AN INTRODUCTION TO
ADWAITA PHILOSOPHY

[A Critical and Systematic Exposition of
Sankara School of Vedanta]

BY

KOKILESWAR SASTRI, VIDYARATNA, M.A.

Lecturer in Vedanta, and in Indian branch of Philosophy, Calcutta
University, and Author of the three Volumes of the
"Upāniṣādār Upādesa," "The Adwaitavada,
"Outlines of Vedanta Philosophy,"
&c. &c. &c.,

AND

Savū-Pandit of the 'Cooch-Behar Durbar'

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भद्देतवाद-मुकुरः किल श्रद्धारः
गाढ़ं कार्यं-रजसा तमसान्तुलिसः।
तत्सैव भाष्यमवल्लभः मया क्तोदस्मिन्।
कामं मलापनन्यनोख् महान् प्रययः॥

परिचितितमवं 'तत् परं'
ग्रथिता व्रज्ञकथा पुरातनी।
इतिमध्य के समपितं
भवतां साद्र मात्मदध्ये॥
PREFACE

The Adwaita philosophy of India was a most magnificent achievement of Indian thought and it towers like a pyramid above all other philosophical schools which pale almost into insignificance before the dazzling brilliancy it sheds both on the practical and the metaphysical needs of humanity. The leader of this school was the great Sankarâchâryya who accepted it as he found it floating among other schools of thought in the intellectual atmosphere of India. It was in no sense a school founded by him. His credit lies in his successful attempt at systematization, development, elaboration and methodically philosophical treatment under which the doctrine appeared in what may be characterised as an altogether new garb in which he clothed it with a master's hand. A large part of its principles existed embedded in the hymns of the Rig-veda* and in the elaborate exegetical rules and injunctions connected therewith. Later on, the diverse theories of Buddhistic philosophy so obscured its principles that its presence seemed at times hardly suspected, and its traces were almost lost sight of. It was mainly Sankarâchâryya who first discovered and then brought it out from its unmerited obscurity into the clear light of day, adding to it the lustre which has since gathered round it.

Of late, many volumes have been written and the system criticised by a large number of brilliant scholars,

* We have shown this in our Third volume of the "Upanishader Upadesh."
nearly all of which have tended to fall into a groove—an undesirable state of things which cannot but demand serious and careful consideration on the part of those who are desirous of seeing the Advaita philosophy preserve its original features untouched by such elements as are likely to prove inconsistent with its special lines of thought and reasoning. It is now clear to the scholars who take real interest in this system that the Advaita philosophy has of late been presented before the learned world in forms which are different from the ideas of its original interpreters.

The main object of this book is to consider all the new forms in which this system has been sought to be presented and it has been the author’s attempt to form an estimate of these with a view to finding out if they really come into a line with the original form in which Sankarāchāryya himself presented it. The time seems almost ripe when a clear note of warning should be sounded for all those who wish really to study the Advaita system. They will have to utterly forget all preconceptions and pre-imbibed ideas and to approach this system of philosophy with an open and unbiassed mind which enables them to make for themselves a correct estimate of the positions adopted therein.

The author further attempts to bring forward, in brief but clear outlines, all the main issues which are generally discussed in the Advaita system, and which have been unfavourably criticised in other quarters. For the student of philosophy, all the points raised here are absolutely necessary for a clear grasp and right comprehension of the Advaita doctrine in its principal aspects. Information requisite for a deeper study of the original works on the subject has been brought together in this book. In dealing with the different topics, an endeavour has been made to discover the real teaching of Sankara. The author has not been unmindful of the imperious necessity which every teacher feels to guide, with a due measure of caution, the foot of the beginner through the naturally difficult track.
rendered, in the case of this system, more intricate by the unfavourable criticisms directed against its main theories.

In this book an endeavour has been made at the very outset to furnish the student and the general reader with the right views about the teachings of Sankara on each of the topics treated herein, and to equip them with the help needed to reach a proper solution of the difficulties they are likely to experience when diving deeper into the subject. No pains have been spared to make the work a suitable introduction to the proper study of the originals, and the subject-matter has been arranged in such a way as to make the book an indispensable companion for any full understanding of Sankara's position. It presents also to beginners an opportunity of making themselves familiar with antagonistic views on various points, and supplies them with reasons to combat those views, from Sankara's works. The whole of the book is expository and contains the essentials of Sankara's teaching in as simple a form as the subject-matter allows, no principles being left out which a student ought to keep in view in the systematic study of Sankara's original works.

The author's experience as a lecturer in the Indian branch of philosophy has convinced him of the necessity of help in the shape of a book like this for the student who may have drifted from the old moorings. It has been his special study to present the expositions as faithfully as possible in the lines adopted and pursued by Sankara himself, and with a view to establishing the various positions, the author has quoted innumerable extracts in the footnotes from Sankara's writings, in support of those opinions. In this respect all the commentaries of Sankara have been treated as of equal importance. For this purpose, the ten Upanishads he has commented upon have been laid under contribution as also his commentaries on the Brahma-Sutra and the Gita.

Considering the intrinsic difficulty in getting at the right sense of Sankara's position from his voluminous
writings on the subject,—writings whose style, though admirably lucid and impressively attractive, is not always easy of comprehension on account of long polemics against his opponents, and considering also the difficulty in putting the most abstruse of the reasonings of Sankara in a foreign tongue, the readers, the author trusts, will look upon this work with a kind indulgence.

Suggestions for the improvement of the book from sympathetic critics and scholars will be most gratefully accepted.

Lastly, the author takes this opportunity to express a very deep debt of gratitude he owes to the Hon'ble Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjee who almost from the beginning of the author's college career has always fostered his literary aspirations and has very liberally helped him. It is needless to say that but for such generous help from him, the desire that impelled the author to undertake this work would have been baffled.

May, 1924.

KOKILESWAR BHATTACHARYYA
CALCUTTA
PREFATORY NOTE
TO THE SECOND EDITION.

In the preparation of the second edition which was called for within a few months of the appearance of the work last year, the book has been minutely and carefully revised. A few mistakes have been detected and corrected. An effort has been made to re-think the entire subject and to throw some more light upon it. Those texts which demanded a larger measure of attention and those also to which ample justice could not be done when the book first saw the light, have in this edition received more adequate treatment and for this purpose considerable new matter has been added to the first three chapters in appropriate places of discussions and the authorities more extensively quoted at the footnotes in support of each position. To make the citations of the authoritative passages as full as possible, all the commentaries of Sankara have been carefully read and re-read and the author hopes that his primary object to place in the hands of the philosophical student a complete and right exposition of the system of Sankara within the scope of a single volume has now been adequately realised. No pains have been spared to give a connected and complete view of the system of Sankara-Vedanta as that view appears from the writings of Sankara himself and to present his philosophy as he himself thought it. The material has been all drawn straight from the fountain-head, and the author ventures to hope that this fact has given to his work an abiding value and its usefulness has thus been greatly enhanced.

To get a fairly adequate and a correct idea of the essentials of the whole Vedanta doctrine which is admittedly a complicated one, it is necessary to master at least the ten
or twelve big commentaries of Sankara which cannot but prove a formidable task to a student. And even then, without such aid as this book is intended to supply, to connect together the widely scattered utterances of Sankara and to arrange them under different topics the student will find his task a very hard one, if not impossible. And even if he is prepared to labour at the actual texts of Sankara, he will find many of his difficulties cleared up and his path smoothed, hitherto considered thorny, if he reads this book side by side with Sankara's own deductions and conclusions. It has therefore been the special aim of the author to state Sankara's essential thoughts as easily and methodically as possible.

The author avails himself of this opportunity to acknowledge a deep debt of gratitude which he owes to those savants of the East and particularly of the West who have given a warm reception to the book and furnished him with their valuable appreciation. The author also desires to return a grateful acknowledgment to the Board of Higher Studies in Philosophy composed of a body of those veteran scholars of philosophy presided over by that reputed Professor of Philosophy—Prof. S. Radhakrishnan, for selecting this work as a text book in philosophy for the M.A. students of the Calcutta University. It is gratifying to note that this recognition from such quarters amply shows that the interpretations which the book contains, though they may appear new, have the approval of the learned world. The author fervently hopes that the reading public will accord to this edition the same measure of sympathy which its predecessor gained.

Any suggestions for the improvement of the book in making it a more efficient help to the study of this difficult subject will be gratefully accepted.

Senate House,
Calcutta University
May, 1926.

KOKILESWAR BHATTACHARYYA.
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ABBREVIATIONS

हृ  मार—Brihadáryaka-Bhásya
खा  मार—Chándogya-Bhásya
ठ०  मार—Vedánta-Bhásya or Brahma-Sutra-Bhásya
गृ  मार—Gitá-Bhásya
प्र०  मार—Prasna-Bhásya
त०  मार—Taittiriya-Bhásya
ठ०  खार—Aitareya-Aranyaka-Bhásya
मार—Mandukya-Bhásya
मार  कार—Mandukya-Karika-Bhásya
केन  मार—Kena-Bhásya
के  मार—Kena-Bhásya
कृ  मार—Katha-Bhásya
हृ—Brihadáryaka-Bhásya
नैनि  मार—Taittiriya-Bhásya
ठ०  मार—Aitareya-Bhásya
शृङ्ग  मार—Isa-Bhásya
मार  खार—Mandukya-Bhásya (A'nandagiri)
ठ०—Vedánta-Bhásya
सारि—Mandukya-Karika-Bhásya
हृ  मार—Mundaka-Bhásya
कंठ  मार—Katha-Bhásya
ठ०  मार—Swetásvatara-Bhásya
हृ  मार—The Upadesa-Sahasri (Sankara's work)
शतकृष्णी—Sankara's work
वाक्यसौ—
खार्मिकप्रक—
पप्हारी—Vidyáranya's work
महूर्तिप्रकाश—
AN INTRODUCTION TO
ADWAITA PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

ON BRAHMAN AS CREATOR

1. It is laid down in the Adwaita System of philosophy that the Prána-spandana—the universally diffused vibratory Prána is the revelation of Brahma's 'nature' which involved the creative activity of Brahman. From this Prána-Spandana or external nature (विषय), gradually, stages after stages, step by step, the human organisms with their external and internal elements (कार्य-कारण-संबंध) have been built up, as the last stage of the process of manifestation. Had there been no such revelation of the 'nature' of Brahman, we could not know its real nature, and it would remain for ever an abstract and remote being. That Brahman is a self-conscious power (प्रात्तादगम्य-र्यं) would have remained shut up from our knowledge.1 Elsewhere, we find this

1 "स प्रात्तादगम्य: ततः व आत्माःत्तत्वातिसत्त्वात: ज्ञातासंज्ञाकर्षात्" (भाग 3, 4.4.2): "नामाविवाहानाति वाचरकारविविधानानि तत्त्वाति, अतिताव नयाबहुकर्षात् भूमायत्त तत्तः" (भाग 3, 7.1.1) "वटि वि नाम-स्त्रयं न वाकित्वं, तदा श्रमानं निधं विविधानैं रूपं न प्रतिष्ठावेत। यदा तु पुन: कार्य-कारण-कामा
fact stated still more distinctly. It is stated that in order to reveal, by degrees, what she contains in herself, nature has gradually assumed the form of human organs—external and internal;—so that she may, through these organs, reveal the infinite treasure she contains within her to the human selves.\(^1\) The organs are merely the different phases of herself, which nature has assumed, and in which she is present herself. This description shows that the building up of the human organisms, or in other words, the evolution of the beings with their cognitive and active organs\(^2\) through which the rational human beings become variously conscious of the external world and can act in diverse ways within it,—is the goal—is the final fulfilment, to reach which nature strives. Thus, Brahman has manifested itself as external nature, with a view to reveal to the human beings its own immense and infinite riches through her. The organisms of the different grades of beings\(^3\) are but the differentiations—

\(तयाम् सत्याः स्वात्त्वम् प्रतिश्चात् " (हृ भा, 2.5.19). (काय्य = Physiological and कारण = functional side of the organisms).

There was the revelation of Brahman as the rarefied, universally diffused Prāṇa-spandāṇi or Sutra. It gradually became more and more integrated, and it differentiated into five classes of elements (पञ्चतन्त्र), which became, as the result of combination in different proportions, gross (मूलभूत) out of which the organisms were built up in accordance with the inner 'nature' or स्वरूप of the individuals "इन्द्रियादीनां यत् भोजनार्थं, तत् 'पारस्परिक' निविष्णूलेन, चैत्यायात्मकाननिवृत्तं "—गैठा भा, 13.22).

\(^1\) "विषय-समान-जातीय कारण समस्ते स्वतं:। विशेषाय खास्यायाचयाचलोऽन्त:। खास्यायियायाचयाचलोऽन्त:। खास्यायाचलोऽन्त:। कारणाणि" (हृ भा, 2.4.11).

\(^2\) "विषयान्त: वित्तायाश्चत्सान्तः स्विन्तात्माः (सूत्र:)।"—This is the Rational and moral self (हृ भा, 8.12.3).

\(^3\) The Individuals are classified under four typical divisions—केदः, वेदः, वाक्य and शरात्व।
not separation—from the common environment universally existent. There are thus action and reaction always going on between the organisms and the particular portion of the environment—within which they are placed. As there is always a feeling-element which accompanies these reactions, the organised beings—particularly the human beings whose organs have been more highly developed—come to enjoy what is शौक्य (beauty), विभूतित्वम् (grandeur) and आत्मन्त्र (sublimity)¹ in the external world; and as the human being actively arranges these feelings and rationally acts for the realisation of his own end,—this contact with the world reveals to him the important truth that he is a rationally active being. Thus we find that to furnish the human selves with their objects of knowledge and action in the shape of cognitive and active organs, manas, etc.—appears to be the purpose for which nature perpetually works, and this she does, because an eternal, inexhaustible Power (Brahman) is present behind her, which is realising its own Swarupā (स्वरूप) gradually in higher and higher forms, through the successive stages of nature.² Such creation is perpetually going on and it

¹ Vide Gita, 10.41. “यदृ यदृ विभूतित्वम् सत्य शौक्य्यश्च तमिष या। तस्मात्सत्यते मे सत्य मे शौक्य रसायनम्” इवादि।

² “भावार्थादारभ उच्चरीश्चाविकारलमायन्” (एवो भावो शहर-भाओऽ, 2.3)। “एवाद्विधि कृतान्तथा विद्व-तातुमा श्रानन्तयांशायमभवत्: परं परं श्रृंगो भूमिर्द्व भवति” (वैभावो, 1.3.30)। “प्राप्तः सिद्धांत-स्वा याद्वासंहृत जगतो विशारदित—पुनः सिद्धां भावातिभिषं, तस्कृतं सब्भव नियमायो विद्यात्” (वैभावो)। “स प्राणन्नज्ञत। तथ च भावार्थवज्ञज्ञोतिः सत्यं भविष्यत्तरम्” एवो भावो। “स प्राणन्नज्ञत। तथ च भावार्थवज्ञज्ञोतिः वस्त्रेण भविष्यत्तरम्” एवो भावो। “स प्राणन्नज्ञत। तथ च भावार्थवज्ञज्ञोतिः वस्त्रेण भविष्यत्तरम्” एवो भावो। “स प्राणन्नज्ञत। तथ च भावार्थवज्ञज्ञोतिः वस्त्रेण भविष्यत्तरम्” एवो भावो।
still continues. The creation is described in the Vedanta, for this reason, as not an event in time done once for all; but as an eternal act and its purpose has not yet ceased or been finished.

2. Thus, Brahman is represented in the Vedanta in its two inseparable aspects—its लिङ्ग or Transcendental aspect and its कृष्ण or Immanental aspect. As Brahman is revealed partially in the activities of प्राण, it is Saguna (कृष्ण); and as it is present behind its activities as the infinite and inexhaustible source of these activities, it is Nirguna (लिङ्ग). The same fact is stated in another form. Brahman is both the Efficient cause (विभिन्न कारण) and Material cause (उपादान कारण) of the world. If one of these aspects be ignored, a serious defect will at once vitiate the theory. If you represent Brahman in its purely immanent character, the world would be invested with a false independence, and everything of the world would have to be accepted as it is. The world, in this case, would be an exhaustive expression of Brahman, and a self-sufficient, an independent, completed whole—all its steps being predetermined by its antecedent steps in time. The individuals also, being mere parts of this whole, would be like automatic machines, acting their parts as they are made to act. If, on the other hand, Brahman is represented in its purely transcendental character, it is absolutely separated from

1 “यथा ब्रह्मचर्ययात् विद्याभिषेकुष्मण्य न व्यविषयति, तथा कारणपरि निर्माणिशिस्य वक्तेन न व्यविषयति” (श्री भागवत, 2.11.6). “समाधामाधिकरणः सत्यम्-निपाश्च” (गौतम)

2 “अनादिलक्षणं रेण्यालं इति” (श्री भागवत, 2.1.35).

3 “तदेऽ ब्रह्मानुप्तम् प्रक्षेपनं नायापि निर्देश” (श्री भागवत, 6.3.2).

4 Vide श्री भागवत, 1.4.23-27.
ON BRAHMA AS CREATOR

the world, and has no concern with any activities going on in the world. It would thus be a distant and remote being absolutely cut off from the changes,—an abstract, incomprehensible, extra-mundane being, exalted beyond all predicates ( चैति, नैति).

Even among the friendly interpreters of Vedanta whose writings we have come across, there are many who have, unfortunately, thought of Nirguna ( निरुग्न ) Brahman in this light. They speak of Vedantic Nirguna Brahman as a “void—without consciousness, without activity,—a characterless nothing.” It is something “abstract and remote and having no relation whatever with the world.” “The Upanishads”—one of these writers declares—“reach their goal by the method of excluding all difference—the goal being pure undifferented being ; Sankara’s doctrine is in this direction.”

Everywhere Sankara has repeatedly declared Brahman to be—“अभिगृह्य-निमित्तोपादान-कारणम्”;—

Brahman as Efficient and Material cause.

that is to say, Brahman is to be regarded in both of its aspects ; i. e., Brahman’s transcendency and immanence are inseparable ( अभिगृह्य ) aspects. Brahman is revealed in the world in the diversities of náma-rupa ( नाम-रूप ), but yet it is present behind its manifestations in its own inexhaustible ( पूश्च ) nature. In the I.4.25-27, ( चैति मायः ), Brahman is described as evolving from its own nature the changes or the emergent effects, itself being their prior cause, present behind each change :

“पुरुषस्वरूपो धृतं सन्मायत, विभूतिष्ठि विभक्तात्माना
परिशमानात्मा आकाशम्”।

It is its own Ātmā, its own ‘nature’ or सत्त्व, which differentiated itself into the multiplicity of changes, but
it retains, behind them, its own unity or identity which it does not lose in them.

In the Gitá-Bhásya, the world, i. e., the active common medium (प्राण-प्रदन) and the finite individuals—these two are called as the two Prakritis of God, and they are held to be eternal (निन्द). Sankara here remarks that unless the elements to be controlled by God are eternal, God the controller of these two would himself turn out to be non-eternal (विन्य), and thus his 'God-hood' (रूपर्य) would fall to the ground.¹ In the Vedanta-Bhásya, he calls रूप to be eternal (निन्द्यः), in several places.² The creative act of Brahman has also been declared as eternal (निन्द)——

"तत् निन्द्य-विन्द्य-रूपर्य सूति-स्थिति-सं ब्रह्म-विषयं
निन्द्यान्तं भवतीति " (वे° भा°, 1.1.5)

That is to say, "the idea, of creation and maintenance of everything in existence, is eternal in Brahman." These gradually-revealed náma-rupas (नाम-रूप) have also been declared to be the 'object' to which Brahman stands related as the 'subject.'——

"वै पुनर्जल " कर्म सः प्रायुपते रूपर्यान्तं " विषयो " भवतीति ?
...नामरूपे...व्याविकौर्यीति रूपमि " (वे° भा°, 1.1.5).

And कर्म pervades its कर्म—s—the latter are taken up into the life of the former—not simply isolated. They are permeated by the action of कर्म।

In the face of such distinct and unmistakable expressions, how can the revealed differences (changes) be severed

¹ "निन्द्यान्तं रूपर्य सूति-प्रायुपति युक्तं निन्द्यः भवितु " (गी° भा°, 13.19).

² Vide वे° भा°, 4.4.17, 18, 21, etc., etc.
altogether from the underlying Brahman, making it a "remote, difference-less being."

3. In the commentaries of Sankara, the Nama-rupas (नाम-रूप) — the evolving and emerging changes — are always described as accompanied by the underlying causal Power, i.e., Brahman.

"Whenever and wherever the changes emerge, they can never emerge separated or detached from their underlying Atma or Brahman" —

"यद्य नाम-रूपे व्याख्यिति, तद्य नाम-रूपे भावस्ववपरिष्वालिनेव, 
वर्ण्यायप्रविभक्त-देशलिषि, स्ववच्छवच्छासु व्याख्यिति"।

"न हि भावानीन्द्रय...तत्-प्रविभक्तदेशकालं...सूर्यं भवत अविष्का 
वस्तु विचारते" (स० माँ, 2.6।)

i.e., "Nothing can be there, separated from the Brahman's 'nature' — either in time or in space."

"चैतन्यायतिरिक्ततः हि कला: जात्मानातिकृत्य: प्रविभक्तदेशः कर्णे 
रत्नयः।" (प० माँ, 6.2।)

"When the कला, i.e., the emerging differences or changes are created, are maintained in existence, and then will merge in their final end — they do so not separated from the underlying chaitanya, i.e., the 'nature' — लक्षण of the self" —

Again—

"All the emergent effects or changes are never severed from their underlying cause on which they stand. When they emerge and are sustained in existence after their emergence,—they are always grounded in the underlying sat (सत्) or the Causal Power." —
"प्रजा: न केवल वस्त्रालं एव, द्रापुरचं विभिन्निकादि सहायतना: सहायया
एव" (शङ्कर, 6.8.4).

"Can ध्व, viz., a transformed state of वस्त्रिका stand
even for a moment, if severed or disconnected
from clay, from the underlying वस्त्रिका?—

"यथा च यथादायादानी मवति, च तेन यथाविभि एतं; कथा घटादीमां
वदा।" (वृंदावन, 1.6.1) "what is produced by
something remains inseparably connected with
it; it cannot be separated out of it."

If such be the case; if under all circumstances, the
emergent changes, the náma-rupas, are found to be accom-
panied by their underlying causal reality, and if this
causal reality maintains its unity in the successive
changes,—it follows that the underlying Brahman, which
is the source of all these varieties of the evolving changes,
can never be looked upon as purely transcendent and as
unrelated to, and cut off from, these changes.

In the Vedanta, Brahman, as well as the finite indivi-
duals are held to have a 'nature'—a श्रेष्ठ, of their own.
This 'nature' or श्रेष्ठ of Brahman or of the individual
beings, is never, in the Bhásyas, regarded as a solitary
nature standing alone on its own account, remote
from, and unrelated to, the emerging states and activities
produced from that nature. It is always looked upon
as adhisthāna (धिःधिः) because it has a 'nature,' a
'character' of its own which sustains all.

1 । "धिःधिः एकलेश, निधिलातु जगानिशुलेग, तस्मां धिःधिः लोपपति:
(प्रातापभवे)। "न च चसतीविभिकालं चार्येताविभिकालं
(सार्थी, तांत्रिक, 8.9।) "यथा यथा-चक्षुविभिकालं हर्षमालं तत्—'तत्र'—9.19 शीतोः"
सुभाषिततापि परस्तुसङ्गमत्वानि विरित्विविवृतज्ञिति" (सार्थी, तांत्रिक, 8.3।
"सुभाषिततापि च सार्थविभिन्निति"—धिःधिः (शङ्कर, 6.2.1)। धिःधिः
sustaining ground.
4. It is indeed true that sometimes, the prior condition—प्राणव्यक्तिः—of the world, where there were supposed to be no changes as yet created or emerged, has been described; and Brahman has also been described as standing alone, without a second, during that condition. And this apparently solitary being, viz., Brahman has sometimes been likened, in the Bhāsyas, to the individual self during its dream-less sleep (सूप्नव्यक्तिः) when all its states and activities disappear in the self, and the self thus stands alone, as it were, at that time. Now, it may be asked, what explanation can be suggested to clear off this situation. Apparently this is a condition described in the Sankara-Bhāsyas, where the pure transcendence of the self or of Brahman—cut off from all relations with the world—seems to be made quite evident.

Our answer to this enquiry is two-fold:

(i) Firstly: When the dream-less state of the finite self is described, it will be seen that the self is not actually solitary or alone even during this condition. Sankara tells us that the self is not an ‘empty subject’ even then. The subject has for its ‘object,’ during that condition, the presence and operation of the Prāṇa (प्राणशक्ति): When the action of the external environment upon our sense-organs ceases to operate, during the time when we fall asleep, there are no functions of the organs excited. In the absence of these, our mind (manas) also ceases to act. Necessarily, all the external and internal functions, says Sankara, merge in the Prāṇa—the source of all kinds of activities of the human
organism.\textsuperscript{1} All activities lie latent in the Prána now. This latent प्राणमुक्ति, though its functions as differentiated in time and space-orders have ceased, is actually present within the organism, as is evidenced by the heat of the body and the other actions during our dream-less sleep. The self is not solitary and alone even now. It controls the Prána-sakti (‘प्राणायच’). When we again wake up, all the latent activities of this Prána will again go on, as before, as soon as they are elicited from the Prána by the actions of the external environment upon our sense-organs. This emergence again of these activities proves the presence of the Prána within our organism during our sleep.\textsuperscript{2}

Similar is the condition of Brahman when the varieties of the changes of Náma-rupa (नाम-रूप) are merged in the universally existent prána-spandana or sūtra (vibratory tremor of the diffuse Prána); and this Prána is the source of all subsequently developed activities emerging after the creation. It appears therefore that this Prána-sakti or the नाम-रूप-शक्ति was existent in Brahman during the प्रागवस्था, \textit{i.e.}, at the time of first manifestation (after the last pralaya). Thus we find that Brahman was not alone or solitary even then. Sankara took sufficient care to observe—

\begin{quote}
\textit{‘आत्मको चन्द्रमयः क्षणमस्तिः’} \textit{।—}\end{quote}

\textit{i.e., the नाम-रूप—}the root-cause of all differentiations existed in Brahman; and it was an ‘object’ in relation to

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{‘दशे वेदार्थे-जीवनश्वेतम् प्राथमकति ‘चादुहिन्दुहि’ (वों मा, रब्र्भमान)}

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{‘तमस-दशादानानां चलनालाकाश ‘क्रियामानामस्वति’ प्राण्यणलभ्यः’ (कों मा)। ‘दशनम-रविवर्त वह नमः-स्पदति, तद्भवे स्बृवन् जीवियियव प्राणिमन्न वनस्पान...वीजाक्षण मनोरिस्वव व्याःशब्दलं सुन।’ (मांका-भाष १)}
which Brahman was described as its ‘subject.’ Brahman was, therefore, not alone and solitary and object-less, even then. To show the presence of this Prána-sakti in Brahman, the Katha-bhásyá thus expresses the idea:

“As in an almost imperceptible tiny seed of a Fig-tree, its final end, viz., the immense and gigantic tree itself is existent as a future-power (वीजशक्ति); so in the ‘nature’ of Brahman is interwoven the subsequently developed world with all its varieties, as a latent future power. Otherwise, the changes or differences are to be imagined to have been produced out of nothing (चतुरु).”

“तत्त्वं सुवृष्टं जगती ब्रजभूतं भवयाकरं-नाम-स्यवतं सत्कारं-करण-शक्ति-समाधार-दुर्म...परमार्थिनि चौत्रोत-भविन समार्थिन, वर्तकं प्रत्येकं वर्त्तोऽमन्वय-शक्ति” (क्रृ. भागो, 3. 11)

In the Chándogya-Bhásyá also, the presence of this náma-rupa (नाम-रूप) in Brahman and its control by Brahman are beautifully expressed thus—

“Brahman is distinguished from the náma-rupa contained within it, and untouched by it, but yet it controls its activities”

“ते नाम-रूपं...यथा रामपीम सद्वत् तत्वं...यथं नाम-प्रत्येकं मूलं...नाम-रूपं विलबयं...तथापि तवेनित्वं तथं ललच्छं ब्रह्म”

(स्व. भागो, 8.14.1)

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1 “ददेव जगतु प्राणविवाहं...ब्रजशक्तवसं भवयाकरयों” (वे. भागो, 1.4.2). “प्रतेकं सत्कारं करणशक्तिःं सत्कारं समाधारं, शक्तिष्ठितं शिवालिनिश्चायं” (स्. भागो, चां गिरि)। ‘प्राण-चेदा’—is a distinguishing property of a चेतन (वे. भागो, 3.3.53).
Exactly similar observations occur in the Vedanta-Bhāṣya also.¹ We find then that Brahman has nowhere really described as a solitary being without anything for it to control, i.e., as ‘object-less’ or difference-less ‘subject.’

(ii) We shall now come to our second answer—

The individual self, according to Sankara, has a distinct ‘nature’ or श्रेष्ठ of its own, and this श्रेष्ठ cannot be resolved into its states and activities evoked from it through its interaction with the external environment. This nature or श्रेष्ठ maintains its unity or identity in all its evolved changes or states. Brahman too, in this system of philosophy, has a distinct ‘nature’ or श्रमाव of its own, and this श्रमाव maintains its unity, as distinguished from the infinite varieties of the changes of नाम-रूप (गम्य-रूप)—ever evolving from this श्रमाव.² The importance of this truth cannot be too highly emphasised. Most people are liable to resolve this unity into the visible multiplicity of the changing states and to take the aggregate of the states to be the only self. It is therefore necessary to impress the mind of the seekers of truth with this great principle, so that the people may not forget this श्रेष्ठ of their own, as well as of Brahman itself,—as underlying all the diversities of the changes.

During our dreaming and waking states, our real ‘nature’ or श्रेष्ठ becomes utterly obscured by our

¹ “इंद्रः प्राणस्यौऽणां नामपदेऽस्माहास्मः प्रज्ञानिर्दिता च अभिभूति।
ताभ्या ‘नमः’ श्रमेष्ठ: इंद्रः” (वः भः, 2.1.14).

² “गति व्याविधियादि श्रमादेभयं वच्चुलीयादेऽ ‘श्रमावः’ श्रमाविति”
(वः भः, 3.2.11)। “श्रमाविकिविद्यायायायाः—श्रमादेभय—शाश्वतः”
(3.2.23)। “वयपितस्य विविध्या देव अथवादेऽ, न च ‘श्रमाविकी’
चित्रणाशास्त्रां अवलि (3.2.25)।
waking and dreaming *experiences*, as the case may be. The sum-total of these experiences appears to us to be the only self. It is most difficult to distinguish the presence and operation of our true self which underlies these experiences, unaffected by them.¹ It is needful therefore to choose a condition where, if possible, these varieties of experiences, do not appear to disturb the 'nature' of the self. Our dreamless sleep is the right condition, when all the outward and inward distractions seem to cease. There the true underlying self, unaffected by the experiences, comes distinctly into the view. For this very reason, the dream-less condition (सुनधर्मक्षण) has been taken to be the चक्षुपात्मा, *i.e.*, the true condition where the real 'nature' (चक्षुः) of the self is to be discovered. It is not really meant to show that the self is actually solitary or object-less.²

In a similar way, the pre-existing state—(प्रागाधिकारिकोपिनिर्त्याः...चक्षुपात्मा च चनपायिला)’ (६० भाः, 3.2.35).

¹ “उपाधिकलसचंपतिसिद्धान्ता...चक्षुपात्मा च चनपायिला” (६० भाः, 3.2.35).

² “आयुष्ये...वायुद्भवसर्वकारे...कर्म-क्षय-क्षयपात्माकृतलात, न 'शक्ने तस्मीतिरास्मात् सुप्रभीमेन् निंदोऽवशंधितुः’ (६० भाः, 4.3.7).

“आयुष्ये...त्वोमाः कारणे...सुप्रभीमेनकं त्वोमाः” (६० भाः)। “सह्यांगेष्वेऽथं उपाधिकलसचंपतिसिद्धान्तं परवर्तिंशिविविद्ये...धुर्ये: ‘चक्षुपात्मांयिले...चक्षुपात्मा चनपायिला” (६० भाः, 3.2.7)। “एकाध चनिकाधिकारिकादुपरि:” (३.२.२१)।
to detect the presence of this ‘nature’ unaffected by the changes, when the diversities of nāma-rupa (नाम-रूप) perpetually work, as at present. The शुद्धत्व of the individual self and the प्राप्तिक्षा of the world both help us in easily detecting the presence of the ‘nature’ or शृंखला of both the individual self and Brahman respectively, and in becoming convinced of a unity amidst diversity.

It has been thought advisable, on account of this very difficulty, to select or rather to imagine a condition of the world when the changes as yet did not appear to emerge, but just on the point of emerging into the view. This condition is named as Prāgabasthā (प्रागवस्थ) of the world. It would be far easier to grasp the undisturbed true nature (शृंखला) of Brahman in the absence of any emerging changes or विचाराः. During the प्राप्तिक्षा, there is no possibility to resolve the nature of Brahman into, and to identify it with, the empirical changes—taking the aggregate of these changes to be the only reality. It is for this that we find the प्राप्तिक्षा (Prāgabasthā) of the world described in the commentaries of Sankara. Its real purpose is not to show that there can ever be a state when Brahman can exist without any differences, as a solitary being self-sufficient without the created world—an object-less subject. To imply this fact, the nāma-rupa (नाम-रूप) has been expressly stated, in the beginning of the Vedanta-bhāṣya, as the ‘विषय’ or the ‘object’ of Brahman—the ‘subject.’

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1 “किं पुनश्च कर्मसि, शुद्धत्वाय संविद्या विषयोऽवस्था भवति पदम्...नाम-रूपे व्याधिकौंशिकः ध्रुवं ब्रूमः” (६° भावः, 1.15)। “तत् दशन्यं विषयोऽवस्था—कर्मेत्तामात्मा व भवति। तत् कर्मं कर्माधमात्मम्, कर्मं अवधिकारित्वम् भवतिः।... कर्मं वि कर्म्यं विषयं व्याख्यातं भवति; अर्थशास्त्रः, अर्थसाधारणः; न तेनेत्र तत्तत्त्वम्” (६° भावः, 4.4.6)।
is therefore an erroneous attempt to interpret Brahman as ‘object-less,’ as Dr. Paul Deussen has done in his *Philosophy of the Upanishads*. This Prior state or प्राणवक्षा has been chosen to show that Brahman has a ‘nature’ of its own and this nature must be existent prior to its manifestations and that Brahman is not an ‘abstraction.’

That Brahman in its own character is invariably to be found present behind all the changes of the world and that the latter can never exist without the underlying Brahman—is everywhere repeatedly shown in the commentaries of Sankara. How carefully and beautifully the above fact is stated will appear from the following passages which we have selected with a view to support what has been stated in the preceding page.

In the Māndukya-bhāṣya, in describing the nature of the Transcendental (तृतीय) Brahman, Sankara states—

(i) If, it may be asked, Brahman is to be taken as something which lies beyond what has been manifested in the world; if it be apart from all changes, all states, all actions which are visible in the empirical world;—then it necessarily follows that no speech, no language, no word can describe its nature; in as much as the speech, the word and the language are included in the manifested things of the world. Then go a step further. That which cannot be expressed by a word; to which no thoughts—no words can be applied;—we may very well take that to be a non-entity, a mere void (शून्य). Raising this objection, Sankara thus meets it:—‘No, Brahman is not a void, never a non-entity. Brahman always underlies the changes and sustains them. All manifestations come out from that underlying sustaining ground. The ground which gives support to these changes and constantly sustains them cannot prove to be a mere void or nonentity.
It must have a positive nature of its own. Even when a snake, a silver, a mirage appears to arise,—all these appearances are invariably found to be supported, in each case, by a sustaining ground upon which they appear, viz., a rope, an oyster, and the surface of a desert; unsupported by which, these appearances cannot for a moment stand. Hence the Brahman's 'nature' is the sustaining ground of all changes, all manifestations,—in the absence of which the latter cannot stand, cannot live. If the sustaining ground is held to be a non-entity,—nothing; then, can mere 'nothing' give birth to the positive things of the world?  

(ii) Our life begins with our experiences. These experiences are of two kinds. Those which we experience in our waking state and those which are experienced in our dream. All our experiences are various, successive, and they change their aspects always. But underlying these changing experiences and unaffected by them, there is our true self which experiences them as they arise. This self is the sustaining ground of all our experiences, in the absence of which the latter cannot stand and operate. The experiences are, as noted above, successive, multiple in their nature and transitory. But the underlying self which lives in them and sustains them is a unity and it maintains its identity unaffected by these changing experiences. Our self is in touch with the transcendental (तुरीय) Brahman, which is our real self.

1 "सर्वेष्णांद्रहितं-भिन्नतयाबलकात्, तथा श्वानन्विभिभविभित्र, भिन्नताप्रतिविनिर्भैव
‘तुरीय’ निभिदिष्टां।।।यद्यन्ति तांशि? तद्र। विभिन्नापरमेत्र निभिन्नितानुपरिपरीफलि:। न हि रजन-वर्ष-पृथक्क-भन्नतसकाठििद विकार्य:। युक्तिः-रजन-सङ्कायंनासिगिनिस्य:।
व्यवस्थित नवस्थापयोः यकाः। कालविषुत।।।एवं तांशि प्राणादिविभेविकायायास्यदलं
तुरीयं।” (मा° मा°, 1. 7).
There is no other way left to us to comprehend the nature of the self, except as the sustaining ground of our experiences, through which that nature realises or expresses itself. It cannot be a non-entity.\(^1\)

No further quotation is necessary. These will suffice to prove the position of Sankara. From what has been stated above, it is evident that Brahman is regarded in the Vedanta, as perpetually present and operative, as an inexhaustible source, behind the changes or transformations evolving from it. It is thus intimately related to the nāma-rūpas, the vikāras or changes, as their ever-present ground and controller. It is therefore impossible to regard Brahman as remote and solitary and as an ‘abstract void.’ And as the creation is perpetually going on—

"नायापि जन्मवनं प्रतिजनं निर्माणम्" (का° मा°)——

and newer and newer differences are emerging continuously,

"अष्टरीश्च-सहेकाशेष्" (मी°)——

how can these be separated from Brahman, making Brahman a difference-less abstract?

