti:—When it is seen that the attributes of one thing do not produce effects in another thing, it would be more reasonable, one may say, to assert just the non-existence of Dharma, etc. In regard to this, the author says:

Just as of the earth, etc., because of their being seen, there is not absolute exclusion, so is it the case also with the Guṇas, etc., and also with Dharma, etc.

And the causing of effect by the attributes of one thing in another takes place, as has been stated before, by means of the falling of the shadow of Consciousness.—26.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—Do the Guṇas exist in what possesses the Guṇas, (i.e. in a substance), or do they exist in what does not possess the Guṇas? (i.e., is not a substance). In the former case, there is self-dependence; in the latter, the implication of the Guṇas possessing the Guṇas. Therefore, the existence of the Guṇas is obstructed in any case. So is it the case also with Karma, etc.—thus hold some.

The author discredits their view.


Bhāṣya:—It might have been the case, as you say, may rejoin our opponent; but what has been declared, viz., that the existence of Dharma, etc., is proved from the diversity of the products of Prakṛti as well as from the Śruti, etc.—that does not stand to reason; because to the very existence of Prakṛti constituted by the three Guṇas, as well as of the products thereof, there is obstruction by means of the very Śrutas on which you rely, e.g.

सत्सृष्टा चेताक्रियेत्तैर्निद्ध चरण
(Puruṣa is) the witness, intelligent, alone, and devoid of the Guṇas.

वर्तमान वृद्धिभैः मैति भैति
Now, then, the direction: “Not this,” “Not that.”

हस्तः कर्मसाधीतः सप्ताहः चतुर्वज्ञः
(viśeṣa, sāmānyam, pāñcāsāṭya, pāñcābhilāṣya, pāñcādvēśa)

(Being developed) that which is sound-less, touch-less, form-less, un-declinable, or also is taste-less, eternal, not possessing smell, (not having a beginning, not having a
and also by means of such Śruti as:

Neither destruction nor production.—Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 10.

Modification is a creation of speech,—a mere name, while the truth is that it is only clay.—Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI. i. 4.

Now the author repels such an objection.

"Gūpānām," i.e., of Sattva; etc., and of their attributes, pleasure, etc., and also of their products, Mahat, etc., there is no denial, so far as their (svarūpa) essential form is concerned; but there is denial of them with reference to their (samāsarga) association with the intelligent principle, just as is the case with the denial of hotness in the iron.

Note:—That is, when it is denied that hotness is a quality of iron, it is not meant that hotness as a quality nowhere exists, but all that is meant is that hotness is not a quality of iron, but sometimes appears in it only when it is placed in conjunction with fire of which it is a quality. Similarly, when it is denied that pleasure, etc., exist in the Self, it is not thereby implied that pleasure, etc., as such nowhere exist, but only that they have no permanent connection with the Self, but are occasionally superimposed upon it by the Guṇas, Sattva, etc., of which they are the properties, and thus appear to be connected with the Self: in other words, that their association with the Self is not real, just as the association of hotness with iron is not real.

Similarly, it is only with reference to time that there is, by means of states or conditions, etc., denial of (the reality of) the Guṇas and all the rest of those that undergo transformation. Such is the meaning.—26.

Note:—Compare the well-known doctrine of Sphula: Guṇas determinatio negatio est, that all determination is so much negation. E.g., a seed is, in course of time, transformed into a tree. In the state of a tree, the seed becomes more limited or determined than it was before. In other words, the tiny atom of reality in the shape of the seed puts on a huge phenomenal form which it would be wrong wholly to identify with the seed. If you attribute the character of the tree to the seed, that is, say, for example, that the seed is of such and such dimensions, you thereby deny the reality of the seed as seed. Similarly, a transformation such as a Tanmātra or an element, e.g., earth, is a temporary and passing phase of the realities which are the Guṇas. If you wholly identify the two together, you thereby deny the reality of the Guṇas as Guṇas.

Reality of Objective Existence is established by proof.

Pañca-svaya-yogā, through the application of the five-membered (process of reasoning, i.e., inference). अवाप्ल: Sukha-saśvātīḥ, cognition of pleasure.

27. Through the application of inference (takes place) the cognition of pleasure.—354.
Vṛitti:—Non-existence of pain is, according to some, pleasure. For the refutation thereof, the author says:

"Though pleasure is ascertained to be of the form of (a positive) existence by means of mental perception, still, for the purpose of the knowledge of others, proof also has been stated.

By the phrase, "Through the application of the five-membered (process of reasoning)," the view that inference is two-membered, is rejected. (The five members of an inference are) Pratijñā, Enunciation, Hetu, Reason, Drisṛanta, Illustration, Upānaya, Application, and Nigamana Conclusion.

Hereby it is established that pleasure is a property of the subject of the inference, that it exists in things of the same class as the subject, that it does not exist in things of a different class, that it is not opposed by an equally valid argument to the contrary, and that the existence of the thing in which it inheres, is not obstructed. —27.

N.B.—For an account of the logical processes alluded to in the above, vide the Vaisēṣika Sūtraṃ of Kaṇḍāda, B. H., Vol. VI.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—The author mentions the proof of pleasure.

"Sukha-samvittib," cognition of pleasure, is "Yogāt," through the proximity, of that, i.e., the mind, to which the five Indriyas or Senses belong, as though these were its limbs. So that, the import is that pleasure is an object of mental perception.

Bhāṣya:—But why cannot there be obstruction to their existence, even in respect of their essential form, as in the case of dreams, desires, and similar objects (padārthas)? There being room for such an enquiry, the author says:

Here the mention of "pleasure" only which forms a portion of the objects under discussion, is indicative of all objects, because its mention has been made with the intention of making a specific object to be the subject of inference. The reading "Sukha-ādi-samvittib," cognition of pleasure, etc. (as in Nāgara Bhaṭṭa’s MS.), is, however, more in accordance with the sense desired.

And the five members of a Nyāya or Syllogism are: Pratijñā, Hetu, Udāharana, Upānaya and Nigamana. "Yogāt", through their application, is the establishment of all objects, pleasure, etc. Such is the meaning.

And the application of the Nyāya is as follows:

Pratijñā:—Pleasure is existent,
Hetu:—Because it causes the idea of an object and causes action,
Uddhāraṇa: — Whatever causes the idea of an object and causes
action, is existent, e.g., the intelligent principle.

Upanaṣa: — Pleasure is the cause of object and action such as the
standing of the hair on end, etc.

Nigamana: — Therefore, it is existent.

Although the intelligent principles do not undergo modification, yet,
in their case, it is the manifestation or illumination of objects that
constitutes object and action. In regard to the Nāstikas or Nihilists, on the
other hand, should be applied the negative form of inference, and, in that
inference, the illustrations will be the hare’s horn and the like.—27.

Note: — The negative form of inference mentioned in the Hitkṣa may be exhibited
thus:

Pratijñā: — Pleasure is not not-existent;
Hetu: — Because it causes the idea of an object and causes action;
Uddhāraṇa: — Whatever does not cause the idea of object and does not cause action
is not-existent, e.g., a hare’s horn;
Upanaṣa: — Pleasure is the cause of object and action, such as the standing of the
hair on end, etc., which characteristic is pervaded by the characteristic of being existent;
Nigamana: — Therefore, it is not not-existent.

By such negative arguments are to be met the Nāstikas, who deny the existence of
the forms and of their attributes and products.

Note: — The test of reality is “artha-kriya-kāritaṃ,” that is, to produce im¬
pression or idea and to serve some use. E.g., an ink-pot; it produces an impression in
the Buddhi of something outside it, and also serves to hold ink in it; in other words,
it is in correspondence with the passive and active states of the mind. Whatever
lacks in these characteristics, is not a reality; e.g., a hare’s horn.

Vyāpti or Logical Pervasion cannot be grasped from a single instance.

व तत्त्वमहाभावास्तु सम्बन्धिततिष्ठति: || ४ || २८ ||

न, na, not. सक्रिय-ग्रहणत, from single apprehension. संबन्धित: sambandha-siddhi, establishment of the relation.

28. Not from a single (act of) apprehension (is) the
establishment of the relation (of pervasion).—355.

Vṛitti: — The author declares that, from seeing once only, there can be no (certainty of) Vyāpti.

Because of contradiction (of an inference so made), by one’s own percep-
tion. Thus, from seeing fire and the ass together on a single occasion,
there would be an inference; but such inferential cognition is not
known.—28.

Vedāntin Mahādeva: — Now, is Vyāpti cognizable through seeing
concomitance once only, or more than once? In the former case, the
Vyāpti of fire and the ass would also be cognised, and thus the inference of fire even from the ass (as a mark) would be the implication. It cannot be the latter, because the characteristics of being of the earth, earthy, and of being imperishable with steel, though these have accompanied each other a hundred times and over, fail to accompany each other in the case of diamond. Therefore, it is not easy to assert the proof, namely inference. Such is the view of some.

The observation of accompaniment attended with the non-observation of non-accompaniment, is the cause of the apprehension of Vyāpti or Pervasion. Whether it be once or more than once, does not matter. Such is the import.

"Sambandha-siddhi" means the apprehension of Vyāpti.

Bhāṣya:—The author next apprehends an objection from the Chār-vāka, who maintains that there can be no other means of proof at all besides sense-perception, because the conditions of being pervaded and the like are not established.

Through the apprehension of a single concomitance "Sambandha", i.e., Vyāpti, is not established, while multiplicity of instances is uncertain, (as nobody can be quite certain that a contrary instance will never be found). Hence, on account of the impossibility of the apprehension of Vyāpti, there can be no proof of the reality of objects by means of inference. Such is the meaning.—28.

N.B.—It will be observed that Aniruddha and Vijnāna read different purposes altogether in this aphorism. This, however, makes no material change in the line of argument.

Vyāpti or Logical Pervasion explained.

नियतप्रयत्नालिखितमयोरेकतरस्य कर्तव्यवाच: ॥ ५ ॥ २६ ॥

नियतालिखितम् Niyata-dharma-sāhityam, constant concomitance as attributes of one and the same thing. उभयोः: Udbhayōḥ, of both, i.e., of the साध्यa or the thing to be proved and the साधनa or the means of proving it. एकार्थस्य: Eka-artha-sya, of one of the two, i.e., of the साधनa only. अव: Vā, or. यथा: Vyāptib, pervasion, that is, of one characteristic by another, e.g. of humanity by mortality.

29. Constant co-existence of both (the साध्यa and the साधनa), or of one, is Vyāpti.—356.

Vṛtti:—What is this Vyāpti?—it may be asked. In regard to this, the author says:

"Udbhayōḥ" : Of two things of equal pervasion; e.g., of producibility and non-eternity. "Eka-artha-sya" : Of a thing of unequal pervasion; e.g., of smoke.
And so has it been declared:

याप्राप्तेऽतिर्विभ विदाशेयनि यथवि ।

विपलयु कुलसंप्रेक्षेर्नसिमक्षायम् ।

So long as the non-divergence of the Vipaka or the thing different from the subject of the inference is suspected even by a one-hundredth part, how can the Hetu or Reason derive its power of leading to the inference?—29.

Note:—That is, the strength and validity of inference depends not only on the inclusion of all possible similar instances, but, and much more, on the exclusion of all possible contrary instances, which go to establish the general proposition underlying it. And so long there remains the slightest doubt as to the possibility of a single contrary instance turning up, the mark of inference is powerless to lead to a valid inference.

Bhāṣya:—The author solves the difficulty.

"Dharma-sāhityam" means association or concomitance in being properties, in other words, going together or co-existence. So that, "U bhayoh", of the Sadhya and the Sadhana, or "Eka-tara-śya", of the Sadhana only, what is "Niyataḥ," unfailing or inviolable, co-existence or concomitance, that is Vyāpti. Such is the meaning.

"U bhayoh":—this has been stated in respect of the case of equal pervasion (of Sadhya and Sadhana).

And regularity (in "Niyata"), constant, i.e., Vyāpti is cognisable by means of favourable arguments.

Hence, there is no impossibility of the apprehension of Vyāpti. Such is the import.—29.

Vedántin Mahadeva:—"Dharma" is what is contained. The relation of Vyāpti is the constant co-existence of the contained.

Vyāpti is not a separate principle.

न तस्यान्तः वस्तुकल्पनाप्रस्तुते: || ४ || ३० ||

Na, not. तत्तत्त्व-स्वतंत्रता, a separate Tattva or Principle. स्तुतिने? वस्तु-मुक्ताङ्काय-प्रसाक्तय, because of the implication of the supposition of an entity.

30. (Vyāpti) cannot (be) a separate principle, because of the necessity for the supposition of an entity (being entailed thereby).—357.

Vyāpti:—Vyāpti, say some, is a separate Tattva. The author refutes this view.

Even on the admission of (its being) a separate Tattva, non-divergence or unfailing consociation must be asserted. Let that alone be Vyāpti; what is the use of the supposition of an (additional) entity?—30.
**Bhāṣya** :- The author declares that Vyāpti is not a separate object having the form of the power, etc., desired to be predicated of it (i.e., of the required nature).

Vyāpti is not something other than constant concomitance (i.e., of attributes) as attributes; as, otherwise, it would be necessary to make the supposition of an entity as being the substratum of the quality of Vyāpti. By us, on the other hand, has been made the supposition of the mere characteristic of Vyāpti in the case only of objects, the existence of which has been established. Such is the meaning.—30.

**Other views of Vyāpti : Of the Āchāryas.**

निजमयुज्वलमित्याचार्यः ॥ ४ । ३३ ॥

निजसाक्तिउद्भवम्, production or development of own power.

र्तित, thus. कहते: Āchāryāḥ, the Āchāryas or teachers.

31. Development of own power (is Vyāpti),—thus (say) the Āchāryas.—358.

**Vṛtti** :- The author states his own view of Vyāpti.

Fire and smoke possess a power (of inferential suggestion) which is all their own. It is grasped by means of the observation of both. It is the same, that is Vyāpti.—31.

**Vedāntin Mahādeva** :- The power which is "nija", i.e., natural or inborn; the development of it, i.e., its constant accompaniment, e.g., in the case of smoke, of fire. Thus the Āchāryas. By means of the plural number in "Āchāryas", the fact is signified that it is approved by the author.

**Bhāṣya** :- The author states the view of others.

Others, however, that is, the Āchāryas, say that Vyāpti is verily a separate Tattva or Principle, having the form of a particular power producible by the power belonging to the Vyāpya or the thing to be pervaded. But mere own power cannot be Vyāpti, because it lasts as long as the substance lasts; (also) because, (e.g.,) smoke, passing away to a different place, does not retain the characteristic of being pervaded by fire. By means of passing away to a different place, that power is lost; hence the definition given is not too wide. In the author’s own view, however, smoke has to be qualified with the characteristic of being limited to the time of its production. Such is the import.—31.

Note—The words, "UdBhavam" or development, in the aphorism, and "mere" and "lost" in the Bhāṣya are significant. "Nija-sākta-udbhavam" means development or product of the power of the thing to be pervaded which is denoted by the other terms,
"Hata" or Reason or mark of Inference, and "śādhanā" or means of Inference. The Ākāras maintain that Vyāpti is a power which is the product of the power of the thing to be pervaded. This production of power, of course, requires certain collocation. Thus, smoke, after it rises from fire, produces, within certain limitations of time and place, the power, called Vyāpti, which serves as the basis for the inference of fire from the smoke. But when it is carried away by wind to a distant place, that power is lost. In other words, it loses its character of serving as a mark of valid inference. It follows, therefore, that the mere power of smoke as the thing to be pervaded does not constitute its character of serving as a mark of inference, for that power would still belong to it, even when it fails to serve as a mark of inference. Something more then is required. And this is what, in plain terms, may be described as a certain correlation between it and the fire, arising and persisting within certain limitations of time and place.

The view of Pańchadikha.

**Bhāṣyakārikās**

32. (Vyāpti is) connection with the power of that which-is-contained,—thus (declares) Pańchadikha,—359.

**Vṛtti:** The author states the view of the Ekaśeṣa (i.e., a branch of the Sāmkhya School.)

Were the power natural, then, from seeing the thing, even when it was not fully developed, the cognition would arise that “it is capable in this matter”. But such is not the case. Therefore, the power should be asserted to be of a thing in its relation as being that which is contained in another thing.—32.

**Vedāntin Mahādeva:** There being “Yoga,” i.e., connection, with the power of that-which-is-contained, concomitance (is possible),—such is the complement of the aphantism. So that, concomitance is the development of the power of that-which-is-contained. By the singular number in “Pańchadikha”, the author indicates that this is the view of one of an opposite way of thinking.

**Bhāṣya:** Since it is customary to predicate the characteristic of being pervaded by Prakṛti, etc., in respect of Buddhī, etc., therefore, pervadedness consists in the power of being the container, and pervadedness is the possess of the power of being the contained; such is the view of Pańchadikha. Such is the meaning.—32.

An objection considered.

Na, not. **Sraṇa-saṅgaṇiḥ:** power which constitutes or belongs to the own or essential form of the thing. **Niyamāḥ:** rule. **Punar-vaḍa-prakāśakāḥ:** because of the implication of tautology.
33. The power constituting the own-form of the thing is not the rule, because of the implication of tautology (in it).—360.

Vṛtti:—The author gives the reason for the above.

Were the own-form the power, it would be tautology to say, "The pugilist is able".—33.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—"Śvarūpa-saktiḥ" what is the essential form of the thing, the same is its power. Thereby "Niyamah", i.e., Vyāpti, is not produced, but by a power other than the essential form. The author mentions the fault in the case of the power not being different from the essential form; "because of the implication of tautology", i.e., because in such cases as "The Mantra is powerful", etc., there would be tautology. Such is the meaning.

Bhāṣya:—But, for what purpose, it may be asked, is the power of the thing as the contained imagined? Let the power constituting the essential form of the thing to be pervaded, be itself Vyāpti. In regard to this, the author says:

But the power constituting the essential form of the thing cannot be "Niyamah", i.e., Vyāpti; because of the implication of tautology, that is, as in the case of "The jar is a pitcher", so in the case of "Buddhi is the thing to be pervaded", (there would be tautology) by reason of the non-difference of meaning. Such is the meaning.

The addition of the word "sakti", power, to the word "Śvarūpa", i.e., essential form, which only was required to be mentioned, is for the purpose of showing that Vyāpti is an attribute of the thing to be pervaded.—33.

Above continued.

विशेषतानाद्वित्यप्यस्यप्रसादः || ५ || ३४ ||

Viveçana-Anarthakya-prasakteḥ, because of the implication of the futility of the qualification or adjective.

34. (Power of the essential form cannot be Vyāpti), because of the implication of the futility of the qualification.

—361.

Vṛtti:—The author adduces another reason.

There would be no such intuition as "Devadatta is powerful", but (only) "Devadatta is Devadatta".—34.

Bhāṣya:—The author himself explains the tautology.

This has been almost fully explained in the previous authorism.—34.
35. (Power of the essential form is not Vyāpti), also because, in the case of the twigs, etc., (the absence of Vyāpti is) not explained.—362.

Vṛtti:—The author adduces yet another reason.

Because, when the essential form continues in the same state in the twig, etc., there would be removal of poison, even though the Mantra is not applied.—35.

Note:—It will be observed that from the consideration of the power of leading to an inference, Anruddha passes into a consideration of power in general. Thus, a twig, charged with a certain Mantra, has the power of counteracting the effect of poison when applied to the affected part of the body. And if this power of counteracting the effect of poison is inherent in the twig, as is supposed by the Ekadesin in the 33rd aphorism, then it would act even without the application of the Mantra; but such is not the case. Therefore, the power is not svā-rūpa-śakti or power belonging to the essential form of the twig, but is something super-added to it. Such is the meaning, read into the present aphorism by Anruddha.

Bhāṣya:—The author mentions another defect.

In the twig, etc., there exists the characteristic of being pervaded by the tree, etc. But the mere power of the essential form cannot possibly be its definition or characteristic mark. Because, by reason of the non-departure of the power of the essential form even from the lopped off twig, even in that state also the characteristic of being pervaded would be involved. Such is the meaning. While the power of its being the thing contained is destroyed at the moment of cutting. Hence there can be no Vyāpti at that time. Such is the import.—35.

Conclusion of the argument.
connection of the own power (of the thing), because the argument is the same (in both the cases).—363.

_Vr̥tti:_—The author states the conclusion.

It is its own and it is also a power,—such is the meaning of "Own-power"; but not that it is the own or essential form that is the power. So that, on the establishment of the power of the thing as the contained, there is connection of its own power, because of the identity of the argument. Thus, there being no distinction in the power (as such), the argument, _viz.,_ Connection of the power of the thing as the contained (is Vyāpti), or Connection of the own power of the thing (is Vyāpti), is the same.

And in the case of the apprehension of objects, it is not at first apprehended on account of the variety of the powers of objects, _e.g._, though the relation of father and son is subsisting, it is not cognised without instruction (_Vide IV. 4, page 363 ante_).

Hence it has been declared: "Development of own power" (_Vide V. 31 above_).—36.

_Vedántin Mahādeva:_—Let, then, there be only the power of the thing as the contained; what need, it may be asked, of the innate or natural power? In regard to this, the author says:

Just as, by means of Agreement and Difference, and by means of Sāstra, the power of the thing as the contained is proved to exist in the twig, etc., and also in the paddy, etc., even so, by Agreement and Difference, in respect of those respective entities or objects, and by means of Sāstra, in respect of the several classes of Karma, is the power established.

_Bhāṣya:_—But, is it not, it may be asked, said by Pañchaśālikha that development of own power is Vyāpti and nothing else? If not, then the result will be that, since smoke is not contained in fire, therefore, it cannot be pervaded by fire.

In regard to this, the author says:

It having been proved that the power of the thing as the contained, is Vyāpti, development of the own power also is certainly established as being Vyāpti, "Samāna-nyāyat", _i.e._, because of the sameness of the argument. Such is the meaning.

Want of assimilation of (of the two theories), on the other hand, is no fault,—as is the case with words conveying different meanings.

_Similarly, in the author's own view also, it is concomitances of diverse kinds that are to be understood to be Vyāptis. Neither should it be_
said that, that being so, Vyāpti will have no admittance or inclusion into being the cause of inferential cognition; for, as is the case with the grass, an igniting stick, a gem, etc., heterogeneity, etc., inhering in the effects, is also quite reasonable.—36.

Note:—"Vyāpya," "Vṛṣṭıka," and "Vṛṣṭı" are the three technical terms of Hindu Logic which summarise practically the whole of the theory of inference. "Vyāpya" means that which is pervaded; "Vṛṣṭıka" means that which pervades; and "Vṛṣṭı" means the pervasion. The import of these terms is from the denotative point of view. Thus, to take the familiar example of fire and smoke, the denotation of smoke is wholly contained within the denotation of fire. Therefore, smoke is the thing pervaded; fire is the thing pervading; and the subsumption of the denotation of smoke under the denotation of fire is the pervasion of smoke by fire. Similarly, again, the denotation of humanity is contained wholly within the denotation of mortality. Therefore, humanity is the Vyāpya; mortality is the Vṛṣṭıka; and the pervasion of humanity by mortality is Vṛṣṭı.

It is this Vyāpti which forms the basis or principle of all inference. It is different in different cases, and the number of Vyāptis is manifold, according to the manifold combination of objects. In fact, these are so many Uniformities of Nature. But they are not altogether un-correlated, nor are they un-related to a General Law governing them all. That General Law has been laid down, for example, in the fifth aphorism, in the second chapter of the ninth book of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra-s of Kapāla. Vide the sixth volume of the Sacred Books of the Hindus, page 316 and the Introduction to it, page xviii. That General Law is: एव तस्य. "It is its." This is Vyāpti par excellence, and consists in the invariable and unconditional accomplishment of two things, whether it be under the laws of causation or under the laws of co-existence.

The ascertainment of Vyāpti is dependent upon the observation of concomitance, together with the non-observation of non-concomitance.

Now, the question has been raised whether Vyāpti is a mere relation of two things, or is also a thing itself. Vyāpti is not a thing itself, as the supposition would offend against the law of parsimony (vide S. P. S., V. 30.) It is, therefore, nothing but a relation of things. But how does this relation become possible? Does it arise from the essential form or a primary property of the Vyāpya, or from a secondary quality of the Vyāpya, as asserted by the Āchāryas, or from an accidental characteristic of the Vyāpya, as maintained by Pañchadikha? The first cannot be the case, for the faults in the theory are tautology and fallacy. (Vide Śāṅkhyā-Pravachana-Sūtra-s, V. 38-39.) The third is really included in, or implied by, the second, and both of them are not altogether free from the suggestion that Vyāpti is something more than a mere relation, the fault of which has just been pointed out (vide S. P. S., V. 31, 32, and 33). The relation of Vyāpti, therefore, arises from the co-existence or co-inherence of attributes as attributes (vide S. P. S., V. 29), in the widest senses of the terms "Co-existence" and "Attributes."

Relation of Word and Object.

The relation of Word and Object is the relation of the thing to be signified and that which signifies.—364.
Vṛitti:—The author forbids the identity of word and object.

In the case of identity, even a jar would be cognisable by the Ear; even sound would be cognisable by the Eye; on the pronunciation of the words, "fire," etc., there would be the possibility of burning the mouth, etc.—37.

Bhāṣya:—What has been declared above, viz., that through the application of the five members (of Inference) is the proof of Guṇa, etc., (Vide V. 27),—with a view to establish that, has been removed by means of the ascertainment of Vyāpti, the obstruction to the probative force of Inference. Now, with a view to establish that words of the form of the five members is capable of producing cognition, is being removed, by means of the ascertainment of the power or force, etc., of words, the obstruction, raised by opponents, to the probative force of words, in the form that the power to produce cognition, is not possible in the case of words.

In the object (Artha) lies the power called signifiability, and in the word (Śabda), signifiactivness. It is that (power) which constitutes their relation, as is the case with the adaptability of one thing to another. And through the cognition thereof becomes possible the presentation of objects by means of words. Such is the meaning.—37.

Proofs of the relation of Word and Object.

श्रीभि: सम्बन्धासिद्धि: || ४ || ३८ ||

श्रीभि: Tribhūḥ, by means of the three. सम्बन्धासिद्धि: Sambandha-siddhiḥ, proof of the relation. Aniruddha reads "Siddhiḥ" instead of "Siddhiḥ," meaning, because of the proof, etc.

38. By means of the three, is the proof of the relation.—365.

Vṛitti.—The author gives the reason for the above.

Because, by means of the "three," i.e., methods, is the cognition of the denotation. Viz., from the instruction of the Āpta or trustworthy; e.g., "It is a jar." From the usage of the old, e.g., "Bring the white cow with the help of the goad." Here, from seeing the activity (i.e., in the act of bringing the white cow) of the grown-up employee, after hearing the words of the grown-up employer, there is knowledge of the boy as to the object denoted by the word 'cow'. From having the same denotation, as some well-known word, e.g., "The bird is eating the mango". On hearing this, one cognises that the object denoted is what eats mango, and, then, the cognition of the object—bird—is established.—38.
Bhāṣya:—The author mentions the means of apprehending the power of Word.

Instruction of the Āpta, usage of grown-up people, and possession of the same denotation as well-known words—by means of these three, the relation stated above, is cognised. Such is the meaning.—38.

An objection refuted.

न कार्येन्नियम उभयथा वर्णितम् || १ १ ६ ||

Na, not. कार्ये, in respect of an act. नियम: Niyamaḥ, rule, cognisance of the power of word. उभयथा Ubbaya-thā, both ways. वर्णित Darsanāt, from observation or seeing.

39. Not in respect of acts (is) the rule, because it is seen in both cases.—366.

Vṛtti:—The author altogether discards the rule (that the significance of word is) in respect of acts only.

Significance in respect of acts is seen; e.g., “One shall worship the Sandhyā day after day”. It is also seen in respect of proved objects; (Siddha artha) e.g., “Hari is the sovereign Deva among the Devas”.

For, thus, the Vedas contain Vidhis or Injunctions, Arthavādas or Recommendations exhortations, and Mantras or Helps to meditation. In a Vidhi there is probative force in regard to the characteristic of the act being the means of attaining the end desired, which characteristic inheres in the same object with the characteristic of its being an act to be performed.

Note:—That is to say, a Vidhi, by itself, proves two things, namely, that the act enjoined ought to be performed, and that the performance of the act is the means of attaining the object desired.

An Arthavāda also, because, by reason of its being the promoter of the power of the Vidhi, is an indirect means of causing activity, is authoritative.

A Mantra also possesses authoritiveness by reason of its being the means of causing the remembrance of the act enjoined.

What (is asserted by some), namely, that authoritiveness, and not probativeness, belongs to Mantra and Arthavāda, because these are the nimitta or occasional or efficient cause of activity,—that is not so. In the matter of production (of results, e.g., Merit and Demerit, etc.) they are for the purpose of activity, but, in the matter of cognition or making things known, they are simply directed to denote established objects. Therefore, authoritiveness belongs also to those Mantras and Arthavādas which are demonstrative of established objects.—39.
Bhāṣya:—And this cognisance of power takes place in regard to acts only,—such a rule does not exist; because in the world, as in the case of acts, so in the case of what are not acts also, the usage of grown-up people, etc. are seen. Such is the meaning. For, just as, from hearing sentences which are (kārya-para) directed to (the performance of) an act, such as, "Bring the cow", conduct such as the bringing of the cow, etc., is seen on the part of a grown-up man, so also, from hearing sentences which are (a-kārya-para) directed to an established fact, such as "A son has been born to you", conduct expressed by the hair standing on end, etc., is seen.

And on the proof of the authoritativeness of the words referring to established objects, depends the proof of the authoritativeness of the Vedānta, in regard to Viveka or Discrimination. Such is the intention of the author.—39.

Note:—(a) Here is a bit of Grammar which may be shortly explained. "Kārya-para" and "A-kārya-para" denote the modes or manners in which a statement is made by the verb. Grammar calls them Moods and enumerates four of them. But here we are concerned with the principal two only; viz., the Indicative and the Imperative. "In the Indicative mood we assert or indicate an action as a fact"; as, 'A son has been born to you.' "In the Imperative mood we command or advise an action"; as "Bring the cow."

Now, the opponent’s contention was that statements could be made by verbs in the imperative mood only. The author shows that statements can be made by verbs in the indicative mood as well. In other words, statements are not only sādhyā-para, i.e., directed to the performance of an action which has not yet been performed, but are also siddha-para i.e., directed to convey information about accomplished facts.

(b) The commentator next shows why it is important to establish that statements are not only sādhyā-para, but are also siddha-para. As we all know, the Veda has two primary divisions; viz., the Karma-kāya and the Jñāna-kāya, that is, the portion dealing with the injunctions and prohibitions, in regard to the performance of meritorious acts, for the attainment of desired ends, and the portion dealing with knowledge of Brahman, the Self, etc., with a view to teach Discrimination between the Self and the Not-Self. Now, obviously the Karma-kāya statements will be in the imperative mood of the verbs, i.e., will be sādhyā-para, directed to the performance of some action, in other words, will be directed to the production of results by means of acts; and the Jñāna-kāya statements will be in the indicative mood of the verbs, i.e., will be siddha-para, directed to the making known of established or accomplished facts, in other words, will be directed to the cognition of matters of fact, such as that "the Self is the witness, intelligent, alone, devoid of the Guṇas" etc.

Now, if statements were sādhyā-para only, as maintained by the opponent, the Jñāna-kāya portion of the Veda would be perfectly meaningless, and, therefore, unreliable, unauthoritative and useless. Therefore, the author shows that statements are not only sādhyā-para, but are also siddha-para; so that the Jñāna-kāya of the Veda is authoritative, and the revelations made in it convey perfect transcendent knowledge about the Discrimination of the Self from the Not-Self, which is an established fact and which, by means of the cessation of Avidyā, leads to Release.
An objection answered: As above, so below.

वोके स्युत्प्राच्छ वेदार्थसातीति: || ॥ ५ ॥ ४० ॥

न लोके स्युत्प्राच्छ वेदार्थसातीति: || ॥ ५ ॥ ४० ॥

N.B. Aniruddha reads the two words together as a compound. वेद-अर्थ-प्रत्तिति, intuition of Vedic objects.

40. Intuition of Vedic objects (is possible for) one who is conversant about the world.—367.

Vṛtti:—When the objects mentioned in the Vedas are supra-sensuous, how, it may be asked, can there be cognition “in both cases”? In regard to this, the author says:

Whatever objects are the worldly, the very same are the Vedic, such being their community, cognition takes place in the present case also.—40.

Bhāṣya:—Well, let there be cognisance of the power of words in the case of, or with reference to, established worldly objects, since intuition, etc., of such objects is seen; but how, it may be asked, will it take place in the case of, or with reference to, Vedic objects, since the making known of things which are not acts, is futile (and, consequently, the Veda will be charged with the fault of futility)? In regard to this, the author says:

In the case of a person conversant about the power of words in respect of worldly objects, it is just by following that that there takes place the intuition of objects revealed by the Vedas; for, the power of words is not different in the world, and different in the Veda; because there is the maxim: Whatever is the worldly, the same is Vedic. Hence, when the power of denoting, or referring to, established objects is proved in the world, the same is proved in the Veda also. Such is the meaning.

And, of the making known of Viveka or Discrimination which is an established thing, the fruit is Release, by means of the cessation of Avidyā; just as, in the world, of the making known of established facts, such as in the case of “A son has been born to you”, the fruit is joy, etc. Hence, there is no futility of that (i.e., of the power of making known things other than acts).—40.

Note:—But how is it proved that in the Veda the statements are siddha-pāra as well as sādhya-pāra? The reply is that they are so in the Veda, because they are found to be so among mankind, and because the moods of verbs are the same in the Vedic literature as they are in secular literature.

An objection apprehended.

न निराकील्यात्वक्षमिदि संस्कृतवत्लात्व || ॥ ५ ॥ ४१ ॥

Nā, net. त्रिभिः, by means of the three, vis., instruction by trustworthy persons, etc., vide V. 58 above. अपरंप्रया-त्रि, not being the
work of a person. अस्त्य Veda, of the Veda. अतिरथy Tat-artha, of the objects revealed in it. अतिरथy Ati-indriya-trāti, being supra-sensuous.

41. Not by means of the three (is the relation of Word and Object established in the Veda), because the Veda is not the work of a person, and because the objects (revealed) in it are supra-sensuous. —368.

Vṛti: —It might be so, says an opponent, were the Veda the work of a person, but that is not the case. This the author notes.

Since Isvara has been excluded, since it is not possible for any one else (to be the author of the Veda), and since, by reason of error being a characteristic of puruṣa or man, there can be no certainty about trustworthiness, therefore, the unauthoritativeness of the Veda is the result. And the Veda being unauthoritative, there can be no faith in, or reliance upon, Sacrifice, etc. (taught in the Veda).—41.

Vedāntaś Mahādeva: —The author declares the authoritativeness of the Veda.

Unauthoritativeness does not attach to the Veda, because it is a-puruṣeṣya, i.e., not of personal origin. And that, (i.e., that it is not of personal origin, is established) “tribhīḥ”, by means of three reasons; viz., by the exclusion of Isvara, by the impossibility of any one else (being the author of the Veda), and by the uncertainty about its trustworthiness, (were it the work of man, which it is not), on account of error being the characteristic of man. But if it is urged that some specially qualified Jīva may be the author of the Veda, the author replies that (that is not possible), because “tat-artha,” the objects treated of in the Veda, viz., heaven and sacrifice, related to each other in the form of the object to be achieved and that which is the means of achievement, are not within the cognisance of the senses, etc.

Bhāṣya: —Here the author apprehends (an objection).

But, then, by means of the three, i.e., instruction by an śpta, etc., it is not possible to grasp the power of words in the case of the Veda; because, by reason of the fact that the Veda is not of a personal origin, there does not exist in it any instruction by an śpta in regard to the objects treated of in it; and, further, because, the objects of the Veda being supra-sensuous, it is not possible to grasp, in regard to them, the usage of the old and also the fact of their having the same place of inheritance (i.e. denotation) as other well-known words. Such is the meaning. —43.
Answer: Vedic objects are not absolutely supra-sensuous.

न यथात्: स्वरूपं धर्मेऽवर्धितम् ॥ ३ ॥

Na, not. स्वरूपं: Yajña-ādeh, of sacrifice, etc. तय: स्वरूप-तय: in respect of their essential form. धर्मेऽवर्धितम्, to be dharma or merit; meritoriousness. वैशिष्ट्यम्, on account of qualifiedness, or of excellence, or connection with something visible.

42. Sacrifices, etc., are not in themselves meritorious, because of the (existence of) special conditions (of their being so).—Aniruddha. Not (so); sacrifices, etc., are in themselves the duties enjoined, on account of their excellence.—Vijñāna.—369.

Vṛtti:—With a view to establish the authoritativeness of the Veda, the author says:

“Vaiśiṣṭyam,” qualifiedness, arises by means of dependence upon time, place, and person. Were (sacrifices, etc.) to be independent of these, they would not, in themselves, be acts of merit. Otherwise, sacrifices, etc., performed at an impure or inauspicious time, in a mlechchha or barbarous country, by the greatest sinners, would be causes of Merit. But such is not the case.—42.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—But Dharma or act of merit, it may be argued, is a Vedic object, and this, in the form of sacrifice, curd, white, etc., is not supra-sensuous. In regard to this the author says:

Mere sacrifice, etc., is not an act of merit, as, in that case, sacrifice, etc., performed by a Śūdra, would also be an act of merit. On the contrary, (sacrifice, etc., which is an act of merit, is) conditioned by the characteristic of being the means for the attainment of heaven, and that certainly is supra-sensuous. How? “Vaiśiṣṭyāt.” For excellence or qualification as regards the adhikārin or person entitled to the performance of the acts, place, time, and the like, is appropriate or contributory only to that part of the act which serves as the means of attaining heaven, but not to the essential form of sacrifice, etc., or to sacrifice, etc., in themselves.

Bhāṣya:—Out of these (i.e., that the Veda is not of a personal origin and that the Vedic objects are supra-sensuous), the author first refutes that the Veda treats of objects which are supra-sensuous.

What has been stated (by the objector, i.e., in the preceding aphorism) that is not so; because sacrifice, gift, and the like, in the form of the offering, etc., of substances or things in the name of a Devatā or Deity, possess in themselves, indeed, “dharmatvam,” i.e., the characteristic of
being enjoined in the Veda, "Vaiśīṣṭyāt," i.e., as they are attended with
excellent fruits. Sacrifices, etc., again, being of the form of desire, etc.,
are not supra-sensuous, but, on the other hand, it is not the case that the
apūrva or adriṣṭam, i.e., merit, which has sacrifice, etc., as its subject, is
the dharma, whereby what is enjoined in the Veda might be supra-
sensuous. Such is the meaning.

But, still, may rejoin our opponent, it remains that sacrifices, etc.,
are constituted by, i.e., by reference to, supra-sensuous objects such as a
Devatā or deity, and the like. We reply that there is nothing to object to
in this; because, as will be declared in the sequel (v. 44), there can be
(sensuous) intuition, even in the case of supra-sensuous objects, by means
of the universal forms (Śāmānyā rūpa) which determine the character of
being a padārtha or an object denoted by a pada or word.—42.

Power to denote objects is inherent in Vedic words.

निजशक्तिवेयस्य प्रत्ययम् \| ४ \| ४३ \|

विज्ञानं: Nija-sātkā, natural or inherent power. पुनर्या Vyutpattyā, by
means of conversancy, specific knowledge or instruction. अवश्चिṣ्करण Vyavachchhi-
dyate, is determined or differentiated.

43. The inherent power (of Vedic words) is (discriminatively) determined by means of specific knowledge (of
their meanings).—370.

Vyākhyā:—When it is seen that fruits are reaped by the ignorant (from
the performance of acts enjoined in the Veda), the authoritativenss of the
Veda (is established.) What is achieved by Vyutpatti? it may be asked.
In regard to this, the author says:

This word is here, by being denotative, primary, and is here second-
ary,—in this way (the uses of the word) are distinguished or differentiated
(by means of Vyutpatti).—43.

Vedānta Mahādīcā:—The author states the helpfulness or contribu-
toriness of Vyutpatti.

The natural power of the word, called denotativeness, is "Vyut-
pattyā," i.e., by the cognisance of its power, "vyavachchhyādye," i.e., is
established in usage under the characteristics of being primary and
secondary. For primary denotativeness belongs to that which causes
intuition of the object directly, while secondary denotativeness belongs to
that which causes such intuition through a śakya or object capable of
being denoted. And this is applicable in such cases of ascertainment as
"Of a Mantra the application in respect of the object is certainly primary,
and not secondary."
Bhāṣya:—What has also been stated, namely, that, the Veda not being of a personal origin, the instruction of an āpta does not exist in it,—that also the author refutes.

Though the Vedas are not of a personal origin, yet it is the natural power to denote objects, which exists (in the Vedic words), that, by the āptas, by means of successive traditions of old people, "Vyavachchhidyața," i.e., is instructed to the disciples, discriminatively from other objects, by means of Vyutpatti in such form as that, of this word, this is the object. But it is not the case that, like modern words, (the Vedic words) are themselves applied as so many arbitrary signs (to signify things), whereby there would be need of (the Veda's) having a personal origin. Such is the meaning.—43.

How the power of words to denote imperceptible objects, is possible.

Yogāyogāyatā pratiṣṭhānakaṃ ca jñāna-viparītāḥ: II 4 44 II

Yogāyogāyatā, in respect of objects which are capable of perception and of objects which are incapable of perception, pratiṣṭhānaṃ, pratiṣṭhānakaṃ, because it produces intuition or knowledge. pratiṣṭhānaṃ: tat-siddhiḥ, the proof thereof, i.e., of vyutpatti or cognisance of the power of words.

44. Through its producing knowledge in respect of perceptible and imperceptible objects, there is proof of the power of words.—371.

Vṛtti:—But how is the perfection or development of vyutpatti known? To this the author replies:

Because it produces knowledge in respect of secular and Vedic objects, known and unknown, there is proof of vyutpatti.—44.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—The author tells us that proof of the power under discussion is known from inference by means of its effect in the form of (causing) cognition of objects.

Bhāṣya:—But still, how can there be, it may be asked, in the case of Vedic words, cognisance of the power to denote the supra-sensuous Devatā, fruit, etc.? To this the author replies:

In regard to objects perceptible or imperceptible by the senses, "tat-siddhiḥ," i.e., cognisance of the power (to denote objects) takes place by bringing forward the generic properties (of the objects); because, the power of words to produce cognition, by reference to the common properties, is proved by perception or consciousness. The difference, however, is this: that it is the supra-sensuous, i.e., the apūrva or adriṣṭam, alone, that is the object denoted by the (vedic) statement, and that the cognition or apprehension of it is not required before. Such is the meaning.—44.
Note.—Words denote objects through concepts. This is true of Vedic as well as secular words. A “waterpot,” e.g., denotes all waterpots whether they be present before the eyes or not. In the Vedas, statements, however, the fruits of actions enjoined, such as Merit, are all super-sensuous. This is the difference.

The Veda is not eternal.

45. Eternality does not belong to the Vedas, because it is heard that they are effects.—372.

Vṛiti:—The author refutes the (alleged) eternality of the Vedas. The Śrūta-s, for instance, (declaring that the Vedas are effects), are.

Neither was day nor was night.

He practised penance; from that penance having been practised, the three Vedas were produced.

And the inference (of the non-eternity of the Vedas) is from their being products.

Also, by means of sense-perception, it is known that the Varnas or letters are perishable after having been pronounced. (Recognitive) intuition such as “It is that same letter ka, ः,” however, takes place; but the object of it is (not a particular ka, but) the genus ka.—45.

Bhāṣya:—Just in connection with (the discussion of) the authoritiveness of Ṣabda or Verbal Testimony, the author ascertains a peculiarity appertaining to the Ṣabda.

Since there are such Śrūta-s as:

Therefore, the Vedas do not possess eternality. Such is the meaning.

And the statements (that may be found here and there) about the eternality of the Vedas, (should be understood to) have reference to the non-cessation of succession to something homogeneous which existed before.—45.

The Vedas are not of a personal origin.

Na not. Pauruṣeya-tvya, the being of a personal origin. Tāt-kartuḥ, of the author thereof, i.e., of the Vedas. A-bhāvāḥ, owing to non-existence.
46. The Vedas are not of a personal origin, since there does not exist a person who can be their author.—373.

Vṛitti:—The Vedas being non-eternal, they are, it may be thought, originated by a person. In regard to this, the author says:

The intention is that already has been excluded Īśvara (who, if any, could be the author of the Vedas).—46.

Bhāṣya:—Are, then, the Vedas originated by a person? it may be asked. The author replies, No, and says:

Because of the exclusion or denial of Īśvara—such is the complement (of the aphorism.)

It is easy.—46.

The Vedas cannot be the creation of Puruṣa.

मुक्तमुक्तोपर्योपंतवत् II ४१ ४७ II

मुक्तमुक्तोपर्योपंतवत्: Muktā-muktayoh, of the released and the unreleased. A-yogya-tvāt, because of the unfitness.

47. Because of the unfitness of the released as well as of the unreleased (Puruṣas to be the author of the Vedas, they are not of a personal origin.)—374.

Vṛitti:—Some one else, and not Īśvara, will, it may be said, be the author of the Vedas. In regard to this the author says:

Because the released, since he is free from attachment (of all sorts, desire, motive, etc.), cannot be the author, and because the unreleased (cannot be the author), since he is incapable of knowing all the materials (such as Dharma, etc.) simultaneously.—47.

Bhāṣya:—Let some one else be the author (of the Vedas),—there being room for such an enquiry, the author says:

Viṣṇu, who is in the forefront of the Jīvan-muktas, although, by means of his having the Satvā-element in him in the purest form, is the all-knower par excellence, yet he is unfit for the composition of the Veda with its one thousand branches, since he is perfectly free from Rāga or Passion. While the unreleased Puruṣa, just by reason of his not being all-knower, is unfit. Such is the meaning.

Neither should it be contended that, just like the activity or function of preserving, etc., of innumerable living beings, the composition of the numerous-branch Veda also may be possible (in the case of Viṣṇu) ; because it is only by means of the intuition of objects from the self-revealed Vedas that there is activity (on the part of Viṣṇu) in the preservation, etc. (of living beings.)—47.
An Objection Answered.

48. Through (the Vedas) not being of a personal origin, their eternality (does not (result),—just as in the case of the sprout, etc.—375.

Vyāti:—Since they are not personally originated, they are then, it may be said, eternal. In regard to this the author says:

It is clear.—48.

Bhāṣya:—But, then, that being so, from their not being of a personal origin, it is, one may say, their eternality that results. In regard to this, the author says:

It is clear.—48.

Vedāntin Mahādera.—(The apprehension is groundless), for to be not of a personal origin and to be eternal are not co-extensive terms, since there is a failure of their co-extension in the case of the sprout, etc.

A further objection answered.

49. Were these also to have connection with that, (there would be) the implication of contradiction of what is seen, and the like.—376.

Vyāti:—But if one were to argue that the sprout, etc., also must have a creator because they are effects, then, it may be said, agency would belong to the released. In regard to this, the author says:

Since the creator of the sprout, etc. is not visible, there is exclusion of Perception. And it has already been declared (vide V. 47) that their creator does not exist, because of the unfitness (of both the released and the unreleased Purusa to be their creator).

By the word “Adi” is exhibited that the characteristic (of the sprout, etc.) of being the thing pervaded (vide Bhāṣya below), is not established.—49.
**Vedántin Mahádeva:**—The author replies to those who maintain that the sprout, etc., also must have a creator, because they are effects.

"Tat-yoge," i.e., on their connection with a creator, there will be contradiction of things observed which have no creator. The word "adi" suggests the supposition of things unobserved having their creator. The idea is that the fact that something is an effect is here, as a mark of inference, inoperative.

**Bháṣya:**—But in the case of the sprout, etc., also, as in the case of the jar, etc., it should be inferred, one may say, that they are originated by a person. In regard to this, the author says:

The Vyápti or pervasion is seen in the world that whatever is originated by a person, is produced through or by means of the body. If the case were as is asserted by the objector, then there would be contradiction, etc., of such pervasion. Such is the meaning.—49.

**Note:** An important distinction here made between Kritam, created, i.e., originated de novo by an intelligent person, and Upstham, produced or grown, i.e., developed according to the law of the nature of a thing. *Vide* the next aphorism.

**Meaning of "Pauruseya," originated by person:**

वस्तिस्मचाहेति क्रतुबुद्धिरपजातो तत्वोऽस्थितेभ्यः || ३ ॥ ४० ॥

श्रीम् Yasmin, in respect of which. अन्न्य A-driśte, remaining unseen or unobserved. के Api, even. कस्मिन्: Krita-buddhi, the idea as of something created. क्षणसः Upajayate, grows or arises. कि Tat, that. चतुर्वत् Pauruseyam, originated by a person.

50. In respect whereof, though the (creator) remains unobserved (Aniruddha), or though it be something invisible (Vijñāna), the idea arises that it is something created, that is (called) Pauruseya.—377.

Vritti:—The author tells us that logical pervasion, vyápti, does not subsist between the characteristics of being non-eternal and of being Pauruseya.

As, e.g., the jar, etc., but not in the case of the tree, etc., "Adriśte api:" that is, though the creator be not observed.

Effect as such does not necessarily have a creator, but only particular classes of effects have.—50.

**Vedántin Mahādeva:**—What, then, proceeds from a creator? it may be asked. To this the author replies:

In the case of the sprout and the like, on the other hand, the idea does not arise that it has been created, but that it has been produced or has grown or developed.
"Pauruṣeyam" means that which has a creator.

_Bhāṣya:_—But, it may be argued, the Vedas also, since they have been spoken by the Ādi or Original Puruṣa, are certainly Pauruṣeya or originated by a person. Hence the author says:

As in the case of things observed, so also in the case of things unobserved, in respect whereof arises "kṛtabuddhiḥ," i.e., the idea that it (i.e., its origination) has been preceded by intelligence, that alone is treated as being Pauruṣeyan. Such is the meaning.

Hereby it is said that the characteristic of being pauruṣeyan does not arise by reason merely of the characteristic or fact of having been pronounced or breathed by a Puruṣa, inasmuch as inhalations and exhalations of breath, taking place in the state of deep sleep (sūṣṭi), are not treated as being Pauruṣeyan or originated by the Puruṣa; but it arises by reason of the origination of the thing being preceded by intelligence.

Now, the Vedas, just like the breath, verily not being preceded by intelligence, appear, of themselves, from the atmosphere of the Svayambhu or self-born (Brahmā) under the influence of Adiṣṭhaṃ. Hence they are not Pauruṣeyan or originated by Puruṣa.

And, thus, there is the Śruti:—

_वस्त्रैलक्षणं वीर्यम्, स्वाक्षरं स्वतंत्रतमेतत्र चार्यऽविवेचः इत्यादि!_

Of that, the same, great being, it is the breathing—the which is (called) the Rigvedas, etc.—_By the Aryan Upaniṣat, II. iv. 10; IV. v. 11._—50.

_The Vedas themselves are proof of their own authority._

51. From (seeing) the manifestation of the power inherent (in the Vedas), (their) authoritativeness (follows) from themselves.—378.

_Vṛtti:_—The author condemns (the view that) the authoritativeness (of the Vedas depends) on something other (than themselves).

The authoritativeness (of the Vedas) is dependent merely on the materials which produce cognition of the power inherent (in them), but does not, so far as the production (of fruits by means of the acts enjoined in them) is concerned, stand in need of any other additional quality. So far also as (the appearance or development of) knowledge (by means of
the truths revealed in them) is concerned, natural is the power of (the truths) which communicate the knowledge, to bring out, or to impress one with, their authoritativness. Through the manifestation thereof, is their authoritativness, of itself, manifested, as well as from seeing, on the part of men), instant application to them.

Where, again, for the purpose of setting on apprehension at rest, these is pursuit of evidence or proof with a view to an enquiry into their authoritativness, there also the enquiry or pursuit is for the purpose of finding out and removing the fault in the cause, and not for the purpose of (discovering) a quality or excellence (in the Vedas). It is for this reason that, if their authority depends upon something other than the Vedas, there will be unauthoritativness, inasmuch as, in the case of that, "fault" also is a cause.—51.

Vedántin Mahadeva:—Just by means of their own inherent power of producing knowledge, since there takes place the manifestation,—of their being pramā or right knowledge—such is the complement of the sentence.

Their authoritativness, i.e., the characteristic of being producer delimited by the characteristic of right knowledge, is of their own, and is not dependent upon an adventitious quality, wherefore the Vedas should, for their authoritativness, stand in need of being created by an āpta. And to be created by one who is not an āpta, will, on the other hand, lead to the inference of their unauthoritativness.

Bhāṣya:—But, if that be so, then, may rejoin our opponent, since the Vedas are not preceded by cognition of the imports of the statements as corresponding to objective realities, authoritativness will not belong to the Vedic statements also, just as in the case of the words uttered by a parrot. In regard to this, the author says:

Of the Vedas what is "Nījā" or natural or innate "Śakti" or power of producing cognition corresponding to objective realities, of that, since there is observation of manifestation in the case of mantras, the Ayurveda, etc.; therefore, of all the Vedic declarations, without exception, is proved the authoritativness just by themselves, and not by means of their having their origin in cognition corresponding to objective realities on the part of their speaker. Such is the meaning.

Thus is there the Nyāya-Sūtram:—

And the authoritativness thereof (is established), just like the authoritativness of mantras and the Ayurveda.—Nyāya Sūtram II, 1.07.—92.
Reality of the Objective World further established.

52. (There can be) no manifestation of what is non-existent, just as of the horns of man.—379.

Vṛtti:—The author condemns the Baudhāya theory (of the Void).

(Where a shining mother-of-pearl shell is mistaken for a piece of silver), “It is silver”—this identity of the mother-of-pearl shell and silver, which is really non-existent, manifests itself, (says the Baudhāya). But that is not so; because, since it lacks in producing (the impression of) an object and serving any action, it is impossible for the non-existent to be the producer of cognition, just as is the case with the horns of man.—52.

Bhāṣya:—To establish the proposition, namely, that “and of the Gūnas, etc., there is not absolute exclusion” (V. 26), has been, by way of argument, put forward and discussed one reason in the form: Because of the proof or reality of pleasure, etc. (V. 27). Now, in respect of the very same proposition, the author adduces another reason.

Let alone, by all means, the proof of pleasure, etc., by means of the five-membered (sylllogism); through mere cognition or knowledge also will there be proof thereof. If they were absolutely non-existent, knowledge itself of pleasure, etc., would not be possible, since there is no manifestation to consciousness of non-entities, such as the horns of man, etc. Such is the meaning.

Thus, there is the Brahma-Sūtra:

Not non-existence, because of perception.—Vedānta Sūtras, II, ii. 33.

And in the case of a mother-of-pearl shell appearing as silver, dreams, (imaginary) desires, etc., it is the object just in the form of a transformation of Manas, that is intuited; and those, as the author will declare, are, therefore, not absolutely non-existent.—52.

The Objective World is not absolutely real.

53. No, because of the observation of the non-existence of what is existent.—380.
Prati:—The author condemns the theory of the followers of Prabhakara a celebrated Mimamsika.

In "It is silver," "it" is the object present before the eyes, and "silver" is the thing remembered; these two are cognitions, and their application to each other is, (say the followers of Prabhakara), due to the non-cognisance of their difference.

No, (says the author); because such application is seen to take place through cognisance of non-difference, and also because there are contrary instances in the form of "It is not silver."

Neither is there any contradiction or exception to perfect knowledge or knowledge corresponding to reality. Were there any, then, knowledge having arisen such as "It is a jar," there would be knowledge that "It is not a jar."—53.

Vedanta Mordhaka:—"It" and "Silver" are two cognitions one of which is perception, and the other, recollection. Their application to each other is due to non-cognisance of the difference, and not due to cognisance of the difference, say the followers of Prabhakara. But that is not so, because, "It is not silver"—such contradiction or exception is seen.

Bhaga:—But, if this be so, then let the Gunas, etc., be verily existent, (may say our opponent), and, in that case, the word atyanta or absolute in "not absolute exclusion" (vide V. 20), would be meaningless. In regard to this the author says:

The manifestation of the Gunas, etc., as though they were absolutely existent or real, would not also be reasonable; because of the observation of their non-existence at the time of their destruction, etc., and also because of the observation of the non-existence, even in consciousness, of the world previously shining in consciousness, and further, (because of the contradiction of their absolute reality) by means of the arguments furnished by such Shrutis as:

प्राकारः चाहेंि भेषि भेषि

Now then the direction: Not this, not that.—Bṛhat Āraṇyaka Upanishad, II, iii, 6.

गृह नागानि किंय

Here exists nothing whatever which is manifold.—Ibidem, IV, iv, 19.

यथ देवा न देवा माता न माता

Where the Devas are not Devas, the mother is not mother.—Ibidem, IV, iii, 22.

Such is the meaning.—53.

The World cannot be something else than real and unreal.

नानिद्वद्भीति सत्वमाताः II ४. ४३ II

Na, not. नानिद्वद्भीतिः A-nirvachanlya-aya, of that which is indescribable by
the words, real and unreal. अणन्ततः Tatt-abhāvāt, because of the non-existence or absence thereof, i.e., of manifestation to consciousness.

54. No, because of the absence of the manifestation (to consciousness) of that which is indescribable (by the words real and unreal).—381.

Vṛtti:—The author condemns the theory of the Vedāntin.

"It is silver,"—in this case, were (the identity of the mother-of-pearl shell with silver) unreal, sensuous cognition would not take place, (but it does); were it real, no obstruction (to its reality) would exist, (but it exists): hence it must be something indescribable, quite different from being real and unreal. Accordingly (has it been said):


In the case of reality, there can be no knowledge of an obstruction, neither can there be manifestation of what is unreal. It cannot be of the nature of both, because of their being opposed to each other; hence how can it be a different Tattva or principle?

When, on the other hand, the web of Creation is proved, by means of evidence, to be constituted by Māyā, the evidentiary value of the Proofs, Perception, etc., is for practical purposes only.

While the Vedī declaration on Non-Duality, characterised by being the communication of the truth, acquires the character of Proof through the weakness of its opposite.

Therefore, though they be constituted by Māyā, it is reasonable that the Vedī declarations on Non-Duality should be proof of Brahmaṇ. So much is, no doubt, established.

(So argues the Vedāntin), but that is not so, because, by the very statement, "It is silver," the thing is capable of being described, and also because, by means of its indescribability expressed by "Neither existent nor non-existent," is furnished a description of it.—54.

Bhāṣya:—Well, even if this be so, let the world, it may be said, be just what is different from the existent and the non-existent; and still the negation of its absolute non-existence is not justified.

In regard to this the author says:

Of that which is indescribable, by the terms existence as well as non-existence, manifestation cannot take place; "tatt-abhāvāt," that is, on
account of an object which is different from the existent and the non-existent, not being known. Such is the meaning. Because it is proper that supposition should be made in accordance with the facts of observation. Such is the idea.

What, on the other hand, the Smriti says, namely,

नान्यप्राय: साधुषा माया नैवेदमयालिका ।
सब्दस्याम्याति सङ्कोचाय मनायती ॥

Neither of the form of the non-existent, nor of the form of the existent, is Māyā, nor does it verily partake of the character of both. Indescribable by the terms, existent and non-existent, is it,—a pure Falsity, everlasting.

Of that the meaning is this: "Māyā," that is, Prakṛti, together with her products, does not possess the forms of the three kinds (existent, non-existent, and other than existent and non-existent) refuted by the three aphorisms (V. 52—54), but is "sat-sat-bhyām anirvāchyaśa," that is, uncertainable, in other words, incapable of being spoken of, with certainty, either as that “it is just existent" or that “it is just non-existent”; because “mithyā-bhūtā," that is, every moment it passes into a different mode (of existence). Hence also is it "saṃsāram," that is, eternal as regards its own or essential form, that is to say, is of an existent non-existent form.

Very similarly has been declared, in the Yoga Bhāṣya, the non-existence-cum-existence of Prakṛti attended with her products.—54.

Nor is the world a reflection of what it is not.

नान्यप्राय: स्वस्वच्छाकारात्तु ॥ ॥ ॥

* Na, not. अन्यर्थ: Anyathā-khyātiḥ, manifestation otherwise; cognition of one thing as another. स्व-वचनाः Sv-vachanāḥ, vyāghāt, because of contradiction of their own statement.

55. (The cognition of a mother-of-pearl shell, for example, as silver, can) not (be said to be) an anyathā-khyāti, because of the contradiction (thereby) of their own statement.—382.

Vṛtti:—The author condemns the view of the Nyāya Dārśanas.

"It is silver,"—in this case, it is not the fact that the mother-of-pearl shell itself manifests by the nature of silver. One thing manifests by the nature of another thing,—this is contrary to consciousness. In the case in question, it is the attributed or super-imposed (āropita) silver that manifests in the shell.*—55.

* This last sentence is read by Garbe in the introduction to the next aphorism.
Bhāgya:—Well, then, if this be so, is it anyathā-khyāti, it may be asked, that is desired? The author replies, No.

One thing manifests by the form of another thing, but not that there is manifestation of what is non-existent,—this too is not reasonable; "sva-vachos-vyāghatīt," that is, because the opponent's own tenet that the non-existent does not manifest in consequence of the absence of contact with the senses, etc., is contradicted, on account of the admission of the manifestation of a non-existent connection (in the case of anyathā-khyāti). Such is the meaning.

And if it is said that the connection also, being verily existent in another place, manifests; still there would be manifestation of the non-existent involved in the cognisance of things having the object and the attribute as the auxiliary and the antagonist; while, in the non-cognisance thereof, by reason of the implication of the manifestation of the irregular combinations themselves of silveryness in the mother-of-pearl shell, since it comes to be nothing but the very non-cognisance of the discrimination as is inferred by us, there is certainly contradiction of the assertion of anyathā-khyāti, inasmuch as the meaning of the term "anyathā-khyāti" is nothing but a particular form of error.

Moreover, in the case of cognition wandering away from the object, their own statement that the proof of objects is by means of cognition, would be contradicted. Accordingly has it been said:

śāsana-saṃvidhiśu siddhāsā kāśīkāle śāsāsāh:\ II
Did cognition wander away, on what would belief rest?

But for the purpose of the establishment thereof, by reason of the redundancy in making a thousand suppositions, it is proper to make the supposition of the non-cognisance of the non-connection, which is established both ways, as being the cause of the use of anyathā-khyāti.

Furthermore, by reason of there being no distinction between cognitions as such, there is a want of a principle of determination in regard to their relation as the obstructed and the obstructor. Such hint.—55.*

* The translation given above is of the reading of the Bhāgya adopted by Garbe. F. H. Hall's reading is altogether different from this. In the absence of the original sources from which these editors have made their selections, it is not possible for us to say which of these contradictory versions is the genuine one. The divergence between them is almost astounding. We give below a translation of the Bhāgya according to the reading of F. H. Hall:

One thing manifests by the form of another,—this too is not reasonable, "sva-vachos-vyāghatīt," that is, because, by the word anyathā or otherwise, it is declared that the form of one thing is, in the case of another thing, like the horns of men, and, of that is asserted
The World is both existent and non-existent.

56. (Of the Guṇas, etc. there is) manifestation of existence as well as of non-existence, according to obstruction and non-obstruction.—383.

Vṛtti:—The author states his own view.

"It is silver,"—here, as the object (mother-of-pearl shell) present before the eyes, it is existent, since there is no obstruction (to its existence); but, as silver, it is non-existent, since there is obstruction (to its being silver). Therefore, manifestation of existence-cum-non-existence is the truth.—56.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—"It is silver,"—this embraces existence and non-existence. "It is not silver,"—this is the negation of silver, but not of the thing present before the eyes.

Bhāṣya:—Elaborating what has been stated before, namely, that "(Of the Guṇas, etc., there is) not absolute exclusion or obstruction" (V. 26), the author deduces his own conclusion.

It is the manifestation of existence and non-existence (that takes place) in the case of all, the Guṇas, etc. How? "Owing to obstruction and non-obstruction." Therein there is non-obstruction of all entities as regards their own or essential form, because of their being eternal (in that respect), but, as regards their associations, there exists obstruction of all entities in Chaitanya or consciousness. Just as, e.g., of the silver, etc., residing in Buddhi, in the case of the mother-of-pearl shell; of redness, etc., in the case of the crystal, etc.: similarly.

Likewise, by means of states also, there exists, in time, etc., obstruction of all those that undergo transformation. Such is the meaning.

And "obstruction" is to be the object of the idea of negation in respect of something of an ascertained or established nature; while
non-existence is non-being, and this too is of the own or essential form of the receptacle (adhiścarana).

Neither can it be said that there would be mutual contradiction between existence and non-existence; since there can be no such contradiction by reason of the difference of modes. For, just as, e.g., it is seen that redness in the form of the reflecting body, (the China rose), is existent, and, in the form of the reflection penetrating into the crystal, is non-existent, or just as silver in the form resting on the shelf of the jeweller's shop, is existent, and in the form superimposed upon the mother-of-pearl shell, is non-existent, very similarly is the whole world existent, as regards its essential form, and, in the form superimposed upon Consciousness, etc., is non-existent.

So has it been said:

चरणं धर्मसमानोपरं संविश्वानेन स्वमन्दित्तं निवर्तने ।

व्याप्तेन विवयानवः श्यामं उपभोगते यथा ॥

For even though the object do not exist, the rounds of existences do not come to a stop. Just as, through contemplating objects, non-objects present themselves to one is dream.

In the very same way, again, by reason of the difference of states also, existence and non-existence are unopposed to each other. For, just as trees, etc., though existent by their grown up and like states, are non-existent by the states of the sprout, etc., very similarly do Prakṛti, etc. possess the double nature of the existent and the non-existent.

So has it been said:

नित्यं गुणं भूतानि प्रकृति न संविश्वानां च ।

कार्यान्वयनं शुचश्चतुर्वेयं हृदयते ॥

For, constantly, my child, entities exist and exist not in course of time, of which the motion is imperceptible. On account of subtlety it is not observed.

This existence-cum-non-existence of the web of Creation, as is mentioned in the aphorism, is recorded in the Smṛti:

प्रमाणं कार्यं यथाचार्यं सद्व्यवस्थानम् ।

प्रथां प्रकृतिस्पृशितं व्यवास्तुस्वकिल्को ॥

What is the Unmanifested Cause, that is eternal and of the nature of the existent and the non-existent,—which the contemplators of the Tattvas or Principles describe as Pradhāna and as Prakṛti.—Vṛṣṇi Purāṇa, I. ii., 19.

Note:—The words, “Pradhāna” and “Prakṛti,” represent two distinct aspects of the Root cause. Pradhāna, derived as pra + vā+kā+anā, denotes that in which all things are contained. Prakṛti, derived as pra + y+kri+kīti, denotes that by which all actions, creation, sustentation, and re-construction, are achieved.

And this has been elaborated by us in the Brahma-Mīmāṃsā-Bhāgā and Yoga-Vārttikā. Such is the hint.—56.
Theory of Sphoṭa refuted.

57. By reason of intuition and of non-intuition, Word is not of the nature of Sphoṭa.—381.

Vṛtti:—The author discards Sphoṭa.

"Intuition" is in the case of the letters, "non-intuition," in the case of Sphoṭa. Therefore, Word is not of the nature of Sphoṭa.

If the letters do not establish anything at all, how can there be the establishment of Sphoṭa even? Now, if they do establish objects, what need of a useless Sphoṭa? Let the letters themselves be the means of the establishment of objects.

On account of manifoldness also there can be no proof of Sphoṭa.—

57.

Bhāṣya:—The above discussion (on the reality and unreality of the Guṇas, etc.) is sufficient. Now a consideration of Šabda or Word which has come up incidentally, is proposed,—because it is an adventitious matter,—at the end.

Over and above the letters individually, in the form of "waterpot," etc., a single indivisible word is recognised by the Yoga philosophers to bet h e Sphoṭa,—just like the wholes such as a water-pot, etc., over and above the parts, such as the conch-shaped neck, etc.; because, just like "one water-pot," there is intuition of "one word," and also because, since the letters are of speedy destruction, it is impossible that they should, by combining together, cause the intuition of objects. And that particular form of Sound, called the word (pada), is described as Sphoṭa, inasmuch as it serves to make the object manifest.

That Sound (Sphoṭa) is not supported by evidence and is, therefore, unworthy of belief. Why? "By reason of intuition and non-intuition": Is that Sound intuited, or is it not? In the first alternative, by what collection of letters, arranged in a particular manner, one after another, that is manifested, of that alone let the power be of causing the intuition of objects; what is the necessity for that (i.e., Sphoṭa) which is useless? While, in the latter alternative, an unknown Sphoṭa cannot have the power of causing the manifestation of objects, and hence the supposition of Sphoṭa is futile. Such is the meaning.
If it be thought that the intuition of unity will somehow or other be the means of establishing objects, then the result would be that a forest and the like will be something over and above the individual trees composing it, because of the identity of the intuition of unity in such cases as "one forest," etc.—57.

**Varṇas or Letters are not eternal.**

न शब्दनित्यत्वं कार्यतप्रतीति:॥ ॥

Na, not. शब्दनित्यत्वं, eternality of Sound or Word. कार्यतप्रतीति: कार्यतप्रतीति, because of the intuition of its being an effect.

58. Sound is not eternal, because it is seen to be an effect.—385.

**Vṛitti:**—On account of contradiction by Perception, the Vedas have been stated to be non-eternal. (Vide V. 45). The author now demonstrates the non-eternity of the Varṇas or letters.

Because, immediately after the hearing of Sound (in the form of the letters), arises the intuition that "it is not." Otherwise, eternality will belong to the water-pot also.—58.

**Bṛāya:**—Previously (V. 45) the eternity of the Vedas has been refuted. Now the author refutes the eternality of the letters also.

On the strength of recognition such as "This is that same letter Ga," is maintained the eternality of letters, but that is not reasonable; because, by means of such intuitions as "The letter Ga is produced," there is proof of their non-eternity. And their recognition has their belonging to their classes as its object, since, otherwise, the eternality of the water-pot and the like also would result by means of their recognition.—58.

An objection apprehended.

पूर्वसिद्धस्तयात्माभविष्यतिवैर्विद्यनिवृत्तयथ॥ ॥

पूर्वसिद्धान्तस्तस्यात्माभविष्यति वैर्विद्यनिवृत्तयथ॥ ॥

Pṛṇa-siddha-satya-sya, of the previously established existence. भविष्यति: अभिव्यक्तिः, illumination. भविष्यितं ज्ञानं, by lamp. भविष्यितं ज्ञानं, by lamp. भविष्यितं ज्ञानं, of the water-pot.

59. (What you call production, may rejoin our opponent, is) the manifestation of the previously-established existence,—just as (is that) of the water-pot by the lamp.—386.
Vṛttī: — For the purpose of establishing that, except Prakṛti and Puruṣa, all else is effect, the author apprehends:

Just as a water-pot, lying in the dark, is illuminated by the lamp, so are Vṛpas or letters illuminated by Dhvani or Sound. When there is an absence thereof, there takes place the reflex cognition or manifestation that “they do not exist,” but not because they are non-existent.—59.

Bhāṣya: — The author apprehends an objection.

Well, what is the manifestation, by means of Dhvani or Sound, etc., of the Word of which the existence has verily been previously established, that alone is the object of the intuition of production. An example of such manifestation (i.e., of a previously existing thing) is that “of the water-pot by the lamp.” —59.

The objection answered.

The objection answered.

60. If (it is) the tenet of Existent Effect, there is establishment of what is already established.—387.

Vṛttī: — The author gives the solution:

By depending upon illumination or manifestation, eternality is asserted. If thence follows the tenet of Existent Effect, there would be establishment of what is already established.—60.

Vedāntin Mahādeva: — What is the purport of the assertion of eternality based on the doctrine of manifestation? Is it that the Effect is existent, and not non-existent, (in the Cause even prior to its production) or, is it that, just as in the case of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, eternality belongs to the letters? In the first alternative, the implication is as is here mentioned. In the other, the defect will be shown afterwards.

Bhāṣya: — The author repels the objection apprehended.

If it is asserted that manifestation consists in attaining the present state by the abandonment of the state past and gone, then there is the tenet of Existent Effect. And such eternality belongs to all effects whatever. Hence there is establishment of what is already established (which is fallacious). Such is the meaning.

If, again, it is maintained that manifestation is of the form of the mere cognition of just the effects which are existent only by their present states, then the eternality of water-pot, etc., also will be entailed; for, just as in the case of sounds, so in the case of the water-pot,
etc., also, it is but proper to hold that it is cognition alone that is the object of the intuition of its production by reason of the operation of the cause.—60.

Refutation of the Non-Duality (A-Dvaita) of the Self.

नाद्वैतमात्मनो विज्ञानञ्जनेवप्रतीति: इ ४ । ६१ ॥

Na, not. अ-द्वैतम् A-dvaitam, non-duality. आत्मन: Atmanah, of the self. विज्ञान Līṅgāt, through inferential marks. अभिव्यक्तिः Tat-bheda-pratīrtha, because of the intuition of the division or difference thereof.

61. (There is) not non-duality of the Self, because there is knowledge of its difference, through marks.—388.

Vṛtti:—The Self is one and one only, say some. Thus,

सतिगंधितिरिम्यथन पथरं देवरे नस।
स्रा-हिसिरिरेवाल तत्परः स्त्रू पृथि पृथक् ॥

Just as one single sky is seen separately, being divided as white, blue, etc., so is the Self, though it is one and one only, seen separately, only by those whose vision is erroneous.

The author refutes this theory.

Because of the law or uniformity of the marks of decay, death, etc.

In the preceding (vide I. 154-159), (denial of non-duality) was stated to be as good as established: now it is being established. Hence there is no tautology.—61.

Bhāṣya:—The objections, not previously mentioned, to the non-duality of the Self, should also be brought forward,—for this purpose the refutation of the non-duality of the Self is commenced again.

Even though, like the statements declaring the mutual differences (bheda) of the selves among themselves, there be also statements declaring their non-difference, still “Na advaitam,” that is, absolute non-difference would not belong to them; inasmuch as it is their mutual difference that is established by means of the characteristic marks such as the abandonment (by one person) and non-abandonment (by another person) of Prakriti, mentioned in such declarations as Aja, etc. (Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣat, IV. 5). Such is the meaning. For, those marks could not be explained in the case of absolute non-difference, since, as has been already shown, it is impossible to explain those declarations by the help of super-imposed or Upādhi-caused differences. The declarations on the subject of non-duality, on the other hand, by reason of their being of the same import as the Vedic declarations of equality (sāmya), etc., can be explained
as having reference to non-difference characterised by non-difference of essential properties; and also because that they bear such a reference is ascertained by means also of the fact that the cessation of Abhimaṇa, etc., cannot otherwise be possible.—61.

Evidence of Sense-Perception is against Non-Duality.

नानास्मादपि प्रत्यक्षबाधात् ॥ ४ । ६ ॥

Na, not. An-ātmanā, with the Not-Self. Api, also. Pratyakṣa-bādhiḥ, because of contradiction by perception.

62. Nor (can there be unity of the self) with the Not-Self, because of contradiction by Perception.—389.

Vṛtta:—Let there be not homogeneous non-duality (i.e., non-duality of Self with Self); but the not-selves such as the water-pot, etc., will be, may say our opponent, of the form of the Self, and hence there will be heterogeneous non-duality (i.e., non-duality of the Self with the Not-Self).

In regard to this the author says:

There is not unity of the Self with the Not-Self, e.g., the water pot, etc., because of the seeing of the difference of the water-pot, etc., by reason of their being external. Were the Self and the Not-Self to be one, then the character of the Self would belong to the water-pot, etc., and it would belong to the Self also to undergo transformation.—62.

Bhāṣya:—It has been stated that the marks mentioned above, in other word, difference, is an obstruction to the non-duality of Selves. To the non-duality of the Self with the Not-Selves, as declared by the Sutis, such as

All this is verily the Self.—Chhāndogya Upaniṣat, VII. XXV. 2.

All this is verily is Brahman.—Mundaka Upaniṣat, II. ii. 11.

there is, on the other hand, Perception also as an obstruction, says the author.

With the Not-Self, that is, the world of the objects of experience (Bhoga) also, there is not non-duality of the Self, because of obstruction by Perception. In the case of the non-difference of the Self from all objects of experience, there would be non-difference also between a water-pot and a piece of cloth, because of the non-difference of a water-pot, etc., from the Self which is non-different from a piece of cloth, etc. And such
non-difference is contradicted by Perception which is cognisant of their difference. Such is the meaning.—62.

The same repeated.

नोमान्या तेनेव || ४ १ ६३ ||

Na, not. उभाभ्याः, with both the Self and the Not-Self तेन, by the same, i.e., Perception. एव, very.

63. Nor (is there non-duality of the Self) with both (taken together), (because of contradiction) by the very same.—390.

Vṛtti :—But there will be, it may be said, non-duality which is at once homogeneous and heterogeneous (Viśiṣṭa Advaita). In regard to this, the author says:

Because of the observation of difference by the very means of unobstructed intuition.—63.

Vedāntin Mahādeva :—“Tena eva,” by reason of the very contradiction by Perception, “Ubbabhyaṁ”, with the Self and the Not-Self, unity is not possible. “You are happy, I am pained, this is a water-pot”,—such unobstructed perceptions themselves are the obstructors to the unity of the Self. Such is the import.

Bhāṣya:—With the object of clearing the Buddhi of the disciple, the author makes the object or sense, even though it has been obtained, plainer still.

“Ubbabhyaṁ”, that is, with the Self and the Not-Self taken together, there is not absolute non-difference: “tena eva”, that is, by reason of the very same two causes (i.e., obstructions by Inference and by Perception). Such is the meaning.—63.

Śrutis on Non-Duality explained.

प्रच्छर्यसन्मवेकान्त तथ || ५ १ ६४ ||

Anyā-paṃ-ṭvam, significance or reference to something else. अविवेकान्त, of the non-discriminating. तत्र, therein; in the so-called Śrutis on Non-Duality.

64. In those (Śrutis) of the non-discriminating, there is reference to something else. (Aniruddha). There is in it (i.e., Non-Duality) reference to something else in regard to the non-discriminating. (Viśīṣṭa).—391.
BOOK V, SŪTRA 64, 65.

Vṛtti:—But, if this be so, then, one may say, there is conflict with the Vedic declarations of Non-Duality. In regard to this, the author says:

Of those Śrutis of the blind, the reference is to something else, that is, the reference is to the genus (of the Self).—64.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—“Tatra,” in the Śruti on the unity of the Self, which is demonstrative of the unity of Self-hood, “A-vivekānām,” in the case of the dull, “Anya-paratvam,” significance of the unity of the Self, manifests,—such is the complement. So that, there is no conflict with the Śruti. Such is the idea.

Bhāṣya:—But, then, if this be so, what, it may be asked, will be the fate of the Śrutis such as

The Self verily is this.—Oṁḥakāraya Upaniṣat, VII. xxv. 2.

In regard to this the author says:

“A-vivekānām,” that is, with reference to the non-discriminating Purāṇa, “tatra,” that is, in the teaching of Non-Duality, (there is) a translation or reinculation of that which has worship for its purpose or object. Such is the meaning. For, men fail to discriminate between the body and the owner of the body and also between the objects of experience and the experiencer, and treat them by way of non-difference; e.g., “I am fair,” “My self is Bhadrasena,” etc. Hence, by transcribing that very (popular) usage (vivadāraṇa), with reference to them alone, worship in that form the Veda enjoins, for the purpose of the purification of the Sattva element in their nature. It is for the same reason that in worship in the state of (the realisation of) the absolute reality, the Veda refutes that there is worship of the Self. Thus

Which man cannot comprehend by the mind, by which, they say, the mind is comprehended, that very same is Brahman, know thou, not this,—that which man worships.—Kena Upaniṣat, I, 5.—64.

Non-Dual Self cannot be the material cause of the world.

Naṁ naṁ viṣṇuḥ naṁ nāmasya jagad-paśaṁ karotāṁ nāmaṁ sankalpitāṁ

65. Neither the Self, nor A-vidya, nor both together are the material cause of the world, because the Self is devoid of attachment.—392.

Vritti.—The upholders of the doctrine of One Self have not also, says the author, a material cause of the world.

Being Kātastha or immutable, the Self cannot be the (material) cause. A-vidya, because it is an unreality, cannot have the causality. In the case of its reality, there would be loss of Non-Duality. On account of the absence of relation (between them), both (jointly) cannot be the cause.—65.

Bhāṣya:—With the upholders of Non-Duality, a material cause of the world, says the author, is not possible.

Neither the pure Self, nor A-vidya resting in the Self, nor the two put together, as in the case of two potsherds, can become the material cause of the world, because the Self is devoid of attachment. For, what is a particular form of Saṃyoga or conjunction, called Saṅga or attachment,—by means of that alone takes place the modification or transformation (Vikāra) of substances (Dravya). Hence, on account of its being devoid of attachment, it is not possible for the pure unseeled Self to be the material cause of the world; nor even through A-vidya, because connection of A-vidya (with the Self) has already been refuted by means of the Self's being free from attachment. Moreover, A-vidya being not-a-substance, it is unfit to be the material cause of substances. And if it is said to be a substance, then, by the very means of its being a substance, Duality will be entailed. Furthermore, nowhere has A-vidya been seen to have become the material cause of anything. For, in the case of the appearance of silver in a mother-of-pearl shell, etc., A-vidya is intended to be the Nimitta or efficient cause, and it is Manas that is intended to be the material cause, insomuch as the Saṃskāra or impression springing therefrom is a property (Dharma) of Manas.

And just as it is not possible for them singly to be the material cause, so also, on the very same account of the Self's being devoid of attachment, is it impossible for them jointly to be the material cause. Such is the meaning.

In the Brahma-Mimamsā (Vedānta), on the other hand, A-vidya, in the form of a non-substance, resting in Puruṣa, like air in the sky, is desired, and by means of such A-vidya, it can belong to Brahman to be only, the Adhīṣṭhāna Kāraṇa or the Supporting Cause. And that is approved also by us. Because it is Prakṛti, as conceived by us, the
has been given by them the technical name of A-vidya, and because, by reason of the web of Creation being for the sake of the Self, it is in the Self alone, as the Adhishāna or receptacle, that there is admission, equally on both sides, of Creation having Prakriti as its material cause.

The difference, however, is this only that, while it is desired by them that the activity of Prakriti also should be preceded by Samkalpa or Will, it is not by us. And also Non-Duality by means of A-vibhāga or non-division, as is affirmed by them, is verily desired by us also.

Moreover, by the Śrutis such as

इदेश सौन्दर्यम् जातिवेद्यकान्तिनिरीक्षयाय

Verily existent, O Calm One, was this at the beginning.—One without a second.—Chāndogya Upaniṣat, VI. II. 1.

it is Non-Duality, just in the form of non-division (a-vibhāga), that is established; inasmuch as there are such other Śrutis as

यु तावानुविद्यति नतोविद्यित्त्वम् यथा पदेव

That second exists not,—other than this, divided,—which it may see.—Brihad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣat, I V, III. 23.

And so has it been declared:

आलोक्या प्रवेदार्थपर्यं पंक्तेवाविदिक्षितम्
तयेऽपिवेदनं द्वायं प्रवेद्याविदिक्षितं
र्गाने लवणं भावं पुरवालोभिषीपते ॥

Knowledge and Object were one and undifferentiated. Object is one of the two, while Prakriti is of the nature of both. But Knowledge is a third entity: It is designated as Prasāda.

"Undifferentiated" means undivided.

Therefore, Non-Duality of one whole (a-khaṇḍa) Self is not the meaning of the followers of the Vedānta. And yet the modern Vedāntins imagine just the group of Pārva-pakṣas or contrary views in the matter as being the conclusion or established tenet of the Brahma-Mīmāṁsā. We have, however, demolished this interpretation in the very same place (Brahma-Mīmāṁsā), by showing that these contrary views are not only not mentioned in the Brahma-Sūtras, but are really in conflict with them. Here also the established tenet of the Brahma-Mīmāṁsā is not, it should be remembered, condemned, but, on the other hand, is refuted only the meaning that may, at the first blush, be found to be possible in the Vedānta Sūtras. So also in the case of the subsequent aphorisms.—65.

The Self is not Ananda or Bliss.

नैकस्यानन्दचित्तपूर्वमेव भयोमेवात् ॥ ७ ॥

Correo, not. वर्गो, of one and indivisible. अनंतचित्रापदात्वेन, the characters of being of the form of Bliss and of being of the form.
of Intelligence. द्वयोः, of the two, भेदः, on account of difference.

66. Not to one (and indivisible entity can belong) the characteristics of being of the form of Bliss as well as of Intelligence, on account of the difference between them.—393.

Vṛtti:—The Self, according to some, is of the form of Chit or Intelligence and Ānanda or Bliss. In regard to this, the author says:

“Ānanda” is Sukha or pleasure or happiness. “Chit” is Jñāna or knowledge.

In the case of the Self being of the form of Ānanda and Chit, there is the implication of Duality.

Neither can it be said that Ānanda is not the pleasure derived from the objects of experience, nor is Chit knowledge of the modifications of the mind, but that both denote something quite different and supramundane or transcendental; because, by reason of their (supposed) transcendental character, they would be beyond the scope of proof. Were they to be subject to proof, then by means of the very existence of proof, there would arise Duality.

Moreover, does the Self possess the characteristic of being of the form of Ānanda or the characteristic of having Ānanda as a property? In the alternative of Ānanda being a property of the Self, there is the implication of there being a duality as well as conflict with the Śruti on the Self’s being free from attributes, etc. As regards the alternative of Ānanda being the very form of the Self, in the state of Samsāra or worldly existence, Ānanda is nowise experienced. If it is said that it will be experienced after the disappearance of Avidyā, (we reply that this cannot be, because), since A-vidyā is incorporeal, it is not possible for it to disappear just like a screen, a wall or a plastering. If it is said that the meaning of the word “disappearance” is to be overpowered, (we reply that) what is eternal and universal, cannot be overpowered. Since A-vidyā is unreal, and since the Self is real, there can be no relation or connection between them, because no relation or connection can subsist between reality and unreality. Or, were there to be a connection between them, there would be conflict with the Śruti declaring the Self to be devoid of attachment, etc.

In the feeling of Ānanda, again, there is the contradiction of the object and the subject (in the shape of Ānanda feeling Ānanda).
Further, what is the proof that the Self is Bliss? If you reply, "What need of a search after proof, when the Self, just as such, is of the form of proof?", we say that such is not the case, because, since the supposition or admission of Prameyas or provables is for the sake of the establishment or distribution of Pramâna or Proof, what is to be determined by Proof when there is no Provable? And when it does not lead to acquirement of Pramiti or knowledge established by Proof, the very character of being Proof does not belong to it.

And to be of the form of Chit is not the same as to be of the form of Ânanda, since there is a difference between them. Neither can it be the case that, by reason of their being transcendental, their non-difference is established, because, on account of the very fact of their being transcendental, there cannot be the cognizance of their Vyâpti or Logical Pervasion. Hence the characteristic of having a double form does not belong to the Self.

If, on the other hand, in the state of Release, Bliss is not experienced, what is the harm? If it is experienced, there must be asserted the Experiencer, the Experience, and the Object of Experience. "Just as, on the one hand, by reason of its taking place so long as the body lasts, Samâdhi or Trance is said to be possible also through the immediate vision of the Self (âtma-sâksâtkâra), and as the existence of the Self continues after the body has dropped down, where then is Samâdhi or Trance? So, on the other hand, there is the Abhimûna or conceit that, in the state of Samâdhi, through the cessation of all pain, there is the attainment of Ânanda, and, on the loss of Samâdhi, on account of the non-existence of the body, where is the experience of Ânanda?" This being so, the experience of Ânanda in the state of Release is erroneous. — 66.

Âbhâya:—Illumination is the svârûpa or essential form of the Self,—this has been established by the author as a tenet of his own. In regard to this, the author refutes the Pûrva-paksa or contrary view that Ânanda or Bliss also constitutes the essential form of the Self, since there is the Sruti:

विद्यामानम् भवः

Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman. — Bṛhat Âranyaka Upaniṣat, III. i. 29.

To an entity possessing a single nature, there cannot belong the characteristic of being of the form of both Ânanda or Bliss and Chaitanya or Intelligence; because, by reason of the non-experience of pleasure at the time of the cognition of pain, there is a difference between pleasure and cognition. Such is the meaning.
Neither is it possible to assert that pleasure is a particular form of cognition; because cognition or knowledge which constitutes the essential form of the Self, is one and indivisible (akhaṇḍa).

For the very same reason, it cannot also be asserted that, at the time of the experience or intuition of Intelligence, there is an obscuration or veiling of pleasure; because, by reason of the Self being one and indivisible, in the state of the veiling of Ānanda or Bliss, the experience or intuition of "I know pain" cannot be possible. For there does not exist a division of parts in the Self, whereby even in the state of the veiling of the Ānanda part, the part of Chaitanya or Intelligence will still manifest or shine.

Nor can it be said that by virtue of Śrutis (to the contrary), these are Āsāt Tarkas or invalid reasonings; because, by reason of the fact that non-existence of Ānanda also has been established by such Śrutis as

Neither Bliss nor absence of Bliss, and also by such Śrutis as

Pain-less, pleasure-less is Brahman, consisting of beings past, future, and present, it is reasoning alone that should be given the preference in the present discussion; and also because it has been declared by the Śruti itself that the negative Śrutis alone are the more forcible; since, otherwise, by means of the Śrutis such as

Of infallible will etc., the attributes of will, etc., will also be entailed in the case of the Self.—66.

The Śruti on Ānanda is secondary.

67. On account of (its reference to) cessation of pain, (the Śruti on Ānanda is) metaphorical.—394.

Vṛtti:—Now, what account (do you give, it may be asked), of the Śruti on Ānanda? Thus,

Knowing the Ānanda or Bliss of Brahman, one does not fear from anything whatever.

—Taittirīya Upaniṣad, II. iv. 1.
From which Speech turns back, without reaching it, along with the mind.—Tattvārtha Upaniṣat, II, iv. 1.

In regard to this the author says:

It is clear.—67.

Bhāṣya.—But then, if this be so, what will be the fate, it may be asked, of the śruti which declares that the Self is of the form of ānanda? To this the author replies:

By reason of (reference to) cessation of pain, the word ānanda or Bliss, as applied by the śruti to the Self, is derivative. Such is the meaning. And the ānanda or property from which it is derived, is exceeding dearness; since the exceeding dearness of the Self is proved by perception, reasoning, and by śruti such as

तद्वेषो व्याप्ते

It is dearer than son, etc.—Bṛhat Āranyaka Upaniṣat, I, iv. 8.

Such is the import.

So has it been said:

सुखं हुल्लुष्कुलयक्षयं

Happiness consists in the passing away of pain and pleasure.

The śruti

अ विरन्यायं

Not devoid of ānanda,

has, on the other hand, reference to ānanda due to the upādhi or external investment of the self,—just like the śruti on its being of infallible will, etc.

What some one says, namely, that there is inference of the self being of the form of pleasure, by means of its (intrinsic) dearness independent of upādhis or external investments,—that is not so; because this love of the Self can be explained as being of the form of the absence of pain, and also because, just like the characteristic of its having pleasure, the characteristic of its being the Self is also the exciting cause of love towards it; since, otherwise, there will be the implication of love even in the case of another's pleasure.—67.

The Purpose of the metaphorical Mention of ānanda in the śruti.

विमुक्तिप्रशान्ता मन्दानाम् ॥ ४ ॥

प्रशान्तं विमुक्ति-प्रशान्त, praise of Release. विमुक्ति-प्रशान्त, praise of Release. मन्दानाम्, of the dull.

68. (This is) praise of Release (for the sake) of the dull.—395.

Vṛtti:—The author gives another explanation.
“Mandānām”, of the dull, that is, of those in whom the qualities of Tamas predominate. “Praise of Release” is encouragement for the purpose of making them strive after Release.—68.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—“Of the dull”, that is, of those in whom the qualities of Rajas and Tamas predominate.

Bhāgya:—The author mentions the seed or the origin of the above derivative application of the word Ānanda.

With reference to the “dull”, that is, the ignorant, the Śruti praises the release of the essential form of the Self, in the shape of the cessation of pain, as being pleasure, for the purpose of instigating them to seek release. Such is the meaning.—68.

Refutation of the Theory that Manas is All-pervading.

न व्यापकस्य मनस: करशलातिनिद्रियत्वादा || ५ ४ ६६ ॥

Na, not. व्यापकस्य Vyāpaka-tyaṃ, all-pervading-ness; universality. मनस: Manasāḥ, of Manas. करशलातित्वादा Karasha tvāt, because of its being a Karṣaṇa or Instrument. निद्रियत्वादा Indriya-tvāt, because of its being an Indriya or Sense or Power. वा or.

69. All-pervadingness does not belong to Manas, because it is an Instrument, or because it is an Indriya.—396.

Vṛtti:—The author refutes the universality of Manas.

And what universality of Manas, cognition, namely, “There is pain in my head, pleasure in my leg,” establishes, that is due to the non-apprehension of the succession (of the cognitions) on account of the quick movement of Manas. Hereby there is no establishment of universality—69.

Bhāgya:—With a view to establish more firmly the production of the Antaḥkaraṇa described above, the author discards the contrary theory of the universality of Manas.

Universality does not belong to Manas, meaning Antaḥ-Karaṇa or the Internal Instrument in general, because it is an instrument, just like an axe, etc.

The word Vā, or, has been used in the sense of a definite alternative. Moreover, because of its being an Indriya, Manas, as a particular Antaḥ-Karaṇa, the third one, (the other two being Buddhi and Ahaṃkāra), cannot possess universality. Such is the meaning.

Cognition, etc., on the other hand, extending over the whole body, can be explained just by means of their being of intermediate extent (i.e., neither infinite nor atomic).—69.
BOOK V, SŪTRA 70, 71.

Argument in support of the above.

मनस्सक्यवादः गतिध्रुवे: ॥ ५ ॥ ७० ॥

सत्कितावति सृजन्तत्व, on account of its performing action. गतिध्रुवे: गति-ध्रुवं, there being गति about going.

70. (Manas cannot be universal), because it performs action, and possesses movement, as the श्रुति says, (Aniruddha); or because it performs action, since there is श्रुति that the Self goes (to other worlds). (Vijñāna).—397.

Vṛtti: —The author points out another defect.

"Because it performs action,"—herein is Inference shown. "Because it possesses movement, as the श्रुति says,"—herein is सब्द or Verbal Proof shown.—70.

Bhāṣya: —Lest it be said that the reasons given above are inoperative, the author states an argument in support of them.

By the hearing (from the श्रुति) of the going of the Self to other worlds, it being established that the अनत्तकार्य, which forms its उपाधि or investment, performs action or possesses motion, universality (of the latter) is not possible. Such is the meaning.—70.

Manas is not partless.

न निर्माणस्त्व तथोगासः घटवत् ॥ ५ ॥ ७१ ॥

"Na, not. निर्माणस्त्व (Nir-māna-tvam), partless-ness. निर्माणस्त्व Tat-yogat, because of connection with that, i.e., Indriyas (Vijñāna), "part" or cause (Aniruddha). निर्माण Ghaṭa-vat, as is the case with a jar.

71. Manas is not cause-less, because it has connection with a cause, just as a water-pot and the like. (Aniruddha). Manas is not part-less, because it has connection with the Indriyas, just as is the case with a water-pot and the like. (Vijñāna).—398.

Vṛtti: —Even if it be atomic, on account of the non-existence of a cause, it will, one may say, be eternal In regard to this, the author says:

"Na nir-bhāga-tvam," that is, not cause-less-ness. "Tat-yogat," that is, on account of connection with a "part." What is its cause? Ahaṃkāra. Through their simultaneous connection with the sixsatt of the Indriyas, there is establishment of the ultimate atoms' having parts. Therefore, just like the water-pot, etc., Manas is non-eternal.—71.
Bhāṣya:—With a view to establish that Manas is an effect, the author discards also the theory that it is partless.

The word "tatt," that, in "Tat-yogat," alludes to the word, Indriya, occurring in a preceding aphorism (V. 69). Part-less-ness does not belong to Manas, on account of its connection with more than one Indriya at one and the same time; but just like a water-pot, it is of an intermediate size (i.e., is neither universal nor atomic), and contains parts. Such is the meaning.

And in the causal state, Antah-Karana, it should be understood, is certainly atomic.—71.

Objects Eternal and Non-Eternal.

Prakṛiti-puruṣayoh svarmanavaye || 5 \ 72 ||

Prakṛiti, puruṣayoh, except Prakṛiti and Puruṣa. Anyat, other; Sarvam, all. A-ṇityam, non-eternal.

72. Except Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, all else is non-eternal.—399.

Vṛtti:—The author states the division of eternal and non-eternal.

It is clear.—72.

Bhāṣya:—The author forbids the eternity of Manas, Time, etc.

It is easy.

And, in their causal states, Antah-Karana, Ākāśa, etc., are called only Prakṛiti, but not Buddhī, etc., owing to the non-existence (at the time) of their specific or uncommon properties, such as ascertaining, etc.—72.

Eternality of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa defended.

Na bhāga-lokaṃ bhāgaṃ bhāgino nirmāṇagāmabhūte: || 6 \ 73 ||

Na, not. Bhāga-labha, connection with parts; combination of parts. A-bhāginaḥ, of the partless. Prakṛiti and Puruṣa nirākāraḥ, because of the Śrutis that they are partless.

"Bhoginaḥ" : "This reading", remarks Mr. F. E. Hall, "is peculiar; many Mas. of Viṣṇuṣa, with which agree Aniruddha, Nāgārjuna, and Vedāntin Mahādeva, having Bhoginḥ (Bhāginaḥ)........... But (Bhaginaḥ) is, without doubt, the correct reading."

But we cannot be so sure. Bhāginaḥ means, literally, that which is made up of parts, and, therefore, it can, by no means, signify Prakṛiti or Puruṣa, since both of them have no parts in their composition. The reading, Bhoginaḥ, therefore, seemed puzzling to Nāgārjuna, and he interpreted the aphorism as follows: In the case of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, (the clause being, according to him, understood in the aphorism), the connection of a whole with its parts, that is, the relation of parts and whole, is not reasonable. The reading, Bhoginaḥ, adopted by Viṣṇuṣa, no doubt, removes the difficulty, for both Puruṣa and Prakṛiti are Bhogin, i.e., undergo Bhoga or Experience. But the structure of the aphorism as
73. Combination of parts does not exist in the partless, (and, therefore, in Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), since there is the Śruti that they are partless.—400.

Vṛtti:—Since Space, Time, etc. are eternal, how, it may be asked, is all non-eternal? In regard to this the author says:

There is no connection with cause “bhāginaḥ,” that is, of the cause of the world, namely, Pradhāna, “nir-bhāga-tva-drutēḥ”; that is, because there is the Śruti:

मूलकारकत्वात् शास्त्राय पावनारम्

Since it is the root cause, there is no other cause of it.—73.

Bhāṣya:—But, then, since, by means of such Śrutis as:

वाच्यं प्रक्षतं द्वियत्तत्तत्तवं शास्त्रं शर्मिष्ठं ज्ञाती

Let one know Māyā to be Prakṛiti, and the Lord of Māyā to be Mahēśvara, and all this world to be pervaded by what form his parts.—Śvetāvatara Upaniṣat, IV. 10.—it is established that Puruṣa and Prakṛiti also contain parts, it follows, one may say, that they are non-eternal. In regard to this the author says:

“A-bhāginaḥ,” that is, either of Puruṣa or of the Pradhāna, (possession of) part is not appropriate, since it is heard that they are partless, from such Śrutis as:

निरक्तं निरक्तं शास्त्त्रं निरंकितं निरज्ञातम्

Part-less, act-less, quiet, blame-less, spot-less.—Śvetāvatara Upaniṣat, VI. 19.

Such is the meaning.

And the Śruti cited above (by the objector) imports the relation of part and whole merely by way of A-bhibhāgī or non-division, just as in the case of the consciousness of the father and son, and in the case of heaven and water.—73.

Release is not Manifestation of Bliss.

नानन्दवाभिरस्यरूपस्यनिर्धरितं निर्द्वं

“Na, not. अनन्दवाभिरस्य, manifestation of Ananda or bliss. मुक्तिः Mukti, release. निरंतरं Nir-dharma-tvāt, because of having no attribute.

74. Mukti is not the manifestation of Ananda, since the Self possesses no attributes.—401.

well as its drift are against this reading. It seems to us that the best reading would be A-bhāginaḥ. In fact, Vedantic Mahādeva reads it as such; for, he analyses the word in the following way: In the case of which Bhāgaḥ, i.e., causes do not exist, as to make it an effect, of that, i.e., of Pradhāna. It will be noticed that, according to the rules of Grammar, the letter A of A-bhāginaḥ elides, when the words Bhāga-labhāḥ and A-bhāginaḥ are put together, as in the aphorism. Neither is it at all unlikely that the mark of elision should be missed by the copyist. For these reasons we have thought it fit to read A-bhāginaḥ for Bhāginaḥ and Bhoginaḥ.
Vṛūti.—Release, according to some, is the manifestation of bliss. The author condemns this view.

Because in Release the relation of attribute and the possessor of attribute does not exist.

Does that manifestation exist at all times? Then Release will be entailed even in the state of Sāṃśāra or transmigratory existence.

If it is said that it is effected in the state of Release; in that case, since an entity which is an effect, must necessarily perish, there will not be absolute or permanent release.—74.

Bhāṣya.—It has been stated that cessation of pain is Release. With a view to determine this with certainty, the author repels the theories of others in regard to that view of Release.

In the Self does not exist the attribute or property in the form of bliss or in the form of manifestation. Its Svārūpa or essential form, again, is verily eternal: hence it is not what can be effected by a means Sādhanā. Therefore, manifestation of bliss is not Release. Such is the meaning.

Manifestation of bliss, on the other hand, is, in the worlds of Brahma etc., Release only in a secondary or figurative sense. Such is the import. Since, otherwise, there will be conflict with the Śruti:

विद्यनात्तर्वपरोस्फोटयाताति

The knowing (Puruṣa) abandons joy and grief.—Kātha Upaniṣad, 11. 12.

Moreover, were manifestation to be an attribute of the Self, would it be eternal or non-eternal? In the first alternative, by reason of its being an accomplished fact, it cannot be an object to be desired by Puruṣa. In the latter, since a thing which is producible, is perishable, the destruction of Release would be entailed. Therefore, manifestation of bliss is Release in the primary sense,—this is simply an erroneous tenet of the Neo-Vedāntins. Such is the hint.—74.

Release is not the Elimination of all Particular Attributes.

न विशेषगुणोद्विरिस्तमितवम् ॥ ४ ॥ ७५ ॥

Na, not. विशेषगुणोद्विरिस्तमितवम्: Viśeṣ-guṇa-udviriṣṭitaṁ, eradication of particular qualities. कण तत्वत, similarly to that.

75. Nor, likewise, (is Release) the eradication of (all) particular attributes.—402.

Vṛūti.—The author condemns the view that the eradication of particular qualities is Release.

Through the exclusion of the particular (attributes), there will be the admission of the general (attributes). So that, through connection with attributes, there will not be permanent release.—75.
Bhāṣya:—Eradication of all particular attributes whatever, is also not Release: "tat-vat", that is, just because the Self is devoid of attributes. Such is the meaning.

But, then, how has it been said, you may ask, that only the cessation of pain is Release, when the non-existence of pain also possesses the characteristic of being an attribute? To this we reply that such is not the case; because non-existence of pain has been declared by us to be the object desired by Purūṣa, simply by the relation of its being the object to be experienced.—75.

Attainment of Particular Worlds is not Release.

न विशेषगतिनिग्रिहयस् ॥ ५ । ७६ ॥

य Na, not. विशेषगतिनिग्रिहयस्: Viśeṣ-gaṭīb, going to particular worlds; higher journey. निग्रिहयस् Niṅkriyasa, of the act-less or inactive.

76. Nor (can there be) movement to particular places on the part of the act-less (Self).—103.

Vṛtti:—The Self is of the measure of the body; and Release, say some, is nothing but its going away from every form of body. This view the author condemns.

Release does not result by means of journey upward, since there is the Śruti:

नित्य विमिश्रायनर्येष्यं व्याख्या

The Self is devoid of attribute, devoid of motion, devoid of quality.

(Further, the Self being all-pervading) how (there can be) Release (in this sense)? (If you say that the Self will move from one place to another by the help of particular bodies, in that case), by reason of its undergoing transformation in the shape of the bodies of the elephant and the worm, and consequently, of contraction and expansion, it would be a whole made up of parts, and therefore, non-eternal.—76.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—Release is the steady upward journey of the Self which is of the size of the body, after it has gone out of the body,—this external view of the matter the author condemns.

For, were the Self of the size of the body, then, by reason of the necessity of increase and decrease in respect of entering the body of the elephant and that of the worm, it must be asserted that the Self is a whole made up of parts. And thence it would follow that it is non-eternal. It is proper, therefore, to hold that the Self is all-pervading, and consequently motionless. Hence its upward journey is not possible. Such is the import.
Bhāṣya: — Attainment of the world of Brahman is also not Release, because the Self, being act-less, possesses no motion. And if the Liṅga Śārīra or Subtle Body is admitted, (as that which can go to the world of Brahman, then, because of connection with that very Body), Release does not take place. Such is the meaning. — 76.

Release is not Cessation of Connection with Objects.

Nākārakāparānāgraṇṭhikṛti: चालिकालविवेकोषात् || ४ || ७७ ||

Na, not. चालिकालविवेक: Ākāra-ūparāga-uchchhittib, eradication of the influence of objects. चालिकालविवेक: Kṣanika-tva-ādi-doṣāt, on account of the faults of momentariness, etc.

77. Nor (is Release) the removal of the impress of objects, because of the faults of momentariness, etc. — 404.

Vṛttī: — The author condemns the Release of the Bauldhálas.

Is that “ākāra” or impress the essential form of cognition? If that be so, there will be eradication of cognition also: of which, then, is Release? Now, if it be an attribute, then, since, on account of its momentariness, there is destruction of it at all times, there will be release of those Puruṣas also who are undergoing Samśāra or transmigratory existence. If it be said that, in that state, they are not released owing to the influence of Vāsanā or tendency, then let the eradication of Vāsanā be itself release: what need of the removal of the impress of objects?

From the word “ādi,” etc., it is obtained that, since the stream of transparent states of consciousness also is perishable, of which will be release? — 77.

Bhāṣya: — What is the view of the Nāstikas or heretics, namely, that the Self is nothing but a momentary cognition, that its modification into the form of the object is bondage, and that the annihilation of the influence thereof, called Vāsanā or tendency, is Release,—that also is not so, because, by reason of the faults of its being momentary, etc., such Release cannot be a Puruṣa-artha or object desired by Puruṣa. Such is the meaning. — 77.

Total Extinction of the Self is not Release.

न सर्वद्वीपिकितपूर्वार्थस्वाधिकोषात् || ५ || ७८ ||

Na, not. सर्व-uchchhittib, eradication or annihilation of all. सर्व-पुरुष-ार्थात्-tva-ādi-doṣāt, on account of the fault of its not being an object desired by Puruṣa, etc.
78. Nor (is Release) total annihilation (of the Self), because of the faults of its not being an object desired by Puruṣa, and the like.—405.

Vṛtti:—The author condemns the Release of a particular section of the Baudhās.

It is clear.—78.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—The author condemns the view that the extinction of all except the Self is Release.

What is the offence of all, wherefore the extinction of all is desired? Nor is this possible.

Bhāṣya:—The author condemns another view of Release held by the Nāstikas or heretics themselves.

Neither is Release the wholesale extinction of the Self the form of which is cognition. because, among other reasons, it is seen in the world that the annihilation of the Self is not an object desired by Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.—78.

The Void is not Release.

एवं शून्यमपि ॥ ५ १ ७६ ॥

Evam, similarly. śūnya, the Void. Api, also.

79. Similarly, the Void also (is not Release).—406.

Vṛtti:—The author condemns the view that the Void is Release.

("Evam" refers to "Because of its not being an object desired by Puruṣa and the like" (in the preceding aphorism). By the term "and the like" is indicated the non-existence or impossibility of anuṣṭhāna or practical application (of the theory).

If the Self is admitted, may argue our opponent, then, there will be aversion towards what is antagonistic to it, and affection towards what is congenial to it, and, since these are the causes of bondage, there will be no release. But (we reply) such is not the case. For, bondage does not result through desire and aversion as such, but through particular forms thereof. Just as in the very theory of the Baudhās, bondage does not take place through the stream of conscious states as such, inasmuch as the stream of transparent states is subservient to Release; similarly, through aversion to what is antagonistic to the isolated state of the Self, or through desire for the stability of the Self in the state in which it is divested of all upādhi or external condition, there does not take place bondage; on the contrary, they are indeed the causes of Release.—79.
Bhāṣya:—The annihilation of the whole fabric of creation consisting of cognition and the objects of cognition, is also "evam", that is, on account of its not being an object desired by Puruṣa, not Release. Such is the meaning.—79.

_Release is not the Possession of Excellent Enjoyables._

संयोगस्य वियोगान्तः इति न देशादिलाभोपि || ५१ ८० ||

वेचा: Samyogāḥ, conjunctions. च Cha, and. वियोगन् Viyoga-antāḥ, having disjunction as their end. इति Iti, hence. न Na, not देशादिलाभो Deśā-ādi-lābho, attainment of places, etc. वेचा Api, also

80. And conjunctions end in disjunctions,—hence attainment of places, etc., is also not (Release).—407.

_Vṛitti_:—Release (takes place, according to some), through particular time, place, and act. The author condemns that view.

Since conjunction with place ends in disjunction, Samsāra or transmigratation will again take place. By the word "ādi," etc., time and act are included. So is it also the case with conjunction with time. And Karma also being perishable, there will again be Samsāra or transmigratation.—80.

_Bhāṣya_:—Neither is Release the ownership of excellent place, riches, girls and the like, because, as is heard,

संयोगस्य वियोगान्तः अपरात्तस्य नीवनस्य

Conjunctions end in disjunctions, and life ends in death.

Such is the meaning. So that, on account of its perishableness, ownership is not Release.—80

_Release is not the Absorption of Jīva into Brahman._

न भागियोगो भागस्य || ५१ ८१ ||

वेचा: Na, not. अभिव्यक्ति Bhāgi-yogab, connection with the whole. N.B. Aniruddha reads Bhāga-yogab, meaning connection of part (with the whole). अभिव्यक्ति Bhāga-sya, of the part. N.B. Aniruddha reads A-bhāgasya, meaning, of the partless.

81. There can be no connection of the part with the partless (Aniruddha). Nor (is Release) the connection of the part with the whole.—408.

_Vṛitti_:—Release, according to some, consists in the connection of the Jīva Ātman or the Incarnate Self which is a part, with Brahman which is the whole containing the parts. This the author condemns.
The Jiva Atma is not a part of Brahman, since there do not exist parts in Brahman.

(Further), since connection ends in separation, bondage will result again. Now, if it is said that, on account of the non-existence of the cause of the Samsara or transmigration, there will be no separation, then let that alone be Release: what need for the supposition of connection of part?—81.

Bhada:—Release is not the absorption "bhagasya", of the part, that is, the Jiva, bhagini, in the possessor of parts, that is, the Supreme Self, because of the reason that conjunctions end in disjunctions, also because of the non-admission of Isvara, and, moreover, because the absorption of oneself is not an object desired by Purusa. Such is the meaning.—81.

Release is not the Acquisition of Supernatural Powers

नायिकामात्रयोगोऽस्यस्वयम्भावकारशुचिनिधिचेरितयोगवसतः॥ ४० ॥

Na, not. अंगिर-अधि-योगाः, connection with, or acquisition of, attenuation and other Yogic powers. अधि अधि. आयासिन्धु भविन्दित, because of its necessarily taking place. चेतिन्द तत्-चेतिन्द, of the eradication thereof. आयासिन्धु अधि-योगा-वसि, like other acquisitions.

82. Nor (is Release) the acquisition of Attenuation and the like, because of the inevitableness of their destruction,—just as (it is) in the case of other acquisitions.—409.

Vruti:—Release, say some, is nothing but the acquisition of the powers of Attenuation, etc. In regard to this, the author says:

These also, being effects, are non-eternal. By the word "अधि," "and the like", are denoted Levitation, Heaviness, Acquisition, Unrestricted Desire, Lordliness, Control, and Free Movement.—82.

Bhada:—Neither also is Release connection with the supernatural powers of Attenuation and the like, because, just like the connection with other powers, these also necessarily come to an end. Such is the meaning.

In the reading "Itara-viyoga-vat," as in the case of disjunction from Isvara, (adopted by Aniruddha), the meaning, on the other hand, is that, in respect of their destruction, this is an example.—82.

Release is not the Attainment of Supreme Power.

नन्द्राधिपयोगोऽस्य सदृढः॥ ५ ॥

Na, not. अंगिर-अधि-योगाः, elevation to the status of Indra.
84. The Indriyas are not produced from the Elements, because there is the Sruti that they are produced from Ahamkāra.—411.

Vṛtti:—The Indriyas, according to some, are produced from the Elements. The author repels this view.

Thus, there is:

पत्तमात्रावर्यो प्राच्यो मनः सबिक्षार्थि च
जं बायुबालिनिरपेक्ष सृष्टिकामत्वस्तरिकी

From Him is produced Prāpa; Manas and all the Indriyas; Ether, Air, Fire, Water and Earth, the support of the universe.—Mudgala Upanishat, II, I, 3.

"Bhūta-prakriti-tvam", the characteristic of having the Elements as their material causes,—the application of this expression to the Indriyas is due to the mistake or misconception that by whatever Indriya whatever cause of the Gross Elements, that is, Tan-mātra, is cognised, has that as its material cause.—84.

Bhāṣya:—What has been stated before, (Vide II. 17), namely, that the Indriyas are produced from Ahamkāra, in respect thereof, the contradictory doctrines of others, the author repels.

The (syntactical) connection is easy to grasp.

Previously the author's own tenet has been established; and in the present book, the doctrines of others or opponents are being refuted; hence there is no tautology.—84.
Release does not result through Knowledge of the Six Predicables.

न प्रयासविष्मिषमति-दिपान्तिकपिरिक्ष II 41 II

**Note:** Not. विष्मिषमति-सत्पधात्म-नियमाः, limitation of six predicables, as done in the Vaiśeṣika Darśana. तत्त्वमा Tat-bodhāt, through knowledge thereof. चन्द्र: Mukti, Release. च चान्द्र, also. N. B. Aniruddha does not read cha.

85. Neither is there any limitation of Six Predicables, nor does Release take place through the knowledge thereof.

—412.

**Vṛtti:**—Release takes place, according to some, (the Vaiśeṣikas), through the knowledge of the Six Predicables. In regard to this the author says:

"Substance, Attribute, Action, genus, Species, and Combination (are the Six Predicables). *Kavāda-Sūtram*, I. i. 4.

"Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Self and Manas are the only Substances. (Ibid. I. i. 5).

"Colour, Taste, Small, Touch, Numbers, Measures, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority, Cognitions, Pleasure and Pain, Desire and Aversion, Volitions, Gravity, Fluidity, Viscidity, Potentiality, Merit, Demerit, and Sound are the Attributes. (Ibid. I. i. 6).

"Throwing upwards, Throwing downwards, Contraction, Expansion, and Motion are the Actions. (Ibid. I. i. 7).

"High and low is genus. (Ibid L ii. 3, *Upāṣkāra*).

"The Ultimate Species are those residing in the "eternal" Substances. (Ibid. I. ii. 8).

"Combination is that relation of things inseparably associated together by nature, which is the cause of intuition in the form of "It is in it." (Ibid. VII. ii. 28).

Such rule or limitation does not exist, since the Sāṁkhya believe in an indefinite number of Predicables.

Nor is Release due to the knowledge of those (six) Predicables, since, (as the Sāṁkhya believe), Release takes place through the knowledge of the Self alone. —85.

**Bhāṣya:**—Having in mind that there exist other Tattvas or principles also such as Force, etc., the author refutes the limitation of Predicables to a fixed number and the theory of Release through the knowledge of those Predicables only, as held by others.

What is the rule with the Vaiśeṣikas, namely, that the only Predicables are Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Combination,
and what is, again, admitted by them, namely, that Release takes place through the knowledge of these six Predicables,—that is not supported by evidence; because there are, in addition, Force and the like; because Prakṛiti exceeds the number of nine Substances beginning with the Earth; for, thus, it has been declared that Release is obtained only through the discrimination of Prakṛiti. Such is the meaning. For, the use of the terms Earth, etc., is due only to the possession of Smell, etc., and Smell, etc., do not exist in the state of equipoise (of the Guṇas). Hence the Jāti or universals of Earth-ness, etc., are also, like the characteristics of being a water-pot, etc., reside in effects only. So has it been said:—


There was then (during Pralaya) neither day nor night, neither heaven nor earth; neither was there darkness nor light nor anything else, cognisable by the Senses of Hearing, etc., and by the Understanding. There were then singly the Pradhāna, Brahmā, and Puruṣa,—Viṣṇu Purāṇa, I. ii. 28,—85.

Nor does Release result through Knowledge of the Sixteen Predicables.


dhārtāāchāyāṇavāyam II ४६ II

Soṇādhyā in the case of the sixteen Predicables of the Nyāya Dārśana, etc. वै Api, also. वै Evam, the same.

86. Similarly in the case of the Sixteen Predicables, etc., also.—413.

Vṛttī:—Release, says the Naiyāyika, results through the knowledge of the Sixteen Predicables (enumerated in the Nyāya-Sūtram of Gotama). In regard to this, the author says:

"Proof, Provable, Doubt, Purpose, Example, Tenet, Member (of a Syllogism), Argumentation, Certainty, Declaration, Wrangling, Cavil, Fallacy, Equivocation, Futility, and Ground of Defeat,—through the knowledge of the truth about these Predicables, takes place the attainment of the Supreme Good. (Nyāya-Sūtram, I. i. 1).

"Proofs are Perception, Inference, Comparison, and Word. (Ibid I. i. 3).

"The Provables are the Self, Body, Indriya (Powers of Cognition and Action), Objects, Understanding or Reason, Manas, Activity, Fault, Re-birth, Fruit, Pain, and Release. (Ibid. I. i. 6.)"
"Doubt is reasoning wanting in definiteness, which arises from the cognition of common and uncommon properties, from indetermination, and from irregularity of cognition and non-cognition. (Ibid. I. i. 23.)

"Purpose is that with reference to which one proceeds to act. (Ibid. I. i. 24.)

"Example is the thing about which the opinion of ordinary men and of experts is unanimous. (Ibid. I. i. 25.)

"A Tenet is a doctrine laid down with authority by a Śāstra or an Adhikaraṇa or Topic of it, or by way of Abhyupagama or Admission without proof. (Ibid. I. i. 26.)

"It is fourfold: according as it is a Tenet of all the Śāstras, a Tenet confined to a particular Śāstra, a Tenet under a Topic, and a Tenet by Admission, among which there is a real difference. (Ibid. I. i. 27.)

"The Members of a Syllogism are Proposition, Reason, Instance, Application, and Conclusion. (Ibid. I. i. 32.)

"Argumentation is reasoning for the purpose of knowing, by means of the determination of the cause, the true character of an object the true character of which is unknown. (Ibid. I. i. 40.)

"Ascertainment is the determination of an object by considering the views for and against it. (Ibid. I. i. 41.)

"A Declaration is the adoption of either of two opposite sides, which is established by the five Members of the Syllogism, is not contradicted by the Tenets, and the knowledge of which is obtained by the means of Proof and Argumentation. (Ibid. I. ii. 1.)

"Wrangling is cognition by the means of Equivocation, Futility, and Ground of Defeat, and established in the manner aforesaid (i.e., by the five Members of the Syllogism). (Ibid. I. ii. 2.)

"Cavil is a kind of wrangling which is devoid of the establishment of one's own side. (Ibid. I. ii. 3.)

"The Fallacies are the Variable, the Contradictory, the same as the topic, the same as the thing to be proved, and the mistimed. (Ibid. I. ii. 4.)

"Equivocation is the contradiction of a proposition by the establishment of an alternative meaning. (Ibid. I. ii. 10.)

"It is threefold: Equivocation in respect of a term, Equivocation in respect of genus, and Equivocation in respect of a metaphor. (Ibid. I. ii. 11.)
"Futility is opposition by means of similarity and dissimilarity. (Ibid. I. ii. 18).

(Futility is of twenty-four varieties: viz.) "(1) Balancing the homogeneity, (2) balancing the heterogeneity, (3) balancing an addition, (4) balancing a subtraction, (5) balancing the questionable, (6) balancing the unquestionable, (7) balancing the alternative, (8) balancing the reciprocity, (9) balancing the co-presence, (10) balancing the mutual absence, (11) balancing the infinite regression, (12) balancing the counter-example, (13) balancing the non-produced, (14) balancing the doubt, (15) balancing the controversy, (16) balancing the non-reason, (17) balancing the presumption, (18) balancing the non-difference, (19) balancing the demonstration, (20) balancing the perception, (21) balancing the non-perception, (22) balancing the non-eternity, (23) balancing the eternity, and (24) balancing the effect." (Ibid. V. i. 1.

"Ground of Defeat is indetermination as well as wrong determination. (Ibid. I. ii. 19)


—-This much, and no more,—such rule or limitation does not exist, nor does Release take place through the knowledge of this.

From the word, Ādi, it follows that such other determination of Predicables should also be rejected.—86.

Bhūṣya:—As regards also the sixteen and other number of Predicables maintained in the Nyāya, Pāṇḍūraka, and other Darśanas, there is no such limitation, nor, again, is it the case that, through the knowledge thereof, Release takes place, because, in the manner aforesaid, there is an excess of Predicables. Such is the meaning.

In our opinion, on the other hand, the Predicables which are eternal, are two only: but there is no limitation with us that the number of Predicables in general, both eternal and non-eternal, is twenty-five only, and not more. "(All that our mention of twenty-five Predicables is intended to indicate is that) Attribute, Action, Genus, Force, and all the rest are included just in the twenty-five substances (enumerated by us).—86.
The Ultimate Atoms of the Vaiśeṣikas cannot be eternal.

नास्तिनित्यता तत्कार्यस्वरूपः || ॥ \ \ \ ॥ ॥

Na, not. Aṣu-nitya-tā, eternality of the atoms. Tat-kārya-tva-ārutaḥ, because there is Śruti or Vedic declaration that they are effects.

87. Atoms are not eternal, because there is Śruti that they are effects.—414.

Vṛttī:—There are four classes of "eternal" Ultimate Atoms, and since, by means of these alone, there can be the origination of the Great Elements, what need, it may be asked, of the Prādhāna? Hence the author says:

All was produced from the Prādhāna; excepting Prakṛti and Puruṣa, all else is non-eternal:—there being such Śruti, since they are effects, the Ultimate Atoms can have neither eternality nor causality.—87.

Vedāntin Mādhyācāra:—From the hearing of the eternality of Prakṛti and Puruṣa alone, it is learnt that all else is effect. Such is the meaning.

Bhātya:—For the purpose of demonstrating that the five Gross Elements are effects as declared above (I. 61), the author repels the eternality of the atoms of Earth, etc., admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas and others.

Eternality of the atoms of Earth, etc. does not exist, because it is heard from the Śruti that their atoms also are effects. Such is the meaning.

Although by us such Śrutis are not seen by reason of their having disappeared in course of time, yet they can be inferred (to have existed) from the statements of teachers and also from the memory of them recorded by Manu. For example, says Manusūtra:

चतुष्णो नात्र विशीष्यितो वयाक्षरो द्य यात स्वरूपः ||

तत्सि: सातृयिं सर्वं समस्ववषुप्रूपिसः ||

The atomic measures or parts of the half of ten (i.e., the five Gross Elements) which are remembered to be perishable,—along with them, all this is produced one after the other.—Manu-Sūtra, 1. 27.

"Of the half of ten," that is, of the five Gross Elements beginning with Earth.

Neither can it be said that, in the above saying, by the word "Atom," only diatomic combinations are to be understood; since there is no evidence or reason for so narrowing the sense of the term. Here the word "Atom" denotes nothing but the ultimate atoms of the Gross Elements.

And, (it should be observed), by the present aphorism is refuted the eternality of these (ultimate atoms) as maintained by the Vaiśeṣikas, but
not the eternality of substances in general which have the magnitude of atoms; because there is proof or establishment of atomic existence by means of the necessity of accounting for the restlessness of the Guna called Rajas; since, were there the intermediate magnitude only, and also were eternality to be universal, there would be no explanation of action or motion or change.—87.

Atoms are not partless.

न निर्माणतः कार्यतः || ५ ॥ ३२ ॥

Na, not. निर्माणतः Nir-bhāga-tvam, partlessness. कार्यतः Kārya-tvāt, being effects.

88. Being effects, they cannot be partless.—415.

Vṛttī:—And this being so, says the author, the very characteristic of being ultimate atoms (i.e., indivisible parts) is not possible.

That which is an effect, cannot be without parts; e.g., a piece of cloth.—88.

Bhāṣya:—But, then, how can it be possible, it may be asked, for the ultimate atom which is partless, to be an effect? In regard to this, the author says:

By reason of the fact that its being an effect, as proved by the Śrutī, cannot be otherwise explained, it belongs to the atoms of Earth, etc., not to be without parts. Such is the meaning.

For this very reason has it been established by the revered Vyāsā, in his Commentary on the Yoga Sūtram of Patañjali, that the fine substances, called the Tan-mātrās, are themselves the parts of the atoms of Earth, etc.

Usage such as “the ultimate atom of Earth, the ultimate atom of Water,” etc., is, on the other hand, intended to imply only the extreme limit of sub-division. Hence there is no harm if the characteristic of being atom reaches even up to Prakṛiti.

Although, even in the Tan-mātrās, there exist Smell, etc., still these, being imperceptible, do not become the determinant of the characteristics of being Earth, etc.; because it is established that only manifested Smell, etc., possessing the distinctions of being manifestedly pacific, terrific, etc., constitute the characteristics of being Earth, etc. Hence (is it not that) the Tan-mātrās are Earth, etc. And it should be further understood that, in respect of them also, the use of the term, Subtle Elements, is simply by reason of their being the immediate causes of the (Great) Elements, and far like reason.—88.
BOOK V, SÜTRA 89, 90.

**Criticism of the Vaiśeṣika Theory of Visual Perception.**

न रूपनिश्चयनात् प्रत्यक्षनियमः || ५ || ४६ ||

Na, not दृष्टसृष्टं Rūpa-nibandhanāt, from the cause of Colour-sum-Form.

प्रत्याक्ष: Pratyākṣa-niyamāḥ, rule of perception.

89. There can be no such rule that Perception is due to Colour and Form. —416.

**Vṛtti:** —And through the possession of developed Rūpa, say some, is perception possible, nor is the atom so (i.e., possessed of developed Rūpa). How is it perceived? Hence the author says:

Because Ākāśa or Sky (which is devoid of colour and form) is an object of perception, in such cases, for instance, as “Here is this bird,” and because there are cases of violation of the rule, therefore, there is no such rule, that Perception takes place through the cause of developed Rūpa. And in respect of the super-normal perception of the Yogins, produced through the strength of Sarvākṣhi or Trance, there exists no ground of objection.—89.

**Bhāṣya:** —Direct intuition of Prakṛti and Puruṣa cannot be possible, because Rūpa or Form is the cause of the intuition of substances, (which they do not possess); —this allegation of the heretics the author repels.

From Rūpa alone, as the efficient cause, arises the characteristic of a thing’s being the object of perception,—such a rule does not exist; because, by means of Dharma or Merit, and the like, also, there is possibility of direct intuition. Such is the meaning. Irregularity of the manifestor (Rūpa, Dharma, and so forth), on the other hand, is no fault, because it is seen in the case of the collyrium, etc. Therefore, only in regard to the ordinary perception of external substances, developed Rūpa is the manifestor. Such is the import.—89.

**Magnitude is not fourfold, as maintained by the Vaiśeṣikas.**

न परिमाणाचार्य्यभिः प्राप्त्या तत्तथाभासं || ५ || ६० ||

Na, not चतुर्भूतम् Parimāṇa-chāturvidhyam, fourfoldness of magnitude.

पद Drāhyam, by means of two. तत-योगत, because of the connection or possibility thereof, i.e., of four magnitudes.

90. (There is) not fourfold magnitude, because of the possibility thereof by means of two. —417.

**Vṛtti:** —The author says that fourfold magnitudes, os., small, large, long and short, do not exist.
Because usage is established by means of small and large, through connection of effect and cause, it is these differences (small and large) that are the divisions of magnitude.—90.