5. The conclusions we have drawn above will appear more clearly if we show how in the Sankara-Vedanta the production of this world, of nāma-rūpas, from the Nirgun Brahman, and the relation subsisting between them have been described. The observations made by Sankara in this connection are of immense value for a clear

\(^1\) "आयुद्धार्थास्तेः एक एव ज्ञातस्य तत्वभविषय: ब्रह्म: प्रक्रिय: तेन चतुर्विधे...

...तृतीयं रंगम् त्विविक्षेवे प्रत्येक: सहस्त्रादि-वन्येशाः कविता:। ताहा

एते च चतुम: सहकथा: सत्तेत्र चतुर्भुविषय: (मा° मा°, 1. 7)। नायापि ज्ञातस्य

तृतीयशेष प्रतिपदाधिशिरसाः।"
comprehension of the Māya-theory of Sankara. We have therefore thought fit to elaborate the idea of Sankara in these respects here.

(1) In an important passage occurring in the Bhāṣya on the Tāttvārthas Upanishad, Brahmān is defined as Sāmānyā (सामान्य) — _i.e._, as the universal.

सामान्य वह ब्रह्मः

याविद्वसतविभिन्नताः ...सामान्यानाध्याय विद्याः: (१०:भा, २.६.)

This universal, this Sāmānyā is the idea of Being in general, pure being—कृत्ति. It is obtained by abstracting from all specific determinations (विशेष) whatever. We are to think its Being which it has in common with every other object of the world (सामान्यानाध्याय). This being has no specific determinations, for we have abstracted from all determinations (याविद्वसतविभिन्नताः). As it is the absence of everything of all determinations, it is undetermined. Apart from its Being, its "isness" (त्वम्), it has no character. It is pure "is," without any further determinations. This being, this "isness," cannot be removed; for in that case, Sankara points out, it would be pure nothing, it would lose its nature altogether. ¹

But a doubt may arise that what is devoid of all determinations is merely a non-existent thing—

नाशोति ?—(३.० भा, २.६.)

Sankara resolves this doubt by remarking that as Brahman is the Cause (जार्ज), it cannot be said to be non-existent. In the 'Vedanta,' Brahman, the Universal, the

¹ सामान्यविभिन्नताः क्रमव वृद्धसंक्रस्य, कार्यप्रकाशीय अतिसिद्धस्वताः।

(---भा)। परिवर्तयनानि कार्यविभिन्ने जार्जकार्जे, युक्तवादवादग्राह... अवज्ञा निराक्षयद्वार नौप्पायते—(३.०, ३.२.२५.)
ON BRAHMA AS CREATOR

Being—is held to be the Cause of the world. It has no other cause beyond it, is its own cause.\(^1\) And as a cause, it is not determined by something else (जन्तु); but it determines itself; the whole of its determinations rises out of its own resources. Hence it is not undetermined, it is self-determined. All determinations can therefore be removed, excepting \(\text{"isness"}\); for, Brahman being the Cause of the Universe, this cause underlies hidden behind this universe.\(^2\)

Now, as Brahman is held to be the cause of the universe, the universe is produced out of it. It is a fixed tenet of the Vedanta that prior to their production, the effects (कारण), the náma-rūpas—existed in the cause. But in what form the effects, the differences of Náma-rūpa, existed in Brahman? Did the actual diversities of Náma-rūpa, the actual determinations (विविधता) exist in the cause? No; there was not yet any differentiation, there was as yet no separation of náma-rūpa into space and time.\(^3\) Within the Being (जगत्), no differences have yet disclosed themselves (जगत्तिमिस्ते गुणवत्ते) There was nothing to distinguish the जगत्त् from Brahman in that stage. Differentiations were all implicit, hidden

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\(^1\) व्यास लगाति, विकृतिः तदस्याति हतं लोकी। भाषाविर्यवर्णवाचल्युः प्रभावः, न वाष्पि व्रजः—(तौ भौ, 2.6) न च प्रस्तते जाति विषयति व्रजः लोकि वाष्पम्।

\(^2\) प्रभाव: ‘सुक्त’—लक्षण: समाव: ब्राह्मादिरुप अत्रवसानादि हत:—वै भौ, इत्यते गृहोत्सवदिवस् निग्रामवकलापिष्ठके त—तौ भौ, 2.6.

\(^3\) “राममेऽत्र जगतिम्यक्ते समस्तं अस्मिन्यं” “महासूग्दीलमवधिपुराणोर्वारं ध्वजः” —४�最合适, 2.6। “समस्तवाष्पादि तें गुणविशालेऽक्षेत्राति जातवत् भाषाविर्यवर्णवाचल्युष्म” (2.1.)

The जगत्त् existing in Brahman prior to its manifestation is called in भौ भौ as प्राक्षणिक or वौणवति। Sankara here says that the qualitative
in गुण; differentiations were all inseparably, indistinguishably, blended in Brahman. Sankara has very beautifully described this condition by illustrations—

मधुलिः रसलिः न च त्वत्मयेनात्मयादिवश
मधुलिः मधुपञ्चायतं—ज्ञाते भविष्यित विवेकानंतरसिद्धिष्ठान
गुणिलिः (सुदुरः-प्रलययोः) १
—प्रथं भा, ४.१.

But, it may be asked, if there were, in that stage, no differentiations of Nāma-rūpa, if there were no specific determinations yet appearing in the गुण, if जगत् could not be separated from Brahman, if there was nothing to distinguish nāma-rūpas from Brahman,—may not the universe be called non-existent in that condition? How do you know that nāma-rūpa, जगत्—existed in Brahman? In fact, there are passages in the शुल्ष itself where the universe, prior to its production, is called as ब्रह्म—non-existent.—

ब्रह्मदेवभय भारतः।
ब्रह्मदासीति ततः: रहस्ययत। (स० उ०, २.७४)

How do you know then that जगत् existed in the Being?

differences exist blended in Brahman; otherwise the differences could not issue from it afterwards. भाद्रेहरि remarks here—“सुवर्णाकार्यप्राप्तयाः ततुकार्यप्राप्तयाः ब्रह्म्यानित्यं गुणसंयुक्तं ब्रह्मसंयुक्तं अविभाज्याच्यं अविभाज्याच्यं” (स० भा, भागः प्र०, ५) In वेदांग भाष्य, २.१.९, this वीजमयिः is called भ्रातानतिष्ठति विभाज्याच्यं (Power of potential distinction). This is सत्य, the potential बौऽ for existing hidden in Brahman. It is objective, not merely subjective.

१ As the sweetness existing in honey cannot be separated from it; as the flavour exists indistinguishably blended in the clarified butter (शृङ्ख); as the different rivers flowing into the ocean exist there with their differences merged, etc., etc. So all differences exist in Brahman inseparably and indistinguishably merged in it. There is yet no separation of the नामस्य from प्रकाश। Under no circumstances, नामस्य can remain separated—divided—from the underlying cause (Brahman).
Sankara furnishes us with the requisite reply to this question. First of all he points out that it is not in the sense of absolute non-existence of the जगत्, that the term अस्ति is used in the श्रुति. The statement simply means that there were no differentiations developed as yet, no specific determinations, no actual manifestations. The term अस्ति, therefore, does not mean absolute non-being. Non-being here only means the absence of specific determinations. It only means that the determinations were implicit, hidden, not yet manifested or developed.\(^1\) It follows therefore that the Being and non-being, सत् and अस्ति, ब्रह्म and जगत्—were *identical* in that condition,\(^2\) and therefore indistinguishably blended. On account of the identity of the Being and non-being, Brahman is called in the Vedanta-bhasya as—चस्तिव, and जगत् also is called in the Chāndogya-bhāṣya as सत् and in the Taittirīya-bhāṣya as आका\(^3\)—in that stage.

\(^1\) चस्तिवति भाज्ञनासदपविशेषं ‘विपरीतं’ सविन्यं ब्रह्म उच्छेदे; न पुनःवाचानि

अस्ति—तेऽभाः 2.7, “न श्रुतानाशवाचानिशिव प्राप्तप्रेपः कार्यस्य

अस्तियांगियम्। किं ताहि? भाज्ञनासदपविशेषं भाज्ञनासदपविशेषं अस्ति

...नामप्रणालं सच्चिदाहं लोके प्रसिद्धं। भव: भाज्ञनासदपविशेषः

‘चस्तिव’श्रीति” (वेदांभाः, 2.1.17).

\(^2\) We have found before that the Being (सत्), i.e., Brahman has been obtained by abstracting all specific determinations. The non-being (अस्ति) here mentioned is simply the absence of all specific determinations and differentiations. The Being and non-being are therefore *identical* (पूरीमृतं, विवेकानं गतः). Being identical, they are indistinguishable. Cf. भाः गिठो—“श्रुतानाशवाचानि...श्रुतानाशवाचानि... नामप्रणालि

गिठो 3.11). Cf. ‘चतुर्जगतिश्रीति: सति खलु वोजि समीक्षि वक्ते; (Sankara’s ‘श्रुतानाशवाचानि’)।

\(^3\) “सत् न च सुवर्ण्यं ‘चतुर्जगतिश्रीति’ श्रुतानाशवाचानि गिठो 3.11)

कार्यस्य—प्राप्तप्रेपः? (भाः गिठो, 6.2.2) “श्रुतानि च सुवर्ण्यं श्रुतानि गिठो। श्रुतानि तु—मनविवर्धनः—
Having thus pointed out the fact that ज्ञात in the Sruti does not mean absolute non-existence of नामा-रूपा, Sankara goes on to show that ज्ञात could not be said to be non-existent in the ज्ञात in that condition. For, if ज्ञात was absolutely non-existent, if ज्ञात did not exist in Brahman, it could not be produced from it. Why? Because, Sankara continues, you cannot get that from a thing which it does not contain within it. Brahman could not produce the universe from itself, unless the universe is contained in it—

यदि ज्ञ यदान्तम न वर्णिते, न तत्त्व ज्ञातीते।

(वृ. भा०, 2.1.16)

It follows therefore that the being (ज्ञात) contained non-being (अज्ञात), its own differentiations hidden away, merged, suppressed, within it. As Being gave birth to nothing, nothing (अज्ञात) was therefore within the Being. Brahman which is सामान्य contained within it the differences (विभेद). It is wrong therefore to suppose the

**1** गर्वितयास्वरूप सामान्या कारणवर्णाद्वयसम्मस्ववर्षेत् यथविषयायदिविषयं पिष्कुरुत्योजोगीभर्

—वृ. भा० 2.2.26। Also cf. कारणीय ईश्वर विद्या च चतुर्दश संसारिते, न ब्रह्मविद्या:।

**2** चतुर्दशा एव च चतुर्दश ज्ञात, न च चिन्तायं—वृ. भा० 22.1.30।

**3** अज्ञात does not mean सामान्य or unreality. It is simply the opposite of ज्ञात; cf.

“तद्वस्तं कचिदं अयोगीमात्मायते कचिदत्” (वृ. भा०)

**3** ‘Nothing’—We shall see that all determinations are, according to Sankara, Negations. ‘Nothing’ here means therefore determinations or विभेदः.
universal, the being, the sat, as totally excluding all determinations; for it had its own differentiations implicitly present in it. Because it contained the जगत in it, it has become possible for the जगत to come out from it.

Now, we shall see how the जगत, how the diversities of नाम-रूप came out—

"एकं वैण्ण विधि य: कारणिः" (बृ. वृ.)

The Being distinguishes itself from itself and becomes its other. The unity suffers self-differentiation into diversity.

As the differentiations come out, there is some distinction, some वैलब्ध्य which now appears.\(^1\) For Sankara remarks—

अजगराद्विभो प्रक्ततिविकारोप्यते प्रस्तुत:।—नग्न
प्रक्तार्थी प्रक्ततिविकारभावे इति सत्ति (बृ. मा. 2.16 & 2.39).

"प्रक्त्तिविकारो भेदेन्य वयदेशत।"—(बृ. 2.1.27).

It was simply कारण before, now the कारण comes out in the form of कार्य.\(^2\) And this कार्यान्वय is the other of the कारण.

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\(^1\) Vide Vedanta Bhasya, 2.1.6 and also 2.2.11 where some वैलब्ध्य of this जगत from its cause कारण (ब्रह्म) has been established. In another way this वैलब्ध्य has been shown by Sankara when he describes the relation between कार्य and कारण in बृ. मा. 2.1, where कारण is described as कारण from the effect.

\(^2\) ‘कारणायारिश कारण’ अवस्थायत: कारणायापूर्वः पर्यायमायति (बृ. मा. 2.1.18). But in the case of Brahman, कारणायापूर्व is not necessary. cf. निनिशानादेवेषातः अभवात, सत्ति (सू. मा. 1.1.7). कारकादेव-भावेष्टि प्रस्ति स्यदेव: ?—बृ. मा. 2.1.20। परिपूर्वायारस्य ब्रह्म—अनेपेत्त वाच्यम प्राप्तम स्वयम विदेशते—बृ. मा. 2.1.24.
There was सांस्कृतिक (universal) before, now बिशिष्टत्व (particulars) comes out.¹ And this बिशिष्टत्व is the opposite of the सांस्कृतिक.²

It is well-known that all determinations are regarded by Sankara as negations.³

The कारण therefore produces its own negations from it which it contained within it.

We find therefore that the Being or Brahman produces its other, its opposite, its negation from it. In this way there is, according to Sankara, some distinction, some वेष, some भेद, between the cause and its effect.⁴

¹ सांस्कृतिक बिशिष्टत्व उपयुक्त द्वारा, खुदाई: चाटाबु: —६० भाग २३.९. "...प्राणसत्ता सांस्कृतिक कारण बिशिष्टत्व अन्तरणाया २.१.१५, २.३.८।
² तथा तद्विपरीत प्रकृतः विविधता में रूपसत्ता जैसा भाग २.७।
³ It is remarkable that here in this point there is complete agreement between Sankara and Hegel. Determinations are बिशिष्टत्व, and बिशिष्टत्व operates by negation (निर्वर्तन, आवर्तन)। We quote the whole passage from Sankara-bhashya:

"यदा द्विरूपिनी नन्दन्यानि एकसत्तायानि बिशिष्टत्वविशिष्टविमूल्यिनि, तदा बिशिष्टत्व अवस्थित। बिशिष्टत्वविशिष्टवर्तन बिशिष्टत्वविशिष्टवर्तन, यथा नीलग चक्रवर्तन चन्द्रपृष्ठम्। समाजालयायत एवं निधिविशिष्टवर्तन (negations) बिशिष्टत्वाशिर्ष (determination) बिशिष्टत्व। निधिविशिष्टवर्तन: ब्रह्मात्मा बिशिष्टत्व निधिवालस्—६० भाग २.१।

"To determine a thing is to limit it, to cut it off from some sphere of being. To say that a thing is green limits it by cutting it from the sphere of red, blue and other coloured things. The differentia (विशिष्टत्व) is that which carves out a particular class from the general class, by negating, excluding, the other species. Whatever is said of a thing denies something else of a thing. All determination is therefore negation.” (W. T. Stace.)

⁴ Sankara shows there is some अवतिष्ठत्व, some वाविष्ठत्व, some new element appearing in the effect (कारण)। cf. 'जीवाणूर्धिय' चाकुकल-प्राक्कालविखित्य ज्ञातार्थ संबिधतेः (६० भाग २.१.२०। Also 'कारणावब्धा'
As the Being (वर्त) splits into particulars, as the Being, of its own accord (संक्रम), by its own act, has undergone self-differentiation into diversity in which it manifests itself, it is now वर्त and something more; it is now वर्त and diversity of nāma-rūpa. ¹ The universal is therefore inflated ² with a determination, a difference, a negative element—nothing. This is the particular (विशेष or विषय). The being, the universal, the वर्त—as determined by particularity and difference appears as the universe. It is evident from these that Sankara did not altogether deny distinction or वेद between the cause and its effect. ³

But is this distinction an absolute distinction?

The particulars and determinations which are produced are, in reality, not utterly and absolutely different,

¹ वर्त ‘सर्वेश्वरस्वाभिभिदति उच्चते? श्रवे, जगत्: प्रारम्भम्।’ तिन न दशानी-
स्वविदेहम्? . . . . . पदार्थस्वाभिविदेह, तिन न नामध्य-विशेषव्यवहिदर्शनस्व-कृति-
विशिष्टस्वते इत्यं च भवतोति। प्रारम्भम्—वेषव्यवस्थित—प्रारम्भम्—
हरू मात्र, ६.२.१.

Also ‘प्रारम्भम्:’ अयात्यास्तमालकस्मसदु... शर्मक काशं-प्रवक्षण-गीतरं जगत्; 
दशानी‘ अयात्यार-काशं-वैदिकः... चन्द्री-काशं-प्रवक्षण गीतरं शर्मक प्रवक्षण- 
गीतरं विवेशं’ एव मात्र, १.१.

² Cf. ग्रहः—समाचारसे, समाचारविषयविद्य जगत्, अवर्गस्विद्या ‘वीणा’—‘ज्ञाति जगत्’
गत्तति।—प्रा मात्र

³ The distinction is there, but it is not absolute and ultimate. See further on.
absolutely and utterly other (অস্ব), from the Being (সত্য). Sankara observes that it is our Avidyā—अविद्या—which sees absolute distinction, absolute separation and opposition between the cause and the effect, between the विषय and विषय. Avidyā looks upon the diversities of नाम-रूप, the effects, the अस्त—as absolutely different, as absolutely separate (अस्त) from Brahman. Sankara has thus characterised the अविद्या—

\[\text{अविद्या अस्ति} \text{ न् अस्ति} \text{ अस्तित्वादि} \text{ अस्तित्वादि} \]

Sankara has repeatedly shown that it is not possible and proper at all to separate नाम-रूपas, the particulars,

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1 We regard the effects (कार्य) different—अस्तित्व—अस्तित्व—from the cause which underlies hidden behind them, and treat them as separated from, outside of, the cause—as self-sustaining and independent. This is our अविद्या view of the world. But the अविद्या view is अविद्या. Sankara remarks in the Vedanta that “परमार्थनिर्माणाभ नासार्थविद्या संशयार्थ:” From the परमार्थनिर्माण view, the effects are really अस्तित्व—non-different from, identical with, the cause. This relation between कार्य and कार्य is to be found elaborated in the तुषा 14 to 20 in the Vedanta Philosophy, Chapter II. 1. परमार्थनिर्माण view is the real view. Although कार्य is somewhat distinct—विचित्रण—(२० तदनेव २.१.६) from the कार्य, yet in reality it must be regarded as अस्तित्व—not अस्तित्व, not other. Hence अस्तित्व and अस्तित्व are not of equal value. अस्तित्व has been particularly emphasised by Sankara, but अस्तित्व has not been abolished.

2 By अविद्या the particular is regarded as अस्तित्व—different from the universal. ‘विशेषता……’ अस्तित्व—विशेषता—विद्या—विद्या’—२० मात, २.४.१३. And also—

‘अविद्या ‘अस्तित्व’ अस्तित्व प्रकृत्याप्यति—अविद्या हौ मात, ४.२.२०. इशादि।
from Brahman, and to regard them as अभ, as so many self-sufficient independent entities. There is distinction, but also identity.¹

Sankara thus brings out the identity, the non-separation (अनन्यता) between the universal and the particular:—

It is Brahman, the Universal, the Being, which evolves all its determinations and differences of nāma-rūpa out of the depth of its own being; what it has put forth from itself is only itself. For, it is the Being which distinguishes itself from itself and appears as its other. In putting forth its own particulars, it has not lost itself, nor has it become something else (अभ). For, its other, its opposite, is only itself, as Sankara declares—

‘नष्ट विशेषं बद्धनमाविषयं वस्तुकल्यं’ भवति

...‘व प्रभृति’ प्रब्धिभावानात.’

कायांकारिणी कारणं चालभूतं एव।

(व० मा० 2.1.18.)

It is the self-differentiation of the कारण itself ² into its other, its opposite—

परस्पर एवं तेन तेन भावनाः (i.e., कायांकारिणी) भवतिकः...

...सूक्ष्मिति।—(व० मा०, 2.3.13).³

¹ But both are not of equal importance. We must cultivate the अभेद्यत्व even in our ordinary practical concerns of life (अन्वष्ठिकायव्य)।

Cf. ‘एव विशेषे विविधा, पव्यतीतिप्रत्य परस्य संवार्यं, ‘दुर्गम’कर्नो न पर्ययं’
—Sankara’s ‘सामसनिद्ध्वल्ल’। Cf. स्त्रियांस्क स्मृति सानि वाग्न्य वादितलावत्
(व० मा०, 2.1.22).

² “क्राक्यांतिविद्विषा एव प्रभृतिः”—स० मा०, 1.1.6.

³ एवक एवं अवस्थानानात्योगात् अवनिष्कर्षणवायव्याकृति। (2.2.17, व० मा०)।
Hence, in passing out into its opposite, it remains identical with itself (अंतःसम्बन्धमत्वं). As it has put forth its opposite from itself, the Being (सत्ता) remains, even in its opposite, identical with itself. It is the कार्य itself which embodies itself in particular shapes—

"अध्यात्मिक्यं तत्त्वानिश्चयं सम्बन्धमत्वं।
'कार्यं' संयम समर्थे।"
—२० भाग, २.३.७।

Hence the कार्य finds in its own कार्य—not an alien other, but its own very being (कार्यावेश)। For, the कार्य is, in reality, no other but the mere form, the guise, the shape, which the कार्य itself has assumed for its own manifestation—

कार्यावेशं 'संयमसम्बन्धं' निव वेषं (२० भाग, २.२.१७।)

It follows therefore that the other is only itself; part of the कार्य; the manifestation of its nature ¹; it is, in reality, only itself—

न कार्यं सास कार्यांद्रातिरिक्तं सविन्द्रितम।
—२० भाग, १.६.१।

It is the universal itself which has gone forth into its particular. In passing from one to the other, nothing has been added from outside; new material has been put forth from the womb of the being itself.

Hence, the universal sunders itself into its particularity, yet remains universal. Hence, the distinction which it gives rise to is no distinction. Therefore the world is at bottom no other than Brahman.² Therefore the universal,

¹ Cf. 'अध्यात्मिकाभवं व अध्यात्मिकां भवतिमा तत्त्वानिश्चयं कार्यं' वर्णमाला (२० २.६।)
"वर्णमालासम्बन्धं वर्णप्रतिपादितासनात्तथा, २० भाग, (१.४.१४) न गो 'कार्य: वर्णविशदः अध्यात्मिकायं सम्बन्धं।"

² "सासं तत्त्वावेशं जगतं वेषं' परिष्कर्षयितात्)—२० भाग। The Universe is nothing but the ब्रह्म in reality. This is पारंपरिक विद्वान।
Cf. 'पितलस्य इत्याविवेचं, द्रव ज्ञात पद्धतविरुचिः'—Sankara's 'सासंगिकवेशं'.
while going forth out of itself, yet all the while abides unchanged within itself.

"तथेऽविद्यायां द्वन्द्व: भवेत्...विद्यायां भवे।"—सू, 2.2.17.

The true कारण is therefore identical in all its diverse forms, which remains hidden behind (कार्याःकारणं तिरङ्गितम्).

Under the influence of ज्ञात्म, we absolutely separate and thus forget or ignore this underlying being and take the mere forms as so many independent objects—as शर्तविज्ञ, कारण, ज्ञ, etc. But the one ज्ञ (being) which is identical in all its diversity of forms, as ज्ञ, is not itself any single individual thing or phenomenon. The 'multiplicity' is not therefore something different (अभय) or separate altogether from the 'unity.'

We find from this discussion that there is distinction as well as identity or more properly, identity in difference, between the कार्य and the कारण.

Sankara has therefore concluded thus—

"सर्वसंकप्तेषु भविष्यति...अभावं भविष्यति...समस्तं स्वरता" (सू 1.1.6).

Elsewhere we find him remarking that every finite individual object is a compound of two factors—वन्त् and अवन्त्;

\[1\] Vide also गङ्गाकाम्, नीडः कारिका, 6 Sloka.

In Vedanta Bhāṣya where Sankara shows the relation between कार्य and कारण, he shows the distinction between them by holding कारण to be भव्य from the कार्य. He has shown the identity between them by holding कार्य to be भव्य from the कारण. The reader should bear this in mind.

In सू 2.1.13, Sankara distinctly says that although the differences are non-different (अभव्य) from their cause, still they remain—they are not abolished. "म प संहस्त्रयच्यति...तत्सांवक्ताः...इति।...ज तत्...परं अवक्ति।"
of which तत्त् is abiding and constant, while भवत्त is ever-changing.\(^1\) The readers will note that भवत्त does not mean here ‘unreality.’ What is variable;—the perpetually changing and succeeding forms—are called भवत्त. And what is constant amidst all these changing forms or appearances is called तत्त.

These discussions unmistakably show that it is not at all possible for the जगत्, for the नाम-रूपस to break loose from the कारण, *i.e.*, from Brahman—

\[
\text{(१० ८, २.४.७)²}
\]

The distinction of नाम-रूपा is developed *within* the unity of the cause—

\[
\text{विशेषः सामान्य चतुर्भुजानि।—हृ ८, ७.४.१.}
\]

\[
\text{सामान्य विशेषानि भारतलक्ष्यप्रदानिन विभषित।—हृ ८, २.४.७.}
\]

Hence, under no circumstances, can the नाम-रूप be *separated* from Brahman and regarded as प्रत्य. As soon as they are *separated*, they become *unreal*, false—कलाकर्षितं भूतस्य दशारूप। It is in this sense alone, Sankara has called जगत् to be unreal. खदानम विभमानः सत्यसं, सतीयम्यम्य ब्रह्मस्य (हृ ६.६.२).

By ignoring or forgetting the Reality of the ever-constant, underlying, hidden, Brahman of which the *process of the world* is a gradual manifestation or appearance and by

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\(^1\) “सत्त तन सत्त प्रकटिकसणो यथा विषयः सन्धित: सन्धित: सन्धितः।
ततो च तत्त्वो निर्देशितः न तत्त्वः सन्यः।” (गीता ८, २.१६) भावन् is what changes—‘विशेषः विशिष्टिः’ तत् ‘भवत्त्’। This is also called ‘तत्त्’। भवत्त means—‘तत्त्व’ विशेषितः तदुप व्यविचारत् ‘भवत्’ सिद्धितः (हृ २.१।)। It does not mean unreality.

² “वष्ट नामरूप मयाधिकरण: सत्यम आपकाला ततो सूयम भविता” (हृ ७.३.१।) The effects are subsumed under their cause and are pervaded by it. It runs on into each of the effects.
severing the connection of जग्न with the underlying Brahm-an, if you occupy yourself with merely this continuous process, imagining a sort of causal relation among the changing antecedents and consequents ¹ and a relation of means and end ² among them, it would be a futile and useless occupation on your part. For, you would take that to be real which is unreal, in as much as, severed from their connection with Brahman, the नाम-रूपas become at once जडलीश्वरदासर:—uneessential.³ We cannot resist the temptation of quoting, with the permission of our readers, the beautiful lines in which Sankara has embodied this idea—

“...स्वरूपविलः साध्व-सनातन-लकष्यः जिया-प्रतिरूपः।
संहाराचारैः भाष्याण्वयस्यसविवरधातु—वध्यकोशःबारोण्यौ।
नीतिबन्धः-प्रदोषयालक्ष्यः कलशी bewärts: प्रेमामात्मनी—निवव: सारवनिन्त लक्ष्ये।”—व° मा°, 1.5.2.

(2) In this connection, we now desire to place before our readers some very weighty observations made by Sankara while explaining the term जग्न—Infinite, and showing its relation with the finite things of the world. These observations, properly understood, will

¹ जिया-प्रतिरूपः। Elsewhere it is called ’जिया-कारक-पल लक्ष्यः।’

² साध्व-सनातन-लक्ष्यः।

³ Of also “अनात्मणेपत्ती अद्यतु...वस्त्रार्थः...क्षणनावरोपृत्रस्वत्-सवारसः”—व° मा°, 3.5. Also स्वरूपार्थः क्षणनावरोपृत्रस्वत्-सवारसः, इत्यदि।—व°०, 15.3. Severed from Brahman, this world becomes unessential (चुन्तः), since—“गृंच निरान्तरं किष्मति अवभावम् अवकाले्।”

Of also थीर्थं ब्राह्मणमं जग्नं चार्मोपस्य, ‘सागरवेष’ लक्षणां पवित्रि, सं निषादधिम्रूः। (व°, 4.19).
show that to separate the Vedantic Nirgun Brahman completely from the world and to treat it as vacuum and empty is to go directly against the views of the Bhāṣya-kāra.

All finite objects, Sankara observes, are limited. We can only know the limit of a thing by knowing what lies beyond the limit. We can only be aware of the end (चन्द) of a thing by being aware of something which stands beyond the thing. A finite is that which has a limit. If something is limited, it follows that beyond the limit, there is another something. Therefore to be finite means to be limited by something else. Sankara says:—

"चन्दलाने गोलमिति चन्दलेव। च च चली (limit)
विस्तु मपूर्च हृदि।" (२.१)

But limit always involves negation (निवर्तक). A horse is a horse and not a cow, because it possesses the determinations or qualities of a horse and not those of a cow. Its being a horse is just what limits it, prevents it from being a cow. It is in its negative aspect that quality is limit. Sankara says—

चली चल चले सिंहिति: (negation),
च चल चली (limit) चलि।

यथा गोलयूनिगस्त्यान 'निभिन्निति'।—२.१, २.१.

In this way, one determinate thing negates its opposite, negates another determinate thing. This is what keeps one thing separate (विस्तु मपूर्च) from another thing. Each one excludes or negates the other ones from it. They are thus different from one another. विस्तु is विस्तु for it negates (निवर्तक) its opposite विस्तु; विस्तु is विस्तु for it negates its other घट. Thus one finite object negates

1 "विस्तू मपूर्च हृदि। चलाने गोलमिति 'निभिन्निति' (negates)—२.१, २.१.
another finite object.\footnote{1} This is Sankara's description of the relation between finite objects.

Now can any of the finite objects exclude or negate the Infinite? No; it cannot. Why? Because, according to Vedanta, the Infinite is the \textit{Cause} of all finite objects. Hence, none of the finite objects can \textit{negate} their \textit{cause}. Sankara has declared—

``
``

\textit{वणोत् कायः नान्य वस्तुसंविदिति,}

\textit{वतः कार्यशुचि 'विसिद्धयत्' } \textit{—तैः मा, २.१.}

\textit{For, कायः (the effect) is not something really different from the कारण (the cause). Had it been different from the cause, the cause could not have produced it from itself. For, Sankara remarks—}

\textit{गच्छ यदानमाय ययं न वस्तुते, न तत्तस्त चापयते।—वैः मा।}

\textit{What is not contained in a thing cannot be produced from it. The cause, the Infinite, contained its effect, the finite, \textit{within} it which it has expelled from it. It is the Infinite, the cause, which has differentiated itself as the effect, the finite. For, what is an effect (कायः)? It is the cause (कारण) itself which has taken the shape of an effect—a काययाकार।—}

\textit{काययाकारयोधि कारणम् स्वाभ्युतं एव।—वैः मा, २.१.८।}

\textit{Really, the effect, the finite, is no other than the cause, the infinite itself. For, the कारण in becoming its \textit{other}, has not, in reality, become something different from it. For, Sankara says—}

\textit{व विशेषद्वैद्विद्विष वद्वयते समतः...

स एति प्रत्येकभवसात्।—वैः मा, २.१.१८।}

\textit{Hence, as the finite is not something different from, other than, the Infinite, how can it negate the idea of its}

\footnote{1} ``वल्लकुपरिषिद्ध प्रकाशसम्बन्धम् 'निपरिषिद्धि (negates)—तैः मा, २.१।}
cause? Even when Infinite passes over to its opposite—finite, it still remains the same. The effect, the विषेष, the finite—has not broken loose from the cause, the वास्तव, the infinite;—but remains the product of it, so that in it the cause, the Infinite, is still present, though hidden.¹

It is चरित्रा which separates the two. चरित्रा supposes finite is not infinite and infinite is not finite. They stand facing each other, totally opposed. But this view will make the infinite finite. Infinite, in this view, would be limited by the finite. Sankara Says—

"न प्रक्ष: परतं (outside) वबहलारचि।
प्रक्षः परिक्ष: वङ्करुः वार्याचि।
चार्यप्पशुष्टिः, वचः वबहलाराचि
'चार्यसन' परत परिष्ठेद (limit) एव
वार्याचि: प्रस्यवेषत् ॥ (बैंचा, 3.2.37.)

Hence, infinite is not something outside the finite; it has the finite within the Infinite.

In another way, Sankara brings out the same thing—

We have seen above that वचः negates or excludes विषेष; and विषेष excludes or negates (चरित्रा) its opposite घट. But do the वचः, विषेष, घट—negate चरित्रा, of which they are the products? He says—

विषेषः घट: चचर्चा, घट: विषेषः,
किन्नू मिश्र:-उत्ती चचर्च: न चचर्चा:। (बैंचा 6.2.2.)

Neither विषेष, nor घट negates the underlying causal substance—वचः which has taken these forms, which the वचः has expelled from itself; for, these are merely घट: संस्कृत

¹ Of ‘इत्यज्ञस्त्वः’ and ‘कथा विषायः’—in the Brihadāranyaka.
"वाक्यायात्मानमुन्ने न प्रवचनमानमुन्ने (चिन्ना तस्माप्यत्बह्वत्)।
'एवमन्नीतिः वचः, चचर्चायाविनितः' (Sankara’s ‘स्वस्तीस्तम्’)।
'बायाजः अण्वाय मान्नासस्त्राशः'। (Sankara’s ‘स्वचार्योः’)। ‘कार्यायाय
कार्याय अण्वायाछानार्त्यार्थे'।—बैंचा, 2.3.14-
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It is the cause which has distinguished itself from itself in the forms of विषय, घट, etc. Hence we see the justification of Sankara's remark—

गवि काय्ये नाम विलुग्नार्थि,
यताः कारणं द्विविधविनिविन्यासं—०७४ भागं, २.१.

The काय्ये is not something different from the कारण; hence it cannot negate the idea of the cause. We have already seen that what stands at the end of a thing, what is outside of a thing, can negate it. But the Infinite being the cause runs through all the effects, underlies each of the finite effects, hence how can काय्ये be treated as standing outside of, or at the end of, its कारण? It is therefore clear that no finite effect can negate or exclude the idea of its cause, the infinite. For, it is the cause itself which has issued from it as its effect, has differentiated as its effect, has manifested itself as its other—as particular effects. Hence the Infinite does not exclude but include its effects within it. For it has not become something else, in assuming a mere form.

The readers will remember that in the Vedanta Sutras (II.1.14-20) where the relation between the effect (काय्य) and the cause (कारण) finds an elaborate discussion, it has been shown that the effect cannot be separated from, and placed outside of, the cause and regarded as utterly other (भव) from the cause. It is really भल्ल from the cause. For, there is distinction no doubt, but the distinction is not absolute, not ultimate; for, the कारण itself appears as काय्ये, as its other. It is therefore not really other, but कारण itself.

1 I.e., mere shapes, forms, means—for its manifestation.
2 I.e., From the पारमाज्ञविक stand-point.
3 It is our भविष्य which makes it utterly distinct (स्मलक). It is our अक्षरारिक हृदि.
In this way, it is impossible to separate the effects from their cause, separate the नास्ति from their underlying Brahman. Yet, under the influence of Avidya, we separate the effects and treat them as outside of the cause, as something नास्ति. This is a wrong view of the case. It is done in either of two ways: by separating Brahman from the world altogether as an unknowable and unknown something, or by entirely reducing the nature of the cause (Brahman) to the Nāma-rūpas, taking nāma-rūpas as self-subsisting independent-things, and ignoring the underlying hidden Brahman altogether.

6. We now come to consider the important question of the alleged unreality of the Creator—the Vedantic Iswara (रूप). Several writers on Vedanta maintain the view that “Sankara was unable to rise to a higher conception of Divine character and that रूप as creator is recognised by the wise as unreal.” This is indeed a very serious allegation against Sankara and, we confess, there are passages in the Vedanta bhāṣya which are responsible for this hasty conclusion formed with regard to the unreality of the nature of Iswara. We shall consider these passages presently. But before we do so, a remark or two on the subject is necessary.

(a) Sankara has made no distinction between the two—Brahman and Iswara. The act of creation, he says, ought not to be regarded as a separate and distinct

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1 Cf. "एव विद्येयोविद्यतां, प्रमाणापि प्रपति द्वारां।। प्रथमाभावा ग निमित्त प्रकृतधारा।। Sankara's 'सांवकानिष्ठपनम्'.

2 This is Sankara's चिन्तन.

3 कात्यायनी चिन्तनीवसन्।
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act, by which Brahman has become something other than its own self;—as if it was Brahman first, and then became a creator. Such manner of thought would introduce a false difference in the ‘nature’ of Brahman which is always a real unity. The act of creation is but the revelation of its own nature. As the revelation cannot be exhaustive and must necessarily be partial, every fresh act of creation must be regarded as the revelation of its nature so far forth. The nature of Brahman being infinite (पूर्ण) and inexhaustible (सच्य), no act of creation can be the exhaustive expression of its nature. Sankara observes—

“वथपि कायानि शतिरतिः, तथापि यत्सः
पूर्णं तत्र ज्ञातिः। पूर्णशीर्ष तत्सः (५° मा०, ५.१.१)—

i.e., as Brahman is inexhaustible in its nature, it is eternally making (चत्रिष्ट) itself—creating itself—to realise its own nature. If Brahman, creating the world, were to exhaust its nature, the world, in that case, would have to be regarded as a complete and finished whole. But such cannot be the nature of Brahman which is inexhaustible and infinite. Sankara has told us that—

“चेष्य ब्रह्म, i.e., Iswara can never really be an aggregate of many parts—मेदवसाकुल चनिकरस्” (५° मा०, ५.१.१.)

In the Gita-Bhasya he observes that—

“the being which has revealed itself as the world is no other than the ‘nature’ of Brahman itself.”

1 “वथ…मेदवसाकुल चनिकरस् (i.e., a whole—aggregate of parts: mere unity of collection) चनिकरसं ब्रह्म—आदिलेन अनिमालिन बा—बुध्या जनितकरस्ते” (५° मा०, ५.१.१.). “एकतरं चनिकरसं ब्रह्म:—वापपसे” (५° मा०). Otherwise a false difference would be introduced into the ‘nature’ (सधार) of Brahman which is always a unity (एकः सधार:).