Bhāya:—But, then, it may be asked, does there exist, or does not, a thing having the magnitude of an atom? There being room for such an enquiry, the author makes the ascertainment of magnitude:

Small, large, long, short,—such fourfoldness of magnitude does not exist, whereas twofoldness certainly does exist. "Dvā-hyām tat-yogāt": because fourfoldness is obtained just "dvā-hyām," that is, by means of the small and large magnitudes. Such is the meaning. For, short and long are nothing but minor divisions of large magnitude; since, otherwise, by means of the forms of curved, etc., an infinity of magnitudes will be entailed.

Of these two, in our System of Thought, the atomic magnitude should be conceived as existing in the Guṇas, Sattva, etc., which are the root causes of the Gross Elements and the Indriyas, with the exception of that particular modification of the Guṇas which is the cause of Ākāsa. In other places, appropriately in each individual case, the magnitudes are those beginning with the medium and ending with the extreme large, and these are nothing but the minor divisions of largeness.—90.

Note:—The theory of four magnitudes is held by the Vaiśeṣikas. Compare the Kaṇḍā-Sūtram, VII. i. 8, Upāṣāṇa and VII. i. 17 and Upāṣāṇa. For facility of comparison, we give the following extracts from our translation of the Kaṇḍā-Sūtram (S. B. H. Vol. VI).

"This Measure or Extension is of four kinds, namely, Largeness, Smallness, Length, and Shortness.

"Some maintain that length and shortness do not exist in the "eternal" substances (Time, Space, Ether, and Soul). Others hold that these are not even modes of Measure or Extension; for, what they mean is this: As in the command "Bring the longer ones from among these bodies," so also in the command "Bring the spherical and the triangular ones from amongst these bodies," discrimination being equally possible, sphericity or roundness, etc., also will have to be admitted as modes of Measure or Extension.

Whatever is productive of magnitude (largeness), the same is productive of length: whatever is productive of minuteness (smallness), the same is productive of shortness. If it be asked, the cause being the same, how there can be this difference in the effect, the reply is that it is proved or explained, like attributes produced by burning, by the presence of antecedent non-existence."

Criticism of the Theory of Eternal Genus.

श्रीमत्प्रभुतानीपि स्मरणायेगात्र प्रक्ष्यविभाज्यताः सामान्यतया || ४१ ॥

अनुसारे, रामनारायण वेदोपनिषदं न विषयं न विचार्यते, यथा अनुसारे, रामनारायण वेदोपनिषदं न विषयं न विचार्यते. अतः केन्द्रशास्त्र, रामनारायण वेदोपनिषदं न विषयं न विचार्यते. अतः केन्द्रशास्त्र, रामनारायण वेदोपनिषदं न विषयं न विचार्यते.
91. Even though (the individuals are) non-eternal, recognition thereof takes place through the persistence of the Genus (Aniruddha), or, recognition which is dependent upon connection with persistence, is of the Genus (Vijñāna).

—418.

Vṛitti:—Some are of opinion that, besides Prakṛti and Puruṣa, there exists some eternal Genus. In regard to this the author says:

Just as in the case of "He is that Devadatta," the recognition has not the Genus as its object, so, also even though the Genus is non-eternal, through the persistence of the Genus for a long time, takes place the recognition of a flame and the like.—91.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—Just as the recognition, e.g., "He is that Devadatta," has not the Genus for its object, but, on the contrary, has the individual for its object, owing to the lastlingness of the individual, so the recognition of Genus also is due to its persistence, and not to its being eternal.

Bhāṣya:—It has been declared in clear voice that the unity of Puruṣas is by means of their Genus. It has been declared, through the sense or significance (i.e., by implication), that the unity of Prakṛti is by means of Genus. For the purpose thereof, the author rebuts the contrary opinions of the heretics in respect of the Genera:

Even though the individuals are non-eternal, that is, impermanent, the recognition, for example, "This is that very same water-pot," that takes place by means of connection with permanence,—that is of the Genus, that is, that recognition has nothing but the Genus for its object. Such is the meaning.—91.

Genus exists.

न तत्परपलापस्मात् ॥ ४ ॥ ५२ ॥

Na, not. तत्परपलापस्मात्: Tat-apalāpah, repudiation or negation thereof, i.e., of the Genus. तस्मात् Tasmāt, therefore.

92. (There can be), therefore, no denial thereof—419.

Vṛitti.—The author refutes the non-existence of Genus.

There can be no denial of Genus, because of recognition, and because of the opposition by perception of the argument of the others—92.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—"Tasmāt," that is, since there is perception (of Genus), "Tat-apalāpah," that is, the denial of Genus, should not be made, inasmuch as unobstructed perception is the means of establishing the existence of objects.
Bhāṣya: — Therefore, the denial of Genus, says the author, is not reasonable. It is easy.—92.

Genus is not a Negative Idea.

93. It cannot belong to Genus to be of the form of non-application to others, since there is intuition of it as a positive existence.—420.

Vṛitti: — There exists the concept of the form of one, but, says an objector, it has reference to non-application to, or exclusion of, others. Hence the author says:

In respect of a thing which is of the form of non-existence, the knowledge that is obtained, is dependent upon the recollection of the counter-opposite, but not by way of an affirmation. Thus has it been said:

And Non-cow which is proved, should be ascertained: And that is of the nature of the negation of Cow. Therein it is the Cow that must be affirmed,—which is negated by the particle, Non. If the Cow be, on the other hand, non-proved, then there is no Non-cow; and in the absence thereof, where is the Cow?—93.

Vedāntin Mādhava: — The author repels the view that Jāti, or Genus, consists in the ascertainment of others:

It does not belong to the gener of bovineness, etc., to be of the form of difference from non-cow, etc. Why not “Bhāva-pratīteḥ”, that is, because the intuition thereof, as being of the form of positive existences, takes place without, indeed, the recollection of the counter-opposite in the form of the non-cow.

Bhāṣya: — But, then, may contend our opponent, recognition should be explained just by means of non-existence in the form of non-divergence from that, and let this very same (i.e., recognition) be the meaning of the word Genus. To this the author replies:

Since there takes place such positive intuition as “That very same person is this”, Genus cannot be of a negative form. Such is the meaning. For, otherwise, the Intuition would be only this that “This is not
water-pot." Moreover, divergence from not-water-pot should be asserted to be the meaning of the words, divergence from others; therein to be not-water-pot is to be different from the water-pot as a genus; and thus the result is nothing but the admission of Genus.—93.

**Similarity is not a Separate Principle.**

\[ न \ तत्वान्तरं सादृश्यं प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धे: \] ॥४॥

Na, not. तत्वान्तरं Tattva-antaram, a separate or distinct principle. सादृश्यं Sādāriyam, likeness, similarity. प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धे: Pratyakṣa-upalabdheḥ, because of perceptual cognition.

94. Similarity is not a separate Principle, since there is perceptual cognition.—421.

**Vṛtti:** Recognition, one may say, will take place by means of similarity. Hence the author says:

Similarity consists in the connection or presence of a large number of common or generic parts. It is not a separate Principle, because, through the apprehension of a larger number of such parts by means of Perception itself, there arises the cognition that "This is similar to that."—91.

**Vedāntin Mahādeva:** The author repels the view that similarity is a separate principle.

(It is not), because there is cognition, by means of perception, of only the form of the respective Substances, Attributes, etc. Such is the meaning.

**Bhāṣya:** But still, one may say, recognition will take place by the help of similarity. To this the author replies:

There does not exist similarity which is other than the common possession of a large number of parts; since there is, through perception itself, cognition (of similarity) as being of the form of Genus. Such is the meaning.—94.

**Nor is Similarity an Inherent Power of the Thing.**

\[ निजाशक्तिरिभिः वैशिष्ट्यार्थतुपलब्धे: \] ॥५॥

निजाशक्ति Niṣa-ākṣi-abhivyaktiḥ, manifestation of the own power of something. \( \text{Va} \), or. \( \text{विशेष्ट्य} \) Viṣeṣṭī, under distinguishedness or distinction. पलब्धे: Tat-upalabdheḥ, because of the cognition thereof.

95. Nor is Similarity the manifestation of the own power of a thing, because the cognition thereof takes place under a distinction.—422.

**Vṛtti:** The author exhibits another mode.

Own power of things there does exist. And this power, being particularized by manifestation, after the seeing of another like body,
becomes the cause of the cognition of the similarity that "It is similar." But similarity is not a distinct Principle.—95.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—"Manifestation of own power": own power manifested,—such is the meaning. "Manifested" means evolved as being favourable to the production of their respective effects. "Under a distinction" means through relation to such power. "Because of the cognition thereof" means because of the cognition of similarity. Such is the meaning. So that, it is the power inherent in the objects respectively, that is the object of the intuition of similarity. Such is the import.

Bhâṣya:—The author removes the apprehension that some one may contend: But still let the natural power of the thing be itself the similarity, and that cannot be the Genus.

Even the appearance of a particular modification of the natural power of a thing cannot be its similarity; because the cognition of similarity is different from the cognition of power. For, the cognition of power is not dependent upon the knowledge of another thing (lit. possessor of properties); whereas the cognition of similarity, just like the cognition of non-existence, depends upon the cognition of the counter-opposite; hence there is a characteristic difference between the two cognitions. Such is the meaning. Because there is observation of accidental similarity also.

The term, Manifestation, has been used with the object of differentiating the power which lasts as long as the thing lasts.

Moreover, sameness of power belonging to a thing or possessor-of-properties is not its similarity; since, in that case, similarity to youth will be entailed even in the state of boyhood. It should, on the other hand, be asserted that particular modification of power appertaining to youth, etc., is the similarity to youth, etc.

So that, in comparison with the supposition of an infinity of power belonging to each individual separately, it is the supposition of a single Genus common to all the individuales, that is more reasonable.—95.

Nor is Similarity the Relation of Names and Things.

न संज्ञार्थिनितसंबंधोऽधि || ९ ६ ||

Na, not. संज्ञार्थिनि: संज्ञार्थिनि-संबंधः, connection or relation of name and things or the named. अधि Api, also.

96. Nor is (Similarity), moreover, the relation between the name and the named.—423.
Vṛitti: ---Similarity is the cause of the cognition of the relation between the name and the named; hence is the proof thereof, say some. In regard to this, the author says:

Similarity is not the cause of the cognition of the relation, because there are exceptions, inasmuch as elsewhere also the relation of the name and the named is ascertained through instruction, etc.

By the derivation of the word in the instrumental sense, Sambandha or relation is indicative of the cognition of which it is the object.—96.

Vedāntin Mahādeva: --- (The connection of the name and the named is not) eternal,—such is the complement of the aphorism.

Bhāṣya: --- But still, let the mutual similarity of individual water-pots be merely that they bear the (same) name, water-pot, etc.; likewise, in the case of pieces of cloth, etc. So that, when, by means of this alone, assimilative intuition is explained, there is no need of the Gopa. To this, the author replies:

Moreover, the relation, as described above, of the name and the named, is not similarity, simply because the cognition thereof takes place with a distinction. Such is the meaning. For, there is cognition of similarity even in the case of one who is unaware of the relation of the name and the named.—96.

Because their relation is non-eternal.

Na sambandhānirūḍhā tathā nityānityātvaḥ||4||

Na, not Sambandha-nītya-tā, eternality of the relation. Ubhayānitya-tvāt, on account of the non-eternality of both the correlates.

97. The relation (of the name and the named) is not eternal, since both the correlates are non-eternal.—424.

Vṛitti: --- The author repels the view that the relation of Word and Object is eternal.

Since Word and Object are non-eternal, how can their relation be eternal?—97

Bhāṣya: --- Moreover:

Since the name and the named are non-eternal, eternity cannot belong to their relation also. Hence, how, by means of that (relation), can be possible, in a present object, similarity to an object of the past? Such is the meaning.—97.

Nor can the Relation be from Eternity.

Nāja: sambandho dharmaśākhāmanabhdhaḥ||5||

Na, not. Ajaḥ, unoriginated, from eternity. Dharmi-grahaś-mana-baddhāt, owing to opposition of
obstruction by the evidence cognisant of the thing as the subject of certain definite properties, i.e., by the definition of the term.

98. Nor can the relation be unoriginated, since there would be self-contradiction.—425.

Vṛitti:—The author rejects the suggestion of unoriginated relation.

Samyoga or Conjunction, when it takes place, must be produced through karma or action (vide Kaṇḍāda-Sūtram, VII. ii. 9,8. B. H. Vol. VI, page 247). Neither is there action or change or motion in the case of what is eternal and all-pervading.

And Mahat and the rest are non-eternal: how can their conjunction be eternal?

And inasmuch as the Selves are devoid of properties, with them there cannot be conjunction of the Pradhāna.

Moreover, by what proof or evidence the thing is cognised, by the very same is the cognisance of conjunction,—such is the opposition by, or of, the evidence cognisant of the thing as the seat of properties, (that is entailed).—98.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—Since the very relation subsisting between the subject and the property is proved by means of the intuition of the subject as possessing the property, and since that (intuition) is impossible in the absence of the relation of the subject and property, it is illogical to suppose that the relation can be unoriginated.

Bhāṣya:—But then, notwithstanding that the correlatives be non-eternal, the relation, it may be said, may be eternal: what is there to hinder its being so?

To this the author replies:

Relation or Conjunction is proved, only if there ever be Disjunction; as, otherwise, there is no room for the supposition of relation, inasmuch as the case is accounted for, as will be explained hereafter (vide V. 100 below), by the very Svā-rūpa or own or essential form of the things in question. And this possible Disjunction cannot be possible in the case of the relation being eternal. Hence, because there is opposition by the very evidence which makes us cognise the relation, relation cannot be eternal. Such is the meaning.—98.

Denial of the Samavāya or Combination of the Vatāpikas.

न समवायोस्तिप्रमाणाभावात् II 41 66 II

Note: Samāvāya, Combination, Co-inherence, e.g., of attributes in substances. तथा Agni, exists. सत्त्वस्तः Pramāṇa-abhāvāt, owing to absence of proof,
99. Samavāya does not exist, since there is no proof of it.—426.

Vṛūtī:—The author discards Samavāya.

Is Samavāya related or is it unrelated? If it be unrelated, how can it make another thing to be invested with relation? If it be related, then, since no other relation is possible, Samavāya itself must be stated (to be the relation by which it is related); of this also, another; of that, again, another; and thus, since there would be infinite regression, Samavāya does not exist.

What, on the other hand, is the manifestation together by way of non-separation—that is due to a particular variety of Conjunction, just as, for example, of fire in a hot mass of iron.—99.

Bhāṣya:—But then, if this be so, the eternal combination, it may be said, of attribute and possessor of attribute, where both are eternal, would not be explained. In regard to this the author says:

It is easy.—99.

"Absence of proof" shown.

उपप्रकाशान्यांत्यासिद्धैः प्रत्यक्षममुमानं वा ॥ ४ । १००॥

Udbhaya-tra, in both cases, i.e., of perception and inference. अपः, also. Anya-tā-siddheḥ, since there is explanation otherwise. ना, not. न.ब. Aniruddha alone omits this word. प्रत्यक्षत्वः Pratyakṣam, perception. अनुमाणम् Anumānam, inference, वा Vā, or.

100. Since, in both the cases (i.e., of perception and inference, what is called Samavāya) is otherwise accounted for, neither Perception nor Inference (proves the existence of Samavāya).—427.

Vṛūtī:—If Samavāya does not exist, how does, it may be asked, cognition such as "White cloth," "The horse goes," "It is a cow," arise? To this the author replies:

Because, in both the cases, (the origin of the cognition) is explained by means of identity alone. Otherwise (i.e., in the absence of identity), co-existence in one and the same substratum will not be possible.—100.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—The author demonstrates the very absence of proof.

For, in respect of Samavāya, perception such as "White jar," "is, (according to our opponent), the proof. There is Inference also (says he), namely, that a qualified intuition, (that is, intuition in which not merely the thing intuited, but the thing plus a qualification, something else
added to it, is present) must have, for its object, the relation subsisting between both the qualification and the thing qualified, because it is a qualified intuition, just like the intuition "(He is) bearing-a-staff." But as regards both alike, the intuition is proved otherwise (without the supposition of Samavāya) by means of identity alone.

Intuition such as "The cloth exists in these yarns," etc., is, on the other hand, imagined merely by one's own Vāsanā or natural tendency, and does not establish an objective reality.

Bhāṣya:—But then, the evidence (required) is the perception of qualifiedness or of a thing's possessing a certain form, and also the unaccountableness otherwise of the notion of the qualified. In regard to this, the author says:

"Ubhayu-tra api," in both cases also, in the perception of qualifiedness, and in the inference thereof, since the case is explained otherwise by means of the Svarūpa or own form of the thing alone, both of them are not evidence in respect of Samavāya. Such is the meaning.

The idea is this: Just as the notion or cognition of qualifiedness in the case of Samavāya is desired to arise by means of its Svarūpa or own form alone, in consequence of the apprehension of infinite regression, and the perception and inference in this case are otherwise explained; so let the qualified notion or cognition in respect of attribute, the possessor of attribute, etc., also be desired to arise simply by the Svarūpa or own form of attribute, etc.; hence, in these cases also, perception and inference are otherwise accounted for.

But if this be so, may argue our opponent, then Conjunction also is not established, inasmuch as the intuition of the jar, etc., as lying on the ground, etc., will also be otherwise accounted for by means of their Svarūpa or own form. Such is not the case, we reply; because at the time of Disjunction also, since the surface of the earth and the jar will have their Svarūpa or own form in the same identical state, qualified cognition will be entailed. While, in the case of Samavāya, there is never disjunction of the thing combined from its own substratum. Hence this is not a fault.

Some one (Aniruddha), however, has said that, in the case in question, the explanation otherwise of Samavāya is by means of the relation of identity; but that is not so, since the difference is merely one of words. For identity here cannot be asserted to be absolute, because, even in the absence of the attribute, the thing of which it was an attribute, continued to exist, and also because the intuition of qualifiedness still takes place.
BOOK V, SÜTRA 100, 101.

But it is a particular form of relation which is determinative of the cognition of difference in non-difference, that must necessarily be asserted. So that, "(It is) Samavāya," or "(It is) identity,"—thus merely the name is different. But there is no question that a relation other than the two correlates, is established.

If again it is asserted that identity is nothing but Svarūpa or own form, then the very same has been asserted by us also;—thus the difference is one of mere words.

Moreover, of identity, to be the determinant of the idea of difference is seen in such cases as "The jar is a substance," etc., but not also its being the determinant of the idea of the relation of the container and the contained, since intuition in the form of "Substance of the jar" does not take place. Hence it is Substancess, etc., that are the identity of Substance, etc. And, therefore, how can the relation of Samavāya, desired by others as being the determinant of the relation of the container and the contained, be fulfilled by means of identity, when the characteristic of being a cloth does not exist in the yarns and the like? —1001.

N.B.—For a presentation of the case of Samavāya from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view, see Kapāla-Sūtra, VII. II. 36-38.

Motion is Perceptible also.

नानुवेशल्लेख क्रियाया नेविक्ष्य तत्तदत्तोरूपरोपथंतिते:

॥ ४ ॥ ९०१ ॥

Na, not. नृणमन्त्र Anumeyatvam, inferribility. <> Eva, only. क्रियायाः, of action, change, or motion. किरेत्र Nediṣṭhaśya, of the nearest observer. तत्तदत्तोरूपरोपथंतिते: Tat-tat-vatoby, of it, action, and of what it belongs to <> Eva, just, indeed. अपरक्रियान्तिते: Aparakriya-pratibh, because of immediate intuition.

101. Action is not merely a matter of inference, because he who stands very near, has, indeed, immediate intuition of it and of what it belongs to.—428.

Vṛtti:—Action, one may say, will have to be inferred. In regard to this, the author says:

Because only one who stands very near, has immediate intuition of just the action and what possesses action. Otherwise, there would be exclusion of the perception of proved objects. If action is to be inferred by means of Conjunction and Disjunction, then, since they embrace both (the things conjoined or disjoint), when a person climbs a tree from the root towards the top, action would be inferred in the tree also.
But, Conjunction and Disjunction being established by the action of the person, for what purpose, it may be asked, should action be admitted in the tree? It would have been so, we reply, were it a case of production, but, on account of their invariableness, by means of Conjunction and Disjunction, the inference of action in the tree cannot be resisted. Moreover, in the dark, the cognition of mere trembling in such cases as "The tip of my arm trembles," etc., is (an error or, according to another and better reading), not due to Conjunction and Disjunction. And the non-cognition of the action of the sun is due to the 'fault' of its being at too long a distance, and the like.—101.

Bhāṣya.—Through the agitation of Prakṛti takes place the conjunction of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, and therefrom, creation,—such is our tenet. In regard to this, there is this objection of the heretics: The action, called agitation, does not belong to anything whatever. All entities are momentary: they perish no sooner than they are produced. Hence is not established action inferrible from conjunction with a different place.

To this, the author replies:

It is not merely the case that action can be inferred only by means of conjunction, etc., with another place; because "nadiṣṭhāsa," that is, of an observer standing near by, there is intuition by means of perception also, of action and of what possesses action, such as "The tree moves," etc. Such is the meaning.—101.

The Body is not Composed of Five Elements.

न पाक्षोति कारण भद्रामुखायायोगात्। ५ । १०२ ॥

Na, not. पाण्डित पाण्डित. Pāṇḍita-Bhautikam, constituted by five elements. शरिरम्, the body. बहुनाम, of many. उपादान-योगिता, because of unfitness or unsuitableness as material causes.

102. The body is not made of five elements, because many (heterogeneous things jointly) are unfit to be the material cause (of anything).—429.

Vṛtta:—The body, according to some, is originated by the five elements. In regard to this the author says: "Of many," heterogeneous things.

But, in being helpers or supporters, the efficient causality of the four certainly exists. And that is why the Body is said to be constituted by five elements.—102.

Vedántin Mahādeva:—"Upādāna-a-yogāti," on account of unfitness of material; on account of unfitness to be the materials; such is the meaning.
Moreover, did the body consist of five elements, the non-perception of it, just like that of the conjunction of the jar and the sky, would be entailed, because it is only what is combined with what is appropriate to it, that is, as a rule, an object of perception.

Bhāṣya:—In the third book, only the different opinions were mentioned, that the Body is formed of five elements, and so forth, but no particular one of them was ascertained (to be the true). Among them, the author here refutes the contention of an opponent.

“Bahūnām,” that is, (of many) heterogeneous things. The rest is easy.

And heterogeneous things are not seen to be jointly the material causes in the case of the jar, cloth, etc.; hence only what is homogeneous can be the material cause. And the remaining quartet of elements are auxiliaries. To signify this, it is usual to speak of the Body as formed of five elements.

Hereby is refuted the contention of the Body's being constituted by two, three, or four elements.

And, further, while the Body has one element as its material cause, it is Earth itself that is, as the author will declare later on (V. 112), the material cause of all Bodies.—102.

Body is not necessarily Gross.

न स्त्रृलमिति नियम भ्रातिवाहिकत्वापि विद्यमानस्वातः ॥ २१६ ॥

Na, not. स्त्रृल Shālam, gross. कै Iti, such. नियम: Niyamah, rule. भ्रातिवाहिकत्वā, of the vehicular. कै Api, also. विद्यमानस्वात: Vidyamāna-tvāt, because of the existence.

103. (Body is) gross;—such is not the rule; because of the existence of the Vehicular Body also (which is not gross).—430.

Vṛtti:—The Subtle Body does not exist, say some, since there is no proof (of its existence). In regard to this, the author says:

Since there can be no movement of Manas without a seat or vehicle, a vehicle should be affirmed for the purpose of Manas getting to another Body at death. The very same vehicle is the Vehicular Subtle Body.

Says the Sruti also:

पुरुषस्मितः पुरुषां निबद्धाः प्रताः ॥

...Yaksā, durbhīṣṭa extracted the Puruṣa of the size of the thumb.

In the city (purī), i.e., in the Gross Body, it lies (stē),—such is Puruṣa, i.e., the Subtle Body.—103.
Bhāṣya:—Only Gross is the body, say some. The author refutes this.

The characteristic of being body is to be the seat or support of the Indriyas, as will be seen from the declaration of Manu, viz.

यम्नां विद्ययोऽस्मात्मानमाध्यं भूत ।
तस्मात्कर्मिनिविद्याय नूति समाधिष्ठित: !

What are the subtle parts of corporeal bodies, them do these six (Indriyas) take to as their support. Therefore, do the sagacious people call his corporeal form by the name of śarira or body.—Manu oṣṭhi, i. 17.

And Body which is of this description, is only the gross and perceptible one,—such is not the rule. Why not? Because of the existence also "Ātivāhikasya," of another Body which is imperceptible, subtle, and formed of the elements. Such is the meaning.

It conveys the Līṅga Deha or Subtle Body from one world to another world, so is it Ātivāhika or Vehicular. For, as has already been stated (vide III. 12), without the support of the elements, the movement of the Subtle Body, just like that of a picture, is impossible. And this aphorism is for the purpose merely of the elucidation of that very aphorism.

And the subtle one's being a Body should be understood to be either by reason of its being the seat of Bhoga or Experience or by reason of its being the seat of the reflection of Purusa.

And of the existence of the Vehicular Body, the evidence is furnished by the Śruti; for example:

चक्रपुर्विलोक्तः पुले प्रतिपर्यासात्
लम्बा जनानां द्रव्ये सक्षिप्ता ।
(तत् लघुप्रदृशवट प्रमौदेत
स्माविद्यवेयोऽस्मायन्ते)

संविदायुक्तस्मात् संविदायुक्तस्मातः !

The Purusa of the size of the thumb, the internal body, is always seated in the heart of all beings; (one should distinguish it from one's own (external) body, with patience, just as one does the stock from the straw. One should know that to be shining and imperishable, one should know that to be shining and imperishable).—Kātha Upaniṣad, vii. 17.

And by the Smṛiti; for example:

चक्रपुर्विलोक्तः पुले प्रतिपर्यासात्
भद्राच्छायाय विद्यवेयाय वाक्यम् !

Purusa, of the size of the thumb, Yama extracted with force.—Mahābhārata.

For, it is not possible that the Subtle Body, which pervades the whole Gross Body, should itself be of the size of the thumb. Hence it is established from the sense that it is the receptacle of the Subtle Body that is of the size of the thumb. Just as the light of a lamp, though it
pervades the whole room, is of the shape of a cone, by reason of the fine particles of the terrene portions of the oil, wick, etc. condensed above the wick, having a conic shape; even so does the Subtle Body, though it pervades the whole Gross Body, possess the magnitude of the thumb, by means of the subtile elements which constitute its seat or support, having the magnitude of the thumb.—103.

How the senses illuminate objects.

104. It does not belong to the senses to be the illuminator of what they do not reach to, because of their not reaching, or because they would (else) reach everything.

Vṛtti:—The senses are the illuminators of what they do not reach to, say some, because there is perception of sound at a distance, and because there is perception of objects through glass, mica, and crystal. In regard to this, the author says:

Not to be the revealer of objects which they do not reach to, that is, to be the revealer of what they reach to. Hearing, by means of its Vṛtti or modification, is connected with Sound. Glass, etc., on the other hand, on account of their transparency, do not resist the passage of the Eye. And at a distance, cognisance of things takes place by means of the modifications of the Senses.

If (it be said that) the Senses do not cognise objects (at a distance), on account of their not reaching to them, just as in the case of (an object) intercepted by a wall, (then) since there is no distinction of the not-reaching to objects near by which is implied, from the not-reaching to objects by reason of their lying at a distance, they would not cognise even objects which are not intercepted.

Note:—Here the point at issue is whether, in cognising objects, the Senses reach to them, or not. The opponent says that they do not, and argues that, if they did, then they would cognise distant and intercepted objects also, but that, that is not the case, and that, therefore, it follows that they do not reach to objects which they cognise. Now, the author points out the defect in this argument by the expression “because of not-reaching”. That is to say, if, as alleged by the opponent, the senses do not reach to objects, then this disability of the Senses would affect the cognition not only of distant and intercepted
objects, but that of unintercepted objects as well, because the disability must operate equally in both the cases. But, in fact, the cognition of unintercepted objects is not so affected. Therefore the position is untenable that the Senses do not reach to objects.

If, on the other hand, (it be said that) they cognise objects even without reaching to them, then, since there is no distinction (in this respect, in the case of any object whatever), they would cognise all objects whatever lying within the womb of the world (—which is contrary to experience).—104.

Vedāntī Mahādeva:—There is no rule that the Senses operate by reaching (to objects); for, even if it be possible for the Eye, by reason of its being formed of Light, to go to the place of the objects, it is impossible in the case of the Ear, etc. On the contrary, it is the Sound itself that, arrived at the locality of the Ear according to the principle of ripples and waves, or according to the principle of the budding forth of the Kadamba flower, is cognised by the Ear. Smell also, arrived, along with the particles in which it inheres, at the locality of the Power of Smell, is cognised by the Power of Smell. Similarly in the other cases also. The intuition, on the other hand, of Sound at a distance, is nothing but an error, or has the causal Sound as its object.

The author discards these views.

"Aprāptānām," of things unconnected as objects of cognition, "prakākṣitvān," to be the revealor, does not belong to the Senses, "aprāptaḥ," on account of non-connection. Now, if it be said that there is, indeed, connection of the Senses, since they are pervaded (i.e., pervading) to this the author replies "Sarva-prāptaḥ". So that the senses would cognise everything whatever lying within the womb of the world. Therefore, a different or special connection is necessary. Such is the import.

*A statement of the principles referred to herein, will be found in the following extract from the Gloss of Jayanārayaṇa Tarkaratna on the Valāśekha Sūtram of Kapāla. (Vide, ibid. II. II, 87, S. B. H. Vol. VI, page 108): "Some explain the production of Sound on the principle of ripples and waves. According to them, the first Sound is produced from the impact (e.g.) of a drum and a drum-stick, etc., within the limits of that particular space. Then, outside that circle, and within the limits of the ten quarters, the second Sound is produced from the first, and extends it. After that, beyond this second circle, and within the confines of the ten quarters, the third sound is produced from the second. And, in the same way, the production of the fourth and other Sounds should be understood. Others, however, hold that the production of Sound takes place on the principle of the ball of the Kadamba flower. In their view, the second and other Sounds are neither single nor confined to the ten quarters taken together, but are produced tenfold in ten quarters. (Thus, the one is the theory of the successive production of single Sounds, while the other is the theory of the simultaneous production of multiple Sounds). This is the difference."*
Bhāṣya:—The senses (e.g., the Eye) have already (Vide II. 23) been declared to be other than the eye-balls. With a view to establish that, the author refutes that the Senses are the revealers of what are not reached to (by them).

Objects unconnected with them, the Senses do not reveal; "aprāptah," (because of their not reaching to them), since it is not seen that a lamp and the like reveal what is not reached to by them; also because, in the case of their being the revealer of what is not reached to, there is the implication of their being the revealer of all things, including the intercepted, etc. Such is the meaning. The Sense, therefore, must be other than the eye-ball for the purpose of connection with the sun lying at a distance, etc. Such is the import.

And, in the case of the Senses, to be the revealer of objects is just by way of their delivering objects to Puruṣa, since they are themselves unintelligent,—just as is, in the case of the mirror, to be the revealer of the face. Or, their being the revealer of objects consists simply in their taking on the reflection or image of objects.—104.

The Eye is not formed of Light.

न तेजोपसर्प्यासंहासं वाचुइसांस्तिस्ततिः: ॥ ४१०४ ॥

Na not. तेज-अपसारपातः Tejas-apasarpāt, because of the gliding forth of Tejas or Light. नेता Taijasam, formed of Tejas or Light. चक्षुः Chakṣuḥ, the Eye (other than the eye-ball); Sight; the Power of Vision. व्रित्तिः Vṛitti-taḥ, through modification or function. तत-सिद्धेषः Tat-siddheṣaḥ, owing to the possibility or accomplishment thereof, i.e., of gliding forth.

105. Not because Light glides (and the Eye, does so too,) is the Eye formed of Light, because of the taking place thereof through the modification (of the Eye).—432.

Vṛitti:—If the Eye be gliding, then, some one may say, it must be formed of Light. In regard to this, the author says:

Just as in the case of Light, "apasarpāt," through its being the revealer (of objects, even at a distance, the abhināma or misconception (arises that it is) formed of Light. In reality, however, by means of modification, that is, through connection, is the accomplishment thereof, that is, the proof of the objects of cognition.—105.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—And that ("different or special connection", vide above) is, says the author, Vṛitti or modification (of the Senses).

Bhāṣya:—But, if this be so, then, one may say, the opinion that the Eye is formed of Light is alone reasonable, because Light alone is seen
to glide, to a distance, in the form of rays:—this apprehension the author repels.

The gliding forth of Light is seen,—by making this the ground, it must not be asserted that the Eye is formed of Light. Why (not)? Because, just as in the case of Prāṇa or Life, even though it is not formed of Light, the gliding forth can be accounted for by means of a kind of modification. Such is the meaning.

For, just as Prāṇa or Life, without at all altogether abandoning the body, glides out from the tip of the nose, up to a certain distance, by means of the modification called vitalising (prāṇana), even so will the Eye, though it is a Substance not formed of Light, without, indeed, altogether abandoning the body, dart off, all in a moment, towards an object lying at a distance, such as the sun, etc., by means of a particular transformation of itself called Vṛtti or modification. —105.

Proof of the Vṛtti or Modification of the Senses.

Prāśāraśāramadhyāyāḥ itiśāraṇāḥ: II 4 II 106 II

prāpta-artha-prakāśa-lingat, through the sign or mark of the manifestation of object reached to. itiśāraṇāḥ: Vṛtti-asāraṇāḥ, proof of modification.

106. Through the mark of the manifestation of objects reached to, (there is) proof of the modification (of the Senses).—433.

Vṛtti:—Since Vṛtti or modification, is not an object of sense-perception, how, it may be asked, is its existence established? To this, the author replies:

It is clear.—106.

Bhāṣya:—But then, what is the proof, it may be asked, in respect to any such modification? To this, the author replies:

It is easy.—106.

Note:—The reasoning, indicated here, may be exhibited as follows: For the manifestation of objects, the Senses must reach to them. In reaching to objects, they were not in direct contact with the body. So that, while their connection with the body maintained, their connection with objects has to be explained. And this can be possible only by means of a peculiar modification of the Senses themselves, which is technically called Vṛtti, modification. Thus is the existence of Vṛtti proved.

Nature of modification of the Senses described.

Agniparāśāramadhyāyāḥ tattvāntarāḥ itiśāraṇāḥ sambūdhau sārāṇāḥ itiśāraṇāḥ: II 4 II 107 II

bhāṣya: from a fragment and a quality. tattva, a different Tattva or principle. itiśāraṇāḥ: Vṛtti, modification of the Senses.
107. The 'modification' is a different principle from a fragment or a quality (of the Senses), because it is for the purpose of connection (with objects) that they glide forth.—434.

Vṛitti:—Is the modification, it may be asked, just like the flame of a lamp, of the form of a fragment, or is it a sort of quality? To this the author replies:

The 'modification' which is (to be) inferred by means of the effects, is a different Principle which is formed of Ahamkāra, (and this does not run counter to our enumeration of twenty-five principles), because padārtha or predicable is indeterminate (in number).

Since the cognition of unconnected (objects) is impossible, (it, i.e., the 'modification') glides forth for the purpose thereof. So has it been said:—

कृत्वा प्रसर्दृष्टि स्कारितात्मस्य वच च ।
प्रहस्तहथाकार समवार्योविविधाः॥

And where, in the case of one with the eyes widely opened, arise the modifications in the form of gliding forth, there they become, under the favourable influence of Adhīṣṭam, the causes of the enlightenment of connected objects.—107.

Bhāga:—With a view to establish the going (of the Senses), without, indeed, at the same time, parting connection with the body, the author displays the Svarūpa or essential form of Vṛitti or the 'modification' (of the Senses).

For the purpose of connection (with objects), (the Senses) glide forth,—for this reason, of the Eye, etc., 'Bhāgaḥ', that is, a disjoined part like a spark, or a quality like colour and the like, is not their ‘modification’. On the contrary, the modification, whilst a portion thereof, is something different from a fragment or a quality. For, if it were a disjoined part, connection of the Eye with the Sun, etc., would not take place by means of it; and, if it were a quality, the action called gliding forth, would be impossible. Such is the meaning.

Hereby is it established that the modification of Buddhi also, like the flame of a lamp, is a transformation quite of the form of a Substance, resembling a piece of very clean cloth which, by means of its transparency, is capable of taking up images possessing the shape of objects.—107.
Modification may be a Quality as well as a Substance.

न द्रव्यनि०स्तत्तथोदत् ॥ ४ ॥ १०८ ॥

Na, not. प्रवनिः: Dravya-niyamaḥ, limitation to substance. N.B. Aniruddha here reads two words instead of one; viz., Dravya, in respect of substances, Niyamaḥ, rule. केनकान् Tat-yogāt, on account of the presence thereof, i.e., of etymological meaning in the word, modification (Vijñāna); through connection thereof, i.e., of action (Aniruddha).

108. (It is) not a rule (that action takes place) in substances (only), because (the rule as to action depends upon) connection of action (Aniruddha).

(It is) not a rule (that modification is always the name) of a Substance, because there is present (in it) an etymological meaning (as well) (Vijñāna).—435.

Vṛtti:—But how can the action of gliding forth take place, it may be asked, in the case of the modification which is incorporeal? To this, the author replies:

Owing to the indeterminateness of the number of Predicables, action is not confined to Substances alone. But, on the contrary, wherever proof (of action) is seen, we infer it. And action is seen in the modification, as, otherwise, there would not take place the cognizance of things.—108.

Bhāṣya:—But, if this be so, then all modifications being Substances, how, some one may ask, do you account for the use of the word, modification, to (denote) the attributes of Buddhi in the form of desire and the like? To this, the author replies:

Modification is substance and nothing but substance,—such rule does not exist. Why? “Tat-yogāt”, that is, because of the presence of the etymological meaning therein, that is, in (the word,) modification. For, this word is derivative in this sense, namely,

व्रत्तिः देद्वदन्वेशते।

Vṛtti denotes (manner of) existence and life.

And “life” is an operation which is the cause of one’s own preservation or continued state, (as follows) from the teaching:

श्री चक्रवर्तिकारण्।

The root Jīva, to live, is in the sense of upholding strength and upholding vitality.—Dhātupātha, XV. 54.

as well as from such uses as “the occupation of a Vaiśya,” “the occupation of a Śūdra,” and so forth. Therein, just as, by means of the
modification in the form of a Substance, Buddhi lives, so also by means of desire and the like; hence these too are modifications; because on the very suppression of them all, there would be death of the Chittam or Buddhi. Such is the meaning.—108.

Ahamkāra is everywhere the uniform cause of the Senses.

Na, not. वेषे दोष-भेदे, there being a difference of locality. अपि, even. आत्मविद्या अन्याद्-पादानात, to have something else as the material cause.

109. Nor, even though there be a difference of locality, have the Senses something else (than Ahamkāra) as the material cause; the rule is as with us and the like.—436.

Vṛitti:—In a particular locality, the Senses, it may be said, will be formed of the Elements,—just as, in a particular locality, death occurs to one bitten by a scorpion. In regard to this, the author says:

In one’s own body itself, the Vyāpti or logical pervasion or universal concomitance is recognised that the Senses are formed of Ahamkāra. On the violation thereof, the smoke also will wander away from fire.—109.

Bhūtya:—Since it is sometimes also heard (from the Vedas) that the Senses are formed of the Elements, it may be doubted, whether the Śruti (on this subject) is perhaps to be established by means of (occasional) differences of particular localities. In regard to this, the author says:

Not even according to difference of localities such as the world of Brahmā, etc., do the Senses have anything else than Ahamkāra for their material cause; but, just as in the case of ourselves and the like who dwell in the terrestrial world, so also in the case of all, without exception, they are all uniformly formed of Ahamkāra; for, (in an analogous case, difference of locality causes no difference in the constitution of the Subtle Body, as) it is heard from the Śruti that it is one and the same Subtle Body that merely moves from place to place by reason of there being differences of localities. Such is the meaning.—109.

The doubtful Śruti explained.

Nimitta-ṛyapadeśā, through mention or predication of the nimitta or efficient cause. तत-ṛyapadeशः, the mention or predication thereof, i.e., of the Senses having the Elements as their material causes.

110. The mention thereof is due to the mention of the efficient cause.—437.
VRITTI:—The author shows the reason for the predication: "formed of the five elements."

The material causality of the five is denied, but not their efficient causality: therefore is the predication: "formed of the five elements."—110.

BHADRA:—But, if this be so, then, how, it may be asked, is the Sruti about the Senses being formed of the Elements to be accounted for? To this, the author replies:

The predication of being the material cause is made even in respect of the instrumental cause, from the desire to emphasise or to point out that it is the chief cause; just as fire (is spoken of as arising) from fuel. Hence is the predication of the Senses as having the Elements as their material causes. Such is the meaning. For, it is by means of the Support given by the Elements of Fire, etc., that the Senses arise from the Ahām-kāra inhering in them; just as fire, by means of the Support given by the earthly fuel, arises from the fire inhering in it. On this point, the proof is furnished by Srutis such as:

\[ \text{प्रचारमय हि सृष्टं सन्त} \]

For, formed of food, O calm one, is Manas.—Chhandogya Upaniṣat, VI. v. 4.

and the arguments mentioned therein.—110.

Varieties of the Gross Body.

उष्मजाएवजजारायुजोतिरभुजसांकल्पिकातत्सिद्धिकर्मात्
वैति न नियमः: || ५ । १११||

111. (Gross Bodies are the) heat-born, egg-born, womb-born, vegetable, will-born and artificial; hence it is not a rule (that the varieties of the Gross Body are the first four only as held by the Vaiśeṣikas and others).—438.

VRITTI:—How many are the varieties of the (Gross) Body? It may be asked. So the author says:

The heat-born are the flies, mosquitoes, etc.; the egg-born, birds, reptiles, etc.; the womb-born, man, etc.; the vegetable, tree, etc.; the will-born, Manu, etc.; the artificial, those produced by means of Mantra or incantation, herbs, etc.
Incidentally the author determines the variety that belongs to the Gross Body.

In the Sruti:

And whenever the manufacturers determine the variety of a thing,

Of the same, those beings, verily the seeds are three only: egg-born, life-born, vegetable. — Chāndogya Upanishat, VI. iii. 1.

of threefoldness of the Body, in the form of the egg-born etc., has been mentioned with a view or with reference to the usual varieties, but not that such is the rule, or that it is an exhaustive enumeration; because the Body becomes indeed of the six varieties of the heat-born, and the rest. Such is the meaning.

Among these, the heat-born are mosquito, etc.; the egg-born, birds, reptiles, etc.; the womb-born, man, etc.; the vegetable, tree, etc.; the will-born, Sanaka, etc., the artificial, those produced from the perfection or supernatural power attained by means of Mantra or incantation, penance, etc., e.g., the bodies produced from the body of Itakabija, etc.—111.

Earth is the material of the Gross Body.

In all (Bodies), there is Earth as the material cause, because of some speciality; the predication thereof is as in the preceding case.—439.

Vṛtti:—Which Element, it may be asked, is predominant in the Body? To this, the author replies:

"In all"—this phrase has been used to denote "generally," "to a larger extent"; because there is the Sruti that, in the world of Sūrya, etc., the Body is formed of Light. There even there is reliance on the support of a larger number of terrene particles, because, on the other hand, were their number small, there would be no enjoyment.

"As in the preceding case," that is, everything is explained.—112.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—Because, in the matter of enjoyment, terrene particles alone possess the fitness or capability (of being enjoyed).

Bhadra:—It has previously been declared that the Body has only one Element as its material cause. In this very incidental explanation the author mentions it specifically.
“In all”, that is to say, bodies, it is Earth alone that is the material, “because of some speciality,” that is, because of its predominance by means of excess and the like. The predication of the body’s being formed of five, four, etc., Elements, is, on the other hand, “as in the preceding case,” that is, just like (the predication of) the Senses being formed of the Elements, by reason merely by their presence as auxiliary or instrumental causes or as supports. Such is the meaning.—112.

Prāṇa or the Life-Breath is not the originator of the body.

113. Not to the originant of the Body (belongs) the characteristic of being Prāṇa, because of the accomplishment thereof through the power of the Indriyas.—440.

Vṛtti:—The author removes the apprehension, (which may arise) from seeing Prāṇa in the Body, that it is the originant of the Body.

It belongs to the elemental Air to be the originant of the Body; nor is Prāṇa Vāyu or the “vital air” elemental, since there exists the Śruti:

प्राक्तन्तः स्वेच्छायाय

All was produced from Prāṇa.

And because it lasts as long as the Body endures, (there arises) the error of its being the originant.

Prāṇa is supported or upheld by the power of all the Indriyas: hence, as long as the Indriya exists, so long is “the accomplishment thereof”, that is, accomplishment of the upholding of Prāṇa.—113.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—The author refutes the view that Prāṇa is Air.

The import is that Prāṇa is a modification of all the Indriyas.

Bhāṣya:—But then, on account of the pre-eminence of Prāṇa in the Body, let, one may say, Prāṇa itself be the originant of the Body. In regard to this, the author says:

Prāṇa is not the originant of the Body. “Because of the accomplishment” of Prāṇa, that is, because, by reason of the fact that Prāṇa does not remain without the Indriya, (it is established), by means of Agreement and Inference (that) the production of Prāṇa is only from a particular Indriyas. Such is the meaning.
The import is this: Prāṇa, which is of the form of a modification of the Instruments (i.e., Indriyas), does not subsist in the absence of the Instruments. Therefore, since in a dead Body, by reason of the absence of the Instruments, there is the absence of Prāṇa, (it follows that) Prāṇa is not the originant of the Body.—113.

The Building of the Body is due to the Self.

नोकृतपतिधानादृ भोगायतननिमित्तमन्यथा
पृविभावरस्यात् || ४ || ११४ ||

नेतृः Bhoktuḥ, of the Experiencer. अधिष्ठानात् Adhiṣṭhānāt, through the Superintendence, presence. भोग-यातन-निमित्तम् Bhoga-ayatan-nimittam, building of the house of experience. अन्यथा Anyathā, otherwise. पृविभावस्यात् Pūrvi-bhāva-prasāgat, because of the implication of the putrid state.

114. Through the superintendence or presence of the Experiencer (takes place) the building of the House of Experience; since, otherwise, there would be the implication of the putrid state.—441.

Vṛitti:—The author makes the ascertaining whether it is after the Body has been produced that there comes to be in it the Superintendence of the Self, or whether it is after the Superintendence of the Self has come into existence that there takes place the production of the Body.

It is lucid.—114.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—Commencing with the deposit of the seed into the womb, etc., (the Body builds up under the Superintendence of the Self).

"Adhiṣṭhānāt," that is, through a particular connection.

Bhāṣya:—But then, Prāṇa being thus not a cause of the Body, the Body will be produced, it may be said, even without Prāṇa. In regard to this, the author says:

"Through the Superintendence," that is, just through the operation, "of the Experiencer," that is, of that to which Prāṇa belongs, takes place "the building of the House of Experience," that is, of the Body; since, "otherwise," that is, in the absence of the operation of Prāṇa, the result would be the putrid state of the blood and semen, just as is the case with a dead body. Such is the meaning.

So that, by the particular operations of circulation of the juices, etc., Prāṇa is the instrumental or efficient cause of the Body, owing to
its being the means of upholding or sustaining the Body. Such is the import.—114.

The Superintendence of the Self is Relative, and not Absolute.

भृत्यद्वारा स्वाधीनयितुष्टान्तकान्तात् || १२ ||

भृत्यद्वारा, through, or by means of, the servant. स्वाधीन, Superintendence of the master. ए ना, not. एक-अंतात्, immediately; real, full, effective.

115. Through the servant is the Superintendence of the master,—not immediately. (Vijñāna). Superintendence through a servant cannot be effective. (Aniruddha).—442.

Vyrtti:—Because Pradhāna is the root of the Body, Superintendence (of the Self) will be, one may say, only through that and not otherwise. In regard to this, the author says:

* Just as where an unintelligent servant is depended upon, there is not well-being everywhere, so, through superintendence of the unintelligent Pradhāna, there cannot be the counteracting or prevention of the putrid state.—115.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—The Superintendence of Puruṣa, through Pradhāna, (cannot be)—the counteractive of the putrid state—such is the complement (of the aphorism); “Na-eka-antāt,” (on account of its being not-one-ended), that is, on account of its vyabhichāra or promiscuous connection, in other words, on account of its being present everywhere.

Bhāṣya:—But then, some one may say, it is possible for Prāṇa alone to be the Superintendent, because it is this which possesses operation, and not for that to which Prāṇa belongs (i.e., the Self), because it is immutable, and because there is no purpose in the Superintendence of that which is devoid of operation. To this, the author replies:

In the building of the Body, superintendence, in the form of operation, of the master, that is, the intelligent Principle, does not exist, “e-kantāt,” that is, immediately, but through its servant in the form

* The translation given here is that of the reading of the Vyrtti found in Dr. Garbe’s Jeypur MS, which we adopt, without the least hesitation, as being the correct one. Dr. Garbe, instead of caring to understand it, “corrected” the reading! Had he paid due regard to the sense required, he would not have misled himself into reading the two words “avalamhits” and “as,” as one word “avalamhitas.” With the result that his “corrected” reading conveys a meaning which is obscure and inappropriate. For rendered into English, it runs as follows: As, dependent upon an unintelligent servant (is) everywhere one’s own presence, so etc.
of Prāṇa;—just as in the case of a king's building a city. Such is the
meaning.

And thus it is established that Prāṇa's being the Superintendent
is immediate, while Puruṣa's being the Superintendent is by means of
the mere conjunction of Prāṇa.

So is it also in the case of the acts of construction of a water-pot,
etc., by a potter, etc.

The difference, however, is this: In that (i.e. construction, e.g., of
a water-pot) there is the contributiveness of the intelligent Principle
as well as of Buddhi, etc., as the creation (by a potter) is preceded by
Buddhi.

Although the building of the Body takes place only through the
Superintendence of Prāṇa, yet, by Prāṇa, is awaited conjunction of that
to which Prāṇa belongs, i.e., Puruṣa, inasmuch as the building up of the
Body by Prāṇa is only for the purpose of Puruṣa. With a view to show
this, has been declared: "Through the Superintendence of the Expe-
riencer."—115.

Puruṣas are ever free.

समाधिसुंप्तिवधेषु भ्रूतेर्पता || ॥ ॥ ११६ ॥

समाधि-सुप्तिः Samādhi-sūpti-, mokṣa-yu, in the states of meditative trance,
profound sleep, and release. भ्रूतेर्पता Brahma-rūpa-tā, the condition of being of
the form of Brahman.

116. In trance, profound sleep, and release, (Puruṣa
rests in) the condition of being of the form of Brahman.—
443.

Vritti:—With a view to the determination of the form of Brahman,
the author declares others' being of a like form.

(In these states there is) the condition of having a similar form with
Brahman, on account of the non-perception of external objects anywhere,
but not the condition of being of the (very) form of Brahman.—116.

Vedāntin Mahādēva:—In order to declare, by the example of deep
sleep, the absence of pain in the state of release, the author says:

"The condition of being of the form of Brahman", that is, the not-
feeling of pain.

Bhāṣya:—It was stated before that (the activity) "of Prakṛiti is for
the sake of the release of the released " (II. 1). In regard to this, since
there is (room for) the objection of the opponents, namely, how can the
Self be eternally free when its bondage is seen? therefore, with a view to demonstrating its eternal freedom, the author says:

"Samādhi," (trance) that is, the ultra-cognitive state (vide foot-note on pages 305-306 above); and "Suṣupti" (profound sleep), that is, total profound sleep; and "Mokṣa" (release), that is, disembodied singleness (i.e., the resting purely and absolutely alone of the Self after its separation from the Body. In these states, (there is), of Puruṣas, "Brahma-rūpatā," that is, the resting by being full of its own Svārūpa or intrinsic form, by reason of the disappearance, through the dissolution of the modifications of Buddhi, of the limitations caused by them as its upādhi or external investment; just as, e.g., is the fullness of the portion of space confined within a water-pot, after the destruction of the water-pot. Such is the meaning.

And the same, has been declared (before):

तत्रिविद्युत्यदप्यवस्तुपञ्चक । स्वस्वः ॥

On the cessation thereof, the adventitious tint having subsided, (Puruṣa becomes self-seated. —Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram, II. 34.

And thus it is nothing but Brahmaness, the being Brahman, that is, the nature or essence of Puruṣas, since it is not due to any nimitta or (external) instrumental cause,—just as is whiteness in the case of the crystal.

But at the time of connection with the modifications of Buddhi, by reason of the manifestation (of the Self) as having the form of consciousness limited or conditioned (by those modifications), (there arises) the abhīmāna or conceit or misconception of limitation or determination; and, likewise, under the influence of the reflection of the modifications (falling on it), pain, etc. come to be as though they were its impurity;—all this is nothing but upādhi, caused by external investment, or adventitious, as it varies concomitantly with the presence and absence of the nimitta or occasional or instrumental cause called the upādhi or external investment; just as is the case with the redness of the crystal, such is the import.

And so there is the Yoga Sūtram:

रूपसाद्वप्यविरियं ॥

Elsewhere (there is) similarity of form with the modifications.—Yoga Sūtram, I. 4.

And in our Šāstra, the word, Brahman, denotes conscious or intelligent existence in general, which is all-full, and devoid of limitation, impurity, and the like, caused by the upādhi or external investment; but not, as in the Brahma-Mīmāṃsa, (Vedānta), merely a particular Puruṣa characterised by being the Lord. This distinction should be observed.
In this connection, the following Šlokas are recited for the sake of the illumination of the disciples:

विद्यासागरः निपित्तो माहाकाशरौरिस्तमः ।
भीतवं ताहवस्त्रस्तो श्रीरीकास्तखे ।
पशुवस्तुं तत्वा पुरावेकान्ते शिवमः ।
रुक्मिश्वरवेशेऽद्य द्विष्ठामार्गान परशुरति ।
कालसी द्रवपतु सुंदीर्दुर्घचिं नेतरः ।
समाव्यासी ब्ल शा मालसीः पूर्वः पुरावतः ॥

Buddhdhi, moving hither and thither and everywhere, by manifold forms, in the unmanifested firmament of consciousness, may show consciousness as moving along with the manifestation.

In reality, however, the firmament of consciousness is always full and of the same form throughout; in those quarters which are devoid of modifications (of Buddhdhi), (one) does not see (it) on account of the absence of any object of sight.

For, just as is colour in the case of the Eyo, the modification is the object of vision in the case of Purusa,—nothing else; and this (modification) does not exist in the state of trance and the like;—hence, at that time, is Purusa full (of himself).—116.

Release distinguished from Deep Sleep and Trance.

द्वयोः सवीजमान्यतः तद्वा द्रविः ॥ ५ । ११७ ॥

द्वयोः Dvayoh, in the case of the two, i.e., profound sleep and ultra-cognitive trance. सवीज Sa-bijam, seed-carrying, with a seed. अन्यत्र Anya-itra, elsewhere, i.e., in the case of release. तद्वा Tat-hatib, the destruction thereof, i.e., of the seed.

117. In the case of the two (the condition of being of the form of Brahman is impregnated) with the seed (of Samsâra); in the other case (there is) the destruction thereof.

444.

Vṛtti:—The author tells us the Sva-rūpa or essential form of Brahman.

"Dvayoh," that is, of trance and deep sleep, (there is) the characteristic of being with the seed, that is, the possession of Samsâra or impression (of past experiences); of the other, that is, of Release, (there is) absence of the seed.—117.

Vedantin Mahâdeva:—"Sa-bija-tvam," the being with the seed, means the possession of the impression of past experiences which is the predisposing or exciting cause of a recurrence of pain. "Destruction thereof" means the destruction of the impression.
Bhāṣya:—What then, it may be asked, is the difference of Release from deep sleep and trance? To this, the author replies:

“Dvayōb,” that is, of trance and deep sleep, the characteristic of being Brahman is “Sabljam,” that is, attended with the seed of Bondage; “Anyatra,” that is, in the state of Release, there is the absence of the seed;—this is the distinction. Such is the meaning.

Well, if, as you admit, the seed of Bondage exists in the state of trance, etc., then, limitation or determination being caused by that itself, how, our opponent may ask, can there be in them the characteristic of being Brahman? But such is not the case, we reply; because the seed of Bondage such as Vāsanā or tendency, Karma or merit and demerit, and the like, remain, in those states, in the upādhi or the external investment alone; and not in the intelligent principles, and because, moreover, they are not reflected in Purūṣa.

In the waking and other states, on the other hand, the bondage is, as has been declared more than once, upādhi or caused by the external investment, arising, as it does, under the influence of the reflection of the modifications of Buddhi.

But still, may ask our opponent, when in the (Yoga) Aphorisms of Patañjali as well as in the Commentary thereon, Ultra-cognitive Trance has been declared to be seedless, how is it stated here to be with a seed? We reply that this is not exactly the case; the declaration of seedlessness has been made there just with a view to indicate that, in the ultra-cognitive trance, the dissolution of seed takes place gradually; since, otherwise, were all ultra-cognitive individuals, without exception, seedless, there would be no explanation or accounting for of the fact of their rising again into waking consciousness.—117.

The Reality of Release demonstrated.

Dravyośīṛṣṭyāpya dhrṛṣṭvā saḥ bhū || २ । २१२ ॥

॥ Dravyo-b, of the two, i.e., deep sleep and trance. ॥ Iva, like. ॥ Traya, of the third, i.e., release. ॥ Api, also. ॥ Drīṣṭvā, because of being “seen,” i.e., cognised or proved. ॥ Na, not. ॥ Tu, but. ॥ Drāv, two.

118. But (there are) not the two (only). (Release also is a reality), because, just like the two, the third also is seen.

Vṛtti:—In the case of trance and deep sleep, successfulness, through their having the modifications suppressed, is evident, but it is not so,
it may be said, in the case of Release. In regard to this, the author says:

"Trayasya Api," that is, of Release also, "Driṣṭva-tvāt," that is, through demonstration by Śruti and inference, (there is) successfuless; but not the "two," that is, deep sleep and trance (only are successful). Since they are with seed, their successfuless is secondary or relative, --118.

**Vedāntin Mahādeva:** Just as deep sleep is proved by perception, or just as trance is proved by the Veda, so also is Release proved by the Śāstra or Scripture. Among them, again, the "two," deep sleep and trance, are not absolutely the ends of Puruṣa, since they are with seed, but Release alone is, since it is seedless. Such is the import.

**Bhāṣya:** But then, trance and deep sleep are "visible," but what proof is there, it may be asked, of Release? This insinuation of the heretics the author averts.

Since Release also is "seen," that is, inferred by the example of trance and deep sleep, there are not the "two," that is, deep sleep and trance, only, but Release also is. Such is the meaning.

And the inference is in this way: The abandonment of the condition of Brahman which exists during deep sleep, etc., takes place through the fault such as Desire and the like, inhering in the Chitta or mind. If this fault be annihilated by Knowledge, then a condition, quite similar to deep sleep, etc., becomes permanent. It is the very same that is Release. --118.

Vāsanā is powerless during Deep Sleep.

**Bhāṣya**

Vāsanā, by Vāsanā or the impression of past experiences.

An-arthā-khyāpanam, non-informing or non-manifestation of objects. This is

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* For "An-arthā-khyāpanam," Vijñāna clearly read "Naśvārtha-khyāpanama" Vide p. 181. Nagoda follows Vijñāna in this reading. F. E. Hall's doubt on this point ought not to have prevailed. It is equally clear, however, that Aniruddha read "An-arthā-khyāpanama," and hinted, in his Vṛtti, at the plain, natural meaning of the term, e.g., "manifestation of 'evil' (anartha) or wrong objects," which is specifically set forth in the Sāṁkṣepa-Śrītā-Pātra of Vedāntin Mahādeva, who herein follows Aniruddha. Quite evidently, therefore, the two great commentators had different readings of the same original Aphorism before them. What that original reading was, is now difficult to ascertain. Aniruddha being the older of the two, his reading might be preferred. Secondly, while to derive Vijñāna's meaning from Aniruddha's reading, requires a little imagination only, it is impossible to derive Aniruddha's meaning from Vijñāna's reading. For these reasons, we have adopted the reading "An-arthā-khyāpanam."
According to Vijñāna. From Aniruddha’s view of the sense of the aphorism, the phrase means manifestation or cognition of anartha or evils or wrong things or things which cause desire, aversion, etc. दोष-योगे, while there is conjunction of fault (V.) ; in respect of the conjunction, i.e., production, of faults (A.) किम् Api, even; also न न not. विभिन्न निमित्तस्यa, of the instrumental cause. वाज्यायणम् निर्देह बाध्यक्त्वम्, the being the impeder of the principal cause (V.); the being the impeder in the case of Pradhāna (A).

119. Even in the production of faults, the manifestation of wrong objects by Vāsanā (is the cause); (therefore, desire, etc., are) not (the sole causes of Bondage); the instrumental or efficient cause (of these, i.e., Vāsanā, is) the impeder (of Release) in the case of Pradhāna.—Aniruddha.

Likewise, during the conjunction of the fault (in the shape of sleep), there does not take place the manifestation of (its own) objects by Vāsanā; (for), the instrumental cause does not obstruct the principal.—Vijñāna.—446.

Vṛtti.—Since Desire, etc., are the cause of Bondage, what need, it may be asked, of Vāsanā? Hence the author says:

It should not be asserted that Bondage takes place through the “fault” alone. Manifestation of wrong objects by Vāsanā must be made. It should be asserted that the instrumental or efficient cause of the faults themselves, (which is Vāsanā), is the impeder of the release of Pradhāna. And Vāsanā, (therefore), is the primary or chief thing—119.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—“Doṣa-yoge api,” even in the conjunction of Desire, etc., “anartha-khyāpanam,” the cognition or knowledge of beauty and non-beauty (which arises), “Vāsanayā,” by means of Vāsanā alone,—(is) the cause,—such is the complement (of the aphorism). Hence it does not belong to Desire, etc., alone to be the cause of Bondage; but “nimittasya,” also of the instrumental cause of Desire, etc., that is, of Vāsanā, is “pradhāne-bādhaka-tvam,” the characteristic of being the impeder of Release. Therefore, effort should be made only in respect of the uprooting of Vāsanā. Such is the import.

Bhāṣya:—But then, may say our opponent, even notwithstanding the existence of the seed called Vāsanā, let there be not, during trance, a modification (of Bodhi) in the shape of an object, on account of the deadening of Vāsanā by Dispassion and the like; but, since Vāsanā prevails in a person in deep sleep, there certainly will be cognition of object:
hence the condition of being Brahman or Brahman-hood during deep sleep is not reasonable (to assert). In regard to this, the author says:

As when there is Dispassion, so also when there is the conjunction of the fault of sleep, there does not take place "Sva-artha-khyāpanam," the reminding of its own object, by Vāsanā; inasmuch as it is not possible, "nimittasya," for the mental impression (of past experiences), holding, as it does, a secondary place, to be the counteractive of the more potent fault of sleep. Such is the meaning. For it is precisely the more potent fault that makes Vāsanā weak, that is, incompetent to produce its own effect. Such is the import.—119.

A Defence of Release during Life.

एक: संस्कार: क्रियानिर्वर्तिको न तु प्रतिक्रिया
संस्कारंनेत्रि कषुकल्पनासम्बन्धे: || ९ || १२० ||

यस्य: Ekāḥ, one single. समस्त: Samskāraḥ, impression; Samskāra. Kriyā-nirvartakāḥ, complete performer of action. न: Na, not. १: १, but. निष्क्रिय: Pratikriyam, one for each action. समस्तक्रियांक: Samskāra-bhedāḥ, differences of Samskāra. कषु: कषु: Bahu-kalpanā-prasaktāḥ, owing to supposition of too many being entailed.

120. A single Samskāra is sufficient to carry action to the end; but there are not different Samskāras, one for each action; as, (else), a supposition of too many will be entailed.—447.

Vṛtti:—In the case of the shooting of an arrow or the like, action (or motion) takes place through Samskāra or impression called Vega or momentum, and, by means of action (is produced) Samskāra: hence, it may be said, there are more than one Samskāras. * This the author denies.

In the case of there being a single Samskāra, it is unreasonable to suppose that the arrow will never fall down. While, in the case of transformation, through the transformation of the very single Samskāra, as becoming gradually less and less, (there will be) the falling down (of the arrow). Hence, there would be redundancy in the supposition of a multiplicity of Samskāras, one to each instant of motion of the arrow)—120.

Bhadra:—It was clearly stated, in the Third Book (vide aphorism III 83, page 357), that the retention of the Body is, in the case of the Jivan-Mukta, through the least trace of Samskāra. In regard to that there is this objection: Experience is (to take place), in the case of the Jivan-Mukta (the person who is released during life), just as it is in the
case of ourselves and others like us (who are not released during life), constantly in respect even of one and the same object. And this is unaccountable; because, just after producing the first (instant of) experience, the previous Sāṃskāra is destroyed, and because a new Sāṃskāra is not produced by reason of the obstruction caused by knowledge, just as is the case with Karma or Merit and Demerit. To this, the author replies:

The Sāṃskāra whereby is commenced the experience of the Body of a Deva or the like,—that very single Sāṃskāra is the completer of the experience of the Prārabdha (or Karma which has begun to yield fruits) to be accomplished in that Body; and that (Sāṃskāra) is, exactly like action, destructible by the completion of Experience; “but not one for each action,” that is, one for each individual instant of Experience, there is not a multiplicity of Sāṃskāras; as (in that case) redundancy in the form of the supposition of too many individual Sāṃskāras would be entailed. Such is the meaning.

Likewise, also, in the case of the whirling of the potter’s wheel, the Sāṃskāra called Vega or Momentum, is to be regarded as being one only,—continuing till the completion of the whirling.—120.

The Vegetable Kingdom also is a Field of Experience.

न बालबुद्धिनियमो द्रव्यमलतोषिष्वनत्वदित्यवीरूपा
वीनामितोभोक्तोगायतनलं दुर्ग्रेवत् ॥ ॥ १२१ ॥

न, not. बाल-bālubuddhi-niyamah, limitation or restriction to external cognition. द्रव्यमलतोषिष्वनत्वदित्यवीरूपा, Vṛkṣa-gulma-latā-osadhī-vanaspati-tripi-vrūṭ-adhānām, trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees with invisible flowers, grasses, creepers, etc. दुर्घ्रेवत्, also. बालबुद्धि Bāłu-buddhi, being the site of the Experincier and of Experience. पुर्ववत् Pūrva-vat, just as in the former case.

121. (There is) no restriction (of the “Body” or the House of Experience) to external cognition: it belongs also to trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees with invisible flowers, grasses, creepers, etc., (in which consciousness is internal), to be the site of the Expericner and of Experience,—just as in the former case (V. 114).—448.

* Aniruddha and Vedāntin Mahādeva split the aphorism into two and interpret them quite in a different way.
Vṛtti:—The object (of cognition) is one (only), it may be said, because the cognition (thereof) is a single one, inasmuch as there is no distinction in the (individual) intuition that "it is existent," "it is existent." Hence the author says:

As the intuition that "it is existent," is unobstructed, so also is the intuition that "it is a water-pot" or that "it is a piece of cloth," or the like. The intuition, again, that "it is existent," has the genus (of existence) for its object. Therefore, in the case of external cognition, there is no such rule as that it is of one and of one only.—121.

The Body of the Jīva or Incarnate Puruṣa consists of five Elements; originated from how many Elements, it may be asked, is the immobile? To this, the author replies:

"Just as in the former case": That is, since it is the site of Experience, it is formed of five Elements.

And its being the site of Experience is due to some particular action appertaining to another birth, because there is the Sruti:


tīlayaṃ pūbāṇaḥ śaśādabhiṣaṭādina

It is the Jīvātmans or Incarnate Purugas that take to the immobile as their support.—122.

Bhāṣya:—It has been declared (in V. 114.) that there exists vegetable Body. The author repels the objection of the heretics that, owing to the absence of external cognition in that, there does not exist the characteristic of being a Body.

There is no such rule or restriction that that only should be a Body, in which there is external cognition; but it is to be considered that "to be the site of the Experiencer and of Experience," that is, to be a Body, belongs also to trees, etc., in which there is internal consciousness (or an under-current of consciousness without any external manifestation); because, "just as in the former case," that is, precisely like what putrescence has been mentioned before (in V. 114, as taking place) in the Body of man, etc., in the absence of the superintendence of the Experiencer, do withering, etc., take place in the Body of the tree, etc. Such is the meaning.

And thus, there are such Srutis as:

tt layaṃ pūbāṇaḥ śaśādabhiṣaṭādina

What single branch of it the Jīva abandons, the same withers thereafter.—Bhāṣyapaddhati, VI. xi. 1.

Even if the portion, "(There is) no restriction (of the Body) to external cognition," constitute a separate aphorism, the two aphorisms,
after being made into one, should be explained just in the above name, and not otherwise; but it should be understood that the division of the aphorism 'into two as done, e. g., by Aniruddha) is due to the apprehension of the aphorism being otherwise too long.—121.

The evidence of Smṛiti on the point.

स्मृतेश्च || ४ । १२२ ||

तथा: Smritēḥ, from the Smṛiti or that class of literature which embodies memories or recollections of by-gone days. च स्मृतिः, and, also.

122. From Smṛiti also (the reality of the vegetable Body is established).—449.

Vṛtti.—In regard to this there exists, says the author, (the evidence of) the Smṛiti also.

It is clear.

And to this effect there are:

प्रभुवाणित्वा किम श्रावितं न प्रयत्नति ||

वमतानं भाजते बुधाः पुरुषकारणेवः ||

The Brāhmaṇa who, having been saluted, does not give blessing in return, is born in a burning ground, as a tree occupied by vultures and kites.

यास्त्रैः कर्मेभिप्रयति शाश्रयता नर ||

वासिकः पृथिविभारतं मानसस्वर्गशास्त्रताम ||

By reason of faults of actions, produced by means of the body, man goes into immobile existence; (by reason of those, produced) by means of speech, into existence as a bird or a beast; and (by reason of those produced) by means of the mind, into the life of the lowest beings.—123.

Bhāṣya:—Also from the Smṛitis such as किंतु: (the second verse just now cited by Aniruddha), is established that the characteristic of being the site of the Experiencer and of Experience exists in trees, etc. Such is the meaning.—122.

Vegetables are not Moral Agents.

न वेदानात्र: कर्माविशिष्टविः वेदिष्वयपूर्वते: || ४ । १२३ ||

न: Na, not. देशस्त: Deha-mātra-tah, through merely being a Body. कर्माविशिष्टः karma-adhikārī-tvam, competency to perform meritorious acts (Aniruddha); Susceptibility to the production of Merit and Demerit. (Vijñāna) वैदिकस्त: Vaidiśya-sūtram, because of the śruti declaring the possession of a distinction or qualification.

123. Not through the mere Body is there competency to perform meritorious acts (Aniruddha), or susceptibility (to the production) of Merit and Demerit (Vijñāna), because the
Sruti declares (the necessity of) a special qualification (for this).—450.

Vṛiti:—If trees, etc., be Bodies, then, one may say, they will have competency to the performance of meritorious acts. Hence the author says:

Even the Bodies of Jivas or Incarnate Puruṣas, such as those of Chāṇḍālas (an untouchable class), etc., are not fit for the performance of meritorious acts; what to say, then, of the immobiles? Because competency for the performance of meritorious acts belongs to a Body specially qualified.—124.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—He who is rich, physically able, learned and unsubdued, is the competent person. Such is the import.

Bhāṣya:—But then, in the case also of trees, etc., by reason of their being conscious, there would be, one may say, the possibility of the production of Merit and Demerit. To this, the author replies:

Not by means of a Body merely does fitness for the production of Merit and Demerit appertain to the Jiva. Why? “Vaisistya-Sruteḥ”; because it is heard that competency arises only by means of being qualified as the Body of a Brāhmaṇa, or the like. Such is the meaning.—123.

Bodies are of three principal kinds.

श्रीमा प्रयाणां व्यवस्था कर्मवेद्वृष्टंहोमेहोमयेद्वित्ति: || १२४ ||

विषय Tridhā, threefold. Trayāṅg, of the three classes, good, middling and sluggish, and, therefore, of all creatures. Vyavastha, allotment; distribution. किंकर्म-पुनात्मक: Karma-deha-upabhoga-deha-ubhaya-dehaḥ, the body of Karma or Merit, the body of Bhoga or Experience, and the Body of both Karma and Bhoga.

124. Of three (classes of living beings there is) a threefold distribution (of Bodies; viz.,) the Karmic Body, the Bhologic Body, and the Dual Body.—451.

Vṛiti:—The author states the division of Bodies.

The Karmic Body is of the dispassionate, because the performance of act, by them, is by means of, or along with, the renunciation of the fruits. The Bhologic Body is of the beasts, and the like. The Karmic-cum-Bhologic Body is of those competent persons who are also Experiencers. —125.

Bhāṣya:—Showing that fitness for (the acquisition of) Merit and Demerit arises only by means of the kind of the Body, the author declares that there are three kinds of Bodies.
"Of the three," the good, the middling, and the sluggish, that is to say, of all living beings, there is a threefold division of Bodies: Karmic Body, Bhogic Body, and Dual Body. Such is the meaning. Among them, Karmic Body is of the great sages; Bhogic Body is of Indra and others as well as of the immobiles, etc.; Dual Body is of the royal sages.

Here the threefold division is (not exhaustive, but made) by reason of these three being the principal (kinds of Body); for, otherwise, it would consequently belong to all, without exception, to be, or to have, the Bhogic Body.—124.

A Fourth kind of Body.

न किचिद्वप्रवशाय च: || २ ।१२४ ||

Na, not. किचिद् Kim chit, any one. च Api, even. अनुवायिनः Anuvāyinaḥ, of one who is dispassionate.

125. Not any one whatever (of these) is that of the Yogins (Aniruddha), or the dispassionate (Viññāna).—452.

Vṛtī:—The author mentions a fourth (Body) which is not competent for meritorious acts.

Says the lexicon Śāsvata:

विवाद्वपायं ह्वेदे प्रवासालक्षणोऽपैसः ||

One should know the word, Anuvāya, in the sense of aversion, and in those of repentance and attachment.

"Anuvāyinaḥ," in the case of the Yogin, there is no karma, meritorious act whatever, because he is above all moral obligation.—126.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—"Anuvāyaḥ" means the end or termination of pārabdha karma, that is, Merit and Demerit which had commenced to work out their effects. ("Anuvāyinaḥ", therefore,) means, of the person in whom there is Anuvāya, that is, of the wise or knowing Puruṣa. Such is the meaning. Nothing whatever—"karma" is the complement. A knowing Puruṣa, after experiencing the remnant of his Prārabdha, remains no longer liable for the observance of injunctions and prohibitions.

Bhāṣya:—Yet a fourth Body, the author mentions.

According to the saying that "One should know the word, Anuvāya, in the sense of aversion and in those of repentance and attachment", Anuvāya here means dispassion. The Body of the dispassionate is, among these three, none whatever, that is, is different from these three. Such is the meaning; as, e.g., were those of Dattātreya, Jāja Bharata, and the like; because they had Bodies constituted principally by knowledge alone.—125.
Eternity of Buddhi refuted.

126. Buddhi, etc., are not eternal, even (when they exist) in a particular site (as is alleged),—just as is the case with fire.—453.

Vṛitti:—The author refutes the theory of eternal Buddhi.

In the case of a violation or transgression of the essential nature of Vyāpti or logical pervasion (which the theory of eternal Buddhi really implies), there would be uncertainty and insecurity everywhere. So that, in the case of a particular site, absence of heat would belong to fire produced from the sandal wood.—127.

Bhāṣya:—For the purpose of the establishment of the non-existence of Īsvara (i.e., of an eternal Īsvara), which was declared before, the author disproves the eternality of knowledge, desire, act, etc., which is admitted by others (as existing in the case of Īsvara).

Here the word, Buddhi, denotes the modification called ascertainment or certainty (and not the Principle called Mahat or Buddhi). So that, eternity does not exist in the case of knowledge, desire, act, etc., even where there is a particular site of them, i.e., even when they arise in that particular evolution of the Principle of Buddhi which is admitted by others as the Upādhi or external investment of Īsvara; because, by the example of the Buddhi of ourselves and the like, there is inference of the non-eternity of knowledge, desire, act, etc., in all cases without exception; just as, by the example of ordinary or human fire, there is inference of the non-eternity of the covering or empyrean fire also. Such is the meaning.—126.

Above continued.

Prāṇyātisādhaḥ || ४ || १२७ ||

Vṛitti:—The author points out another defect.
Because of the non-existence of Īśvara; and because of the absence of attribute in the Self; because of the attributes of Prakṛti undergoing transformation; because of the non-externality of Mahat and the rest.

Nor can the attributes, residing in non-eternal sites, properly be eternal.

Therefore there exists no site or place of inheritance for an eternal Buddhi.—128.

Bhāṣya:—Let alone altogether the eternality of knowledge, desire, etc.; the (alleged) site thereof, namely, the Upādhi or external investment of Īśvara does not itself exist, in consequence of the non-existence of Īśvara. This the author says:

It is easy.—127.

Defence of Yogic Perfections.

But Yogic perfections also, like the success of drugs, etc., are not to be repudiated.—455.

Vṛtti:—Success through the power or potency of gems, charms, drugs, and penance is seen, but the Yogic perfections are not seen, one may say. In regard to this, the author says:

(Yogic perfections, such as the power of attenuation, the building up of bodies, entering into another’s body, etc., are seen. And these cannot arise from charms, etc., which yield minor perfections, depend upon Yoga alone. Hence they are not to be ignored.—129.

Bhāṣya:—But then, such being the case, how can it even possibly be supposed, one may ask, that omniscience, etc., adequate to the creation of the world, etc., should be producible (in the course of progress towards Release, instead of being present from before the creation of the world, i.e., being eternal), when such lordliness or Īśvara-like powers are not seen, in the human world, to arise by means of penance, etc.? To this, the author replies:

By the example of the success or power of drugs, etc., perfections such as attenuation, etc., produced through Yoga, and adapted to the work of creation, etc., are also established. Such is the meaning.—123.
Consciousness is not a product of the Elements.

129. Because it is not found in each of them separately, therefore, Consciousness does not belong to the Elements, even in their combined state, even in their combined state.—456.

Vṛtti:—Even though there is non-observation of consciousness in the Elements separately, they, one may say, while combined, that is to say, arrived at the condition of a Body, may invest it with consciousness. In regard to this, the author says:

Greater power is produced through the combination of those in which power, in a small measure, exists; as, for example, power to bend down an elephant is seen to arise through the combination of fibres possessing very little power each. But, likewise, consciousness is not seen in the Elements separately, whereby, on their combination, there might be the development of consciousness.

(Moreover), since there is no distinction in respect of the combined-ness of the Elements (between a dead and a living body), the implication of the theory of Elemental consciousness) would be the existence of consciousness in a dead body also (which is contrary to fact).

Therefore, what is conscious, is indeed something different (from the Elements).

The subject, although mentioned before, is called back to mind (by the present aphorism), because it was intercepted by topics and sub-topics; therefore, there is no tautology.

The repetition of “in their combined state” is to indicate the close of the Book.—130.

Here ends the Fifth Book, of the Demolition of Counter-Theories, in the Vṛtti to the Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram of Kapila.

Bhāṣya:—The author refutes him who asserts that consciousness arises from the Elements; because it is hostile to (the proof of) the existence of Puruṣa.

Consciousness does not exist in the five Elements, even in their combined state; because, during their disjunction or state of separation
in space, consciousness is not seen in them severally. Such is the meaning.

And, in the Third Book, this was stated under the name of the author's own tenet, while, here, it is stated for the sake of refutation of an opponent's view. Hence the repetition does not amount to a fault.

The repetition (of "even in their combined state") marks the close of the Book.—129.

By refuting, in the Fifth Book, those misleading disputants who declare things which are opposed to the author's own tenets, the author's own tenets have been firmly established.

_Here ends the Fifth Book, of the Demolition of Counter-Theories, in the Commentary, composed by Vijñāna Bhikṣu, on the Sāṃkhya-Pravachanam of Kapila._
BOOK VI.

OF THE RECAPITULATION OF TEACHINGS.

INTRODUCTION.

Vṛitti:—All the tenets of the Śāstra having been declared, with a view to state, by recapitulating, the very same tenets, according to the maxim of the Tantra or System, is made the origination of the Sixth Book, after the demolition of Counter-Theories.

Bhāṣya:—Having enunciated, by means of the (first) four Books, all the matter of the Śāstra, and having, in the Fifth Book, established it by the refutation of Counter-Theories, now the author brings the Śāstra to a close, by recapitulating, by means of the Sixth Book, the very same matter of the Śāstra which forms its essence. For, where a further elaboration, called Tantra or summary, of the matters, previously discussed, is made, an undoubted, unerring, and more solid knowledge is produced in the minds of the disciples. Hence, according to the maxim of fixing a peg into the ground (by means of repeated strokes on the head), and also because of the bringing forward of arguments, etc., not previously mentioned, the repetition does not here amount to a fault.

The Existence of the Self.

prasādaksya nātītāsādhanaśvāt (I. 19)

asti, exista. atma, the Self. nātītāsādhanaśvāt, because of the non-existence of any means of proving its non-existence.

1. The Self exists, since there is nothing to prove that it exists not.—457.

Vṛitti:—It is clear. In regard to the Self in general (i.e., in its generic aspect), there is no conflict of opinion.—1.

Bhāṣya:—By reason of there being manifestation to consciousness in such form as "I think," the existence of Puruṣa is, indeed, established generically, because there exists no evidence to countervail this. Therefore, merely the discrimination thereof (from other things gathering about him) has to be made. Such is the meaning.—1.
Marks of Discrimination: (a) Difference of Self and Body, etc.

वेदाभ्यस्तितिरिक्तोऽवैचित्र्यात् ॥ ६ ॥

वेदाभ्यस्तितिः: Deha-ādi-vyatiriktab; absolutely different from the Body, etc.
सु असु, तदायोऽवैचित्र्यात्; on account of diversity.

2. This (the Self) is absolutely different from the Body, etc., because of diversity. — 458.

Vritti: The author gives a description (of the Self) in particular.

In the (opposite) theory of the non-difference (of the Self) from the Body, would be the implication of there being a manifoldness of Selves (in one and the same Body) according to the differences of the Bodies of childhood, boyhood, youth and old age; (and, further,) since there takes place the destruction of the Body, when the Body is dead, there can be no accounting for of the diversity of another birth.

Says the Sruti also:

चपास्तिपादेः जगन्नत प्रविष्टः
पवित्रवचनानुसः स मुखेयायः
स च वेदिः सत्यं न हि तत्स तेषा
तमांशुरस्य दुर्लभं पुरावस्य ॥

Having no hand and leg, he goes and grasps; having no eye, he sees; having no ear, he hears; he knows all, verily there is no knower of him; — him they call the first-born Purusa of old. — Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, III. 19. — 2.

Bhāṣya: — In respect to that Discrimination, the author mentions two proofs by means of two aphorisms.

"Asu," the Self, the Seer, is absolutely different from (all other things) beginning with the Body and ending with Prakriti; "Vaichitryāt," on account of the differences of characters such as to undergo transformation, not to undergo transformation, and so forth. Such is the meaning.

Prakriti and all the rest are, 'to be sure, established, by means of Perception, Inference and Testimony, just as undergoing transformation; while, in the case of Purusa, the characteristic of not undergoing transformation is inferred through his ever knowing the object (of his cognition). For, thus, just as Rūpa or Colour alone is the object of the Eye, and not Taste, etc., even though they be, equally (with colour), in close proximity to it, similarly it is the modification of his own Buddhi that alone is the object (of cognition) of Purusa, and not anything else, even though it be equally proximate; — this is established through the force of actual results.
It is only by having risen into the modification of Buddhi that other things become the object of Experience to Purusa,—and not through themselves, since, in that case, the manifestation of all things, at all times, would be entailed.

And these modifications of Buddhi never lie without being cognised. For, on the admission of the uncogised existence of knowledge, desire, pleasure, etc., there would be, in respect of them also, as in respect of a water-pot, etc., room for doubt, etc., by such forms as "Whether I think or not," "Whether I feel pleasure or not," etc.

Hence, from the fact that they are always cognised, it is obtained that the Seer of them, the intelligent principle, is not liable to transformation; because, were the intelligent principle liable to transformation, then, by reason of its transformation into blindness, whenever it may occur, even actually existent modifications of Buddhi would not, in consequence, be seen.

Similarly, it should be understood to be the case also with the whole lot of differences in characteristics (between Purusa and the rest), previously mentioned, such as to exist for the sake of another and not to exist for the sake of another, etc.—2.

(h) Use of the possessive case.

3. Also because of reference by the sixth case.—450.

Vritti:—The author mentions another reason.

"My body,"—Such cognition there is, and the sixth or possessive case is heard (to be used) where there is a difference.

If it be said that there is co-extensiveness or identity of denotation (of the Body with the Self), e.g., "I am fat"; (we reply), No; for, since Experience takes place through the Body, thereby is occasioned this secondary or derivative intuition.—3.

Bheda:—Also because of reference in the sixth or possessive case, made by the learned, such as, e.g., "This is my Body," "This is my Buddhi," etc, the Self is different from the Body, etc.; because, were there absolute non-difference (between them), the use of the sixth case would not be justified. Such is the meaning.
So has it been declared in the Viṣṇu-Puṇḍara:

कं किमतिलकम् किं तु किरस्तवः तत्वात्मम्।
किं तु पाब्धविंश्च लं ते तैत्तिर्य महीस्ते॥
समासत्वकेर्ज्ञपरं पुष्पमयुः व्यवविवः॥
कोशमित्रस्य निपुनः मूल्या विनित्य वाचवः॥

Are you this head, or is the head yours; so too the abdomen? Are these legs, etc., you, or are they, O Lord of the Earth, yours?

You are situated, being separate from all the limbs (of your Body). "Who am I?"—being skilful in this, reflect, O Ruler of the Earth.—Viṣṇu Pūrṇa, II. xiii. 98–99.

Neither should it be said that there is also such usage of the learned as, e.g., "I am fat," etc.; because, since it is contradicted or opposed by the Śruti, it is to be accounted for just as being a secondary use, (a case of transference of epithet),—just like "My Self is Bhadra Sena."—3.

An alternative explanation rejected.

न शिलापुत्रवस्त्रिमिश्रवक्नवापात् || ५ ५ ३ ॥

Na, not. शिलापुत्रः Śilā-putra-vat, as in the case of the pestle. वस्त्रिमिश्रवक्नः Dharmi-grāham-kāna-balāhāt, because of opposition by the evidence cognisant of the specific thing.

4. (The use in question of the sixth case is) not as in the case of the pestle, because of opposition by the evidence cognisant of the specific thing. —460.

Vṛtti:—Because we hear the sixth case used in the case of non-difference also, e.g., "The body of the pestle," therefore, one may say, (it is used here not in the sense of difference. In regard to this, the author says:

No; in that case (i.e., of the pestle), because there is intuition of non-difference by the very means of Perception, (the differentiating sense of the sixth case is obstructed; hence the use (of the sixth case) is secondary. In the case in question, (of "My Body"), since the primary use is possible, (as there is no obstruction), there is no (room for the supposition of the) secondary use. —4.

Bhāṣya:—But then, one may say, let this declaration also (of the Self by the sixth case) be just like the declarations such as "The consciousness of Purusha," "The head of Rāhu," "The body of the pestle," etc., (where the possessive denotes identity instead of difference). To this, the author replies:

This declaration by the sixth case cannot be just like the declarations, e.g., "The body of the pestle," etc. In the case of the pestle, etc., since
there is obstruction (to the existence of difference) by means of the evidence cognisant of the thing, (the use of the sixth case) is a mere figure of speech. But in the case of ‘My body,’ no obstruction by such evidence exists, because it is only of the Body’s being the Self that there is obstruction by means of the evidences of the Śruti and the like. Such is the meaning.

What prohibition, on the other hand, there is, in the Śāstras, of the sense of My-ness, that, by reason of the impermanence of ownership, has reference to its unreality by being a mere creation of speech. Such is the import.

“The consciousness of Puruṣa,”—here also there is obstruction by the evidence cognisant of the thing: for fear of a regressus ad infinitum as well as for the sake of simplicity, when the Self is established as being different from the Body, etc., there is, at the bottom, the cognition of its being essentially of the form of consciousness.—4.

Puruṣa’s Aim how fulfilled.

अत्यन्तदुःखनिरित्तिता कृतक्रियता || 6 ||

Atyanta-duḥkha-nirṛittyā, by the absolute cessation of pain.

Kṛita-kṛitya-tā, fulfilment of the end.

5. By the absolute cessation of pain, is the fulfilment of the end.—461.

Vṛtti:—Through excess of pleasure, one may say, there is the fulfilment of the end. Hence the author says:

Because excess of pleasure also is liable to waste, there can be no fulfilment of the end thereby. ‘But absolute cessation of pain is not so (liable to waste), because there is no recurrence of pain after it.—5.

Bhāṣya:—Having ascertained Puruṣa as being different from the Body, etc., the author ascertains his Release.

It is easy.—5.

Pain is more intense than Pleasure.

यथा दुःखतः केवलः पुरुषस्य न तथा सुखाविज्ञापः || 615111||

Yathā, as. दुःखतः, Dubhatta, from, i.e., towards pain. न, Na, not. यथा Tathā, so. सुखतः, Sukkhā, for pleasure. अविज्ञापः, Abhīṣṭā, desire.

6. There is not so much desire from pleasure as there is annoyance from pain.—462.
Vṛtti: — Since the absence of pleasure is also present, therefore, one may say, that (i.e., entire cessation of pain) cannot be the highest end of Puruṣa. In regard to this, the author says:

Because of the unavoidable or necessary presence of pain in pleasure. If, there being pleasure, pain must necessarily take place, who will desire for pleasure? Therefore, because of the abundance of pain, it is the cessation of pain that alone is the highest end of Puruṣa.—6.

Bhāṣya: — But then, our opponent may contend, by reason of there being an equality of gain and loss, through the cessation of pleasure also by means of the cessation of pain, that (i.e., cessation of pain) cannot be the end of Puruṣa (as declared above). To this, the author replies:

The two-fifths case-endings (in “Dukhāt” and “Sukhāt”) have been used in the sense of the hetu or cause in the shape of the subject matter. And “Kleśāḥ” or annoyance here means aversion.

As aversion towards pain is stronger, not so stronger is desire for pleasure; on the contrary, by comparison with that (i.e., aversion), it is weak. Such is the meaning.

So that, even by obstructing the desire for pleasure, aversion towards pain generates will only in respect to the cessation of pain: hence there is not a case here of the equality of gain and loss.

So has it been said:

श्रव्येत्यमज्ञमेवलेन सादु—
मोक्षायते उपवसस्वामीतयेत्येत

For fear of a refusal of the request, a good man employs an intermediary, even in the case of a cherished object. —Kumāra-Sambhavam, I. 58.

What striving, on the other hand, (there is seen) for minor pleasures, even after seeing the pain of hell, etc., that is only due to the influence of passion, etc.—6.

Rareness of Pleasure.

कुः भारी कोः पि सुन्तलि || ६ १ ३ ||

कु: Kutra, somewhere. को: Api, may be. क: Kah, some one. को: Api, may be. सु: Sukhi, happy. ति: iti, because.

7. For, only some one, somewhere may be happy.—483.

Vṛtti: —The author tells us that pleasure is the thing to be avoided.

He effect and see for yourself.—7.

Bhāṣya: — Because, moreover, pain is abundant, in comparison with pleasure, it is the cessation of pain alone that is the end of Puruṣa, says the author.
Among the infinity of grasses, trees, beasts, birds, men, etc., only few, such as man, Deva, etc., become happy. Such is the meaning.

The word, Iti, is in the sense of Hetu or reason.—7.

All Pleasure is alloyed with Pain.

\[ \text{तत्} \text{, तत्, त; तत्, तत्,} \text{ the very rare pleasure. अष्टि, अष्टि,} \]

\\( \text{धुङ्खपते निन्दितपते विवेचनकः} \)

\\( \text{क्रमेय} \text{, मकर,} \text{मकर, mixed or alloyed with pain. किं हिते, hence.} \)

\\( \text{धुङ्खपाके, in the de of pain. जिसप्रे निन्दितपते, throw. विवेचनकः Vivechakal, those who can discriminate.} \)

8. Even that is alloyed with pain: wherefore the discriminating throw it to the side of pain.—464.

Vritti:—But, evident to the senses is, indeed, may say one, the characteristic of the wife and the like to be the cause of pleasure. In regard to this the author says:

Verily one's own feeling itself is proof that there is pain in the acquisition of garlands and the like as well as in their waste, etc.—8.

Bhāṣya:—Even that pleasure which may occur at some time to some one, is, just like the food which is mixed with honey and poison, fit to be rejected by those who can discriminate,—says the author.

"Tat api", that is, even the pleasure mentioned in the preceding aphorism, is mixed with pain: hence those who discriminate between pleasure and pain, throw it to the side of pain. Such is the meaning.

So has it been declared by the Yoga Sūtram:

\[ \text{परिवारम् परस्परसा} \text{वष्णू} \text{वष्णू} \text{विवेचितां} \]

By reason of the pains due to the consequences (following from the enjoyment of pleasure), to warmth (in the enjoyment of pleasure which gives rise, at the same time, to aversion to whatever interferes with such enjoyment), and to the impressions (created by the enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, which lead to future suffering), and, on account of the mutual contradiction of the modifications of the Guṇas, all, indeed, is pain to the discriminating.—Yoga Sūtram, II. 15.

And also in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (VI. v. 55):

\[ \text{सर्वच्च मृतिकार् पुनः पस्तः नैशेष जापसे} \]

\[ \text{सर्वेष धुङ्खपुण्यकार्य धीरतामुपन्निति} \]

Whatever thing, O Matranga, grows to be the cause of pleasure to man, the very same comes to be the seed of the tree of pain.—8.
An Objection Answered.

9. If it be said that, owing to the absence of pleasure (in it), cessation of pain is not the end of Purusa, (we reply) No, because of the two-foldness of the end of Purusa).—465.

Vṛitti:—Pleasure alone is the highest end of Purusa, say some, and not non-existence (i.e., of pain.) In regard to this, the author says:

Of the passionate, is pleasure, and of the dispassionate, is the non-existence of pain, (the end of volition).—9.

Bhāṣya:—The author discards the opinion that the mere cessation of pain is not the end of Purusa, but (that it is this) tinctured with pleasure.

If it be said that, owing to the absence of the acquisition of pleasure, the absence of pain, which is called Release, is not the end of Purusa; we reply that this is not so; "Dvai-vidhyāt"; that is, because of the double variety of the end of Purusa, according as it is pleasure and the absence of pain. Such is the meaning. For, quite a distinct desire, viz., "May I be happy," or "May I not be miserable," is seen amongst men.—9.

A Doubt Raised.

10. It belongs to the Self to be devoid of qualities, because there is the Sruti that it is free from association, etc.—466.

Vṛitti:—Release, according to some, consists in the uprooting of particular qualities. In regard to this, the author says:

Through the denial of particular qualities, there is admission of general qualities. So that there will be contradiction of the Sruti about (the Self's) being free from association, etc.—10.

Bhāṣya:—The author apprehends (an objection.)

But then, of the Self, the characteristic of being devoid of qualities, that is, the characteristic of being bereft of all qualities whatever, such as pleasure, pain, delusion, etc., is indeed eternally established; because
Here is Śruti of its being free from association, that is, because it is heard that there is absence of conjunction which is the cause of modification, and cause, without that (conjunction), modification called quality, is impossible. Hence the cessation of pain also cannot be the end of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

If (the Sāṃkhya say) that modification may take place, of itself, without association, we (the objectors) reply that it cannot:

वाधाय नामचै वन्दे नामा हे दात वामसस।
तत्तुयमत्वं तत्तुयमविवकारार्य नै यत:॥
संर्वं स्वयं विनियुक्तं नेत्रो नेत्रोपत्तः॥
स्यां मृत्तिकावरेय पुनःपुष्पक्षुत।॥

Fire is not for the burning of fire, nor is water for the wetting of water, because the same respective thing is not verily for the modification of that thing. In the case, moreover, of its (the Self’s) being transformable of itself, Release cannot certainly be possible: by means of the modification into delusion of itself, Bondage ever again will be the result.

And the same has been declared in the Kūrma Purāṇa (II. ii. 12):

यथात्मा मृत्तिकावरेय विकारां स्वयम्भवत:॥
न दात सत्य मृत्तिकाविविभार्य।॥

For were the Self, by nature, impure, untransparent, mutable, verily Release would not accrue to it even by hundreds of re-births.—10.

The Doubt Solved.

धर्मविवेकत । तत्त्वशिविवेककार ॥ ७ । ११ ॥

सेवने Para-dharma-tve, being the property of another. अधि Api, even, though. अतिक्षप: Tat-siddhiḥ, proof or knowledge thereof. अववेकन् Avivekāt, through Non-discrimination.

11. Though it (Pleasure, etc.) be the property of another, (i.e., Buddhi), the (supposed) existence thereof (in Puruṣa) is due to Non-discrimination.—467.

Vṛtti:—But if Puruṣa be free from association, how do you say, may ask our opponent, that through Merit, there is heaven, and that through De-Merit, there is hell? To this, the author replies:

Though they are the attributes of Prakṛti, by means of the falling of the shadow of those attributes, through the non-discrimination of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, the Abhimāna or misconception or conceit arises that the attainment of heaven, etc., is of the Self.—11.

Bhāṣya:—The author solves the doubt.

Though the qualities such as pleasure, pain, etc., are the property of the Chittam, ("Tat-siddhiḥ" :) 'tatra,' that is, in the Self, ‘siddhiḥ,’ that is, existence or resting (of them), by the form of reflection, is
“A-vivekāḥ,” that is, (through Non-discrimination) as the instrumental cause, that is to say, by means of the conjunction of Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

And this has been established in the First Book and also in the aphorism (No. 74) of the Third Book: Non-discrimination is the Nīmitta or efficient cause,—(so that) there is no loss of the “visible.”

So that, since, just like redness in a crystal, there is, in Puruṣa, the existence of pain by the form of reflection, it is the cessation thereof that alone is the end of Puruṣa. Because Bhoga or Experience consists just in the connection of pain entering as a reflection, and because it is just by the form of a reflection that pain is the thing to be avoided.—11.

Non-discrimination is from Eternity.

12. Non-discrimination is beginning-less, since, otherwise, two faults will be entailed.—468.

Vṛitti:—Is Non-discrimination with a beginning, or is it without a beginning? it may be asked. To this, the author replies:

Were Non-discrimination to be with a beginning, then, prior to the arising thereof, there would be Release, and, on the arising thereof, Bondage; thus (there would be) bondage of the released:—this is one fault.

Because of the existence also of the antecedent non-existence of Non-discrimination, futile would be the effort or practical application made for the purpose of the annihilation of Non-discrimination in regard to the accomplishment of Release:—this is the second fault—12.

Bṛddha:—In Puruṣa, bondage with the Guṇas has Non-discrimination for its root; but what does Non-discrimination have for its root?—there being room for such an enquiry, the author says:

Non-discrimination is cognition, which embraces both (Prakṛti and Puruṣa, for example,) as its objects, and which fails to grasp the absence of connection (between them). And this property of the Chittam, which, by the form of a stream, is without a beginning, remains or continues, during Pralaya or Cosmic Dissolution, by the form of Vāsanā or impression or tendency; since, otherwise, if it were with a beginning, two faults
would be entailed. For, in the case of its being with a beginning, since it would be causa sui or produced of itself alone, bondage of the released (Puruṣa) also would be the result; and, in the case of its being producible by Karma, etc., then, since, by reason of its being the cause of Karma, etc., also, one will have to look for another (antecedent) Non-discrimination, the consequence would be infinite regression. Such is the meaning.

And this (beginning-less) Non-discrimination (as described just now), having the form of a modification, looks, by means of the reflection of itself, as though it were a property of Puruṣa; hence it becomes the operative cause of the bondage of Puruṣa, as has been previously stated and as will be declared in the sequel. —12.

But it is not eternal.

न नित्यः स्वात्मवत्त्यायां जुचितक्षितः || ६ || १३ ||

Na, not. नित्यः: Nityaḥ, eternal. स्वात्मवत्त्या: Syāt, will be. जुचितक्षितः: Ātmavat, like the Self. जुचित अयस्त्वा: An-uchchhittih, non-eradication.

13. It cannot be eternal, like the Self; otherwise, (there would be) no eradication (of it). —169.

Vṛttī: —Is Non-discrimination, since it is without a beginning, eternal, or is it non-eternal? it may be asked. To this, the author replies:

Eternal is two-fold: eternal by the form of being immutable, which is the Self, and eternal by the form of undergoing transformation, which is Prakṛiti. Neither of these is Non-discrimination, but, on the contrary, it is verily non-eternal, on account of its destruction. Otherwise, were it eternal, there would be no eradication of it (and consequently, no Release).

“Ātmavat,” “like the Self,” is merely indicative; “like Prakṛiti also,” —it should be observed. —13.

Bhāṣya: —But, if it is without a beginning, then, our opponent may say, it will be eternal. In regard to this, the author says:

(Non-discrimination) is not, like the Self, eternal and without beginning as one undivided and indivisible whole, but is without beginning by the form of a stream (of continuous flow); because, otherwise, of it, the existence of which is without beginning, the eradication, which is established by the Sruti, would not be possible. Such is the meaning. —13.

Cause of the Annihilation of Non-discrimination.

प्रतिनिवितथंकारयात्रांसंपत्तं ज्ञातं भवति || ६ || १४ ||

प्रतिनिवितथं: Prati-niyata-kāraṇa-pāya-tvam, to be destructible by a fixed and determinate cause in each respective case. ज्ञातं: Asya, its. भवति: Bhavati, as is the case with darkness.
14. It belongs to Non-discrimination to be destructible by a fixed and determinate cause (in each respective case),—just as is the case with darkness.—470.

Vritti:—Whereby is the destruction of Non-discrimination? it may be asked. To this, the author replies:

Just as light is the destroyer of darkness.—14.

Bhāṣya:—Having stated the cause of Bondage, the author states the cause of Release.

"Asya," that is, of the cause of Bondage, namely, Non-discrimination, is the characteristic of being destructible by that, that is, Discrimination, which is the fixed and determinate cause of the destruction (of mistake or non-discrimination) in the cases of the mistaking of a mother-of-pearl shell for silver, etc.,—just as is the case with darkness; for darkness can be destroyed only by the fixed and determinate cause which is light, and not by any other means. Such is the meaning.

So has it been said in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (VI. v. 62):

तत्र तद्वाच अवशय निष्ठवयोऽवशयाः

ज्ञान ज्ञातालः कालं यदृ विवेयं विवेकाः

Ignorance is just like blinding darkness, and the development of the Senses is like the lamp; just as is the sun, so is, O sage among Brāhmaṇas, the Knowledge produced from Discrimination.—14.

Proof that Discrimination is the only destroyer of Non-discrimination.

अत्र अतीतिवयमोऽवशयायातिकात् || 6 || 19 ||

Attra, here, on this point, in the case of discrimination being the cause of the destruction of Non-discrimination. Api, also, as in the case of darkness. Atitvam: Prati-niyamāḥ, pre-determination, allotment. Anvayavyātirekat, through agreement and difference.

15. Here, also, the pre-determination (is proved) through Agreement and Difference.—471.

Vritti:—What is the annihilator here? it may be asked. To this, the author replies:

On account of its invariability, it is Discrimination that alone is the annihilator (of Non-discrimination).—15.

Bhāṣya:—The author tells us that also which cognises the pre-determination that it is by means of Discrimination alone that Non-discrimination is destroyed.

Just as in the case of darkness and light, so also in the case in question, the fixed and determinate relation is cognisable by means only of
Agreement and Difference :—If the cases of a mother-of-pearl shell and silver, etc. Such is the meaning.

Or, the aphorism may be interpreted in the following way :—But then, what again, it may be asked, is the fixed and determinate cause of Discrimination? To this, the author replies:

“Atra api,” that is, in the case of Discrimination also, the rule about the cause is established by the very means of Agreement and Difference. The cause of Discrimination is just of the form of Hearing, Thinking, and Meditating, and not Karma, etc.; Karma, etc., are, on the other hand, only the external means. Such is the meaning.—15.

Non-discrimination is the sole cause of Bondage.

Prakāra-antara-a-sambhavat, on account of the impossibility of any other manner. अविरbt: A-viveka, non-discrimination. वा Eva, alone, only.

16. On account of the impossibility of any other manner, Non-discrimination alone is Bondage.—472.

Vṛtti:—Is the Self bound through Non-discrimination, or is there, one may ask, also any other cause of Bondage? To this, the author replies:

It is clear.—16.

Bhāṣya:—The author calls back to mind what has been declared in the First Book, namely, that it is not possible for Bondage to be natural (to Puruṣa), or the like.

“Bondage” here denotes the cause of bondage designated as conjunction of pain. The rest is easy.—16

Bondage does not over again befall the released.

Na, not. Muktāya, of the released. अव्ययम्: Punar-bandha-yogab, conjunction of bondage over again. च अष्टि: also. अविर्यति: An-āvṛtti-śrutab, because of the Śruti or Vedic declaration of non-return.

17. (In the case) of the released, there is not conjunction of bondage over again, because the Śruti declares his non-return (to Samsāra).—473.

Vṛtti:—Since Release is an effect, on the destruction thereof, there will be, one may say, bondage over again. In regard to this, the author says:

And the Śruti (referred to) is:

चाला तत्त्वो विन्यस्तं विकस्य: पुनर्मद्वैतं
The Self is to be known, to be discriminated from Pāśyā: he does not return (to Sāṃstak) again.

And the argument (in support of the above proposition) is: Because destruction is of an effect which is an entity; whereas the cessation of pain (wherein consists Release) is of the form of a non-entity.—17.

Bhāṣya:—But then, since Release, also, by reason of its being an effect, is liable to destruction, there will be, our opponent may say, bondage over again. In regard to this, the author says:

Because it is effect which is an entity, that alone is liable to destruction, there is no destruction of Release, since there is the Śruti:

न स पुनराकर्षिते

He does not return again.

Such is the meaning.

The word, Api, also, is in the sense of the addition of the sense stated in the preceding aphorism.—17.

Vedāntin Mahadeva:—Through the word, Api, is added Release by the manifestation of Discrimination, because, in both cases, there is the Śruti about non-return.

Opposite view is defective.

अपरापरापरिपन्नस्यः ॥ ६ ॥ १७ ॥

A-puruṣa-artha-tvam, not to be the end of Puruṣa. Anya-thā, otherwise.

18. Otherwise, (Release will be) not the end of Puruṣa.—474.

Vṛtti:—The author points out the defect on the opposite side.

Discrimination is the end of Puruṣa.—18.

Bhāṣya:—“Otherwise,” that is, in the case of the bondage over again of the released also, Release, just like Pralaya or Dissolution, will not be the end of Puruṣa, or, in other words, will lack the characteristic of being the highest end of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.—18.

Reason for the above.

अविरोधापिति: || ६ ॥ १८ ॥

A-vidyā-apattiḥ, implication of non-difference. Ubha-yoh, of both.

19. (Were Bondage to befall the released also), non-difference between the two (i.e., the released and the bound) would be the consequence.—475.

Vṛtti:—The author points out another defect.
Because of the non-distinction between the transmigrating and the released (Puruṣa), in respect of conjunction of bondage.—19.

Bhāṣya:—The author gives the reason why it cannot be the end of Puruṣa.

By reason of the sameness of the character of the future bondage, there will be no distinction between the two, that is, between the released and the bound. So that, the result is not to be the end of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.—19.

Nature of Release.

मुक्तिनर्तरायुज्वते परः || ६ || २० ||

पूर्वः: Muktiḥ, release. पञ्चात्तरा: Antarāya-dhvanstham, from the removal or destruction of obstacles. ॥ Na, not. ॥ Parāḥ, different, other.

20. Release is nothing but the removal of obstacles.

—476.

Vṛtti:—Disease, etc., are the obstacles to Yoga. And thus says Patañjali:

व्यविस्तारायुज्वनायविरितश्वारानांत्वमथ्युज्ञानविनिश्चितत्वानु विश्रेतेश्चकरवतः योगसूत्रम || े || २० ||

Disease, weakness of the mind, doubt, heedlessness, sloth, attachment to the world, error, failure to gain the ground, and unsteadiness,—these distractions of the mind, are called Obstacles.—Yoga Sūtram, I. 30, S. B. H. Vol. IV, page 53.

'Disease' is, e.g., fever, etc. 'Weakness of the mind' is incapacity to do work. 'Doubt' is cognition touching the two ends or alternatives. 'Heedlessness' is inattention to Samādhi or Trance. 'Sloth' is heaviness of the body. 'Attachment to the world' is thirst after objects (of enjoyment.) 'Error' is false knowledge. 'Failure to gain the ground' is the non-reaching of the plane of Samādhi or Trance. 'Unsteadiness' is the susceptibility to slip in mind, in the case of one who has reached the ground.

(Now), in Release, is there, one may ask, the mere destruction of these (obstacles), or is there the attainment of some other characteristic? To this, the author replies:

In the case (of the attainment) of some other characteristic, there will be lapse from the character of being immutable.—20.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—In Release, there is only the destruction of the obstacles, and not "Parāḥ," that is, some other,—characteristic: such is the complement of the aphorism.
Bhāṣya: — But, then, when there is, in this way, the admission or acknowledgement of a distinction between the bound and the released, how is it asserted (vide I. 19) that it belongs to Puruṣa to be eternally free? To this, the author replies:

Something other than the destruction of the obstacle presently to be mentioned, is not Release. Such is the meaning.

For, just as, in the case of the naturally white crystal, the redness due to the Upādhi or adjunct of the China rose, is a mere obstacle in the form of an envelope or cover of whiteness, but it is not the case that, by means of the superimposition or investment of the China rose, the whiteness is destroyed, and that, on the removal of the China rose, is produced again, very similarly, in the case of the Self which is by nature free from pain, the reflection of pain due to the upādhi or investment of Buddhi, is a mere obstacle in the form of the envelope or cover thereof (i.e., of the naturally painless state of the Self), but it is not the case that, by the investment of Buddhi, pain is produced, and, on the removal thereof, is destroyed. Hence there is no conflict in the proposition that the Self is eternally or ever free and that Bondage and Release are phenomenal.—20.

Conflict with the Vedas avoided.

II 6 I 21 II

Tatra, therein, in the connection of some other characteristic (Aniruddha); in the removal of obstacle being release (Vijñāna). Api, even. A-virodhah, non-conflict.

21. Therein, even, there is no conflict.—477.

Vṛtti: — Even admitting (the contrary view, for the sake of argument), the author says:

Let there be, (in the state of Release), conjunction of some other characteristic (with the Self), still there is no harm. After Release no return has been declared (by the Śruti), and this (non-return) exists even if there be conjunction of some other characteristic.—21.

Bhāṣya: — But, if, in this way, Bondage and Release are unreal, then, there will be, one may say, conflict with the Śruti and the like, which establish Release as being the end of Puruṣa. In regard to this, the author says:

“Tatra api,” that is, even in the case of Release consisting in the destruction of the obstacle, there is no conflict with its being the end of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.
For, it is only the conjunction and disjunction of pain that have been imagined in Puruṣa, but not also the experience of pain. And experience (of pain) is the connection of pain by the form of a reflection. Hence the cessation of pain by the form of a reflection is, indeed, in the real sense of the term, the end of Puruṣa. It is just this that is the destruction of the obstacle; and Release of this description is, indeed, (objectively) real. Such is the import.—21.

A distinction pointed out.

विषयाः भौतिकार्यम् नियमे: || १२ ||
विषयाः भौतिकार्यम् नियमे: || १२ ||

Adhikārī-trai-vidyāt, owing to the three-foldness of those competent to attain release. || Na, no. नियम: Niyamaḥ, rule, uniformity.

22. (There can be) no rule (that, by the mere hearing about the removal of the obstacle, there will be Release), because those competent (for Release) are of three classes.

—478.

Vṛtti:—It may be enquired whether Hearing, Thinking, and Meditating are, (as means of Release), common to all Puruṣas, or are not. In regard to this, the author says:

But those competent are of three sorts: mild, middling and exceeding or intense. Of the exceeding, Release takes place through mere Hearing; of the middling, through the two (i.e., Hearing and Thinking); of the mild, through the three. All these do not apply in the case of all (equally).—22.

Bhāṣya:—But, if the mere destruction of the obstacle is Release, then, one may say, there will be the accomplishment thereof by the very means of the mere hearing (about the truth)—just as is the case with the accomplishment or attainment of the gold round the neck, the conscious attainment of which was obstructed by ignorance. In regard to this, the author says:

Those competent for knowledge are threefold: good, mediocre, and sluggish; thereby it is not the rule that, immediately after the mere Hearing, direct mental intuition of the truth does, indeed, take place in the case of all. Such is the meaning. Hence, through the fault of the competency of the sluggish type, mental cognition, capable of causing the dissolution of the Chitta, was not produced, in the case of Virochana, etc., through the mere hearing of the truth, but not because Hearing was incapable of the production of cognition.—22.
Utility of Other Means.

शार्यार्थमुद्रेशाय ॥ ५ ॥ २२ ॥

दार्थ्या-रत्न, for the sake of confirmation. उत्तरेषम्,
of the others, i.e., the sluggish (Aniruddha), thinking and meditating (Vijñana).

23. (The injunction) of the others is for the sake of
the confirmation or of ensuring the permanence of (what is
achieved by the first).—479.

Vṛitti:—The author exhibits another side.

"Of the others," that is, the sluggish: for the sake of confirmation,
the triad of the means have been declared. Says the Śruti also:

शास्त्राय वाहुरे भ्रान्या अनेको मन्त्रो मन्यायतात्यथः ॥

Lo, the Self has to be beheld, to be heard about, to be reasoned about, to be con-
stantly meditated upon.—Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, II, iv, 5.—23.

Bhāṣya:—Not only is mere hearing the visible cause in the case
of cognition, but there are, says the author, others also:

"Of the others" than hearing, that is, of thinking, meditating, etc.,
for the purpose of the confirmation in the form of absoluteness of the
destruction of the obstacle, is the rule or injunction,—which word is
pursued in the preceding aphorism.—23.

Misconception about Yogic Posture removed.

रस्तरुखमासनसिद्धि न नियम: ॥ ५ ॥ २४ ॥

रस्तरुखम, Shīra-sukham, steady and easeful. असनम्, असान, posture.
Compare III. 34, page 308. वै Iti, hence. न Na, no. नियम: Niyama, rule,
restriction.

24. Āsana is whatever is steady and easeful; hence
(there is) no restriction (of it to Svastika, Padma, etc).—480.

Vṛitti:—In regard to which Posture amongst the Svastika, etc.,
should be practised, the author says:

The practice of Posture is for the sake of steadiness and for the
sake of ease. Let that alone be, because of its universality.—24.

Bhāṣya:—The author states these very other means:

In regard to Posture, there is no restriction (of it) to the Padma or
Lotus Posture and the like; because whatever is steady and easeful, that
itself is a Yogic Posture. Such is the meaning.—24.
Chief Means of Release.

25. Dhyāna is Manas without object.—481.

Vṛitti:—Is Dhyāna the contemplation of an object with one-pointedness of mind, or is Dhyāna mind without object? it may be asked. In regard to this, the author says:

The word, Dhyāna, is here in the sense of Samādhi or Trance.—25.

Bhāṣya:—The author mentions the principal means.

What Internal Instrument becomes devoid of modification, that only is "Dhyānam," that is, Yoga or Concentration of the form of the inhibition of the modifications of the Chitta. Such is the meaning.

According to the non-difference of the effect and the cause, the word (Dhyāna) denoting the cause, has been here applied to the effect, since Dhyāna will later on be declared as being the means thereof (i.e., of the inhibition of the modifications of the mind).—25.

Defence of Yoga.

26. Bothways even there is, if you say, no difference, (we reply), it is not so,—through suppression of the reflected colour there is a difference.—482.

Vṛitti:—When inhibition of the modifications is the same in both the cases, what, it may be asked, is the difference between Deep Sleep and Trance? To this, the author replies:

"Uparāgaḥ," tincture or reflected colour, is the vāsanā, aroma or impression, of objects. The inhibition thereof takes place in Trance (but not in Deep Sleep): such is the difference.—26.

Bhāṣya:—But then, when Puruṣa remains of the same form during Concentration and Non-Concentration, what need, it may be asked, of Concentration? To this, the author replies:

"Through the suppression of the tincture," that is, through the departure of the reflection of the modifications, there is, in the state of
Concentration, as compared with the state of Non-Concentration, a difference belonging to Puruṣa,—such is the sense of all the established tenets. The rest is as good as explained.—26.

_Cause of Tincture._

निःसङ्गेऽपि उपरागो विवेकात् || ६ ॥ २७ ॥

निःसङ्गे, though unassociated with anything. अपि, even. उपरागः, tincture. विवेकः, A-vivekā, through non-discrimination.

27. Even though (Puruṣa) is unassociated (with anything), the tincture (of the modifications of the mind takes place in him) through Non-discrimination.—483.

_Vrtti:_—Since, the Self being free from association, there will be absence of the tincture (of external things), there will be, one may say, release at all times. In regard to this, the author says:

Through the non-discrimination of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, by means of the tincture in Prakṛti, arises the Abhimāna, fancy or misconception, that there is tincture in the Self.—27.

_Bhāṣya:_—But then, how can there be, one may ask, tincture in what is unassociated (such as the Self is alleged to be)? To this, the author replies:

Although in that which is unassociated, real tincture does not exist, still, conveying, as it does, the idea that it is, as it were, a tincture, reflection itself is treated as tincture by those who know the discrimination of tincture (from Puruṣa). Such is the meaning.—27.

_Above elaborated._

तैत्तिरिक्तोरूपेण नोपरागः कि वस्मिमानः || ६ ॥ २८ ॥

तैत्तिरिः: Japā-sphaṣṭikayoh, in the case of the China rose and the crystal.

28. Just as in the case of the China rose and crystal, there is no (real) tincture (in the case of Puruṣa), but the conceit (of it).—474.

_Vrtti:_—The author here says that Uparāga or tincture also is not real.

Because of the association of the two (i.e., China rose and crystal), tincture is reasonable. While, because the Self has no association, there is not tincture, but the conceit of it, that is, through the superimposition of the Abhakāra upon the Self, is the superimposition of the tincture.—28.
The author expounds the very same:

Just as in the case of the China rose and crystal, there is no (actual) tincture, but the mere conceit of tincture, viz., “The crystal is red,” through the influence of the reflection of the China rose, even so, in the case of Buddhi and Puruṣa, there is no (actual) tincture, but the mere conceit of it, due to the reflection of Buddhi under the influence of Non-discrimination. Such is the meaning.

Hence the resultant meaning of these two aphorisms is that it is just the reflection of the modifications, that is called the tincture of Puruṣa, by reason of its similarity to tincture.

And to this effect has it been remembered:

शरणे बालूम् कामप्रियलक्तका गुरु: ||

हुश्च द्रव्यस्वतार्थं प्रवृत्तमेव गुरु: ||

Just as seen the attribute of the moon, created by water, such as the trembling of the moon in water, etc., similarly is seen the attribute of the Not-Self to belong to the Self which is the Seer.—Śrīmad Bhāgavatam, III. vii.—11.

And it is this very tincture of the essentially painful modification, that is the obstacle to Release designated as the cessation of pain; and the annihilation thereof is through the dissolution of the mind; and that, again, is by means of the A-sampārañā or Ultra-Cognitive Trance, designated as the inhibition of the modifications of the mind. Hence it is through Trance or Yoga alone that there takes place the annihilation of the obstacle. This is the established tenet of the Yoga Śīstra also.—28.

Means of the Suppression of the Tincture.

ध्यानदार्शायतिन्यासवर्मायत्वमित्वसर्वसहस्रसम्पर्कमिति: || 6 || 29 ||

आपल्लकांशिवायतिविधिः: Dhyāna-dhāraṇā-abhyāṣa-vairāgya-ādi-bhīṣ, by means of Dhyāna or Meditation, Dhāraṇā or Concentration, Abhyāṣa or Constant Practice, Vairāgya or Dispassion, and the like. निल्लिः: Tat-siddhiḥ, the accomplishment thereof, i.e., of the removal or suppression of the tincture of the Not-Self upon the Self.

29. By means of Meditation, Concentration, Practice, Dispassion, and the like is the accomplishment thereof.—485.

Vṛitti:—How can there be, one may ask, the destruction of Abhimanā or the conceit (of tincture)? To this, the author replies:

Through the word, Ādi, and the like, there is inclusion of Samādhi or Trance.—29.

Bhāṣya:—“Dhyāna is mind without object,” (VI. 25),—thus is Yoga stated. Just declaring the various means of its accomplishment, the
author states the means of the suppression of the tincture as exhibit above:

Through Trance, Meditation is the cause of Yoga, and of Meditation, the cause is Concentration, and of this, the cause is Practice, that is, institution of the means for the steadiness of the mind; of Practice again, the cause is Dispassion towards objects; of that, again, the seen of the faults (of objects), Restraint of the Senses, Observances, and forth. By this process, as taught in the System of Patañjali, "the suppression thereof," that is, the suppression of the tincture, takes place, b means of Yoga, designated as the inhibition of the modifications of the mind. Such is the meaning.—29.

Note:—As to the process taught by Patañjali, referred to by Viñëa, compa Yoga Sätram:

Śāmśākṣāyāpyaśa ṭhānirteṣaḥ: || 1 || 12 ||

By means of Practice and Dispassion, is the suppression thereof, i.e., of the modifications of the mind or the states of consciousness.—I. 12.

तत प्रत्येक यवरस्मारः || 1 || 13 ||

Of these, Practice is the effort to secure steadiness of the mind.—I. 13.

हष्णातुहातविविषविविषपमः वसीतलस्य वेतान्यम् || 1 || 14 ||

Dispassion is the consciousness of self-command in one who has killed, within oneself, all desires for "visible" as well as scriptural objects of enjoyment.—I. 15.

तथा यथे पुरुषवातिस्य वेतान्यम् || 1 || 15 ||

This is Higher Dispassion; it results from knowing Puraça, and its effect is absence of desire for association with the Guṇas.—I. 16.

तथावते विरोधे सर्ववैद्यविविधोऽस्मिन् || 1 || 16 ||

When there is the suppression of all the (modifications), on the suppression of the (mind) also, there is the Seedless Trance.—I. 51.

abilidadatvam: || 1 || 17 ||

Their modifications are to be destroyed by Meditation.—II. 11.

हेवं दुःखानपद्यम् || 2 || 18 ||

Pain not-yet come is the Avoidable.—II. 18.

नः नालर्यमेव संवचणः हेवेदूत: || 2 || 19 ||

The Conjunction of the knower and the knowable is the cause of the Avoidable.—II. 1.

विवेकायतिस्विपमः हन्ताययाः || 2 || 20 ||

Discriminative knowledge undisturbed, is the means of Avoidance.—II. 20.

वस्मिन्निकालमोक्षायाऽस्मिन्निकालमोक्षायां || 2 || 21 ||

According as the impurity (in the Self) wears away through the performance of several members of the eightfold Yoga, the light of knowledge shines brighter as brightness, till the manifestation of Discrimination.—II. 20.
Restraint, Observation, Posture, Regulation of Breath, Abstraction, Concentration, Meditation, and Trance are the eight Āngas or Members of Yoga. — II. 29.

Kalpana or absolute independence or release consists in the equally perfect clarity of the Objective Essence and of Puruṣa (by means of Discrimination).—III. 54.

Compare also the Introduction to the Yoga Sūtrām, S. B. H. Vol. IV.

Teaching of the Ancients on the point.

लयविक्षेपयोन्यायस्यत्तुपायाचार्याः: II Ė 30.

मनोहकः: Laya-vikṣepayoh, of inaction and distraction. व्यावृत्तिः, by the turning away or exclusion. किं इति, thus. श्रवणः: Āchāryah, the Āchāryas as teachers.

30. (Suppression of the tincture is) by means of the exclusion of inaction and distraction,—thus say the Āchāryas.—486.

Vṛtti:—Having stated the opinion of a branch School, the author states his own opinion.

"Layaḥ" means deep sleep; "Vikṣepah," the waking state. By means of their exclusion, is the annihilation of the conceit of tincture.—30.

Bhāṣya:—In respect of the suppression of the tincture of Puruṣa, by means of Meditation, etc., appertaining to the mind, the author shows the way established by the previous teachers:

By the suppression, by means of Meditation, etc., of the modification of Sleep as well as of the modification such as Proof, etc., of the mind, takes place, of Puruṣa also, the suppression of the tincture of the modifications, because the suppression of the reflection takes place on the suppression of the reflecting body,—so say the previous teachers. Such is the meaning. Just as, for example, says Patañjali the very same thing by the three aphorisms:

योगसम्बन्धस्वस्वपनिभिः कर्तव्यम् II Ė 2.

Yoga is the suppression of the modifications of the Chitta or mind.—Yoga Sūtrām, I. 2.

तथा ह्रस्वः स्वप्नप्रक्षेपाचार्याः II Ė 2.

Then is the resting of the On-looker in his own form.—Ibid. I. 3.

इत्यित्याविभिःकस्व यहीका विविधानां कर्तव्यम् II Ė 2.

Elsewhere there is identity of form with the modifications.—Ibid. I. 4.

So too do the Smṛitis such as:

किं कार्ययोगविमुक्तिलक्षिपस्मयं ||

कथा यथा संबंधितभिः तद्विधिः ||
For the Self is eternal and all-reaching. By reason of its being attended with the
violence of Buddhi, however the Buddhi becomes (modified), similar to that in the Self
here desired to be,
say the very same thing.

Thus, then, the sense of the sub-topic (hereewith concluded) is that
the destruction of the obstacle of Release takes place, (directly) by means
of the immediate intuition (of the truth about the Self and the Not-Self),
through the A-samprajñāta Yoga or Ultra-Cognitive Trance alone.—30.

For Practice of Yoga, no Need of a Particular Locality.

न स्थाननियमित्तमिष्ठावात् || ५ ॥ ३२ ॥

Na, no, स्थाननियमित्तमिष्ठावात्, rule about localities. चित्तम, Chitta
प्रसदात, from tranquillity of the mind.

31 There is no rule about localities; (Yoga is pro-
duced) from tranquillity of the mind.—487.

Vṛtti:—In which amongst the cave and other localities, it may
be asked, should meditation, etc., be practised? To this the author
replies:

Where tranquillity of the mind does not arise, there the cultivat
should not be made.—31.

Bhāṣya:—The author declares that, in the case of Meditation, etc
there is no rule about localities such as the cave, etc.

Only from tranquillity of the mind is produced Meditation etc.
hence, in this respect is, no rule or restriction exists as to localities
such as the cave, etc. Such is the meaning.

In the Sūtra, on the other hand, with a general intent only, he
the woods, the hills, the caves, etc., been indicated as being suitab
places for the cultivation of Yoga. For this very reason says the Brah
(Vedānta) Sūtram (IV. i. 11) also:

वर्णाश्रयते स्थानविषयाः || ५ ॥ ३३ ॥

Wherever there takes place one-pointedness of the mind, there let Meditation
performed; because there are no such conditions laid down with regard to this meditat
as are laid down with regard to the Vedic Sandhyā.—31.

Prakṛti is the Material of the World.

प्रकटेऽपरायणात्मप्रकृतेऽकार्यत्वाद्: || ६ ॥ ३२ ॥

वेक: Prakṛteḥ, of Prakṛti. अद्वयाद्वात् Anyaśām, of the others, Mahat, etc. अन- Kāry-
सतेः, because of the śruti or Vedic declaration of being effects.
32. It belongs to Prakṛti to be the primordial material, because the Śruti declares the others to be effects.—488.

Vṛtti:—Let material causality, one may say, belong to Ahamkāra, etc.; what use of Prakṛti? To this, the author replies:

Because of the Śruti that Ahamkāra, etc., are effects, of them also the cause is Prakṛti; and this has been mentioned more than once.—32.

Bhāṣya:—The consideration of Release is completed. Now, for the sake of (establishing) the immutability of Puruṣa, the author compendiously deduces the (material) cause of the world:

Because it is heard that Mahat, etc., are effects, Prakṛti is established as being their root or primal cause. Such is the meaning.—32

Puruṣa cannot be the Material of the World.

नित्यलेखित नान्तम: योग्यत्वाभवात् || ६ । ३२ ॥

नित्ये Nitya-tve, being eternal. * Api, even. * Na, not. अत्मानाः Atmanāḥ, of the Self. योग्य-व्रव-अवात Yogyā-tva-abhāvat, because of absence of fitness or suitableness.

33. (To be the material of the world does) not (belong) to the Self, though it is eternal, because of its want of suitableness.—489.