2 “सर: ‘पद्ध’ सब्जल जनिकरमपि, जनिकर्मेव उच्चिस्तहाः अविनितिनकायाः…
सत्यमा सत्यमः न निवद्धनेष्वन्त: ‘सत्यपद्धताः’ ‘सर: पद्ध’ ‘सप्तेज्वालासाईल’ विवचुः…
विनिर्भरायकामाह” (५° मा०, १५.११.).
In the Kena-Bhaṣya, a similar remark is recorded—

“तत्स्येव प्राणाय:...सहस्यकेन हत्यानम्। प्राणाय: परः, विश्वासू।
न वद्य संमत्व परास्तिंत्वरात्...तथा वर्णस्वरूपं सामवे मलिता” (3.1.).

That is to say—the immanent God is really the same as the transcendent Brahman. Sankara is still more explicit and expressive there in the sentence—

“श्रीश्वरवाच सङ्ग्रहं देवत भविष्यते” (कृपा भाव, 3.1.)

Elsewhere, the same fact is stated expressly thus—

“It is the same transcendental Paramātmā who sustains everything in the world by His Power.”¹

In the Mundaka-Bhaṣya, he observes that—

“the immanent God is in reality nothing but the transcendent Brahman”

“चाहरं निर्मिति इत्य पुरां सवं......
सति भवना, पानीवृं ‘निर्मिति’ वर्णश्च
भविष्यति प्रवति”। (हृदभाव, 2.1.3.).

Sankara has definitely condemned those who would make the slightest distinction² between प्राण and देवत—

“संदेहत् सोहरावादः, तद्वर प्राण,
श्रीमानमात्रं क्रोधेति सर्वं सत्य” (तेन भाव, 2.7).

¹ ॥ चारेयु अच्छरेयु ‘देवेयु खंडयु’ (निर्मु भवय) या या भविष्यनि; सा सा
भव ‘विशिष्टयु’।...खंडयु, सवं विनिमयिनि” (शेषभाव, 15.19). देवत
is only the विशिष्टयु of Brahman itself, not something separate or भव।

² Iswara is not to be really looked upon as identified with the world; for Brahman has not really and actually been reduced to the created elements and thereby has become something else. It is really the same Brahman still. Hence, Brahman and Iswara are not distinct, but the same being. This is the पारस्याविकालिक, i.e., true view of the case.

“खंडयु, सवं विनिमयिनि—गुण ‘आयतनया’।
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Thus, it is wrong to ascribe to Sankara the view that in his system, his Iswara is something other than (अब्र) and distinct from Brahman, that Iswara is a lower and empirical Brahman. It is the Sankara’s established theory that, in revealing itself as the world, Brahman has not become something other than its own nature.

It is not possible to regard the निर्मल्य and the समृद्ध as two separate entities. We have already seen that behind the multiplicity of Nāma-rūpa there is the underlying unity (वर्तप). With a view to show that this unity is not to be reduced to the multiplicity, the निर्मल्य aspect has been emphasised, which shows that भ्रम is unaffected by the changing Nāma-rūpas. As this unity is the indwelling spirit working in the world, as it is the impelling force—energy which makes things move or change, its विस्मृद्ध aspect has been mentioned, which shows that it controls and directs all movements—changes—in the world. To show this two-fold ¹ relation of Brahman with the world, viz., standing unaffected yet controlling

N. B.—Col. Jacob in his introduction to his edition of the Vedānta-sūra is wrong in pointing out ‘inconsistencies’ in the writings of Sankara. The reader will see that he has failed to grasp the true sense of the relation of ब्रह्म and ब्रह्मचार.

¹ (a) यथा नैति नेतीति अव्य-प्रतिष्ठितविश्राधिः (Negative) अश्रयौ निषेधः: कः, तथा विचिचित्व (Positive) कर्य निषेधः: कर्मवृद्ध द्वितौ च अन्तरी ब्रह्मचः (भ ¹, 3.1.27).

(b) समय-वक्रता धीन नियतं (i.e. regularly controlled) वक्रतत् प्रतिष्ठित भाषात्मान भौतिक प्रत्यर्थ—तथा निष्ठापकधासः ‘नैति नेतीति’ निषेधः: कर्मवृद्धः: (3.9.26).

(c) काय्य-करण अवतिर्विन्यस—काय्यवर्ता भाषाविन्यस तत्त्वोऽर्थः: (4.3.6).

(d) भ्रम: काय्यविन्यसंस्रवर्तिन: विवि: खन द्वेषः—(किल) काय्यकर्यफयः सदान्वितवानि विषयस्वा आप्र्वमनि (4.3.11.).
and acting—the निर्वष and the समष aspects are given in the Vedanta.

(6) Without taking into consideration the foregoing passages of Sankara, much emphasis has been laid upon certain passages which occur in the Vedanta-bhāṣya (II.1.14). One of such passages runs to this effect—

“It is only in the practical concerns of life that there is Iswara and the idea of a Controller and the Controlled. But when the real knowledge will dawn, where is the creation and where is the creator?”

“परमार्थव्वाव्यायो ईशाव्विविवित्वः
अश्वारामालः प्रदशः।
अश्वाराव्वात्स्वात्त्स्वातः चन्द्रः चुलावपि
इश्वराधिव्वव्वरः (२० भा०, 2.1.14).

The true idea of the passage, as it appears to us, has not been correctly grasped and Sankara has been unjustly ridiculed as “recognising a pinchbeck deity” and his system has been thought “to have no place in it for theism.”

We shall here try to arrive at the right view of Sankara’s remarks from his own standpoint, and we crave our readers’ particular attention to this important point.

The world is the manifested form of Brahman. We have already seen that Brahman, of its own motion, has manifested its ‘nature’ in the form of the universe. This is its immanent aspect. Ordinarily, people take this aspect of Brahman as Iswara. In our everyday अव्वरार, in our all practical concerns of life, we are quite satisfied with taking the world—the nāma-rūpas—as the manifested
form of God—कर्म. As Iswara is the cause of the world, the world is regarded as His manifested form. We do not care to direct our thought to the deeper implications involved in this view of Iswara.

That this is the people’s conception of Iswara was known to Sankara quite well. For, we find him remarking in his Vedanta-bhāṣya thus—

‘सर्वकार्यार्थिषु विकार्धधैर्यािपि कौषिकिः विशिष्ट:’
परस्पर: चपाल्लेण निधि ज्ञाते ।
—सर्वकार्यार्थिषु सर्वकार्य: साधर्म: श्रव्दिन्ना’’
—भृ, 1.1.20.

Iswara, then, is ordinarily restricted to the विकार्धधैर्यािपि, as He is the cause of the विकार्धध, the Nāma-rūpas, the world. This is the विशिष्ट-form, of Brahman. Brahman, in this view, is taken to be entirely manifested in this world. That there is still a transcendental form is not at all thought of. It is assumed that because the world has been deduced from Him, He becomes the world, He is the world. That, in reality, He is indeed the world, but yet something more is quite forgotten. People think that

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1 Cf. ‘सर्वकार्यार्थिषु विकार्धधैर्यािपि कौषिकिः’—भृ, 18.22.

2 It is the notion of the Divine immanence. It is the pantheistic idea of “All is one”. “सर्वकार्यार्थिषु सर्वकार्यार्थिषु” (भृ 1.1.20) पादोऽस्मात् सत्यैवृत्ति—हति ‘सर्वकार्यपि’—भृ, 1.1.26. As it is the cause itself which transforms itself into various forms of effects, so God is taken to be an all-inclusive whole. “कर्मस्य कर्मोदयः या या भवतः”

3 Compare—“सर्वकार्यार्थिषु सर्वकार्यार्थिषु: ‘तत्त्वम’ सत्यतद्। विषयांति तस्मान ‘बिधिष्यत’ सत्यतद्—तैतिः सत्य, 1.6। “सर्वकार्यार्थिषु सर्वकार्यार्थिषु विकार्धधैर्यार्थिषु परििश्वरभिंद्रियािपि सत्यिविद्यया सत्यतिः”
is the only Reality existing on his own account, and that there is no other Reality (विज्ञ) beyond God (देवर).

We have already seen that under the influence of Avidya (अविज्ञ), people quite ignore the separate being of the cause and regard the effects as something quite distinct (अत्य), as self-subsisting objects. This is called by Sankara as अवज्जालिक-stand-point. Thus, we quite forget the transcendent aspect of Brahman and restrict it to its immanent aspect alone. In this way, the विशेष रूप of Brahman, i.e., Iswara is looked upon as quite sufficient for the purpose of worship. This is our ordinary view of Iswara.  

This view has been emphasised by Sankara when he declares Iswara to be—"सत्यं विज्ञं: चक्षृरं," etc., quoted above.

But, although, we admit, this view of Iswara is sufficient for the ordinary purposes of life, still there is the other side which, philosophy demands, can never be lost sight of. As Brahman is perfect and transcendent, as it is inexhaustive and inexhaustible (अवज्ञ and पूणै), no one of its determinations, no one of its definitions can exhaust its potentiality, no one of its actualisation can fix it in a rigid form and be regarded as final.  

(वे भा, 1.2.7.). "वधार्यं 'विज्ञं' चेत भवभासाय, न च वायुस्वरूपीं 'विज्ञानस्वरूप' जसलि तथसु " (वे, 3.2.25). "सत्यं विज्ञं: परमेश्वरं; एक: 'सत्यं' च और 'कृम्यं रूपं प्रतिरूपं', 'सत्यं' (कर्म भाव)। In Vedanta, परमेश्वर is everything, yet he is more. This is the true view.

1 "तत्तावादीं भावै, परमेश्वरीं वा, नात: परमेश्वरितं—देवं देवं (तामसावातथेत भवति)—तीस भा, 18.22.

2 To restrict the cause to its particular manifested effects and to regard these as its complete and final expressions is wrong. नौता has denounced this view as तामसिक। —

"विषु वक्तुवद्दीकारिन, कार्वेत एतमहेतुवप...सचानन्तत्तात" (18.22.)
But, we have seen, it is our Avidya (अभियो) which makes us forget this transcendental aspect of Brahman and to reduce or restrict it to a particular manifestation. For this reason Sankara has described Iswara—God—as—वशस्त्रिक and also as अभियो. The readers will see that by this, Iswara does not become an unreality. Sankara remarks—

मायामायेन वत् परमानानोबस्ताच्यात्मानाधिकारम्—(वै 2.1.1),
i.e., It is माया which conceals the transcendental and inexhaustible nature of Brahman and entirely reduces it to, or identifies it with, the three manifested states of activities (viz., श्रद्धा, ज्ञाति and प्रक्षेप). But the true view of the case is that Iswara (God) though the creator or the cause of the world, has not and does not necessarily become restricted or entirely reduced to the effects (कार्य or विकारस) created; but He has also a transcendental nature which remains unaffected by these. This is the true view of God. Sankara has declared for this reason that—

‘विश्वपरिवर्धने न विध्वते’—(वै 1.1.24)

1 “अवङ्कितावस्तायन वत्: शुराविपि खंशालादिवच्चारः” (वै 2.1.14).

and अवङ्कितावस्तान—मामयायामधुरौधी नाइरोधी भवति”—द्वादि।

“Cf. उपाधि वशस्त्रानु तदानात्मात्रमिव प्रतिवधाते, तदानाम| प्रक्षेप भावार-विश्वविपदः; उपाधार न विध्वते’—वै 3.2.15

‘प्रक्षेपो भवेकरस्यं भवेकधारां......न दृश्यं। वकु एकरस्यं तद्दृश्यं प्रवक्षालम्’”—वै, 5.1.1.

2 “उपाधितर्कत्वकर्तिप्रतिवादात्” (वै 3.2.35)। Also ‘काल्यानं भवं विश्वेच्छ भावसंहि भवते’ कवी 5.15। “उपाधितर्कित्वं विश्वादिवदेयं निविद्धं ज्ञाते” (कवी, 2.1)।—द्वादि। ‘समुद्: संकल्पवशायदि प्रवक्ष्ये न रहित्वेऽज्ञेऽ’ ब्रम्ह (कवी, 4.5)।

3 पराधि विश्वासात्, चाहिनिति अक्षया प्रतिवधानात् खालवज्जपितिर्विश्व निबद्धं खिद’ (स्म 1.86)। “बालकाच्यायायि शाश्वति न
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For, although Brahman assumes particular forms or aspects, it remains all along identical with itself. For—

"न विशिष्ट-द्वंशनमयिः सल्लग्यं भवति
....स परिणि प्रभृतिमहानावः"—वै 2.1.18

and also

"न पि चतुर्थिधिगादिपि चन्द्रामयः वस्तुः
चन्द्रामयः समानः सम्भवति।"—वै 3.2.11.

It is clear therefore that although Iswara has assumed the manifested forms—although He is बिकाररूपः: बिविषः; still it is in reality nothing but Brahman; that is to say, although Brahman appears acting in the world in its immanent aspect, yet it remains unaffected in its transcendental nature. It is wrong to take the immanent aspect alone as an independent reality and to ignore the transcendental aspect which is the real aspect\(^1\).

For, the fact is that—

श्रवणि वांगीर्मणा चतुर्वंते,
तथापि यत् पूर्वः सर्वः सम्भवति,
पूर्वः विदिष्ठे'ः—वै 3.11

\(^1\) "चतुर्वंतिस्मां भवेद्विद्धि रूपः श्वायति शास्त्रः।"
"तद्द्विद्धि तात्पर्यात्"—वै 3.2.11. Also 'चतुर्भिधिमिनिष्ठा वश्व-नाश्यायप्रणः'—वै 3.2.15.

Cf. ‘चतुर्वंति अर्जितार्जुण सम्बन्धी मासुद्रः।
परं भास्मासानि समावेश मनुपी। नीः......)

It is the ignorant (चतुर्वंति) who regard the inexhaustible Brahman as entirely reduced to its manifestations (अस्ति)।
From these discussions, the readers will find now that —the immanence of God must not be taken in the sense of Divine identification with the process of the finite world, and the transcendency also ought not to be taken in the sense of absolutely separating God from the world as an unknowable something, without recognising His activity as indwelling spirit. It is the immanence of transcendence, in reality.

(c) Now, we shall come to explain some other passages in the Sankara-bhashya which have produced the erroneous opinion about the unreality of the Vedantic Iswara. It will be seen that Sankara begins his discussion about Iswara in this part of his commentary with the sentence—

"शब्दावलक-नामसवीपायनुरोधी द्वेषरी भवति" (१, २.१४)

"शब्दाबलक-नामसवीवाकरवापिलात्र द्वेषरकस"—(Ibid).

Finding that the word शब्दाबलक has been used in connection with द्वेषर, the conclusion has been hastily formed that द्वेषर must be unreal, false.

• Now, what does the word शव्दाबलक really mean? We have carefully examined the various commentaries of Sankara and have found that in connection with नाम-ब्रह्म, he has used these words—शव्दाबलकित, शव्दाबलकपालित, शव्दाबलकारीत and शव्दाबलक। In a passage in the Taittirīya-bhashya, Sankara has concluded that the Nāma-rupas cannot be regarded as the essential property (चर्च्य) of the self; that they are the property of our intellect. Our intellect (understanding) falsely ascribes Nāma-rūpa to the self as its essential property¹. If we follow this explanation,

¹ "शव्दाबलकत्ववालकोलिङ्गित्वात्? न। विवेकाबिष्को ब्राह्माक्षर, प्रवचन-बुद्धशिणि ते जनः ज्ञातोत। तपासाह भवनानूपवच सिद्धाबिष, नामसवी ज्ञ नामभवो"—प्रवचन (२, २.८)। It is also found in ३, १०।
we come to see that wheresoever he uses the epithet अबिद्वाक्षित in connection with नामचय, the enquiry would naturally arise to the effect—अबिद्वाक्षित on what? and अबिद्वाक्षित how? That is to say, are the नामचय imagined by अबिद्वाक्षित on the self? ;—and are the नामचय imagined by अबिद्वाक्षित on the self as its essential property? This disposes of the enquiry about the 'on what' and 'how'? The two phrases अबिद्वाक्षित and अबिद्वाक्षित convey the same sense with अबिद्वाक्षित1. Only one phrase, namely,—अबिद्वाक्षित now remains to be explained. The readers will see that when this phrase invariably occurs in connection with the term नाम-चय, as in the case of the three other phrases, it must also convey the same sense and significance which those other phrases convey. We therefore would not be wrong, if we say that the नामचय are 'अबिद्वाक्षित', because they are imagined to be the essential property of the self. This is the sense of 'अबिद्वाक्षित' here.

In the famous Introduction to the Vedanta-bhāṣya, Sankara has taken care to explain the sense of the term अबिद्वाक्षित which it would convey in his commentaries. From the explanation given here, it will appear that under the influence of अबिद्वाक्षित, men ignore the distinct presence of the underlying unity and identify it with the changing states and activities evolved from it. Men, under the power of Avidya, identify the underlying नाम with the manifested world. In this way, the manifested नाम-रूपas, i.e., the world becomes the only Reality standing

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1 The readers will see therefore that wherever Sankara would employ such phrase as अबिद्वाक्षित नामचय, it would mean that नामचय is always erroneously imagined by अबिद्वाक्षित as the नाम or the essential property of the self; (whereas it is really the property of the intellect itself).
on its own account, and beyond this reality there is no other reality (अवध) at all. In this way, द्वेष is regarded quite an independent reality, absolutely separate and different (अवध) from द्वेष. Now, Sankara has declared such view of द्वेष as unreal, false and अवधायितव. For, Brahman in appearing as creator—as द्वेष—has not in reality lost its own nature, neither has it passed out of itself into something else—

नष्टि विशेषदेवसात्रिष्ण, वल्लचलं भवति,
……..स एवंति प्रचरभीत्तालु।—(वं मा° 2.1.18)

The fact is that if you look upon द्वेष as a different being, as other than (अवध) Brahman, you are wrong. But if you regard Him as an aspect of Brahman and therefore nothing but Brahman itself—this is the correct view.

Thus the readers will find now that Sankara has not denied द्वेष।

(4) The created elements have been evolved from the ‘nature’ of Brahman for its own realisation. Brahman has not sundered itself into these elements; it has not actually passed into, or been converted into, these elements and thereby has become something other than its own nature. It expresses itself through these. We have therefore no right to separate these from it and take them as ‘something’ distinct and complete in themselves. Hence is Sankara’s remark—

“परमाधार्यायां क्षत एव वा खृष्टः? ”
(वं मा°, 2.1.22)

The evolving changes—the diversities of emerging नाम-रूप—are not something other than (अवध) Brahman’s nature. We can not sever their connection with the
underlying Brahman, but they must be looked upon as really the further and further revelations of this nature.

When we come to truly realise the unity of Brahman as untouched and unaffected by the evolving changes, we will then look upon the world and all the changes evolving therein as mere means, medium, symbols, through which Brahman is realising its own nature—is expressing itself. Everything will appear as incorporated in Brahman as its necessary expressions. This is the correct interpretation of the passage under notice, in the light of the Sankara's entire theory. No other view is possible. One who has declared Iswara to be eternally existent (विशिष्ट) cannot declare him to be unreal.

That this is the case will appear also from the illustration recorded by Sankara which we now desire to explain. To express the idea of the letters, we employ certain points, lines, strokes, etc. The letters do not themselves pass into or become actually

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1 Vide तुझुधिकला in है 147. “सामाज्य यथोऽग्रहणे तत्त्वश्रव्ये यहौता सचली। न तु त एव भिन्नय यहौ अरुरोधी”। Cf. ‘न प्रभुवमः किल्ला ततु-थास्यां—स्त्राक्षरी, 63। “तदुत्कामिह समा वस्तु, यविक्षिप्तमिति। तथातु सर्वातु तत्त्व, चौर्दी सर्पिलितथिने”—”उपयुप्यरि अथिविरल-मात्रुन: जातसप्रकाशायनाय—है 147. 2.1.3.

2 “दर्शनी सहायमथिर चाद्यदिप्तिन्नेवस्यता।...उपाय: चौर्दी,भाराज्य” (है 147, 1.4.14)। “नवदानापरिणाममितिवर्यादेविन चिन्मुच्यते (है 147, 2.1.14)। ‘नामपादि...उपयुप्यरि भवति (है 147 7.17.1)। नवदानापरिणाममितिवर्यादेविन चिन्मुच्यते (है 2.2.2.) &c.

3 ‘सामाज्य यथोऽग्रहणे तत्त्वश्रव्ये यहौता सचली...तत्त्वश्रव्युहारीत” (है 147)। ‘सामाज्य तत्त्वश्रव्य: तदविना।

4 “षष्ठ एकाश्शालाप्रोधिकृतांशा-विनेक्षण-परिणामाय, रेखाभारणेन कलाकर्मय रेखाभारणेन कलाकर्मय रेखाभारणेन कलाकर्मय वहाउं; न तु...
converted into these points, lines, strokes. These merely express the nature of the letters. These are merely symbols standing for the letters which find their expression in them. Such is the case also with the numbers. The numbers—one, two, three, etc.—are expressed through certain lines and points. They do not actually pass into, or are converted into, these lines and points. These are merely symbols which are employed to express the nature of the numbers. Separated from the numbers which find expression in them, and taken as independent things,—the lines, points, etc., lose their value and become unreal.¹ So long as they are taken in connection with the numbers which they express, they have their value. But sever them off from the numbers, they at once become useless. Such is the case with the created elements, and Brahman. As soon as they are separated from the underlying Brahman which expresses itself through them, they lose their value and are quite useless. Hence these cannot be regarded as something independent—अन्य—self-sufficient and complete in themselves; but they are अन्य from (i.e., not really other than) Brahman underlying them. In the third chapter of this book we have tried to explain the relation of the cause and the effect elaborately. We need not repeat here the arguments used there. It will suffice to say that “The first part of Sankara’s causal theory implies that the causal reality is distinct from its effects or its successive manifestations, because it has a ‘nature,’ a शरूप, a शाभाव (swarūpa or swavāba) of its own, and it cannot therefore

¹ “तथा चकारादिप्रकाशरतिपति हें, रेखायङ्गातिपति:” (२० भा°, २.१.१४).
be resolved into, or identified with, the effects or the changes emerging from it. Sankara expresses this idea in—

"न तु कारणक कार्यावली" (२.१.९)।"

"The second part of the theory implies that the cause is no doubt distinct from, and independent of, its effects or the emergent changes; but the effects cannot be separated from their underlying cause and regarded as independent and self-sufficient 'things' (वस्तु), each complete in itself. The effects must therefore be regarded as ananya (अनन्य) from their cause; i.e., the real 'nature' of the cause expresses itself gradually, or becomes realised in, these successive effects.¹ The latter are therefore mere forms, means, instruments for the realisation of the nature of the cause which underlies them. It is not therefore possible to separate any of the effects from the underlying cause which expresses itself in them. Separated from it, they would lose their value and become useless."

We find therefore from the illustrations quoted above that the successive changes are inseparable from their underlying cause which gradually realises or expresses its own nature in and through them. The underlying causal reality has not actually passed into, or been converted into, these evolving changes,—thereby becoming something else other than its own nature (चतुर्वेदी)².

7. It follows from this exposition that what gradually expresses its inexhaustible nature in

Finite individuals and their responsibility for their works.

its changes, cannot exhaust itself in them and so become identical with them. Yet translating the word ananya (अनन्य) as absolutely "identical," Sankara's theory

¹ "तात्त्विक चतुर्वेदी:" (२.१.११). Also १.३.३०.

² Cf. "मृत्युजय शब्दावली: 'मृत्युला'व्यभास तिरक्कुल"—२.१०, ५.१.१.
has been reduced to a kind of 'Pantheism' which he took so much pains to refute in various parts of his commentaries.

Taking Sankara to be a Pantheist, it has also been supposed that he has, in his theory, not only abolished Iswara but also abolished or negated the 'Individuality' or the 'personality' of the finite individuals, making them merely parts of an all-inclusive abstract whole, viz., Brahman:—"ascripting to this Brahman alone the agency of all works." Many critics of Sankara's theory believe that in the Adwaita philosophy as expounded by Sankara, the finite individuals are not responsible for their works, that all activities proceed from the agency of Brahman alone.

There are valuable arguments by which Sankara has established the 'individuality' of the selves which we have discussed elsewhere. Here in this chapter, we shall content ourselves only examining the position whether the individual beings are not responsible for their works in this system of philosophy, so far as the 'theory of creation' is concerned.

We find in our daily observation that the experiences of one individual man differ in their character from the experiences of another individual. Your experience and mine are not of the same character. Even the individuals born and brought up under similar circumstances develop different experiences, exclusively belonging to each. If Brahman—the only Individual—be reduced to the relations of the world, he alone can be held responsible for this unequal distribution of the experiences or fortunes of different individuals, and the finite individuals would thereby be absolved from their share in the responsibility for their experiences. Sankara appears to remark in the Vedanta-
bhāṣya (II. 1. 34) that for the inequalities of the experiences, the works of the individuals are to be held responsible. A hasty idea has been formed from this remark that as in this system there are no real individuals at all, these actions alone constitute the so-called individuality of men. A western writer has thus written about Sankara’s theory—

“Its resolution of human life into a series of acts mechanically related keeps it at what we must describe at a low level.”

That in the Sankara-system, the actions are but the responses made by the individual to the external environment with which there is an interaction, and that the source of this response is the ‘nature’ of the individual which underlies these actions, and that this nature cannot be resolved into these activities—all these points can be proved without much ado from the pages of Sankara’s commentaries. We shall record in this place only one argument employed in the Vedaṇṭa-bhāṣya to expose the absurdity of the position held by the critic above referred to, which will suffice for our present purpose.

8. Every individual self, Sankara remarks, has a two-fold mode of existence—substantive (धन्य or विशेष) and adjectival (समवेति-पद or विशेष).

In his substantive mode, he exists for himself, he belongs to himself. In his adjectival mode, he is related to others.

1 “एकवर्षी धन्य-विशेषप्रेषितम्, अनेकःर्थवधद्वर्णनात्। यथा काौऽपि वत्सः त्रिवेदि, यथवं बालिभ-दप्तर अपेक्षा, अनेकगयमयस्यभवनस्य नभवित। —सत्व: राज्यस्य: …युं हृदिकर: …पितां भाना जाराता रति”।

“यथा एकवर्षी व्याय: राजा, आगाभलेल निविन्भाना, एक-द्य-शत-समकादिभ-वेदाभवनस्य-ननुभवित”।

“द्यायें तेन्तेन विशेष धन्यभेदेन प्रतीयमानयात्, न द्याये-गुणोद्वेदद्वतीति-रति” (२० अग 2.2.17).
he exists for others. His substantive existence or स्वरूप cannot be resolved into the adjectival existence; for, the individual is always more than his mere relations. His स्वरूप (Swarupa) is permanent and transcendent (एकत्व); but his स्वल्पस्वरूप, i.e., his relations with others depend on the things with which he comes into interaction, and these relations therefore are always liable to changes. Thus, there is a Swarup (स्वरूप) belonging to each individual being which underlies the relations or the activities elicited from this स्वरूप (Swarupa) through its relation with other objects.

How is it possible, in the face of such clear arguments, to come to the conclusion that the system of Sankara has left no place for the ‘individuality,’ and that the individuals are mere aggregate of their actions or relations? It follows irresistibly from this discussion on the subject in question that when Sankara apparently makes the works of the individuals responsible for their inequalities, he really makes the underlying ‘natures’ or स्वरूप (swarupas) of each individual responsible for the special character of the works issuing out from him. This will be evident, if we consider the character of the collateral arguments used by Sankara in this very place (वेदांत, II. I. 34). He illustrates his position here by showers of rain and the germination of distinct kinds of crops from their respective seeds. The peculiar and the distinct nature inherent in each class of seeds is the true cause, says he, for the visible inequalities in the development of different plants, each distinguished from each class;—though the general and common cause for the growth and germination of crops must be held to be the showers acting upon the
seeds. It is well-known that Sankara has used the term ‘seed,’ i.e., बीज with reference to the four different types of individuals distinguished from one another in their nature and character. We would refer our readers to a passage in the Bhāṣya on the Chandogya Upanishad where this line is to be found—

"तेथां सब्यां भूतानं श्रीक्षेऽऽ ‘बीजानि’ मवविन,  
—प्रक्षे, जीवनमुद्धिमणिि (जीवज्)  
—includes खेदज and जाराजूज")’ (कृतं मात, 6.3.1.)

The seed (बीज) therefore includes in it the living ‘natures’ of the individual selves, each distinguished from the other class. The difference in experience therefore is to be accounted for by the difference in the respective ‘natures’ or ब्रह्म of the individuals. The result reached here will be far more evident if another passage is considered in this connection. In the Vedanta-bhāṣya (III. 2. 9), a discussion runs to the effect whether, when a man wakes up after a deep sleep, it is the

\[1\] “manda हि प्रवेशाण्व द्रवीष्याबिद्वहर्षि साधारण बार्षि कार्यं भवति। श्रीक्षेऽऽ मम ज्ञानेन तस्मान श्रीक्षेऽऽ साधारण साधारणि कार्यानि भवनि। एवभी नहिं। इवस्मानवादिप्रहर्षि साधारणि कार्यं भवति। इवस्मानवादि्याभस्माये तृत्योग्यसहार्षि व वचाराष्ट्रं साधारणि कार्यानि भवनि।” (कृतं मात, 2.1.34). Cf. परायंके र वेदं हि कर्षणे, कराहिव जीवः।......इवस्माित ज्ञानात्वेदः...पुत्रार्थस्य वेदं”) (कृतं मात, 2.3.42).

\[2\] “बीज is what grows and hence continuously permanent. “बीज’ प्रचारस्य...न हि ब्रह्म’ विद्विन्ति प्ररेषित। निबध्य प्ररोटर्षान्ति बोज-  
साधारं बोजित साधुगति सति सहयोगः” (कृतं मात, 9.18). ‘Seeds’ (बीज) in the  
Sankara system means those which have living individual selves behind them, and hence they grow. Cf. बीजं मा सत्त्वानात्”—(7.10) and  
“भूतानं जीवाधिहितान” गौर (10.32).
same identical individual who had slept has now waken up or it is a different individual. It is shown here that it is the same identical individual to whom both the past and the present belong. Among other arguments used to prove this fact, we should like to refer to only two arguments given there. The first is about the works done by the individual and the second is the fact of recollection. To prove the identity of the same individual both before and after his sleep, Sankara argues that otherwise the man waking up could not have begun again the same works which he had left unfinished before he went to sleep. Here we would request our readers to carefully examine the nature of this argument employed by Sankara to establish the identity of the individual. If the idea of Sankara were, as our opponents hold, really to resolve the individual self into his actions or works, how, we ask, could he employ this argument; and how could the argument establish the identity of the Soul? The works the man had left off when he fell asleep, are a thing of the past. Those works have vanished already because they belonged to a past time. How can the man who now wakes up begin again the works which are now non-existent? What is the link here to connect the past work with the present? It must be, therefore, Sankara’s inner purpose to show that it is the identical inner ‘nature’ of the man to which both his past and present works must belong, which ‘nature’ must be the underlying link here, connecting the works. This line also brings to light what was really working in the mind of Sankara when he wrote this commentary—

“न न अवयन वालिकानाथ करण्या, धन्वधेयायाः प्रविष्टिनमः”

_i.e.,_ A piece of work half done by one man, cannot be brought into completion by a different man.
Again, Sankara speaks of ‘memory’ (अध्ययन) here. The man exercising his memory, recollects where he left off his past work and where he is to begin now. The works themselves cannot exercise the memory.\(^1\) It must be the underlying self which does it and recollects his past work and connects it with the present. It is therefore to this self that both the works must belong, and it is not the works themselves which can recollect themselves. Here again, by the phrase—

"अज्ञाताव्यं न ज्ञाताव्यं"

Sankara makes the underlying self responsible for his works. By holding the individual man responsible for his works done by him (or left undone by him), Sankara clearly establishes the fact that behind the works done, there is the underlying ‘nature’ or ख़च्छ (Swarupa) of the man which is really accountable for its works. Otherwise, if the man be simply an aggregate of his works, then his present work being the necessary outcome of his antecedent work in time and predetermined by it,—you cannot make the man responsible for his present works.

9. It may not be out of place here to refer, in this connection, to the arguments used by Sankara in the Vedanta-bhāṣya, which will also show that difference in the works or activities really implies difference in the deeper ‘natures’ which underlie the works or activities. The argument is originally used

\(^1\) अध्ययन (memory) is the distinguishing characteristic attribute (वर्ण or ख़च्छ) of the self. "प्राणिविद्याशिष्यग्राहव  पार्थरघुलिन  भस्मतः:  पाण्डवदीना" (२० मासो, ३.३.५३).
to expose the absurdity of the theory of \textit{Asad-káryya-váda}. It is everywhere observed that certain definite changes or activities are invariably accompanied by a definite ‘nature’ behind them. Certain other definite changes or actions are invariably accompanied by another definite ‘nature’ which is utterly distinct and different from the ‘nature’ mentioned above. In all the successive transformations or changes of ध्वस्तः (say, a lump of earth), the ‘nature’ of ध्वस्तः is seen behind them (but not the nature of a \textit{tree}). Again, in all the successive transformations or changes of a tree, the nature of the tree—but not the nature of the earth—is seen behind them. Why, it may be asked, is such the case everywhere in connection with all kinds of definite changes or activities? \footnote{1}—Simply because, these definite changes or transformations are determinations of the \textit{nature of the earth}, and not of any other nature. This proves the fact that definite changes or actions belong to definite ‘natures,’ and these natures are distinguished, one from the other.\footnote{2} A similar argument, slightly changed, is given elsewhere. If a man wants to produce an earthen vessel, he must collect some \textit{earth} for the purpose. But \textit{milk} must be collected, if he wants to produce curd. The collection of earth will not serve his purpose in the latter case. Thus, definite ‘natures’ only, can produce definite works or changes. If there are not definite natures

\footnote{1} “म च चर्याला: शर्याशायीभा:; तत्त्वादिविकारा: कैनिनिद्धःपापस्य। तत्त्वादिविकारे तु चर्यालान्तः भावान् लोकः प्रवेष्टिः।...नौकाय प्रजुगो जायसि, चौतादिदृष्टिः।तत्त्वादिविकारे: ‘कारत्विनिहेत्रपुरगाम्’ अच्छे द्वारा;...सर्वस्य च वचुः:। ‘खेल खेल दपेश’ (\textit{i.e.}, खेलपेश = Their own natures) भावायेः पुर्वपुराणानि।” (वो भा, 2.2.26).

\footnote{2} \textit{Cf.} “गुरुप्यात्मानोऽदेत्व, सर्वाद्वे सत्ताया;” रमायिर् (सी भा, 18.66).
actually present in the world, anything could be made to produce any work indiscriminately. There would have been no difference in the works at all. For, there would be nothing to distinguish one kind of work from another.\(^1\) These arguments very clearly prove that every finite individual possesses a definite nature of its own which cannot be resolved into the works or activities produced from it. We fail to understand how Sankara's system can be held to negate the individualities.\(^2\)

10. "The creation," according to Sankara, "is but the gradual manifestation of diverse Universals (বস্তুসমূহ) in the form of individual objects (বিষিষ্ট) produced from them."\(^3\) All finite individual objects are a compound of two factors—the universal and the particular. The universal or বস্তু সমূহ স্তং স্তং stands to the individual objects (বিষিষ্টেরা) as unity to multiplicity. There is but one universal cow, while there are many individual cows. There is the clay, while there are its many particular differentiations—লিখিত, লিখিত, লিখিত. Thus the world of the Universals (বস্তুসমূহ) manifests itself in

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\(^1\) "দৃষ্টতাবিশিষ্টে বিষিষ্টে বিষিষ্ট: প্রতিনিধিত্ব কর্মঞ্চ; নর-কর্মঞ্চ-বিষিষ্টের দিকাতে। ন-চ দৃষ্টতাবিশিষ্টে বিষিষ্টে বিষিষ্ট: প্রতিনিধিত্ব কর্মঞ্চ। তাহ এই প্রাণীসমূহের বিষিষ্টের। বিষিষ্টের। শব্দঞ্চ শব্দঞ্চ প্রাণীসমূহের কথাতু বৌদ্ধি দৃষ্টি চন্দ্র, ন শব্দঞ্চ।" (ভাষা, প্রাতন, 2.1.18.) [Does not the expression—'প্রতিনিধিত্ব কর্মঞ্চ' imply the different grades of Individuals?]

\(^2\) Besides the arguments given in this chapter, there are other valuable arguments used by Sankara to prove the existence of the 'nature' of different individuals.

\(^3\) "বস্তুসমূহ বিষিষ্টের। বিষিষ্ট বিষিষ্ট: বিষিষ্ট।" (ভাষা, 2.4.9).

"বস্তুসমূহের প্রতিনিধিত্ব বিষিষ্ট। বিষিষ্ট।" (ভাষা, 1.6.1).
the multiplicities (विशेष) of the sense-world. Thus, the truth of all particular things we find in the Universals.

The true सामान्य is thus used in the Vedanta-bhāṣya to denote the Universals or the deeper ‘natures’ of the single individuals, and the term विशेष is to denote the states and activities (which constitute the finite individual beings) produced from these ‘natures’ through interaction with the environment¹ (कार्यात्मक). The readers should remember that in his theory of causality as explained by Sankara (वैद्यः, 2.1.14—20) the term सामान्य stands for the causal reality; and the term विशेष stands for its effects which are but its appearances or forms or shapes or its modes of acting in which the causal reality reveals its nature.² The same reality appears in many different forms. The true causal

¹ “अयात्विष्यं सामान्यं कार्यं विशेषवदवालयामपदार्थानं कार्यसंग्रामं ज्ञाते” (वैद्यः, 2.1.15 and 2.37).

“कार्यात्मकां कार्यं अवश्यापदत् ‘कार्यात्मकार्यात्’ अवश्यसंग्रामपदति” (वैद्यः, 2.1.18).

² Vijnāna-bhikshu very clearly explains these terms and agrees with Sankara entirely in this respect. He explains—

“सामान्यं ‘साधनं’-मथ्न परिभाषितं। साधनपरिभाषा च विशेषतामविवश।”

Sankara also says—

“विशेषभावनां...कार्यात्मकार्यात्” (वैद्यः, 2.2.6).