Vṛtti:—Since there is no distinction between Prakṛti and Puruṣa as regards their existence antecedently to all other things, which of them, one may ask, is the cause? To this, the author replies:

Suitableness for being the cause lies in the characteristics of possessing Āṭās or subordinate constituents and of entering into association, and this does not exist in the Self; hence Prakṛti is the cause.—33.

Bhāṣya:—But then, let Puruṣa alone be the material, may say our opponent. To this, the author replies:

Possession of Āṭās and associableness make up suitableness for being the cause. Owing to the absence of these, material causality does not belong to Puruṣa, though he is eternal. Such is the meaning.—33.

The Śruti is against the Opposite View.

भृतिविरोधां कुतकिष्ठस्वादलाम: || ६ । ३३ ॥

भृतिविरोधत् Śruti-virodhāt, because of conflict with the Śruti. * Na, not. कुतकिष्ठस्वादलाम Kūta-kīṣṭhasvādam, of the low perverse thinker. अत्म-लाभः Atma-lābhah attainment of the knowledge of the Self.
34. Because of conflict with the Sruti, there is not attainment of the Self in the case of the low perverse thinker.—490.

Vṛtti:—To be the experiencer, etc., is appropriate in the case of the Self, because of its being intelligent, but not, one may say, in the case of the Pradhāna, which is non-intelligent. In regard to this, the author says:

It is clear.—34.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—The author condemns the view that agency and experiencership belong to the Self just according to its own nature, and that there is no need of introducing the tincture of Prakṛti.

("Kutarka-apasadāḥ"): Apasadaḥ, that is, a perverse assembly, engaged in misleading argumentation. The knowledge of the Self propounded by it, is not reasonable, because of its contradictoriness to the Sruti, because the Self does not possess agency of itself, and because (on this theory) non-release will be entailed, since there is the saying:

...śravādīśvādāśvābhuma śaśvātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातातāt

If the Self be of the form of an agent or the like, do not then desire for its freedom for, the nature or essence of entities cannot depart from them,—just as does not heat for the sun.

Bhāṣya:—But then, since from the Srutis such as:

...pūrvaḥ puruṣāt sampraptāt:

Many creatures are begotten from Puruṣa.—Mundaka Upanisat. II. 1, 5,
there is knowledge of Puruṣa's being the cause, the doctrine of Vivart or Illusion, our opponent may say, should be adopted. Having apprehended this, the author says:

The various views, in regard to Puruṣa's being the cause, which are conceivable, are all contradictory to the Sruti; hence, in the case of the low, such as the perverse reasoners, etc., there does not take place knowledge of the essential nature of the Self. Such is the meaning.

Hereby it should be understood that those (e.g., the Vāideśika who teach that the Self possesses the characteristic of being the material cause of pleasure, pain, and such other qualities, are also, indeed, perverse thinkers, and that, in their case also, there is no knowledge of the truth about the Self, or the real character of the Self.

And the Srutis on the causality of the Self are, by reason of the not difference between power and the possessor of power, simply for th...
purpose of worship, since the causality of the Pradhâna is established by means of such Shrutis as

One Unborn etc.

And if it is asserted that the causality of the Self is just like the causality in the form of being the receptacle of the cloud, etc., belonging to the sky, then we do not controvert that, because it is transformation (of the Self as the world) only that there is denial of by us.—34.

A Misconception Removed.

पारंपरिक प्रधानानुवृत्ति निरखुलत् || ६ || ३५ ||

पारंपरिक Prârampariye, in successiveness. अपि Api, even. प्रधानानुवृत्ति Pradhâna-anuvr̥tti, successive presence or transfluence of the Pradhâna or Prakritic matter. अपु-वत् Aâu-vat, as is the case with the atoms.

35. Though (evolution be) successive, there is (still) the transfluence of Prakritic matter (in each evolute),—just as is the case with the Atoms (of the Vaisēśikas).—191.

Vṛitti:—But when it is seen that the Tan-mātras are the cause of the Great Elements, how, it may be asked, can causality belong to Prakriti? To this, the author replies:

Just as, in the case of a jar, etc., though they be the effects of a lump of earth, there is, mediately, the material causality of the ultimate atoms, so too in the present case.—35.

Bhâṣya:—But when only Earth, etc., are seen to be the causes of things inmobile, mobile, etc., how can it belong to Prakriti, one may ask, to be the material of all? To this, the author replies:

Though there be intermediate, causality in things inmobile, etc., since there is in them the transfluence of the Pradhâna, its material causality is unimpaired; just as, though the seed, etc., be the gate-way, still, since there is in things inmobile, etc., the inflow of terrene and other atoms, these are the material of those. Such is the meaning.—35.

Proof that Prakriti is All-Pervading.

सर्वत्र कार्यवर्तनात् बिसूर्य-म् || ६ || ३६ ||

सर्वत्र Sarvatra, in all places. कार्यवर्तनात् Kārya-varśanāt, from the seeing of effects, activity, or change. बिसूर्य Vibhu-vṛam, all-pervadingness, universality.

36. From seeing change everywhere, (is established) the universality (of Prakriti).—492.
Vṛitti:—In regard to whether Prakṛiti be all-pervading, or not, the author says:

It is clear.—36.

Bhāṣya:—The author cites the proof, on the maxim of the forest (which is a collection of trees, every one of them being pervaded by the characteristic of being a forest), in regard to the Universality of Prakṛiti.

From seeing change or transformation, everywhere, without any rule or system (to regulate it), is established the all-pervadingness of the Pradhāna,—just as is the characteristic of the atom to pervade the jar, etc. Such is the meaning. And this has indeed been previously explained.—36.

Motion of Prakṛiti is not in conflict with her being the Primal Cause.

(व) गतिवेत्‌प्रयाचारकारकातहातिनिष्कृत || 6 || 37 ||

Na, not. [N.B.—This word is not read in current editions of the Aphorisms. But the context and otherwise obscurity of the sense would seem to require it.] गति गति-योग, there being connection of going or motion. अधि, even.

सदात्मानबन्धः अध्य-तरान-तत्-हानिक, loss or impairment of the characteristic of being the primal cause. अनु-वत, just as in the case of the atoms.

37. Though there be connection of motion, still Prakṛiti does not lose her character of being the primal cause,—just as is the case with the atoms.—493.

Vṛitti:—The author points out the fault on the opposite side.

"Gati" means action or change. To which connection thereof belongs, that is not all-pervading. Were Prakṛiti to possess action, she would be an effect, just like the ultimate atom, and not the primal cause.—37.

Bhāṣya:—(Prakṛiti is not universal, but limited). But, it should be asserted, may contend our opponent, that, though limited, she goes wherever effect or change is produced. In regard to this, the author says:

Even while you admit the going of Prakṛiti, by reason of her being limited, absence of the characteristic of being the primal cause would follow by the example of the ultimate atoms. Such is the meaning. 

Or, the aphorism should be interpreted in the following way: But action then, called agitation, is heard to take place in the Pradhāna constituted by the three Guṇas, for the purpose of their mutual conjunction. And because she possesses action, therefore, by the example of the yamas,
etc., she must lack the characteristic of being the primal cause. Having pondered on this, the author averts it:

Even while there is connection of action, there is no loss of the characteristic of being the primal cause, as in the case of the atoms, "clati" means action; notwithstanding the presence thereof, there is no loss of the characteristic of being the primal cause, just as in the case of the terrene and other atoms in the theory of the Vaiśeṣika. Such is the meaning.—37.

Pradhāna is sui generis.

Prātishṭhāṇikṣaṃ pradhānasya nīyam: || ६ || ३८ ||

Pratishthāṇikṣaṃ Pradhānasya Nīyamam, the condition of that which exceeds or is over and above the notorious numbers of substances held by the Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, Pāṇḍūpatas, Baudhāyas, etc. वैवेद्य Pradhānasya, of the Pradhāna. ना, no. नियम: Niyamabh, limitation, rule, restriction.

38. Pradhāna exceeds the well-known (numbers of Substances); (hence) there is no limitation (of their number).—494.

Vṛtti:—If Prakṛti is to be the material, and since it belongs to Substance to be the material, there would be, one may say, the inclusion of Prakṛti in Substance. In regard to this, the author says:

Pradhāna is additional to the well-known Substances, because the number of Predicables is indeterminate. And material causality is not the same as combinative causality, but is the characteristic of being the Pradhāna, i.e., that in which all things are contained, because the Sāṃkhya do not admit the "Combination" of the Vaiśeṣikas.—38.

Bhāṣya:—But then, when we see only nine Substances, such as Earth, etc., and not more, how is it possible, our opponent may ask, that there should be a Substance called the Pradhāna, which is devoid of the nature of Earth, etc.? Nor can it be said, “Let the Pradhāna be not a Substance at all,” because by means of its conjunction, disjunction, transformation, etc., it is established that it is a Substance. In regard to this, the author says:

The Pradhāna is in addition to the well-known nine Substances (of the Vaiśeṣikas); hence there can be no such rule or limitation that Substances are nine and nine only. Such is the meaning. And the Śruti that the eight (Substances) other than the Self, are all effects, is here the impediment to there being any such limitation. Such is the import.—39.
Relation of the Guṇas to Prakṛiti.

39. Sattva and the rest are not the properties of Prakṛiti, because they are the form thereof. —495.

Vṛitti: — It may be enquired whether Prakṛiti be constituted by the Guṇas or have the Guṇas, as her properties. To this, the author replies:

Because of their identity. —39.

Bhāṣya: — Are Sattva, etc., just the properties of Prakṛiti, or is Prakṛiti what forms the substratum of the three substances in the form of the three Guṇas? — there being room for such a doubt, the author makes certain what the case is.

It does not belong to Sattva and the other Guṇas, to be the property of Prakṛiti, because they are the very essence of Prakṛiti. Such is the meaning.

Although both of the views are heard from the Śrutis and Smṛritis, yet, from a consideration of such points as simplicity, naturalness, etc., only this is ascertained that the Guṇas form the very essence of Prakṛiti, but not that they are the properties thereof. For, then, should the triad of Sattva, etc. be the property of Prakṛiti in the form of being her effects, or should they be just the eternal property of Prakṛiti by reason of mere conjunction with her, just as is the air in the case of the sky? In the first case, there is the impossibility of the production of three diverse Guṇas or qualities without the association of Prakṛiti with another substance, and there is also the impropriety of the supposition of what is contradictory to what is seen. In the last, since all diverse effects can be accounted for from the very eternal Sattva, etc., by means of their mutual association, there is the futility of the supposition of Prakṛiti in addition to them.

And the declarations about Sattva, etc., being the effects of Prakṛiti, by reason of the fact that she is partially influenced by the effect of illumination, etc., express nothing but the manifestation, etc., just as (do similar declarations) the production of the lamp from the earth.

But then, if this be so, there will be, our opponent may urge, conflict with the Śāstra or teaching which demonstrates twenty-eight Principles. We reply that such is not the case, because, in that Śāstra, the enumeration
of twenty-eight Principles, is accounted for by the admission separately of
the properties of Prakriti, such as pleasure, etc., which the Vaiśeṣikas treat
as Guṇas.

In reality, however, this aphorism is to be interpreted in the following
manner: Of Sattva, etc., is “not to be the property thereof,” that is, a
want of the characteristic of being the mere effect of Prakriti, “being the
form thereof,” that is, because Prakriti also is of the form of Sattva, etc.,
as is evident from such Smṛitis as:

Sattva, Rajas, Tamas,—these very same are remembered to be Prakṛiti.

So that, just as with the Vaiśeṣikas, in the case of the Earth, etc., so
also with us, in the case of Sattva, etc., by reason of their being of the form
of both the effect and the cause, there is no contradiction among the inter-
pretations of their being effects (or attributes), etc., of Prakṛiti. Therein
Sattva in the state of equilibrium, which may be likened to the fibres,
is the cause of the Sattva in the state of inequilibrium, which may be
likened to the yarns, and which is the cause of the Principle of Mahat,
etc. Similarly are Rajas and Tamas also—39.

Purpose of Prakṛiti’s Creation.

Prāṇyaśayopādakarṇam pravṛttir āhātāmgarbha

Vṛtti:—Activity is seen for the sake of enjoyment, nor does, one
may say, enjoyment exist for the unintelligent (such as Prakṛiti is alleged
to be). In regard to this, the author says:

This aphorism has been explained in the aphorism (III. 58)
“Creation by Prakṛiti etc.” of the Third Book.—40.

Bhāṣya:—The author concludes the teaching on the purpose of the
activity of the Pradhāna.

This has been explained in the aphorism “Creation by Prakṛiti is
for the sake of another etc.” of the Third Book.—40.
Reason for Diversity of Creation.

41. Diversity of Creation is according to diversity of Karma.—497.

Vrūti:—But when Prakṛti is one, how, it may be asked, does diversity of creation arise? To this, the author replies:

Though there is no difference in the material, still difference is caused by difference in the nimitta or efficient or instrumental cause; just as, though there is no difference in the gold, there arises the difference of the crown, the necklace, etc.—41.

Bhāṣya:—The author mentions the nimitta or instrumental cause in respect to diversity in creation.

Karma means Merit and Demerit. The rest is easy.—41.

How Prakṛti Destroys as well as Creates.

42. The twofold effect is by means of equilibrium and inequilibrium.—498.

Vrūti:—How do creation and annihilation take place? it may be asked. To this, the author replies:

Annihilation is “Sāmyāty”, from equality, that is, from homogeneous transformation of Prakṛti. Creation is “Vaiśamyāty”, from inequality, that is, from heterogeneous transformation of Prakṛti by the condition of Mahat, etc.—42.

Bhāṣya:—But then, granted that creation proceeds from the Pradhāna; but whence is Pralaya or Dissolution? it may be asked. For two contrary effects cannot possibly come from one and the same cause. To this, the author replies:

The triad of the Guṇas, Sattva, etc., is Pradhāna; and their inequilibrium is the mutual contact or aggregation amongst them by the relation of more and less; the absence thereof is equilibrium. By means of these two, as instrumental or concomitant causes, take place, from one and the same (material), the duad of contrary effects, in the form of creation and dissolution. Such is the meaning.
With the idea, on the other hand, that preservation is included within creation, the causality therein of the Pradhâna has not been separately discussed.—42.

Activity of Prakriti is no bar to Release.

विमुक्तबोधीतः प्रधानान्य लोकवत् II 61 32 II

विमुक्तः Vimukta-bodha, owing to the awakening of the released. Na, not. स्वः Sriññab, creation. निमित्तः Pradhânasya, of the Pradhâna. लोकः Loka-vat, as in the world, as with men.

43. Owing to the awakening of the released, there is no (longer) creation by the Pradhâna (with regard to him),—just as is the case with men.—499.

Vrîti.—The author discusses Dissolution.

Just as man toils for the sake of release from bondage, and one whose bondage has been released, remains aloof, because one’s object has been fulfilled, so too does the Pradhâna.—43.

Bhâya.—But then, when creation is the very nature of the Pradhâna, there will be Sâmsâra or worldly existence, one may say, even after the attainment of knowledge. In regard to this, the author says:

Through the reason of its direct vision of Puruṣa as one released, creation by the Pradhâna, over again, for the sake of that Puruṣa, does not take place, because of its object having been fulfilled. “Just as is the case with men.” Just as men, e.g., ministers, etc., having accomplished the object of the king, and with their purpose thus fulfilled, do not exercise again for the sake of the king, very similarly acts the Pradhâna. Such is the meaning. For it has already (II. 1.) been mentioned that the activity of the Pradhâna is for the sake of the release of the released. And that is accomplished by means of knowledge. Such is the import.—43.

Creation for one Puruṣa does not affect another.

नात्त्रायस्यपेति सुकृतमोगो निमित्ताभावत् II 61 44 II

Na, not. अन्यः Anya-upasarpate, in approach to others. Api, even. सुकृतमोगो Mukta-upabhogah, experience of the released one. निमित्ताभावत, on account of the absence of the nimitta or concomitant cause.

44. Even on the (Pradhâna’s) approach to others, does not take place the experience of the released one, in consequence of the absence of the concomitant cause.—500.

Vrîti.—In consequence of their being all-pervading, connection between Prakriti and Puruṣa does verily exist, and hence, one may say,
even in the state of release, there is the implication of experience. In regard to this, the author says:

It would have been so, were the mere approach of the other, i.e., the Pradhâna, the instrumental cause of experience. But that is not so, but, on the contrary, the instrumental cause of experience is the object of experience. And this does not exist in the state of release.—44.

Bhāṣya:—But then, there is no cessation of the creation of the Pradhâna, because the Samsâra or mundane existence of the ignorant is seen. So that, our opponent may urge, by means of the creation by the Pradhâna, there will be bondage over again of the released Puruṣa also. In regard to this, the author says:

Even when there is the approach of the Pradhâna towards others, by means of the creation of the aggregates, etc., in the form of effects and causes, experience of the released one does not take place, “in consequence of the absence of the concomitant cause,” that is, in consequence of the absence of the concomitant causes of experience, such as the particular conjunction of one’s own Upâdhi or Buddhist investment, Non-discrimination which is the cause of that conjunction, etc. Such is the meaning. For the cessation of the creation by the Pradhâna in regard to the released one, is nothing but this, namely, the non-production of the cause of the experience thereof, that is, the particular transformation of one’s own Upâdhi, which is called birth.—44.

Multiplicity of Puruṣas proved by the Veda.

पुरुष्वहुतं व्यवस्थात्: || ५ || ४५ ||

पुरुषानि Puruṣa-bahutvaṁ multiplicity of Puruṣas. Vyavasthâ-taḥ, from allotment or distribution (of release and bondage, lots on earth, etc., made in the Veda).

45. Multiplicity of Puruṣas (is established) from allotment.—501.

Vṛtti:—There is but one Self, our opponent may contend; and to this effect there is the statement:

एक द्वन्द्व पद्य तत्त्वमभिन्नविचिनितम्।
केवलेऽपि केवल तदान्तः एकत्वाभिन्नविचिनितम्॥

Supreme Brahman, one and one only, is the truth; all else is empty thought. What delusion, what sorrow is there then for one who looks back into the unity?

The author discards this view.

This has been shown in the first book in the aphorism (I. 149), beginning with Janma.
And to this end there is (the Shruti):

The one Unborn (Puruṣa), for enjoyment, consorts with the one Unborn (Prakṛti), having the colours of red, white, and black, the procreatrix of manifold progeny like unto herself. The other Unborn deserts her, after she is enjoyed.—Bṛhatāraṇyaka Upaśīyat, IV. 5—45.

Bṛddha:—But then, this arrangement could be possible then only, were there a multiplicity of Puruṣas, but, may urge our opponent, that is obstructed by the Shruti about the Non-duality of the Self. With this apprehension the author says:

Through the very distribution of bondage and release, mentioned in the Shrutis, such as:

Whoever know this, they become immortal, while others experience only sorrow.—Bṛhatāraṇyaka Upaśīyat, IV. iv. 16., is established the multiplicity of Puruṣas. Such is the meaning.—45.

Upādhi cannot explain the situation.

46. If Upādhi (is acknowledged), then, on the establishment thereof, there is again Duality.—502.

Pṛitti:—But diversity or multitude will be, it may be contended, according to differences of Upādhi. In regard to this, the author says:

"On the establishment thereof," that is, on the establishment of difference. In the case of Upādhi being an unreality, where is the establishment of difference? While in the case of its reality, by means of that itself, there will again result Duality.—46.

Bṛddha:—But then, according to differences of Upādhi, there will be, may rejoin our opponent, the distribution of bondage and release. In regard to this, the author says:

In case Upādhi is acknowledged, then, by the very establishment of Upādhi, there will be again a breakdown of Non-duality. Such is the meaning.
In reality, however, even if there be differences of Upâdhi, still the distribution is not possible, and this has been elaborately shown in the very First Book.—46.

Even A-vidyâ is a Contradiction to Non-Duality.

Even by the two, there is contradiction of the evidence (of Non-Duality).—503.

Vrîtti:—The author points out another defect.

("Dvâbhyâm":) In the case of reality and unreality. In the case of reality, there will be impairment of the tenet of Non-Duality. In the case of unreality, whence will be the distribution of diversity?—47.

Bhâsa:—But then, the Upâdhis also will be, may contend our opponent, constituted by A-Vidyâ, and, therefore, there will be no breach of Non-Duality by them. There being room for such an apprehension, the author says:

Puruṣa, and A-Vidyâ,—by these two also, being acknowledged, the contradiction of the Śrutis which is the evidence for Non-Duality, is in the very same state. Such is the meaning.—47.

Other Faults in the Teaching of Non-Duality.

Since, by means even of the two (interpretations), there is no opposition (between the Śrutis on Non-Duality and the tenet of Duality), (it is) neither the first (i.e., unity of the Self) nor the last i.e., (contradiction of the Śrutis), because of the absence of the means of proof (of unity of the Self).—Aniruddha.

Since, even by the two (the Self and A-Vidyâ), there is no conflict (with the Śrutis on Non-Duality), the first (i.e.,
that our Duality is in conflict with the Śruti) is not possible; nor is the last (i.e., the tenet of Non-Duality), because there is no means of proof (of the Self).—Vijñāna.—504.

Vṛtī:—The author shows that neither is there contradiction of the Śruti on Non-Duality, nor is there detriment to Duality.

If the Śruti on Non-Duality bear a different sense (from its literal meaning), either being directed to denote the genus (of the Self) or being directed to express eulogy, there is no contradiction, while in the case of the reality of the Upādhi, there is no detriment to Duality;—thus no conflict exists. Therefore, neither is the first, that is, the unity of the Self, nor is the last, that is, contradiction of the Śruti. Because of the non-existence of proof in respect to Non-Duality, there is no establishment hereof,—hence something different exists. Such is the meaning.—48.

Vedāntin Mahādēva:—The first, that is, the unity of the Self, and the last, that is, manifoldness according to differences of the Upādhi, are not (established), because, in both of the cases, does not exist the means of proof. But, on the other hand, the difference of the Self is true by itself. The Śruti on Non-Duality has the oneness of the Self-hood for its object, while the perception of difference has for its object real difference not caused by the Upādhi: hence there is no contradiction between the Śruti and Perception.

Bhadra:—The author mentions two other defects also:

Even by the two being acknowledged, the first, that is, your Pārva-Paksa or primâ facie proposition, is not possible; we also acknowledge only two, that is, Prakṛiti and Puruṣa; because it is desired or intended by us also that Vikāra or transformation, by reason of its being non-eternal, is a mere creation of speech.

But our opponent may urge that, in consequence of our admission of the multiplicity of Puruṣas, and also in consequence of our admission of the eternity of Prakṛiti, there is, indeed, our conflict with them. Having apprehended this, the author mentions another defect by the words, “Nor is the last, etc.” The last, that is, the established tenet of the teachers of Non-Duality is also not possible, because of the non-existence of the proof to establish the Self. And if the existence of such proof is acknowledged by them, then, by the very means thereof, there will be impairment of Non-Duality. Such is the meaning.—48.

The Self cannot prove itself.

प्रकाशायतस्तत्सिद्धी कर्मकर्तर्विरोधः || ६ || ५६ ||

प्रकाश-ताप, through light or illumination. तत-सिद्धां, in
the case of the establishment thereof, i.e., of the Self. कार्माकर्षणात्मक: Karma-karṣaṇa-virodhaḥ, contradiction of the object and subject.

49. In the case of the establishment of the Self through the light (of the Self), there is the contradiction of the subject and the object.—505.

Vṛtti:—There is no want of proof, may rejoin our opponent; there does exist proof which indeed is self-revealed. In regard to this, the author says:

It is clear.—49.

Bhāṣya:—But then, the Self will be proved, may rejoin our opponent, as being the revealer of itself. To this, the author replies:

In the case of the establishment of Chaitanya or Intelligence through the light in the form of Intelligence, there is the contradiction of the subject and the object. Such is the meaning. For, in the case of light, etc., illumination is seen where there is a relation of the object of illumination and the light; and the relation of one thing directly with itself is contradictory.

In our opinion, on the other hand, since we acknowledge the proof called the modification of Buddha, by means thereof, is possible the relation of the thing itself, in the form of a reflection, to itself, in the form of that which casts the reflection; just as is in the sun, by means of water, the connection of itself in the form of the reflection. Such is the import.

The Śruti, on the other hand, which declares the Self to be self-revealed, is to be understood to refer to its illumination, etc., being not dependent upon the Upādhi of any other Self.

"Light" is not a property of the Self.

ज्ञात्वयाभूतो जानं प्रकाश्यचित्रीयम्: || ६ || ५.० ||

स्म: जाद्व-रावणितिः, the other than the unintelligent. ज्ञातम, the unintelligent. चित्रीयति, Prakāśyati, illuminates. चित्त, Chit-rūpaḥ, of the form of Intelligence.

50. The other than the unintelligent, of the form of Intelligence, illuminates the unintelligent.—506.

Vṛtti:—The author points out another defect.

The other than the unintelligent, of the form of Intelligence, illuminates the unintelligent. Its being of the form of light arises by means of
its being different from the unintelligent, but not that it is stated that
light is its property. For this very reason, it is said:

स एव भैति भैति

He the same, is not this, not that;
but not in the way of a positive affirmation.

Now, if it is said that the Self may be of the form of Light which
is supra-mundane or transcendental, we reply that, in that case, because
there can be no cognisance of Vyāpti or logical pervasion, there will be
a want of a familiar example (which is essential to a complete syllogism).

Now, if it is said that that is cognisable by the Yogin, (we reply that
this is not possible). In the case of the ultra-cognitive Yogin, since cog-
nition and volition are absent, the mark does not exist (whereby he can
know that the Self is of the form of transcendental light). And in the
case of the Cognitive Yogin, there exists the mark such as speech, volition,
etc., and thereby only ordinary objects can be inferred. Neither is he, too,
capable of establishing Intelligence or Consciousness in the form of
Anubhava or sensation or intuition. To this effect has it been said:

सत्योर्युद्धारीनां माधुर्यस्यान्तिर महोऽ
तथापि न तद् न्यायादुर्सरस्यान्तिर धायते ॥

Vast is the difference in the sweetness of the sugar-cane, milk, treacle, etc. Yet
this is not possible, even by Sarasvatī (the Goddess of Learning), to describe.

Similarly, a thing is said to be conscious, through its being different
from what is unconscious; but it is not that there is in it the inherence
of consciousness, or that it is formed of consciousness; because in the
state of ultra-cognitive trance, the use of the expression, “Super-normal
consciousness,” even when the modifications of the mind have been sup-
pressed, cannot be otherwise accounted for; while in the cognitive state,
the predicative of “Consciousness” is just by means of the cognition of
the modifications.

In like manner, the application of the expression “It is of the form
of bliss” is in respect of the cessation of pain. If the being of the form
of bliss denotes a positive state, is the application of it in respect of
pleasure as such? That being so, since an unknown pleasure is not
seen, (three things are entailed, viz.) pleasure, its cognition, and the
cogniser; hence where is Non-Duality? Now, if you say that the pre-
dication of bliss is in respect of a particular pleasure, we reply that
pleasure and the form of consciousness are not found together. Only the
non-discriminative think so. But the discriminating consider that, when
the thing is explained by its being of the form of difference or divergence,
which is quite visible, the supposition of something invisible and extraordinary is cumbersome.

If you say that, were there no Consciousness, the very intuition of things would not take place; we reply, that it is not so. Just as a particular conjunction, in that manner, of the gourd, piece of bamboo, and string, is the cause of sound, but it is not the case that there exists something over and above the conjunction of the three, so, although they are all alike formed of the five Elements, through the combination, in that manner, of the bodies modified by the form of living beings, there arises Consciousness.

In the case also of the Self's being Light, the characteristic of being non-intelligent partially attaches even to it.—50.

Bhāṣya:—But, then, may urge our opponent, there is no contradiction of the subject and the object, because by means of the property of illumination appertaining to it, is possible its relation to itself, just as, with the Vaiśeṣikas, by means of cognition appertaining to it, it is its own object. To this, the author replies:

In the intelligent principle, does not exist the property of the form of illumination, just as it does in the sun and the like; but “Chit-rūpaḥ,” that is, of which intelligence is the essential form, that illuminates the non-intelligent, because it is called intelligent by reason of its mere divergence from the non-intelligent, but not by reason of its possessing a property different from the non-intelligent. Such is the meaning.

It is for this reason that, by reason of its being devoid of properties, it is taught by the Śruti just in this way, viz.,

ḥāṃ मेति मेति

This, the same, is not this, is not that;

but not by way of an affirmation.

So, too, says the Smṛiti:

तत्वं तत्वी विरूद्धैः गृहस्थार्थि न वाप्पति

Even the preceptor is not competent to refer to it as that “That is this.”

Where the reading is “Jāda-vaśvittau,” in the case of divergence from the non-intelligent, the seventh case-ending is in the sense of denoting the reason, and, consequently, the meaning of the aphorism is the very same.

And in this aphorism, it is not the meaning that what is of the form of intelligence, illuminates the non-intelligent alone, but not the Self
For, if it were so, then, by reason of its being unknowable, it would not be proper to throw before our opponents the obstacle in the form of absence of means of proof, because the same argument would apply to us also.—50.

Conflict with the Veda avoided.

न भूतिविरोधो रागिणां वैराग्याय तत्तिल्वे: || 6 || 51 ||

*Na, no. भूतिविरोधि: भूति-विरोधि, contradiction of the Veda. रागिणां, of those who are attached to the things of the world. वैराग्याय, for the sake of dispassion. तत्तिल्वे: Tat-siddhena, because of the proof thereof, i.e., of the Vedic texts.

51. There is no contradiction of the Veda, because it is established (otherwise, as being) for the sake of dispassion in those who are attached to the world.—507.

Vṛtti:—This being so, the Śruti that the Self illuminates itself, will, may say our opponent, be contradicted. To this, the author replies:

Because the unintelligent, by reason of its being constituted by the three Guṇas, is the cause of passion or attachment, proof, etc., also, by reason of their being made of the three Guṇas, are to be avoided. And eradication of passion is to be effected. “Tat-siddhena,” that is, because the Śruti that the Self illuminates itself, is otherwise established.—51.

Bhāṣya:—But then, when, in this way, Duality is established in accordance with proof, etc., what, it may be asked, will become of the Śruti on Non-Duality? To this, the author replies:

Contradiction of the Śruti on Non-Duality, however, does not exist, because it is only for the purpose of evoking Dispassion towards things other than Puruṣa, on the part of those who have passion for worldly objects, that there is establishment of Non-Duality by the Śruti; since it is not heard that, as in the case of the knowledge of Puruṣa, so also in the case of the knowledge of the absence of Duality, there is any other separate fruit.

And this Dispassion is made possible by means of the non-duality of the existent alone, and to be existent is to be immutable. Such is the meaning.

It is for this reason that the Śruti also has established the non-duality of the existent only in the Chhāndogya Upaniṣat. Such is the import.—51.
Reality of the World also is subversive of Non-Duality.

Jagat-satyātvam, reality of the world. A-duṣṭākāraṇa-jānya-tvāt, being the product of not-imperfect or not-defective cause. Bādhaka-abbhāvāt, because of the absence of any impediment.

52. The reality of the world (follows) from its being the product of not-imperfect causes, and from the absence of any impediment (to its reality).—508.

Vṛtti:—But when the world is unreal, how, it may be asked, is the Śruti otherwise established? To this, the author replies:

Product of imperfect causes is, as, e.g., the cognition that the conch shell is yellow. Impediment is, for example, the cognition that "it is not silver." But such is not the case here, because Prakṛti, etc., are not imperfect or defective. Nor does there exist any impediment, because of the absence of the intuition that "it is not the world."

Briefly, the Universe is being described: Above are the worlds Bhū, Bhuva, Svāh Mahāb, Jana, Tapā, and Satya. Below are the worlds Mahātāla, Rasātāla, Talātāla, Paṭāla, Sutāla, Vītāla, and Atāla. In the middle is the Jambu Island. In the middle thereof is the Mount Sumeru. To the four directions thereof, beginning with the East, are the Pillar-Mountains, bearing the names of Mandara, Gandhamādana, Vipula, and Śupārśva. To the south of the Meru are the mountains Himālaya in the country of Bharata, Homa-kūṭa in the country of the Kimpuruṣas, and the Niśadha in the country of Hari. To the north of the Meru are the mountains Śringī in the country of the Kurus, the Śveta in the country of Hiraṇyaka, and the Nīla in the country of Ramyaka. To the east of the Meru is the mountain Mālysavān in the country of Bhadrāśva. To the west of the Meru is the mountain Gandhamādana in the country of Ketumāla. Opposite the Meru, on the other side, is the country of Ilavīta.

The extent of the Jambu Island is one hundred thousand Yojanas. Surrounding it, of equal extent, is the Salt Sea. Surrounding it, of double the extent, is the Śaka Island. Surrounding it, of equal extent, is the Sea of Sugar-cane Juice. Surrounding it, of double the extent, is the Kusa Island. Surrounding it, of equal extent, is the Sea of Wine. Surrounding it, of double the extent, is the Krauṇḍa Island. Surrounding it, of equal extent, is the Sea of Clarified Butter. Surrounding it, of double the extent, is the Salmali Island. Surrounding it, of equal extent, is the Sea of Curd. Surrounding it, of double the extent, is Plakṣya Island.
Surrounding it, of equal extent, is the Sea of Milk. Surrounding it, of double the extent, is the Puṣkara Island. Surrounding it, of equal extent, is the Sea of Sweet Water.

The Universe is surrounded on all sides by the hemisphere of Brahmaṇḍa, of which the mountain Loka-Aloka forms the extreme barrier.—52.

Bhāṣya:—The author tells us that the teachers of Non-Duality are to be rejected not only by means of the argument set forth above, but also by means of the non-existence of any proof to lead to the cognition of the unreality of the Universe.

In the world, the unreality is seen of dream-objects, the yellowness of conch-shell, etc., by reason of their being the product of the Internal Instrument, etc., affected with the defects of sleep, etc. But this (unreality) does not exist in the fabric of creation beginning with Mahat, because Prakṛti, the cause thereof, and also the Buddhi of Hiraṇya-Garbhā (Brahma) are not defective, inasmuch as it is heard, for instance, from the Śruti:

रथरावस्वरूपवः

Created without departing from the past.—Rig Veda, X, exc. 3.

But then, since it is opposed by such Śruti as

नेव नानातित किलव

Nothing here exists which is manifold.—Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, IV. iv. 19,
some eternal defect, called by the name of A-Vidyā or the like, should, our opponent may say, be conceived. To this, the author replies by saying “from the absence of any impediment.” The idea is as follows:—The Śruti such as “Nothing here exists which is manifold,” which are intended or employed by our opponent as being the debarrer of (the reality of) the fabric of Creation,—they, according to their context, simply forbid the non-division or non-separation in space of the Self, but are not directed to signify or establish the absolute nothingness of the fabric of Creation; since, as, in that case, obstruction to their own reality also would be entailed, it would follow that they do not establish their own sense or signification. For it is not that, though there is obstruction to the reality of the words heard in a dream, the objects denoted by them are never doubted again. Therefore, because they are not detrimental to the Self, the Śruti are not directed to establish the absolute negation of the fabric of Creation. Among them the meaning of such Śruti as “Nothing here exists which is manifold,” is that nothing whatever exists which is separated from Brahma, because they convey the very import as do the Śruti such as

तथेष वामाणिक तत्सम्भव कर्तं
Thou seest all, whence art Thou All.—Gītā, XI. 40.

Of the Śrutis, for example:

Modification (e.g., a water-pot) is a creation of speech, a mere name; (while “It is clay,”—only this much is the truth.—Chādādoga Upaniṣat, VI. 1. 4., on the other hand, the meaning is the absence of transcendental reality in the form of eternity, as, otherwise, the familiar example of the clay would be unproved; for, in the world, the absolute nothingness of the modifications of clay is not established, whereby they could be used as familiar examples.

Of the Śrutis, again, such as:

Neither suppression, nor, again, production,—neither entangled, nor, again, engaged in the pursuit of freedom,—neither desires of release, nor, again, released:—such is the absolute truth.—Brahma Bindu Upaniṣat. 10., the import is the absence of ultra-transcendental existence, in the form of the eternity of the immutable, of something other than the Self. The import, moreover, is the non-existence of the suppression, etc., of the Self, since, otherwise, there would be conflict with the demonstration that such knowledge has release as its fruit. For, it cannot be that, having demonstrated that “Release in unreal,” one, being quite unmindful, demonstrates Release to be the fruit.

What Śrutis there are, again, on the unity of the Self, have been explained in the very First Book. In our Commentary on the Brahma-Mimāmsā, these and other Śrutis have been explained by us. Such is the hint.—52.

The Universe is ever existent, never created.

Prakāra-antarā-samhavat sahāpya: || 6 || 43 ||

Prakāra-antarā-samhavat, owing to the impossibility of any other mode or manner. Sahāpya: Sat-upattib, production of the existent.

53. Because of the impossibility of the other mode, production must be of the existent.—509.

Vṛtti:—For the benefit of the disciple, the author establishes over again even what was mentioned before.

And the alternative mode has already been condemned.—53.

Bhāṣya:—The author tells us that not only in the present state is the web of creation existent, but also always.
Because, by reason of the arguments mentioned before, production of the non-existent is impossible, it is that which is existent in a subtle form, that is produced, that is, becomes manifested. Such is the meaning.—53.

_Agency belongs to Ahamkāra._

Ahamkāra, the Ego, or Kartā, agent, is not Puruṣa, Puruṣa.

54. Ahamkāra is the agent, (and) not Puruṣa.—510.

_**Vrtti:**—Since there is the immediate cognition that “I do,” the doubt arises whether Ahamkāra be the agent or whether, by the word Ahamkāra, the Self be denoted and it be the agent. In regard to this, the author says:

Because Puruṣa is not liable to transformation. And the co-existence of activity and intelligence in one and the same subject fails in such cases as “The tree stands.”—54.

_Bhāṣya:_—Even though agency and experience reside in different subjects, the author establishes their (separate) distribution by means of the (following) two aphorisms:

The Internal Instrument possessing the modification of Abhimāna or conceit, is Ahamkāra. It is that which possesses activity, as exertion is generally seen to follow immediately after conceit; but not Puruṣa, since he is not liable to transformation. Such is the meaning.

And what has been previously stated, namely, that Dharma, etc., belong to Buddhi,—that was with reference to the differences of the mere modification of one and the same Internal Instrument.—54.

When Experience ceases.

_Chiṣakṣana_ suktakṣarāntāntāntāntāntaḥ.—51. 54.

_Chit-avaśāna_ resulting to intelligence. _Bhūtib, experience._

55. Experience ends with knowledge (Aniruddha), or, Experience results to Intelligence (Vijñāna), because it is earned by the Karma thereof.—511.

_Vrtti:_—Although one Karma is worked out, when other Karmas will be produced, inasmuch as Karma is co-eval with the Body, there will be non-release. In regard to this, the author says:

Through Non-discrimination is the acquisition of Karma, whereby is Experience.
“Chit-avassāna” means that of which the termination is in the knowledge of the Self. On the appearance of Discrimination, where with the acquisition of other Karmas? In the absence thereof, where is Experience? Of Karma already effected, the destruction is through knowledge itself. So has it been declared:

यथैव समझोऽभिवर्धस्मात् कुद्रोहसू म
ब्रह्मात् सर्वेदक्षर्वं महास्मात् कुद्रोहसू तथा

Just as fire to which fuel has been added, reduces the fuel to ashes, similarly, Arjuna, does the fire of knowledge burn all Karmas into ashes.—Gītā, IV. 27—55.

Bhāṣya:—Though agency belongs to Ahamkāra, Experience ultimately results to the Intelligent Principle alone, because Ahamkāra, the reason of its being an aggregate, is for the sake of another (side I. 140).

But if Experience thus results to one by means of Karma inherin in another (Ahamkāra), then, one may say, there will be no limitation (a particular Experiences) to particular Puruṣas. To this, the author replies in the words: “because it is earned by the Karma thereof”: because Experience is the result of that Karma which belongs to the Intelligent Principle, being transferred to it by Ahamkāra. Such is the meaning.

What Ahamkāra, by taking up what Puruṣa, produces in the unintelligent the modification of “I” and “Mine,” the act of that Ahamkāra is said to belong to that Self, and by means of that very act, Experience in respect of that Self is acquired: thus there is no undue extension in the causality of the agency of Ahamkāra being responsible for the Experience of Puruṣa). Such is the idea.—55.

How Re-birth takes place after attainment of Higher Worlds.

इभिन्नतिरिनिश्चात्तिरिनिश्चातः II 6 1 56 II

Chandra-Adi-loke, in the world of the Moon, etc. की Api, even व्यवहारित, return to Sampāsra or transmigration, विनिमया निनित्त्वानि sat-bhā vāt, because of the presence of the instrumental cause.

56. Even in the world of the Moon, etc., there is return (to transmigration), because of the presence of the instrumental cause (of transmigration).—512.

Vṛtti:—On account of its excellence, the attainment of the world of the Moon, etc., will, one may say, itself be the end of Puruṣa. In regard to this, the author says:

From the word, Adi, etc., the world of Brahmā, etc., are to be understood.—56.
BOOK VI, SUTRA 56, 57, 58.

Bhāṣya:—The author shows the reason for what was mentioned before, namely, that there is no cessation of liability (to re-birth) by means of reaching to the worlds ending with that of Brahmā.

"The instrumental cause" is Non-discrimination, Karma, etc.
The rest is easy.—56.

Higher Instruction in the Higher Worlds availeth not.

लोकस्य नोपवेशात् सिद्धि पुर्ववत् ॥ ६ ॥ ४७ ॥

सत्तमः Lokesya, of the denizens of the higher worlds. "Na, not. उपदेशः, through instruction. शिष्यः Siddhih, success, development of knowledge, effectuation of non-return. पुर्वः Pūrva-vat, as in the former case (i.e., the terrestrial world), as before, i.e., while on earth.

57. Not through instruction by the denizens (of the Higher Worlds) is there success,—as (it was not) before.—513.

Vṛtti:—In the case of one who has (duly) approached a preceptor, Release will take place, one may say, just through the hearing of the words (uttered by the preceptor): what is the use of reflection, etc.? To this, the author replies:

Already has this been verily stated. Of the sluggish, Release does not take place through mere hearing, but by means of reflection, etc.

Hereby are to be indicated Restraint, Observance, Posture, Regulation of Breath, Abstraction, Concentration, Meditation, and Trance.—57.

Bhāṣya:—But then, through instruction by the denizens of those respective worlds, one may say, there will be non-return. In regard to this, the author says:

Just as there is no "Siddhih", that is, development of Knowledge, through the mere instruction of the former, that is, of the human world, so does not development of Knowledge take place, as a rule, in the case of those who have reached the higher worlds, through the mere instruction of the denizens of those respective worlds. Such is the meaning.—57.

A doubtful Śruti explained.

पारम्पर्येण तत्सत्त्वी विमुक्तिसुधृति: ॥ ६ ॥ ४८ ॥

पराप्रयोगः Pāramapunya, immediately, gradually. तत्सत्त्वी Tat-siddhau, there being the attainment thereof, i.e., of knowledge. विमुक्तिसुधृति: Vimukti-drutib, the Śruti about Release.

58. Because the accomplishment thereof takes place:
intermediately, there is the Sruti about Release (in the worlds of Brahmā, etc.).—514.

Vṛitti:—How then is it heard, it may be asked, that Release takes place through mere instruction? To this, the author replies:

Because Hearing, being the first to take place, is proved to be the cause intermediately, there is the Sruti about Release (being the result of Hearing alone).—58.

Bhāṣya:—But this being so, what will become, one may ask, of the Sruti which declares non-return from the world of Brahmā? To this, the author replies:

Seeing that, in the case of those gone to the world of Brahmā, etc., development of Knowledge generally takes place gradually by means of Hearing, Reflection, etc., the Sruti declares Release (taking place in those worlds). But it is not the case that Release takes place there by the mere going there directly. Such is the meaning.

In those worlds, Knowledge being very common, there is a distinction from the other worlds.—58.

Going of the Omnipresent explained.

रौढ़ण्डुष्यते स्यायपक्क्या प्राप्तियोगाज्ञोगरेषकालांनो भयोमवत्

II 61 56 II

वचने: Gati-śrutah, from the Sruti about going. चा, and. जगते Vyāpaka-tve, being all-pervading. विषयतः Api, even. उपाधियोगाज्ञोगरेषकालांनो bhogadesa-kalābhyoh, connection with, or reaching, the place of experience in time, connection with the place and time of Experience. ब्योमवत् Vyoma-vat, like the sky.

59. And, in accordance with the Sruti about its going, though the Self is all-pervading, there takes place, in the course of time, its connection with the place of Experience, through conjunction of the Upādhi,—just as in the case of the Sky.—515.

Vṛitti:—Just as it belongs to Prakṛiti, because she is all-pervading, to be the cause of the world, similarly, it may be said, of the Self, because it is all-pervading, there will be the implication of Experience in all places. In regard to this, the author says:

Just as, through conjunction of the Upādhi in the shape of a water-pot, etc., when the water-pot moves, there arises the cognition that "the
Space confined within the water-pot moves," similarly, is the going of the Self, by the going of the Body, by reason of its delimitation by the Body. Through the going of the Body to that place where, under the influence of Karma, Experience is to take place, is the reaching of Experience by the Self.

If you say that, were the Self all-pervading and of the form of Intelligence, simultaneous cognition would be entailed in respect of all objects, everywhere and at all times, but that that is not seen; we reply that this is not so. It would be so, did the Self produce cognition of the modifications by its own form of being all-pervading, but it is not so; on the other hand, it produces such cognition just by being delimited or conditioned by the Body, etc. Just as the sun, although illumination is its very nature, does not, while it lies to the south of the Mount Meru, illumine the northern quarters, and while it lies to the north, the southern quarters, because it is not all-pervading.

While, on the other hand, the receptacle of Karma (i.e., Manus) having been consumed by means of Knowledge, etc., the aggregates such as the Body, etc., disappear, and the Self becomes free from the influence of Rajas and Tamas, and becomes all-pervading, does not produce cognition of the modifications, because it is immutable, but remains itself, indeed, of the very form of the illumination of the Universe.

And just as the Sky which is all-pervading, does not become black by the local connection of smoke, etc., but when it is confined within a water-pot and the like, the whole of it lying within the hollow of the water-pot and the like is thought to be black: though in that case the sky does not become black, because it does not possess adhesion, but the idea of blackness is a mere false misconception of the non-discriminating, inasmuch as, on the breaking of the water-pot, it is no longer so seen; similarly, the self all-pervading; it has no connection with Merit and so forth, nor even cognition, but by means of the delimitation or determination caused by the Body, through conjunction of Manus by the relation of the Jiva, as is the case with the conjunction of the air and fire, it is called Jiva-Atmā, and appears as though it possessed Merit, Demerit, cognition, non-cognition, pleasure, pain, and so forth, Ahamkāra, the Senses, their Objects, birth, etc., which are all of Prakṛti. Because of the clearness or transparency of Prakṛti in her Sattva part, the Self reflected therein, mistakes (abhimāna) the agency, etc., of Prakṛti as belonging to itself. The false misconception also is in the Self as reflected in Prakṛti, and not in the Self (as such); just as the moon, though it is motionless, being reflected in water, moves through the motion of the
water,—such false intuition arises; or just as the face, though it be free from dirt, being reflected in a dirty mirror, is erroneously regarded as dirty.

The discriminating, on the other hand, who behold the aloneness (of the Self), see that, since the Self is not liable to transformation and is free from association, its agency, etc., are unreal. But when there is the non-production of another Body, after the breaking up of the previous Body, in consequence of the destruction of Vāsanā or tendency, through the dissolution of the Manas, in the order of the decrease of Vāsanā, under the influence of the maturity of meditation, then, since the Jīva-Ātmā also, by being one with the Supreme Self, is all-pervading, wherein is the conjunction of Merit and Demerit?—or agency, etc.? But while it is beyond the cognisance of Speech, the characteristic of being of the form of bliss of supra-sensuous intuition is attributed to it, as, otherwise, it is incapable of being demonstrated.—59.

Bhāṣya.—The author explains the Śruti about the going of the Self, although the Self is all-full.

Although the Self is all-pervading, yet, by having regard to the hearing of its going, the attainment of the place of experience by it is established through the influence of time, just as it is in the case of the Sky by means of the conjunction of Upādhi or adjunct or external investment. Such is the meaning. For, just as, though the Sky is all-filling, yet movement to particular places is attributed to it through conjunction of the Upādhis such as a water-pot etc., very similarly.

And thus there is the Śruti:

घटलंदेह-पुरयं नाकायं नाकायो नरेःपेतस ||

As the Sky, enveloped within the water-pot, (seems to move), while the water-pot is carried (from place to place), (whereas, in reality), the water-pot is removed, and not the Sky, so the Jīva, the embodied Self, which is like the Sky (in this respect).—Brahma-

Existence of the Body is dependent upon the presence of the Self.

प्रतीतवापरजन्य वृक्षापरायणात् तत्ततिसि || 61 ||

An-adhiṣṭita-sya, of that which is not superintended. प्रतीतवापरायणात्, owing to the implication of the putrescent state.  

60. Because, in the case of that which is not superintended (by the Self), there is the implication of the putrescent state: there is no proof thereof.—516.
Vṛitti:—Since, prior to the production of the Body, superintendence is impossible, in consequence of there being no support (in which the Self may reside), the superintendence of the Self takes place, one may say, after the production (of the Body). In regard to this, the author says:

Because, in the case of the all-pervading and eternal, there is no connection of the relation of the prior and the posterior, through superintendence just simultaneous with the production of the Body, is not "the proof thereof," that is, is not the proof of non-superintendence (prior to such production), and thence also is not the (implication of) the putrescent state (of the embryo).—60.

Bhāṣya:—The author expounds what has been stated before, namely, that the building of the house of Experience (i.e., the Body) is through the superintendence of the Experiencer (i.e., the Self).

Because semen, etc., not superintended by the Experiencer, are liable to putrescence, there would not be the building of the house of Experience mentioned before. Such is the meaning.—60.

Formation of the Body is not possible through Adṛṣṭam.

61. If (you say that), through Adṛṣṭam, (takes place the formation of the Body, we reply that it is not so), because this is impossible in the case of that which is unconnected with the seed, as is the case with water, etc., in respect of a sprout.

Vṛitti:—It is just through the influence of Adṛṣṭam, one may say, that the putrid state will not take place. In regard to this, the author says:

Because of the incompetency of Adṛṣṭam which is without a support, there cannot be the production of an effect through it, by reason of its being unconnected with the Body, just as the power of producing the sprout does not belong to water unconnected with the seed.

From the word, Ādi, etc., there is the inclusion of Fire.—61.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—If you say that the Self does not exercise superintendence from the very seed state of the Body, but after its production, and that the superintendence of the Self prior to the production...
of the Body, is through Adriṣṭam, we reply that it is not so, because of the impossibility thereof, that is, of the unconnected, i.e., Adriṣṭam, being the cause. The meaning is this: Of course, the connection of Adriṣṭam therewith must be asserted, and that is nothing but of the form of a particular conjunction, etc., of its own support.

The phrase "As is the case with water, etc.," gives a familiar example. Just as water, etc., though they be the generators of the sprout do not, being unconnected with the seed, generate the sprout.

_Bhāṣya:_—But then, may say our opponent, let the construction of the house of Experience take place from the Experienceers, even within their superintendence, through Adriṣṭam. To this, the author replies:

Because it is impossible for Adriṣṭam which is not directly connected with the semen, etc., to operate, through the Experienceers, in the construction of the Body, etc., just as it is impossible for water, etc., which are unconnected with the seed, to operate, through the tillers, in the production of the sprout. Such is the meaning.

Hence, it should be affirmed that, in the case of the semen; etc., there is connection of Adriṣṭam just by means of the connection in the form of the conjunction of its own support or substratum. So that it is established that superintendence in the form of the conjunction of the Self attended with Adriṣṭam, is the _Heta_ or efficient cause of the construction of the materials of Experience. Such is the import.—61.

_Reason for the above._

निर्गुण-चाल्यसम्भवाइकारणं हेतु || 6 || 62 ||

निर-गुण-त्वात्, because it is free from the Guṇas. 
तल-सम्भवात्, because of the impossibility thereof, i.e., of its possessing Adriṣṭam-
कारकाः, Ahamkāra-dharmāḥ, properties of Ahamkāra. हि Hi, for कै£ एस, these, i.e., Merit, Demerit, etc.

62. (The Self cannot, through Adriṣṭam, be the cause of the Body), because it is free from the Guṇas and because Adriṣṭam is not possible to it; for these, (Merit, Demerit, etc.), are the properties of Ahamkāra.—518.

_Vṛtti:_—Merit, etc., residing in which as their substratum, become. it may be asked, the producers of effects? To this, the author replies:

Because, since the Self is free from the Guṇas, it is impossible that they should be its properties, these, merit, etc., are the properties of Ahamkāra.
Since there is no difference between effect and cause, it is the properties of Buddhī (the cause) that are here stated to be the properties of Ahamkāra (the effect).—62.

Bhāṣya:—By the Systems of Thought, such as the Vaiśeṣika, etc., after having admitted, without proof, that the Self is the cause (in the construction of the Body) through Adhīṣṭam, is established the superintendence of the Self as consisting in its being the means of bringing about the connection of Adhīṣṭam with the semen, etc. But, in the author’s own tenet, says he, since Adhīṣṭam, etc., lack the characteristic of being the properties of the Self, it is not possible for the Experiencer to be, through that, even the Heta or concomitant cause of the Body.

By reason of the Experiencer’s being free from the Guṇas, and also on account of the impossibility of Adhīṣṭam (appertaining to the Self), there is no intermediateness of Adhīṣṭam: “Hi”, because, “Eva”, Adhīṣṭam, etc., are the properties only “Ahamkārasya”, of the Internal Instrument in general. Such is the meaning.

So that, in our doctrine, it follows that the superintendence of the Experiencer is quite immediate, by means of mere conjunction, independently of any intermediary. Such is the import.—62.

“Jiva” distinguished from Purusa.

बिषिष्क्ष्य जीवस्मन्य्वय्यतिरंकात् ॥ ६ ॥ ६ २ ॥

विषिष्क्ष्य Vaiśeṣika-śya, of that which possesses a distinction. जीव-त्वम् Jiva-tvam, the characteristic of being Jiva or Embodied Self. अन्वय-व्यायामस्य Anvaya-vyāyām, from Agreement and Difference.

63. The characteristic of being Jiva belongs to that which possesses a distinction, (as is proved) from Agreement and Difference.—519.

Vṛtti:—Does the characteristic of being Jiva belong to the Self in its own intrinsic form, or otherwise? it may be asked. To this, the author replies:

Were the Self to be Jiva by its own intrinsic form, its immutability would be lost through agency and experientship. Also from Agreement and Difference. The characteristic of being Jiva belongs to that (Self) which is distinguished by the conjunction of the Senses, through the conjunction of Air and Fire, by means of the limitation caused by the Body.—63.
**Bhāṣya:**—But then, if Puruṣa be all-pervading, then, may say our opponent, the limitedness of the Jīva, established by the Śruti, *viz.*, बालाध्यात्माकालशताचा करितरस च। मागे श्रीवेर स विषया च स बालाध्यात्माय कलयते॥

Jīva should be known to be a part of the one-hundredth part of the end of a hair, divided one-hundredfold, and he prevails for eternality.—Śvetāvatāra Upaniṣat, V. 9., is unfounded. Similarly, in consequence of the denial of Īśvara, and also in consequence of the identity of form among the Puruṣas, the division, made in the Śāstras, of the Jīva-Ātmā and the Para-Ātmā is also unfounded. Therefore, in order to remove these two causes of apprehension, the author says:

According to its derivation, *viz.*, श्रीवेर बालाध्यात्माय कलयते।

The root *Jīva* is in the sense of upholding strength and upholding vitality.—Dhātva-Pātha, XV. 54., to be a Jīva is to be a living being, and that is a property of Puruṣa possessing the distinction of Āhamkāra, but not of Puruṣa as he is in himself. Why? “From Agreement and Difference”: because it is only in the case of those who possess Āhamkāra, that the sustentation of excess of strength and vitality is seen, while, in the case of those who are devoid of it, only the suppression of the modifications of the mind is seen, in consequence of the absence of Āhamkāra which is the cause of the production of Rāga or Passion which is the cause of activity. Such is the meaning.

Or, the agreement and difference are to be explained in this way that there is no *living* in the states of Release, Dissolution, etc., when there is non-existence of the Antah-karaṇa or Internal Instrument, and that when there is the presence thereof, there is *living*.

So that, the limitedness of the Jīva as well as his being different from the pure Puruṣa, called the Supreme Self, are caused by means of the Upādhi or external investment of the Antah-karaṇa. Such is the import.

By this aphorism is declared neither that experience which belongs to that which possesses the distinction, nor that it is the object of cognisance of the intuition of “You” and “I”; for, experience which is of the form of immediate intuition, does not possess the characteristic of being a property of Āhamkāra; and also because it is not established that Discrimination is produced by the bringing forward of the subjects of the properties of “You” and “I”. But, on the contrary, has been exhibited
the division of the Jiva-Ātmā and the Parama-Ātmā declared by hundreds of sayings such as:

वहा त्वासत्सविवां जीवात्मकपरमात्मकसः ।
सम्बेद्या वृद्धिं देह पञ्चचत्तृको माणिभ्यः ॥
ताहार्य विश्वये ग्राहुः परा-परविवेदः ।
परस्यति निष्णुः क प्राणोपत्यायांस्वातः ॥

But when there will be cognition of the non-difference between the Jiva-Ātmā and the Parama-Ātmā; then, O best of Manas, will there be the cutting asunder of the noose.

They declare the Self to be twofold, according to the distinction of the Higher and the Lower: the one free from the Gunas, is said to be the Higher, and the one conjoint with Ahaṃkāra, the Lower.

Of these, in respect to the state of being the Jiva, Ahaṃkāra is nothing but the mark of distinction.—63.

Ahaṃkāra, and not Īśvara, is the Cause.

श्रव्यतारकर्त्तर्चिना कार्यसिद्धिनेवकर्त्तर्चिना प्रमाणाभावात्

|| 63 ||

| 64 |

Ahaṃkāra-kartṛ-adhīnā, dependent upon Ahaṃkāra as the agent.

- Kārya-siddhiḥ, accomplishment of effects.
- Na, not.

Īśvara-kartṛ-adhīnā, dependent upon Īśvara as the agent.

Pramāṇa-abhāvāt, because of the absence of proof.

64. Dependent upon Ahaṃkāra as the agent is the accomplishment of effects, (and) not dependent upon Īśvara as the agent, because there is no proof (of this).—520.

Pṛitti:—Since it possesses lordliness (Āśvarya), therefore, it is the Jiva-Ātmā, may say our opponent, that is Īśvara, and it is He who will create the Universe. And to this effect has it been said:

हैवद्र लवणामेन द्रोहो द्रोहं न विविदति ।

वश्याद्व वश्येवाति वत्सास्तहूः मायाय ॥

Īśvara dwells, O Arjuna, in the region of the heart of all beings, causing, by means of His Māyā, all beings to move about, like puppets made to perform movements through a mechanical apparatus.—Gītā, XVIII. 61.

In regard to this, the author says:

"Because of the absence of proof": because of the absence of the knowledge of the material cause of the Universe.

Because (the supposed Īśvara, i.e., the Jiva as Īśvara) is not all-pervading, the supposition of more than one Īśvara (will also be necessary).—64.
Bhāṣya:—Now, with a view to establish that the triad of Brahma, etc., are the only Isvaras in a practical (and not in a transcendental) sense, the author desires to demonstrate that it is of Mahat and Ahamkāra only that the Universe, excepting these, is the effect, and not of any Isvara. Therein, in the first place, he states the effect of Ahamkāra.

The agent which is of the form of Ahamkāra,—it is dependent upon that only that there is “the accomplishment of the effect,” that is, the fulfilment of creation and destruction; because power equal to such a task, is the effect of Ahamkāra, since that power is not seen in those who are devoid of Ahamkāra.

On the other hand, (“the accomplishment of the effect”) is not dependent upon a Supreme Isvara, not affected by Ahamkāra, as declared by the Vaiśeṣikas and others; because there is no evidence of creatorship uninfluenced by Ahamkāra, and of an eternal Isvara. Such is the meaning. For, it is creation preceded by Ahamkāra that alone is heard in the Śruti,

वहि वहि स्वं प्रजाते
I will be many, I will procreate.—Chhāndogya Upanishat, VI. II. 8.

There is no evidence that, in the above Śruti, the word, Aham, I, is a mere imitation (of secular language).

By this aphorism it is also established that the agency of Brahmā and Rudra, in creation and destruction (respectively), as proved by the Śruti and Smṛiti, is due to the Upādhi or investment of Ahamkāra.—64.

There is no Intelligent Cause of Ahamkāra.

यद्यकमुद्यत समानत्वम् \| 6 1 64 \|
Adriṣṭa-udbhiṣṭi-vat, like the arising or development of Adriṣṭam, or Desert. समानम् Samāna-tvam, sameness.

65. It is the same as in the case of the arising of Adriṣṭam.—521.

Vṛttī:—The author says that, because it is an effect, even the characteristic of being the effect of an Intelligent cause is not-one-pointed, i.e., inconclusive.

“As in the case of the arising of Adṛṣṭam,” because it has no creator. If that also were to have a cause, another arising of Adṛṣṭam will be required as a concomitant; of this of that also, yet another; and hence there will be non-finality. And because it has a beginning, there is no abandonment of the beginninglessness of Sampātra or mundane existence.—66.
Bhāṣya:—But granted that Ahamkāra is the cause of all the rest: but what, pray, our opponent may ask, is the cause of Ahamkāra? To this, the author replies:

Just as, in the case of creation, etc., manifestation of karma, action or change, causing agitation in Prakṛti, takes place merely through a particular time, inasmuch as, in the supposition of another karma or action as being the cause of the development of the preceding one, non-finality is entailed, very similarly is Ahamkāra produced just from time merely as the Nimitta or concomitant cause, but not that there exists another cause of it also: thus there is equality between us. Such is the meaning.

Neither can it be said, in the opinion of those who admit an Īśvara, that the manifestation of effects also is caused by Īśvara himself, inasmuch as it would entail partiality and want of compassion on the part of Īśvara. For, it is just by means of their being dependent upon karma that partiality etc., on the part of Īśvara, are to be avoided by those who admit an Īśvara. If, then, Īśvara himself is to superintend karma, then partiality, etc., will certainly be entailed. Such is the import.—65.

Vedāntin Mahādea:—As in the case of the Udghāt or production of that of which there is no visible creator, e.g., earth, sprout, etc., there is (in the case in question) the sameness of the absence of an intelligent cause. For, as in the case of the earth, sprout, etc., there is no intelligent creator, because there is no knowledge of it, similarly in the case of the Tan-mātras also.

Other functions of the supposed Īśvara accounted for.

66. Of Mahat, (the cause is) something else (than Ahamkāra.)—Aniruddha. From Mahat is the rest.—Vijñāna.—522.

Vṛtti:—While Ahamkāra is the cause, does it, it may be asked, possess causality towards Mahat also? To this, the author replies:

The cause of one thing cannot be its effect.—66.

Bhāṣya:—What is other than the effect of Ahamkāra, viz., creation, etc.,—that is, preservation, inner rulership, etc.,—that arises from the Principle Mahat itself; because, by reason of absence of the cause of
Abhimāna or conceit, and the like, on account of its being constituted by 
pure Śattva, the spring of its activity is only benevolence towards 
others, and also because it possesses exceeding knowledge, power, and 
lordliness. Such is the meaning.

And by this aphorism it is established that the character of Viśṇu 
as the Preserver of the Universe is due to the Principle Mahat as his 
Upādhi or adjunct. While, because the Principle Mahat is His Upādhi, 
Viṣṇu is sung as the Great, the Supreme Lord, and Brahmā. So has it 
been said:

यदानु: वाहुरैवावट्वो विषयं तमस्वात्मकम् ||

What they declare to be the Chitta or mind called Vādudva, i.e., (Viṣṇu), that 
consists of Mahat,—Śrimad-Bhāgavata-m, III, xvi. 31.

In this (Śāṅkhya) Sūtra, the Causal Brahman is, however, intended 
to be nothing but the genus of Puruṣa free from the Guṇas, inasmuch as 
there is non-admission of Isvara. Therein the word, cause, either refers 
to the Upādhi in the shape of its own power or energy, viz., Prakṛiti, or 
refers to Nimitta or instrumental or concomitant causality, since the 
end of Puruṣa is the cause of moving Prakṛiti to activity.—66.