Vijnāna also explains—

“विशेषत्वं भि ज्ञातापातित्या न ज्ञातं साधनं।”

Sankara also says—

“विशेषत्वं विशिष्यं” (वैद्यः, 2.8).
reality is therefore identical in all its diverse effects or forms, but is not itself any single individual thing. —

“सामाजाधि विशेष। वत्तुशास्त्रालः
डृष्टिः, सदाधिचंतादायः” (२० सा०, २.३.९).

“सामाजाधि विशेषादाय
यथादिवियवदे द्वितिदाति
प्रभासमान्ति, विषयश् चमत्तः”
—२० सा०, १.६.१.

That the causal reality (सामाज्य) is active points to something beyond it with which it interacts. The term कारण-आपर stands for stimulating conditions which make possible its interaction, evoking its responses and activities (िॆ. विशेष).

“न द्विकारणसारेष जिए सामाज्य” (२०, २.४.१४).

Elsewhere in this connection Sankara has written—

“There are in the world diverse universals (सामाज्य) involving their particulars (विशेष) which they produce—both sentient and insentient. All these Universals form a hierarchy and in their graduated series (पारम्परिक) are included and comprehended in the one highest universal, i.e., in Brahman. It is Brahman which contains and connects with it all these universals.” Brahman is the central controlling unity of all

1 Cf. “य: कारण श्रद्धो वासिं भाव। शब्दशास्त्राभवम्; एवं विशेषादाय नामविशेषाएवो
...कारणम्।...विशेषाणाधि सामाज्ये चतुर्वत्तान्त”—२० सा०, १.६.१.
universals, so that the whole form an organic unity in which all सामान्यां are fused.¹

Now, it is clear that in the Sankara-system, the deeper 'natures' or सामान्यां of the finite individuals are not denied. It is in this way then that the difference of experiences or works implies difference in the deeper 'individual natures' which underlie them. Brahman is thus absolved from any share in the inequalities or differences of the works for which the inner 'natures' (सामान्यां) of the individuals are solely responsible,—Brahman being looked upon as a general controller or director of all the activities set a-going in the world. It proves also that Brahman has a distinct 'nature' (सामान्य) of its own which cannot be resolved ² into the evolving changes, and neither can

¹ चतुर्दशोऽनि विशेषज्ञातचर्चनाथश्रीमान्: सामान्य-विशेषा:। तेषा पार्श्व-गताः। एकधुर्मण्य महासामान्यं बन्धनार्थ: प्रणीतवर्गे (॥० ॥, 2.4.9).
两家 movements—कृत्यानि द्वितीयाणि कृत्यानि (२.० ॥, 7.7)।”
—i.e. Each universal runs on continuously into every other; not a mere aggregate. We have seen before that भूतानि = वैज्ञानिक वैज्ञानिक (10.32 and 7.10).'

N. B.—These सामान्यां are elsewhere (२.० ॥, 2.6) called as Divine Ideas—सदा. वर्ण:—(संकल्प) and these are not different from (संकल्प:) the nature of Brahman. There is, the धार्मिक says, a causal relation between these Divine Ideas and the manifested individual things in the world (३ ॥, 8.5.4).

Also cf. "वैस्माद्भवं विशेषायम्या तत्त्वात् अति आभिन्द्रवे ध्वनिप्रभावाः" (३ ॥, 1.4.7).

N. B.—The 'Universals' may be called as the Ends. Brahman is the absolute End to which all beings strive. Each being has its own end in itself. But Brahman—as absolute End—includes all lower ends (चालां).

[Vide the terms साध्य and पराध्य explained in Chapter II of this book.]

² एकधुर्मण्यानि हेतूद्वारा। तथा समुद्रानि। एवंले, केश-सर्वभूतानां चविषेषां—२ ॥, 2.1.14. Also vide २ ॥, 5.1.1.
the individuals be treated, in this system, as mere parts of an all-inclusive abstract whole. We have found that Brahma is a Reality which maintains its unity and identity in the multiplicity of the ever-changing, but inseparable, elements of the universe—which cannot therefore be taken as a "difference-less, empty, pantheistic void."

11. We shall now proceed to show how Sankara has characterised the 'nature' of Brahma. In many parts of his commentaries, Sankara has made a very valuable observation which, we regret to note, seems to have escaped the attention of many critics of his Advaita theory.

He has repeatedly stated, and drawn our special attention to, the important truth that 'unity' and 'multiplicity' cannot both be held to be equally true in respect of the same thing. If a particular object be 'one,' it cannot also be held to be its opposite, i.e. 'many.' Because, 'one,' and 'many' are of opposing characters and contradict one another. One cannot be put as a rival to the other; for, the claims of both cannot be adjusted. If a thing be possessed of several qualities or states, it cannot also be devoid of all qualities.1 Brahman is a 'unity' and,

1 "न दिः एकसन्दर्शनः परिष्थास्पदानां, तद्रजिविषय शक्तिप्रतिनिधिः" (वृः 2.1.14).
"विशिष्टविशेषप्रतिनिधिः, विशेष-प्रतिनिधिः—दति विशिष्टविषेष" (पौराणिक, 12.1).
"न दिः एकं विशेष परमार्थस: कर्मादिर श्रवणां, तत्क्रियाको-समवया रूपः ब्रह्मा" (सौभाग्यम, 1.11).
"न निरूपितं चन्द्राकारस्तति शक्तिसः कल्पितां एकसः" (तृं 4.3.30). "नकुल एकसः नागालख—सम्बन्धसि कमलसि ? नैवेच्छाति" (वृः 2.1.14).
as such, it retains that character, throughout, under all circumstances. It cannot be reduced to the multiplicity of the transformations which are produced out of it. Such being the case, the multiplicity which is working in the world indicates the presence of a unity behind it and this unity cannot be phenomenalised. For, it is the presupposition of the ‘many,’ and its presence and operation are necessary to connect the ‘many’ to it. The multiplicity of transformations issuing out of the ‘unity’ is not, therefore, of equal value, though inseparable from it. The ‘many’ are the expressions or manifestations of the ‘one,’ without which the real nature of ‘unity’ could not have been comprehended.

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1 “सङ्केतिकः यः पदार्थः प्रभावः अवतिस्य, स दैवकालाकालिणियम, तद्विशेष एव अवतिस्य” (पृभम, 2.1.20).

2 “सामावः दि विशेषानुत्कर्ष्यादायम् विचारसिः” (पृभम, 1.6.1). अज्ञात्वद्विविचार भावसंद्रयस्य कार्यं अवतिः—सम्मेध्य विकारसिः अज्ञात्वविच्छ दिश्यात्।

3 “न दिस्यान्त्याश्च सम्मेध्यान्त्यासम्मेध्याश्च सम्मेध्याश्च” (पृभम, 6.7.1, and (पृ 2.3.14).

4 “स वाच भावार्थ: सेवामयिणी युतिज्जायत्व अपदिश्यः” (पृभम, 3.2.29). Sankara elsewhere observes that there can be no co-ordination (समानाविधयक्ष) between the one and the many. ‘संदर्भी वर्ण्यते च सामानाविधीकर्षानां...नालार्ष: विविध चार्कमिति चानावर्तिः, तां निविश्विधुताय (पृ, 1.3.1).

5 सामावः दि विशेषानु: प्रीतिः: (णोंभम, 7.7, and (पृभम, 1.6.1).

6 Of. “स प्राच्यमर्गानु प्रति। तद्व दि भाष्यवाच्चक्यति रहिवःऽक्षरम्” (पृभम, 4.4.2). Also vide पृ 2.5.19. “रज्ञा...मन्यान्याः व-परिस्थानाय रेश्चार्टारं स्मातः...प्रविष्टयति संवाजालक्षिमेऽक्षमसंस्कृतेऽस्मात: (पृभम, 4.4.25).
Nature of Brahman.

With these general observations, we come now to consider how Sankara has characterised the nature (सत्व) of Brahman.

1. Brahman— is a self-conscious subject (वाता)—

(a) We can, to a certain extent, learn the nature of Brahman by discovering the nature of ourselves—our own self. The self of man is in essence one, but yet this unity is manifested in several cognitive states and functions. Consciousness is our essence, and it is really the consciousness of Brahman, and it is this consciousness within whose embrace we live. ¹ Whenever an object is presented to our senses, we immediately come to be conscious of it. That an object of consciousness is there, and yet we are not conscious of it—is a contradiction.² But the objects of consciousness may change, one object may succeed another, but the subject (वाता) which is conscious of these changing objects does not change. It underlies, unaffected, all its conscious states, hidden behind them.³

¹ “चेतनेन चेतित्विभन्नो जीवित्विद् यथा च चित्ति-स्वल्पिकृत्यो रेकाम्” (वैमथो, 2.3.43). “चेतनेन्द्रियो विच चेतने (चीववचु) सत्वेन, चेतनेन्द्रियो चीववचु (चीववचु) (2.3.29).

“सुवृती—प्राणि न भाष्मस्वरूपेऽव्यविश्वस्य” (2.3.40). “चेतने चेतनेन्द्रिय सुवृत्ति-खाईं (3.2.7).

² वैदिकल्लेख विश्व व वर्ति वेदान्तावानिका विवाहितायाः।” — (केनमथो मथो, 2.1).

“सत्तुरुपां च चेतनेन्द्रियाः।” सत्तुरुपां चेतनेन्द्रियाः। सत्तुरुपां चेतनेन्द्रियाः। यथा चेतनेन्द्रियाः तथा चेतनेन्द्रियाः। तथा चेतनेन्द्रियाः तथा चेतनेन्द्रियाः। तथा चेतनेन्द्रियाः।

“तथा चेतनेन्द्रियाः। तथा चेतनेन्द्रियाः। तथा चेतनेन्द्रियाः। तथा चेतनेन्द्रियाः।

³ “सत्तुरुपां चेतनेन्द्रियो विश्वाय विश्वाय भाष्माय भाष्माय भाष्माय।” —(मथो, 4.4.6. “तिन्द्रियायुपाधियाः। सुवृत्तिः।”}
(b) Consciousness which is our essence is constant. It retains its own character always. The particular states of consciousness (विषयविषय) are the modes which are evoked from it by its connection with the external objects. And whenever these are produced, they appear permeated by, and embraced within, the Consciousness, and what is pervaded must lie within the pervader. These particular modes or the cognitive states are included within the consciousness itself. They are felt as its objects (विषयमृता चतुर्पद्यमः), and the conscious subject (ज्ञाता) remains unaffected by them (यो यथा विषयः; न तेन हीयते वहे...ते).

c) The presence of a conscious subject, the “I,” thus accompanies each of our particular states whenever they are produced. This “I” is present in all our acts

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1 सब्जन्य स्वभावविज्ञानम् चेष्यै ‘संचर्य’-कारणमृता विषयम्’—डः मा, 4.3.9.

2 द्वादासुपापापापादुपाप ‘ह्रदयः’ विशेषविषयम्’—डः मा, 3.2.34.

3 “वार्तयो ‘संचर्य’ विशेषविषयं चर्य...’क्रमात् विभाज्यते...विशेषविषयं वत्सूत्रते, वकाशर्यं भविषये यास्मि बशते—डः मा, 2.1.18.

4 “चतुर्पद्यपक्षि अभिनिधिनि, समस्माय–‘संचर्य’ विशेषविषयम् वनस्पति”–डः मा, 6.3.2.

5 “‘चक्राय: चक्रतः’ ताय वच:...चक्रवर्धिनः...यथा मभवावाराव-भाषा: तेष्याचित्वविषयम् ‘विषयमृता’ चतुर्पद्यम् एव आभिनिधिनि ‘विज्ञान’ चन्द्रपादने”—डः मा, 2.1.

6 “ब्रह्म आयो, ब्रह्म आयस्थः। न दृश्य तेनेवतृतृ आयस्य—डः मा, 4.4.6.

7 “तथाचेश्वराशी, परमात्मेवावरमेव भक्तिवति”...“तथातु सब्जन्यस्त: ‘ह्रदयः’ विशेषविषयाय भावने चशः। यः प्रबन्धविषयः, तथा श्रव्याव भवति सृष्टिः” —‘वार्तयोणपद्यम्’ 87 and 88. “समस्माय: विषयविषयक्षेत्रधारावः: ‘च’ विशेष चाब्रज्ञा:” (डः मा, 4.1.2).

8 “सब्जन्य विषयविषयाय: ‘ह्रदयः’ समस्म...आभिनिधिनि एव विषया विषयविषयः य: प्रबन्धविषय: भ्रमस्रियम्” (डः मा, 1.7). “ह्रदयः...
of consciousness, without being itself an object of consciousness. The cognitive states are variable, being determined by stimulating objects; but the underlying conscious subject does not change. For, if it were to change itself, who is to know these changing states? It is the constant factor in us,
not determined by anything else (निर कितावल मित्रिक). It is our true self, and the particular states constitute our ordinary empirical self. The latter is really the 'object' of the former. We are thus finite and infinite in our nature,—a combination of subject and object. It is the infinite lying hidden in us which, as an End, moves us towards its fulfilment or realisation.

From these considerations, we come to the following conclusions:—

(i) As Brahman has no other cause of itself and is thus self-caused; so it has no other knower of itself: It is self-knower. As it is the knower of all, its knowability is not dependent on anything else. It knows itself: It is thus the absolute knower. If it be an object of a conscious subject other than itself, it would be dependent upon that. Its self-subsisting independence would vanish: it would not be a self-explanatory principle. That which is determined by something other than itself cannot be regarded as the first knower. But Sankara has defined Brahman as 'that

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1 'सर्वव्यापन: 'ब्रह्म परमात्मेति' न ग्राहति।—भागवान: दत्तद्वित्रादिसंवादं भावनि 'हृदयम' मध्य (i.e. its object) घटदिवन, भासलेन...दसैष्ठविवाहिकप्राण प्रति ग्राहति' (का, भ, 3.12).

2 (a) "एवं समविप्राप्तिः पूर्वपूर्वव्यायानिः: उत्तरोचिः: सूक्ष: भागवान:याहि:...
...भासलेन: संविप्राप्तिः: : (b) तथा स्वामविप्राप्तिः...भविष्यते...पञ्चकोषा-
तितिन...श्रास्वत: (१, २, ३). Again—(a) स प्रक्षः: व्यवहार: भूलसाधा-
संसङ्कीर्णतः...प्रविष्टता; (i.e. प्रक्षः). (b) स प्रक्षः: स्नान स्वामविप्राप्त भासला 
समविप्राप्त: एकत्रितः स्वास्तहारणा...न वाद्य विन्य विष्णुवाहिकी वेद (२, 4.3.21).
Again—(a) देशदिनालालमाधं लुसैव निहितान्ते प्रहस्तारिः. (b) प्रहस्तारिः प्रेषादिसंविप्राप्त: भाविते भविष्यति: (बा, भ, 7.25 and 26).

3 Otherwise शास्त्राय (regressus ad infinitum) would arise. "सूत्रानामी 
शास्त्र: नामशास्त्राय: " (बा, भ, 1.4).
which is in itself and is conceived through itself.\(^1\) If it has another knower, it must fail to be a self-determined and self-conscious principle.\(^1\) Sruti has declared therefore—

(ii) Our knowledge, as we have already seen, is dependent on, and determined by, the object\(^2\) which is ‘other’ than us, which is outside \(^3\) us. Our \(\text{मानस} \) is thus variable and dependent. But the consciousness of Brahman is self-determined and self-sufficient (स्वयंचारित, \(\text{अपवासित}\))\(^4\); it is not produced or determined by something \(\text{other than itself}\). In the earlier part of this chapter it has been pointed out that it produces its object from out of itself, and therefore its object, the world,—is not something \(\text{other} \) (चच्चा), but only itself.\(^5\) It is thus a

\(^1\) (a) यथा श्रीमत घटादिकशिष्य श्रात शालिन आपा निषिधिर, तथा शालीपि (\(\text{i.e. शालिवसि}\)) शालानाते (\(\text{i.e. अफेन शालिया}\) शालानाताम निषिधित् पि) से विद्विति।

\(^2\) अवस्यातिक श्रान्त, शालिपि अनेकं श्राविष्कृतं (अवस्यातिक—\(\text{स्वतः}, \) \(\text{अपवासित}\) अवस्यातिक स्वतः, \(\text{अपवासित}\) अनेकं श्राविष्कृतं।

\(^3\) श्रात 18. 50. “ध्येयं दृष्टं श्रात…तद्दातिकिन्तु श्रान्त शालासिव (\(\text{i.e. शालेब} \) प्रं भवं, 6.2. “विश्रामस्वरूप विश्राम लोपचाराणं—नैर्यस्य नैर्यस्य नैर्यस्य।”

\(^4\) (b) श्रात शालासिव निषिधितुहं… श्रात विदितं। नव विप्रक्षिपं… विश्वाम विज्ञानं? न एव विश्वाम विप्रक्षिपं। अववसायनप्यालाय।

\(^5\) विश्रामप्रसादो एव विश्रामविस्तारो वद्याकािशादिह्यं अनावश्य:—सदातिकाः। खरे विज्ञान व शालियो अपवा खरे लामात—\(\text{वृं मात्रं, 2.2.28.} \)

\(^6\) “विश्वविविधम् सचनानाति” (\(\text{तैं मात्रं, 2.8.} \))

\(^7\) “मधुकराभिनव वैधानिक विभागवषामानानाति” (\(\text{तैं मात्रं, 4.1.2.} \))

\(^8\) What is determined by something else can not be a self-determined and self-sufficient thing.
self-determined principle. In manifesting its object, it manifests itself; in thinking of the world, it only thinks itself.\(^1\) It is thus at once the subject and object of its thought.\(^2\) We find therefore that Brahmā is a self-conscious subject—the first knower.

We thus find that in Vedanta, Brahmā is a self-conscious, self-determined subject.\(^3\) It is not, as many hold, a “homogeneous impersonal intelligence.”

II. Brahmā—is Directive Power (प्रविधिता)—

All the activities manifested in the world have behind them a unity which must be the source, of which they are the visible products; and this source or power is realising itself in these activities. Sankara’s arguments in proof of Brahmā as the seat of power are well-known. They are:

(i) Where regularity (विषयविद्याप्रकाशन) and adaptability (विषयविद्याप्रकाशन)\(^4\)—are visible in any action, these marks indicate the presence and operation of a Director (दयानन्दी).

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\(^1\) Cf. “धनान्त्रयम: विनाशाः च...ततं एवं च विकाशार्थम: साधवः

\(^2\) रथिवर्मयो द्रोहु न परिष्रव:” (केस 34, 2.4).

\(^3\) “भाषिकः साधवः विषयविद्याप्रकाशन:” (केस 34, 2.8).

\(^4\) In Sankara-bhāṣya, the terms रथिवर्मयो, रथिवर्मयो—occur frequently. These terms, as we have already explained, mean—Not dependent on, not determined by, something other than itself. It is self-determined and hence self-conscious. For, the world is in reality not other, but itself. In knowing the world, it knows itself. Hence it is not determined by anything other, but itself.

N. B.—It is to be noted that this does not mean that Sankara has abolished the world. He simply holds it to be वायुमयो from Brahmā, from the परमायत क stand point.

\(^5\) i.e. Adaptation of means towards an end—i.e. arrangement in a purposive way (विषयविद्याप्रकाशन:—केस 34, 2.2.1).

\(^6\) “प्रायितस्मिष्टमिष्टादिकु अतु अयाचित्त प्रक्ष्यो बिभयत, विषयविद्याप्रकाशम् प्रवश्चले दही...क्रमः” एकादशम् नमीं परमायत उपयोगि, न वायुमयो”

(केस 34, 1.3.39).
(iii) Where a combined activity (संध्यमनस्) for a common purpose (रक्षणसंबिन) is visible—where parts are mutually related and act in subordination of the whole—it is to be inferred that a purposive power is present and operative behind such activity—which (power—साधन) has combined the elements and directs them for its own purpose.¹

(iv) All material object in activity proves the presence of an intelligent principle as the source of these activities.²

In the Kena-bhāṣya, the true self is proved to be a Prayoktā (प्रयोक्ता) or Prerayitā (प्रेरिता), and throughout this Upanishad, the real underlying self is regarded as a purpose—a will-power—the supreme End.³

1 “नहि एवं ‘परार्थानां’ संध्यमनसंबिन जीवनसंहतुल सुपपदति। ‘साधन’ चासंहत्ते कैरविचिन्द्रयुक्त संहताना संध्यानां न हस्तस्।।।संहतिविचिन्द्रेन तु सन्तः संहता: सन्तः प्राणादयः जीवितः। यथा चंसंहतव: तथा चंसंहत्वानु कुञ्जानु वर्षति संहता: सन्तः च सतीर्थः।’ (कृद्दे, 5.5).

Also “‘धिनिदिकाधिशः’ संहते: कैरं—कर्मसंस्कृतेऽपि प्राणः।—तथा ‘एकार्य-विस्तिर्यः’ संध्यन्त नात्येषु वितन्तसंहतं समभवति” (तेन्या, 2.7). “नहि चंसदयः।।।विनमितितः: ‘विषेषकार्याभिमुखविश्वासः हस्तेन’” (हृदेन्या, 2.2.2). ‘संहतवात पारार्थयपतिः प्राणव’—हृदेन्या, 2.1.15.

This is the relation of ‘End’ and ‘means.’ As End, it is the organisine principle, a Unity. As means, it is the factor of plurality (संध्यन्तनस्यकलिपिनि)—which are moulded into this End.

² “चतुर्विशेषतः विद्याप्राप्तात्वेत्रतुल विद्याप्रच्छिन्तात् राशिदित्” (वर्गम्).

“चतुर्विशेषतः कालोपनासः चतुर्विशेषतः प्रच्छिन्तात् प्रच्छिन्तात्” (हृदेन्या, 3.2.38). Vaid: also हृदेन्या, 3.8.9, “तत्काल (प्रसादनमाणि) विवद्यः (भवार्तः) अविलम्”—रक्षादि.

³ “विषेषप्रकर्तितविराजः क्षतकम् ‘रक्षामार्गवेष्ट’ मव-चार्त्री-प्रेतिस्थंलम्—विषेष प्रकर्तितं कैर्यविविधतादि विशेषाभिस्मुपपदति।’ And this purpose cannot
III. Brahman is the supreme End or the supreme Good (धन्यात्मकता)——

The varieties of pleasure, pain, etc., Sankara declares, which we find manifested in the world and which the जीवs enjoy show the constant presence of a perfect good which finds higher and higher realisation in them.¹

Now, the readers will find from these discussions that all the phenomenal cognitions elicited from the self are premeated and pervaded by the eternal consciousness underlying them²; and the self is the source of all its visible activities in which the underlying power is manifesting itself partially. The self is, for this reason,

¹ ‘परमानन्देऽवि परमानन्देऽवि सत्या प्रकटता...परमानन्देऽवि सत्या प्रकटता’ (तद्वारा ४.३३). In तद्वारा, this good is called साध.

“साधवतब विद्वाकार्यम् कारणम् चतुर्गतात् साधवतबायच्...द्रष्ट्र वा लोकातिकायं चतुर्गतम्” — २.२.१. Also cf. “सुख्वप्रनामवा विशिष्टानां सुखायबलां तद् भलृकतात्...कसोऽनामिनां चतुर्गतम् चचिकलां” — तद्वारा २.५. Here cf. “केतुमच्य कारणमेते चतुर्गतायें द्रष्ट्रम्...सुखाद् प्रवर्तकस्तद्रष्ट्रम्)” (सहस्तति नीलकण्ठ, वनप्रकट, Chap. 213).

² “धातु: ‘खल्लिकं’—चर्च:। तदापि वुद्ध विद्वाकार्यम्: विधाताद्वारे-विद्वाकार्यम् परिवर्तितम्। वा शब्दायाकाराबालं: (i.e., cognitions or states of consciousness), तद्...विशारदिविजीतं व्यासास्वदानं तु...तास्ति विकृतार्थवादाय:। विशारायार्थानं तद्” (तद्वारा २.२). Of. also “चधुमच्य व्यापकं, चधुमच्य व्यापकं; न तेनैव तत् व्यापनं। कामे द्वि कामुकं; किमत्व व्यापनानं भवति (तद्वारा ४.४.६). “सब्यं प्रवृत्तं विश्वद्रविस्तितं यथ, स प्राणसा सर्वप्रवृत्तिः” (तद्वारा २.४).
characterised as *Sattā-sphurti-rūpah* (सत्ता-स्पृहति-रूपः).\(^1\) It is partially manifest in its cognitions and in its activities, and in varieties of pleasure, pain, etc., and they are therefore regarded as a *means*—द्वाराधिकारी—indicative marks—for the presence and operation of the underlying Rational power.\(^2\)

It is very hard to believe how such broad and clear facts have escaped several writers who have, unjustly, exhibited Sankara’s Brahman or the self as a mere “abstract intelligence” to the learned world.

12. We cannot conclude this chapter without recording Sankara’s view on the purpose of the creation of the universe as stated by him in his commentaries. It has been shown above that in the System of Vedanta, it is held that Brahman has a ‘nature,’ a ख्रिताव, ख्रितप, of its own; and this nature cannot be resolved into anything else. This nature (ख्रिताव) is constant and does not vary

\(^1\) “सत्ताविशिष्टाः सत्ताः ख्रितिः—सत्ताविशिष्टाः सत्तासिद्धाय! ख्रिताविशिष्टाः।”
(वषो भाग) (सत्ता भो भीत, सत्ता भीत ख्रिताविशिष्टाः ख्रिताविशिष्टाः।)

“निर्धनः निर्जनः...जात्वर्ज्जपसमेवं नियत्तुलातुरु भन्यााहिनिश्चः अभवत्”
(वे भाग)। “चेतसार्यवालिताः ३पसेपपचः।” (वे भाग, 3.2.38.)

\(^2\) So it is likened sometimes to the reflected image of the sun upon a surface of a lake. As the reflected image is an imperfect and partial expression of the sun which underlies the image; so the nature of the self is imperfectly and partially reflected or manifested in our cognitive states and activities, etc.—

चर्या विधि; भूतानाःसिद्धात; प्रतिभाः (अन्य वचन separate) जलादी चक्रानि
चर्यविधिविष्णु, कार्यररे भुऽथ प्रविष्ण।” (वे भाग, 4.2.21).

“तत्त्त्वज्ञानः अधिष्ठिताः विचारिताः ज्ञात्स्तिकते ‘बबापद्वा’ विश्नः।”

“सत्ता...सत्ताविशिष्टं कुरुताः...श्रीरतिः तत्-सत्त्वार्यविशिष्ठाः। श्रीरतिः;
सत्त्वार्यविशिष्टाः...चैतन्यसंगमं सत्त्वार्यविशिष्टं विषयति, नासातीत।” (केन भाग, 1.2). *Cf.* “श्रीरतिः कार्यरर्व संचारतिविविष्ण; चैतन्यसंगमं विषयति (हः, 3.8.8-9).”
under any circumstances. This nature remains identical, even in its relation with the things of the manifested world (अवाधिकीयादिपि). An object, Sankara remarks, must have always one nature and one nature alone; it cannot have more than one nature. Otherwise, it would be impossible to recognise the object. Brahman is always a unity and it does not vary in its relation to any place, time, object or circumstances.

The diversities of the changing नाम-रूपाः (नाम-रूप) which have evolved and are still continuously evolving point, Sankara observes, to something beyond, as their cause; they cannot but indicate the presence of some conditioning activity which must have produced them—

"शुक्लमुनि त्वेदसूर्य भविष्यति" (छा ५० भा ५.३.१५)

quoted in वे ५० भा, 4.3.14).

Again, these emerging changes point to some final End (उद्देशी), towards which they are moving; they indicate the final stage, the complete realisation, of the purpose which has created them—

"उद्देशी तस्मात जगाभूतम् 'देवियल' शुरुतति."

It is thus that Sankara states here the fact that the created world—the emerging changes—always carry with them the idea of a purpose as yet unrealised. The

1 "एकाक्ष भनेक खमाक्षलाकुपयम्" (वे ५० भा, 3.2.21).

"व तापमूक्षतः परम्पर विवक्ष; भवाभिक्ष लुपपिति।।श्रद्ध भवाभि- योगाविन्यासाः अन्तराश्यम् वत्तुन्।।अन्तराश्यम् 'खमाक्ष; 'सुष्धात्' सुष्धाति।" (वे ५० भा ३.२.११).

"भवाभिक्षिनिषिः च 'वतृत्तमैला'कुपयम्" (वे ५० भा, 3.2.15).

* The term विशेष used here and elsewhere means the End (as contrasted with the means). It is explained in the Gita-bhasya thus—

"श्री ब्रह्म जगात सत्ता जागारासं (End) साधति।" (गी ५० भा, 13. 17).

* "श्रवस्त्रस्वदियुतीयोऽविकाशविकल्पः भविष्यति अविकल्पः औपदेशसामस्यम्।।" (वे ५० भा, 4.3.14).
reader are requested to carefully mark the arguments employed by Sankara to establish this important position. He speaks of ‘ज्ञेय’ i.e., Brahman (to be realised), as the final end of realisation—

“ज्ञानपलं सचित्” —

that is to say, Brahman is completely realised in the final stage, and that is the final purpose or end of the created world.¹

This truth is very distinctly explained in the Gita-bhasya—

“सम्य ज्ञेयस्ति बृहद्यमानां च वारसंज्ञसः

विपरिवर्तते स्वायत्तेऽवस्थां” (9.10.)

What do these emerging changes—परिवर्तनः—परिषासों of the world imply? Whatever has been manifested in the world—all its अवस्थार्थ, i.e., all its states, activities, the objects, in fact, everything of the world—all these are for—

“धार्मिकाव्यवस्थायथायेलात् सङ्केर्वन्यस्तिस”...

i.e., “all these move towards the final realisation of the Atma. Brahman is the final End (विष्णु), for the realisation of which, these changing manifestations are perpetually moving on.”²

¹ Vide Gita-bhasya, 13.17—“सृष्टिमेव ज्ञेयं च तु ज्ञानपलं सचित्ते ज्ञेयंग्यम् सुचिते।” Brahman is the ज्ञेय, i.e., the final End. Hence it is that in Vedanta, it is called as व्ययम्, i.e., the last or final End. “परिवर्तितं पञ्चमं चामां भावपरं विशिष्टं ज्ञातयमकिकि।” When this End is realised, there remains no further end for realisation, and our desires and aspirations get their fulfilment (२० सृष्टि, 1.1.1). “भावपरं विशिष्टं ज्ञातयमकिकि” (2.1.14). It is the goal where our higher and higher aspirations are finally fulfilled.

² The same idea is expressed in “धार्मिकाव्यवस्थायथायेलात् सङ्केर्वन्यस्तिस” (सौर्य, 18.50). All our actions (प्रचत्ययां) being पराव, they are for the realisation of the Power behind them—which is their विष्णु, final End.
ON BRAHMA AS CREATOR

This is the purport, Sankara goes on to point out, of the creation mentioned in the Sruti-texts. When the final stage is reached, then and then alone the changing nāma-rūpas (नाम-रूपस) will reach the complete realisation of the purpose working behind them. Hence this आकाशa viz., this realisation of the final end or purpose is inherent—interwoven—into the structure of the created elements of the world. The creation is meant to show this important truth in the Sruti. It is not meant to show that the underlying Brahmā is identical with the world, as if Brahmā has no ‘nature’ of its own to realise.

We had occasion to point out above that in the Vedanta-System, we find mention of the four typical classes of Bijas (बीजस्) ; and that these are characterised by growth and development, and this characteristic feature marks them out to be living individuals (जीवस्). 1 In the Gita-bhāṣya, it is stated that they are continuous. This description of the Bijas (बीजस्) clearly indicates that by them the different grades of finite individuals from the lowest to the highest are meant. Now, these continuously evolving higher and higher grades of the individuals are all interwoven in the Infinite Self (Brahmā) which is always present behind them. 2 In the lower finite individuals, the Infinite is realised unconsciously.

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1 "बीजं प्रीरेतारथं प्रीरेताङ्गिधिरतः।...न हि भवेऽविष्किर्तृ प्रीरेतति। निष्कर्ष प्रीणेताद्विषान्, बीजं-स्तनत तैं अति इति इति गमयते।" (वीर्या, 9.18).

This term बीज is synonymous with the term सूत्र in the Gita; and the सूत्रs are described as जीवाधिकारिणाः in 10.32. Cf. "बीजं सां सूत्रसूत्रानं" (7.10). It is clear therefore that बीजस् = सूत्रस् = जीवस्.

2 "सर्वनिदं‧‧‧‧‧‧सर्वाधि सूत्रानि‧‧‧‧‧‧प्रात्मतनुविद्ध सत्यां सत्य परिश्रमी॥" (सौराङ्ग, 7.7). Cf. also: "सर्वं प्राणं‧‧‧‧‧‧सर्वं ये परास्मानः‧‧‧‧‧‧यथात् अष्टतितः‧‧‧‧‧‧यदात्सक्षकं वर्णले॥" (१० आसि, 2.1.20). Also १० आसि, 2.5.15. "तेषां पाराप्रथं ग्राहं प्रकाशिन् मद्वाधिकायः चायाकृतः॥" (२, 2.4.9).
It is only in man that the Infinite is present and is being realised consciously.

According to Sankara, then, this realisation of the Infinite in the world and in the finite human beings in higher and higher forms until the final stage is reached—is the purpose of the creation.¹

¹ Such is the 'nature' or स्वभाव—of Brahman—‘स्वभावादेव सम्प्रभृति’ (२.१.३३-३४). "परिपूर्णतिकातु वर्धनं—चालविव वाच्यं साधनं—
स्वयंभव परिषुमति " (२.१.२४).
CHAPTER II

THE PURE EGO AS ACTIVE POWER.

1. The individual ego, as depicted in the Advaita philosophy, has given rise to several controversial points, as regards its nature and character, in certain quarters. Among other points, the most important controversy has gathered round the question of the 'activity' of the pure Ego. An idea prevails that in the Sankara system the Individual Ego, like Brahman, is merely an "abstract intelligence destitute of activity." How the idea arose we shall try to set forth. It was found out from the Bhāṣya that Sankara raised a clear voice of warning against ascribing the objective qualities to the subject; that as soon as it acquires an objective content, the "I" passes over into the Me. The Ego or subject is that through which we know all; it follows from this that it cannot itself become an object of knowledge. And because the self cannot be known, Sankara treated it, as an "abstract concept, as pure knowledge or intelligence." This idea was strengthened and received an additional force when it was discovered that there were sentences in the Sankara-bhāṣya itself which unmistakably refuse to allow 'agency' to the Pure Ego. Take for instance such sentences as the following:

"न खामाविकं करूवलं चार्मन: लाखतितः सम्बन्धितः चार्मनीयः प्रस्थताः। करूवलखामावले फरु चार्मनी, ग करूवलेतः चार्मनीयः सम्बन्धितः। अन्नरविव: चीमार्गारव।"

वेदां भाष्य: 2.3.40.
i.e., The self cannot be an agent; it is not active. If there be agency in the nature of the self, it can never free itself from it—no more than the fire can free itself from its heat. The activity does not really belong to the self, and if we could only realise this, we gain a true conception of the individual self.

Now, the natural consequence of these discoveries in the Sankara-bhāsyas was not slow to make its appearance. The conclusion which the critics of the Sankara system drew from these, resolves itself into such a train of thoughts as this:—

"The idea of intelligence dissociated from the idea of activity is an idea which passes from the subjective order to the objective order. The self thus conceived merges necessarily in the universal and it disappears into a pantheistic void. . . . . We can only be sure of this pure Ego, not as an object, but as a subject persistently active so long as we have experience. But this activity Sankara denies to the self."

But the self which the critics of the Sankara-system have found out is not the true self at all according to Sankara as we shall presently see. Sankara is reluctant to call this a self at all; he rather wants to call it a non-ego—चन्द्राका.¹

Sankara not only refuses to allow agency to this self, but he has refused to allow it knowledge also. For, all the elements which constitute this self are not free in their activities; the next term being given by the preceding

¹ "चन्द्राका मया कर्मम्:—चन्द्राभासिका—‘चाहि करीं’ ति प्रहास-वैद्यगात्" (भौ 18.66). "वैद्यविनियमति ‘चाहि’ प्रहास्योगात्"—Ibid. It is called चन्द्राका because it is the product of interaction with the Non-Ego "चन्द्रिक्षयं तु प्रायश्चित सदास्तिनिधियः" (१.१)
which determines its action.° And the states constituting this self have borrowed their consciousness from the true conscious self which is present behind them.²

2. We propose in this chapter to consider carefully the view if in Sankara’s system, he regards the Pure Ego merely as an "abstract intelligence," and whether it is active or not. It is needless to say that there is hardly any justification for this belief in the writings of Sankara himself. Let us now proceed to consider what evidence the Bhāṣyas themselves offer which show that the individual Ego has ever been regarded by Sankara as "dissociated from activities."

The finite self is ordinarily regarded as a self-contained entity existing on its own account. It is merely a bundle of passive feelings and states, and possesses a fund of impulses and passions which constitute the source of its physical and mental movements or activities. It is continuous with, and a part of, the external nature which has equipped it with its organs of sense and the nervous system. When the organs of sense come in contact with the external environment (विद्यालय-सम्बन्ध), the latter evokes certain states and activities in the former, and these actions

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¹ “विज्ञायती नि अचूकः संवेदन सम्मति; संवेदन वा ‘कर्तृत्व’ यथा।

न तु अविज्ञायत्व अत्मन: कृतचित्त संवेदनविभावित, न समुद्र ‘कर्तृल्लुभुपति’

(श्रीमण, 18.17).