In any case, the relation of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa is from eternity.

कर्मनिमित्तः प्रकृते: स्वःमिभवोप्यनाविषः

वीजाकुञ्जरत् ॥ ६ ॥ ६८ ॥

कर्मनिमित्तः: Karma-nimittah, of which Karma or Desert is the nimitta or in-
strumental cause. कर्म: Prakṛiteḥ, of Prakṛiti. स्वाभविषः: Sva-Svāmi-bhāvah.
the relation of the thing owned and the owner thereof. अं Api, also. अन-
किष्टः, beginningless. बिजाकुञ्जरत् Bija-aṅkurus-vat, as in the case of the seed and
the sprout.

67. The relation of the owned and the owner, in the 
case of Prakṛiti (with Puruṣa), even though it be due to the 
instrumentality of Karma or Desert, is without beginning, 
as in the case of the seed and the sprout.—523.

Vṛtti:—The thing owned is Prakṛiti, the owner is Puruṣa. Is 
the relation between them, it may be asked, natural, or is it due to the 
instrumentality of something else? If it be natural, then, since nature 
never departs, there will be non-release. In regard to this, the author 
says:

"Of Prakṛiti",—this is an illustration: of Puruṣa,—this also is to 
be observed.
And if Karma is the cause of the relation of the owned and the owner, on the exhaustion of Karma through Discrimination, from the absence of the relation of the owned and the owner, there will be Release.

By means of what is non-eternal being with a beginning, there is no avoidance of beginninglessness in the case of what is eternal also: hence "Beginningless,"—this has been stated.—67.

Bhāṣya:—In places it has been stated that, for the sake of the owner, the activity of Prakṛiti arises quite spontaneously. Herein the relation of the owned and the owner is the relation of the experienced and the experiencer. And that, one may say, does not exist prior to the activity of Prakṛiti.

The author removes this apprehension.

According to what class of the Sāṃkhyaśa of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, the relation of the owned and the owner, that is, the relation of the experienceable and the experiencer, is due to the instrumentality of Karma or Desert, in their opinion also, that relation is, in the form of a continuous stream, indeed, without a beginning, as in the case of the seed and the sprout, because it is borne out by evidence. Such is the meaning. For, if it be an accidental or chance relation, the bondage once again of the released one also will be entailed.—67.

A Second View of the Case.

श्रववेकाराजिद्वै पञ्चशितः: \(\text{II 66}\)

A-viveka-nimittat, due to the instrumentality of Non-Discrimination. वा, or. अविवेक: Pañcaśikha, Pañcaśika, the celebrated Sāṃkhya teacher.

68. Or, (it is the same if the relation of the owned and the owner) be, as says Pañcaśikha, due to the instrumentality of Non-Discrimination.—524.

Vṛtti:—The author states another view.

"The relation of the owned and the owner",—this follows (from the preceding aphorism).—68.

Bhāṣya:—This beginninglessness is, says the author, the same even in the doctrine of (the relation of the owned and the owner) being due to the instrumentality of Non-Discrimination.

Pañcaśikha says: Or the relation of the owned and the owner is caused by Non-Discrimination as the nimitta or instrumental cause. In
that doctrine also the relation is without a beginning: Such is the
meaning.

It is this very doctrine which is the author's own, because it has
already been declared by him.

And Non-Discrimination, just like Karma or Desert, persists, in
Pralaya or Dissolution also, in the form of Vasanț or Tendency.

In the doctrine, on the other hand, that Non-Discrimination is the
antecedent non-existence of Discrimination, beginninglessness, as in the
case of the seed and the sprout, is not possible; because it is the undivided
(akhañda) antecedent non-existence alone that is the Hêtu or cause
of all experience whatever.—68.

A Third View of the Matter.

लिङ्गेयरीरनिमित्तक इति सनन्दनाचार्यः || 6 || 66 ||

लिङ्गेयरीरनिमित्तक: Liñga-śartra-nimittakāḥ, due to the instrumentality of the
Liñga Śartra or Subtle Body. विलील: iti, thus. सनन्दनाचार्य: Sanandana Āchāryaḥ,
the teacher Sanandana.

69. (The relation of the owned and the owner, bet-
ween Prakṛiti and Puruṣa is) due to the instrumentality of the
Subtle Body,—thus holds Āchārya Sanandana.—525.

Vṛtti:—The author states the doctrine of a branch (of the Sāmkhya
School).

Because it undergoes transmigration (lauñya), therefore, it is called
the Liñga; it is the Subtle, Vehicular Body.

So long there is the going of the Subtle Body into the Gross Body,
so long, there being the relation of the owned and the owner (between
Prakṛiti and Puruṣa Puruṣa), is said to be bound.—69.

Bhāṣya:—Professor Sanandana, on the other hand, says that the
relation of the owned and the owner, between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, that
is, their relation of the experienceable and the experiencer, is due to the
Liñga Śartra as the instrumental cause thereof, because it is by means of
the Liñga Śartra itself that Experience takes place.

In his doctrine also, that (relation) is without a beginning. Such is
the meaning.

Although the Liñga Śartra does not exist in the state of Pralaya or
Dissolution, yet there exists the cause thereof, viz., Non-Discrimination
Karma, etc., produced by the Liñga Śartra belonging to a previous
Creation. By means thereof is the similarity of the relation of the owned and the owner and the Litiga Sartra to the seed and the sprout. Such is the intention.—69.

Conclusion.

वद्य तद्व तत्तचित्विर्ति: पुरुषार्थस्तुचित्विर्ति: पुरुषार्थ: ॥ ६ ॥ ७०॥

कः Yat, what. कः Vā, or. कः Tat, that. कः Vā, or. तत्तचित्विर्ति: Tat-uuchchhitiḥ, eradication or uprooting thereof, i.e., of the relation. पुरुषा: Purūsa-arthaḥ, the end of Purūsa.

70. Be that either this way or that way, the uprooting thereof is the end of Purūsa,—the uprooting thereof is the end of Purūṣa.—526.

Vṛtti:—The author states his own opinion.

"Be that either this way or that way": whether it be through exhaustion of Karma or Desert, or through Knowledge, or through anything else; the cutting short of Samsāra, by means of the uprooting of the relation of the owned and the owner, is the end of Purūsa.

"The uprooting thereof is the end of Purūṣa",—the repetition of this is to indicate the close of the Book.

This tenet of "Existent Effect," which was indeed previously ascertained, was to be established according to the Tantra or the Principle of Recapitulation; hence it will not count as a tautology.—70.

Here ends the Sixth Book in the Vṛtti to the Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram of Kapila.

And this treatise is here completed.

By the wise Aniruddha has been composed the Vṛtti of the Sāmkhya-Sūtram for the discrimination of the Sattva of the sluggish or dull and also for the Release of the Self.

Bhāṣya:—The author sums up the sense of the teachings of the Sūtra.

Whether the relation of the experienceable and the experiencer, between Prakṛti and Purūṣa, be due to the instrumentality of Karma or Desert; or be due to the instrumentality of Non-Discrimination, etc., the uprooting of this which is by all means difficult to uproot, by reason of its being without a beginning, is the supreme end of Purūṣa. Such is the meaning. "This, the same, was premised in the beginning: "Permanent Prevention of the threefold Pain is the Supreme Purpose of Life" (I. 1.)
But then, may say our opponent, here the cessation of experience, equally of pleasure and pain, is said to be the end of Purusa, whereas there the cessation of mere pain is said to be the end of Purusa: how then is here the conclusion of what was stated there? We reply that it is not so; because, even if there is a difference of language, there is no difference of sense. For, pleasure is verily thrown to the side of pain; hence experience of pleasure is the very same as the experience of pain: the experience of pain also is nothing but the connection of pain with Purusa in the form of a reflection: and by reason of the fact that the Self is of itself eternally free from the association of pain as an attribute, in the first aphorism also is intended the cessation of pain just in the form of a reflection: hence there is one and the same sense in the opening and concluding aphorisms.

The twice repetition of the greater portion of the aphorism is for the purpose of showing the close of the treatise.

In the Sixth Book, called the Tantra, has been made the elaboration of the principal teachings of the Sāstra which were not mentioned by the ancients, and afterwards the sense of the treatise also has been summed up.

This the same Sāmkhya Sāstra was promulgated by the Lord Vīśṇu, in the form of Kapila, for the benefit of the world. In regard to this, what a certain so-called Vedántin says, namely, that Kapila, the author of the Sāmkhya, is not Vīśṇu, but is a different Kapila who was an incarnation of Agni; since there is the Smṛiti:

चाशिष्ठिक: स कपिले सम्वित्वाग्नि पुराणानां

He is Agni, by name Kapila, who is the promulgator of the Sāmkhya Sāstra.—Mahābhārata,

that is merely an illusion caused to mankind, inasmuch as we learn from such Smṛitis as:

परमम अन्य देवधर्मिनासुदृढ़म् दुराचायाः

This My birth in this world is for the sake of a complete exhibition of the Tattvas or Principles, as approved in the Philosophy of the Self, to those who crave for release from a painful state.—Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam, III. xiv. 85.

that it is the son of Devahuti, the incarnation of Vīśṇu, that is the teacher of the Sāmkhya, and also because the supposition of two Kapilas is redundant. And in the above passage of the Mahābhārata, the word, Agni,
has been used simply because of the appearance or influence of the power called Agni; just as, e.g., in the saying of Sri Kriṣṇa:

क्रिष्णः क्रिष्णेऽवाच न तद्भवति

I am Kāla, the destroyer of worlds, apposed.—Gītā, XI. 32.

has been employed the word, Kāla, simply because of the appearance of the power of Kāla; since, otherwise, there will be entailed the difference of Kriṣṇa, as the Manifestor of the Universal Form, from Kriṣṇa, as the incarnation of Viṣṇu. Such is the hint.—70.

Having filled up, to overflow, the receptacle of the Sāṁkhya with the nectar churned from the Vedānta, the Rṣi Kapila entertained, in days of yore, other Rṣis, at the Sacrifice of Knowledge.

By means of faith in his words, through constant devotion to that Guru, with the help of a drop of his grace, that Śāstra, in this form, has been expounded by me.

Here ends the Sixth Book, called the Book of Tantra, in the Commentary, composed by Vijnāna Bhikṣu, on the Sāṁkhya-Pramachānam of Kapila.

Thus is complete the Commentary on the Sāṁkhya-Pramachānam.
APPENDIX I.

INDEX OF APHORISMS.
# Alphabetic Index of the Aphorisms.

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APPENDIX IV.

A CATALOGUE OF SOME OF THE IMPORTANT WORKS ON THE SĀMKHYA.
A CATALOGUE OF SOME OF THE IMPORTANT WORKS ON THE SĀMKHYA.

A List of Recognised Text-Books of the Sāmkhya School
(Taken from Fitis-Edward Hall’s Collection).

1. Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtra, attributed to Rishi Kapila.
2. Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtra-Vrītī by Aniruddha.
3. Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtra-Vrītī-Sāraḥ by Māhādeva Sarasvatī, more commonly known as Vedicant Mahādeva.
4. Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Bhāṣyam by Vijnāna Bhikṣu.
5. Laghu-Sāmkhya-Sūtra-Vrītī by Nāgoji Bhatta or Nāgoji Bhattachar, surnamed as Upadhyāya.
6. Tattva-Samāsah, attributed to Rishi Kapila.
7. Sāmkhya-Tarangah, a Commentary on No. 1, by Viśveśvaradatta Miśra, ascetically called Deva Tirtha.
8. Sarvopakāraṇi, a Commentary on No. 6. Author is not known.
10. Sāmkhya-Krama-Dipikā, also called Sāmkhyalāṅkaaraḥ and Sāmkhya-Sūtra-Prakṣepikā, ditto. ditto.
12. Tattva-Samāśa-Vyākhyā, by Kṛṣṇamūnda.
13. Sāmkhya-Karikā, also called Saptatih, by Nāvara Kṛṣṇa.
15. Sāmkhya-Tattva-Kauumudi, also called Tattva-Kauumudi, by Vachaspati Miśra.
17. Tattvārnavālaḥ, otherwise called Tattvānupita-Prakṣiṇi, a Commentary on No. 14, by Itāghavāla Sarasvatī.
20. Sāmkhya-Tattva-Vilāsaḥ, also called Sāmkhya-Vṛittī-Prakṣālaḥ and Sāmkhyārtha-Sāmkhyāyikā, by Raghunātha Tarka Viśiṣṭa Bhattāchārya.
21. Sāmkhya-Chandrikaḥ, a Commentary on No. 12, by Nārāyaṇa Tirtha.
23. Sāmkhya-Tattva-Pradīpāḥ, by Kaviraja Yati or Kaviraja Bhikṣu.
27. Rāja-Vartikam, attributed to Ranarāyaṇa Malla, king of Bāhāra.
APPENDIX V.

TATTVA-SAMĀSA OR KĀPILA-SŪTRAM.
KÂPILA-SÛTRAM
(TATTVA-SAMĀSA)

WITH
NARENDRA'S COMMENTARY.

COMMENTATOR'S INTRODUCTION.

Aum

Salutation to the Supreme Self.

I compose this Commentary on the Aphorisms of Kapila, after making obeisance to Him, the Lord of infinite bliss, Whom the mind of thoughtful men reaches by thinking in deep meditation, as well as to Kapila, that Seer of ancient fame.

Now, verily, in this world, all beings, endowed with life, desire, "May there be no pain, may there be pleasure for me," and, thus, production of pleasure and avoidance of pain are the two things always desired by them. For there can be no feeling of pleasure without the disappearance of pain, inasmuch as, possessing contradictory properties as they do, they, like darkness and light, cannot exist at one and the same time. If pain had no existence in the Sûtrâ, stream of transmigration,—the world-process,—then nobody would care to find out the means of its removal. But if it does exist there, care must be taken in respect of the remedy of the threefold afflictions; for, it is the cessation of the threefold afflictions that is the supreme object of desire.

...
Thereupon Kapila, whose mind has been purified by the consideration of the Real and the Unreal, with a view to demonstrate the Avoidable, (i.e., pain), through the removal of false knowledge, by means of this collection of twenty-two aphorisms, briefly proposes the beginning of the Śāstra, for the illumination of the disciple.

The Śāṅkhya (-Pravachana-Śātram), consisting of six books, of which the first aphorism is, Final cessation of the threefold pain is the supreme object of desire, appears, it is said, to be a repetition or reproduction of what is taught in this Śāstra, inasmuch as brevity in speech should be the characteristic of Kapila who is spoken of in the Veda and who was master of meditation. Thus there is the Śrutī:

अर्थेण प्रकृतं कारितं यत्समे दत्तेषिन्मर्ति ज्ञायनायम् पवेतु।

(Who at first nourishes the Seer Kapila, when brought forth, with knowledge, and also looks upon him as he is brought forth.)

This is true; for, their subject-matter being the same, the present one was taught as an elementary course, while the object of both the Śāstras is the ascertainment of the Principle of the Self.

Kapila’s system is called the Śāṅkhya, because the word Śāṅkhya conveys a technical or singular sense derived from its etymology. Thus there is the authority of the Mahābhārata (Śānti Parvan):

संस्कृत्यां प्रकृते यथा प्रकृति च प्रवस्यते।
तत्र श्रेष्ठम् बलगृहसः तेन सांक्ष्य: प्रकृतिविद्या॥

[They are called Śāṅkhyas, because they cause illumination (of the nature of the Self), and declare Prakṛiti or the First Cause and the twenty-four Principles].

What, then, is that Śāstra?

आथातस्तत्स्य समास: || 1 ||

அஷ்ட காலத்தன் சமாச: || 1 ||

அ ஆதா, now, denotes undertaking and refers to the subject-matter.
அ அதா, therefore, gives the reason why cultivation of knowledge is required.
அ தட்டவே, of truths, principles.
அ ஸ்மாஸாம், collection, compendium.

1. Now, therefore, a Compendium of Principles (is wanted).—1.

Athā signifies a good omen, enquiry, inception of an act, sequence, undertaking, promise, substitution, etc.” Although so many different meanings of the word Atha, are observed, yet it is here taken in the sense of an undertaking, the other senses being inappropriate. It may be rightly urged that, at the commencement of a book, the
observance of a good omen is indispensable, as, without the observance of a good omen, the completion of the book cannot be expected. But we believe that the sense of a good omen is obtained here from the mere recital of the word, Ata, which drives away all possible hindrances. Hence there is no violation of the practice of the polite. Ata, therefore, denotes undertaking. The word, Ata, conveys the sense of cause or reason. The meaning is, because the fruit of action does not endure, as declared by the following and other Shrutis:

यथेष्ट कामलित्वं विद्धः तीर्थायं प्रवृत्तियुध पुष्पिष्ठेऽवेस्तः क्षीरसेति।

(As here the world conquered by action wears away, so there also the world conquered by virtue wears away.)

The word, tattva, bears the sense of reality as demonstrated in the Veda. Samasah means throwing together or collection, i.e., compendium or abridgment. Tattva (locative) samasah has been used for tattvasya (genitive) samasah, a short account of the Principles. The expression, "should be understood," is the complement of the aphorism.—1.

In order to throw light on those Principles, the author lays down the aphorism:

कथयायं स्वप्नोऽन्नकत्यः ॥ २ ॥

कथयायी् Kathayami, declare, describe. अष्ट आषां, eight. प्रक्रियायः, प्रक्रियायिन, roots, radicals, originals, evolvents, first causes.

2. (I) describe or declare (the Prakritis). (There are) eight Prakritis.—2.

There is a stop after Kathayami. The meaning is that the author is declaring the Prakritis one by one. What is the designate of the word, Prakriti? What, again, are the kinds of Prakriti? And how many are the Prakritis? Prakriti (derived from prakriti, in the sense that) it multiplies, modifies, procreates, means procreatrix, that which brings forth. It is two-fold: pure and mixed. Pure Prakriti is one, being the state of equilibrium, or neutral state, of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, the sentient, mutative, and conservative Principles, or the Principles of Illumination, Evolution, and Involution; it is Unmanifest, Principal, Insentient, and the Cause of the World. By means of their unequilibrated, disengaged, or perturbed states (arise, the Principles of Mahat, Ahamkara, and the five Tan-mantras, (collectively) called Prakriti-vikriti or mother-principles as well as products or transformations. The mixed Prakritis, therefore, are seven. These are the eight Prakritis. Cf.
(Mahat springs from Prakriti; from Mahat, Ahamkāra; from Ahamkāra, the five Tan-mātras.)—(Samkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram I. 61).

What is the nature of Mahat? It is a species of buddhi or understanding. Ahamkāra, on the other hand, is the principle underlying such conduct as "I do." The five Tan-mātras also are the five species of sound, touch, form or colour, taste or flavour, and smell.

But how can there be production from an insentient cause? For no production can take place in the absence of a sentient agent, as, for example, the water-pot will not be produced where there is no sentient agent at work. This may be rightly contended, except that productive power is observed in insentient things also, as, e.g., even insentient milk causes the growth of the baby. In like manner, insentient cow-dung, etc., give birth to insects. Similarly. If it is rejoined that, in the case of milk and cow-dung, the power of production comes from the sentient principle presiding over the bodies of the mother and the cow, we reply that this is not well said. How can the perception of sentience in the bodies of the cow and the mother be continued as the perception of sentience in the milk and cow-dung expurgated by them? At no time is sentience perceived in them as they are being ejected. Or, it may be understood in this way that as the loadstone, which is unconnected with sentience, is found to possess the power of causing vibration of particles in other bodies by means of its mere proximity to them, so do sentient effects everywhere follow from insentient causes.—2.

After declaring Prakriti, the author lays down the following aphorism, with the object of reciting the Transformations:

||
| प्रेयः | शोधानकख विकारः |

कृति: शोधानकख, सिरेफळ. यदि, अन्य: विक्रिय, निर्माण, वैकार, उत्पाद.

3. Transformation is numerically sixteen only.—3.

Transformation is sixteen in number. The word, tu, is used to show that the enumeration is exhaustive. Now, what are the sixteen Transformations? The sixteen Transformations are the five elements, viz., Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Ether; the five Energies or Action, locally named as the voice, hand, leg, anus, and organ of speech; the five Energies or Faculties of Perception, located in the eye, tongue, and nose; and Manas, Intellect. But why should Manas, which enter into the production of the water-pot, and the like, as material causes, be characterised as Transformations only, when, like the five Tan-mātras,
they embrace the nature of both Prakriti and Vikāra? This objection cannot be allowed, as, in that case, the result would be infinite regression in this way that curd is the transmutation of milk, cream is the transformation of curd, bad smell is the transformation of cream, and so on. Moreover, the objects, water-pot, cloth, etc., are not different from earth, etc., as is found in the Śruti:

बाँचारमण्य विकारं नामवेयं नुविकारेियं सत्तवं।

(Transformation, such as a pot, a plate, a cup, etc., is a name, the creation of speech, while, in reality, it is nothing but clay).—Chh. Up., VI, i. 4. Hereby it is understood that water-pot, milk, sprout, etc., are not different objects from earth, animal, seed, etc., since perceptual cognition arises in the same form in both the cases.—3.

Motion in a chariot and the like, which are insentient, arises from their conjunction with horses. In like manner, the perception of sentience in objects is everywhere due to their relation to a sentient object. Intending to teach this, the author says:

पुरुषः || ॥

पुरुष: Purusha, Person, Spirit, Self, In-dweller.

4. (There is one) in-dwelling Self (in every object appearing as sentient).—4.

He who lies (etc.) within the body, like one within a room (purī), is Purusha, by conjunction with whom everything appears to possess sentience. He is the Enjoyer, stainless, eternal, and unproductive. So say the Śrūtis, e. g.:

इदानि भूतमयस्य स पवायाः स उ पवाय व तथाः।

(The Purusha, of the measure of the thumb, "smokeless" like light, the Lord of the past and the future; He is the very same to-day and will remain so the next day; this is that)—Katha Upanisat, II. iv. 13.

[(He) possesses no sound, gives no touch, possesses no form, and is immutable.]

Now, here the question may be raised whether there is only one Purusha, or whether there are many Purushas. Let us see how the two theories stand.
Objection to the first theory:—It is not tenable, as, there being unity of the Puruṣa, on the death of one, all would die, and so on, and that thereby creation would suddenly vanish out of existence.

Answer:—Still there may be unity of the Puruṣa since he is capable of manifold divisions, according to variety of upādhis or external limitations, like (portions of) space confined within a water-pot and a temple and known as Ghaṭa (water-pot)-Ākāśa (space) and Maṭha (temple)-Ākāśa.

Objection:—Even if the accidental manifoldness of the Puruṣa be conceded, it would still entail the disappearance of the world (Samsāra) in course of time, as, the Śruti teaches, Release is attained on the destruction of the upādhi by knowledge of truth. For, a thing which is not capable of growth, cannot be lasting, in the same way, for example, as immeasurable masses of wealth, belonging to a charitable person, will be spent up in no time, if there be no fresh source of income.

Answer:—This is not a sound objection. The body of the son, produced from the mother and the father, being made up of parts of their bodies, what is there to prevent, in the son, etc., the inflow of the parts of the Puruṣas seated within the parental bodies as well as of the part of their Vāsanā or the tendency of their nature? For, living beings do not spring into existence as not embodying parts of the bodies of their parents. Consequently, sentiency of the same kind as exists in the causes, is perceived in the effects, as, for example, pieces of cloth are perceived to be red or yellow, because the threads which are their material causes, have conjunction with red or yellow colour. In the Mahābhārata we find:—

कलेष्याय संयमने मुखि हुयोऽधना तुपः

(And a part of Kali, O king, was born on earth as Duryodhana.)—Also in the Veda:

आलमा है जायते पुत्रः

(Verily the Self is born as the son).

Thus the one unborn Puruṣa becomes multiplied to infinity as emanations from successive parents. Amongst them, some undergo transmigration, and some are released.

Objection:—Such a view cannot find favour with those who know the traditions of the School, as it is in contradiction with the Sāṁkhya conception of the Puruṣa as undergoing no transformation at all.

Hence the second theory should be accepted, namely, that there are many Puruṣas, there being diversity of pleasures, pains, births, deaths, etc., as well as variety of virtuous lives such as Varṣa, castes, Āśrama, stages of life, etc. It cannot be said that in this theory also there will be an
end of the world, since such a conclusion is contravened by the infinity and eternality of the Purusa.

These are the twenty-five principles maintained by the Sankhya teachers.

Now, why should not the Purusa, it may be asked, have a beginning or birth? We reply that the Purusa is unborn, because, there being the Vatsana or tendency towards transmigration, the beginning of which is not known, the Vedas had no occasion to believe in repeated births and deaths of the Purusa, as repeated windings and turnings are required in the case of the clock and the potter’s wheel. For, there is the Sruti: 

संत्वसंरहे द्वारा पापतिल्लालयाने द्विकोपात्त्वरथा तत्मौ वेद वे तत्तदांपुरूषं इत 

dhruvah de bhavannantah hanyantarangahyante t eva purnarvasayate tattvādāt

प्रजायतान 

dr̥vam pratisamaya ite bhūtvā nityānām bhaṣyaṅgagṛ̥tānām bhūtvā

विद्यां नानानि श्रविधयानि ब्रह्मानि ज्ञातानि॥

(The whole year is verily the Lord of Beings. It consists of two Paths, the southern and the northern. Those who worship by means of sacrifices and benevolent deeds, surely ascend to the World of the Moon. It is they that return into transmigratory existence. So the Rishis, desirous of progeny, take to the Southern Path. This is Bhūtvā, this is Radv, this is the Path of the Rishis. Again, by the Northern Path, by penance, by continence, by faith, by reason, one should search for knowledge. For these they are born.)—4.

After declaring the twenty-five Principles, the author now analyses the subsidiary states:

चौरःप्रायस् ॥ ॥

चौरः Traigunyam, tri-qualified-ness.

5. Prakriti has three modes, manifestations, or states.

—5.

Traigunyam means the essential form, essence, or (manifested) existence, of the three Guṇas, modes or states, namely, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. Herefrom it is learnt that Traigunyam or Prakriti is Prachānām, i.e., the Principal or Primary (as distinguished from the Guṇas which are, as their name probably implies, Secondary or Subsidiary), and is the existence of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas in their intrinsic or essential form and in equilibrium, apart from the state of their predominance over one
another. If it be asked, what the reason for this interpretation is, we reply that it is so taught in the Veda. Thus:

[The One Unborn (Puruṣa), for enjoyment, consorts with the One Unborn (Prakṛti), having the colours of red, white, and black, the procreatrix of manifold progeny, like unto herself. The other Unborn deserts her, after she is enjoyed.]—Svetāsvatara Upaniṣat, IV. 5.

There is connection of the unattached, sentient Puruṣa with these modes, or subsidiary states, inherent in their material cause (Prakṛti), and this connection takes place through mere proximity, as in the case of a lamp and darkness.

Object:—But how can connection of states or modes, be possible in the case of the material cause of the world, which contains no parts? In the world, blue and other attributes are observed in the lotus and the like, which are made up of parts. But nowhere is found connection of attributes in things which contain no parts.

Answer:—This is true. But we may point out that super-ordinary things, made known by the Vedas, do not possess merely the same power as do ordinary things, since objects, proved in the Vedas, are capable of everything. Or, we may say, if white and other attributes may be admitted in the case of part-less, popular entities, namely, ultimate atoms, then the anomaly in the case of the all-powerful (material) cause of the world is really an adornment—5.

After stating Sattva, and the other modes or states, of Prakṛti, the author lays down the following aphorism, with the desire of declaring their properties also:

सम्बर: प्रतिसम्बर: || 6 ||

कर्म: Sañccharah, production, appearance. कल्पन: Prati-sañccharah, destruction, disappearance.

6. Entities spring from the eight Prakṛitis, and disappear into them.—6.

The meaning of the word, Sañcara, is production, and of the word, Prati-sañcara, dissolution. It is learnt from the Veda, that production is from the eight Prakṛitis, and that dissolution is into them. How? Because, as, in the Veda itself:

prasādāt, mohādāntāt, ca dharma āt ca yād tāmābhāvīṣāya vasya .
from Prakrīti, Mahat; from Mahat, Ahamkāra; and from Ahamkāra, the five Tan-mātras are produced, so the five Tan-mātras are dissolved into Ahamkāra, Ahamkāra into Mahat, and Mahat into Prakrīti. As a tortoise sometimes extends and sometimes withdraws its limbs, and, similarly, as a spider itself spins out and withdraws its thread, in like manner the Prakritis also work in the order of evolution and involution.—6.

Since these Predicables of the Sāṃkhya System possess the characteristics of pleasure and pain, the author now describes the nature of Pleasure and Pain:

**व्यायामसमसमप्रमिलाः प्रमणत्**

प्रारंभ Adhi-ātma, adhyātma, springing from the embodiment of the self. कूलयति Adhi-ātmam, adhibhūta, caused by elemental creation. विद्युत्त Adhidaivam, adhidaiva, caused by celestial beings, super-human agencies

7. Pain is threefold: adhyātma, adhibhūta, and adhidaiva.—7.

In the world of living entities, none is known to be free from the three-fold suffering. Why? Because they are subject to three kinds of pain. What, then, are these three kinds of pain? To this it is replied. यथायात्मासन्यासः Adhyātma means that (pain) which is adhī, relative, ātmāni, to (the embodied state of) the self. It is twofold: bodily and mental. Bodily (pain) is occasioned by disorders of wind, bile, and phlegm within the physical organism. Mental (pain) is occasioned by desire, anger, lust, bewilderment, fear, sadness, envy, and non-attainment of the object of desire. All this should be regarded as adhyātma pain, because they are produced from within, (that is, from the person himself). Adhibhūtam is that (pain) which is adhi, relative, bhādām, to the elements, that is, occasioned by men, beasts, birds, reptiles, and immovable things. Adhidaivam is that (pain) which is adhi, relative, daivam, to celestial agencies, that is, occasioned by the influence of planetary powers, Vināyaka, Yakṣa; Rākṣasa, and the like.

The import of the aphorism is that Prakrīti, the Prakrīti-and-Vikāras, and the Vikāras (mentioned above) have identity of nature with these threefold pains.

There are many easy means of exterminating them. Thus, for the cure of bodily pain, such an easy means as arboreal elixir has been prescribed by the physicians. To counteract the torments of the mind, there are such pleasant and easily applicable remedies as a splendid
palace, woman, excellent dishes, ornaments, and so forth. In like manner, for the prevention of elemental pain, thorough mastery of polity or the science and art of civic life, is the means. Similarly, again, for the removal of adhidaiva pain, use of jewels and incantations is the means.

(Objection):—When pain is remediable by these quite ordinary means, where, then, is the necessity for this Sāstra which purports to teach discrimination of the Puruṣa from Prakṛiti as the means for the termination of pain?

Answer:—There are no doubt all these means, but still, it should be observed, absolute or permanent cessation of pains is not possible by them, there still remaining the possibility of the re-appearance of those pains, time after time.—7.

Being desirous of pointing out the general characteristic of Buddhi or understanding, the author frames the aphorism:

पञ्चमिलइँद्रः ॥ ८ ॥

च: पञ्चा, प्व:। कीर्तिन्योः: अभी-बुद्धयाह, नोडिन्त युक्तिः योगिः योगिः.

8. The Cognitive Powers are five—8.

Abhibuddhayāh means that by which objects are known. How many are they? Five. Which, again, are they? The three inner senses, the power of perception, and the power of action. Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, and Manus are the inner senses. Adhyavasya, certainty, is the characteristic of Buddhi, Understanding (another word for Mahat); Adbhimaṇa, undue application of the Self (e. g., to think that the Self is the agent in all acts, which, however, is not a fact), or Self-assumption, is of Ahaṃkāra, Egoity; and Samkalpa, ideation (or conception), and Vikalpa, imagination, are of Manus, Intellect. The Powers of Perception are, according to the differences of the acts of seeing, etc., respectively (localised in) the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin. Their sub-divisions are five. The Powers of Action, again, are, as, according to the differences of the acts of speaking, etc., respectively (localised in) the vocal organ, hand, leg, anus, and the organ of generation, five in number. Taking them all together, with their sub-divisions, we find, Karana, sense or the instrument of knowledge, is of thirteen kinds. Hence, in this world, consisting of births and deaths in continuous succession the beginning of which is enveloped in darkness, every object being knowable, these Powers of Knowledge are maintainable.

Some are, however, of opinion that, amongst the inner senses, Manus is not a sense or power or faculty of knowing. But this is not a sound
opinion, because, as in the case of a ball of iron, the (external) senses are
found to have, with regard to their respective objects, identity of nature
with Manas, the ruler of all the senses. The sense-ness of Buddhi and
Ahamkāra is hereby explained, inasmuch as there is such perceptual
knowledge as "I shall go," "I am happy," etc. For, there could not be
such perceptual knowledge, did not Buddhi, etc., possess the characteristic
of senses.

Objection:—But, in your theory, even when you admit the (co-
)extensiveness of all the predicables, diversity of Buddhi, etc., according
to diversity of Puruṣa, is not justified. Why? Because there is cer-
tainty of their (ultimate) unity or homogeneity.

Answer:—True, but your objection is futile. For, we admit
diverse Buddhi, etc., as undergoing change or transformation (at every
moment), and taking their origin and form from the (peculiar) Vāsanā or
tendency (of each individual embodied Self). By reason of this Vāsanā
or tendency the senses attend to, or turn away from, particular objects.—8.

(An objection is apprehended:) This may be the case. But whence
is this invention of Vāsanā? With this apprehension, the author says:

पच्च कर्मयोनयं || ६ ||

पच्च: Pañcha, five. कर्मयोनयं: Karma-yonayah, action-borns, the products of action,
the functions of Buddhi, Understanding or Consciousness.

9. The products of action are five—9.

Karmayonayah means things of which karma, action, alone is yoni,
the source or origin, that is, modifications of the understanding or states
of consciousness. Thus, the products of action which, distinguished as
painful and non-painful, are responsible for the experience (bhoga) of
pleasure and pain by living beings, are used as being five in number.
Thus, in consequence of the painful modification, the living being suffers
pain, being scorched with the fire of Samsāra or transmigration, and,
similarly, by means of the non-painful modification, enjoys pleasure,
possessing developed discriminative knowledge, and being desirous of
Release and filled with the greatest bliss. What are those functions?
It is said, (they are): Pramāṇa, Proof, Viparyaya, Fallacy, Vikalpa, Fancy,
Nidrā, Sleep, and Sarviti, Recollection. Vijnāna-Bhikṣu has elaborately
explained this point in his Commentary on the Sāṃkhya Aphorisms in
Six Chapters. We, refrain from doing the same here for the sake of
brevity.—9.
Now the author shows the formal differences of one of the elements:

पञ्च वायुः ॥ १० ॥

पञ्च पञ्चा, फी. । कः: वायवह, अर्थ.

10. The Airs are five—10.

These Airs should be known to be five, seeing that living beings, undergoing production and destruction, possess a variety of (physiological) functions of Air, namely Prāṇa, Apāṇa, Samāna, Udāna, and Vyāna. Where are these different functions of Air located? The function operating in the mouth, nose, etc., belongs to Prāṇa; the function operating in the back, anus, organ of generation, etc., belongs to Apāṇa; the function operating in the heart, navel, and all the joints, belong to Udāna; the function operating in the skin, etc., belongs to Vyāna.

Objection:—But Vāyu, Air, also may be regarded as causing all living beings to move or to shine, being itself sentient, moving, and the performer of vital activities in all bodies. Why, then, do you imagine a sentient Puruṣa different from it?

Answer:—Quite so, but there is nothing to be disputed here, because we learn from the Veda that there is a Puruṣa different from Prāṇa, etc. Thus there is the Śruti:

(This Puruṣa is unattached, and so forth.)

Or, were Prāṇa itself the sentient Principle, then, in the case of a person in dreamless sleep, whose Prāṇa does not at that time leave him, water-pot, cloth, and other objects would be perceived by him, in that state, in the same way as perceptual knowledge arises in him in the waking state, because in dreamless sleep Prāṇa exists all the same. But no such cognition takes place in dreamless sleep, as the senses then cease to be active. The matter should be regarded in this light that, as the owner of a house goes out, with his whole family, employing a gate-man to guard the door, so does the Puruṣa, (in dreamless sleep), rest in bliss, employing Prāṇa alone to protect the body.—10.

After stating Sattva and the other Gūpas of Prakṛti, the author now ascertains the essences of action:

पञ्च कर्मात्मान: ॥ ५ ॥

पञ्च पञ्चा, फी. । कः: कर्म-अत्मानह, अर्थ.

11. The essences of action are five.—11.
Karmātmā means ātmā, the discriminator, that is, determinant, karmāṇām, of actions. Herefrom it should be learnt that the determinants or essences of actions are five, of which the causes are Yama, Abhyāsa, Vairāgya, Samādhi, and Prajñā. These, being developed, enable all acts to be performed. The proof, on this point, is furnished by:

न चात्य कर्म इत्यादि

[Action does not belong to him (Puruṣa), etc.]

They are described, one by one: Yama, Restraint, is the designation of harmless-ness, truthfulness, non-stealing, continence, not to enter into family life or unworthiness, etc. Abhyāsa, Habituation, denotes attention to puro thoughts, deeds, and objects, for a long time, without intermission. Vairāgya, Dispassion, is absence of desire for enjoyment here and hereafter. Samādhi, Concentration or Meditation, consists in one-pointed-ness of Manas. Prajñā, True Knowledge, means knowledge of Prakṛti and Puruṣa as different things. This has been explained by Vyāsa Deva in the Aphorisms of Patañjali.—11.

Now, in the next aphorism, the author teaches the mutual distinctions of the five kinds of A-vidyā or False Knowledge:

पञ्चपर्वः छाविषः ॥ १२ ॥


12. False Knowledge has five knots.—12.

Here parva means a knot. Kinds of False Knowledge which is knotty, are five. As, in consequence of the hardness of the knot in a string, a man cannot easily free himself from it, so also in consequence of the surpassing hardness of the knot of Samsāra or transmigration.

How many are they? A-vidyā, ignorance, Asmitā, the sense of "I am," i.e., egoity, Rāga, attraction, Dveṣa, aversion, and Abhinivesa, clinging-to, idle terror, or love of life, respectively called Tamas, obscurity, Moha, infatuation, Mahāmoha, great infatuation, Tāmāsra, darkness, Andha-tāmāsra, blinding darkness, will be five in number. It is A-vidyā to call things eternal, pure, and pleasant, which are, in reality, perishable, impure, and painful. Its form or function is as, e.g., "I am surely a Brāhmaṇa," the conceit being due to the identification of the Self with the Not-Self (or cognition of the Not-Self as the Self). Asmitā is of the form of Abhimāna (q.v.). "Wealth is dearer to me."—such a state of mind is of the form of Rāga. "It is not desirable, being perishable."


such a state of mind is of the form of Dveṣa. Abhinivesa is the state of mind having the form of, that is, leading into, births and deaths.

There are eight varieties of Tamas and Moha; ten varieties of Mahā-moha; and thirty-six varieties of the other two. The same has been declared in the Kārikā (Verse 48):

अंतःलोकोद्विषयों मोहस्य च द्विविषयों महामोहः।
तामोविषयाद्विदाय तथा अवभवितान्तः॥

(The division of Tamas is eightfold; so it is also of Moha; Mahā-moha is tenfold; Tāmīśra is eighteenfold; the same is Andha-Tāmīśra.)

—12.

Thus declaring the five divisions of the opposite of True Knowledge, the author describes the twenty-eight varieties (of Incapacity):

अशालीविन्यासार्थाकिः ||२२||

व्यविन्यास आष्टाविन्द्यान्तः द्वांविंद्यान्त अशाली, च.

inability, incapacity, disability.

13. Incapacity is twenty-eightfold.—13.

Here the suffix dха, is employed in the sense of variety. Hence it should be known that incapacity has twenty-eight varieties, inasmuch as it is diversified in form on account of A-vidyā. What are those varieties? It is said: Owing to the deadness or depravity of the senses or powers of perception and action, there exist eleven varieties of incapacity belonging to the eleven senses, namely, deafness, paralysis, blindness, loss of taste, loss of smell, dumbness, inactivity of the hand, lameness, constipation, impotence, and insanity, respectively belonging to the ear, skin, eye, tongue, nose, voice, hand, leg, anus, organ of generation, and Manas. Similarly, there are seventeen more varieties constituted by the opposites of Tūṣṭis and Siddhis. By their addition, these are the twenty-eight A-siddhis or imperfections (or inversions of Siddhis). Although the senses are the seats of these imperfections, still Vṛitti or state of consciousness is included in Buddha, Understanding or Consciousness and nowhere else, since there is no room for a state of consciousness in any other place except where Buddha is the material cause.—13.

The author now enumerates Tūṣṭis:

नवञ्जन सुन्धिः ||२२||

नवञ्जन किन्यास, नीन्दर, सुन्धर, रक्षित.

14. Complacency is ninefold.—14.
It, Tuṣṭi, is (primarily) twofold: Ādyatmika, internal, and Bāhya, external. The internal divisions are four, designated by reference to Prakṛiti, Upādāna, means or materials, Kāla, time, and Bhāgya, luck. Immediate intuition of the difference of Puruṣa from Prakṛiti is really a species of Transformation, and is the work of Prakṛiti itself, while I (Puruṣa) am perfect; what is the use of contemplation, and the like?

—the Tuṣṭi which the disciple derives from his thinking, (is of the first kind). It is called Ambhas. For, Viveka, discriminative knowledge, does not result from Prakṛiti alone. The same Tuṣṭi is found in retirement; there is no use of contemplation, and the like,—the Tuṣṭi which lies in such instructions, is designated by Upādāna. It is called Salila. Retirement will take place, by means of meditation, after waiting for a long time,—the Tuṣṭi which lies in such instructions, is designated by Time. It is called Megha. Nirvikalpa Samādhī, meditation without discreet consciousness, will result by the force of luck alone,—the Tuṣṭi which lies in this, is designated by Luck. It is called Vriṣṭi.

Five external complacencies are produced or arise for him who unduly applies the characteristic of the Self to Prakṛiti, Mahat, Ahaṃkāra, Tat-ātman, and the gross Elements. These complacencies, consequent on the disappearance, dissolution, or dispersal of objects which entail acquisition, preservation, waste, enjoyment, and injuriousness, are respectively known by the names of Pāra, Supāra, Pārāpāra, An-uttama-amhāras, and Utama-amhāras. Whatever people will become delighted by obtaining external complacency, would not be knowers of Principles; for, e.g., acquisition of wealth can be effected only with the greatest trouble, and also there is no knowledge of Principles in it. So it has been said:

कथान्यामहान्य वषाद्वेष परिसरसः ।
रागो दुःखो वै दृष्टविवर्तितं पुनः ' ॥

(There is trouble in the acquisition of wealth, and the same also in its preservation... There is pain in attachment to it, and also in its expenditure. Similarly, again, in the case of injuriousness or killing.)—Mahābhārata.

By the aggregation of these, complacency is said to be ninefold—14.

The author now lays down an aphorism, enumerating the minor divisions of the uninvited Siddhis alluded to above (vide Aphorism 13):

व्यास-धा, eightfold. सिद्धिः Siddhis, perfection.
15. Perfection is eightfold.—15.
What, again, are those eight sorts of perfection? Accordingly they are being specifically ascertained:

It is divided into two sorts: three primary ones and five secondary ones. The three primary ones are those named Pramodā, hilarious; Muditā, delighted; and Madamāṇā, joyful. Study, oral knowledge, reasoning, intercourse of friends, and charity are the secondary perfections. Thus, knowledge that is produced, after causing the disappearance of Adhidaiva pain, is Pramodā Siddhi; knowledge that is produced, after causing the removal of Adhibhūta pain, by means of service, etc., is Muditā Siddhi; knowledge that is born, immediately after the prevention of Adhyātma pain, is Madamāṇā Siddhi.

To receive instruction regarding knowledge of the Self, from a competent teacher, with due rites and ceremonies, constitutes study. That which is established by study, is oral or verbal knowledge. Reasoning is that perfection which consists in reasoning about the Principles, under the influence of previous practice, instinct, without instruction from teacher. Intercourse of friends is where pleasure is obtained by the mere company of near and dear ones. The perfection in charity consists in donation, according to ordinances, by one whose mind is absolute free from all sorts of impurity.—15.

Now the author distributes properties or characteristics amongst the twenty-five Principles.

वैभाष्यम् तत् ॥ १६ ॥

दशमूलिकाया ॥ १६ ॥

१६. दशमूलिकाया केति। प्रयोगः सार्धार्थां, रूढः रूढार्थाः सार्धार्थाः।

Herefrom these, mulikāh, root, arthāh, objects (of perception), should be known to be ten. (Why are they called root objects?) Because objects reside, so far as may be, in one or other predicables amongst these twenty-five Principles. What are they? Where do they reside? All this will be stated. Unity, productiveness, and existence for the sake of another i.e., (Puruṣa), have been declared with regard to Prakṛiti; other-ness, non-agent-ship, and diversity, with regard to Puruṣas; and is-ness, union, and separation, with regard to both. Occupation of space or existence in time (has been declared) with reference to gross and subtle bodies. Thus, in the Bhoja-Vārttika:

वैभाष्यम् तत् ॥ १६ ॥

परम् प्रयोगः सार्थार्थां रूढः रूढार्थाः रूढार्थाः।

वैभाष्यम् तत् ॥ १६ ॥
(Principal existence, unity, productiveness, other-ness, existence for
other, plurality, separation, union, finite existence, and non-agent-ship
re remembered to be the ten root objects or primary qualities).—16.

After declaring the properties of the twenty-five Principles, the
author now describes the manner of Creation.

अनुग्रह: सर्ग: || 17 ||

अनु: Anugrah, taking or putting together, composition, accumulation,
aggregation. सर्ग: Sarga, emanation, evolution, production, creation,
17. Emanation is accumulation.—17.

Here the word, anu, has the sense of ‘together with.’ Anugrahah
means that which takes together. It is springing into existence. And it
has two varieties: one, of the form of Vasana or tendency or disposition,
and the other, of the form of the subtle body. Both these forms are
capable of being known, as they do not appear one without the other.
Or, there can be no subtle body in the absence of Vasana, nor does
Vasana exist in the absence of subtle body, as is the case with seed
and shoot.

Objection:—But, since, in your theory, Buddhi, and the other
predicates are beginningless, how can you hold the theory of emanation
with a beginning?

Answer:—Quite so, but, in spite that they are beginningless, yet
perforce, by the maxim of ripples and waves, it is hinted that emanation
appears in the form of development and envelopment.—17.

Evolution of species is next elaborately ascertained:

चतुर्दशाविधो भूतसर्गः || 18 ||

चतुर्दशा: Chaturdasa-vidhah, of fourteen sorts. भूत: Bhuta, sarga, elemental
creation, evolution of beings.
18. Evolution of beings is of fourteen sorts.—18.

Herefrom the evolution of all entities should be known to be
chaturdasa-vidha, of fourteen specific kinds. For, all living beings
come into existence, under the influence of Vasana or tendency, by the
form of Svadaya, sweat-born; Anda-ja, egg-born; Udbhid-ja, shoot-born;
and Jaraya-ja, uterus-born, during the disengaged state of Sattva, Rajas,
and Tamas. And this evolution has three minor divisions: celestial or
superhuman, human, and the grovelling. The first has eight varieties, the
second, one, and the third, five. These varieties are declared: Brahma,
Prajapatasya, Aindra, Gandharva, Yaksa, Raksha and Paisa, these are the eight varieties of superhuman evolution. Human evolution has one variety only. Beasts, domestic animals, birds, reptiles, and immovable are the grovelling kinds.

Objection:—But why is evolution of entities limited to fourteen kinds only, when we observe evolution of such entities as a water-pot, etc.?

Answer:—The objection cannot be allowed, because we do not know of any producible thing, like a water-pot, etc., which is different from the five gross elements. Similarly, it should be understood in all other cases.—18.

It is so; for, without the knowledge of the predicables already mentioned, cessation of bondage cannot take place, since bondage has no beginning. Intending, therefore, to declare the nature of bondage, the author introduces the next aphorism:

श्रवणो वन्य: || १६ ||

श्रवणः: Tri-vidhaḥ, threefold. वन्यः: Bandhaḥ bondage.


Here, what is precisely the nature of bondage? Bondage is the fabrication of false knowledge, occasioned by upādhi or external condition or adjunct, and is by no means real. Of how many kinds is it? (They are) Prakritikā, Vaikārikā, and Dākṣipāka. This threefold bondage should be known. They are, therefore, successively recited. Thus, the absorption into the Prakriti, of those, who devote themselves to Prakriti by meditation, wrongly believing that the eight Prakritis are the ultimate or transcendental realities, constitutes Prakritika bondage. The absorption into the Vikāras or Transformations, of those who devote themselves to them, wrongly believing that sentience exists in the Vikāras, e.g., the powers of perception and action, etc., constitute Vaikārika bondage. Those whose mind has been misled by transmigration, and who, knowing only the sacred performances intended for the Southern Path (vide Aphorism 4), think that the performance of Adva-medha and other sacrifices is the supreme object of life, and thereby experience the fruits of action,—theirs is Dākṣipāka bondage, for they uniformly follow the revolutions of births and deaths, like a wheel. So says the Śruti:

श्रवणो वन्यः सत्यवाच सदितिः ||
श्रवणो वन्यः सत्यवाच सदितिः ||
(According to their action and enlightenment, migratory Selves, for the sake of embodiment, resort, some to wombs, and others to immovable entities).—Kaṭha Upaniṣat, II. V. 7.—19.

Notwithstanding, therefore, that bondage has no beginning, exertion must still be made for its dissolution. So thinking, the author reads the aphorism:

त्रिविधो मोक्षः || २० ||

तिरिच्छि: Tri-viḍhaḥ, threefold. मोक्षः: Mokṣaḥ, release, liberation.


Now, threefold release of living beings results by the exhaustion of virtue and vice. What, then, are these three kinds of release? So it is said Krama-mokṣa, gradual release; Vi-deha-kaivalya, dis-embodyed singleness; and Svarūpa-pratiṣṭhā, rest in one’s self. Where a man who is attached to the objects of the world, pursues also the investigation of the Principles, for him release will result in another birth. This is Krama-mokṣa. For, we may recall:

बहुतो जननामते भानवा भाते।
(The wise come unto Me at the end of many births).—Gītā, VII, 19.

Dis-embody singleness implies the enjoyment of that bliss which is attained by a man who is dispassionate towards the objects of the world and who “regards pleasure and pain in the same light,” as the Śruti says:

चतुर्दशीत चन्द्र च मेवः।

[Wear the Soma (acid asolepias) juice, and we become immortal.]

Rest in one’s self means existence of one by one’s pure essential form, continued through the endless future time. For according to the Śruti:

ष्टविभृत्य विपुलप्रभुत्वाति॥

connection with the essence of Buddha may again take place.---20.

The author now fully defines the characteristic of Pramāṇa or Proof:

त्रिविधं प्रमाणम् || २१ ||

तिरिच्छि: Tri-viḍhaḥ, threefold. प्रमाणम्: Pramāṇaḥ, proof.


* I. e. (Verily there can be no extinction of the pleasant and the non-pleasant so long as there remains the body.)—Chh. Up. VIII. xii. 4.
Here Pramāṇam means that by which something is proved, that is to say, the instrument of Pramāṇa or certain knowledge. Proof is threefold, viz., Dṛṣṭa, Anumāna, and Āpta-vachana. Whatever entities Buddhi makes its objects, in the form of their identity with Chitta or Manas, by the gateways of the senses or powers of perception, the same are objects perceived. This is Dṛṣṭa, visible or immediate, proof, e. g., “I see the Deva,” “I am happy,” etc. Anumāna, inference, is threefold: (successional, from the observed to the unobserved), Pūrva-vat, from cause to effect, Śeṣa-vat, from effect to cause, and (co-existential, from two equally observed marks:) Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa, equally observed. Pūrva-vat inference is where the effect is inferred from the cause; as, e.g., a shower by the ascent of clouds. Śeṣa-vat inference is where the cause is inferred by means of the effect; as, e.g., ultimate atoms, etc., by the observation of a water pot. Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa inference is where, after leaving a place for a time, something, previously observed in one place, is next observed in another place; as, e.g., giving is inferred by the observation that Devadatta who was previously observed inside his house, is now outside it. The Veda which is the repository of all knowledge and the cause of the divisions of Devas, Yakṣas, birds, men, castes, stages of life, etc., not being the work of a personal author (and being accordingly free from the defects of personal equation; its declarations are Āpta-vachana, trustworthy sayings, upon which proceeds the conduct of the elders that this is real, that this is unreal, that this is a water-pot, etc.

Discriminative knowledge of Prakṛti and Puruṣa by means of this threefold proof, is the source of the supreme object of desire with Puruṣa—21.

Therefore, after declaring these predicables, and desiring to briefly recapitulate them, for showing that release is attainable through knowledge of them, the author lays down the aphorism:

पत्त्व सम्यक्ष्जात्वा हतक्ष्य: स्यात्
न पुनाप्रिविचेन हुः सेनानामृते ॥ २२ ॥


22. By thoroughly knowing this, man will be fulfilled, and will not have to suffer again from the threefold pain.—22.
Estat is easily understood. Here 'man' is the complement of the sentence: Samyak jñātvā kṛta-kṛtyah syāt. Tri-viḥēṇa, with pains Adhyātmas, etc. Na anubhūyate, is not conjoined; for, on account of their absolute extinction, it is impossible for them to come to appear again.—22.

This Commentary on the Sāmkhya was composed, with great delight, by Śrī Narendra, a terrestrial divinity (i.e., a Brāhmaṇa), in the Śaka era 1703.

The End.
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THE SÅMKHYA-KÅRIKÅ.

The Såmkhya is the only means of the Supreme Good.

I. From the disagreeable occurrence of the threefold pain (proceeds) the enquiry into the means which can prevent it; nor is the enquiry superfluous because ordinary means exist, for they fail to accomplish certain and permanent prevention of pain.

ANNOTATION.

1. Wise men want to demonstrate that which, by being known, would accomplish the Supreme Good. Knowledge about the subject matter of the proposed Såstra is the means of accomplishing the Supreme Good. The present Kårika, therefore, introduces an enquiry into that subject.—Bhaspati Miśra’s Tattva-Kaumudi.

2. The subject-matter of the Såmkhya System comprises the well-known Twenty-five Tattvas or Principles, from the knowledge of which results the destruction of the three kinds of pain. Cf. Gaudijåda’s Ishâyan.

3. The Supreme Good is Mokṣa or Release which consists in the permanent impossibility of the incidence of pain in any form whatever, that is, in recovering that state of the pristine purity of the Self in which the occurrence of pain is impossible, in other words, in the realisation of the Self as Self pure and simple.
4. Pains, according to the place of their origtn, are divided primarily into two classes: internal and external. Internal pains, again, are either bodily or mental. These are called Ādhyātmika or intra-organic. External pains are either Ādhibhautika or caused by created beings, namely, man, beast, bird, reptile, and the inmobile, or Ādhipāda or caused by supernatural agencies, such as Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Vināyaka, etc. Now, pain, such as it is, cannot be ignored, because it is experienced by every individual being.

5. Pain is not a condition of the pure Self. It resides in the Internal Instrument of Action and Cognition, that is, the inner sense, or Buddhhi, and is a particular modification of that component element of it which is called Rajas. “Abhīghāta” is the contact of the power of Senttency with pain as an object of disagreeable sensation.

6. It may be objected that when such obvious remedies as medicines, desirable objects, skill in political arts and sciences, employment of gems and charms, etc., for the alleviation and removal of pain, do exist, whilst the knowledge of the Tattvas is difficult of attainment and to be acquired only by long study and traditional tuition through many generations, the investigation proposed is needless. To this, the answer is that the obvious means are neither Ekānta or absolute, nor At্যānta or final; that is, there is in them no certainty of the cessation of pain nor of the non-recurrence of pain that has ceased. Therefore, the good accomplished by them is not the Supreme Good. The means of accomplishing the Supreme Good must possess these two properties. Such a means is the knowledge of the Tattvas. The enquiry, therefore, is certainly not needless.

7. But our opponent may contend that, though the obvious means may fail, still there are means declared in the Vedas, which bring about absolute and final cessation of pain, and that, consequently, the proposed enquiry is quite superfluous. Accordingly, the next Kārikā declares:

Scriptural, like ordinary, means are defective.

श्रुत्विवादानुभवि: तद्विविश्लेषण्या वातिष्ठवतुः।
तद्विपरीत: भ्राम्यात् वय्काव्यक्त्वाभिष्मानात् || २ ||

पुरुष द्रष्य-वत, like the ordinary (means).  अनुभवित: Anuśāsanā, the revealed, Vedic, scriptural.  सह, it, i.e., the Vedic means.  हि, for वायुभाषायात्: A-viśuddhi-kṣaya-atīśaya-yuktah, attended with impurity, waste and excess.  अनुभवन: Tat-viparitāh, the opposite thereof, i.e., of ordinary and scriptural means.  स्रवणि Śravaṇa, preferable.
as it consists in discriminative knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest, and the Knower.

II. Like the ordinary, is the scriptural (means ineffectual), for it is attended with impurity, waste, and excess. (The means which is) the opposite of both is preferable, as it consists in a discriminative knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest, and the Knower.

ANNOTATION.

8. "Scriptural" here refers to the rituals laid down in the Vedas, and not to their Jñāna-Kāṇḍa portion, for Discriminative Knowledge also is enjoined in them.

The scriptural means are, e.g., the drinking of the Soma juice, performance of sacrifices such as the Jyotishoma, the Aśvamedha, etc. They are "impure" from sacrifice of animals, etc. The result produced by them is liable to "waste," for even heaven and the gods pass away in course of time. They are also inequal in the distribution of their rewards.

9. The "opposite of both" that is, that which is absolute and final in its result, and is free from impurity, deficiency, and inequality. Such a means is the discriminative knowledge of Prakṛti and Puruṣa.

10. "Vijñāna" means knowledge of discrimination. Knowledge of the Manifest leads to the knowledge of its cause, the Unmanifest. And knowledge of both as existing for the sake of another, leads to the knowledge of the Self. The Manifest begins with Mahat and includes Ahamkāra, the five Tan-mātras, the eleven Indriyas, and the five Great Elements. The Unmanifest is the Pradhāna, i.e., Prakṛti. The Knower is Puruṣa. These are the Twenty-five Tattvas.

11. The mutual differences of the Manifest, the Unmanifest, and the Knower are declared in the next Kārikā.

The Manifest, the Unmanifest, and the Knower distinguished.

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिमेघाया: प्रकृतिविकृतयः सत्त।
पोडःकस्तु विकारः न प्रकृतिर्विकृतस्म: पुरुषः । ॥ ३ ॥

मूलप्रकृति: Mūla-prakṛti the root-evolvent. प्रकृति: Prahṛiti, non-evolute.
प्रकृतिर्विकृतिः Prakṛti-vikṛti, evolvent-evolutes.
सप्तम: Mahat-adyaḥ, Mahat, etc. सप्तमकाश्च: Prakṛti-vikṛtiyāḥ, evolvent-evolutes.
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पाँचालिकाः: Panchalikāḥ, sixteen. पुरुषः Puruṣa, merely.
पुरुषाः Puruṣa, evolvent.
पूर्वपुरुषाः: Puruṣa, evolvent.
III. The Root Evolvent is no evolute; Mahat, etc., are the seven evolvent-evolutes; the sixteen are mere evolutes; (that which is) neither evolvent nor evolute, is Purusa.

12. By “Prakriti” is meant that which procreates or evolves—the Pradhana, that is, that in which all things are contained, and in its general significance, it denotes that which becomes the material cause of another Tattva.

13. The Root Evolvent is the state of equipoise of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. It has no root of its own and is the root of all things. Hence it is not a product. To imagine a root for the Root Evolvent would entail infinite regression.

14. Evolvent-Evolutes: Mahat springs from the Pradhana and, in its turn, gives rise to Ahamkara; Ahamkara, in its turn, to the Tan-matras of Sound, Touch, Smell, Form, and Taste; and these, in their turn, respectively to the gross elements of Ether, Air, Earth, Fire, and Water.

15. It is next to be considered how the existence of the Tattvas described above can be rationally established. The causes of cognition and non-cognition are, therefore, expounded in the following four Karkikas.

Sources of knowledge enumerated.

I. Samtanmanamastavarcha
caw samasamashastvarativraya


IV. Perception, Inference, and Testimony (are the Proofs; by these) all proofs being established, Proof is intended to be threefold. From Proof verily is the establishment of the Provables.

Perception, Inference, and Testimony defined.

Prati-vichayasyavatsayor samasamashastvarativraya

caw samasamashastvarativraya

Prati-vichayasya-adhyayasyayah, ascertainment of each respective object by the senses. Dristam, perception. Trividham, threefold.
Anumāna, inference. अनुमानः Akhyātam, declared. तत् it. अतिवाली Liṅga liṅga-pūrvakam, preceded by the mark and by that of which it is the mark अप्तत् Apta-sūtrī, trustworthy person and the Veda. अप्तचारणम, trustworthy statement, testimony. तत् Tu, while.

V. Perception is the ascertainment of each respective object (by the Senses). Inference has been declared to be threefold. It is preceded by the mark and it is preceded by the thing of which it is the mark. While Testimony is the statement of trustworthy persons and the Veda.

ANNOTATION.

16. Vāchaspāti Miśra interprets “Prati-visaya-adhyavasyāya” as follows: Adhyavasyāya, that is, the operation of Buddhi, in other words, cognition, based on or depending upon Prati-visaya, that is, that which functions in regard to, that is, comes into contact with, the several objects, in other words, the Senses.

17. The same authority describes the process of perceptual cognition thus: On the modification of the Senses apprehending objects, when there takes place the subdual of the Tamas of Buddhi, there is predominance of the Sattva, which is variously called Adhyavasyāya, Vṛitti, and Jñāna. And the favour that is hereby done to the power of intelligence, that is the fruit; it is the consciousness of Pramāṇa or Right Cognition. For the Buddhi Tattva, being derived from Prakṛti, is unintelligent; hence its Adhyavasyāya also is unintelligent, like a jar, etc. Similarly, the other modifications of the Buddhi Tattva, such as pleasure, etc., also are unintelligent. While Puruṣa, unassociated with pleasure, etc., is intelligent. Yet he, by the falling of the shadow of cognition, pleasure, etc., reflected by those residing in the Buddhi Tattva, becomes, as though possessed of cognition, pleasure, etc. This is how the intelligent one is favoured. And by the falling of the shadow of intelligence, Buddhi and also its Adhyavasyāya, though unintelligent, appear, as though intelligent.

18. Anumāna is inference, by means of the mark, of the thing of which it is the mark, and vice versa. The Methods of Inference are either of Agreement, called Vīti, or of Difference, called A-Vīti. A-Vīti inference is called Śeṣa-vat, because it has the Śeṣa or the remainder or the residue as its subject matter. E.g., Earth is not not-Earth, because it possesses smell. Gauḍapāda explains Śeṣa-vat to be inference in respect of the Śeṣa or remainder of the class; e.g., having found a drop of water taken from the sea to be salt, the saltiness of the rest also is inferred.
Vita inference is two-fold: Párvā-vat and Sámanyato Driśṭa. Párvā-vat is the inference of an individual of a genus particular instances of which have previously been seen; e.g., the inference of fire from smoke, in a mountain, fire having previously been seen in the kitchen. Sámanyato Driśṭa is inference of a thing particular instances of which same kind have not previously been seen, but particular instances of a kind similar to which have previously been seen in analogous cases; that is, in this case, the particular is not seen but the genus is seen. E.g., Karana-tva or instrumentality, that is, the capability of effecting an act is, as a genus, a known thing, because it has been seen in the axe which is an instrument of cutting. But an Indriya or Power of Cognition and Action (commonly rendered as Sense Organ) does not belong to the same class as the axe, and is also not an object of perception. Now, cognition and action are acts, and as the act of cutting cannot be effected without an instrument, so the acts of cognition and action cannot be effected without some instrument. Thus is inferred the existence of the Indriyas as the Instruments of Cognition and Action.

Apta means Acháryas, such as BrabmA and the rest.

Super-Sensible objects how proved.

Sámanyata-dhávastha-tiná-dhyáanam pratiścítirumañáat ।
Tattvādi vyāsaścandhā prátimsamāgamatā siddhā ॥ ६ ॥

Sāmanyata, of the generic. ś Tu, but. शून्य Driśṭa, from the seeing. अतिजन्यात्त्र Ati-indriyānām, of things transcending the senses. अधिक Pratthib, approach, intuition, cognition. अनुमान Anumānāt, from inference. तस्मात Tasmāt, from that. अथ Api, even. च Cha, and also, from Śēṣa-vat inference (Vāchaspati). असिद्ध A-siddham, not-established. भवेन Parokṣam, super-sensuous. अतिजन्य अतिजन्यात्त्र Apta-āgamatā, from Testimony and Revelation. सिद्ध Siddham, proved.

VI. (Intuition of sensible things is from perception). But the intuition of super-sensible things is from Sāmanyato Driśṭa and Śēṣa-vat Inference. And super-sensible things—not established from that even, are established from Testimony and Revelation.

19. Prakṛiti and Puruṣa are not objects of perception and therefore they are unreal, argue our opponents; for a hare's horn or a castle in the air is not perceived, because it is unreal. It is, accordingly, next pointed out that perception cannot be the sole test of reality, because there are well-known causes from which even admittedly existent things are not perceived. These causes are declared in the next Kārikā.
Causes of failure of external perception enumerated.

Sruti-dhāraṇā, sāmīpyādviṃśatājñāna-vigahānāt

Sāksyādviṃśatābhimbhavāt, sāmanābhārasā

Ati-dhāraṇā, from extreme distance. N.B. — The word Ati qualifies distance as well as all the rest. Sāmīpyāt, from nearness. Indriya-gahāt, from impairment of the senses. Manah-anavasthānāt, from non-presence of mind. Saukṣmyāt, from fineness. Vyavahārāt, from intervention. Abhiḥavāt, from suppression by others. Samāna-abhiḥavāt, from intermixture with likes. Cha, and others.

VII. (Apprehension of even existing things may not take place) through extreme remoteness, nearness, impairment of the senses, non-presence of the mind, extreme fineness, intervention, suppression by other matters, intermixture with likes, and other causes.

Why Prakṛiti is not an object of perception.

Sāksyādviṃśatāpratītya-śabdaṃ kāyāṃ sādhaṃ

Mahārāṣṭraprakṛti-śabdaṃ vṛśchrāṇo vā


VIII. From extreme fineness is the non-apprehension of Prakṛiti, and not from her non-existence, because there is apprehension of her from the effect. And that effect is Mahat, etc., similar and dissimilar to Prakṛiti.

20. "Similar and dissimilar to Prakṛiti": for these resemblances and differences, see Kārikās X and XI.

21. But from the effects, a mere cause or cause in the abstract is deduced, and not its nature, and, on this point, different conclusions have been arrived at by different thinkers. Thus, some Buddhists, say that the existent is produced from the non-existent; e.g., from the non-existence, by destruction, of the seed is produced the sprout. Some, the Vedāntins, say that the effects are the Vivarta or revolution of one
single existent thing, and are not themselves ultimately real. 3. Some, the Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, etc., say that from the existent, i.e., the Ultimate Atoms, is produced the non-existent. 4. The elders, the Sāṁkhya, say that from the existent is produced the existent. Of these, on the first three alternatives, the Pradhāna is not established. For the characteristic of being the Pradhāna, i.e., that in which all things are contained, and of being of the nature of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, belonging to the Cause of the World, consists in being of the nature of Sound and all other Paripāṇa or transformations, the essences of which possess the distinctions of pleasure, pain, and bewildernent. Now, if the existent is to be produced from the non-existent, how can a non-existent, nameless, formless cause possess the nature of Sound, etc., in the form of pleasure, etc.? for there is no proof of the identity of nature between the existent and the non-existent. If, again, the diversity of Sound, etc., is the Vivarta of a single existent thing, still it would not follow that the existent is produced from the existent. For a one without a second cannot have identity of nature with the diversity; on the contrary, the apprehension of the non-diversity under the characteristic of the diversity is an error pure and simple. With those also, again, namely Kaṇḍā, Gotama, and others, who say that it is from the existent that the non-existent is produced, the cause cannot be of the nature of the effect, because there is no proof of the unity of the existent and the non-existent. Hence there can be no proof of the Pradhāna on these theories. In order, therefore, to establish the existence of the Pradhāna, the next Karikā determines that the effect must be existent from before its "production."

Effects pre-exist in their causes.

शत्कार्कार्कारादूपानस्वसम्बन्धाना सर्वस्मभवाभावात् ।
शक्स्य शत्कार्कारादु कारणभावाय सत् कार्यम् ॥ ६ ॥

A-sat-a-karaṇāt, from the non-effectuation of the non-existent.
Upādāna-grahaṇāt, from the selection of material for the effect.

IX. The effect is ever existent, because that which is non-existent, can by no means be brought into existence; because effects take adequate material causes; because all
things are not produced from all causes; because a competent cause can effect that only for which it is competent; and also because the effect possesses the nature of the cause.

ANNOTATION.

22. That which is non-existent, etc.: e.g. a hare's horn.

Effects take, etc.: Oil, for instance, can be produced from mustard seeds, but not a piece of cloth.

All things are not produced, etc.: Did effects not pre-exist in their causes, then, in mustard seeds, for example, there would be non-existence of a piece of cloth, a jar; in fact, of every other thing as well as of oil, and it would be quite as easy to produce a piece of cloth, a jar, and all the rest from them as it is to produce oil. But such is not the case.

A competent cause can effect, etc.: Competency means potentiality, the unmanifested state of the effect. A lump of clay, for instance, is potentially a jar; in it the jar lies hidden, unmanifested; it is manifested in the form of the jar by the operation of the potter.

The effect possesses the nature, etc.: The colour, weight, touch, etc. of a piece of cloth for instance, are the colour, weight, touch, etc., of the threads from which it is made. This could not have been so, were not cause and effect identical in essence.

The Manifest and the Unmanifest contrasted.

हेतुमनविनिवादयापि सक्रियमनेकमाध्यतं लिङ्गम ॥

सावयं परतन्त्रं व्ययं विपरीतस्वयं ॥ १० ॥

रेतों हेतु-मत, possessing or depending on a cause. विनिवादया, non-external, perishable. सक्रियम्, unpervading, finite. लिङ्गम्, mobile, mutable. अनेकम्, multitudinous, manifold. तन्त्रं, the manifested, dependent. तन्त्रं, the reverse. विमेघ, the unmanifested.

X. The Manifest is producible, non-internal, non-pervading, mobile, multiform, dependent, (serving as) the mark (of difference), a combination of parts, subordinate. The Unmanifest is the reverse (of this).

ANNOTATION.

23. Sakriya, migratory: Buddhi and the rest leave, one after another, bodies which they had taken up and enter into other bodies: this is their movement. The movement of the Body, Earth, etc., is indeed well-known.
Aṁeka, multitudinous: These are as many of them as there are Puruṣas; Earth and the rest also are multiplied according to the differences of Bodies, jar, etc.

Ādīta, supported: They are supported by their respective causes.

Līṅga, mergent, mark: Buddhi and the rest are marks of the Pradhāna. Gauḍapāda explains the word to mean “subject to dissolution.” At the time of the Dissolution the five Great Elements merge into the Tanmātras, and these together with the eleven Indriyas, into Ahamkāra, and this, into Buddhi; and that merges into the Pradhāna.

Paratāntra, subordinate: Buddhi, for instance, when it has to produce its own effect, namely, Ahamkāra, has to draw upon Prakṛti; otherwise, being weak or exhausted, it will not be able to produce Ahamkāra. Similarly, by Ahamkāra and the rest also is awaited the inflow of Prakṛti in the production of their own effects.

24. Vīparita, reverse: The Unmanifest is causeless, eternal, all pervading, motion-less, single, self-sustained, the subject of the mark or non-mergent, part-less, and supreme.

The Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower contrasted and compared.

ब्रह्मवेदिक विषयः सामान्यमेच्छतां प्रतिविरङ्गितं |

लोकस्तथा प्रधानं तत्त्वाऴिन्सत्त्वा च पुमानः || ११ ||

ब्रह्मस्त्रीय तथा प्रधानं तत्त्वाविन्सत्त्वा च पुमानः

The Manifest is constituted by the three Guṇas, is non-discriminative, objective, common, non-intelligent, prolific. So is also the Pradhāna. Puruṣa is the reverse of them both (in these respects), and yet is similar (to the Pradhāna and also to the Manifest in those other respects mentioned in the preceding Kārikā.)

ANNOTATION.

25. A-viveka:—Just as the Pradhāna is not discriminated from itself even so are not Mahat and the rest also discriminated from the Pradhāna because of their essential identity. Or, A-viveka is to create by unitin
Sāmkhya-Karika.

together, for none of them singly are capable of producing their own effects, but, on the contrary, only by uniting together.

Viṣaya: because it is the Object as distinguished from the Subject, to be apprehended and made use of by all Puruṣas alike.

26. Tathā cha, and yet is similar: that is, as the Pradhāna is, in the preceding Kārikā, declared to be without cause, etc., such is Puruṣa. Thus, "• • • The Manifest is multitudinous; the Unmanifest is single; so is Puruṣa also single." • • • (Gauḍapāda)." "But when similarity to the Pradhāna belongs to Puruṣa in respect of non-causability, eternality, etc., and likewise multiplicity is his similarity to the Manifest, how is it said that "the reverse of them both is Puruṣa? To this, it is replied: Tathā cha: Cha has the sense of Api, even, yet; although there is similarity in respect of non-causability, etc., yet he possesses dissimilarity in respect of not being constituted by the three Guṇas, etc. Such is the meaning." (Vāchāsapti Mītra). "The S. Chandrīkā confirms the interpretation: 'The phrase tathā cha implies that (soul) is analogous to the undiscernial principle in non-causability and the rest, and analogous to discrete principles in manifold enumeration.' This is, in fact, the Sāmkhya doctrine, as subsequently laid down by the text, ver. 18, and is conformable to the Sūtra of Kapila; 'Multitude of souls is proved by variety of condition': that is, 'the virtuous are born again in heaven, the wicked are regenerated in hell; the fool wanders in error, the wise man is set free.' Either, therefore, Gauḍapāda has made a mistake, or by his eka is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations; or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it (R.A.S. Trans. vol. I. p. 31) 'individual.' So in the Sūtras it is said 'that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the etherial element may be confined in a variety of vessels.' This singleness of soul applies therefore to that particular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage, and liberation; for, as the commentator observes, 'one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body)' The singleness of soul, therefore, as asserted by Gauḍapāda, is no doubt to be understood in this sense." (Wilson).

Characteristics of the Guṇas described.

प्रीति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य: प्रकाशप्रतितिपतिविषयमार्थाः ॥
प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्यमतियतिपतिमार्थाः ॥ १२ ॥

प्रतितिविद्यासेवत: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रतिप्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद:
प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद:
प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद:
प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद:
प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद:
प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद:
प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद:
प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद:
प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद:
प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद:
प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद: प्रति-प्रतितिविद्यासाध्य-सामवेद:
the purpose of, or capable of causing, illumination, activity, and, restraint.

Any-a-anything-abhiva-a-draya-jana-mithuna-vrittya, having mutual domination, dependence, production, consociation, and co-existence. Vāchśpati does not consider the term Vṛtti as a distinct condition; he interprets it as Kriyā, act, operation or function, and compounds it with each of the foregoing terms. ^ Cha, and. गुण: Guṇā, the Guṇas.

XII. The Guṇas possess the nature of pleasure, pain and dulness; serve the purpose of illumination, activity, and restraint; and perform the function of mutual domination, dependence, production, and consociation.

ANNOTATION.

27. Possess the nature, etc.: Hereby the intrinsic forms of the Guṇas Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas are declared. The force of the word Ātmā, nature, is that it is a reply to those who think that pleasure is nothing but absence of pain, and that pain is nothing but absence of pleasure. For Ātmā denotes being, something positive, and is a negation of non-being.

28. Serve the purpose, etc.: Hereby the purposes served by the Guṇas respectively are declared. Artha means prayaścita or purpose. Gaudapāda interprets the term in the sense of competency, fitness, capability.

29. Perform the functions, etc.: Hereby the various operations of the Guṇas are declared.

Dependence: Although dependence, that is, co-existence by the relation of the container and the contained is not possible, still that is the support of that, the operation of which depends upon it. Thus, Sattva, by resting on activity and restraint, subserves Rajas and Tamas with illumination; Rajas, by resting on illumination and restraint, subserves Sattva and Tamas with activity; Tamas, by resting on illumination and activity, subserves Sattva and Rajas with restraint.

Production: Production is transformation, and it is of the same form as the Guṇas; hence causability is not entailed, owing to the absence of a cause which is a different Tattva. Neither is non-eternity entailed, owing to the absence of dissolution into a different Tattva.

Consociation: That is, the Guṇas are constant companions of one another.

Co-existence is explained by Gaudapāda thus: As a beautiful and amiable woman, who is a source of delight to every one else, is the cause
of misery to the other wives of her husband, and of bewilderment to the
insolvent; so does Sattva produce the functions of Rajas and Tamas.
As a king, assiduous in protecting his people, and curbing the profligate,
is the cause of happiness to the good, of misery and mortification to the
wicked; so does Rajas produce the functions of Sattva and Tamas.
Similarly, Tamas produces the functions of Sattva and Rajas, as clouds,
overshadowing the heavens, cause delight upon earth, animate by their
rain the active labours of the husbandman, and overwhelm absent
lovers with despair. In this manner, the Gunas perform the functions of
one another.

The Co-operation of the Gunas explained.

सत्वः लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टप्रेमभक्ति च राजः।
धृति परर्वचार्योऽश्चित्तः॥ १३॥

सत्वः Sattva, sattva. लघु Laghu, alleviating, light. प्रकाशकम Prakahakam,
enlightening, illuminating. इत्यादि Ityad, desired, considered. उपासाम Upanasam,
earnest, exciting. चलान Chalam, versatile, restless. च च एव Ch, and, एव: Rajah,
rajas. गुरु Guru, heavy. वर्षकम Vashakam enveloping, covering, obscuring.
एव एव एव एव एव एव. तः: Tamah, tamas. नीलक क्षेत्रपूष्टि, like a lamp. च च एव Ch, and.
यथा: Artha-tah, for a purpose. विरितिः Viriti, function, operation.

XIII. Sattva is considered to be light and illuminating, and Rajas, to be exciting and restless, and Tamas,
to be indeed heavy and enveloping. Like a lamp (consisting of oil, wick, and fire), they co-operate for a (common) purpose
(by union of contraries).

ANNOTATION.

30. Contraries need not necessarily oppose and counteract one
another. As co-operation of contraries for a common purpose is seen in
the case of a lamp, even so is it the case with the Gunas which co-operate
with one another to serve a common purpose, viz., the experience and
release of Purusa.

31. Granted, one may say, that non-discriminativeness, etc., are
proved by perception in the case of Earth, etc., which are objects of
perception; but how can Sattva, etc., which are not objects of perception,
be said to be non-discriminative, objective, common, non-intelligent,
and prolific (Kārikā XI)? To this, the reply is given in the next
Kārikā.
Proof of the properties of the Unmanifest.

XIV. The proof of non-discriminativeness, and the rest (in the Manifest and the Unmanifest) is from their being constituted by the three Guṇas and from absence of their non-concomitance. From the effect possessing the attributes of the cause is proved the Unmanifest also.

ANNOTATION.

32. According to Vāchaspati, the proof of non-discriminativeness and the rest is by the method of agreement, thus:—

Whatever possesses pleasure, pain, and dulness, is non-discriminative, etc.,

As, for instance, are the objects of the senses;
Prakṛti, Mahat, etc., possess pleasure, pain, and dulness;
They are, therefore, non-discriminative, etc.

and also by the method of difference, thus:—

Whatever is not non-discriminative, etc., does not possess pleasure, pain and dulness,

As, for instance, is the case with Puruṣa.
But Prakṛti, Mahat, etc., possess pleasure, pain, and dulness;
They are, therefore, not-non-discriminative, etc.

But the proof of these attributes must be subject to the proof of their alleged substratum. How then is this, namely, the Pradhāna proved?

Thus: The effect characterised as Mahat, etc., possessing the form of pleasure, pain, and dulness, must have the nature or essence of pleasure,
pain, and dulness inhering in its own cause; so that its cause, possessing
the nature of pleasure, pain, and dulness, that is, the Pradhāna Unman-
ifest, is established.

33. Gaudāpāda's interpretation is different from the above. Ac-
cording to him, the properties of non-discriminativeness, etc., are proved in
the Manifest from their being constituted by the three Guṇas, through the
absence of divergence, that is, because the properties of non-discriminat-
iveness, etc., have never been found except in conjunction with the property
of being constituted by the three Guṇas. And their existence in the
Unmanifest is proved from the absence of divergence, that is, from the
invariable and universal concomitance of the Manifest and the Unman-
ifest: just as, wherever there is the cloth, there are the yarns; similarly
whoever sees the Manifest, sees the Unmanifest as well; and also from the
effect possessing the nature of the cause: thus, from the effect, i.e., Mahat
and the rest which are non-discriminative, objective, common, non-in-
telligent, and prolific, is proved that their cause, namely, the Unmanifest,
possesses the same properties.

Proof of the Unmanifest.

भेवानां परिमायात समन्त्यात् शकित : प्रकृतेऽर्थ।
कारकार्यविभांगाविभागाद् वैशेषिकस्थत्॥१५॥
कारकार्यमस्तत्वां विन्यते बिजृष्टत् : समुच्चारः।
परियायात् : संस्फुर्तं वर्गभागायात्तविसर्जयत्॥१६॥

भेवानां Bhedāṇāṁ, of differentiated particulars, specific objects, of the evolves,
Mahat and the rest. परिमायात Parimalāḥ, from finiteness, meaurablility.
समन्त्यात् Samanvayātt, from homogeneity, agreement. शकित Sakti, from power.
कारकार्यविभांगाविभागाद् Kāraṇa-kāraṇa-vibhāgaḥ, from differentiation of cause and effect.
कारकार्यमस्तत्वां Kāraṇam-satyaḥ, from non-
differentiation, from reunion. वैशेषिकस्थत् Vaiśeṣikasūtra, of the formal Universe.
कारकार्यमस्तत्वां Kāraṇam-satyaḥ, cause. अस्ति Asī, exists. प्रकृति Prakṛti, Unmanifest.
समुच्चारः समुच्चारः Pravartate, energises, operates. तिब्बत Tri-guṇa-tabh, through or of the three Guṇas, Sattva,
Rajas, and Tamas. सत्यत् Sam-udayātt, through combination, co-operation. वैशेषिकस्थत् Vaiśeṣikasūtra,
through transformation. यललित Salila-vat, like water.
विसर्जयत् Vais reprati-guṇa-kāraya-viśeṣat, through differences according to
the differences of the several receptacles of the Guṇas, or differences created by
the Guṇas severally based on the principal Guṇa.

XV-XVI. Of the particulars (e.g., Mahat and all the
rest down to the earth), there exists an Unmanifest cause:
because the particulars are finite; because they are homogeneous; because production is through power; because there is differentiation of effect from cause or difference of cause and effect; and because there is reunion of the multi-form effect with the cause.

It operates, in the form of the three Gunas and by combination, undergoing transformation, (diversified) according to the differences severally of the other Gunas depending on the principal Guna.

**ANNOTATION.**

34. Because they are homogeneous: Homogeneity is the possession of a common form among a number of distinct individuals. The presence of a common form infers a common origin.

Because production is through power: Power inholding in the cause is nothing but the unmanifested state of the effect.

Differentiation and reunion: Discrete products of every sort of form from Mahat down to a jar, for instance, successively rise from their causes at the time of creation and disappear into them at the time of destruction and universal dissolution. The ultimate points in the process of evolution and involution are one and the same. It is the absolute unmanifested state of a single entity. It is called the Unmanifest, the Pradhana and Prakriti.

35. It operates etc.: The Gunas of which the nature is to undergo transformation, never rest, even for a moment, without transforming themselves. Their transformation may be homogeneous or heterogeneous. Homogeneous transformation takes place during Pralaya or the period of latency intervening Creation and Dissolution, when Sattva transforms as Sattva, Rajas as Rajas, and Tamas as Tamas. Such is the meaning of the phrase Tri-guna-sa, in the form of the three Gunas severally. Heterogeneous transformation takes place during Creation and Dissolution. For this, combination of the Gunas with one another in different proportions is necessary. Such combination is rendered possible by the diversified activity of the Gunas in the evolution of Mahat and all the rest, of which each successive one is more and more specified than, and differentiated from, its predecessor. And this differentiation is brought about by the difference in the ratio in which the subsidiary Gunas combine and co-operate with the principal Guna. Thus, as regards the eleven Indriyas...
and the five Tan-mātras, while Rajas is equally operative in the evolution of both, the former arise from Ahamkāra in which Sattva is predominant and Tamas is dormant; whereas the latter arise from Ahamkāra in which Tamas is predominant and Sattva is dormant.

Salita-vat: As simple water shed by the clouds, coming into contact with various situations, is modified as sweet, sour, bitter, pungent, or astringent, in the character of the juice of the coconut, palm, betel, karanja, amalaka, wood-apple, etc.

Proof of Puruṣa.

संप्रत्यपारदर्शित्व निःशास्त्रविद्यायविवेकवालयात्रत ।
पुरुषोदतिः भोक्तृभवान्ति केवलार्थं प्रह्वतगच्छ || १७ ॥

Samparkhā-pararthavāt, since an aggregate or structure of manifold parts into one whole is for the sake of another of a different character vikhyāvatāvatārthavāt, since there must exist an entity in which there is the reverse of the properties of being constituted by three Guṇas, and the rest mentioned in Kārikā XI. Adhīḍhānat, since there must be superintendence over Buddhi and other products of the Guṇas. Puruṣat Puruṣa. Asti, exists. Bhoktrī-bhāvat, since there must be an experiencer of pleasure and pain. Kaivalya-artham, for the sake of isolation. Pravritteḥ, since activity is. Cha, and.

XVII. Puruṣa exists: since the aggregate must be for the sake of the non-aggregate; since there must exist an entity in which the properties of being constituted by the three Guṇas and the rest do not appear; since there must be a superintendent; since there must be an experiencer; and since activity is for the sake of abstraction.

Annotation.

36. Since there must exist an entity, etc.: Hereby is prevented the inference of an aggregate by the aggregate. For all aggregates possess the three Guṇas, whereas Puruṣa is free from them, as declared in Kārikā XI. Therefore, the entity for which the aggregate is, must be a non-aggregate. And Puruṣa is a non-aggregate.

Proof of Multiplicity of Puruṣa.

जनन्मर्याकारानां प्रतिचिन्त्यपर्यवपत विद्वस्तेरस ||
पुरुषविच्छेति तिर्थे नेवारविशेषिवाच || १८ ॥

A-yugapat, non-simultaneous. स्मृति Pravritteḥ, from activity or occupation. न Cha, and. पुरुषोपर्वत Puruṣa-bahu-tvaṃ, multiplicity of Puruṣa. न Śiddham, established. त्रयुगवण्यपञ्चमयात, from absence of the condition of the three Guṇas, from diverse modification of the three Guṇas. न Cha, and. न Eva, verily.

XVIII. From the individual allotment of birth, death and the Instruments, from non-simultaneous activity (towards the same end), and from the diverse modification of the three Guṇas, multitude of Puruṣas is verily established.

ANNOTATION.

37. Birth consists in conjunction with body, Indriya, Manas, Ahamkāra, Buddhi, and experience, and death consists in their abandonment. So that they do not entail the transformation of Puruṣa. The distribution of body and the rest, which is different in each individual case, must imply a plurality of Puruṣas, as, otherwise, on the birth of one, all would be born and on the death of one, all would die.

Non-simultaneous activity towards the same end: as, e.g., some are busy with virtuous, others with vicious, actions; some cultivate dispassion, others knowledge.

Diverse modification of the three Guṇas: thus, though birth is common to all, one possessing Sattva is happy, another possessing Rajas, is wretched, and a third possessing Tamas, is dull.

Proof of the Nature of Puruṣa.

तत्स्माद्विपर्यासात् सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य प्रत्यूत्तमस्य ।
कैवल्यं माध्यस्यत्र द्राक्षित्वमकः कार्यवचः ॥ १६ ॥

सत्त्वा Tasmāt, from that. न Cha, and. विपर्यासत् Viparyāsāt, from contrast, divergence. न Śiddham, proved. अस्पर्श Sākṣi-tvaṃ, to be the witness. न Asya, of this. पुरुष Puruṣa-sya, of Puruṣa. न Kaivalyaṃ, aloneness, solitariness, अस्पर्श Mādhyāsthyam, indifference, to be the bystander. न Draṣṭra-tvaṃ, to be the spectator. आकार्त्रि-भावः A-kartri-bhāvaḥ, non-agent-ship. न Cha, and.

XIX. And from that contrast it is proved that this Puruṣa is witness, solitary, indifferent, spectator, and non-agent.

ANNOTATION.

38. That contrast: that is, Puruṣa is not constituted by the three Guṇas, is discriminative, is not objective but subjective, is not common, is intangible, and is not prolific (see Karikā XIV).
Because he is intelligent and subjective, he is spectator and witness. A witness is one to whom objects are shown. Prakriti exhibits herself to Puruṣa.

From his not being constituted by the three Guṇas follow his solitariness and indifference. For solitariness consists in the absolute non-existence of the three sorts of pain, and indifference denotes absence of love for pleasure and hate for pain. But pleasure and pain are properties of the three Guṇas. And because Puruṣa is not constituted by the three Guṇas, he is absolutely free from pleasure, pain and bewilderment.

And since he is discriminative and non-prolific, he is not the agent.

But if Puruṣa is a non-agent, how does he make determination? as I will perform acts of merit, I will not perform acts of demerit: hence Puruṣa must be the agent; neither is Puruṣa the agent;—thus there is, may say our opponent, defect in both the theories. Accordingly, the seeming agency of Puruṣa is explained in the next Kārikā.

The agency of Puruṣa is not real, but fictitious.

तस्मात् तत्सधियोग परिवर्तनं चेतनाविविव लिङ्गम्।
युक्तविवे च तथा कर्म भविष्यतः सन्यातीः॥ २० ॥

तस्मात् Tasmāt, therefore. तत्सधियोग Tat-samyogāt, from conjunction therewith, i.e., with the intelligent Puruṣa. अ-चेतना A-chetanaḥ, the non-intelligent, Chetana-वत, possessing intelligence. इव Iva, like, as if. महत् Mahat, the effect. the rest. गुण-कर्त्रिगुण-कर्त्रिते, in the case of the agency of the Guṇas. च च च, and. तथा Tathā, likewise. कार्तिक Kartik, agent. ईव Iva, like, as if. भविष्यति Bhavati, becomes. अ-सन्यात् Uddāśanaḥ, indifferent, i.e., Puruṣa.

XX. Therefore (the inference that intelligence and agency belong to one and the same subject is a mistake.) Through conjunction with Puruṣa, the non-intelligent Effect appears as if it were intelligent, and although agency is of the Guṇas, the indifferent (Puruṣa) appears, in the same way, as if he were the agent.

39. Liṅgam here denotes Mahat, Ahamkāra, Manas and the five Tanmātras. See Kārikā XL.

40. The confusion then is due to the conjunction of Prakriti and Puruṣa. And conjunction means mutual approach and co-operation,
which necessarily pre-supposes some object or purpose to be achieved. That purpose can be nothing but mutual benefit, as declared in the following Kārikā.

Object of the conjunction of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti.

पुरुषस्य वर्षेनार्थ केवलार्थ तथा प्रधानस्य ।
प्रकृतेऽवदूभयोरिपि संयोगस्ततूप्त: सर्गः ॥२११॥

पुरुष Puruṣa-aya, of Puruṣa. वर्षेन Darśana-artha, for the sake of seeing or exhibition. केवलार्थ Kaivalya-artha, for the sake of separation. तथा Tathā, likewise. प्रधान Pradhāna-aya, of the Pradhāna. अथ वदूभयोरिपि Paṅgu-andha-vat, like that of the halt and the blind. संयोग: Ubbayōḥ, of both. सर्ग: Samyogāḥ, conjunction. सर्गः Tat-kṛitaḥ, originated by that, i.e., conjunction. सर्गः Sargah, creation, evolution.

XXI. The conjunction of Puruṣa and the Pradhāna is, like that of the halt and the blind, for mutual benefit, that is, for the exhibition of the Pradhāna to Puruṣa and for the isolation of Puruṣa. From this conjunction proceeds Creation.

ANNOTATION.

41. The halt and the blind: "As a lame man and a blind man, deserted by their fellow-travellers, who, in making their way with difficulty through a forest, had been dispersed by robbers, happening to encounter each other, and entering into conversation so as to inspire mutual confidence, agreed to divide between them the duties of walking and of seeing; accordingly the lame man was mounted on the blind man's shoulders, and was thus carried on his journey, whilst the blind man was enabled to pursue his route by the directions of his companion. In the same manner, the faculty of seeing is in soul, not that of moving; it is like the lame man: the faculty of moving, but not of seeing, is in nature; which resembles, therefore, the blind man. Further, as a separation takes place between the lame man and the blind man, when their mutual object is accomplished, and they have reached their journey's end, so nature, having effected the liberation of soul, ceases to act; and soul, having contemplated nature, obtains abstractedness; and, consequently, their respective purposes being effected, the connexion between them is dissolved."—Gaudapāda's Bhāṣya, translated by Wilson.
The Evolutions of Prakṛiti and the order of their evolution stated.

प्रकृतेच्छांस्ततो द्वारास्तस्मात्मावास्य न्योतयः प्रकृतेच्छांस्ततो द्वारास्तस्मात्मावास्य न्योतयः 
तस्मादिपि न्योतयः पञ्चव्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥

मेek: Prakṛiteḥ, from Prakṛiti. भाष Mahān, Mahat. तत: Tathā, thence, from 
Mahat. साध्वम: Ahamkārab, Ahamkāra. तस्मात: Tasmāt, therefrom, from Ahamkāra.
वा: Gāṇaḥ, set, group, series. च and. शस्वकाḥ, sixteenths. तस्मात: Tasmāt, from that. चि Api, again. शस्वकाḥ, from sixteenths. पञ्च: 
Pācha-bhyāb, from five. चि पञ्च: Pācha bhūtāni, the five gross elements.

XXII. From Prakṛiti (evolves) Mahat; thence, Ahamkāra; and from this, the sixteenfold set; from five, again, 
among the sixteenfold, the five Elements.

Annotatton.

42. The sixteenfold set: that is, the eleven Indriyas and the five Tan-mātras. From five, etc: that is, from the lower five among the sixteen, 
that is, the five Tan-mātras.

Five Elements: viz., Ether, Air, Fire, Water and Earth.

43. The synonyms of Prakṛiti are Pradhāna, that in which all things 
are contained, Brahmā, that which expands, A-vyakta, the unmanifest, 
Bahu-dhāraka, that in which manifold things are contained, Māyā, that 
which measures or limits.

The synonyms of Mahat are Buddhi, that which makes things known, 
Aśuri, probably Chheda-bhedā-ādi-ātmikta as in the medical science, that is, 
that which causes separation, differentiation, etc., Maś, that by which 
things are understood, Khyāti, that by which things are manifested, 
Jñāna, that by which knowledge is acquired, Prajnā, that by which per-
fect knowledge is obtained.

The synonyms of Ahamkāra are Bhūta-ādi, the origin of the Bhūtas 
or elements, Vaiśrata, the modified, Taijasa, partaking of Tejas, i.e., 
Rajas, Abhināma, self-consciousness.

By Tatwa is meant the Tva, i.e., condition or existence of Tat, 
or that by which all the three worlds are pervaded. Prakṛiti, Mahat, 
Ahamkāra, Manas, the Indriyas, the Tan-mātras and the Elements are then 
the physical and metaphysical existences, realities, or principles pervading 
al the three worlds.
Buddhi and its modifications described.

XXIII. Ascertainment is Buddhi. Virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power are its forms or manifestations or modifications, partaking of Sattva. Those partaking of Tamas, are the reverse of these.

ANNOTATION.

44. Ascertainment is Buddhi: this statement in apposition is intended to teach that there is no difference between the function and the fuctionary.

Ascertainment is to arrive at the certainty that this is a jar, this I will do, etc., which is above the stage of doubt, differentiation, assimilation, and deliberation.

Virtue is that which is the cause of happiness and release, and includes the fruits of sacrifices and of the practice of Yoga as taught by Patanjali.

Knowledge is the manifestation of the discrimination between Prakriti and Purusa.

Dispassion is absence of Raga or passion. It has four names: the name of Yatamana, Vyatireka, Ekendriya and Vasikara. Passion and the like, which act like dyes of different hues, reside in the Chitta or the Retentive Faculty. By them the Indriyas, the Powers of Cognition and Action, are employed on their respective objects. Now, the endeavour, i.e., the putting forth of energy for the purpose of boiling down and dissolving them, with the desire that the Indriyas may not go out to the objects, is designated as Yatamana. And when the boiling is once begun, some passions will become boiled, while others will be in the course of being boiled. In that stage, the relation of before and after thus coming into existence, the ascertainment of the‘boiled by means of their discrimination from those that are in the course of being boiled, is designated as Vyatireka. They being thus disabled to excite the Indriyas to activity, the persistence
of the boiled passions in the mind in the form of mere longing, is designated as Ekendriya. The sucession of even the mere longing in regard to sensible and scriptural objects of enjoyment, even though they be near at hand, which, in its appearance, is subsequent to the first three stages, is designated as Vādikāra.—Vāchaspati.

Power is will-power or thought-power, whereby a Yogi becomes at will light as a leaf or heavy as a hill, whereby he can ascend to the sun on a sunbeam or can touch the moon with the tip of his finger, etc.

Partaking of Sattva: that is, when Sattva becomes predominant in Buddhī, by subduing Rajas and Tamas.

Partaking of Tamas: that is, when Tamas becomes predominant in Buddhī, by subduing Sattva and Rajas.

The reverse are vice, ignorance, passion and weakness.

_Ahamkāra and its Modifications described._

**XXIV.** Self-assertion is Ahamkāra. From it proceeds a twofold evolution only: the elevenfold set and also the fivefold Tanmātra.

**ANNOTATION.**

45. The elevenfold set comprises the eleven Indriyas, i.e., the five Indriyas of cognition and the five Indriyas of action and Manas.

The fivefold Tanmātra comprises the subtle particles or essences which are Sound, Touch, Form, Taste, and Smell. Whatever word conveys the sense of subtilty or fineness is a synonym of Tanmātra.

Self-assertion: All that is considered (ālochita) and reasoned (māta) refers to me, in this I am competent, all these objects of sense are for my sake only, this does not concern any one else but me, hence I am,—such abhimāna, self-assertion or consciousness by reference to oneself, from its having an uncommon or unique operation of its own, is called Ahamkāra, by working upon which Buddhī determines that this is to be done by me.
Transformations of Ahamkara distinguished.

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैक्रिताविहृकारात्।
भृतावैक्रितानाथः स तामसस्ते जायसुभयम्।

सात्त्विक: Sattvikaḥ, partaking of Sattva, in which Sattva is dominant, pure.
एकादशकः: Ekādaśakaḥ, elevenfold.
प्रवर्तते: Pravartate, proceeds.
वैक्रिता: Vaikritaḥ, modified by the predominance of Sattva; an older term conveying the same sense as Sattvika.
भृता: Purusottamaḥ, from Ahamkara.
भृतावैक्रिता: Bhūta-ādehaḥ, from the original of the elements in which Tamas is dominant; an older term conveying the same sense as Tāmasa.
सात्त्विकानाथः: Tāna-mātraḥ, the Tan-mātras.
भृतावैक्रितानाथः: Tānasā, Tāmasa, having Tamas dominant in it.
भृतावैक्रितानाथः: Taijasa, from Taijas, which is an older term having the sense of Rājas, that in which Rājas is dominant.
उभयं: Udbhayaḥ, both, i.e., the Indriyas and the Tan-mātras.

XXV. The Sattvika elevenfold set proceeds from the Vaikrita Ahamkara; from the Bhūtadi Ahamkara, the Tan-mātras; they are Tāmasa; from Taijasa Ahamkara, proceed both.

ANNOTATION.

46. From the Taijasa, both: Of the three Guṇas, Rajas alone is exciting and restless (see Kārikā X.3). Rajas alone, therefore, is active while Sattva and Tamas are inert. These must then depend upon the activity of Rājas for the evolution of their products. It is in this sense that from the Taijasa proceed both, and not that a duplicate set of the Indriyas and the Tan-mātras simultaneously issue from the Rājas Ahamkara.

Indriyas enumerated.

बुद्धिन्द्रियाणि च ज्ञेयोऽग्राश्रवस्तिन्तवगात्म्यानि।
वाक्प्रायिकशास्थ्यपंपवस्थ्यव्यक्तनिश्चायायात्।

बुद्धिन्द्रियाणि: Buddhī-indriyāṇi, the Indriyas or Powers of cognition.
च: Chakṣu-srotra-gṛhaṇa-rasana-tvак-ākhyāni, called the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and skin.
वाक-pācī-pāda-pāyu-upasthān, speech, hands, feet, excretory organ and organ of generation.
कर्म-इंद्रियाणि: Karma-indriyāṇi, the Indriyas or Powers of action.
अहुः: Aham, they say.

XXVI. Those called the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue and the skin are said to be the Indriyas of cognition, and the speech, hands, feet, the excretory organ and the organ of generation, to be the Indriyas of action.
Manns described.

उभयात्मकमण: संक्लयकमिनिद्रयः सापस्यौतः ।
गुणपरिणामाविशेषाङ्गानां वाह्येवारं पुराणम् ॥ २७ ॥

Ubbha-utmakam, possessing the nature of both, i.e. Indriyas of
cognition and of action. अत्र Atra, herein, in the set of Indriyas. यद: Manab, Manas.
संकल्पम् Samkalpakam, that which forms a complete idea at last, by means
of assimilation and differentiation; reflective; deliberative; combinative. इत्यः
Indriyan, indriya. च Cha, as well. नवगतः Sadharmyata, from homogeneousness.
गुण-परिणामविशेषत् Guṇa-pariṇāma-viśeṣat, from differences in the transformation of
the Guṇas. नानात् Nānā-tvam, manifoldness; variety; diverseness. अन्वयः
Dhāya-bhedaḥ, external diversities. च Cha, and.

XXVII. Among the Indriyas, Manas possesses the
nature of both. It is deliberative, and is as well an Indriya,
as it is homogeneous with the rest. The variety of the Indriyas is due to the differences in the transformation of the
Guṇas, and so are the external diversities (of objects of the
senses).

ANNOTATION.

47. Nature of both : The presence of Manns is necessary both in
respect to cognition and in respect to action; for, to quote from Locke,
"a man whose mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some
objects, takes no notice of impressions made by sounding bodies upon the
organ of hearing: therefore it is evident that perception is only when
the mind receives the impression." Similarly, there can be no movement
of the hands, etc., without the co-operation of Manns.

48. Samkalpa or deliberation is the uncommon or distinctive func-
tion of Manns. By the form of deliberation, Manns is marked out, because,
when a thing is first simply observed by the sense as it is something, and
doubt arises as to whether it be this or whether it be that, Manns perfectly
images it as. It is this and not that, that is to say, discriminates the thing
as a particular substance possessing specific attributes. In other words,
from the materials of the senses, Manns creates percepts. These are then
transferred to Ahamkāra, which regards them either as concerning itself or
not concerning itself. Thus coloured with the personal equation, they are
next taken up by Buddhi, which makes certain their true nature and deter-
mines conduct accordingly. Such, in brief, is the process of sensuous
cognition propounded in the Śamkhya Darśana.
49. But Manas thus possesses a unique definition of its own, yet it does not lie altogether out of the category of the Indriyas, like Buddhī and Ahaṁkāra; for, unlike them, it is, along with the other Indriyas, produced from the same material cause, viz., Ahaṁkāra modified by the predominance of Sattva. Hence, Manas also is an Indriya.

50. But how, from the same material, are diverse effects, viz., eleven Indriyas of eleven sorts, produced? Further, the eleven Indriyas necessarily imply, and must depend for their existence upon, eleven different sorts of objects. How is this diversity created? when the Pradhāna, Buddhī, and Ahaṁkāra are non-intelligent, and Puruṣa is a non-agent. Is it created by Īśvara or by Svabhāva or Spontaneity? The answer is, that a certain Spontaneity is the cause of the variety of the Indriyas and their objects. Just as through Spontaneity, secretion of milk takes place for the growth of the calf, so the Guṇas become spontaneously modified by the forms of the eleven Indriyas for the benefit of Puruṣa. Similarly, through particular transformation of the Guṇas spontaneously, external objects of various kinds are produced; for whatever is the modification of the Guṇas, is their object; hence, external objects must be understood to be the products of the Guṇas.

"Vāchaspati understands the allusion to external objects to be merely illustrative; that is, the internal organs are diversified by the modification of the qualities, in the same manner that external objects are varied by the same modification".—Wilson’s free translation.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu reads the passage as Bāhya-bhedā cha, and from the variety of external objects, instead of Bāhya-bhedāḥ cha, and so are the external diversities.

The Functions of the Indriyas described.

शब्दाविविभक्तेऽपभावनाविभावनमेतत्सत्वतः ।

dhāraṇa-viśeṣa-tattvārtha-paścāt

अनुपलोकस्य गोपालकः

abda-aditi-pū, in respect to sound and the rest, i.e., form, touch, taste, and smell. Pañcāṇām, of the five, i.e., senses of cognition. Alochana-mātram, observation simply, the mere observation of things, the identity of which is not free from doubt. Isyate, is considered. Vṛttiḥ, modification, function. Vachana-adāna-viśālā-utsarga-anandāḥ, speech, manipulation, locomotion, excretion and generation. Cha, and. Pañcāṇām, of the five, Indriyas of action.

XXVIII. The function of the five, in respect to sound and the rest, is considered to be observation simply. Speech,
manipulation, locomotion, excretion and generation are considered to be the functions of the other five.

The common and uncommon functions of the Antaḥ-Karayas distinguished.

स्यालचर्याः श्रवणेयस्य तेषाः सत्वसामान्या

तामान्यकरायम्बृचि: प्रायायां वायव: पञ्च II २६ II

स्यालचर्याः स्यालचर्याः the condition of having specific or distinctive or uncommon or characteristic definitions of their own. दीर्घः Vṛttiḥ, function, operation. त्रया-स्या, of the three, viz., Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, and Manas. य से, the same. मा एष, this. चतुष्टीस चतुष्टीस A-sāmānya, uncommon, peculiar to each. सामान्यकरायम्बृचि: Sāmkhya-karāya-vṛttiḥ the common function or modification of the Instruments. सामान्य: Prāpa-adyāḥ, Prāpa and the rest: viz., Apāna, Samāna, Udāna, and Vyāna, the five vital airs, life-breaths. अष्ट्र: Vyāvah, air. भष्ठा Pañcha, five.

XXIX. Of the three (internal Instruments), their own definitions are their respective functions. These, the same, (functions) are peculiar to each. The common modification of the Instruments is the five airs beginning with Prāpa.

ANNOTATION.

51. It is to be noted that the five vital airs are taught to be the modifications jointly of Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, and Manas, and not of the elements, as otherwise might be imagined.

The functions of the Indriyas are successive as well as simultaneous.

युगपत्तुद्वितप्तु तु दृष्टि: क्रमशः तत्व निर्विषिदा

हत्ने तपायपदुर्द्वर्त्यं तपस्य तत्पुर्विका दृष्टि: II ३० II

युगपत्तुद्वितप्तु तु दृष्टि: Yugapat, simultaneous, consensaneous. चतुष्टीसाभासायस्यः Chatuṣṭīsāyasya, of the quartet, viz., Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, Manas, and one of the external senses. तु Tu, but. दीर्घः Vṛttiḥ, function. चार: Krama-ād, successively, gradually. चा Cha, and. तपायाः Tapa, its, of the quartet. निर्विषिदा, found. दृष्टि: Dr̥ṣṭi, in the case of the seen, in regard to sensible objects, in the case of perceptual cognition. तत्वाति Tathā api, so too. अदि A-dṛṣṭi, in regard to supra-sensible objects, in the case of the unseen, in the case of cognition by inference, testimony, revelation, and recollection. त्रया-स्या, of the triad, viz., Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, and Manas. तत्पुर्विका Tatr̥purvika, preceded by that, the seen. दीर्घः Vṛttiḥ, function.

XXX. Of all the four, the functions are instantaneous; their functions are found to be successive also. This is in
regard to sensible objects. In regard to unseen objects, so too are the functions of the three, but preceded by that.

ANNOTATION.

52. Instantaneous: as when one suddenly comes across a tiger in a dark night, one’s eyes at once observe, Manas considers, Ahamkara identifies, and Buddhi determines, and the man immediately runs away for his life.

Successive: as when a man sees in dim light something moving in front of him and doubt arises as to what it might be; his Manas considers that it is nothing but a robber; his Ahamkara makes him self-conscious that he is approaching towards him; and his Buddhi determines, I must move away.

So too: that is, in the case of non-perceptual cognition, the functions of Buddhi, Ahamkara, and Manas may be simultaneous as well as successive.

But preceded by that: Hereby the condition of cognition by inference, revelation, and recollection is laid down, which may be stated in the phraseology of Locke as that nothing can be in the intellect which was not previously in the senses. For there can be no inference or revelation or recollection of what has never before been perceived.

How the Indriyas act in harmony with one another.

sva vama pratipadyante parasparam uruchhatah karyaṁ।
puruṣāya eva humtur kāryānta karyaṁ∥ १२ ∥

sva svām svām svām, one, own. pratipadyante, reach, enter into. paraspara-akūta-hetukām, of which the cause is proneness to activity arising from mutual sympathy. vṛttiḥ, function, modification. puruṣa-arthāḥ, the purpose of Puruṣa. eva, alone. hetuḥ, cause, motive. na, not. kṣetra, instrument.

XXXI. The Instruments enter into their respective modifications to which they are incited by mutual desire. The purpose of Puruṣa is the only (cause of the activity of the Instruments). By none whatever is an Instrument made to act.
The number, functions and effects of the Indriyas described.

The number, functions and effects of the Indriyas described.

Kāryan śāyoyāśavinīn tadvaharādhāryakānakāroṣ.
Kāryan-tattvadārāhārābhavānyāsāksāhasyaḥ.


XXXII. The Instrument is of thirteen sorts. It performs apprehension, sustentation, and manifestation. And its effect or act, viz., the apprehensible, the sustainable, and the manifestable, is (each) tenfold.

Annotation.

53. Apprehension is of the five instruments of action. Their effects are speech, manipulation, locomotion, excretion and generation, which being distinguished as earthly and non-earthly, become tenfold.

Sustentation is of the five vital airs, which support the Body. The thing to be sustained, i.e., Body, is fivefold according as it is made of Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Ether, and these, again, being distinguished as celestial (divya) and non-celestial, become tenfold.

Manifestation is of the five instruments of cognition. The things to be manifested are sound, touch, form, taste, and smell, and these being distinguished as celestial and non-celestial, become tenfold.

Gaudāpaśa explains the Karikā differently. According to him, the instruments of action apprehend and sustain, those of cognition manifest. The action or effect of these instruments is tenfold, viz., sound, etc., and speech, etc. Thus, what is manifested by the instruments of cognition, is acquired and maintained by those of action.

The Thirteen Indriyas described and distinguished.

Ananta: kāryan śāyoyāśavinīn tadvaharāhārābhavānyāsāksāhaṁ kārāyaḥ.

XXXIII. The internal Instrument is threefold; the external, tenfold, called the object of the three. The external instrument operates at time present; the internal at all the three times.

ANNOTATION.

54. Called the object of the three: because the external instruments of cognition and action are the channels through which the three internal instruments of Buddhi, Ahamkāra, and Manas come into contact with, and exercise their functions in regard to, the external objects.

Objects of the Indriyas described.

XXXIV. Among these (ten Indriyas) the five Indriyas of cognition have for their objects things gross and subtile. Speech has sound (alone) for its object. But the rest have (all) the five as their objects.

ANNOTATION.

55. But the rest have the five etc.: for, a jar, e.g., which may be taken hold of by the hand, possesses sound, touch, form, taste, and smell; the foot treads upon the earth of which sound and the rest are the characteristics; the excretory organ separates that in which these five abide; and the organ of generation produces the secretion in which all these five are present.

Why Buddhi is principal among the Indriyas.
XXXV. Since Buddhī, together with Ahaṃkāra and Manas, comprehends all objects (at all times), therefore, the three Instruments are like a house of which the rest are gates.

Above continued.

XXXVI. These particular modifications of the Guṇas, which are characteristically different from one another, and which are, therefore, in this matter, comparable to a lamp, present all their respective objects to Buddhī, so that these may be exhibited to Puruṣa.

ANNOTATION.

56. Comparable to a lamp: see Kārikā XIII.

Present......to Buddhī: for Puruṣa can experience objects, pleasure, etc., only such as are lodged in Buddhī. The process by which ideas are conveyed to Puruṣa is here described.

Above continued.
XXXVII. (The other Indriyas present all objects to Buddhi, so that they may be exhibited to Puruṣa), since it is Buddhi which accomplishes the experience of Puruṣa in regard to all (objects at all times). And it is that, again, which discriminates the subtle difference between the Pradhāna and Puruṣa.

**ANNOTATION.**

57. In these three Kārikās it is established that Buddhi is supreme among the Indriyas. It is the principal means of accomplishing the apparently contradictory purposes of Puruṣa, viz., experience and release. For Buddhi, through the adjacency of Puruṣa, by means of the falling of his shadow, becoming verily of his form, accomplishes Puruṣa's experience of all objects; for experience consists in the apprehension of pleasure and pain, and this exists in Buddhi, and Buddhi is verily of the form of Puruṣa; hence it causes experience to Puruṣa. And while, on the one hand, it is the cause of experience, it is, on the other hand, the cause of release as well, since it is Buddhi which causes discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa.

The Tan-mātrās and their products described.

XXXVIII. The Tan-mātrās are the indiscernibles. From these five, proceed the five gross Elements which are remembered to be the discernibles; for they are pacific, terrific, and stupefied.

**ANNOTATION.**

58. Tan-mātrā: lit. That-merely or its measure. The Tan-mātrās are subtle forms of Sound, Touch, Form, Taste, and Small which have...
not yet come down to that degree of materialisation in which they cause pleasure, pain, and dulness, and thereby become capable of experience. Such is the force of the word merely, according to Vāchaspāti's interpretation. They are, however, not properties or qualities but substances. Vijñāna Bhikṣu describes them as "fine substances, the undifferentiated originals of the Gross Elements, which form the substrata of Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour, and Smell, belonging to that class (that is, in that state of their evolution) in which the distinctions of Śanta, etc., do not exist." So we find from the Viṣṇu-Purāṇam and other sources, e.g., that 'in them severally reside their parts (mātrā) wherefore the Smṛiti describes them as Tan (their)-mātra (part). They are neither Śanta, pacific, nor Ghora, terrible, nor, again, Mūḍha, stupefying, but are indistinguishables.'

59. Pacific, etc.:—Every one of the five Gross Elements possesses the threefold characteristic of causing pleasure, pain, and dulness.

Subtle and Gross Bodies described and distinguished.

सुक्ष्मा मातापितुजा: तत्र प्रमून्तिभिष्या विषेषः स्युः।
सुक्ष्मस्तेषां नियता मातापितुजा निवर्तने। ३५।

पूर्वः: Sūkṣmāḥ subtle Bodies. नामविवरणम्: Mātā-pīṭṛ-jāḥ, Bodies produced from mother and father. च तत्र: Sāta, together. तृतीय: Prā-bhūtah, with the Great Elements. तत्त्व: Tri-dhā, threefold. विषेषः: Viṣeṣāḥ, distinguishables, specific objects. स्युः: Syuh, will be. पूर्वः: Sūkṣmāḥ, subtle Bodies. तत्त्वः: Tattvāḥ, among them. नामविवरणम्: Niyataḥ, constant, continuant. नामविवरणम्: Mātā-pīṭṛ-jāḥ, Bodies produced from mother and father. स्वयं: Niyatante, cease, perish.

XXXIX. The Subtle Bodies, Bodies produced from father and mother, together with the Great Elements, will be the Viṣeṣas. Amongst them, the Subtle Bodies are continuant; Bodies produced from father and mother cease (to entangle after death.)

Annotation.

60. Wilson's learned disquisition on the meaning of the present Kārikā is misguided and misleading. The Śāmkhya describes or displays the gradual materialisation of the Pradhāna from the highest degree of subtlety to the lowest form of grossness. In the series of evolutes, the Tan-mātras and the Gross Elements may be said, loosely speaking, to occupy the same plane, that is, the plane of materiality in the current sense of the term, and to stand to each other as do atoms to earth, air,
etc. But though they are on the same plane, there is a marked difference between them; for the Tan-mātras are indiscernible, while the Elements are discernible. A Vīdeṣa is what contains a Vīdeṣa or qualification, something extra by means of which it is distinguished from others. In the present case the Vīdeṣa is the property of causing pleasure, pain and dulness. This is absent from the Tan-mātras and is present in the Elements. It is clear, therefore, that the transition from the Tan-mātras to the next succeeding form of evolution is marked by the development of the property of causing pleasure, pain and dulness. Similarly, the Subtile Body which is a combination of the Tan-mātras and the Tattvas upward, and Indriyas which are pacific, terrific, and stupefied, contains the aroma of past experiences. So is it as well as the Elements and the Bodies formed from them classed among the Vīdeṣas, as distinguished from the Tan-mātras which are A-Vīdeṣas.

How the Subtile Body migrates.

पूर्वोत्तप्तिः सिद्धं नियतं महाभिविशुद्धपर्यन्तस्य ।
सत्तरति नियमोऽगे अवैरिविवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥

पूर्वोत्तप्तिः पूर्व-उत्पन्नम्, primeval, produced at the beginning of creation by the Pradhāna, one for each Puruṣa. असंक्त A-saktam, unconnected, unconfined to any particular gross Body, and therefore unobstructed in its passage even through a mountain. नियमं Niyatam, continual, constant, as it lasts from the beginning of creation to the time of the Great Dissolution. महात्-अधि-सुकम-पर्यायं Mahat-Adhi-sukma-parayanam, being the combination of the Tattvas beginning with Mahat and ending with the Subtile, i.e., the Tan-mātras. संपसरति Samparati, moves from Body to Body, transmigrates. निर-उपलभ्यं Nir-upalabhyam, free from, or without, experience. लिङ्गम् Liṅgam, mergent, that which suffers resolution, being a product, a combination of things.

XL. The Liṅga or mergent Body, the one primordially produced, unconfined, continuant, composed of the Tattvas beginning with Mahat and ending with the Tan-mātras, transmigrates, free from Experience, tinged with the Bhāvas.

ANNOTATION.

61. Tinged with the Bhāvas: The Bhāvas reside in Buddhi which accompanies or is associated with the Subtile Body, and through such association, the Subtile Body is affected by the Bhāvas in the same manner, for instance, as a piece of cloth is perfumed with the sweet smell of a
Champaka flower from contact with it. And it is this affection by the Bhāvās which is the cause of the transmigration of the Subtile Body.

Necessity for Gross Creation shown.

विचरं यथाधयक्षृतं स्पष्टेऽविविभृतं विना यथाध्यक्षति ।
तद्वगता विसर्षेष्ठं तिद्विदं निराध्यात्म हस्तस्व ॥ ४२ ॥

सिद्ध, Chitra, a painting or picture. क्ष यथाः, as. क्ष अधयम, ground, support. ज्ञेये, Rite, without. विश्वासिन: Sthānu-ādi-bhaya, a stake, etc. सिद्ध vinā without. क्ष यथाः, as. क्ष ऋषि Chhāya, shadow. क्ष तत्व, similarly to that. सिद्ध vinā, without. दोष: Viśeṣa, Viśeṣa, Subtile Bodies (Vāchaspati), the Tan-mātras (Gaudapāda), Ātivāhika or Vehicular Bodies (Vijñāna Bhikṣu). का, not. विभाबि Tiṣṭhati, stands, subsists. विभाबि Nir-ārayam, supportless. विशेष Liṅga, that which makes known, etc., Buddhī, Ahamkāra, Manas and the other Indriyas (Vāchaspati, Gaudapāda), the Subtile Body called Liṅga. (Vijñāna).

XLI. As a painting stands not without a support, nor is there a shadow without a stake or the like, so neither does the Liṅga subsist supportless, without the Viśeṣas.

Annotation.

62. Viśeṣas: The difference of the interpretation of this word points to a difference of doctrine. Thus, according to Gaudapāda and Vāchaspati, there are only two kinds of Body, as described above. But, according to Vijñāna Bhikṣu, there is also a third kind of Body, the Adhiṣṭhāna Śarīra, which is formed of a finer form of the gross elements and which serves as the receptacle of the Liṅga Śarīra.

The activity of the Subtile Body further explained.

पुरुषार्थेऽत्वत्रमिहं विनिमित्तेऽनिर्मित्तिक्रसंगृहे ।
प्रकटस्यैस्वयमानवथ्वत्वत्स्ते लिङ्गे ॥ ४२ ॥

पुरुषोऽर्थ-हेतुत्कसं निष्णू-सर्वत्रिष्णू, which has the object of Puruṣa as motive.
स इत्य विनिमित्तेऽनिर्मित्तिक्रसंगृहे, by association with instrumental causes such as virtue, vice, etc., and with their consequences such as the body of a god or a man or a beast. क्ष: Prakṛti, of Prakṛti, विकृतिक्रसं Vibhū-tva-yogāt, from conjunction or the universal supremacy of Prakṛti. नाता-वत्त, like a dramatic actor. विसर्षेष्ठं, Viṣvapati, appears in different roles.
सिद्ध Liṅga, the subtile body.

XLII. Impelled by the purpose of Puruṣa, this Subtile Body appears in different roles, like a dramatic performer, by means of association with instrumental causes and
their consequences, through the universal supremacy of Prakṛiti.

**Annotation.**

63. **Like a dramatic performer:** Just as, on the stage, one and the same person plays the parts of Parāśurāma, Ajītasatra and Vatsarasāja, so the same Subtile Body may appear in the body of a god or an elephant or a man. The final and material causes of this transmigration of the Subtile Body in general are respectively the purpose of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, and the formal and efficient causes which determine particular migrations, are respectively the consequences of the Nimittas and the Nimittas, namely, virtue, vice, and the like.

**Bhāvas divided and described.**

सांतिसिद्धिकाश भावोऽप्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश चम्पायः।

हृदा कर्याधिविषयः कार्याधिविषयः कल्पनायः।

विविध: सांसिद्धिकाः, produced from means already in existence, *e.g.* previous Karma; innate, instinctive. व: Cha, and. अव: Bhāvāḥ, dispositions, conditions, circumstances. विविध: Prakṛitikāḥ, essential, natural, springing from Prakṛiti direct. विविध: Vaikritikāḥ, acquired, due or relating to vikṛti or transformations. अव: Cha, and. अव: Dharma-adyāḥ, virtue and the rest. अव: Dristikāḥ, seen. अव: Karṇa-ādārayināḥ, residing in the Karṇa, i.e., Buddhī. अव: Kārya-ādārayināḥ, residing in the effect, i.e., body. अव: Cha, and. अव: Kalāla-adyāḥ, the uterine germ and the rest.

XLIII. The Bhāvas or dispositions are instinctive, essential, and also acquired. Dharma and the rest are considered as residing in Buddhī, and the uterine germ and the rest as residing in the Body.

**Annotation.**

61. Sāmsiddhi: as, at the beginning of creation, when the Lord Kapila was to appear, the four Bhāvas, *viz.* virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power, were produced along with him. They are then the effects of causes appertaining to a former creation.

Prakṛitika: These are equally innate or instinctive, but are the effects of causes appertaining to the present creation. Thus, from the very same causes, *i.e.*, highly purified form of Prakṛite matter, from which the perpetually youthful Bodies of the four sons of Brahmā, namely, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, and Sanatkumāra, were produced, were
also at the same time produced the Bhāvas of virtue and the rest in them.

Veṣṭrīkā: These are those acquired from a Vikṛti or evolute, namely, a teacher whose body is an evolute; thus the effect of tuition is knowledge, knowledge leads to dispassion, dispassion to virtue, and virtue to power. This is how ordinary human beings acquire the Bhāvas.

The Bhāvas, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power, grow when Sattva is dominant. Hence they are characterised as Sattvic. Those that grow during the predominance of Tamas, are vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness. These are characterised as Tāmasic.

These eight Bhāvas are the Nimittas or efficient cause of particular migrations of the Līṅga Śārira. They operate through bringing about connection with their effects, the Naimittikas, from the first conmingled blood and semen in the uterus up to the fully developed body.

Effects of the Bhāvas described.

XLIV. By virtue, is going upward; going downward is by vice; and by knowledge, is Release; from the reverse, Bondage is considered (to be.)

Annotation.

65. Upwards: that is, to the worlds of Brahmā, Prajāpati, Soma, Indra, the Gandharvas, the Yākas, the Rākṣasas, and the Pīṭāchās.

Downward: that is, into the bodies of beasts, birds, reptiles, trees, etc.

Knowledge: that is, knowledge of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

Release: when the Subtile Body ceases and Puruṣa becomes Paramātmanā.

Bondage: it is either Prakṛti, or Vaikṛti, or Dākṣipāka. The first is of those who, mistaking either of the eight Prakṛtis, viz., the Pradhāna, Mahat, Ahamkāra, and the five Tām-mātras, to be Puruṣa,
contemplate upon that, and not upon Puruṣa. After death, they are absorbed in the Prakriti, and are called Prakriti-lying. The second is of those who contemplate upon the transformations, i.e., the elements, the Indriyas, individual Ahankāra and individual Buddhī, mistaking them for Puruṣa, and after death reach unto the archetypes of those transformations. The third is of those who, not knowing the Tattva, i.e., Puruṣa, seek mundane and heavenly happiness through performance of acts of charity and public utility.

Above continued.

वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः संसारे भवति राजसाध्रागात् ।
प्रक्षयानिविषयातो विर्यवातित्वीयते ॥ ४५ ॥

Vairagya, from dispassion, that is, from dispassion divorced from knowledge of the Tattva. Kriti: Prakriti-lying, absorption into the eight Prakritis, which state of absorption lasts for full one hundred thousand Manvantaras. Samāra, transmigration, revolution of births and deaths. Bhavati, is. Ājñā, Rājas, produced from, or appertaining to, Rajas. Rāgā, from passion. Aivāryā, from power. Viparyā, A-vighāta, non-impediment i.e., of desire. Tat-viparyā, from the reverse, i.e., from weakness. Tat-viparyā, the contrary thereof, i.e., impediment.

XLV. From dispassion is absorption into the Prakriti, transmigration is from the passion of Rajas, from power is unimpediment, from the reverse is the contrary.

ANNOTATION.

66. In these two Kārikās, the eight efficient causes and their eight effects have been declared. They are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUSE</th>
<th>EFFECT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Virtue</td>
<td>2. Elevation to the higher worlds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Power</td>
<td>8. Unimpediment to fulfilment of desire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Weakness</td>
<td>16. Impediment to fulfilment of desire.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The creations of Buddhī classified and explained.

र्गमे प्रत्ययां विपर्ययां शक्तिसिद्धिसिद्धालयः ।
गुणवेष्ठमिर्मवर्धणस्य व भेवाभु पञ्चायत ॥ ४६ ॥

Eṣāḥ, this. Pratyaya-sargaḥ, the creation of that by which intuitional things is made, that is, Buddhī. Viparyaya-shakti-siddhi-Akhyāḥ, called ignorance, incapacity, complacency, and perfection.
XLVI. This is the creation of Buddhi, termed ignorance, incapacity, complacency, and perfection. And from the conflict of the Guṇas in unequal degree of strength, its sorts, again, are fifty.

**ANNOTATION.**

67. This is that, the sixteenfold cause and effect mentioned in the preceding Karikā. They are all modifications or products of Buddhi. Their minor divisions are legions. To attempt some classification, they are primarily of four sorts, and secondarily of fifty sorts.

*The creations of Buddhi subdivided.*

पञ्च विपर्यये भवन्त्यशक्तिः करण्याकल्यात् ।

छहाविरिक्तेऽस्त्वतदुपरिवर्तान्तथा सिद्ध:म ॥ ४७ ॥

पञ्च Pañcha, five, više, A-vidyā, Asmitā, Rāga, Vṛtiṣṭha, and Abhiniveṣa. विपर्यये: Viparyaya-bhedāḥ, divisions of mistake or ignorance. अस्त्वतदुपरिवर्तते Bhavanti, are, अस्त्वतदुपरिवर्तते: A-āśaktīḥ, incapacity. छहाविरिक्तेऽस्त्वतदुपरिवर्तान्तथा: Karuṇa-vaikalyāṭ, according to the impairment of the Indriyas. छहाविरिक्तेऽस्त्वतदुपरिवर्तान्तथा: having twenty-eight divisions. छहाविरिक्तेऽस्त्वतदुपरिवर्तान्तथा: Tuṣṭiḥ, complacency. छहाविरिक्तेऽस्त्वतदुपरिवर्तान्तथा: Nava-dhāḥ, ninefold. छहाविरिक्तेऽस्त्वतदुपरिवर्तान्तथा: Aṣṭa-dhāḥ, eightfold. सिद्ध: Siddhiḥ, perfection.