² “अवमोच्छिन्न विद्यालयसम्बन्धम्—स वाच्य वृहाते माणिक्यविद्यान आत्मा

अभूपमास:” (कृत-श्रीमण, 1. 4). “विद्यालयसम्बन्धम् यद्यविद्यालयसम्बन्धात्

विज्ञायत्ववर्त्तम, न यथा ‘विज्ञातृत्व’।

तथात् विद्यालयसम्बन्धम् विद्यालयप्रमाण आत्मना विज्ञायति’ (श्रीमण, 4.3).”
and reactions constitute the self.\footnote{1} This is the actual empirical self. According to Sankara, it is not the real self; and he calls it—

"कर्मूच-भौसृव-विशिष्ट जीव:"

and

"मार्गा अपरामाधे: "\footnote{1}

The agency disclosed in its activities is not the true agency at all; for, all the elements constituting this agency (कर्मूच) determine, and are determined by, one another in an unbroken series of mechanical causality.\footnote{3} What this self does at the present moment is but the necessary outcome of his motive and character (प्रवृत्ति) and habit formed in the past—

"एषा...कालः; येन प्रवृत्तः अनन्त इत्यंविदुः।

न खं जीवं प्रतिज्ञानाति"

(हृद्य भाष, 1.4.17).

\footnote{1} "श्रीनादीनि द्वन्द्वारणी...मानाः। मानाणि स्याः—श्वादिष्ठ: संयोग:।"

(वी० मा०)। "बिषयोहितीपरिष्कारं साधनं जगन्ति च मनःकरणमतास्मिन्ति। बिषयस्य बिश्रेष्ठं बिविधानं विधानस्य विविधानं। विधानस्य विधानं विधानस्य। अग्निदानिर्मिति प्राणादिरं अतुमधुसौतीरं। नासों। प्रवृत्तीं सिद्धान्ताय भविष्यते।"

(ह०, 4.3.6).

\footnote{3} Sankara calls this self as "मूलमानसायांस्यास्यामितिस्मातः।" and "मनोमायिक प्रकृति परिविशिष्ट:।" This is regarded by him as passive self, and the real self is what underlies it. "कर्पाणि द्विगति मन-शाक्तियमेकस्य निमित्तं।

तम्। न प्रवृत्ति वेदनायति विषमातिरित विकर्षयते।"

(ह० वा० मा०, 1.1).

\footnote{3} "विषयादिनि एव बिधार्यप्रियाकारं शीति चेतु न। भिन्नताः ले प्रवृत्तत्वानुपरिपूर्वक।। भन्तिपरिष्कारं बिशयवात् (दयाभास), द्वसत्यतुवापित:।। तथापि भन्ति: कस्म 'अतिरिक्त' अविष्कः (i.e., true Atma)।"

(ह० मा०, 4.3.6).
i.e., he is a slave of impulses and instincts which move in him and sway him hither and thither; these impulses move him to act in the direction of their guidance. He has no eye to look to the other path.

This self is not free to choose the end of his life—

“পুরুষাধিকারপ্রতিপালি অধ্যাদেশ পরব্রহ্মিকল্পনা”।

(ঝো মাৰো, ৪.৩.৩৫)

But, Brahman indwells and is revealed in man in the form of infinite “শান্তির্থ্যা” hidden in him—in the form of infinite ideal of truth, beauty and goodness.1 These indwelling শান্তির্থ্যা—these Ideals—are gradually being revealed in man in higher and higher form and they are carrying the man to infinite possibilities in future. The infinite Brahman is thus immanent in man and it is for this presence that we do not feel content with our actual situation (বিষয়-বিন্যাস) and seek higher and higher ends.

The শান্তির্থ্যা—চীন্দ্র্য, etc., as we actually find them manifested in human nature are all imperfect, broken and fragmentary. But the শান্তির্থ্যা—which lies hidden deep behind in man is infinite and inexhaustible, and hence the two cannot be identified. Yet we identify the two, and the indwelling infinite শান্তির্থ্যা which constitutes the real self and which is the moving force within us becomes concealed, and the actual human nature as expressed in

1 “জীবন শান্তির্থ্যান্তরিমান; ইংলিন্ডিয়-মণিপুষ্পিকল্পবেদনীগোদাস্তু”।

(ঝো মাৰো, ৩.২.৬)।

“শান্তির্থ্যা অপলাব্যাতু...তপত্রক্ষত্বতান্তরিমানাতু” (ঝো মাৰো, ৩.২.৩৫)

“প্রাক্তনিকল্পবিকারবিহানে: প্রমূঢ়ম” (ঝো মাৰো ২.১২)।
deeds and words is all-in-all to us, and future possibilities are shut out.¹

But the pursuit of knowledge more and more, the quest of beauty in higher and higher forms which no finite objects of the world can perfectly satisfy, our infinite capacity and work for higher and higher ends, our dissatisfaction with mundane goods—all these prove the presence of Brahman in us in a newer way, such that it was never present in the lower animals in the same manner. Sankara points out—

"The supreme self is revealed in the spirit of man in a higher and superior form. It is for this presence that man ever wants to know more and more, and by mundane means ever to reach what is supra-mundane."

"प्राणायाम्। किं पुनः प्राणायाम् पुनः?—कपश्चानाशिवार!।
पुरस्व एव वि श्लाक्लानं, शिवलानं, चयुक्तम् च—पश्चां, विषाण;
समयः...पुरस्व एव चाविशिवारास्मा । स वि ग्राणिन सम्यक्तमः;
विशारं प्रश्नं श्लानं...संस्मृतं ध्यासीतं ॥। चयं दशर्त्यं
पश्चां धान्या-प्रिय्यांश्च एव श्रविविराजं ॥।

(तैसैं भाषा, 2.1.)

¹ No one of its actual expressions can fix the infinite possibilities of the self in a rigid and final form. The Gita has condemned the idea of fixing or identifying the infinite possibility with its actual expressions—as—तांबिम्। "वहायम् ज्ञातवर्णा...‘तत्तंत्रानि ज्ञाता। इत्येव नामा,
परमाण्यिता...तास्मानाये इत्ययं ज्ञाता हम्ये" (Gło, 18,22). Vide also
dे ५, 3,2,22 "तत्त्तात्विक प्रतिपेधिता।
² The implication of the term श्लाना is that you cannot keep a man satisfied with the knowledge of to-day, he will seek for the knowledge of to-morrow and so on. मघ्यं चायते—implies, he will seek the supra-
mundane End, through the mundane means;—you cannot keep him content with what is mundane only. We have translated the passage accordingly.
Then again—

"पुंसे-पौंसे-प्राणिनिरीच्छन, तस्रीतमरापूवे-
प्रहियज्ञनम्म प्रयागरामाभिस्थिते प्रृथ्व्यावधानांहारान"।—
(गी° माण, 18.66).

i.e., “By higher and higher works and pursuits, man desires to realise higher and higher ends, until all his pursuits are directed to the realisation of the supreme End.”

And he further adds that—

“to other animals, their knowledge and action are limited to present eating and enjoyment.”

Brahman thus indwells in us as an Ideal or End and this End is the ‘higher self’—the real ‘nature’ of man. This ‘nature’ underlies all his manifested states and activities. This End or Purpose lying hidden in man carries the man to infinite possibilities in future. To quote a typical illustration ⁷ from the Vedānta—

As खृष्टिकाः (a lump of earth) moves to realise its future ideal घर (the earthen jar), which lies hidden in its nature; so the ideal which is inherent in man’s nature gradually works out its end.

this end is thus the moving force or the real agent in man—

"संवेदित्वान्तः प्रान्तं वस्तित्वाय ज्ञानतः" ⁸

i.e., the realisation of Brahman in our self—the ज्ञानवेदित्वान्तः—is the पुरुषार् or the final end of our life.

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¹ Vide Chap. III of this book for an elaboration of this.

² Cf. also—“सत्यसिद्धः प्रामाण्यं गातः परं साक्षित् ‘शाकांतर’ मल्लिन्” (वेद° भागः, 2.1.14).

"ब्रह्मवेदित्वान्तः, ‘सत्यसिद्धम’ त्रान्तः" (1.1.1).

"वधृ एकत्राय वानरः सत्यं…पुरुषस्त्रावर्णितं वारः" (4.3.14).

This is called ‘प्रामाण्यं’, i.e., the final End. “सत्यसिद्ध शास्त्रं सत्

"‘शास्त्रान्तः’ भवति” (गी° माण, 13.17).
Now, this 'higher self' or the End is our real self lying behind our states and activities. It is present as Purposive Power or End of our life. It is not a slave like the empirical self, but is the true determining agent. It is not in time-series, but above it. It can introduce a new element or a difference in the time-series. Its actions are not determined by antecedents in time. It can direct the natural courses of the functions of its organs and lead them to the realisation of its own 'purpose'—

“स्वाभाविकता साध्योक्तिप्रतिपाधिकृताः
विद्याधीन, प्रव्यागसम्भवति या प्रचैति”।

(वेदां भाष, 1.1.4).

“कार्य-करण-संप्रास्थय स्वाभविक स्वेतः;
प्रक्षकम्—स्वायं पर निरोषः”।

(दीर्घांि भाष, 13.7).

3. Here in this connection, we should like to invite our readers' attention to an invaluable opinion of Sankara which occurs frequently in his Bhāṣyās. We mean how Sankara has drawn out a distinction between the respective characteristics of the Intelligent self (चेतन) and the non-intelligent elements of nature (अचेतन). The readers would do well to bear these characteristic features carefully in their minds. Sankara has characterised the चेतन or the Intelligent Self as स्वार्थ (swārtha), that is to say—it exists for itself and it has the purpose or the reason of its existence in itself. The चेतन is always described as चेतन, चिद or निश्चिद्ध,—i.e., it is self-existent and self-sufficient and

1 These states and activities cannot really conceal it.

“संप्रास्थयित्र के तत्त्वम् युक्तं य स्वाक्षातिकण्यवेद्यव परालेखां तन-चातुर्विधिविन्दुवः...संस्करणां परालेखां” (वेदांि भाष, 1.1).
does not depend for its existence on any other thing. In contrast with this characteristic mark of the ब्रह्म, he has called the ब्रह्म or the material elements as परार्थ (Parārtha),—i.e., existing and working for something else which is distinct from them in its nature; or in other words, which work and exist for the 'purpose' of something other than these elements. Sankara has pointed out the fact that the ब्रह्म has no purpose of its own—

"ञ्चेति खाद्यावपयोः॥" (भ ४ 3.7).

He has thus described the nature of 'purpose' inherent in Brahman—

"ञ्चासमननःजनाना: कामः!" 1

"न हि कामयित्र ज्ञेति मात्रा"।

As our uncontrolled human desires and purposes are dependent on, and determined by, their extraneous stimulating causes; as these, when produced, master us;—such are not the purposes of Brahman, which are समस्या (ananyā) from its nature, i.e., not distinct or separable from the nature of Brahman.

The desires of living beings do not appertain to self, and require motives like virtue, etc., in the accomplishment of objects distinct from the self. But Brahman's wishes or purposes are prompted by no such motives, nor is Brahman influenced by them; because its purposes are not distinguishable from it. ²

1 "यथा चतुर्थयेति परवेदीकृत वामवद्य: प्रवत्तिः विनः, न तथा ब्रह्म: प्रवत्ति ज्ञान: कामः। काव्य तत्त्वः। सतारम्भूतावश्ये टुः।...यथा चतुष्क्षेऽवन्तमित्रोऽसांतासः। निनिष्ठावेषा...सत:स्त्रिया!सिद्धार्थाः।...साधनारूपाय: न तथा ब्रह्मः। कार्य तत्त्वः। सतारम्भुलस्य:।" (भ २ 6).

² These purposes are Divine Ideas which are elsewhere called as सासूक्ष्म समा, subsumed under and organised by the highest सासूक्ष्म।—Vide Chap. 1, pp. 60-61, of this book.
To recognise the character of a man—his will—we must find the expression of his will in action. Brahman is best apprehended by our mind through its self-manifestation,—through the manifestation and expression of its purposes in the created world. Apart from its self-manifestation, Brahman for human thought tends to become a metaphysical abstraction. A Divine purpose is constantly working out and gradually developing from within and the world is progressively working out a purpose—a plan which is fulfilling itself in and through the order of nature.

Now, manifested nature and its elements, being पराधे, are not self-sufficient and independent at all, but are constantly dependent on the self whose purpose they fulfil. They have only an instrumental value;—they are mere means through which the purpose of the self is constantly realised. If you deny this, “what are really पराधे in their nature would themselves become साध्य and would therefore be meaningless”—

“प्राधी: सत्वि: प्रह्लाद; व्यति: प्रत्यक्षंति”

(गौरि भा, 18.50).

“Pleasure and pain and the like would, in that case, work and exist for the sake of pleasure and pain and the like”—

“न च देशायेव इतनां शक्ति कस्य विषयं”।
“न च सुखायं सुखं, दुःखायं व दुःखं”।

From these observations of Sankara, it irresistibly follows that the world and the differentiations visible in the world are to be regarded as a means or instruments for the realisation of the Divine purpose; that a Divine purpose is realising itself gradually through the differences or stages of nature.
The important truth just noted can also be gathered from Sankara’s comment on the Vedānta-sutra (4.3.14). In this commentary, Sankara shows Brahman to be the supreme goal or end. When this goal is reached, all our desires are satisfied and no further desire arises beyond this—

“न भूयः काशितं शाकात्ता उपजायते,
प्रदृष्टायं समाचि-दुःस्वयम्:”

Here, in Brahman,—the end of human aspirations finds its final satisfaction. Thus the Vedāntic चेतन ब्रह्म, is to be always thought of as a Purpose or End.¹

But Sankara observes in the same commentary that it is otherwise with the created elements of the world—

“नेत्रेन्युपश्चादिद्वृतोऽसा निरङ्कारः
प्रतिपाद्याना्स्याङ्कुशः”

that is to say, the idea of the final End, the idea of the final realisation—is not to be expected within the sphere of created nature and in its elements. For, this idea lies beyond them. As the process of the world is progressively moving ² to the final goal which lies beyond it, no one of its elements can give us the final satisfaction. This remark implies that nature is पराथ (parātha)—a means—for the realisation of the final goal or end; for, it gives rise to the idea of something which lies as its source and which also lies as its final goal towards which it is moving.³

¹ Which is being gradually realised in the changing elements of the world and which is constantly directing them to their final goal.

² “चिरोक्तारात्तिरांत्तरात्तिराति ……चात्रम: ……एवापि ……उत्तरोत्तर:-
मायाविज्ञान तात्तत्त्व नेत्र्युपश्चा ……विविधिमुखे: (६° भा°, 1.1.11).

³ “नेत्रेन्युपश्चादिद्वृतोऽसा नेत्राकां: प्रतिपाद्यान्त्यास्याङ्कुश:।
तथापि …
नेत्रेन्युपश्चादिद्वृतोऽसा नेत्राकां: प्रतिपाद्यान्त्यास्याङ्कुश:।
दुःस्वयं सत्तात्त्व एवापि ज्ञात्व: उद्भव नेत्रेन्युपश्चा नेत्राकां: प्रतिपाद्यान्त्यास्याङ्कुश:।
4. The readers perhaps remember that in Chap. I, we have found that our idea of the finite self is खात्स (End or purpose) and its organism is पराप (A means). Conditioned is composed of (1) some kinds of being (जात्स) and (2) the conditions or limits (विनियम—विनियमाद) under which they are known. All these definite individual beings are qualitatively distinct in our consciousness and are all relative realities. These relative realities can be conceived only in connection with an absolute Reality. Sankara has shown that 'those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, jars, etc., employ for their purpose certain determined causal substances, such as milk, clay, etc. Each causal substance has a certain capacity for some particular effects only and not for other effects;—this capacity is the certain Power of the cause.'

We have seen that the effects are the means for the realisation of the End or the purpose working within, and each of the definite causes are but the proximate ends and these are all subservient to a single ultimate end. It shows an immanent unifying power realising purpose;—it is a power differentiating its parts

∗ "द्विघटकार्यकलिक: प्रतिनिधित्वानि कारणामुखी चौरविशिष्टादिवौद्दीनि उपाधिवित्तिगाला खनिने हजमने। न हि द्वेषार्थिनि: विशुचिका उपाधिवित्ति, न परास्थितीमि: चौरं...क्षारातु प्राप्ति दानि उत्पन्नति न वित्तिकायः।...चौरे एव द्वानि: कथितमित्वम्; न खुर्दातिर्यः"—ईवति (२० सं. 2.1.18)

∗ "सामाण्य-विशिष्टादिक: नामाकारण-वाक्ये विविधः...पणि द्व विविधः: सामाण्य-विशिष्टः।—तेषां पारम्पर्यकर्षाये एकाधिक साधारणाये जनमांयः।" (४० सं.)

"सामाण्य-विशिष्टादिक विरिविष्वानि कर्मानि अटीकारम्" (४० सं. 7.4.1).
from within and making the parts to serve as means for the realisation of a purpose.¹

We find therefore, that all the elements of human organism also exist and work together for the realisation of the purpose of the self which controls and directs them.² Sankara has observed—

"The director is inferred by a logical necessity from the activity manifested by the ear and others combined, such as deliberation, volition, etc., incurred for the benefit of something distinct from them all (ear, etc.). As things combined and organised for a common purpose or end exists for the use of other thing not so combined, we argue there is a director of the ear, etc., and for whose use the whole lot exists and has been combined."³ Each of these fulfils

¹ "सच्चे वि काहे-कारण-विबंधन जित्येतित्वात्मात्माये...सच्चे भविष्यत्"

"तथा एकाःसिद्धिः संहितसं

गोतारिक चतुर्मसापेन न संहितसं" (२.७) [एकाःसिद्धिः संहितसं = A central power makes the plurality of parts co-operate as factors of a higher unity.]

² "संविर्यत्वतिरिक्ताय संक्षेपसं कष्टमया वेदान्तमेव सन-पारिप्रेयिता...संसारायं

परालेक्षात्" (१.१) [परालेक्षात् = Each of these fulfils]

"सच्चे वि काहे-कारणाश्च 'पारालेक्षः' संहितसं गामकमेव-पेत्रेव"

(४.८).

We invite our reader's attention to the Bhasya on the Kena-Upanishad, 1. Here Sankara calls the true self as the Purpose or End which directs our impulses, organs, manas, etc., for the realisation of itself 'सच्चे वि काहे-कारणाश्च वेदान्तमेव सन-पारिप्रेयिता...परालेक्षः'. In the Bhasya of this Upanishad this self is described and proved as श्रेयस्ति, i.e., a directive or purposive Power.

³ न वि एवो 'परालेक्षः' संहितसं किलवीरिलादु जीवनसंगतसंबंधसः । 'परालेक्षः' कर्षेवर्तवेच वर्तवेच गर्वसः संहितसंकालसः न इतरे...तथा प्रचारीगान्तः

संहितासंकालाः अवितुप्लेिगः । अनः...संहितासंकालसंबंधसः तु सच्चे संहितसः
a function and in fulfilling it, each contributes to the realisation of the purpose—चतुर्योगि—of the cause within. Sankara says—

“यथायां हस्ताक्षरं संयमं बुद्धिरं चेतनं न भवति”

—(१५० भा, २.७).

*i.e.*, Mutually dependent activities for the purpose of a common object are not possible without an independent intelligent power.

The following observations of Sankara will help us in arriving at the same conclusion:—

“‘We are not told by scripture that the final welfare of man (पुरुषाकार) depends on the scriptural passages about the creation and the like. All the passages setting forth creation and so on only subserve the purpose of the realisation of Brahman. The passages about Brahman modifying itself into the form of this world is merely to be applied as a means for the realisation of the absolute Brahman, but *does not bring about an independent result.*’”

These remarks tell us that we are never to understand the universe of *nāma-rūpa* as mere self-existing (अतक्षः)

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सत्ती अधिविलयः ...इस च संस्कृतं ‘बदें’ प्राणपालिनि: सत्ती आपारं ज्ञातृभूत्त्व वचस्ते संलग्न: समां च ततोऽन्तः चिन्हः” (१५० भा, ५५).

N.B.—This shows that the Vedantic Brahman and the individual self as well are not abstract intelligences, as many seem to hold, but they are conscious organising unities or powers.

“न श्रद्धा ऋषि-यज्ञ: प्रामाणादिबिष्टम्; न इति तद्यतितिं: कथितं प्रयुक्त: दष्टे...द्वैतिन्तं न श्रद्धादियमप्य वाक्यात्पत्तिपर्यंतं” (२०, १.४.१४).

Of. “यत्र च प्रायः नृताति अवस्थितार परिशिलाविषयः...ततौ व्रताद्वेशोऽपि न विविधार्यः, न तु घृतस्तो फलायां सहस्ये” (२.१.१४).
changes, but as movement to a definite goal—a progress; not as becoming merely, but as being that is becoming. The changing elements (विकार) are the means serving the purpose of the being of the cause—the Power—working from within. They are sustained by the cause, so that in their evolution and interaction they conspire to realise the Divine Purpose.

The above discussion clearly brings home to our mind the fact that in as much as the self is held by Sankara to be a purposive Power (प्रार्थ), and all other objects and elements besides the self are regarded as a means (प्रार्थ) for the realisation of the purpose of the self, it follows that we must use the actions of our organs, passions, impulses in a way that our highest purpose may be realised through them. The self is therefore the true agent.

(a) We have already come to learn that in the Commentaries of Sankara one fact cannot fail to stand out prominently. We mean the fact that a finite individual, be it a thing or a self, possesses a distinct 'nature' of its own. It is impossible for an attentive reader to escape this fact. This nature Sankara holds to be permanent or विषय in the sense that it maintains its unity and preserves its identity in the successive changes of its manifested states and activities which it underlies. This nature, Sankara is

1 “बामवीः प्रार्थक्षा काय्य-कर्ष संघातस्य, रुपावेष रुपंतः। प्रभेदः—

हम्बां एव निर्वयः.” (गी० ६, १३.७).

(This idea has been further elaborated in Chap. IV of this book.)

2 Vide p. 57 of this book.
careful to point out, is not at all dependent on anything beyond, or external to it; neither is it produced, like its states or activities, by an external stimulus or the environment with which it is put into relation. It not only retains its unity in its changing states, it continues to live in each of its successive states evoked from it. But such is not the case with its states and activities. These are transient and impermanent; these are produced on the occasion of the action of the environment. But they are not produced out of nothing (अष्टः); there must be something underlying them, out of which they are produced or manifested. This underlying nature is called by Sankara श्रवण्ड (swarūpa) or धर्म (Dharma) or वृक्ष (Swabhāva). Sometimes the word व्याख्या (Sāmānyā) is used to denote this nature. Throughout his system, the term वार्ष or cause invariably refers to this nature. As it transcends its states, it is sometimes called कुत्र (Kūtastha).

Here is how he describes this nature, and contrasts it with its states:

"The Real in a thing is that which does not depend on any other thing and

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1.  "वत्स लोपिता चने वि परमार्थेत, योनिलिपिद्वृक्तू भावानारस्यखि, निरंतरति। न च पारसप्रथैत्वे वसु कानु नित्यविद्यु वा पश्चात् (भृगवा, 1.4.10)।
"न रहु चर्चै: तथा ज्ञानात्म भविष्यम्, च त्त्व का जैसे। "अविश्वायलात निर्भर:...यथार्थनवनी" (4.4.22)।

2.  "वर्तमानं ज्ञातित्र ज्ञातियों...जनाभिषुट्ट्व तत्त्वि, जनाभिषुट्ट्वभविष्यति-प्रकाशः; तत्त्व च ज्ञातिश्रवणेष्चा...तत्त्व अविश्वाय...निष्टाभिष्यकृत्" (भृगवा, 4.4.6)।
"वत्स लोपिता सदा विभिन्न, वत्स लोपिता सदा विभिन्न। सत्त्व अविश्वाय कामाविदिरि" (2.1.15)।

3.  "स्मरणप्रतिगमानिष्ठा, सातकर्त्रवत्मण्येति, सातकर्त्रवत्मण्येति। भवाय च भव भ्रातृति, भवाय च भव भ्रातृति। भवाय च भव भ्रातृति, भवाय च भव भ्रातृति। भवाय च भव भ्रातृति, भवाय च भव भ्रातृति। भवाय च भव भ्रातृति, भवाय च भव भ्रातृति। भवाय च भव भ्रातृति, भवाय च भव भ्रातृति। भवाय च भव भ्रातृति, भवाय च भव भ्रातृति। (भृगवा, 2.1.18)।
which is permanent. It does not change its character under any circumstances but maintains it. What appears or is produced by an external operative cause and is thus dependent on it is not the nature of the thing.—

"इयश्वर चि तत्त्वाभिषेकः। विक्रिया न तत्त्वं—पराप्रेमेलयः। न चि कारकाशिर व पुनर्बल्ल।।
सति वीधेषः—कारकपेशः; वीधेष—विक्रिया।
यद्य वृय नानापेशो खलुषपं तत्त्वं तत्त्वं। यद्यापेशः
न तस्मात्, भवताः भध्याताः।।4 तथाः तृतीयार्थृतः
हुयी न वीधेषः।"

(सैङ्किष्ठमान, 2.8).

Sankara’s elaborate discussions in his Vedanta-bhasya (2.1) on the relation between the cause and its effects bring into prominence these important truths. The वायय or the nature of the individual things or beings maintains its identity and continues to live in their successive effects brought about by the action of the external stimulus (कारक-नायायो). These effects or states or activities do not touch or affect the nature of the cause—

"विष्णुवात् साचे एकः अभिवृतारी,
अभिवृतेऽविशेष अभिष्कृति न संवृत्ते।"

(वेदाभाष्य, 2.1.9).  

1 In the Gita-bhasya, Sankara employs similar arguments, and uses the term सत् (sat) for the “nature” or सत्त्व, and चासन् (hashat) for the changing states. “विष्णुवात् सुस्तिः न विभिरर्वट, तत्त्व्—सत्। यहिष्णु अभिवृति, तत्त्व्—चासन्—विष्णु (चीर्म, 2. 16).

“महत्त्वः प्रथमम्...दामएव वाह्यां व खं खर्मं स्वभावं भाविति” (चीर्म, 3.12).

“सामान्यतः इत्यक्षिप्तेत् एव किंच...साध्यं न कालोऽर्थविविष्णुः दामएव वा।” (भास, 4.9).
(b) The changing states or activities cannot, Sankara takes particular care to observe, constitute the ‘nature’ of things. For, these are always changing and transient, but the underlying nature is not liable to change. Among other arguments used by Sankara to prove this nature, the following may be specially noted here. Sankara points out—

Every individual object, every individual self, exists for itself, as well as for others (खङ्गम प्रेष अथात्). In other words, each individual has a substantive and adjectival existence. The one, Sankara observes, cannot be reduced into the other. But an individual, in order to exist for others, must first of all exist for itself. If an individual does not exist for itself—has no nature of its own—how can it come into relation with others and how can others evoke from it its states and activities? You cannot say that finite individuals exist only by reference to something beyond them. Things cannot

1 “खङ्गम बेदु मिष्या थातु; परिीष्टातैव थातु; न तु खङ्गम; तस्य विनीष्ठ तपदती” (ंय भा, 4.3.15).

“न च खङ्गमाविकाराः एव नाभिक पदाधांगां प्रतिष्ठ यतः वत्स;... न च खङ्गमावनू अब्धु मिष्या विविदितः यतः”। “न चि (क्यांधिन्फ; सः; विविदितः” (ंय भा, 4.4.6).

यां प्रति—खङ्गम—सः प्रच्छाधाराशीगः। संख्यानि वैदिकः—सः प्रच्छाधाराशः; विप्रसं—कार्यकृत्य सायांकारिग कतिप्रति प्रति” (भा, 4.10-11).
be merely adjectival to one another. The same identical Devadatta (देवदत्त) comes to be designated differently in relation to different objects with which he comes into connection, but Devadatta does not, says Sankara, lose his own nature, does not abandon his identity, when he is thus designated differently.—

"एक्षमापि खरुप-वा खरुपपापे खरुपा अनेक- खरुपाप्प्रयवयर्वणार्। एक्षमापि समू देवदत्त\, खरुपाप्प्रयवयर्वणार्। खरुपाप्प्रयवयर्वणार्। अनेकापि खरुपाप्प्रयवयर्वणार्। अनेकापि।

(वेदः भाष्य, 2.2.17).

Making his position thus secure, Sankara now goes on to argue that the nature of the individual cannot be resolved into its states and activities, in as much as the nature maintains its identity and continuity in its changing and successive states and activities. He observes that—

"न त्य विवेषद्वैभेद प्रेष बलिवलं
भवति एत एत भवाभिर भागान्तु"
sustained by, the underlying continuity of their real 'nature'—

“সত্তার্থঞ্চ বিশ্লেষ্যং বিশিষ্ট্যাঃ বিশ্লেষ্যাং জ্ঞানং”

(वृं मात्र, 1.6.1 and 2.4.7).

Yet, such is the perversity of the ordinary human mind that it forgets or ignores the presence and operation of the true self which underlies its successive states, and takes the self to consist entirely in its mutually exclusive states and activities connected by a mechanical causal law. Sankara says that this is done by the influence of avidya or our natural ignorance. The aggregate of these states and activities is the empirical self of the ordinary ignorant people and this is the only self to them. This self is stated by Sankara as the—

“কৃত্তিকাল-দৌষ্টুল-কিলিপ-জীব”।

The nature or the underlying substratum of the individuals, as we have shown above, is the real self and it is transcendental or ব্রহ্ম, to which its states and activities belong as to a centre. It is free in its activities, because it is above time and it has no antecedent in time to determine its actions. This agency is the true agency in the system of Sankara. Out of its own resources which are inexhaustible, this real self can introduce an entirely new element in time, and it can chalk out a new path for itself, and initiate a new movement. Its vision is kept confined to its future infinite possibilities, and it is moving on and on in the direction of its Divine goal, for which reason it is called by Sankara as ব্রহ্মাকায় (i.e., it is essentially Brahman in its nature).

Wherever Sankara denies agency to the self, it is always the passive agency (if such term can be used) of the empirical self, because all its manifested activities are, as
shown above, mechanically determined in an unbroken series in time. Sankara never denies anywhere the free active agency of the underlying real self.¹

The Self is a Real Agent.

5. We shall now proceed more particularly to show that Sankara regarded the real self as an active power, and its activity is “reflected in all our sensitive, intellectual and in other aspects of our experience.” The following discussion will bring out the two-fold sense, in Sankar’s system, in which the term ‘agency’ has been used, and will, we also hope, bring into prominence the fact that the Pure Ego is an active power, when it gains the perception of the external world.

Sankara thus describes—

“Whenever any of our organs functions, there are always two kinds of activities simultaneously present there. Of these, the one is visible and the other invisible; one is transitory and dependent, and the other is permanent and independent; the one works in time, the other is beyond time. There are two visions—

“हृदयी—हार्हिरिति द्विषिव्वा भवति,
लिखिती, परमसार्थिको स”—

¹ Sankara denies movement or change to the real self. He calls such activity as चलनारस्त्र, i.e., in which the sense-organs, body, manas, buddhi, etc., etc., actually move. Such activity he keeps confined to the empirical self. "चलनारस्त्र स्त्रृणि प्रवाहम् भवति अर्थो "करोण्यति" परमसार्थिकान्ति” (वों. 18, 66). These movements he calls चलनारस्त्र—Non-Ego, object. For, these are really objects to the true self which underlies these and connects these to itself as their ‘subject,'
the first kind is an action evoked in the mind through the affection of the organ of eye. This activity is transitory in its character; it appears, it disappears. It is a change produced, when the eye is stimulated into activity by an external object with which it has come into contact; and it vanishes when the contact ceases to operate. But underlying this activity here, there is an eternal and permanent vision of the self, and this vision or activity constitutes its real nature,—as heat and light constitute the nature of the fire. This vision of the self cannot be said to be produced, neither can it be said to be liable to disappear. The former vision of the eye, as soon as it is produced, is found to be invariably permeated or pervaded by the latter vision or the permanent activity of the self which is constantly present and operative behind it.¹ Thus the two kinds of vision or activity appear blended together, and the ignorant unable to discriminate the one from the other, are liable to misrepresent the activity of the self as actually produced and as actually disappearing, with the appearance and disappearance of the changing activity of the eye. Hence, although the activity of the self is eternal and unchanging, it is held to be seeing

¹ Cf. also: “योक्ष्यय बह्यः कर्मदार्जया: प्रक्षयं वस्तीया निवया हन्सः
ब्यासार्म न फलोः ।”—Vi. 3.4.2.

“अवसानपि भारस्म भविष्यितादिकमया हन्सा निवया द्विचित्रेति चतुर्थे “न व
भारस्मीया:द्वम्यं प्रक्ष रोकि”—Vi. 3.23.
when the vision of the eye is excited, and to be not seeing when the vision vanishes. This is also the case with the functions of the other organs of sense."

(Brih. Bhāṣya, 3.4.2 and Ait. Bhāṣya, 4.1.)

Now, what do these remarks show? They unmistakably bring to light the important fact that in the perception of the external objects what really perceives is the true self and that it is this self which exhibits its real agentship (कर्मेऽव) in its activities of comparison, discrimination and assimilation. Sankara holds that there can be no perception of a definite object unless there is an active comparison of similars and dissimilars—

"निरोध समानासमानातैवेष्यो...द्वं तत् प्रति निरहितेऽश्च..."

(तैतिः भाष, 2.6.)

In the Brihadāraṇyaka and in the Vedānta Bhāṣyas also, Sankara thus briefly describes the activity of the underlying self in the act of perception:—

"I happen to receive two distinct kinds of sense-impressions when somebody touches me by his leg and next by his hand. There is as yet no discrimination, until the self energetically sets to work to compare one kind of sensation with the other, and differentiate one from dissimilar other sensations. These activities of comparison, reflection, discrimination and assimilation are all operations of our intellect (बुद्धि) which is a mere instrument in the hands of the self; for all these activities are indeed my present changes; but these activities discover or reveal the active self as the subject from whom they issue. An
activity which distinguishes, an activity which carries the work of comparison and raises the sense-presentations to the level of discriminative consciousness cannot be a mere item of passive feelings. By these activities the Ego is discovered as the energetic source from which the actions issue—

"तथा च ज्ञातं ब्रह्म विशेष्य-प्रतिपक्षिः?" 1.5.3. (२° भा°)

Then again, so long as the self does not direct its attention to the changes received, they can never become the objects of our knowledge. It is for this that Sankara remarks—

"अन्याज्ञानं प्रमुखं, नाप्राप्यं, etc. etc.," (२° भा°, 2.3.32.)

All these reveal the presence and operation of an active self underlying these feelings and activities, which maintains its identity in its constant movement among similar and dissimilar elements, and to which both the past and the present belong. We find Sankara remarking—

"न द्वि भवदर्थं चन्तः तारति, प्रतिस्वर्णि भा।। "तेनेदं सद्यं—तेनेति दशम्-यथं॥

—प्रतिपक्षिः इयायचलात् सारंस्य...

सहस्यो व्यायामं वेश्चति: प्रकृति रिक्षा

भास्यात्, साहित्यिनिसिंधुस्त्रिंस्यान्विति

सिंहार्यापाल एव धारं” (वे० भा, 2.2.25).

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1 Cf. also: "बघुरादिकवि एव द्रव्यादिकिष्या क तु नौं निति ते द्वै, न भवं कालं प्रतिस्वर्णालाभंपचिः। समक्रित्रिक प्रविष्यालाभं (अवि) दशं लाब्धण्यपचिः।। तथानुवि श्रन्तः स विदर्शिन्स विदितः।।" (२° भा°, 4.3.6, etc.)

Cf. "समगतं के समगतं, साध्वतिक स्वरीतिं।

एवं ध्यान भौतिक चौद्धिकं स्वविष्णुविवर्धाय (वाक्योति, 21)"
The identity of the self which persists through its changing states is implied in any exercise of memory. "To know a flower by scent, we must remember a prior experience of it and discriminate it from other appeals to the same sense."

"श्रमददीर्घाचे दर्शवणाचा नाति च,—
पूर्वीतरस्तिल एकाच्यासति कथाचः
प्रष्णप्रशान प्रश्नात्म: सातु?"

These observations of Sankara prove that to him, the real character of the Pure Ego is not merely "a being," or "a knowledge"—but an "active power" and a source of activities. And this source cannot be phe- menalised; for, in its absence there would be no perception at all.

In connection with this subject, we crave our reader's indulgence for the liberty of quoting a few other passages bearing on this important point.

6. In the Gita (Chap. XIII, 12-13), Brahman's nature is described as neither sat, nor asat—apparently possessing no definite characteristics. Now, the question arises—Is ātmā to be regarded, then, as a mere non-entity, a non-existent something? For, if there is no positive mark to characterise its nature, it is as good as non-existent—asat. Now, we invite our reader's attention to the reply which Sankara suggests to this very pertinent question.—

"No, you cannot say that Ātmā is non-existent or asat (असत). For, there are indicative marks by the help of which we are enabled to infer—we are assured of—its nature. What are
these indications? To prevent the supposition that the Ātmā (अत्मा) must be a mere void or non-entity (यथा) the Gita proceeds to teach that the Ātmā exists as—(1) the inner self (प्रथ्वगोत्मा) and as—(2) the source of all activities of the senses and the like."

Sankara points out—

"Kriṣṇa proves, by way of inference, the existence of Ātmā as the inner self thus:—There must be self-conscious principle (power) behind the sentient elements in activity, such as the physical body and the senses; for, we invariably find self-conscious principle underlying all sentient objects in activity, such as carriage in motion. Hands, feet, and the like constituting the limbs of all bodies in all places, derive their activity from the energy inherent in the knowable (चात्मा) and, as such, they are the marks of its existence and operation."¹

Sankara also says—that "Ātmā (अत्मा) reveals its nature through the upādhis (वाप्पि) of external and internal senses, through the functions of all the senses, viz., determination, thoughts, desires, hearing, speech, etc., etc., i.e., the knowable (चात्मा) functions as it were through the functions of the senses. But does it actually function? The Sruti implies the knowable has the power to accommodate itself to the varying functions of all the senses......not that it actually possesses swift motion and

¹ That which is the source of these activities must—itself be an active power. Sankara calls it प्रयोक्ता। "संस्कारां श्रीवादोनां प्रत्येकादिवसात्र श्रीवादोनां प्रयोक्ता। "सन्तानां च धर्मतनां प्रत्येकात्र। तथा विन चेतनावतैः प्रियावतस्य।" (श्री श्री नाथोऽयं)।
such other activities.” This is shown also by Sankara elsewhere by his remarks—

“सत्सामांत्र एव कण्म् ले, न तु आपूततम्”।

It does not imply that the self is to be regarded as merely ‘a being.’ It does not mean that the self is not a power. It simply implies that this power cannot be phenomenalised or reduced to its manifested activities. This expression has been chosen to guard against the supposition that the self is subject or liable to transient changes or विकार, and to show that it is a निर्विकार power.¹ This power is constantly present and operative behind the activities, as their free active source or seat—of which these are but partial manifestations, and these manifestations can never exhaust this inexhaustible source. These manifested activities are the indicative marks of their underlying power. In the Chāndogya-bhāṣya, the nature of the self is actually called “वात्मक” or the source of power (8.12.4). And it is characterised as—

“कार्यारिणु वात्मकः, निर्विकारः”

(गी° भा°, 13.22)

i.e., the source cannot be resolved into the activities of the senses and the like, but is present and operative in and through them, and is above them. This important truth is expressed in the Vedanta-bhāṣya by the expression—

“न कार्यक्ष कायोकालः” (८° २.१.९).