XLVII. Five are the divisions of ignorance; and according to the impairment of the instruments, incapacity has twenty-eight varieties; while complacency is ninefold; perfection, eightfold.

*Divisions of Error subdivided.*

अवस्तमलोज्याधिष्ठो मोक्षस्य च वशिष्ठो महासोहः ।

तामिळोऽवस्तमलो तथा अवस्तस्तान्तान्तानिल: ॥ ४८ ॥

पञ्च Pañcha, distinctions, divisions. अवस्तमलो: Tamas, of Tamas, which is a technical term for A-Vidyā or false knowledge. अवस्तमलो: Aṣṭa-vidhāḥ, eightfold. अवस्तमलो: Mohasya, of Moha, which is technical for Asmitā or Am-ness or egotism. अवस्तमलो: Maha-moha, which is technical for Rāga or passion. अवस्तमलो: Tāmiśaḥ, Tāmīśa, which is technical for Dveṣa.
or aversion. अष्टादश, Aṣṭādaśa-dhā, eighteenfold. अ तथा, so. भवति, is.
प्रभावित अन्धा-तमिष्र, अन्धात्मिष्र, which is technical for Abhinivesa or
blind attachment to life.

XLVIII. The distinctions of A-Vidyā are eightfold,
as also of Āsmitā; tenfold is Rāga; Dveṣa is eighteenfold;
so also is Abhinivesa.

Incacity subdivided.

एकादशोनिर्यथव्यप: तद्व बुद्धिवेदनालिङ्कितिषिता ।
सत्तदश वधा बुद्धिविपर्ययत्वुपदिक्षिन्द्रियानां ॥ ४६ ॥

सत्तदशोनिर्यथवि: Ekādaśa-indriya-badhaḥ, injuries of the eleven Indriyas. ज
Saḥ, together. गुणित: Buddhī-badhaḥ, with injuries of Buddhī. 
कपित: A-ākṣaṇa incapacity. अधिक Uddīṣṭā, pronounced. सप्तदशा-बधां, seventeen inj-
juries. विपर्ययत्, Buddhī, of Buddhī. विपर्ययत् Viparyayata, from inversion. तुष्टिसिद्धिनम्
Tuṣṭi-siddhānām, of complacencies and perfections.

XLIX. Injuries of the eleven Indriyas, together with
injuries of Buddhi, are pronounced to be Incacity. The
injuries of Buddhi are seventeen, through inversion of com-
placencies and perfections.

Complacency subdivided.

प्रकृतिविषयित्तत्त: प्रकृतिप्राथानकालमायाद्यव्य: ।
बाणपि विषवैपब्यवात पञ्च नव तुष्टीयोगतिमिता: ॥ ५० ॥

चार्याल्पिकानाति: Ādhyātmikāḥ, self (soul)-regarding, it is that form of complacency
in which there is belief in the existence of a Self, as distinct from Prakṛiti, but in
which the Self is identified with the Not-Self. चार्य: Ādhyātmika, four. प्रकृतिप्राथानकालमायाद्यव्य:
Prakṛiti-upādāna-kāla-bhāgya-ākhyāḥ, called after Prakṛiti or Root, Upādāna
or Material, Kāla or Time, and Bhāgya or Luck. अव: Bāhyāḥ, external, Not-Self-
regarding. विपर्ययत् Viparyayata, through abstinence from objects. वा
Pañcaka, five. वाच Nava-dhā, ninefold. तुष्टयत् Tuṣṭayat, complacencies. अिनितः
Abhīhitāḥ, propounded.

L. The nine Complacencies are propounded: the
four Self-regarding ones called after Prakṛiti, Material,
Time, and Luck; the external five, through abstinence from
objects.
Perfection subdivided.

उँँ: शब्दोऽयनं हुँ:खविष्टासः: सुहृद्वधारितः; ।
वानं च तिद्दयोऽयो सिद्धे: पूर्वोऽद्वाहःश्रविभ: ॥ ५९ ॥

ष: Ūbhā, reasoning, argumentation. वा: Śabdaḥ, word, verbal instruction.

Adhyayanam, study. पुराविभः: Dūkhā-vighatāḥ, preventions of pain.

Trayaḥ, three. ज्ञेयमिति: Suhṛt-prāptiḥ, acquisition of friend, intercourse with


क्रम: Aksaḥ, goad, curb, restrainer. छिन: Tri-Vidhaḥ, threefold.

LI. Argumentation, Word, Study, the three Preventions of Pain, Acquisition of friends, Charity or Purity are the eight Perfections. Those mentioned before Perfection are the threefold goad to (Ignorance and suffering).

ANNOTATION.

68. Those mentioned before Perfection are Ignorance, Incapacity, and Complacency.

Aksaḥ:—This word may also be rendered by curb', meaning that Ignorance and the rest curb, i.e., impede or obstruct the means to Perfection.

69. Vijñāna Bhikṣu has interpreted this Karikā in a different manner and has criticised unfavourably the exposition of Gaudapāda and Vāchaspati. See our Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtraḥ, Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. XI, page 321.

70. The above details of the creations of Buddhi have been fully explained in the commentaries on the Taṇḍu-Saṃkṣerah and the Sāṃkhya Pravachana-Sūtraḥ. The reader is accordingly referred to Vol. XI of the Sacred Books of the Hindus.

71. Now, if it be questioned that when any one of the two, viz., creations of Buddhi and creations of the Tanmātras, is enough for the accomplishment of the purpose of Puruṣa, what need is there for a twofold creation? so it is declared in the succeeding Karikā.

Twofold creation, of Buddhi and of Tanmātra, upheld.

न विना आर्येाविः न विना विन्द भावनिः: ।
विन्दुप्रायो भावार्थसत्साहित्विभ: प्रवर्त्ते सद्ग: ॥ ५२ ॥

न: na, not. न: Vina, without. छ: Bhāvāḥ, dispositions, the creations of Buddhi mentioned above. न: Lingam, the creation of the Tan-mātras.
Na, not. तव Vinā, without. सत्ते लिङ्गम, the creation of the Tau-mātras. कालस्तीति: Bhāva-nirvṛttī, cessation or pause of the dispositions. कृतस्य: Līṅgā- Akhyāḥ, termed Līṅga. तथापि: Bhāva-Akhyāḥ, termed Bhāva. तथापि: Tassat, hence. तितिक्षित्व: Dvi-vidhāḥ, twofold. समवेति Pravartate, proceeds. कतः Sargat, creation.

LII. Without the Bhāvas, there would be no-Līṅga, without the Līṅga, there would be no surcease of the Bhāvas; wherefrom a twofold creation proceeds: the one called after the Līṅga, the other called after the Bhāvas.

ANNOTATION.

1. Vācchaspati explains the necessity for a twofold creation and their interdependence thus: Experience which is the object of Puruṣa, cannot be possible in the absence of the objects of experience, such as sound and the rest, as well as of the twofold Body which is the Āyatana or house of experience: wherefore the creations of the Tan-mātras are necessary. In the same manner, the very same Experience is not possible without the Indriyas and the Antah-karaṇa which are the instruments of Experience; these, again, cannot be possible without the Bhāvas, virtue and the rest. Neither is the manifestation of Discrimination, which is the cause of Release, possible in the absence of the twofold creation. Hence the twofold creation is established.

The succession of the two kinds of creation as mutually cause and effect is no fault, as it is from eternity, like that of the seed and the sprout. Even in the beginning of a Kalpa the production of the Bhāvas and the Līṅga under the influence of the Samskāra or impression of the Bhāvas and the Līṅga produced in a previous Kalpa, is not unproved.

Gross Creation subdivided.

प्रद्विभाकारो वैविद्यायथोऽभ्रंश्यां प्रक्षेपणं भवति ।

मातुष्य-वैशेषिकः समासतोर्जणं भौतिकं: सर्गं: ॥ ४३ ॥

वैशेषिकः: Aṣṭa-vikalpah, having eight specific kinds, viz., Brāhma, Prājāpatya, etc. दावह, divine, celestial, supernatural, super-human. तार्किकः: Tāirtyak- yonah, the grovelling-born. चा, and. पा: Pāsha-dhā, fivefold. भवति, is. मातुष्यः: Mātusyah, human. चा, and, while. एका-विद्धा, uniform, of one kind. विषयोः: Samāsa-taḥ, briefly. अयम्: Ayam, this. भौतिकः: Bhā- jītak, of the Bhūtas or beings. कतः Sargat, creation.

LII. The superhuman is of eight kinds; and the grovelling species is of five kinds; and the human is of a
single kind; this, briefly, is the Bhautika Sarga or Creation of Beings.

Higher, Lower, and Intermediate Worlds characterised.

उद्धृतम् तत्वाविवाचनस्मृतिविवाचनः मूलत्: सर्गः: ।
मयेऽर्जोविषाणलो भ्राविश्वस्वर्यः ॥ ४३ ॥

Urdhvaḥ, above, in the higher worlds of Brahma and the rest. सत्वः-विद्याथ्, abundant in Sattva, in which Sattva is dominant; and Rajas and Tamás are dormant. तमाः-विद्याथ्, abundant in Tamás, in which Tamás is dominant, and Sattva and Rajas are dormant. च, and. मुल-लह, at the bottom, below.

वर्: Sargaḥ, creation. भवः Madhyas, in the middle, in the world of man. राजा-विद्याथ्, abundant in Rajas, in which Rajas is dominant and Sattva and Tamás are dormant. श्रवण-सत्त्वम्: Brahma-ādi-stambha-paryantāḥ, beginning with Brahmā and ending with a stock.

I,IV. Above, the creation is abundant in Sattva; below, it is abundant in Tamás; in the middle, it is abundant in Rajas; such is the creation from Brahmā down to a stock.

Universality of pain demonstrated.

तद्व जरामरायक्षते हुः चाप्यमुक्तिः पैतन: ।
विद्वृत्ताविविवेषिण्यता हुः स्वभावे ॥ ५५ ॥

तत्र Tatra, therein, in the three worlds, in the bodies of the superhuman, human and grovelling species. सम्बन्धस्य: जरा-मराप-क्रियाः caused by decay and death. दुः Duḥkhaḥ, pain. प्राप्त: Prāpti, experiences. चेतन: Chetanaḥ, intelligent. The force of this word is to exclude experience of pain from Prakṛti and her products which are all non-intelligent. पुरुष: Puruṣaḥ, that which lies (Seta; in the Puri or the Liṅga śāstra or Subtile Body, Puruṣa. लिङ्ग स्त्रीः Liṅga-śyā, of the Liṅga śāstra. सर्वेण्यां: A-viniṇṇitēḥ, owing to the non-cessation, or till the cessation of the Liṅga śāstra which is continuant (see Kārikā XL), and does not cease till the development of discriminative knowledge. तव: Tamāt, therefore. दुः Duḥkhaḥ, pain. स्वभाव: Sva-bhāvena, by nature.

LV. Therein does intelligent Puruṣa experience pain caused by decay and death, on account of the non-cessation of, or till the cessation of, the Subtile Body: wherefore pain is the natural order of things.
Object of Prakriti's creation explained.

LVI. Thus then is this creation beginning with Mahat and ending with specific entities, originated by Prakriti in the interest of another as in her own interest, for the release of each individual Purusa.

Annotation.

73. Originated by Prakriti: Creation by Prakriti is not guided, directed, and controlled by Isvara or Adi Purusa, for this is impossible, inasmuch as no activity can belong to him. Neither can Brahman be the material of creation, for, being the power or energy of Consciousness, it can undergo no transformation or modification.

For the release of each individual Purusa: This explains why, on the release of one Purusa, the release of others does not result, and how the activity of Prakriti whose nature is to energise, can cease in regard to a particular Purusa, and how creation does not ever continue, making release of any one impossible. Vachaspati explains the passage thus: As a man who desires food, being engaged in the cooking of food, rests after the food has been cooked, so does Prakriti, who is engaged in activity with a view to release every individual Purusa, cease from energising again in regard to that Purusa whom she releases.

Spontaneity of Prakriti explained and illustrated.

Vata-vivriddhi-nimittam, for the sake of, or due to the nourishment of, the calf. Yathä, as. Yathä, so. Pravritti, activity, i.e., secretion. A-jāña-sya, of the unintelligent. Purusa-vimoksha-nimittam, due to the release of Purusa. Yathä, so. Pravritti, activity, i.e., creation. Pradhāna-sya, of the Pradhāna.
LVII. Just as is the secretion of milk, which is unintelligent, for the sake of nourishment of the calf, so is the creation of the Pradhâna for the sake of the release of Puruṣa.

ANNOTATION.

74. This Kārikā gives an answer to those who entertain doubts as to how an unintelligent substance such as Prakṛti is represented here to be, can engage in activity for an altruistic end. It cannot be maintained that the secretion of milk takes place under the superintendence of Isvara. For all intelligent activity such as, for instance, as is here attributed to Isvara, proceeds either from selfish motives or from compassion. Now, in the case of Isvara, who is ex hypothesi all-full, having all desires fulfilled, wanting in nothing whatever, can possibly have no selfish ends to accomplish. Compassion also is impossible; for compassion implies the desire to alleviate, remove or prevent suffering, but prior to creation there is no existence of the Jīvas, Indriyas, Bodies, and Objects, and consequently no pain, no suffering. Compassion, therefore, cannot be the motive for creation. Further, were creation an act of compassion on the part of Isvara, one would expect to find in it only happy beings, but such is not the case, but just the opposite. The anomaly cannot be explained by reference to diversity of Karma, as in that case the alleged superintendence of Karma by an omniscient and omnipotent Being falls to the ground. Prakṛti, on the other hand, being unintelligent, has no selfish motive nor any motive of compassion to impel her to activity. Her activity is directed simply by the end of the other; she exists for his sake. Her action is of the nature of a sympathetic response, of harmonical variation or correspondence, like the secretion of the mother's milk, in response to the requirement of the baby.

Above continued.

LVIII. Just as people engage in acts to relieve
anxiety or desires, so does the Unmanifest energise for the purpose of the release of Puruṣa.

*How Prakṛiti's creation ceases spontaneously.*

रक्तस्य वर्षिल्या निर्वर्तते नर्तकी यष्ठा नृत्याद।

पुरुषस्य तथात्मानं प्रकाश्य निर्वर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ ५६ ॥

रक्तस्य Raṅga-sya, to the stage, i.e., the spectators. वर्षिल्या Darśayitvā, having exhibited. निर्वर्तते Nivartate, ceases, desists. नर्तकी Nartaki, fair dancer. यष्ठा Yathā, as: नृत्या Nṛtyā, from dance. पुरुषस्य Puruṣa-sya, to Puruṣa. तथा Tathā, similarly. अत्मानं Atmāṇaṁ, herself. प्रकाश्य Prakāśya, having exhibited. प्रकृतिः Nivartate, ceases.

LIX. Just as a fair dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectators, desists from the dance, so does Prakṛiti desist, having exhibited herself to Puruṣa.

*Unselfishness of Prakṛiti demonstrated.*

नानाबिच्छेद्यायेनकारिणायनुपकारिणा: पुंसः ।

गुणवस्यगुणस्य सत्तस्यस्यार्थमार्थां चर्चित ॥ ६० ॥


LX. By manifold means does benevolent Prakṛiti, possessed of the Gūṇas, pursue, in a manner in which she has no interest of her own, the object of Puruṣa who makes no return, being devoid as he is of the Gūṇas.

*How activity of Prakṛiti ceases for ever, in regard to the released Puruṣa.*

प्रकृतेः सुकुमारदर्शनं न किंचिद्वस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।

या द्वारास्त्रीयत्वं पुनर्वर्षनुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥

प्रकृतेः Prakṛitiḥ, than Prakṛiti. सुकुमार advisor, a more gentle or delicate. सुकुमार Sukumāra-taraṁ, more gentle or delicate. ना Na, not. किं Chūt, anything. किं Asti, exists. किं Iti, such.

या द्वाराś्वयम् पुनः वर्षनुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥

या द्वाराś्वयम् पुनः वर्षनुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥

या द्वारास्त्रीयत्वं पुनः वर्षनुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥

या द्वारास्त्रीयत्वं पुनः वर्षनुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥
LXI. My opinion is that nothing exists which is more delicate than Prakriti who, knowing that, "I have seen," comes no more within the sight of Purusa.

**Annotation.**

75. This Kārikā explains and illustrates how Prakriti does not energise, over again, in regard to the released Purusa.

*Bondage, Transmigration and Release are all of Prakriti, and not of Purusa.*

LXII. Wherefore, verily, no Purusa is ever bound, nor is released, nor transmigrates. Prakriti, being the support of manifold creations, is bound, is released, and transmigrates.

*How Prakriti binds and releases herself.*

LXIII. By seven forms does Prakriti bind herself by herself; and it is she who, by one form, releases herself for the sake of Purusa.
How discriminative knowledge is fully developed.

एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासाय न मे नाह्मित्यपरिशोषम्।
भविष्यादिशिर्दूषं केवलमुत्पथते ज्ञानम्॥ ६४ ॥


LXIV. So, through cultivation of the knowledge of the Tattvas, is produced the final, pure, because free from error and doubt, and one single knowledge that neither does agency belong to me, nor is attachment mine, nor am I identical with the Body, etc.

Relation of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa after Release.

तेन निग्रहत्वात्सवायमेवेशात् सत्तेवपविनिव्यासाम॥
प्रकृतिः परवति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदविस्थितः स्वरूपः॥ ६५ ॥

Tena, thereby, by means of knowledge of the Tattvas, as described in the preceding Kārikā. Nirvṛtti-prasāvam, whose prolificness has come to cease through creation of all that was to be created for the sake of Puruṣa. Artha-vasāt, through the influence of the object, viz., knowledge of the Tattvas. Samsāradevamurāmantaḥ vinivrīttām, desisting from the seven forms, virtue hind the rest, by which she binds herself and which are no longer required for the sake of Puruṣa, both of whose objects, experience and release, are accomplished. Akara Prakṛiti, Prakṛiti. Prasāda Paśyati, looks at. Puruṣaḥ, Puruṣa. Prakṛti, a spectator in a theatre, seats, seated, standing by. Svā-sthāḥ, self-reposed, undisturbed, freed from the reflection of Buddhi rendered impure by means of the modifications of Rajas and Tamas.

LXV. Thereby having her prolific energy stopped, and desisting from the seven forms under the influence of knowledge, Prakṛiti is looked at by Puruṣa just like a spectator, standing by, self-reposed.
Conjunction of Prakriti and Purusa is not, as such, the cause of creation.

The conjunction of Prakriti and Purusa is not, as such, the cause of creation.

LXVI. "She has been seen by me,"—so the one stands indifferent; "I have been seen,"—so the other desists. Though their conjunction still remains, there does not exist any motive for creation.

Jivan-Mukti explained.

LXVII. Through attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest coming to be deprived of their power as causes, Purusa yet continues invested with body under the influence of previous Dharma and A-Dharma, as the potter's wheel continues whirling (from momentum).

Annotation.

76. This Karika explains the fact of Jivan-Mukti or release in life, as in the case of Kapila, Vamadeva, and others. Jivan-Mukti consists in the release of an incarnate Purusa from the entanglement of Prakriti prior to his separation from the Body. These two things, viz., release from bondage and continuance of the Body, are compatible with each other, as they are dependent upon independent causes. For, universally, release
takes place on the manifestation of discriminative knowledge between Prākriti and Puruṣa, in other words, it does not imply the acquisition of a new state or condition, but consists merely in the removal of a veil or a shadow, as it were; whereas the Body is the positive result of positive causes and depends for its existence or non-existence upon those very causes. These causes are Dharma and A-Dharma, or merit and demerit, collectively termed Karma. Now, Karma is distinguished as Prārabdha or operative, Saṁchita or stored or potential, and Agamika, or to come, or future. On the attainment of discriminative knowledge, Saṁchita Karma or Karma in seed-form is burnt up and rendered infructuous, and Agamika Karma also is necessarily precluded. Only the Prārabdha then remains. It is Karma acquired by acts performed in a previous life and which has become operative in the present life, that is to say, it is the cause of conjunction with the present Body and of all the experiences of the present incarnate existence. It is not affected by discriminative knowledge, and it goes on sustaining the Body till it is exhausted or works itself out, in its natural course, when the Body which was supported by it, automatically drops down. It is hence, therefore, that when discriminative knowledge is perfectly developed before the Prārabdha has worked itself out, the incarnate Puruṣa in question, is released, but remains awhile burdened with the Body. This is what is called Jīvan-Mukti or the state of release during life.

When a Jīvan-Mukta is finally released.

प्राप्ते शरीरमेव चरितार्थव्यत: प्रधानविनिबृत्तोऽः
एकान्तिकमात्मनितेकसमयैः कैवल्यमापोति॥ ६८ ॥

प्राप्ते, come to pass, that is, on the exhaustion of Prārabdha Karma by experience. चरितार्थव्यत: on separation from the body. एकान्तिकमात्मनितेकसमयैः, for the reason that she has fulfilled her purpose, viz., Creation for the experience and release of Puruṣa. कैवल्यमापोति, on the cessation of the activity of the Pradhāna. अत्यान्तिकम अत्यान्तिक, certain, absolute. अत्यान्तिक, final, imperishable. अत्य उभयां, both. अत्यत Kaivalyam, singleness, pureness, freedom from the reflection of the threefold pain. अपनोति, attains.

LXVIII. When (in due course) separation from the Body takes place, and there is cessation of the activity of the Pradhāna from her purpose having been fulfilled Puruṣa attains both absolute and final Kaivalya.
Origin of the Sāṁkhya declared.

पुनःसर्वज्ञानमिव युं ष्ठरमार्ग्यैः समाख्यातम् ।
रस्त्रनुस्तत्रनिचरितन्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् || ६६ ||

पुरुषार्थश्रार्थिनम् knowledge for the accomplishment of the end of Puruṣa, i.e., release. इधां Idam, this. गुह्यन् Guhyam, secret, abstruse, unintelligible to the dull. परमर्षी Parama-ṛṣiṇā, by the great Rishi or Seer, namely Kapila. समाख्यातम् Sam-ākhyātām, thoroughly expounded, expounded in all details. स्थितिउपपद्यटीयोः Sthiti-uptpadd-pralAYāh, duration, production, and dissolution. चिन्त्यान्ते Chintyante, are considered, discussed. यत्रā Yatra, wherein. भूतानां Bhuṭānāṁ, of created things, beings.

LXIX. This abstruse knowledge, adapted to the end of Puruṣa, wherein the production, duration, and dissolution of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the great Rishi.

ANNOTATION.

77. Vāchārapati construes the second line of the Karika in a different manner. It is thus: Yatra, wherein, that is, in which knowledge, that is to say, for which knowledge, the origin, duration and destruction of living beings are considered by the Śrūtis. Hereby he wants to bring out the sense that the Sāṁkhya is connected with, and is supported by, the Veda.

Traditional succession of the Sāṁkhya stated.

पत्तं पवित्रमायेन मूनिरासुभ्रेतुक्षसप्त प्रत्येक ।
प्रासुमिव पञ्चविद्य हेतु ग्रहतमनस्तंत्रम् ||१००||

तत्र एत्त विविधतम पवित्रमायेन मूनिरासुभ्रेतुक्षसप्त प्रत्येक ।
प्रासुमिव पञ्चविद्य हेतु ग्रहतमानस्तंत्रम् ||१००||

सत: Etat, this. श्याम पवित्रमायेन मूनिरासुभ्रेतुक्षसप्त प्रत्येक ।
प्रासुमिव पञ्चविद्य हेतु ग्रहतमानस्तंत्रम् ||१००||

तत्र एत्त विविधतम पवित्रमायेन मूनिरासुभ्रेतुक्षसप्त प्रत्येक ।
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LXX. This foremost purifying knowledge the Muni, through compassion, imparted to Asuri; Asuri, again, to Pañchaśālikha, by whom the System was elaborated in manifold ways.
ANNOTATION.

78. In this and the succeeding Kārikā the traditional succession of the Śāṅkhyā doctrine is recorded with a view to establish its authentic character and thereby to inspire reverence towards it.

79. According to Gauḍapāda, the Śāṅkhyā-Kārikā ends with the Kārikā. "For the Śāṅkhyā which is the cause of release from transmigration, was declared by the Muni Kapila, wherein or in regard to which, as he says, 'there are these seventy verses in the Āryā metre,' this is supported by the other traditional name for the Śāṅkhyā-Kārikā, which is Śāṅkhyā-Saptati or the Seventy (Verses) on the Śāṅkhyā Vāchaspāti, on the other hand, has not questioned the genuineness of the claim to authority, of the additional two Kārikās and has added his comment to them.

Above continued.

ṣिष्यपरम्परायानतीर्थःश्रायणेन स चेतवार्तमि: ।
संज्ञितमार्यामालिना सम्यक् विशाय तिल्मात्रम् ॥ ६१ ॥

विश्वसनीया प्रामाण्यपरामाण्या, by tradition of disciples. अनन्य एकत्र, Agatān descended, received. रसन्ने इवारक्रिष्णन, by इवारक्रिष्ण, the author of the Śāṅkhyā-Kārikā. सह, this. ओ, this. चाह इस, this. अर्येभिः, the Āryā verses. रसन्ने Samûkapitam, abridged, summarised, compendiously written. ज्ञानिधि अर्य-मतिः, whose intelligence reached to the Tatvās; holy-minded Samyak, thoroughly. ज्ञान Vijñāya, understanding, realising. रुपा सिद्धान्तम, demonstrated truth, established tenet, doctrine.

LXXI. And this doctrine, descended by tradition of disciples, to the holy-minded Isvarakriṣṇa, having been thoroughly understood by him, has been summarised by means of these Āryās.

Relation of the Śāṅkhyā-Kārikā to the Śāṅkhyā-Pravachana-Sātram.

सतत्त्वा किल चेत्वार्त्तोऽवाय: छत्रस्त्वेण वधिन्तरस्य ।
प्रस्तावार्थीयाविनिर्देशाय विहितन्त्रस्य ॥ ६२ ॥

सतत्त्वा Saptatiya, by the seventy-versed treatise. किल Kila, truly. ये, who किल: Arthaḥ, subject. आर्थकिल: Arthaḥ, subject. श्रद्धा Kriyā-sya, entire, whole. सार्वस्तरात्मक Kriyā-sya, of the system of six topics. प्रार्थनाकीर्तियाः: Akhyāyikā-virañjitaḥ, disjoined from the illustrative stories. प्रार्थनाकीर्तियाः: Para-vāda-vivaritaḥ, omitting demolition of opposite doctrines. ओ, this. ओ, this. ओ, this. ओ, this. ओ, this. ओ, this.
LXXII. The subjects which are treated by the Saptati, are the subjects of the entire Śaṣṭi-Tantra, exclusive of the illustrative stories, and omitting demolition of opposite doctrines.

ANNOTATION.

80. The term Śaṣṭi-Tantra alludes to the Śāmkhya-Pravachana-Śāram divided into the six Books, namely, of Topics, of the Evolutions of the Pradhāna, of Dispassion, of Fables, of the Demolition of Counter-Theories, and of Recapitulation of Teachings. It is thus constructive, illustrative and destructive in its method. In its constructive portions, it establishes the sixty topics of the Śāmkhya System. The same is done by the Saptati as well. Inasmuch, however, as the latter omits the stories and controversies, and also does not deal with the topics in so much detail, it has, in the preceding Kārikā, been described as a summary of the former.

The sixty topics alluded to above are: 1. the existence, that is, conjunction with, and disjunction from, Puruṣa, of the Pradhāna, 2. her unity or singleness, 3. her objectiveness, 4. her subservience, 5. the distinctness of Puruṣa, 6. his manifoldness, 7. his inactivity, 8. his conjunction, 9. his disjunction, and 10. the duration of the rest; these are the ten radical topics.


A third enumeration specifies them as, 1. the eternity of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, 2. the reality of experience and discriminative knowledge in Prakṛiti, 3. the unity of Prakṛiti and of Puruṣa, throughout transmigration, 4. the subservience of Prakṛiti, 5. the difference between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, 6. the inactivity of Puruṣa, 7. the multiplicity of Puruṣa, 8. the conjunction of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti at the time of creation, 9. the disjunction of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti at the time of release, and 10. the pre-existence of Mahat and the other Tattvas in their respective causes.

Add to them, the five kinds of error, nine of complacency, twenty-eight of incapacity, and eight of perfection. Thus the number sixty is obtained.
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APPENDIX VII.

PANCHASIKHA SUTRAM

OR

A FEW OF THE APHORISMS OF PANCHASIKHA.
PANCHASIKHA-SUTRAM.

INTRODUCTORY.

1. Pañchasikha is one of the few earliest writers on the Sāṁkhya. He is an authority on the subject, and is mentioned as an Āchārya or Professor of the School. According to Śvarakṛṣṇa, the author of Sāṁkhya-Kārikā, the original Sāṁkhya which descended from its founder Kapila by Pañchasikha (through Āśuri, see Sāṁkhya-Kārikā, No. I.XX.), was elaborated by him in manifold ways. But not a single one of his works is amongst the current coins of the Sāṁkhya literature. "He is known, by scanty fragments, as the author of a collection of philosophical aphorisms. One other performance, if not two, is likewise imputed to him; and he, perhaps, descanted on the theistic (sic) Sāṁkhya as well as on the atheistic (sic)." (F. E. Hall.) It would appear, from Vijnāna Bhikṣu's Commentary on the Vedānta-Sūtram, that Pañchasikha wrote a commentary on the Tattva-Samāsa.

2. The only source, as yet discovered, so far as we know, from which a few of the aphorisms of Pañchasikha can be recovered, is Vyāsa's Commentary on the Yoga-Sūtram of Patañjali. In the Preface to his edition of the Sāṁkhya-Pravachana-Bhāṣya of Vijnāna Bhikṣu, Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall has collected eleven aphorisms of Pañchasikha quoted by Vyāsa in his said Commentary. Another collection of extracts from the same source has been published, under the title of Pañchasikha-Āchārya-Prāñita Sāṁkhya-Sūtra, by Pañḍita Rājā Rām, Professor of Sanskrit, A. V. College, Lahore, in Nos. 4 and 5, Vol. VIII, 1912, of the series titled Āraṇa-Granthavali, Lahore. This collection contains twenty-one aphorisms including one of Vārsaganyya. Quite recently, again, we had a peculiar opportunity of examining the MS. of another collection of aphorisms attributed to Pañchasikha, prepared by Śvāmī Hariharānanda Tapya of the Kapila Āśrama in the District of Hooghli. This was obviously not an original compilation, but a reproduction of the Lahore publication, with a few additions, one of which was taken from the Veda without acknowledgment! As regards the collection of Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall and the collection of Pañḍita Rājā Rām, we have found that the one in certain respects, more complete and correct than the other, while the paternity of some of the aphorisms attributed in it to Pañchasikha
is not free from suspicion. These will be noticed more in detail in the
subsequent pages.

3. "Little can safely be conjectured," as rightly observes Mr.
Fitz-Edward Hall, "with regard to the character of the work or works
from which these sentences were collected by Vyāsa. They may be
text; and they may be commentary. Probably they are Sāmkhya; but,
possibly, they pertain to the Yoga. That Pañchaśikha treated of other
subjects than the Sāmkhya, may be inferred from a remark of Vijñāna
Bhikṣu's:

Śvaprayojana-abhāve'pi viduṣāṁ pravṛttau Pañchaśikha-āchārya-
vākyam sāmkhya-sthaṁ pramanayati.—Yoga-Vārtika, I. 25."
PANCHASIKHA-SUTRAM.

4. अदि-विद्वान् द्वितीये जिज्ञासमानाय तत्त्रेण प्रवचनं

4. Adi-Vidyān, the primeval Seer. "Primeval" means pro-
voked at the beginning of Creation. "Seer" means Darśana-kāra or one
who has had direct vision of Puruṣa as distinct from Prakṛti. In its
primary significance, the term “Adi-Vidyān” is applicable to Viṣṇu alone.
Here it refers to Kapila, the reputed founder of the Śāmkhya Tantra,
because "it is the self-existent Viṣṇu who appeared as the first Wise Man,
Kapila, at the beginning of the current cycle of Cosmic Evolution,
edowed with virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and infallible will" (Vāchak-
ūti Miśra).

5. निर्माण-चित्तम अधिष्ठाया, प्रसिद्ध वाक्येन, इसे अध्यात्मिक और धार्मिक

5. Nirmāṇa-chittam adhīṣṭhāyā, presiding over, ensoul-
ing, or through the medium of, a self-made mental vehicle. These words
explain how Viṣṇu became incarnated as Kapila. He, by an act of will,
produced Himself as the mighty sage Kapila. Kapila was not a de-
veloped man, but an enveloped Divinity. This artificial creation of bodies,
ensouled by artificial emanations of the mind, which is one of the most
wonderful discoveries of the Hindu Spiritual Science, is not expected to
make any deep impression on the minds of the majority of Western
Scholars in the present age, nor to engage them in the investigation or in
an examination of the truth in this matter, in a true scientific spirit. Neither
we here propose to enter into a discussion with them on this subject.
We shall simply mention, for the information of readers at large, that this
subject of the creation of artificial bodies and minds is dealt with in the
Yoga-Sūtram of Patañjali, IV, 4, 5, and 6 (See the Sacred Books of the
Hindus, Vol IV., 272-273). And to make the words of our text a little
more illuminating to them, we may take the following extract from the
Introduction to the above volume:

"A Yogi, having attained the power of Samādhi, sets about destroying
his past Karmas. All Karmas may be divided into three classes:—(1)
The acts done in the past, the consequences of which the man must suffer
in the present life; the Karmas to expiate which he has taken the present birth
or incarnation. They are the ripe Karmas (Prārabdha). (2) The Karmas
done in the past, but which are not ripe, and will have to be expiated in some
future life. They are the stored Karmas, or unripe (Sačchita). (3) The
Karmas which a man creates in his present life, and which have to be
expiated in a future or the present life. This last kind of act,—the fresh
Karmas, can be stopped. By devotion to the Lord and doing everything
in a spirit of service, no fresh Karmas are generated. The incurring of debt is stopped. The man, however, has to pay off past debts—the rip and unripe Karmas. The ripe Karmas will produce their effects in the present life. The Yogi does not trouble himself about this. But the unripe or stored Karmas require a future birth. It is here that the Yogi is of the greatest practical importance. The Yogi is bound to wait in future lives in order to get an opportunity to pay off the debt of Sañchita Karmas. He simultaneously creates ALL the bodies that those Sañchita Karmas require,—through those bodies expiates all his Karmas simultaneously. Every one of such bodies has a Chitta or mentality of its own. This is the Nirma-pa-chitta or the Artificial mind—like the Pseudo-Personalities of hypnotic trance. These artificial minds arise simultaneously like so many sparks from the Āhamkāric matter of the Yogi's Self, and they ensoul the artificial bodies created for them. These artificial bodies with artificial minds in them, walk through the earth in hundreds,—they are distinguished from ordinary men by the fact that they are perfectly methodical in all their acts, and automatic in their lives. All these artificials are controlled by the consciousness of the Yogi,—one consciousness controlling hundred automatons. Every one of these automatons has a particular destiny, a particular portion of the Sañchita Karma to exhaust. As soon as that destiny is fulfilled, the Yogi withdraws his ray from it, and the "man" dies a sudden death,—a heart-failure generally.

"Now, what is the difference between the ordinary mind and the Yoga-created mind,—the natural Chitta and the artificial Chitta? The natural mind by experience gains a habit, the impressions are stored in it, and they, as Vāsanās, become the seeds of desires and activities. The artificial mind is incapable of storing up impressions in it. It has no Vāsanās and consequently it disintegrates as soon as the body falls down."

6. Kāruṇyāt, through compassion. This word, according to Vyāsa, tells us what the teaching of the text is. It is this that Īśvara, out of the abundance of His compassion towards all Puruṣas, incarnates Himself, from time to time, in order to teach them knowledge and virtue, whereby they may be delivered from bondage. The passage of the text is quoted by Vyāsa in his Commentary on the Yoga-Śātram, I. 25, and Vāchārapati explains the purpose of the quotation thus: "This theory that the passionate Lord teaches knowledge and virtue is also common teaching of Kapila.—So has it been said by Pañchaśikha." Prasada's translation:

7. Bhagavān, divine. This term connotes the possession
virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and infallible will. And we know that these were cognate with Kapila.

8. परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽयः परमार्गियोऽ� पर 9. जयमु षुरये, जसु शुरु, a disciple of Kapila and the first recipient of the Śāmkhya.

10. जिज्ञासामणयोऽयः, who wished to know Śuṣuri approached the divine man Kapila and desired to know from him the means for the accomplishment of the Supreme Good, namely, the permanent prevention of pain.

11. तत्र Tantram, the systematic teaching, the Śāmkhya doctrine.

12. भवनप्रवृत्तचा, declared fully, revealed. Such, then, is the origin of the Śāmkhya.

I. The primeval Seer, (incarnated), through the medium of an artificial mind, (as) the mighty divine sage Kapila, out of compassion (towards all entangled Puruṣaas), revealed the (Śāmkhya) doctrine, in a systematic way, to Śuṣuri, who desired to know them.

13. Now, what is this Śāmkhya Darsana? “Darsana” etymologically means the act or the result of seeing, from the root Uṣp, to see. The term signifies Śāmkatāra or immediate vision, that is, intuition of the Self. And “Śāmkhya” means that by which something is perfectly revealed, from the root Ṛṣy, to manifest. The “Śāmkhya Darsana,” therefore, is that form of Spiritual Intuition of the Self, whereby the sture of the Self is perfectly revealed. So declares Pañcachākika:—

पुष्केव दर्शनं क्ष्यातितिथ्व दर्शनम् II

Ekam, one. single. eva, only, there is no second. Darsanam, knowledge. Khyati, coming to light, shining, manifestation, intuition. Eva, alone. Darsanam, intuition, knowledge.

II. There is but one Spiritual Intuition of the Self; nothing but manifestation which is the Spiritual Intuition of the Self.
14. The word 'Khyāti' is suggestive in more respects than one. Now, manifestation is declared to be the means of accomplishing Mokṣa, Release. (1) What, then, must be its nature? It cannot obviously be of the nature of the attainment of some advanced state or development from a still less advanced or less developed; for Manifestation itself cannot accomplish this. It will also be repugnant to the Sāṃkhya conception of the Self; for the Self is kūtaśtha, unchangeable; it ever is, never becomes. It follows, therefore, that Mokṣa consists merely in the removal of the shadow, as it were, that is, of something which casts its reflection on the Self and thereby overshadows it and causes obstruction to its shining out in the fullness of its own light. (2) This shadow, this obstruction is not of, or from, the Self, but is a creation of the Not-Self. And what is the cause of its origin, the same is also the cause of its removal. It fades or deepens, it contracts or expands, it exists or ceases to exist, and for this depends entirely on the activity or non-activity of the Not-Self. (3) The Self is altogether passive and inert. Shadow or no shadow, it is ever there, all-full, ever shining, unaffected, unsullied. In ignorance men speak of the Bondage of the Self which is never bound, ever released. Bondage, in reality, is this supreme ignorance, this veil of the Non-Self,—the non-discrimination of the principle of Becoming and the principle of Being,—to which alone is due all the suffering in the world,—not exactly suffering, for actual suffering there can be, and it is nothing in the Self, but the Abhūmāna or assumption or attribution of it to the Self. Replace non-discrimination by Discrimination, the veil is gone, and gone with it is the Shadow—the obstruction—and so the ever pure, ever constant, ever shining Self.

15. This Aphorism of Pāṇchāśikha has been quoted by Vyās in his Commentary on the Aphorism I. 4 of Patañjali's Yoga-Sūtram in the following context: Yoga is the inhibition of the modification of the mind (chitta) (Yoga-Sūtram I. 2). Then the Seer (Puruṣa) stands in his own nature (Ibid I. 3), that is, is established in his own intrinsic form, as in the state of kaivalya or absolute abstractedness. Elsewhere (there takes place in him) similarity of form with the modification (Ibid I. 4). How does it take place? Because objects are presented to him. Whatever, therefore, be the modifications of the mind, with the same is Puruṣa invested, so long as the mind remains up and doing. That is to say, Puruṣa, with the light of his intelligence, illumines the manifold modifications of the active mind, which, consequently, he mistaken as being the manifestations of Puruṣa. It is thus this mistake, the failure to distinguish between the unintelligent modifications.
the unintelligent mind and the intelligence of the inert, immutable Puruṣa, which is the cause of all the mental phenomena so universally attributed to Puruṣa. In reality, however, the manifestation of Puruṣa is one and one only, the same at all times and in all circumstances. And so here is the Aphorism: “There is but one Spiritual Intuition of the Self; it is nothing but Manifestation, which is the Spiritual Intuition of the Self.”

16. The Self is most difficult to know. It is inscrutable. Only a steady, pure, and peaceful mind can reflect it as it is in itself. Steadiness of the mind implies a long and arduous process of Yogic practice. The stepping-stone to it is what is called Jyotismati or the state of lucidity, or the activity which causes illumination. This activity of the mind is twofold, according as it is painless objective (vināśa-viṣayavat) or is purely egoistic (asmitā-mātra). It is described by Vyāsa in his Commentary on Yoga-Sūtram, I. 36, in the following manner: “It is the consciousness of thought-forms (Buddhi), on the part of one who practises concentration upon the Lotus of the Heart. For, the substance of Buddhi is refulgent and is like Ākāśa, i.e., all-pervading. Through success in concentration upon that, the activity of the mind modifies by the forms having the colour of the light of the sun, the moon, the planets and precious stones. Likewise, the mind concentrated upon Aṣmitā, am-ness or egoism, becomes pure egoism, calm and infinite, like a waveless ocean.” And he supports his exposition by quoting the abounding Aphorism of Pañcasikha:

अनविद्या तद्भवतः

III. Knowing, at last, that inscrutable Self, his consciousness manifests as “I am” only.

17. It has been mentioned above that the identification of the principle of Being with the Principle of Becoming, of the Self with the not-Self, is the cause of all the suffering in the Universe. This identification is called A-vidya. Its nature is declared by Pañcasikha in the following two Aphorisms:

व्यवहारं वा तत्वमात्रेनाभिवृत्तीं तस्य संपत्तमनुः

व्यापदमनुःक्ष्यालब्धवपरं

मन्यात्वात्स्मि व्यापदस्तुः

पाृतिवुः
V. They are all unawakened who, believing the objective entities, whether they be sentient or insentient, to be the Self, rejoice at their prosperity, imagining it to be the prosperity of the Self, and, the adversity, imagining it to be the adversity of the Self.

18. This Aphorism has been quoted by Vyāsa in his Commentary on Yoga-Sūtram II. 5 which describes A-vidyā as being “the manifestation of the non-eternal, the impure, the painful, and the Not-Self to be the eternal, the pure, the pleasant, and the Self.”

V. Not knowing Puruṣa to be different from Buddhi in nature, character, knowledge, etc., a man is led, by reason of the dullness born of Tamas, to form the notion of the Self in respect of Buddhi.

19. The above has been quoted by Vyāsa in his Commentary on the Yoga-Sūtram II. 6 which describes Asmitā or Egoism as being “the apparent identity of the subjective power of seeing (i.e., Puruṣa) and the instrumental power of seeing (i.e., Buddhi).”
20. It follows, therefore, that there is Bondage as long as this notion of the Self in respect of the Not-Self remains, and that there is release when this notion is destroyed by the knowledge of the Self as being distinct and different from the Not-Self in all essential particulars.

śyāt śvalpyaṃ: sākyā: surparightha: sāparśvakrāmaṃ: kushalsya
śāpakaṃyaśālam

śyāt, can be. śvalpyaṃ: Svalpaḥ, little. sākyā: Sankarah, mixture. surparightha: Sa-parihāraḥ attended with, i.e., capable of, avoidance or removal. sāparśvakrāmaṃ: Sa-pratisamārighthaḥ, attended with, i.e., capable of, being borne easily. kushalsya: The good. kushalsya: کُشَّالُسْ, Apakarṣaya, for damage or impairment or lessening the effect. śāpakaṃyaśālam: sufficient, strong or powerful enough.

VI. A little mixture (of evil entailed, for instance, by the killing of animals) which is capable of removal (by expiation) or is easy to bear, cannot prevail for the diminution of the (greater) good (produced by the performance of sacrifices such as the Āśvamedha and the like).

21. The above bears reference to the vexed question as to the consequences of the acts of sin necessarily committed in the course of the performance of sacrifices which are calculated to produce merits of far-reaching consequences. For instance, an Āśvamedha sacrifice cannot be performed without the killing of a horse, and killing is a sinful act. So that, while the performance of the Āśvamedha produces its desirable consequences, the killing of the horse cannot, at the same time, fail to produce its undesirable consequences. The question, therefore, arises whether what is acquired through the sacrifice, be not lost through the sin. This is an important issue arising in the discussion of the Law of Kārmā as a whole.

22. Now, "the killing of animals, etc., has," as Vāchaspatsi explains, "two effects. The first is that, being ordained as part of the principal action, helps in its fulfilment. The second is that, the causing of pain to all living beings being forbidden, it results in undesirable consequences. Of these, when it is performed only as subsidiary to the principal action, then, for that very reason, it does not manifest its result all at once, independently of the principal action. On the contrary, it keeps its position of an accessory only, and manifests only when the fruition of the principal ruling action begins. It is said to be tacked on to the ruling action, when, while helping the ruling action, it exists as the seed of its own proper effect. Pañchasikha has said the following on the subject: 'A little mixture.'"
“When the ruling factor of the present karma, born from the sacrifice of Jyotistoma, etc., is mixed up with the present cause of evil, it may be easily removed. It is possible of removal by a small expiatory sacrifice. Even if an expiatory sacrifice be not performed by carelessness, the subsidiary action would ripen at the time of the ripening of the principal only, and, in that case, the evil generated thereby would be easy to bear. The wise who are taking their baths in the great lake of the nectar of pleasure brought about by a collection of good actions, put up easily with a small piece of the fire of pain produced by a small evil. It is not, therefore, capable of diminishing, i.e., appreciably lessening the effect of the good, i.e., of his large virtues.”—Rāma Prasadā's translation.

23. This Aphorism of Pañchadikha has been quoted by Vyāsa in his Commentary on the Yoga-Sūtrām II. 13. “So long as the cause remains, the fruition of Merit and Demerit is in the kind of birth, length of life and experience.”

24. Pandit Raja Ram is wrong in reading the next sentence in the Commentary as part of the present Aphorism. For both Svapnaśvara and Vāchaspati are against this reading.

25. But the fact remains that even a highly meritorious act is tainted with sin, and with consequent pain. It is even as Patañjali declares that “to the discriminative, all is pain” (Yoga-Sūtrām II. 15). And pain is the thing which every mortal seeks to get rid of: not merely present pain, but pain not-yet-come is the thing to be avoided (Yoga-Sūtrām II. 16). Accordingly, both in the Sāmkhya and in the Yoga Śāstra, enquiries have been instituted into the cause of its origin as well as into the means of its removal. In the Yoga-Sūtrām II. 17, Patañjali declares that the conjunction of Buddhi and Puruṣa is the cause of pain. And on this subject, also says Pañchadikha:

तत्‌संयोगेऽहतु-विवर्जनात� स्यावेयमात्मतिको दुः‌क्षतिकारः ॥

Tat-samyoga-hetu-vivarjanat, through abandonment of the cause, namely, Non-discrimination, of the conjunction thereof, i.e., of Buddhi. वेद स्यात्त, will be. यथा Aham, this, i.e., the desired prevention of pain not-yet-come. अत्यंतिकारः, final, permanent. दुः‌क्षतिकारः Duḥkha-pratikāraḥ, prevention or remedy of pain.

VII. Through the abandonment of the cause thereof, there can be the permanent prevention of pain, which is desired.
26. The above has been quoted by Vyāsa in his Commentary on the Yoga-Sūtram II. 17.

27. Pain is due to conjunction. Rajas gives rise to pain in Sattva, which reflects it on Puruṣa, through conjunction. In this reflection consists the experience (Bhoga) of Puruṣa from which emancipation (Apavarga) is sought. To describe them more correctly, Bhoga is the ascertainment of the essential nature of the Gṛhas, as desirable and undesirable, in their undifferentiated form; and Apavarga is the ascertainment of the essential nature of the Experiencer, through the withdrawal of the influence of Prakṛti upon him. To accomplish both these objects, namely, Bhoga and Apavarga, is the creation of the world. Creation is the exhibition of Prakṛti to Puruṣa. Puruṣa regards or looks at Prakṛti from these points of view only; and there is no third point of view. So declares Panchaśīkha also:

abhajante labha hṛdayu gūṇeṇu kārṇaṇāttirich...puñāya tattvāntaśācānīyamānānukṛtāmānukṛtaḥ...pṛthvibhūtān vā

ayam tān puruṣa tu, but, hṛdayu surely, hṛdayu triyā, in the three. gūṇeṇa, in the Gṛhas, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. kārṇaṇāttir, which are the actors, agents. kartari, who is not the actor. cīt, and. puruṣa, in Puruṣa. tūlā-sūtulā-jātiye, who is of a like and unlike kind. chaturthē, the fourth. tattvāntaśācānīyamānānukṛtāmānukṛtaḥ, who is the witness of the action thereof, i.e. of the Gṛhas. pṛthvibhūtaḥ, all objects. sarva-bhāvān, all objects. apānān, established, known. anupādan, knowing. na, not. darsanam, view. anyat, other. saṁkṣetra, suspects.

VIII. This one, however, seeing all things explained as these are being presented to the three Gṛhas as the actors and to the fourth, viz., Puruṣa, of a like and unlike kind, as the non-actor and as the witness of their action, does not suspect (the existence of) any other point of view, or object of knowledge.

28. "Of a like and unlike kind":—For instance, the Gṛhas are eternal, so is Puruṣa; Puruṣa is intelligent, but the Gṛhas are non-intelligent.

29. "The above has been quoted by Vyāsa in his Commentary on Yoga-Sūtram II 13: The object (Dṛśya) which possesses the nature of illumination (Sattva), activity (Rajas), and inertia (Tamas) and consists
of the elements and of the powers of cognition and action, exists for the purpose of experience and of emancipation.

30. “But these two, experience and emancipation, which are effected by Buddhī, reside in Buddhī alone; how are they, then,” asks Vyāsa, “predicated of Purūṣa?” He next gives the answer: “Just as victory is defeat, which lies in the army, is predicated of the owner of the army, so he is the experier of its consequences, so too are Bondage and Release, residing in Buddhī alone, are predicated of Purūṣa, as he is the experier of their consequences. Of Buddhī alone are Bondage in the shape of the non-accomplishment of the object of Purūṣa, and Release in the shape of the fulfillment thereof. Similarly, are perception, memory, reasoning, doubt, knowledge of the truth, and blind attachment to life, which reside in Buddhī, attributed as existing in Purūṣa, as he is the experier of their consequences, by having their reflections thrown upon him from Buddhī, through proximity.”

31. Purūṣa, then, is neither quite similar to Buddhī nor quite dissimilar to it. He is not quite subject to Bondage and Release, nor is quite free from them. On this subject, Pañchaśikha further declares:

\[\text{प्रपरिषांत्मिनि हि भोक्तृशक्तिरप्रतिसंक्षमा च परिषांत्मिनि}\
\[\text{वेष प्रतिसंक्षेत तद्वित्तिमुस्वसति। तस्याः प्रात्वेत्त्योपप्राहु}\
\[\text{रूपाया बुद्धिदृश्यतुकारमाक्षयस्या बुद्धिप्रतियोगिता हि ज्ञान}\
\[\text{प्रतितिभास्यायते।}\
\]

अपरिषांत्मिनि A-paripāramiṇi, not subject to transformation, unchangeable. 

Hi, for. नाम निर्देश: Bhoktrī-Saktī, the power of the experier, intelligence, consciousness. 

अपरिषांत्मिनि A-pratī-Saṅkramā, not moving towards objects, inert, actionless, inactive. 

Cha, and. 

प्रपरिषांत्मिनि Paripāramiṇi, subject to transformation, changeful. ओ Arthe, into the object, इ.े., Buddhī. 

प्रतिसंक्रामः Pratiprakṛtā, transferred, moved to. इ Iva, as if. 

तत-प्रतिभः Tat-vrittim, the modifications thereof, इ.e., of Buddhī. 

तत् Tat, its, i.e., of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, transformed by possessing the reflection of intelligence. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpāyaḥ, by the modification of Buddhī. 

ट्राभ्ययुग्मात्मकः Prāpta-chaitanya-upagraha-rūpाया,
object (i.e., Buddhi), imitates its modifications. And by reason of the mere imitation of the modifications of Buddhi, while that is transformed by receiving the reflection of intelligence, it (the imitation) is described as, the modification of intelligence unqualified by the modification of Buddhi.

32. The above has been quoted by Vyāsa in his Commentary on Yoga-Sūtram II. 20: “The seer is the power of seeing merely; though pure, he sees ideas by imitation,” and he thereby supports the proposition that “though pure, he sees ideas by imitation; because he sees, by imitation, ideas belonging to Buddhi, and, though he is not of the same nature as Buddhi, as he sees by imitation, because he looks as if he were of the nature of Buddhi.” This is further explained by Vāchaspati in the following manner:

“Although the moon is not, as a matter of fact, transferred into pure water, yet, inasmuch as its reflection passes into water, it is, as it were, transferred into it. So also, the power of consciousness, although not actually transferred into the Buddhi, yet is, as it were, transferred into it, because it is reflected into it. By that fact, consciousness becomes, as it were, of the very nature of the will-to-be (Buddhi). It accordingly follows the modifications of the will-to-be. This explains the words “by imitation.” It is said, it cognises by imitation, as it cognises by following the modifications of the will-to-be.”—Rām Prāśāda’s translation.

33. Conjunction has been stated to be the cause of Bhoga. The objective world owes its existence to it. But when, in the case of a Puruṣa whose objects have been fulfilled, the objective world no longer exists for him, it does not at the same time altogether vanish out of existence, because there are other Puruṣas whose Bhoga and Apavarga still remain to be accomplished. (Vide the Yoga-Sūtram II. 22). Thus is the continuity of creation established. Hereby is also established that, whereas the Subject and the Object exist from eternity, their conjunction must, in the form of a stream of successive conjunctions, be without beginning. On this subject there has been quoted by Vyāsa, in his Commentary on the above Yoga-Sūtram, the following Aphorism of Panchasikha:

चर्मिष्ठानलाविषिः-sāṃyojanam: परमसाधारणायन्याविव: संयोग: -

Dharmicām, of the container, that is, the Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, An-ādi-samyogat, because conjunction with Puruṣa is without beginning. Dharmamātrāgām, of all the contained, that is, the products
Mahat and the rest. विआ प्र, also. विआ: An-adih, without beginning. विआ समयोग, conjunction.

X. Because the conjunction of the Gṛṇaṣ (with Puruṣa) is without beginning, the conjunction also of the products thereof, taken as a class, is without beginning.

34. "It is for this reason that, although the conjunction of one Puruṣa with one manifestation of the principle of Mahat has ceased to exist, the conjunction of another Puruṣa with another manifestation of the Mahat has not become a thing of the past." — Ram Prasada’s translation of Vāchārpatī.

35. In the Yoga Sūtram III. 13, Patañjali declares: "By this described the changes of characteristic (dharma), of secondary quality (lakṣaṇa), and of condition (avasthā) in the objective and instrument phenomena." — Ram Prasada’s translation.

36. In the course of his Commentary on the above, Vyāsa observes "The change of secondary quality is the moving of the characteristic along the paths of 'being (past, present, and future). The past characteristic joined to the past secondary quality, is not devoid of the future and the present secondary quality. Similarly, the present characteristic joined to the present secondary quality, is not devoid of the past and the future secondary quality. Similarly, the future (characteristic) joined to the future secondary quality, is not devoid of the present and past secondary qualities. For example, a man who is attached to one woman does not hate all the others.

"Others find a fault in this change of secondary qualities. They say that all the qualities being in simultaneous existence, their paths of 'being must be confused, (and thus overlapping one another, cannot be considered as distinct and different).

"This is thus met: That the characteristics do exist as such, require no proof. When there is such a thing as a characteristic, the difference of the secondary qualities also must be posited. It is not only in the present time that the characteristic characterizes. If it were so, the mind would not possess the characteristic of attachment, seeing that attachment is not in manifestation at the time of anger. Further, the three (peace, fearful, and dull) secondary qualities are not possible of existence in an individual simultaneous. They may, however, appear in succession by virtue of the operation of their several exciting causes. Therefore there is no confusion. For example, attachment being in the height manifestation with reference to some object, it does not, for that reason..."
cease to exist with reference to all other objects. On the contrary, it is then ordinarily in existence with reference to them."—Ram Prasada's translation.

And in support of the above view, Vyāsa quotes the following Aphorism of Pañchalikha:

रुपाति: तिष्ठति यस्य विकिर्यन्ते सामान्यायं सति-
शये: तत् प्रवर्तनेन।

रुपाति: Rūpa-atīśayāḥ, intensities of nature or characteristic. तिष्ठति: Vṛtti-atīśayāḥ, intensities of function or manifestation. य च आ नि: Virudhāya, are opposed. सामान्यायं, ordinary ones. तत्, but. आ नि: अतीश Atīśayāḥ, with the intense ones. तत् Saha, with. प्रवर्तनेन Pravartante, co-exist, co-operate.

XI. Intensities of characteristic and intensities of manifestation are opposed to each other, but the ordinary ones co-exist with the intense ones.

37. This simple Aphorism of Pañchalikha embodies the discovery of the important doctrine of the sub-conscious mind.

38. As to the relation between Ākāsa and the Power of Hearing, there is the following Aphorism of Pañchalikha:

तुल्यस्वर्णवेदोक्तेऽक्षणेऽस्तेषां सति II.

तुल्यस्वर्ण Tulya-svāra-dravyānām, of those having their powers of hearing similarly located, that is, equally in Ākāsa or acoustical ether. अक्षण Eka- druti-tvam, to have the power of hearing in the same situation. सति Sarve- svm, of all. अति Bhavati, is.

XII. In the case of all, having their powers of hearing equally located in Akāsa, hearing takes place in the same situation.

39. The above has been quoted by Vyāsa in his Commentary on the Yoga-Sūtram III. 40: "By Samyama over the relation between Ākāsa and the power-of-hearing comes the higher power hearing."

40. And Vāchāpati explains its sense and significance in the following manner: "This sense of hearing, then, having its origin in the principle of egoism, acts like iron, drawn as it is by sound originating and located in the mouth of the speaker, acting as lodestone, transforms them into its own modifications in sequence of the sounds of the speaker, and thus senses them. And it is for this reason that for every living
creature, the perception of sound in external space is, in the absence of
defects, never void of authority. So says the quotation from Pañchaśikha:
"To all those whose organs of hearing are similarly situated, the situation of
hearing is the same." "All those" are Chaitras and others whose powers
of hearing are similarly situated in space. The meaning is, that the powers
of hearing of all are located in Ākāśa. Further, the Ākāśa in which the
power of hearing is located, is born out of the Souriferous Tanmātra,
and hence the quality of sound inherent in itself. It is by this
sound acting in unison, that it takes the sound of external solids, etc.
Hence the hearing, i.e., the sound, of all is of the same class.

"This, then, establishes that Ākāśa is the substratum of the power
of hearing, and also possesses the quality of sound. And this sameness
of the situation of sound is an indication of the existence of Ākāśa. That
which is the substratum of the auditory power (Sruti) which manifests as
sound of the same class, is Ākāśa."—Ram Prasada’s translation.

41. In his Pañchaśikha—Āchārya-praṇīta Śāmkhya-Sūtra, Pañḍita
Rāja Rām includes the following quotations by Vyāsa:

प्रधानं दिखलेयं वर्णमां विद्याकरणादृष्टयं स्वातः तथा गच्छेत् वर्णमां
विद्याशिष्यादृष्टयं स्वातः श्रमयं। वास्तवः प्रधानःविधातरं समस्या शास्त्रार्थेन
वास्तवशिष्यादृष्टयों साधून्ते। ॥

XIII. The Pradhāna, the material cause of all mani-
festation, would become what it is not, if it tended only to
rest, because in that case there would not be any mani-
festation into phenomena; nor would it be what it is, if it were
to remain in constant motion, because in that case, the phe-
nomena would become eternal and never disappear. It is
only when it tends to both these states, that it can be called
the Pradhāna (the cause of manifestation), not otherwise.
The same considerations apply to any other causes that
might be imagined.—Vide Vyāsa’s Commentary on Yoga-
Sūtram II. 23.

शृद्धिप्रविष्टकालिनेनाधाशाह्यः क्लुचप्रकारम् ॥

XIV. On account of, the absence of the difference of
form, intervening space and time, and genus, there is no
separation in the Root (i.e., the Pradhāna.)—Vide Vyāsa’s
Commentary on Yoga-Sūtram III. 52.
XV. All the diverse forms of juice, etc., caused by the transformation of earth and water, is seen in immobile objects; similarly of the immobile, in the mobile, and of the mobile, in the immobile.—*Vide* Vyāsa’s Commentary on Yoga-Sūtrām III. 14.

XVI. Of these which possess the same genus, the differences are in (specific) properties only.—*Vide* Vyāsa’s Commentary on Yoga-Sūtrām III. 43.

XVII. By the magic panorama of Mahāmoha (desire and ignorance), overshadowing the Sattva which is luminous by nature, the very same is employed in acts of vice.—*Vide* Vyāsa’s Commentary on Yoga-Sūtrām II. 52.

XVIII. There is no penance greater than Prāṇāyāma: whence are the purification from dirts and the brightness of knowledge.—*Vide* Vyāsa’s Commentary on Yoga-Sūtrām II. 52.

XIX. (In the case of those who do not possess the curiosity to know the nature of the Self), giving up, through faults (*i.e.*, demerits), the nature, there arises a liking for *prima facie* contrary views, and dislike for the ascertainment of the truth.—*Vide* Vyāsa’s Commentary on Yoga-Sūtrām, IV 25.

XX. As a Brāhmaṇa undertakes many a vow, one after another, he turns away successively from acts of injury due to inadvertence, and thereby makes the virtue of non-injury (ahimsā) gradually purer and purer.—*Vide* Vyāsa’s Commentary on Yoga-Sūtrām II. 30.
XXI. And what are these activities of the Dhyāyins, namely, friendliness (maitri), etc., being, by nature, independent of external means, accomplish the highest virtue. —Vide Vyāsa’s Commentary on Yoga-Sūtram IV. 10.

42. And to them, the Kāpila Āstama reproduction adds:


XXII. The activity of the Pradhāna is for the sake of the exhibition of herself.—Vide Vyāsa’s Commentary on Yoga-Sūtram II. 23.

43. But Vāchaspati tells us that No. XIII is a doctrine of an opposite school, and Nos. XVII—XX are the teachings of the Agamin (Śaiva Durśana); while Vyāsa himself tells us that No. XIV is an aphorism of Vārṣagārya and No. XXII is a text of the Veda. Both of them, again, are silent as to the paternity of Nos. XV and XVI. The remaining one, No. XI, is referred by Vāchaspati to the Āchāryas or older teachers of the Sāṁkhya School. In these circumstances, we do not feel we should be justified in affiliating these aphorisms to Pañchaśikha.

44. Pañḍita Rāja Rām has, we observe, arranged his aphorisms of Pañchaśikha in a particular order, and has explained them in a connected form. This may mislead the unwary in thinking that this collection of aphorisms is a complete treatise composed by Pañchaśikha which, however, it is not, and can, by no means, pretend to be. To avoid any such misconception, we have, with the single exception of the first one,—and this, for obvious reasons—presented the aphorisms just in the order of their quotation by Vyāsa; for there is no more reason known to us for placing them in one particular order than in any other.

45. It may also be just mentioned here that some other views, not aphorisms or sayings, of Pañchaśikha have been referred to in the Sāṁkhya-Pavrachana-Sūtram also. See Ibidem V. 32 and VI 68, and Vijnāna Bikṣu’s Commentary on I. 127.