¹ “विक्रियाविवेकवर्धितम् आकाशो मनः प्रभवः प्रकटी निर्विविद्यते”

(केश° वा° भा°, १.२).

Cf. “चानाप्रविकारः सन् चयनार्धवदेहि यः। वुजाविद्वृष्ट साधृतं प्रचक्
सिद्धिविकारिकरू” (बायकामि, १४)। Vide ई° भा°, २.२.२.
that is to say, the underlying power (cause) cannot be reduced to, and identified with, its manifested, actual activities (effects), because this source is inexhaustible and, as such, no one of its manifestations can fix it in a rigid form and be regarded as final.

It is the influence of Avidyā alone which, as Sankara tells us, is responsible for this erroneous identification. If the cause cannot be resolved into, or identified with, its effects; if the true nature of the individual self maintains its identity through its successive changes; if it is by avidyā that we confound the underlying unity with its multiple states and activities;—it follows, as the night follows the day, that all activities which we find in the phenomena must be traced to their underlying self or the unity—as their source. Had Sankara reduced, like the Pantheists, the Causal Reality into its successive activities and states, then of course for the source of these activities we must seek the phenomena alone. But Sankara has repeatedly remarked that when an individual being or thing assumes different forms or phases in consequence of its connection with the things outside it, it does not lose its identity—it does not become something else entirely different from its own nature—

"म द्विवेषद्वानसत्त्रेष बलव्यक्त भवति

.............स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानानात्;

(वेदां भाषा)।—2.1.18.

It still maintains its unity, preserves its identical nature in and through these successively changing phases or differences. We must therefore look for the source of all phenomenal activities, according to Sankara, to the nature of the individual thing or the self which underlies these activities, and continues to operate through them unaffected by them.
7. As in the intellectual, so also in our moral experience, the operations of an active underlying self cannot be abolished or negated. We, here, briefly describe Sankara’s method in the selection of the ends in our moral sphere.

In the Katha-bhāṣya, Sankara explains this method thus:

In his system, Brahman is both transcendent and immanent. If it be of purely transcendental nature, all possibility of comprehending Him would be shut out for man. He would be a remote and abstract being. But, fortunately, He is also immanent in nature and in man, and through this revelation, man can comprehend His ‘nature’ to a certain extent. Man seeks the realisation of the End inherent in his own nature. But if he seeks this end merely in the external mundane order, he will not find it there—

“श्रीदेविविषुंक्तः प्रयत्नते पुरुषः; रघु मे
नौयद्विनां वे मायूद्विन्ति; न च तत्र भावतिकं पुष्पशाश्चासनते’’।

(वेदं भा, 1.1.4)।

For, outward nature, as it is, cannot be regarded as complete and self-sufficient. The rational and ethical human being seems to be the goal of outward nature.

Sankara teaches—

“विषयस्मै...खाल्लेः
संख्यापालत सरस्च नाम’’— (श्रीं भा, 2.4.11).

Nature has supplied man with his senses and the nervous system, by which he is put into relation with
the world. The more his organs and his mind are developed, he is able more and more to realise the grandeur of the universe. He must therefore seek his end within his own nature. The infinite Divine शानेत्वम्—the Ideal of truth and beauty, etc., is revealed in man, and man is endowed with the capacity to realise it. But if man seeks the शानेत्वम् as it is found actually present in the human beings, and regards this as the final end, he will be disappointed. For, the in-dwelling शानेत्वम् शक्ति-सीन्द्रम् is transcendental and it cannot be identified with the actual शानेत्वम् as is working in the human beings. He must therefore seek the शक्ति-सीन्द्रम् in the future possibilities of man. It is progressively revealing in man and will reach perfection in future.

"Two Ends," Sankara writes—"one mundane and the other transcendental—come to man indiscriminately for his choice. All men are propelled by these two goods according as one wishes for mundane prosperity, or the supreme happiness. These two are opposed and conflicting in their nature to each other. They are therefore not possible to be pursued by the same individual at the same moment. One who pursues the mundane good, and regards this as the true end of his life, misses the true end of man. These two are not easily distinguishable by persons of poor intelligence.
and of irresolute mind. The truly wise man examines both the pleasant and the good—the mundane and the supra-mundane ends—as a flamingo separates milk and water; and having considered in his mind the relative weight of the two courses, divides them both and selects only the supreme end as preferable to the mundane ends. But the man of poor intelligence incapable of such discrimination, pursues the lower good, such as—cattle, sons, position, wealth, etc., for the purpose of gratifying his pleasures of sense."

(Katha. bbās. 2.2.)

Here again, the discrimination between the higher and the lower good, the comparison of the relative worth of the two courses, the rejection of the one and the selection of the other and the pursuing of the same until the supreme end is perfectly realised—all these activities distinctly reveal the presence and operation of an energetic self, not as a "mere being," or a "mere knowledge"—but as an active power.

In spite of such clear expression of his views, is it not doing a great injustice to Sankara’s system to hold that Sankara’s pure Ego is not a persistent activity? We shall further speak on this supreme end later on.

8. Plants and trees are looked upon in the school of Sankara as a kind of lower organism. This school admits the existence and evolution of four kinds of organism, viz.—“ब्रह्म, प्राणिः, भूतिः and जन्म.”

Now, within even the organism of the plants, says

(d) It is revealed in the construction of plant organism and animal organism.

1 i.e. Those born in perspiration, etc., that which is born from the egg, that which is born from seed or which shoots out; and that which is born from the womb.
Sankara, is the constant operation of an *active* self and its *Power is to be inferred* from the incessant movement of the sap (रस) within the body (i.e., its plasticity) of the plants and from the gradual growth and development of the plant through its successive stages, till the full development of the tree is reached.  

Sankara in his commentary on the Chāṇḍogya Upaniṣad and in other places has distinctly expressed his views as to the impossibility of regarding any of the stages of the plant development as *separate* and self-sufficient (अत्यंत) from the process of development of the plant as a whole. The stage of sprout (चक्रावत्स) is seen to arise after the destruction or disappearance of its antecedent stage, *viz.*, the stage of seed (वैज्ञानिक); but that does not, Sankara tells us, prove that non-existence or अकल is the cause of the sprout (चक्र) The *future possibility of the tree which is the final end* is present in its seed-stage and other subsequent stages and this it is which is the *real cause* which has successively operated in bringing the plant to its final stage or full development. In the Brihadāranyaka bhāṣya (1. 2. 1), he explains his theory of causality with the help of the illustration of खलिक (a lump of earth) and its successive development into

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1 “‘मैत्रेि च प्राणमंगलेन पशुपति वैरीत रस्ता गर्तं जीवस्त्रोतेऽवर्षच वर्षयत् रस्त्रेण—जीवस्य सत्वात् लिङ्गं अभवति।’ . . . .उच्छ्याँ रस्त्रेणम् पौशाः दिव्यक्ष्यात् जीवलेष्टीत् वैरीताः . . . .चेतनानां: खलिकः।” (वा° भा°, 6.10.2). “यद्र रस्त्रेण विषममुनीन्न्यैव—तद् चार°, बुधसाधु।”

2 That it is present as a *future end* has been expressed by Sankara in the phrase—चनानात्मि प्रस्तोत्सय (वा° 1.2.1). अर्थ is the end, towards which the अर्थः (i.e., the causal substance, खलिक, in the present illustration) strives. For, the potter for the purpose of constructing घट, gave the खलिक its successive shapes. [We shall further elaborate the idea in the next chapter.]
THE PURE EGO AS ACTIVE POWER

रत्न (Jar). This is to be regarded as a typical illustration which holds good in all cases of causal development, in the light of the rules given in the Brahma-Sûtras, II. 1.14-20.

“श्रेयं भविष्यदृश्य पद्मी स्वाभवितत” ।...
“रत्नयं प्रागभवति इति, न घटक्षयते
प्रागतेन नास्वितत” ।—

(रप्तो भवोऽऽ, 1.2.1.)

In this way, the end is present in the cause from the very beginning and it is this end which gradually carries the real nature of the cause through its successive stages, until it is fully realised in the last stage. He says—

“अस्थः भविष्यतः प्रवर्तिते देह्।” ।—

(Ibid.)

To realise this end or purpose, the movement of the causal substance had begun in the past and this continues in the present, until it reaches its final realisation in future.

If we keep this teaching before our view, we shall be able to comprehend the real significance of the fact as to why in Sankara’s system, the effect or the end is stated to be जनन (i.e., no other than) from its cause. To understand the true nature of the cause, we must see it realised successively through all its stages of manifestation up till the final stage, and no one of its stages can, therefore, be separated from it and regarded as something जनन (other than that ‘nature’).

9. In the human organism also, in the similar manner, it is the self as an active power which, for the realisation of its purpose inherent in it (दशन निमितायं, निमितायं निमितायं), has built up the body. It has brought into being certain elements within it and combined and organised them in
such a way that one and all co-operate to realise a common purpose—

“ऐद्रियाकृतिः संबंधी: कार्य-निर्णयः;
निर्मित्या मानः हयम्। तथा एवात्मानविलेन
संयमगं, नातरेष्व चतुर्दशसंहं हस्यविनिः।”

(तैतिक भाषा, 2.7.)

In the Katha-bhāṣya, similar observations are found—

“‘साधनं’ चतुर्दशेऽपरेऽपराणै: संविद्धत
प्रयुक्तं संवेदना (ि.ि., परावर्ण)।
संयमस्य न हवुः।
वशं चतुर्दशत ‘वशं’ प्राणापालादि;
सत्त्वं व्याप्तं क्षणं वर्तति,
संयमं च तत्तती:।” 1

(कथा°, 5. 5).—

that is to say,—the self which is खार्श (self-existing and self-working and having the ‘reason’ or ‘purpose’ of its being in itself) and which is भव (ि.ि., which transcends) from these elements,—has combined them with a view to realise its own purpose through them, and thus the organism has been built up. 1

The elements and the senses (and their activities) are called पराणें, because these are the means or mere

1 The terms खार्श (Swārtha) and पराणें (Parārtha) have been explained before, in the beginning of this chapter. Sankara has laid down this as a general rule that wherever there is a combination and combined activity, there must be an underlying power which has combined the elements for the realisation of its purpose. “साधनं
पराणं परिश्चतिः संविद्धत चाप्रवृत्तं संवेदनामव्यायां न हवुः” (कथा° भाषा)।
instruments through which the purpose of the self is realised.—

“ईश्वरेद्रानां यतृ ज्ञातचारयः
पारावेग निधिस्यते...तत् जैत्यादिकंज्ञानिव।”

(गी 3, 13.22.)

पारावेग is the निधिग here; that is to say, the realisation of its final end is the निधिग or the impelling occasion, and the building up of the body and its successive developments are जैत्यादि-कंज्ञानिव, i.e., are brought about by the agent-ship of the self.

Can a clearer exposition of the theory go further? That the self is an active power is thus everywhere shown by Sankara.

10. In the Vedānta-Sutra and in the Upanishads, Brahman is described as प्राणेऽप्राण: (i.e., it is the प्राण of the प्राण). That is to say,—Brahman is the underlying power of प्राण (प्राण), it is the controlling and directing power which underlies the प्राण-शक्ति (प्राणशक्ति). This प्राण-शक्ति (प्राणशक्ति), in Sankara's system, has been held to be the first manifestation of Brahman's nature. Held by the underlying power and sustained by it, this प्राण has differentiated itself into the form of the objects of the world and this differentiation is always going on. Brahman, in Sankara's system, is not a characterless being; it has a distinct nature, a character, a ख्यात (swarūpa), ख्यात (swabhāva) of its own, and this nature underlies the differentiations of

1 This differentiation is in three forms of activities—पारावेग, ज्ञातविधिक and ज्ञातात्मा। All these are the interacted relations and are grounded in the various activities of definite individuals which have been brought into closest interaction by the everpresent प्राणa.
the Prāṇa-Sakti (आयुर्विज्ञान), untouched and unaffected by them—

“नामप्राणात्मसंबंधूत्”, “नामप्राणात्मक”,

“नामप्राणात्मसंबंध तथाविय सम्बंधोऽयुत्” —

all these refer to the same truth.

As Brahman is both a transcendental and immanent principle, it is revealed in the world as the differentiations of Prāṇa, but still it is not resolved into or identified with them, but maintains its own unity or its own nature in them. This has been beautifully expressed in a passage in the Ishā-bhāṣya.

‘Held and sustained by the underlying Brahman—a चेतन power—the Prāṇa has differentiated itself—externally as the activities of heat, light as exhibited by the objects—the sun, the fire, etc., and internally as the physical and mental activities of the sentient beings.’

Elsewhere, the underlying principle of Prāṇa is called Antaryāmi (अन्तर्यामी), i.e., the sustaining power which controls and directs the Prāṇa-Sakti and its differentiation.

In the Vedanta bhāṣya, one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Ātmā is stated as धातुचेताः, i.e., the control and direction of the Prāṇa, or which sets Prāṇa to work.9

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1 “तत्त्वज्ञानतत्तले निर्लक्षेपणामादेऽस्य (संसारविज्ञानीय रूपं), मातिर्थ्या...”

2 “तत्त्वज्ञानतत्तले निर्लक्षेपणामादेऽस्य (संसारविज्ञानीय रूपं), मातिर्थ्या...”

3 “तत्त्वज्ञानतत्तले निर्लक्षेपणामादेऽस्य (संसारविज्ञानीय रूपं), मातिर्थ्या...”

4 “तत्त्वज्ञानतत्तले निर्लक्षेपणामादेऽस्य (संसारविज्ञानीय रूपं), मातिर्थ्या...”

5 “तत्त्वज्ञानतत्तले निर्लक्षेपणामादेऽस्य (संसारविज्ञानीय रूपं), मातिर्थ्या...”
11. One Vṛttikāra reduced Brahman or the unity into the differentiations of nāma-rūpa (नामरूप). In this view, Brahman was the whole and the differentiations of the nāma-rūpa including the finite individual selves were looked upon as parts of that whole—as modes of its self-expression—as mere reproductions of the whole. Reducing the unity into the plurality, the Vṛttikāra yet held, quite inconsistently no doubt, both of them to be real. This was a kind of pantheism current in the time of Sankara.

Sankara has, in several parts of his commentaries, taken particular care to refute this opinion of the Vṛttikāra. He argues that when the differences emerge, the underlying unity does not and cannot become reduced into them. The unity does not, as the plurality arises—as the differentiations of nāma-rūpa arise,—become something else, losing its own nature in them—

``न फँ विष्णुद्वैनात्मकः
वल्लकल्यं भवति...........
तएव प्राणभिरानात्''।

.....एमेश चतुर्युक्तं प्राचेयं...निष्ठि निष्ठतः...तत्त्वातु चिन्तक्षम चिन्तक्षम
चतुर्युक्तं। चतुर्युक्तम् वाद्यादिविशी नियते बचति ; चेतनेन प्राचेयं नाथमितरसमर्थेय नैतिकृतः'' (३.८.९)। ``तत्त्वज्ञानी प्राणेऽपि प्राणेऽपि प्राणमयः' (३.१.२)।

1 ``नतु वचनावलोक्यः...यथा सत्सुधालयं एकलं, देश-सर्वस्वाम्यना गानालं; जनः एकलं गानालं—वभयमिय संस्मायः?'' (३.१.१४)।

``पद कैमण्ड्यावचते—पाठावतः; ख्येतः एव एकलं नागालं; यदा यो: कृद्वयात्या एकलं, सापालोऽपि भवधिः परमेति्. भवेद: (i.e. नागालं)''—
३.३.३०।

Also Vide ३.१.१., and ३.१.४. १.१३.

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It retains its unity, its own character, its separate substantial life, behind these differences. In criticising Vrittikāra’s opinion, Sankara shows that when the unity is thought to be entirely reduced to multiplicity, the former cannot retain its distinct character—the separate life of its own. For, it is now to be found present in the form of many; it has now become composed of parts—अनिराम्यकः. The unity, of which the Vrittikāra still speaks, is an abstract nothing—a mere empty logical abstraction. For, it has no existence except in the multiplicity, because it has no nature by which it is recognisable apart from the many. It is a contentless abstract idea in general. Hence, argues Sankara, it cannot be held to be real. It is a mere unity of collection, an aggregate of parts. And the parts—the differences—of which the whole is a mechanical aggregate are disconnected parts with no organising principle to connect them. The parts—the differences—the multiplicity cannot also, in this view, be held to be real. For, mere differences with no real organising unity behind them would be an unreality. There are mere differences, haphazard changes—with no purpose, no plan, no end to govern them. And Sankara asks—how can such parts—differences—stand with nothing to connect them?

“न छि ‘तिरामके’ विशिठ्‌
व्यवहाराय पवकवते;
न छि रूप सर्पिदयोपि
‘तिरामके’ भवति।”

“चारणा ‘विनेत्तकः’ सामवपादि
पश्चात् भवति।”

1 ‘यथा अनिराम्यका छे:—मायाज्ञातावृत्ति, द्वित्रेष नागार्द: विषेष अत्ना
ब्राह्मण्डा भवति ||...जायत्प्रक्रिया-बिलिहः चारणा...(२० १०, १.३.१).
The finite selves, too, being mere phases of an indeterminate whole would have no character, no real life, of their own. They would be liable to be driven, like a ship without a rudder on the bosom of a stormy sea, by the gust of each impulse and passion which find them. Mere parts, mere differences, unrelated to, and separated from, any organising unity behind them are, in the opinion of Sankara, unreal.

"सहावना सत्यवल, सतीपलाचले
पनूतले"

"न कार्योपकारमनरेष
बिविरंसानां कार्यस्य स्मातु
सुनूजनें"

In this way Sankara, in his criticism of Vrittikāra's theory, has shown that neither unity nor multiplicity can be held to be real. Both of them must be declared false (भस्म).

Sankara again asks, if one is reduced to many, how can both be held to be real? One and the same self cannot, he says, be regarded as—possessed of qualities (many) and also devoid of all qualities (one). There would thus arise mutual contradiction (विद्वस्तस्म्य समवाहिल). Yet such absurd supposition would be the irresistible consequence of the theory of Vrittikāra who regarded both to the real. But this absurdity does not at all touch the position of Sankara. In the earlier part of this Chapter we have shown that the Infinite is present in the finite individual and that is the true self. It is present as an end—a possibility—which is the guiding energy of his life. It is this

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1 "विद्वस्तस्म्य समवाहिल, विद्वस्तस्मिश्रेष्ठ—हति विद्वस्तिविष’” (संस्कृत, 13.12).
"विद्वस्तस्म्य समवाहिल—एकसौतास्य; भन्यायायायेकेश्व तत्तल्य” (संस्कृत, 3.5.1).
self which in relation with other individuals and the environment becomes manifested as the qualities and states of the finite self. When these states and qualities are erroneously separated from the underlying self and treated as a self-existing and independent reality, these become unreal. But under no circumstances can these differences (many) or changes remain separated from the self, because they are to be taken as manifestations of the self through which it is gradually realising itself.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Environment—i.e., the differentiations of Prāṇa in the form of Nāma-rūpas of the world under the control of Brahman behind it (see section 10, pp. 111-112).

\(^2\) This is the celebrated ‘Sat-kāryya-vāda’ (सत्कार्ययावाद) of the Vedanta Philosophy. The effects or changes produced reveal the nature of the cause. In the Māndukya-Bhāṣya Sankara has told us that it is the manifestations which throw light on that which is manifested. The nature of the underlying reality is to be read in the manifestations. If, therefore, what is revealed is taken to be unreal—non-existent—then it can come into no relation with the underlying Reality. For, to be related there must be two terms of relation (हस्यवचनत् सबन्धः) which must be both real (न सदस्तो रसात्मः). Otherwise, the causal Reality would, as भानविमीति explains the idea, itself prove to be unreal, and thus Brahman would be an unreality.

“बौध्यन् इव विदेशे कारणव्य-रागायथे अर्थगुणसे। तत्तेदेशव्यवृत्तेन न तेऽऽ मार्गशयण्यमर्हीति—परस्त्रः कारणमिव शास्त्।”

For this Sankara has said—“सतोऽऽ व्यस्तः ससां; न दस्तोऽऽ दस्तोऽऽ” (१० मा, 2.1.18). Hence the future effect (end) exists in the nature of the cause.

N. B.—The changes cannot be separated from the cause and treated as something self-existing. For this important fact, compare—

“यथा भानवे नामस्ये व्यवज्ञायेते, तदा नामस्ये भाववश्चापारिवारिविे व्यवहारस्याते व्यवज्ञायेते” (१० मा, 2.6).

“वैवाक्ष्यवित्तिनायके कलः आयानानाधिक्यः प्रवृत्तानानां सत्यं बत्तमें” (१० मा, 2.6).

“यथा त्व यथा दानाधिकारं भवति, त्व तेऽऽ नार्थिनाय त्रक्तः, यथा दृष्टान्याग्रं युधः” (१० मा, 1.6.1).
The connection of the finite individuals with one another shows that they all depend on a common ground—an ever-present-connecting principle (प्राप्तचक्षु) bringing all into closest interaction. Relations imply the interaction of the individuals and, we have seen, these individuals are something for themselves (स्वकार्य), ere they can be something to one another (समन्वित). The individuals have their determinate character elicited through interaction with other individuals and the whole within which they exist. Brahman is immanent in all individual centres, yet does not reduce these centres to mere phases of its own, as it is Transcendental also and therefore distinguished from the elements it connects.

In the theory of Sankara, therefore, unity is not to be reduced to multiplicity, but unity contains multiplicity which cannot be separated from it. Multiplicity is not self-existing and independent (अप्रत्यावर्त्य), but is its revelations and hence multiplicity is incorporated (प्रत्ययित्व) or शोन as its expressions in the unity.

There are other arguments advanced by Sankara against Vrittikāra's theory of pantheism, but we have held them in reserve for future treatment. Here, we would place before our readers only one or two other arguments which have a direct bearing on the finite individuals. Sankara has clearly shown that the individual selves cannot be mere parts (अभ्यस्त) of an all-inclusive

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1 “ध्यान लोको परम्परापकाराकर्मभूतं ततु एकारणावृत्तं, ‘एक-साशंकाम’...हैं। परम्परापकाराकर्मभूतं जगतु सव नविधारिति’ (२, २.५.२)। “भूतानां वरिष्ठार्मकालेन चक्करात्रु परिपलेज, तदश्रेष्ठानां चरलेन चक्करात्रु सप्तले” (२.५.४). Vide p. 111 for प्राप्तचक्षु।

2 Vide p. 84, sec. 3, of this book.

3 Vide p. 91, sec. 5, of this book.
whole; for, in that case, the whole, i.e., Brahman would lose its own 'nature' or सत्त्व and will have to come down here to become a mundane jiva (जीव); and Brahman would be affected by the pleasure, pain and other experiences of the parts. The finite individuals also will have to lose their own 'nature' or सत्त्व and disappear in the pantheistic whole.¹

12. Before we conclude this part of the subject, we should like to place on record here in this connection two other arguments found in the Vedanta-bhasya from which it would appear that the idea of absorption of the individuals (जीव) in the Infinite whole and treating them as mere phases of that whole—was far from the mind of Sankara.

We shall first invite our reader's attention to the passage where Sankara is considering the relation between the Infinite (सत्त्व) and the finite individuals (जीव).

The relation is thus expressed—

“प्रतिविधिये तस्य तु परमांक्षते: संबंधत: परमेश्वरतः
‘जीवो’ द्वारा शीता वा।— परमेश्वरस्तु—
विश्रामार्धार्धात् ‘जीव’।”

(वेदां भाषा°, 1.1.17).

¹ जीव जनकश्यामार्धाराय सत्त्वय, परमांक्षण: एकदेवविषादो विश्रामादि...जी जिष्यायुविषादावयवात्सातोवयवी परसार्थ, तत्सैव एकदेवी विश्रामाला संशयारी...तदापि सम्बंधायुवात्सातावुत सयवविन एव चयववसि दृष्टि सुषोि शहि...विश्रामार्धाराय: दीविश परसार्था संवधिवे—इयस्य परसार्था कालमा”
(वेदां भाषा°, 2.1.20).

“सच्चैर्तेरु पश्चात् (जीवसि) ‘सत्त्व’-नाशायसि” (वेदां भाषा°, 4.3.14).

Also of. “सच्चैर्तेरु परमाण्डिकाभासम ऐताकायो न विकारः; जीवि चतुरः...तथा खैि चारिमुन: परस्म नाशायकाभ्यानि: ऐताकाम्मानियो जीवि; यवोकृष्णहुः
इतिमि न विकारः जीवि चतुरः” (आो, जाो आो 3.7).
Sankara argues that the individual self (तप) cannot be separated from the Infinite which is present in him, and treated as a self-contained, independent entity (ब्रह्म). The individual Jivas are always to be regarded as ब्रह्म (really not other than) from the Infinite from which they have derived their knowledge, action, everything. Neither can they be taken as mere phases of the Infinite, because the Infinite is ब्रह्म from them; i.e., because the Infinite has a being of its own and is thus distinguished (परमार्थस्व) from the individuals. As Brahman is transcendent, there is no necessity for suppressing the individualities of any one of these.

(a) We shall now come to another passage where the individual Jivas are described as the "reflections" (ब्रह्मावत) of the true self behind them.—

"ब्रह्मावत एव जैव जॊव: परशाल्माण; जनसुधेऽकाशलितः।
न स एव साधाम, नापि वस्तलगर्म।"
(वेदोः, भा०, 2.3.50).

We all know that the reflected image of the sun is but an imperfect and partial manifestation of the sun in the sky, of which—

"it is a reflection. And the image shows that there is something behind it—the original sun in the sky—whose reflection it is. In this way, the actual individual Jiva is but a partial and imperfect 1 revelation of the Infinite true self

1 Cf. "न स एव प्रकृतियोपपत्तिचिन्द्रावरोधपथं ल ‘ब्रह्म’वेदं; यदि—
प्रकृतिदैवतपपपत्तिचिन्द्रावरोधपथं वेदं लं, तदि ज्ञूं दृश्यन्न ‘दृश्यन्न वेदं’।—
कैंसण् पद-भाषा, 21. Cf. also—"सत-उपपाधिकलाविष्कृतं सच्च: संसारब्रह्माविक-प्रकृतं‘रामब्रह्मं श्रद्धा’ (४.५)."
which is behind him. This Infinite cannot be reduced to the individual self, as the sun in the sky cannot be reduced to the reflected image. For this reason, Sankara says—

“न स एव साभाय, भाग्य व्यक्तिः” वे ० 2.3.50.

i.e., neither can the individual Jīvas be identified with Brahman, nor can they be regarded as something other than Brahman.

(8) In another passage in the Vedānta-bhāṣya, Sankara has explained this relation with the help of an illustration of a Juggler and the tricks exhibited by him. Sankara writes—

“A Juggler was exhibiting his tricks before a number of spectators. People saw that a man holding in his hand a shield and sword climbed up to the sky and they all took this man to be the real Juggler. But the fact was that the man whom the people saw playing in the sky was the production of the Śaiva brought into being by the real Juggler who stood on the ground invisible to the spectators. In the same way, the true self of the finite individual is Brahman which underlies hidden behind the actual Jīva. ¹

¹ “तत्त्विएवपि एव तु परसाये तः परसेर्वरातु ‘चन्द्र’ इष्टि शीता व।
परसेर्वरातु शारीररातु बिज्ञान/कारणातु ‘चन्द्र;’। यथा साधविन: ‘चन्द्र-विद्वानः
वृत्त भाषकासाधिविरोधः; स एव सावधी परसायेविद्। शून्ये: अय:।”
(वे ० ४०; १.१.१७).

This also occurs in सावधी-भाष: —“तत्त्विएव परसाय:। सुकाश्यकाश:।
सुकुमार्याविचित्राय;...सुमार्याविचित्राय:। परसायेविद्। स एव भूमि:। शून्ये:
साभ: एव ज्ञात:।” (१.६).
THE PUWE EGO AS ACTIVE POWER  121

Now, the sum total of the states, actions, passions, impulses, etc., constitute to us the actual finite individual—the “Me” (ब्रह्माण्यमइश्वर: विश्वामिर्म). We take this self to be a separate (अन्य) and self-sufficient reality existing on its own account, utterly ignoring the real self which is present be hind 1 it unaffected by these states, etc., and distinguished from them. But the states, etc., cannot be separated from the real self behind and treated as an independent reality; they must be viewed in connection with 2 the true self as its revelation, through which it is expressing its nature and realising itself. Separated 3 from the underlying self, the states, etc., become unreal. 4 The readers will note that it is in this sense alone that the finite self has been declared to be unreal in the Sankara-vedānta. 5

We must change our outlook and think of Brahman or the absolute Reality alone which is revealing in

1 “प्राकारित: विश्वार्थ: प्रवाहु” (कठो भाग, 2.12).
2 Of. “म पूजनसंयोग: विज्ञ मनुष्यांपर:” (सत्संक्रोण)।
3 “नात्मानं तदारामकथा, ‘तद्विध’ गच्छिति बाहन”—कठो भाग 4.9.
4 “जय भं महं यद्यनि, तदारामना ‘विनिप्रम्य’ मस्तूऽभविन्ति”—कठो 2.20.
[For, they would be mere crass plurality, there would be no purpose, no end in them.]

5 The illustration of Juggler appears to us to be more appropriate than even the illustration of रक्षु-सपृश्य. The illusion of a second man (whom the spectators saw) was produced by the power of the Juggler who stood—invisible all along unaffected by this illusion. In the case of रक्षु-सपृश्य, the illusion of Snake is not produced by any action of the rope, it is simply a subjective idea of the people who see it. [The ‘man’ ought not to be thought of as an independent reality, but only as a production of the Juggler and this would be the real view there.]
ourselves, and of our states, etc., as its mere expressions. This is the true तार्किक view. We find thus that the Infinite true self cannot be reduced to, and identified with, the actual individual self. Such self is unreal, Sankara would say.
CHAPTER III.

ON THE FALSIITY OF THE WORLD.

1. A charge has often been brought against the Adwaita system of philosophy to the effect that in this school the world has been treated merely as an appearance and as an illusion; that the object world, in this system, is an "unsubstantial pageant" having no "stuff of reality" in it. And this they say, finds an appropriate and admirable support in the short but significant line of the old Vedantic Professor Gouḍāpāda——

"सत्ता द्वायं जगन्मिथा, अवधूत वै नैव लेखनम्।"

The current belief in this respect is that Sankara's theory of Adwaitavāda unmistakably teaches us the falsity of the world,—that Brahmān being considered to be the only Reality, everything else we find in the world must needs be unreal and false. From a frequent use in the commentaries of Sankara, of the terms 'Māyā' and 'Avidyā'—it has been hastily concluded that everything of the universe must be Māyā-maya—illusory. The employment of some similes, in the works of Sankara, such as the similes of the Juggler and his Jugglery, of the celestial city in the sky conjured up by a magician, of the desert and the mirage, and the like has lent no inconsiderable help in corroborating the idea thus formed of the multiplicity (नालक्ष) in the world as unreal and a mere appearance. It has not been felt advisable to
carefully examine the terms and the contexts in connection with which they occur. No need has also been felt to scrutinise how Sankara himself has explained these terms and similes. Now, we feel it incumbent upon us to test the ground with caution, upon which such dogmatic assertion about the falsity of the world and its diversities of nāma-rupas (नाम-रूप) has been founded and to see also if the alleged unreality finds any real support from the writings of Sankara himself.

2. Those who care to go through the commentaries of Sankara will find out that he has mentioned three distinct classes of objects, each possessing characteristic features which distinguish each class of objects from the other class. This important classification can be very easily gathered from various portions of his Bhāsyas and it has a most valuable bearing upon the question of the falsity of the world which has gained such a notorious currency in his name.

(i) The first class includes in it such objects as are generally known as—rabbit-horn (मृग-विषाण); barren-woman's son (वस्त्रा-पुत्र); and sky-flower (आकाश-कृमिः)\(^1\)—and the like.

We find Sankara employing the term alīka (अलीक), i.e., 'false,' 'non-existing,' and the general term asat (असत्), i.e., 'unreal' in connection with these objects.

(ii) The objects falling under the second class are generally known as things like रक्षु-रप्

\(^1\) These are all imaginary objects conjured up by diseased fancy.
ON THE FALSITY OF THE WORLD

(a rope appearing as a snake); चाँद-रञ्जि (an oyster appearing as silver; मछ-नरीचित (desert-mirage); and गगन-सारिण्य (the sky appearing as blue) and the like.

The term (asat) असत्, i.e., 'unreal' is sometimes applied to such class of objects.

(iii) Then comes the last class which comprises the created phenomenal objects of the world, i.e., the nāma-rūpas (नाम-रूप), i.e., the changes (विकार) in all their diversities which we find in the world.

After enumerating these three classes of objects, Sankara tells us that the objects designated under the first class, viz. the शब्द-विषय, etc., etc., have a peculiar nature of their own. They form a separate class distinguished from the two other classes of objects. For, these objects are of such a character that they do not work at all in the world, that do not serve any practical purpose of men. We cannot put these objects to any practical use at all. Why? Because, Sankara observes, the things which have nothing to take their stand upon, which have no permanent ground to sustain them and which are not supported by any underlying substratum—must be false; since such things can do us no practical good; they would break down, they would not work—in our varied experiences of the world—

"स दि 'लिखर्कर' किंतु एक ज्ञानाय ज्ञानलाते" गी० 9.4.

"स दि शब्द-विषयायोधिपि 'लिखर्कर' ज्ञानलि—सा का० 6, गी० 13.14.

"असुर शाश्वा यद्यपि जोकि वा,'

'सदार्कमा विनिःश्च 'सध्य' सम्पदते'—वज० 2.20.

1 Whatever is presented to the consciousness may be called an—'object.'
In respect of these objects, Sankara's remarks run to this effect:

The objects like वस्तु-विषय, etc., etc., have no prior cause from which they are produced; neither these objects are sustained or supported at the present moment by any underlying cause or 'being'—these have no underlying ground upon which they stand at present. Again, when these objects disappear (in future), they will have nothing—no sustaining ground—in which they will merge. For these reasons, such objects must be pronounced as really false or चलीक. As there is no underlying 'being' (सत्त्व or बास्पद) to support them, they must be 'non-existent' things. Hence they are not true; they are false.¹

But such is not the case with the objects which are subsumed under the second class; viz., the objects शक्ति-रजन, रजस-सत्त्व, etc. We cannot, Sankara remarks, call these things false or चलीक in the same manner as we call the objects वस्तु-विषय, etc., etc., as false. Why? Because, Sankara argues—

Such things as रजस-सत्त्व, शक्ति-रजन, etc., cannot be said to have no permanent

¹ "‘चलीक; वस्तु-विषयायाम्: सस्तुत्त्वदवचनात्—तै-भाष्य 2.6’। Again—
"वस्त्रा-पुत्री न हत्याम, साययावापि भावते—सां कां भाष्य 1.6."
"ष फि वस्त्रा-पुत्री राजास श्रवण, द्राक्षः पूर्वब्रह्मवेदोऽनि कारिकाम्, वस्त्रा-पुत्री राजाः ‘श्रवण,’ ‘सांहास्यीत्’ वा’—वेदाभ्यांभाष्य, 2.1.18."
ground to sustain them as long as they appear,—

"न रूपम् लग्नस्य द्रव्यम् 'निराकारः' भवति" | —
i.e., none of these is निराकार; that is to say, the prior condition of the snake was the rope, i.e., as the rope appears as a snake, the prior underlying ground which gave rise to the form or appearance of the ‘snake’ must have been the ‘rope.’ At the present moment too, the ground which sustains the appearance ‘snake’ is the ‘rope.’ Again when in future the notion of snake, on the dawning of the correct notion, will disappear, it will merge in its underlying ground, i.e., the ‘rope.’

It is evident, therefore, that these objects do not resemble the objects described above, viz., श्व-विषाण, etc., in respect of their ‘unreality’ or ‘falsity.’

These objects, viz., ज्ञ-स्वरूप, etc., cannot, therefore, be declared to be ‘false’ in the sense in which the objects श्व-विषाण, etc., can be so declared.

Now, let us consider the character of the third class of objects enumerated above, viz.,—the empirical objects.

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1 “रूपाकार भविष्यति ‘प्राक्’ सवः ‘सतेव’ भवति” 1-6; “सतिद्विशस्य वस्तुनि रूपाकारः सप्तः दित्तु जनः नुस्तिः” —सार कार भाग, 3.27।

न रूप-रजन-पूर्व-खण्डविकारादिविकारः रूप-पूर्वस्य खण्डविकारादिविकारः श्व-द्विशस्य अवधानं (स्वातिकाश्रयं) भवः कल्याणम् (सारा भाग 1.7।)

"रूप अतिव निष्टः सदविविकाराविविभक्ति (भविष्यति कार्यं) रूप रूपिति” (सारा वैद्यम प्रकार 2-18।)
(i.e., the evolving changes (विकारं) or the नाम-रूपस (नामचफः). Sankara points out—
these objects agree in an important respect with the objects described above as शक्ति-
रक्षकत, ज्ञ्ञ-सत्य, etc., etc. These changes (विकारं),—these empirical objects have a
prior cause from which they are produced; during their sustenance at the present
moment, the same identical causal reality underlies and sustains them; and in future
also, they will merge in the same underlying ground which sustains them now.¹

Thus, it will appear from a comparison of these three
classes of objects with one another that, as regards the
underlying sustaining ground, both the last-mentioned
classes of objects agree with one another; but both of
these differ from the first class of objects in this respect.
It necessarily follows, therefore, that if you call the first
class unreal or false (as Sankara has justly called them),
the other two classes must, by implication, be real

Now, what is the net result of this discussion? The
objects known as ज्ञान-विषयं, ज्ञात्व-क्रमम, etc., are the only
objects which may, as the above discussion shows, be
designated, in the system of Sankara, as actually false
or unreal. Why? Because, these objects are the only
objects which, as has been proved by the above-mentioned
arguments, do not even serve the practical concerns of

¹ "प्रयत्निग्नायीत साधुं विकारं भवन्/विकारं दश्चिं-दर्शनात्, विवधित्रेष्व
सर्वेष अकार्यं भवति, न पिकारित्रिकिव: भवनवात् भवविख्याति" (एको मात्रेः
6.2.2. भाषा)।

"कार्यं वर्ग विषयं कालं तटं अवशिष्यति, तथा कालोपि अवश:"
(वेदां मात्र 2.1.16.)

"सबौृषेुप्पू सबौलस्यफस्ते। ज्ञात्व जाते भविष्यतु स्वकारणं हि।"
(तेऽ मात्र 2.5.)
ON THE FALSIITY OF THE WORLD

our life, because they have no prior or present sustaining-ground upon which they stand.

Tested by this line of argument, even such objects as are known to us as युक्त-रजत, रज, यय, सद-सरीचिक्षा, etc., cannot be regarded unreal or false, in the Sankara system. For, can the snake, as has been seen in the above illustration, remain separated from its underlying substratum, viz., the rope? Can the mirage stand, even for a moment, separated from the surface of the desert? 1

It follows therefore that the man who has, thus, taken pains to prove the reality of such things as रज, यय, सद-सरीचिक्षा, etc., will never feel inclined to regard the actual changes in the world—the empirical objects—the nāmarūpas (नाम-रूप)—as unreal or false. But Sankara is not yet satisfied by mere comparison, by mere exhibition of the points of agreement and disagreement among the three classes of objects. He has gone further. He actually teaches in express terms the fact that the reality of the empirical objects is even more pronounced than the reality of such objects as the mirage, the Sukti-rajata and the like—

“मुनुरश्याकाशपेष्या, परमार्धीदकार्धि सब्हे”। (६० भाष, 2.6.)

Elsewhere too, while describing the created subtle and gross elements (सृष्टिपूर्ण प्रकृतिः) of the world, Sankara calls them—“सब्ह” or ‘reals,’ and the underlying Brahma as—“सब्ह सब्ह” or ‘the Reality of the reals.’

1 “न हि सये-रजत-पूर्ण सुगुणियाकारिद्विकल्पणे; रज, यय, सद-सरीचिक्षादि-‘आतिरिक्ष’ भवतास्यध्या; शक्यः कालविर्यत्” (मणि भाष, भाग, प्रका०) 1.7.

2 Cf. also “सय—परस्राहीदकार्धि। चस्य—सदीयुदकार्धि” (प्रका० मणि, सिखे०)

3 “सय मूलानां सत्यानां सहायाखिराविद्यविधाः” (हृद मणि, 2.3.1.)

“भैल भैल बखाण्डा—सहाय सत्य सिहि विहीरिते” (हृद मणि, 2.3.6.)

17
How can Sankara call the created empirical objects unreal or false? How can their existence be denied? Because, he has laid down the principle that "what is produced from something, from a prior 'being' — cannot itself be a 'non-existent' thing. For, a 'non-being' cannot be produced from a real 'being.'" As we can know nothing of the Causal Reality (i.e., Brahman) apart from its effects upon us, the effects or the products must be 'real.'

In this way, the empirical objects or the emergent changes have been regarded as real objects, in the system of Sankara's philosophy. Yet, most people have hastily concluded that the world is regarded false in this system.

It will be seen that it is only in comparison with the Absolute Reality (परमाणु व्यक्ति) which is none else but Brahman, that the phenomenal things may be designated asat (चक्षु) or 'unreal,' which therefore means—'relatively real.'

It is to be regretted that the critics of the Sankara system have not cared to consider properly these weighty arguments to be found dispersed in the Vedanta-works; but they have, from the mere mention of the terms in the Bhāṣyas, like शास्त्र-विश्वास, नरीचिन्ता, etc., etc., jumped at once at the conclusion that the world is false in the Vedānta.

1 "अत्रः आयतः तत्त्वविवेचनात्, शास्त्रशब्दांक्षणात्, अशुर्य जगतीमृतं।।।
वेदां जाते विभिन्नते तद्विकृती इत्य लोके, संतोषाय संवेदसुखे।।
(५० भाष २.६)।" काव्यिकः इसे विशेषतः कारणार्थालस्य सत्यसुतिः (५० भाष १.६)।
"अत्रः आयतः ततः, अशुर्य शास्त्रविवेचनात्, ततः काव्यशशायतः।।
(५० काव्य १.६, ३.२७)।"

2 "सत्यांगुणं सत्यलोकं विश्वासं—तथा न परमाणुः परमाणुः। फिर तथा?
प्रतिरूपविवेचयो...दक्षिणां विश्वासं अविष्कर्तं (४० भाष ७.१७)।" सत्यां आयताविवेचयं...न परमाणुविवेचयं। एकभी इस परमाणुविवेचयं
(५० भाष २.६)।"
3. To another reason, the current belief in the falsity of the world may be traced. Sankara has, in more than one place in his commentaries, compared the experiences of our waking life with our dream-experiences. Finding this comparison, most people, without feeling any necessity to pause to weigh carefully the observations of Sankara recorded in these places, have run away with the idea that as the dream-experiences are known to everybody to be unreal—to have no objective reality—the waking experiences which have been likened to these, must be equally unreal. But we beg to invite our reader's attention to the two most important passages wherein this comparison occurs and to request the readers to follow us, with a view to find out how Sankara has expressed his own views on the subject.

(a) First, we should like to refer our readers to the famous passage in the Brihadáryayaka—in the story of Ajáta-satrú and Báláki where an elaborate description of the dream-state and its experiences occurs. And here also is recorded Sankara's view of the sense in which he regards the waking and the dreaming experiences as 'unreal.'

If our readers follow us patiently, it will be as clear as daylight that Sankara never regarded the objects experienced by us to be unreal. What he looked upon as unreal is an altogether different thing.

Sankara thus observes—

When a man falls asleep and happens to dream, he finds himself, say, to be a king
actually sitting upon a royal throne—surrounded by his people, ministers and servants;—with the maids fanning him and himself enjoying various pleasurable and painful experiences. Now, the cognitions he receives, the activities he performs, the states and feelings he enjoys—these are all his dream-experiences. Are these experiences to be taken as constituting the actual ‘nature’ or ज्वलन (swarūpa) of the self? or, is the real nature of the self to be regarded as something which is distinct from these, and which maintains its distinct identity and unity in and through dreaming experiences? Is this ज्वलन (nature) to be regarded as the aggregate—the mere sum-total—of these experiences, or does it possess a nature—a ‘Self-hood’—distinguished from these?

Sankara declares that these experiences cannot constitute the self; the self cannot be resolved into and identified with them. What the real self is cannot be reduced into its states and activities; for, these are not its ज्वलन or ज्वाबासूत्र। The real self is that which experiences these things, unaffected by them; and hence it is the subject to which these stand as its object, and these are erroneously attributed to the subject as its ‘nature’ or ज्वलन. Such is also the case with the soul’s waking experiences.

Here towards the close of this discussion, Sankara has employed the term—“अविवादना”: i.e., ‘non-existent.’
and the term—“सत्यशास्त्रीय”—: i.e., ‘falsely ascribed to the self’; and these two terms have been used in connection with the dream-experiences. These two terms are, we are afraid, the source of immense mischief created in respect of the idea of the falsity of our world-experiences.

But the readers will see that Sankara never says here that what a man experiences in his dream is false. He

“अर्थमूलस्वप्न अनवारस्या एव सनाः”

That is to say, these experiences do not exist as his ज्ञानमूल, i.e., as his ज्ञान or as the ‘nature’ of the self. These are falsely regarded as the nature or the swarupa (ज्ञान or ज्ञानमूल) of the self. The experiences of both the waking and the dreaming states of the man cannot be his ज्ञानमूल, i.e., cannot constitute his swarupa. The ‘nature’ (ज्ञान) of the self is what is distinct from these experiences; and this nature underlies these experiences, without losing its own identity in them.¹

Here with a view to preclude any possibility of a mistake, Sankara records three reasons showing that

¹ In his commentary on साक्ष्याकारिका, वेतन्य प्रकरण (2.8), Sankara has shown both the waking and dreaming experiences as ज्ञानमूल—unreal. But the reason given for it is the same as here. They are unreal because they are regarded as ज्ञान, i.e., essential property of the self. In reality, these experiences are not so. The self seems to be affected (i.e., become सत्यसत्य) by these, but really it stands apart from these. “न ज्ञानस्विद्ध, किन्तु ज्ञानस्वाभावती ज्ञानं।...ज्ञानिष्ट्येवस्तवेति ज्ञानस्विद्ध।”
the real nature of the self is distinct from its experiences and the latter cannot therefore be regarded as ज्ञानमूल of the self. The experiences are his; they are not he. Why?—

(I) इत्यत्—These experiences are the objects of the self. They are what the subject experiences, to which the self directs its attention. The knower must be distinct from the objects known. Hence these known objects cannot constitute the nature of the knower.

(II) अविनाशनात्—These experiences are by their nature transient and changing. They appear, they vanish and they are succeeded by other experiences. Such being their character, how can they constitute the nature of the self which is permanent?

(III) विनाशनकार—These experiences are elicited from the nature of the self by the external or internal stimulating environment upon which they depend. But the underlying self is not dependent on anything and not produced by any stimulating object like "शब्दादि," \*i.e., the sounds, touch, etc., etc.*

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1 "हिता त्राणः, यदा सोपः; तदात्मामार्यं गति भवति,....'प्रक-व्यक्त्र-वाक्य-हिता।...तदात्मादि: 'सत्तात्म महत्तार' बिधु न वदि' (व 2.1-18-19).

Here cf. "न हि यस्म यथे खर्द्धे, तस्म च भवतीः प्रचः। भुतते सदा स्वद्वितीया। विघटने, ततै खर्द्धे सिद्धे।" (केशभाष, 1-4). Also—
"द्रव्यस्ति हि तत्तवादिको, पर प्रचेष्यात्। विक्रया न तत्त्, पर विवेचत। न हि कार्यादि वृद्धिकं। सतो विवेष: कार्यादि:। विक्रयविक्रय। यदि यस्म सामायादि खर्द्धे, ततै तथा खर्द्धे। यदापिैः, ततै न तत्त्-प्रक-व्यक्त्र-वाक्यात्।"—तैः भाग 2.8।
The self is therefore distinct from its experiences. We see, now, that the experiences of the world, as such, are never regarded by Sankara as unreal or false. The unreality only comes, when the self is entirely resolved into these experiences, and when these are taken to be the nature (अस्वभूत) of the self.

(b) In a similar passage in the Chandogya Upanishad, where a similar comparison between the waking and the dreaming experiences occurs, Sankara very forcibly expresses his view saying that their apparent unreality lies in their relativity, i.e., in relation to the dreaming experiences, the waking experiences may be called unreal and in relation to the latter, the former may be regarded unreal.¹

"जायः बिषयमेव तदनुभलेन, न खनः।"—8.5.4.

But both kinds of experiences must be regarded real respectively in their own spheres (स्विषये, खनः).

"स्विषयुपि सम्भ सध्येष, स्वक्रमादिवः किं न कार्यिरीषः।"—कृ ८.५.४.

4. The world of नासकेस has frequently been described as inexplicable—चविष्ठेन—नित्यागतात्तंत्र—विषयमेव—व्यक्तायाः ब्रह्माः नासकेसः... "भवायाः सांस्करिक्यं तयाः नित्यागतात्तंत्रलक्ष्मीः प्रतिवेदः" (॥ २.१.२७)²

¹ Here compare भ २.२.२९, where similar conclusion has been drawn.

² Vide also भ २.१.१४.
The reason given for characterising the world as "inexplicable" is to be found in the expression—

तत्त्वायाह्यामविद्विभीनाति)

This expression means that the world is neither absolutely सत्त (i.e. प्रकृत), nor it is not-सत्त (i.e., something absolutely different from Brahman), and it is therefore inexplicable.

If the readers will call to mind what has been said about Sat (सत्त) and Asat (असत्त) in Chap. I, the real significance of the expression (यविद्विभीन) will come out. From one point of view the world will appear as real or सत्त, and from another point of view it will appear as unreal or असत्त. We have seen there that prior to actual manifestation, the world of नामहेतु—existed in Brahman in undifferentiated condition and so indistinguishable from Brahman. But as the differentiations began to arise, some वेत्तस्य—something new—some difference—began to appear. But the difference which arose was in reality not something altogether different (असत्त) from Brahman, but is Brahman itself. For, it was nothing but the manifestation of Brahman’s nature.

So long as the world is regarded as existing in Brahman in undifferentiated condition, it is identical—अभिभुच्छ—with Brahman—not निभस्त or असत्त from it, and so long it is real or सत्त. But as soon as the world is differentiated, there is some difference—वेत्तस्य or असत्त also. In the Chāndogya, Sankara remarks that prior to its production, previous to its manifestation, the world was real—सत्त.¹ But when it was differentiated or came out of Brahman—when नामहेतु actually appeared—we began to look upon it as something absolutely different from

¹ "सत्त न सुतं लया 'वेत्तस्यविद्विभाय' (५.२.२).
Brahman—as विभेद or चिन्त—as something self-existing and independent. Taken in this way, the भावन is unreal—अवस्था. But from a higher view, from the परमार्थक standpoint—नाम देव is not really different or चिन्त from Brahman,¹ but inseparably connected with Brahman. Thus from two different views, the भावन or the world is both real and unreal. Hence it cannot be said to be absolutely real or unreal. We in our अविद्यावेदन, always separate the effects (विकार्य) from their underlying causal reality (कारण). This is our अविद्यावेद-स्थिति. But even in our अविद्यावेद-स्थिति, we must try to change our outlook and look upon the world from the परमार्थक point of view, and then the विकार्य will appear standing inseparably connected with their cause (प्रकृत)—the underlying Reality, and not something separate. For, the underlying Reality is being expressed or realised through them.

The readers will find that Sankara does not deny the existence of the world as such, he only wants us to treat it not as चिन्त from Brahman² or something self-existent and independent. This is Sankara’s view of unreality.

5. The theory of causality as elaborated in the Vedanta Philosophy by Sankara which is known as the Sat-kāryya-vāda (सत्कारवण्यावद्याव) has not, it appears to us, received the attention which it deserves, and such scanty and superficial treatment of this celebrated Principle of

¹ “न च विकारवण्य च चायित्कारणां अस्मातार्थ ऐत्यसिनां चक्षुम्” (ष्ठ, २.१.९).
² For this, the world—the भावन—has been stated as चायित्वूर्त in several places. It means—‘not चक्षुम् from Brahman.’ cf. चायित्वूर्त—समस्यासनम्, न सांपार्विकर्षादिभाद्विविधस्च पूर्वगूढ्यं चक्षुम् सचि…… मेघानिलालाविनं च’ (ष्ठ, २.५, १.३).
Causality is, we fear, responsible, to not an inconsiderable extent, for the current views about the falsity of the world.

In a previous chapter we have given brief indication of this theory, and here we desire to elaborate the idea of causality further in the light in which it has been elucidated by Sankara himself.

Sankara, it will be seen, has, at the very commencement of his discussion, splitted up the theory into two distinct parts and laid it down as a general rule that—

"वानवले पिव कार्य-कारणयोः;—
कार्यस्य कारणामालं, न तु कारणस्य कार्यानां।"

—बेदा। भा। 2.1.9.

(1) The first part, viz.,—न तु कारणस्य कार्यानां implies that the cause or the causal Reality is distinct from its effects or its successive changes or manifestations, because it has a 'nature,' a अङ्ग, 'selfdom' of its own; and it cannot therefore be resolved into, or identified with, the effects or successive changes emerging from it;—it cannot therefore be regarded, to use Sankara's own mode of expression, as becoming something other than its own nature (अङ्ग) when the effects emerge from it in succession—

"न रुद्र निरीष्यद्वैतानां पदार्थो वानानां भवति

.......एवं प्रत्येकिन्द्रानां।"

—बेदा। भा। 2.1.18.

If you violate this part of the teaching, a great fault will vitiate your theory,
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\textit{viz.}, the causal reality would consist merely in its effects, \textit{i.e.}, the sum-total of the effects (parts) would constitute the cause (the whole). In this case—Brahman would be all, and all would be Brahman.

(II) The second part of the theory, \textit{viz.—}

"\textit{कारण अभास कारणांम}"—implies that the cause is no doubt distinct from, and independent of, its effects or the emergent changes; but the effects (कारण) or the successive changes cannot be absolutely \textit{separated} from their cause and regarded as independent and self-sufficient 'things' (वर्ण), each complete in itself—

"यथा च यथावादाः सतताः भवति, स तेन चप्रविभक्तः दृष्ट:। यथा घटायोऽनां बुध्दि 1.6.1. (२०)।" And—"नानां वत्सीयोः विभारी नाम कारणद्विः। कारणार्थाः अतिरिक्तः अभासः कारणयः" | 1

The effects are called \textit{चन्द्रय} from their cause. That is to say,—as the real 'nature' of the cause becomes gradually manifested or realised in these successive effects, the latter are mere \textit{means}, instruments, for the realisation of the 'nature' of the cause. 2 It is not therefore possible to \textit{separate} any of the effects from the underlying cause. For, these are merely the phases, or stages (संध्याकालिक साधन)

1 \textit{Vide} 2.1.14. तः माति, and also तः माति, 1.6.1.

2 Our readers will remember that in the Vedanta the self is known as \textit{सद्य}, \textit{i.e.} purpose, and everything else besides the self is known as — \textit{पूर्वत} for the realisation of that purpose. This point the reader will find discussed in Chapter II.
assumed by the cause for its own manifestation. We cannot, therefore, regard any of the stages as something or independent and separate, as if existing on their own account.—

“सांस्कृतिक (The cause) प्रकृति तत्त्वः (विशेषः) (the effects) प्रत्येकः स्वः...न तत्त्वं ‘विशेषः’ प्रत्येकः स्वः” ¹

In this way, the effects are called in the Vedanta as अनाय (ananya) from their cause.

One of the Tikā-Kāras amplified the sense of the term अनाय (Ananya) by stating—

“कारणातू प्रकृतस्वाभावेण साम्यसे, न तु एकाभिन्नाशेषः” ²

The created world is not absolutely identical with Brahman—its underlying cause; but the world has no separate being apart from, or independent of, its underlying cause. That is to say, the world is entirely dependent on Brahman and inseparable from it. No one of the successive changes can be separated from the underlying Causal Reality (i.e., Brahman) which is constantly present behind each change, unaffected by it; and no one of its changes can be regarded as so many independent ‘things’—

“न द्वि ‘व्यवस्त्वः’ विकारी नाम कारणस्य”
“परस्थितः कारणातू ‘व्यवस्त्वः’ भवाय: कारणाः”

—(वेदां भाष्य 2.1.14).

Sankara has, in this way, explained and elaborated his celebrated Causal Theory in his Vedāntabhāṣya and other places.

6. The readers must remember that we have already referred to the theory of Pantheism which was associated with the name of one Vrittikāra and which Sankara took particular care to refute. Some

¹ Vids इत्यादि, 2.4.11, etc., etc., etc., and इत्यादि, 2.1.14.
² The Bhāmati remarks—'चतुर्दशीत: न साधारे, जिन्म संदिग्धिः व्यवस्त्वः—वेदांश्च।
of the arguments employed for its refutation has been considered in the earlier Chapter of this book (p. 69 and pp. 113-118). Some other arguments are given here.

While treating of Sankara’s own view, we have found that Brahman has a ‘nature’—स्वभाव—of its own and it is not liable to change (स्वभाव जनपाविलक्तः). And from this ‘nature,’ the world—the differences of नामारूपा—are produced. In the finite self also, its states or qualities are elicited from its ‘nature’ by its interaction with the environment. When these differences emerge, the underlying nature or स्वभाव does not lose its identity, nor does it become entirely reduced to these. It continues to maintain its unity—its identical nature—in these successively emergent changes or states.

The Vrittikāra entirely reduced unity to multiplicity—Brahman or the self to the changing नामारूपाः or states. Thus he made Brahman or the Self as—चन्द्रेशसभ, i.e., composed of parts. But yet, most inconsistently, he looked upon both the unity and the multiplicity to be equally real.

But Sankara, in his criticism of this theory, very

1 "संस्कृतमाय विशिष्ट—विश्वविद्या वभावः (वै भाः)। Also "उपाधि—योगाधुराताविशिष्टम्” (3.2.34).

2 "न फिद उपाधि—योगाधुराताविशिष्टम् वभावः वभावः स्वभावः सम्बन्धित। पूर्वपाशिशिबं फिद अभेदविशिष्टम् भावः स्वभावः” (वै भाः 3.2.11-12)।

3 "आस्मा एते वभावः। सम्रेत ज्ञात्वनसकारात्; यथा सर्प-वर्णीयिभ्यं राजः।। कालेवक्षात्तु कालेवक्षात्तु विविधाय विविधाय” (भाः 6.2.2, 2.32-33). “एकवेदिविश्वामयं परसाधते; ’प्रदेश्यकालीय’ (भाः 6.2.2)।

4 न हु चन्द्रेशसभं प्रक्षा……यथा समुदायमस्य एकं—योग—सर्पात्वं स्वात्मस्य गात्रः; तत: एकं गात्रं स्वात्मस्य अवतं द्यादि (भाः 2.1.14).
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pertinently asks—when you reduce the one to the many, or when you reduce the many to the one, how can both be declared to be equally real? ¹ One of them must be an unreality. For—

(a) If the unity is entirely reduced to the many, the many would be the only reality and the unity has no separate existence apart from the many. The unity would be merely a unity of collection—a mere aggregate of disconnected parts. The aggregate alone stands here, with no separate unity behind to connect it. There would be no real unity, no plan, no purpose, no regularity (नियम व्यवस्था) in the world. As the flowers of a garland when the connecting string is removed, so the successive differences of nāma-rūpa without any connecting identity passing through them would fall to the ground, ² as ब्राह्मण भाविक has so beautifully stated. Then again, as the unity is a mere logical abstraction, the nāma-rūpas—the many—would stand unrelated, as an independent whole. But how can there be nāma-rūpas at all, without Brahman on their background? For, it is Brahman as the cause of which the world of nāma-rūpa is the production. And without the subject, how there can be an object? Who

¹ Cf. "न संवेद्य समानतया भाविकः समायितं। लघुवेय पदं विद्यविशेषये एकत्वत् परिप्रेक्ष्येन भान्ति। " (६ 2.4.13).

"न उल्लिख्यं एकत्वते सत्यं भविकविशेष्यं, सार्वभौमे सूत्राभाष्यं भविक विनिरेक्षये। " (६ 3.2.11).

Sankara elsewhere shows there can be no co-ordination between Brahman and the world. "सर्वं भवितं संसारविकारेः सत्यं भवितं, तत्र विद्यविनिरेक्षते—वद्धवे। " (६ 1.3.1). Cf. also ō 3.2.29.

¹ "कान्ति ब्रह्माण्डाम् चाप अत्युत्तमाः अपि। सत्यं भवितं विद्यविनिरेक्षते। " Cf. जैसं, 6.7.1. also.
would combine the series of his states and call them to be his own?

(b) If the many is reduced to the one, if the nāma-rūpas are changed or sacrificed to Brahman, the one or the all-inclusive whole would be the only reality. Everything of the world, all differences of nāma-rūpa, the many—would be equally divine, all would be Brahman; there would then be no differences between a saint and a sinner. All distinctions, all चेतन will, as Sankara justly remarks, disappear. There would be no higher and lower, no तारतम्य in the objects of the world. The finite selves would be mere phases of that whole and therefore would have no freedom and responsibility.

In this way, Sankara has shown that both the unity and the multiplicity cannot be held to be equally real in Vrittikāra’s theory. In Sankara’s own theory where there is no question of reduction, no such absurdity as noticed above can arise. In his own theory, the one is the reality which has a ‘nature’ of its own and which cannot be

1 “एकं द्वि परं ब्रह्म हैतात्त्वकं न व अपदेशा भवन्यो ब्रजाये; 
ब्रज्ञादिकं उपदेशनम् इव शाश्वतसत्त्वात्। न सम्यक्त। न द्वितीयं उपदेशनम् इव। 
तः चेतनम्; इव विज्ञानं भवन्यो; ब्रज्ञ उपदेशी, कपो; केवल उपदेशय 
प्रहोता, इव विज्ञानं नान्यत् उपदेशय प्रहोता इव तत्त्वं।” (४° ५.१.१.)

2 “विद्या च सर्वात्मलेखनान्तः; धार्म-पथं सर्वात्मलेखनान्तः; 
सप्तपीडितां न उपदेशयोः न उपदेशयो; गृहसात् तु उपदेशयोविभवेत्” (४° ३.२.१.)

Cf. क्रिया-कारक-कल्पनेद्य सत्यसत्यां सत्यसत्यां सत्यसत्यां सत्यसत्यां सत्यसत्यां (२.१.२०).

9 “सत्यसत्यां च ब्रह्मचर्यस्य च दर्जन्यां च 
चर्यायां च एव च ब्रह्मचर्यस्य च दर्जन्यां च 
तत्त्वात्मेऽऽुपदेशविभवेत्;” (४° १९.१७)।
reduced to the many. And there arises no need also to declare the unreality of the existence of the many, as in the Vritikara's view. The many is the factor which is inseparable from the one, in and through which the nature of the unity is realising or manifesting itself, and the many—the world of nāma-rūpas—is to be always taken in inseparable connection with the underlying unity of Brahman as its stages or means of manifestation,—and not as a separate and an independent whole. Taken as a separate whole, the world would be an unreality.¹

Now, we find, as the result of this exposition of the Vedantic theory of causality that we are not to resolve the prior causal reality into its effects, i.e., the created nāma-rūpas with their infinite diversities. If we do so, the causal Reality would lose its own unity or its Svabhāva (स्वभाव), and with the successive emergence of the differences or changes, it would itself become something absolutely other than its own nature (i.e., तच्छ); Brahman would become the world, and both would be entirely identical. Sankara calls such world unreal, false, असत्य. For, in that case the world would be the only reality. Everywhere he has held the world and the changes (विचारस) to be unreal and false in this sense only. He has not negated or abolished or denied anywhere the existence of the world and its changing विचारस, as they are, as they stand. In the case of the finite self and its states and activities, the theory holds good equally. If the finite self is resolved into its successively emergent states and activities;—the self will become absolutely identical with these and will thus become

¹ “सतिराज्यं अनुगतंं, सहस्रस्यं संवर्धितम्”। “न श्च ब्रह्मानाविक धरति; सति विचारसं सम्बन्धित । (शः शः 6.3.2 and 6.8.4.)

“धार्मिकमस्तस्ते—‘अवधिः’ पञ्चमनं—पञ्चमावासीयु ब्रह्मस्यमस्त सति ” (शः शः, 3.5.1).
something other than itself; such a self is unreal and false. \(^1\)

The fact is that Brahman as well as the Jivas maintain their own nature or ख्यात and preserve its unity and identity in and through its successive states or changes; and these emergent changes are always to be considered as self-evident stages (संस्कारमेत्) for the manifestation or realisation of their underlying ख्यात; for, we have seen that it is Brahman which has manifested itself as its other and therefore the other is not absolute, but only itself, and consequently they cannot be separated and treated as something absolutely distinct (बन) \(^2\) from Brahman. When they are so treated, Sankara would at once call them unreal, false. In no other way, he is prepared to label the world and its experiences as false.

7. There is quite a large number of terms, phrases, and expressions, very widely made use of by Sankara which frequently occur in diverse places of the commentaries. These terms, phrases and expressions have, we are sure, contributed much to give currency to the idea of the falsity of the world. For, these phrases and expressions, when detached from the context in which they occur, convey the meanings which apparently may be taken to favour the idea of falsity. But fortunately, Sankara has, in every case, taken good care to give a clear exposition of these phrases and expressions, from which we can, if we feel so inclined, gather

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\(^1\) "धार्मिको धर्मोपदेशत्वतिरिक्तव्यं विद्वैव प्रकृतिः। सत्यगृह अन्वययायः, ख्यातप्रदानः बिन्दः।" (सौ २.३२).

\(^2\) This idea of बन, when perfected, has also been called by the phrase 'सहास्यमय' in the commentaries. "सत्यवेत दैवाभेद अवधारे नागारुपः कामतिथ्व वसलः; पूवोऽयः।" (सौ ६.२.३).
their right import. We now propose to present them to our readers with a view to show that a great injustice has been done to the writer of these phrases, terms and expressions in understanding them in a sense which was far from the mind of the author.

(a) Let us take the celebrated expression—

"वाचारन्न्य विकारो, नामधेर्य,

——बेचिनेव्या सबसू।"

We come across this sentence for the first time in the Chāndogya-Upanisad where Āruni Uddālaka, that vedic teacher of high renown who founded the celebrated Mortar-Doctrine—explained, to his son Sweta-ketu, with the help of certain familiar objects of every-day-use in the household, the relation existing between a causal substance and its effects which are successively produced from it. This sentence attained so much importance in the subsequent vedantic literature that one of its phrases formed an integral part of an Aphorism in the Brahma-sutra,¹ and Sankara himself made use of this sentence in several parts of his commentaries while engaged in giving an exposition of the vedantic causal theory. In view of the eminent place which this sentence holds, we shall here try to arrive at the true significance of this expression.

Uddālaka was telling his son that the causal substance—the clay—produces from it several transformations in succession to which specific names are applied—say, the plate, the pot, the cup and so on. A lump of gold produces several forms out of it to which we apply specific names, viz., a bracelet, a crown, a necklace. Now, all these so-called objects, the transformations, the changes, (विकार) are, declares Sruti, absolutely dependent on the

Vide the Aphorism—2.1.14.
specific words people choose to apply to them. But these are in reality nothing other than—नाम-विशेष—\textit{the class-name, i.e., नाम-सामान्य} to which they belong as inseparably connected. This is the relation between a genus (सामान्य) and the several species (विशेष) subsumed under it.

Sankara, in his commentary on the Brihadaranyaka, records his opinion on the relation which exists between a \textit{genus} and its species. Sankara remarks there (1-6.1) that all the (विशेषः) \textit{specific} words are but the differentiations of one नाम-सामान्य—

``vidence क बन्धू वर्णव सा......
शब्द-सामान्यमात्रम्। एतदेवेषाः—
नाम-विशेषाः कारणम्। (ि, 1.6.1).
``

The class-name or the नाम-सामान्य is the cause of the specific words or the नाम-विशेष (individual words). It is the नाम-सामान्य which divides itself into, differentiates into, the specific words and binds them to itself.¹ And these विशेष cannot, therefore, be taken out of, separated from, the नाम-सामान्य and treated as self-sufficient entities (अन्य).² Why? Because these are all \textit{included within}³ the सामान्य and these are mere phases, shapes, forms, of that सामान्य in which it manifests itself—

`` सामान्य: तद्विशेषः ज्ञानः।
`` विशेषाः: च सामान्य: अन्तर्भावात्”—

Sankara concludes that when the सामान्य is taken, all

¹ ``नाम-सामान्यः सच्चार्थ: नामानि यदाधं तदवस्त: श्वेतमात्रादिविशेषार्थः निि गौरवादिविशेषः। न तत: एवं निमिः स्थहित: गंगाद्रे।”
² ``न पुनःसम्बन्धः विद्युत: तन: साध्वशायात्। (क्षतरंनिर्वधासम्)।
³ ``कारणः हि लंके काध्वशाय भूमी देशं।...यथा यथा अन्तर्भावोऽतथा: तद्भवः, भूमि देशसः (ि, 7.12.1)।”
`` सामान्यः हि विशेषः अन्तर्भावत्” (ि, 7.4.1)।
the विषयां are taken along with it; for, it included them within it\(^1\) as its inseparable parts. It is the सामान्य which sustains\(^2\) all its विषयां and it is, therefore, not at all possible or reasonable to separate the latter from the former, looking upon the latter as so many independent and separated objects existing on their own account, which all of us most unreasonably do under the influence of our ब्राह्मण. Regarded in such a way, the so-called objects would be unreal, false.

Now, in the light of these suggestions made by Sankara, the sentence—“वाचार्येष्व विषयो, नामस्थः; वृत्तिज्ञान सच्च”—means that all विषयां, such as the earthen cup, the plate, the pot, etc., which are all dependent on वाच (वाचार्येष्व),—to which specific names or words (वाक्, i.e., शब्दविषयः) are applied—are, properly speaking, only नामस्थः, i.e., नाम-सामान्य।\(^3\) And this सामान्य is real—सच्च—in them, as the clay, i.e., ख्यु-सामान्य is real in the specific differences, viz., the cup, the plate and the pot. Hence the विषयां, i.e., these specific objects cannot be taken out of their सामान्य, cannot be separated from it and regarded as so many self-sufficient entities. In that case, if separated, they would be unreal—परस्य; Yet in our practical life (अवधारित-स्थान), we always regard them so.\(^4\) But in reality—from the परस्मार्थिक-स्थान-पूर्व, they are not such independent (च्यु, विभक्त) things, but they are only सामान्य; for it is the सामान्य which sustains them, सामान्य which includes them in itself and which expresses its nature through them.

\(^1\) सामान्येः प्रकृतेष्व तत्सङ्गविषयः; गृहीताभवति (श्र 2.4.7).

\(^2\) 'सामान्यं वाचार्येपदमालयं द्वि विषयानु विभिन्नि प्राधिति' (श्र 1.6.1.).

\(^3\) The affix ख्यु is in ख्युये; नामशेष अस्य must therefore mean नामसामान्य।

\(^4\) 'अभिज्ञां अभवः' वल्लभस्वरिष्क प्रकाशि' (श्र मृ 4.5).
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The readers will see that this is the real explanation of the celebrated sentence according to the light thrown by Sankara himself, and this explanation does not at all make the विकार non-existent or unreal or पचन्य. Sankara wants us to regard विकार to be taken always in connection with their सामान्य which finds its expression in them—and not separated from it, as so many different objects. We have no right, says he, to sever their connection or relation with their underlying सामान्य—which is their causal substance. Thus the world ought not to be taken as separated from the underlying Brahman and regarded as a self-sufficient whole existing on its own account. The world would be unreal in this sense alone, according to Sankara.

(b) Let us now take the expressions—

सत्य स्यात्मैव ज्ञाता—All this is Brahman;
प्रत्येकत्वादेव सब्ज—All this is Atmā;
इव सब्ज वद्यमात्रम्—All this is what is Atmā;

A superficial reading of such expressions as these cannot but leave in the mind of a reader an impression of the absolute identity of Brahman with the world. But we would request our readers to turn their eyes to the three main places in the Vedanta-bhāsya where Sankara himself explains these expressions; viz.,—the sutra 1.1.25, Sutra 1. 3. 1, and Sutra 2. 1. 14.

1 In fact, in the first section (commencing from aphorism 20), second section and the third section—in all these sections (पाद) of the first chapter of the Vedanta sutras, the readers will find that the real sense of such terms as प्राप्त, दात, प्रायस्कृत, नायनी, वाच, etc., has been discussed. It has been concluded that these terms are not to be mistaken for the mere phenomenal objects of nature. They are all
Sankara's idea about these expressions may be summarised in his following observation:

“विकारेद्वृत्तं अनुज्ञाकारं ब्रह्म निर्देशं—‘तद्विद्रथ सत्यं भिक्षु यथा,’ यथा
‘सत्यं खबिर्धि ज्ञाति।’ कायेश्वर कारणात् चाच्य्यतिरिक्त नििति वद्यास;”

Sankara in these places, does not at all absolutely identify Brahman—the causal Reality—with its effects (विकार). The effects he takes in the relation of अनन्य (ananya) from the cause. We have already explained the sense of अनन्य from the standpoint of Sankara which we need not repeat here. It does not mean pure identity. Such being his explanation of the phrase—‘सत्यं खबिर्धि ब्रह्म,’ we have no warrant to regard the world with all its changes (विकार), as absolutely identical with Brahman.

\[\text{derived objects; have derived their existence and activity from Brahman—}
\text{the causal Energy which lives in them and sustains them,—whose purpose they serve (संस्कारंपरायम् इति). Sankara has shown that these are all effects, and can have no self-sufficient being of their own, apart from the being of the causal Brahman which reveals in them.}\]

1 In Sutra 1.3.1, also, it has been shown that Brahman cannot be resolved into the changes of the world. Hence Brahman is to be regarded as a unity unaffected by its evolving changes.

“न कार्यप्रत्य-विरेच्य: विचित्र भास्मात्...यथा भवेकारस्तो इति...एवं नागार्जुन विचित्र भास्मा इति। ‘सत्यं ब्रह्म सत्यं सामायिकारेन्द्रत्वं भास्मं सत्यं निविषयितं साह।”

In Sutra 2.1.14 also, the effects are shown to be अनन्य from their cause, ‘ग्रहैदं सत्यं, भास्मैदं सत्यं’—‘नेव नागार्जुन इति भवेकारस्’—all these are cited as examples of that theory. The nature of the cause gradually finds its expression in the effects. Hence the effects cannot be separated from it and regarded as something अनन्य or independent.

Such is the sense, everywhere, of these phrases.
regarding the world as the only reality. The real nature of the cause is transcendental (|

\textit{bhr̥tṛ})\textsuperscript{1} in the system of Sankara, which underlies all its products. And it cannot, as we have already seen, be resolved into its products.

It is Brahman which realises itself in the form of the world. Hence the world cannot be absolutely \textit{identical} with Brahman in Sankara's philosophy.\textsuperscript{2} The world is simply to be taken as the means through which the underlying nature or \textit{kāraṇa} of Brahman is being realised or expressed in higher and higher forms.\textsuperscript{3}

\(c\) It is not infrequently that the differentiations or the created \textit{nāma-rūpas} (नाम-रूप), —the changes or differences that are

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item “कृत्यात्...कारणात् कार्यंशुपद्वते” \[भ, 2.2.26\].

“कृत्यात् विकृत्यात्” \[भ, 2.1.14 न्यायिका।

Sankara has nowhere applied the term 'cause' to the mere \textit{antecedent in time}. “नाशुपातः भावम् पञ्चाविक्षमात्। नाशमययं पञ्चावते” \[भ, 2.2.26\].

\item Compare the famous phrase “तत्त्वातःत्त्वातःत्त्वातःत्त्वातः” —i.e., neither \textit{tātāt}—absolutely \textit{identical}, nor \textit{विस्तार} absolutely \textit{other}. \textit{(Vide p. 180)}

\textit{Of. Bhāmati—‘न तु यत् भवः, तत् समः’} \[भ, 1.3.1\].

\item “कृत्यातिक्रिया एवप्रकारपि उपरीतर्वस्त्राविश्वतः तात्त्वव नेत्रवेदन्तिक्रिये; ज्यूद्म्” \[भ, 1.1.11\]. Continuously higher and higher differences emerge in \textit{Nature}, as an Inexhaustible (अनन्त) and perfect principle stands behind nature and is revealing itself through her. “चतुर्दिव्यविविधु जिन सत्त्वमय क्रियायेऽचतुत्तत भाविताऽविविधायाः क्यों? [चतुत्तता], न तु तातेव तस्मात् अविविधाः।... 

यथा... नाशयति सर्वं ज्ञातिके... चाद्यात् च तात्त्ववेदन भावितवेदति तत्तत।...सत्त्ववेदन्तिक्रियाविविधाः” \[भ, 15.12\].

“यथा... कार्योपदेशात् तंत्रित्यस्ति—सत्त्ववेदन्ति, तथापि सत्त्ववेदन्ति तत्र ज्ञाति,— 

\textit{वर्षमेव यत्रित्यस्ति”} \[भ, 5.1.1\].
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
emerging in the world have been called in the Bhāṣyas as—

अप्रायम्—brought about or presented by Avidyā;

विद्याकालयत्—fancied or imagined by Avidyā;

अप्रायम्—consisting of Avidyā;

विद्याभारोपिते नामरूप—(nāma-rūpas) ascribed or imposed by Avidyā;—

and so on.

Now, these phrases, to all outward appearances, imply the illusory character or unreality or falsity of these changes—these emerging nāma-rūpas. But such meaning, if adopted, would militate against the entire theory of Sankara, as we shall presently see.

For the true meaning of these phrases we would refer our readers to Chap. I of this book (p. 45) where we have shown that Sankara in commenting on the Taittiriya Upanishad observed that as Avidyā belongs to nāma-rūpa¹ and exists as a property of our intellect, ² it is under its influence that our intellect (ज्ञानःकर्म) always takes nāma-rūpa as an essential property of the self (आत्मकर्मी). ³ In

¹ "नामरूपःप्रकाशोऽविद्याविद्या। नामरूपः प नामाभिषेकः।" ।

² "विद्याविद्या (ि.े... विद्य्या) ध्यातिविद्या...नामाभिषेकः।"

³ "नामरूपं प आत्मकर्मी...ते प पुनर्विद्या साधिते। भृगुराये देव—

आत्मक भावन्ति, न परिमुक्ती विवासे।" —तैं भागो, 2.8. (विद्यते= विद्यारोपिते। Cf. "संख्या-कृत्य विभिन्नलिङ्गः"—नाते कृते भागो, भागो 3.32).
another passage, we find Sankara making a similar observation, where he says that as the self has a 'nature' (नाम) of its own, it is always distinguished from the नाम-रूप, and to look upon the नाम-रूप as an essential property or चर्म of the self, which people erroneously do, must therefore be wrong.¹ Brahman always remains unaffected (निरक्षधिक) by the world of नाम-रूप which has emerged from it; it is our Avidyā which makes it appear as affected (विकल्प) by and thus identified with the changing नाम-रूप of the world.²

The celebrated Introduction appended to the "Brahma-sūtra" also points out that it is our Avidyā ³ which produces false

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¹ "तत्त तत् परः भाष्यमालेन चतुर परमार्थति, तस्य तस्य नाम-रूपाकलाभ प्रमात्। नाम-रूपाकलाभ शासनीज्ञात विशेषते, द्विय नाम-रूपे तपस्याप्रमाण तथा।" —अ 2.1.20.

² "न च द्वितीयं विकल्पम् वस्तुप्रत्येकं कालदिवितीयं विकल्पम् परिक्रमिते।... भाष्यमालेन समाधिपरिवर्तन हृद्वर्त-समाहित परिवर्तने वस्तुप्रत्येकं।" (अ 2.8).

Compare—खगेण दक्षिणतस्य 'संस्कृत'—उपेख विवेकतत्त्वस्य’।" (अ 3.32).

³ Dr. Harmann Jacobi of the University of Bonn, Germany, in a letter addressed to the author, expresses his reluctance to take भविष्या in the sense of 'Individual Avidyā' alone, and he makes a distinction between 'Cosmic Avidyā' and 'Individual Avidyā.' This individual Avidya he calls as "fundamental Adhyāśa," under whose influence the world and ourselves appear to us to be real, but when it is sublated, they vanish as far as concern the individual soul who has got rid of his fundamental Adhyāśa. It is the 'Cosmical Avidyā,' he says, which as a cosmical principle is the cause of the material world, and as the world is the product of this Avidyā it must be false. He also observes
identification (अच्छास), and the changing
states of the self are looked upon by its
influence as the ‘nature’ or भाष्य of the

that when विद्या arises it annihilates the अविद्या of an individual and
thereby sublates for him the अविद्या. अविद्या प्रकट. But this विद्या is
inefficacions with regard to the cosmic विद्या which is the cause of
शहद, which latter continues to subsist after the mukti of a jiva.

The arguments used by the learned professor do not, however,
seem, to us, convincing. By making a distinction between the individual
and the cosmic अविद्या, he simply shows that the world born of the
latter is not a mere subjective appearance. It does not vanish into
nothingness, the moment the individual attains Mukti. All that is
involved in the attainment of Mukti is displacement of the false outlook
(विद्या) by the true one and not the annihilation of the world. If
the world is false, even on attaining release not only the false vision
of the world but the world itself should disappear. Since Dr. Jacobi
concedes that the latter does not happen, he admits that the world
is not false. Again, since the world is not due to our individual अविद्या
but is born of the cosmic अविद्या, in Dr. Jacobi’s term, its only locus
is Brahman. मयाः, in Sankara-Vedanta, is looked upon as both
अवारण (अवारण) and vikshepa (विक्षेप). In Mukti, the former only
disappears while the latter remains, and it may not be regarded
as more real than the false error of the independent esse of the world
what the professor calls fundamental भाष्य (i.e., false identification).
This alone disappears in Mukti, and not the world itself. Moreover,
to regard the world as false world would be to identify Sankara’s view
with the vijnana-vāda which would be to violate all canons of sound
interpretation. Sankara criticises vijnana-vāda and it means that
he is against all theses which reduce the world to mental states. In
fact, the world, according to Sankara’s view, is an expression of God’s
sakti and it is relatively real, not false. While it is necessary to
distinguish the world from God, it is equally necessary to distinguish
it from an illusion or subjective phantasm.

N. B. भाष्य or प्रश्निक in the Sankara-Vedanta is not merely a subjective idea but it is an objective principle from which the world of नाम-रूप comes out. Many people labours under an erroneous idea that Sankara’s भाष्य is nothing more than a subjective idea of the
mind by which we perceive the appearance of the world. But this is
self, though in reality, the self is always distinguished from its states.

Now, from the above discussion, we may draw the following conclusions—

(i) The finite self is not a characterless being, but it has a distinct nature of its own and cannot therefore be reduced into its states and activities. The self has been described by Sankara as transcending the external and internal elements of the body, but yet controlling and illumining them—

“कार्यकार्यार्थानि तथापि काय्य-कर्ष्णब्रह्मार्थानि—चायायायीति.” [3, 4.3.10].

(ii) Similarly, he has described Brahman’s nature as transcending the nāma-rūpas (changes) and untouched by them, but yet controlling and directing

not true. In Ved-Bhāṣya, II. 1. 9, a suspicion may indeed arise to the effect that Sankara makes निर्माण as the root-cause of all differentiations (बिभाग ब्रह्म), That it is not a mere subjective idea, but an objective principle or power (of Brahman) becomes clear if we consult a similar passage in Māndukya Bhāṣya (कारिका, अगमवत्र 1-6) where this निर्माण has been identified with प्राणशक्ति which is the cause of all differentiations.

He says there—“निर्बलाजयम्यं बृहु सति प्रकृतिनां सुधिक-प्रलयं: प्रति-हिन्दानुपया: अति; सुभाग ग्रहतां पुर्वक्षेत्रस्य। तथातु “सहवल”-भवपदे प्रणवे सति प्रकाशत्वापदैव सततिनिरुपि च कारणवमादैव।” Here, प्राण is the cosmic seed (धी) of the world present in Brahman. The term निर्माण of the Ved-Bhāṣya referred to above is nothing but this प्राणशक्ति. Thus the world can not be false or subjective phantasm. It is called निर्माण or प्राण, because it is the other i.e. opposite of राज्य or राज्य; but it is not absolutely other, it is also identical. (Vide Chap. I, pp. 25-31.) Also cf. विशेषज्ञानविवि, pp. 135-137.
the activities of these changing náma-rupas—

"नान्द्रामध्यायमन्त्र्यं यथेकेतुतू पत्तू, नामस्व-विलक्षण नामायमध्यायस्यं
तथापि तत्वी: निर्विद्वैर्। एवं लक्षणं तद्। [कृ. भा. 8.14.1.]

Hence we find that neither Brahman, nor the individual selves can be resolved into its manifested changes. The changes stand to the underlying reality in the relation of ananya (अनंय),—i.e., they cannot be separated from it and regarded as something independent; but they are to be taken merely as a means for the gradual manifestations of the nature of the underlying cause—

"विन्दुपरिष्ठाय चाविन्दलम्बकन:... ‘अत्यंक्राक्रणाच्’ ” (१े. भा. भा. 2.1.3).
" चानंयासामविवक्ष: परंण परंथ प्रेष्य भूयाची भवति ” (वेदो. भा. 1.3.30).
" चाक्रप्रतिप्रयथिस्व...वहसंस्त्राणिमि परिक्षणः ” (१े. भा. 2.8).

How can the changes, then, be regarded as false or unreal, in the view of Sankara? It is only when under the influence of Avidyā, we forget the separate reality of the underlying cause and identify it with its evolving changes (विकार), as if the causal reality has become something other than its own nature,—that the changes become false, unreal.¹ This is done under

¹ Cf. "अन्यत्रेऽल्लोकस्य विन्दुपरिष्ठर्यं विन्दुपरिष्ठर्यं विन्दुपरिष्ठर्यं...विन्दुपरिष्ठर्यं
परिक्षणानानि अभावो” [१े. भा. 4.3.21-23].

"विन्दुपरिष्ठर्यं विन्दुपरिष्ठर्यं सूक्ष्मोऽर्थोऽर्थम्...विन्दुपरिष्ठर्यं विन्दुपरिष्ठर्यं” (५.१.१).

The changing states and activities are all elicited from our underlying ‘nature,’ through interaction with the external environment भूतलाखर्ष्यं; भूतलाखर्ष्यं भूतलाखर्ष्यं भूतलाखर्ष्यं (४.३-९).
the influence of Avidya. It is in this sense alone that the diversities of the changing nāma-rupas in the world are regarded as false or unreal, in Sankara’s system.

(d) Now, let us consider such expressions as—

नेव नामावि किष्मन—The diversities or the differences exist not in the world;—
वस्त्र सर्वत्रात्मायावरूप—.. .तसू कैं के पक्षस्त ?—i.e.,
the man who sees the Atmā everywhere,
cannot see other things in the world.

These phrases seem to imply, apparently, that there are really no diversities,—
no nāma-rupas—no changes—nothing—in the world;—that these are all mere
appearances and unreal.

But let us see how Sankara himself has explained these expressions. We invite our
reader’s attention in this connection to Sutras 2, 1, 14 and 3, 2, 22, where
Sankara himself has quoted these phrases and explained them.

He first raises the question—If the
‘unity’ is reduced to ‘multiplicity,’ can

When these are produced, we erroneously identify ourselves with
these; and these become the only self to us. But this Self is false.
The real self is what underlies these states and activities and to which
these are referred as to a centre. Such is the case with Brahman
also. This identification is due to the fault of our intellect. But how
can there be identification? Sankara says—“पारमार्थिका वीये पारसार्थिका वीये न वृत्तित।—न च सिद्धाव्यान परमार्थिका वीये न वृत्तित। समय।”
[भैं 8, 13-2]. Sankara does not call the objects false; he calls
identification false. द्वितीये बिभिन्नत्व ‘संस्कृतेऽविभिन्न कान्तितलमिन’
[भैं 8, 8, भैं 8. 1. 22].
it retain its unity—and decides in the negative. He points out—as ‘one’ and ‘many’ oppose each other, both cannot be true in respect of the one and the same thing. The pantheists of his time looked upon ‘unity’ and ‘multiplicity’ both as true. The pantheistic unity is merely अनेकार्थ, i.e., it is the unity of mere collection. It is an abstract whole—a mere aggregate of parts, having no substantial being or life of its own outside of and apart from its parts which constitute it.

But Sankara shows here that Brahman cannot be both एक and अनेकार्थ. Brahman is a true unity; it has a ‘being,’ outside the world—

"उद्भवसतायांति किं एकदेवानि
नामाद्वस्तसनपत्ति ैव व्यतीतः?" — बौ 2,1,14.

As Brahman has a ‘nature’ of its own, how can it be resolved into many and become अनेकार्थ? Hence his conclusion is that the ‘unity’ retains its unity in all circumstances and it is the only

1 क य च अस्वभाविन्यमस्वभाविन्यमात्रम् साधारणस्मारकमिति अति नामात्रात् अनेकार्थाने—कस्वरूपविद्वान् विशेषः। "न गात्रायात्माना सदा भवति क्रियायात्मायात्।" यदा रजुसहस्राधिशः
लिखितादि न नामात्रात् विशेषः काल्याणः सर्वस्यात्, ततुष्ट्।" (मृ का भा, 2,34)

Of. ‘साधारणस्मां तद्भवत, यदृ परसारविशेषप्रवक्ष्याद्विमण्डलं चक्षुशोकं’ (बौ भा, 2,1,9). (i.e., as if Brahman has become चक्षुशोकं—i.e., entirely reduced to चक्षुशोकं).

"साधारण निविदते...स्व परसारस्त: चिल्लिवंशायामस:। साधारं त्य चक्षुशोकं-
शालेन भिक्षते"—मृ का भा, चौथा पा, 19).
Reality. The diverse changes—नामप्रस—
the differences which emerge from it—are not absolutely distinct from Brahman, as so many independent things true and real with the unity; but they are means, stages (धार्मणाति)—for the gradual manifestation of the ‘nature’ of Brahman which is present behind them and is realising itself through them.

Now then, the line—
“यथा सत्यसत्यात्माभूता…………तत्त्वेन कौ पर्यन्त?”—
—and the line—
“नेन्द्र नागाधिक विषय”—
Such lines, such expressions—do not mean that there are not things in the world, that all are non-entities. They mean that the things in the world will no longer appear to us in the same light in which they appear to the ordinary ignorant people. They would not appear as so many absolutely—-independent things—a crass plurality—a tree there, a cow here; a river there, a man here. They would appear only as higher and higher stages through which the underlying unity of Brahman is progressively revealing its own ‘nature,’ is realising itself—

1 “ह्यादर्दार्थस्य उपस्थितिर्य धार्मिकर्मात्स्य:……ह्यादस्या ध्वपन”
[५० सा, २.१-३]।
“यथा महुषादिशास्ययुग्मे धार्मिकर्मविप्रतिवन्दः परिध वर्ष परिध भूषाशु अवम्
"तत्त्वात् ‘व्यतिरिक्ता भवन्ति स्वयं फलितकर्मम्’

......शास्त्री ‘व्यतिरिक्ता कस्य कामाय’?

(इश्वरात्मको, 4.4.12).

The emerging nāma-rupas would, now, be looked upon as only further and further revelations or realisations of Brahman; they would not, now, be looked upon as ‘व्यतिरिक्ता’ or ‘अय’ or absolutely distinct from the underlying Brahman 1 but as अन्य from it.

This is the conclusion which we have gained from a discussion of Sankara’s celebrated Doctrine of Causality. Now it stands clear that there arises no question for the abolition of the diverse objects in the world—in the system of Advaita Philosophy.

(e) There is still another phrase used in the Vedanta which demands our consideration and attention. We mean the phrase known as—विशीष-निराकार or विशीष-प्रतिपंच |— i.e., the repudiation or rejection of the

1 “स इति कारणव्यतिरिक्त काथ्यवाद वचनोऽभिषिक्त्य यतस्मात्व्यतिरिक्तालोकमाणि” [वेतात्मको, 2.1].
particular determinant qualities we find in the world. The qualities are universally existent; and although they belong, in a sense, to one Reality—as a whole, still they belong definitely to a particular reality as its determinations and not of others. The qualities are but the activities of the individual things or individual beings. The phrase विशेष-निराकरण may appear at first sight to mean that Sankara has denied the existence of the qualities—that these are mere appearances—that they do not really exist. But let us assure our readers this was far from the mind of Sankara. The explanation of this विशेष-निराकरण which he himself gives in the Vedanta-Sutras—4-3-14 and 3-2-22 conclusively shows that he has denied nothing, repudiated nothing, rejected nothing.

The purport of his explanation is briefly this:—Suppose a quality emerges; if you identify the underlying Brahman (Causal Reality) with this quality, Brahman becomes entirely reduced to this quality and hence it becomes something other than its own ‘being’; whereas all the time Brahman maintains its unity in and through this quality;—and so on with other successively emergent qualities in the world. Sankara's idea is that Brahman is to be regarded always as a unity, unchanging in its own nature and unaffected by the
qualities; and it cannot therefore be regarded as—सुप्रभावित्त or चर्चेस्वरित्त, *i.e.*, identical with the qualities—as if its nature is not one but composed of the qualities (चनेकाश्मक)1—

"चनेकाश्मकं चारणं प्रति यैव ? न।
विशेष-विशेषार्गेश्यतीना मनोवैद्यवादि।"

Sankara next concludes—

"प्राप्ते 'प्राप्ति कल्पसे' प्रतिसमस्थः,
परिवर्णाच ब्रज'"—(मॊ शाॊ, 3.2.22).

*i.e.*, By विशेष-विशेषार्ग, the qualities, as such, are not repudiated or negated; but Brahman if regarded as composed of the qualities is repudiated or negated.

The 'nature' (कार्यः) of Brahman is present behind the qualities evolved in the world and this nature cannot be resolved into or identified with them. It is present unaffected by these changing qualities. Sankara has elsewhere pointed out that all the changing and emergent qualities

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1 Cf. "न कार्यप्रभावित्ते: विशिष्ठ अन्तर्व विनीयः...यथा चनेकाश्मकः क्रष्णः" (मॊ, 1.3.1).

2 "कल्पत-प्रभावार्ग्यते—'कारणवेदनस' (कल्पते=चनेकाश्म कारोपिता)।

Cf. "कारणवार्गार्गरूपार्गन सरीयुक्त-रज्जु स्वः-गगनस्खलानीयः, सरीचिः-रज्जु-गगन-
स्वः-गगनस्खलानीय स्वः-नामार्गभवति" (शिॊ शाॊ, 3.14.)। "रज्जु द्वेष्यन स्वास्थ्यं स्वः, 'स्वं द्वेष्यन प्रतिः, भार्यं, दुःस्वाभित्तिः वा—रज्जु द्वेष्यन ज्ञातते, एवं प्राचार्यिनीनां।...स्वस्वं
रज्जु अते भार्यणि भार्यणि...भार्यणाः एतेऽरुप भार्यणः, सर्पशालिखेष्टेः यथा रज्जुः।"
(शॊ शाॊ, 2.32-33).
are interwoven into the underlying Reality which reveals its nature through them—.

“ভাসতাভাসনবিষয়ান্তি বিশেষাদিহস্তনাত” (সন্ত ৮৫ ১.৬.১).

It is wrong therefore to identify the under-lying reality with these qualities. This identification is repudiated, as it is due to our intellectual error (বুদ্ধিতীক্ষ্ণ or বিবিধতা); and therefore such identification must be false, unreal.

This is the purport or sense of the বিবিধানতত্ত্ব or of the repudiation or rejection of the qualities. Sankara has established this position in another way thus—

These qualities are definite relations into which one individual is brought with other individuals or things. But these relations cannot exhaust the individuals. I am brought into a particular relation with you, but yet I am something more than this relation. In this way, every individual self is a part of another individual self, yet he belongs to himself. Sankara points out that an individual has a substantive (স্বত্ত্ব or বিষয়) and an adjectival (সম্বন্ধিত or বিবেশ) mode of existence. He exists by himself and this is his substantive mode; yet he is related to something beyond him and this is his adjectival mode of existence. A man, say Deva Datta, may come into different relations with different people and he is designated differently. But yet the same Deva Datta does not lose his own স্বত্ত্ব in
these relations. Every individual therefore maintains his own identity in the various relations into which he is brought with others. Brahman, in the same way, maintains its own identity in those variously interconnected relations or qualities.

If you identify the underlying Brahman with these relations, Brahman would become 'many'—चविकायक, नागासुधीविविध i.e. composed of parts. Sankara has not denied the relations or qualities as such. He only denies Brahman or the individual self being regarded as चविकायक. Such self or Brahman must be unreal, false, in Sankara system. The relations are but a means, or medium (उपाय, हार) for the expression

1 “एकले पित खबर-वाचकवाचिपिप्या चविकायकधर्मयतं र्श्वनात। यथा एकले पित सम देवदत्तः खबरं सचिविकीपुष्चप्रेया चविक वच गय मात्र भवति—सहक्य वाजः यवां...पित। अर्नार आशात र्तित’ (वैशार्द, 2.2.17)

“गुहवंस: कमलं, सोर्दङ्गी वेदुः, नौसुन्धारं—र्तित हृदयालंबू तेन तेन विषयेन विभावमाललर्तक, द्रष्याभकुटा युनयाः”
(वैशार्द, 2.2.17.)

9 “र्तितं (i.e., immanent) परमेश्वरं—एकं सत्त्वम (i.e., transcendental)”कर्त-भावं 5.12। The qualities are but the responses made by the individuals to the Pran-spandan which is the active common medium or environment which elicits the responses. The qualities are thus 'inter-connected relations.'

Of. “चविकायकः...कार्यमार्गविविधं विचित्र चात्मा र्तित चात्मा भविता, etc.” (रूप. 1. 3.1). To imagine parts of the underlying ground is due to our intellectual error. In नौसुन्धारित, Sankara calls it विषयकार्त्ता.
of the swarupa of the underlying unity and hence they are धन्य from the swarupa.

(फः) There is another expression, रिज, प्रपश्च-विलय—Dissolution of the world—which deserves consideration.

The question of प्रपश्च-विलय arose in connection with a doubt which existed in the mind of many people. So long as the world exists to occupy our mind, to distract our attention, how is it possible to realise the knowledge of Brahman? For, the world stands there as a rival to Brahman and it will act as an obstruction in the way of the knowledge of Brahman. It is therefore necessary to dissolve the world—to abolish it altogether so that nothing stands in the way of the realisation of Brahman.¹

In order to remove this doubt, Sankara has given us the true sense of the idea of प्रपश्च-विलय from which his views about the existence of this world very prominently stand in clear light. He has recorded his views thus:—

“What,” Sankara enquires of the doubter, “is your idea about the Dissolution of the world—प्रपश्च-विलय, pray? Do you mean by it that as heat disintegrates the solid particles of the clarified butter and ultimately dissolves them, we are to dissolve the world in the like manner? But this is, we say, simply an impossibility.

The world—both in its subjective and objective condition—actually exists (विद्वान्), nobody is therefore capable of dissolving the existence of such a world. Hence such actual dissolution of the world is out of the question. You cannot really mean this by your term प्रपश्च-विलय. If, however, your idea about dissolution be that we are to remove—dissolve—the false identification—the identification

¹ “......उँ सत्तात् साक्षममुकुतसाक्षादि सत्तात्मनीकमकृतः प्रपश्चः प्रवेशः पवित्रस्वः ।......तेन नामश्चप्रवेशाधिनेन सत्तात्साक्षाति विशिष्यतिः” (वेण्यो मां, 3.2.21).
of the world with Brahman in consequence of an erroneous imposition of the former upon the latter (by ignoring the distinct being of Brahman which underlies the world unaffected by its changes), you are welcome to do this. Such dissolution by true knowledge is indeed possible. We agree with you in this view of dissolution."

Do these remarks show in any way that in Sankara-Vedanta the actual existence of the world has ever been denied?

8. We should like to conclude this discussion by calling the attention of our readers to an important typical illustration given by Sankara with a view to clearly illustrate the steps of his own doctrine of causality as expounded by him in his Vedanta-bhasya. We find this typical illustration admirably explained in the Brihadaranyaka-bhasya. This powerful exposition of the theory makes it impossible, once for all, for us to look upon the world and its evolving changes (विवायम्) as unreal or false. We have therefore to recognise this illustration as a fact of capital interest.

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1 "श्रवण नयं पुज्याम्:—कोष्यं प्रपञ्चविलयो नाम? किमप्रपञ्चविलयमयम् चतुर्विवादित्वम्-प्रविलयं द्रव प्रपञ्चविलयं: कर्मश्:; अक्षोखितु:......अविवादज्ञती ब्रह्मके अयस्म:; प्रामाण्यप्रशस्त:; विद्या प्रविलयप्रविष्टात्मर्ति: ? श्रवण, युद्ध तत्त्व: नित्यानीय: प्रपञ्च:—देशिलालभ भास्करे:; वास्तव पुष्पेऽहिन्दिवश्च:—प्रविलयप्रविष्टा वयूधीत्त, स पुष्पाभिनेतर अयस्म: प्रविलयप्रविष्टा सिद्धात्" (वे° मा°, 3.2.21).

N.B.—In Brihadaranyakabhasya, there is a reference to प्रपञ्च. प्रपञ्च is ordinarily regarded as something independent—as अन्य—different from Brahman. The idea of this अन्य ought to be killed. This is प्रपञ्चविलय. "अन्यान्य विलाषनविभि सिद्धम्—वेणादि (वे° मा°, 2.4.13)"

......In this way प्रपञ्चविलय is explained here. (This अन्यान्य विलाषन is the result of identification.)
and importance to the student of the Adwaita Philosophy which will make clear in a different way the problem, the solution of which we are seeking in this chapter; and will prove helpful in coming to a decision about it. We have therefore thought it fit to re-emphasise this illustration to which reference was made in a previous chapter.

Sankara explains here the idea of the cause and the effects which emerge in succession from it by an illustration of a lump of earth (ख़त्ता) and its successive transformations until the last transformation—the jar (घट) is reached. The ultimate future end is present, he says, in the real nature or सत्य of the causal substance. It is impossible to hold it to be non-existent in the cause. To deny this presence is to make the passage clearer for the easy entrance of that undesirable guest—Asat-kārya-vāda (असत्कार्यवाद). Until it is completely realised, the End—though future—must be held to be present in the nature of the cause.¹

The potter, Sankara observes, with a view to produce this end, viz., घट (jar) collects the ख़त्ता (lump of earth) and continues giving it its successive shapes (in the form of चू०, विशं, क्षण, etc.). You cannot, Sankara goes on, deny this striving on the part of the potter towards this future end.² Sankara says that, it is necessary, for an end to realise itself, completely, to pass through certain

¹ “प्रायःपर्यतरोपन चँद्र कार्ये। तःरात्र घटाविवक्षयायिनः निवत एव बाराकायापारीदेवीपुरूषः।..शकर वसि, घटस्व प्रागभव दति—ग घटस्वप नर्चाग प्राप्तुभ परेनायित।..ख़हेन हि वसिष्ठुप्रेय घटो वति।”

² “अख़ण्डपार्थ्रांप्रसेष। न हि अक्षरि अविनस्य ग्रन्धिके चतु्रषति।चतुष्यं तू वसिष्ठुप्रेय। त्र्यं भविष्यत्वा चतुष्यं प्रशवं भवा स्तो। 1.2.1.।(Hence घट or the end is the real cause of the प्रक्षिप्न or movement on the part of हृताक्षाः.)
antecedent transformations or stages.\(^1\) It follows therefore that the future end is present throughout the successive stages of the \textit{bhūtika}—though not in actual form ("वर्षमानसत्तापये") but still it is present throughout in the form of future possibility\(^2\) in the nature of \textit{bhūtika}.

The change is a relation between two terms. In order to be related, the two terms of the relation must be \textit{real}. The change is therefore a relation between something present and something future, \textit{i.e.}, which is going \textit{to be}. If you say the \textit{future} is unreal, is nothing—then the \textit{cause} or Brahman would itself become unreal.\(^3\) The future (घट) therefore operates in the present \textit{(i.e., in the \textit{bhūtika})};\(^4\) and the present becomes thus connected with the future.

\(^1\) "कारणं वर्षमानं कार्यं कार्यांलकर्षणामस्तर्गमिष्ये।...पिण्ड-कपालात्वस्य उद्भवसे।...घटातिकायं...च...घटातिकायं।...घटामुखघोषां...यवः कर्षेत्।" 1.2.1.

\(^2\) "स्त्रेसे भविष्यदेशे घटे विद्वधे। न भि पिण्डसे वर्षमानसत्त, कार्यास्य वा घटे वा सर्वतो।...तथा किच् किश्यापार—वर्षमानसतायं, प्रात्शक्षेपणोऽवधि सम्बन्धिते न विद्वधते \textit{(i.e., the change is not present actually, but as a future possibility.)}’’........ "विद्वध, भास्यस: चर्मायुस्य घटे खण्ड्यायुस्य:। निद्रायुतातु स्वर्णय। (i.e., the change being a relation, must have two terms of relation—the present and the future. The future cannot therefore be non-existent or भस्तु।)

\(^3\) In the Mandukya, 6, Sankara says—

"यथि श्री भस्तकात्वम अभी ज्ञातु, श्रीरत्नसङ्करावर्षातु। भस्तु-मर्गः।।\\
..nanda-giri elaborates the passage thus—"वघ्रायुतातु स्वर्णय... कार्यशिर्ति श्री विष्णु कार्यमानानाद्वै निद्रिते।।... तथैव सस्तु, न तेन तथा कार्य:। स्वर्णायुतिति विष्णुः कार्यमानायुत।।"

\(^4\) For, घट is an end and it is the real cause of the striving or movement of \textit{bhūtika} towards the end, which striving exists for its sake. The end is therefore present in the beginning and operates as a real cause.
Hence, the cause is really the future End or Power which is realising itself in all the changes. It is therefore this power which underlies, and works in, all changes. It gives continuity to them and is above them all. It is realising itself through all successive changes which cannot, therefore, be separated from it.¹ Sankara illustrates this idea thus—

“As a player, taking on successive characters upon himself, enacts on the stage the parts of each of these characters in succession, but yet retains his own distinct character; so the underlying causal unity, retaining its own distinct identity, realises itself successively in each of the changes produced.”²

Now, we must apply this typical case of बलिका and its final realisation in the form of चर, to all the individual changes in the world. We come then to learn from Sankara’s exposition just stated that—

in the real nature or शक्ति of an individual being, the future end is present, and this end works in it.

¹ Sankara has noted that the changes cannot be separated from the underlying cause, nor can they be separated from one another as independent ‘things,’ because the cause itself holds them all by its own power (शक्ति) and realises itself in each of them successively.—

“सामान्यकार्यक्रम चारण सामान्य विशेषानु भावयति” and “सामान्यो जबलसात्-कार्येऽव महत्त्वा अर्थात् कार्येऽव परिणय” (८° and १०°).

² “मूलकार्यस्य चारण चारण स्वदेशायतन तेन तेन कार्याविकार्येऽव भवेन-वन्धुरास्यबलेन प्रतिपत्ति” (८° भा°, २.१.१८). Also Vide वैदो, १.३.१९.
And in order to have its final realisation, this end will necessarily have to pass through its preceding successive transformations or stages, until at last it becomes finally realised in its last stage.  

This last stage is therefore the end of the individual being and this end is therefore a future possible power, present in the individual; and it works in all the changes as its purpose. This end (or purpose) is the real cause; for it reveals itself more and more through the successive transformations or stages and completes itself in the last stage.

Is it possible, then, to separate any of these changes or stages from the underlying शर्म (swarupa) of the individual and to treat them as independent things (अन्धार्थ)? For, how is it possible to know the real nature of the cause until it reaches, and fully reveals itself in, its last change or stage?

For this reason, Sankara has repeatedly remarked that no effects can be treated as something distinct and separate from their underlying cause. For, it is the cause which is revealing or realising itself in these changes. The

1 It has been noted that the underlying cause must be present up to the time the last effect is produced “अलक्ष्यात्मानं ज्ञातं ज्ञातं च विविजनं” and “अलक्ष्यात्मानं ज्ञातं ज्ञातं च विविजनं” (१० अं, २.२२०). For, it is seen everywhere that the last effect (रहस्य) is always accompanied and coloured by the underlying cause. “सहाय्यात्मा बुद्धि बायात्यात्मा” (१०, २.१.१५).

Cf. the expression—“एकविज्ञान सत्तविज्ञानं भवति.”

* “शास्त्रविद्याप्रविष्टिः” (१०, २.८),
effects are therefore nothing but the necessary expressions of the cause which is present and operative behind them.

Is it then possible for Sankara, who gives such a description, to deny the effects or changes and to declare them to be false or unreal? The falsity only comes in, if you regard the nature (कारण) of the underlying cause actually lost in these effects emerging from it;—if the कारण is resolved into and thus absolutely identified with these changes—as if it has become something other than itself (i.e., ब्रह्म)—as if the underlying Brahman is actually converted into the aggregate of the empirical changes, & thus become चेतात्मकः.

Sankara has, everywhere in his Bhasya, called the world unreal or false in this sense alone.

9. We have tried, in the preceding pages, to find out the real intention of the Leader of the Adwaita school of thought in the Indian Philosophy, and examined carefully all possible cases which may produce in the mind some confusion about the unreality of the diversities of नाम-रूपa emergent in the world. It is, however, not necessary to push our examination any further, and the considerations we have so far made will, we hope, clear away all

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1 “भाकप्यादायनादेवानिर्वंतकालोऽ” (२० चा भा). ।
2 “न कारणात् ‘कल्पन’ कारणं” वद्विषेयेन वषय दिवक्—दशे दुष्के कारण प्राप्तस्ते: तस्मान्यवचनात् कारणात्—वद्विषेयस्” (२० भा, 2.18).
3 “न च विशेषाद्वेदानां च ‘वत्सलं’ अब्हि...स्थलितिप्रत्यभिज्ञातुलतु”—2.18.
4 “भाकप्यादायनादेख मत्त्रनितित्वं लोगांस्य;—‘मध्यें लोकाण्यं’ ‘पुण्यवल्लह’ ‘वद्विषेयस’—वद्विषेयसंह; पुण: पुण: अनन्तन्यर्थ-प्रवचनाकं...। सब्जातम-दर्शित (i.e., चलनकालिकि);) तद्भवाद्व एव” (२० भा, 4.4.2).
5 “न कारणं: तद्विषेय चारणं ‘संवचनाय’—दशे भा, 2.1.9.”
misapprehensions which certainly exist about the problem of the unreality of the objective world of facts and we may fairly conclude that we are not committed to the universal nihilism in Sankara’s school of Philosophy. A few words must, however, be added in regard to one point of primary importance, before we conclude this line of our enquiry.

We have said that Brahman (as well as the individual-selves) possesses a खरण, a nature, of its own. In order to realise this खरण, Brahman has created and evolved the world,¹ and the world is moving from the lowest to the highest stages.² This movement has become possible for the world, because behind each stage, that eternal principle (प्राणविषयः भास्मा) is present, which is gradually expressing itself in and through these stages or changes.

The reader who has followed us thus far will now find that such is the position which Sankara has taken up in the Vedanta philosophy. Against this position, however, an objection may be urged to the effect that if the multiplicity of the changes is held to be not false or unreal, what would be the fate of the Sruti which insistently declares that—

“there is only one principle—Brahman which is without a second—secondless”—

“ब्रह्म एकं अविभूतयम्”.

¹ “पूर्वेणिर्द्विधि समु भास्मा विषयविषय विकाराध्वाना परिषमयासास प्रांत्यम्” (ब.भ.०, 1.4.26). “यद्य यदार्मन्य यज्ञ न सर्वं, न तत्तु तत् छल्लले; यथा चिकितत्वस्य तद्वै” च.भ.०, (2.1.16).

² “नामाद्विव ग्रामानि द्रवरिप्य-विफात्तानि तत्वानि, भद्विरि तेषामुनक्करः-ततं भूसाम्य तत्” (ब.भ.०, 7.1.1). “विकारावशं शृंवं नामान्तः सबसां: अवसां” (ब.भ.०, 6.8.4).
There is thus a conflict between the statement of the Sruti and the position established by Sankara. To this supposed objection, Sankara thus replies—

(i) To the ordinary ignorant people,—who under the influence of avidyā, resolve the underlying unity (Brahman) into the multiplicity of the changes and thus identifies the two,—the multiplicity of the changes is the only Reality. Thus no question of conflict between the unity and the multiplicity can rise here.  

(ii) But those who have realised the truth that the underlying unity (Brahman) is untouched (unaffected) by the evolving multiplicity of changes—do not regard these changes as something separate and apart (व्यतिरिक्त) from Brahman, do not look upon them as so many independent and self-sufficient ‘things’ (कथा) complete in themselves. To these people, the multiplicity of changes would appear merely as

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1 "नाममपोपात्मिति,—‘एकभौतिकायं’ इवादित्तत्त्वो विद्येशरं—

2 "यदा तु स्वाभाविका भविषया ब्रह्मकारृ तत्त्वं—स्वाभाविकायं

3 "यदा तु परमार्थेन परमार्थेन परमार्थविशेषस्वरूपे

4 “स्यातपर्यं तत्त्वमात्रं न नाम; तद्र इत्यतिरिक्तः परमार्थेनात्माने चरणं प्रस्तुतं, चरणं न कारणं विरोधम्” (भव, 3.5.1).

5 “परमार्थः सविग्यायं चतुर्मयो चतुर्मयं चतुर्मयं चतुर्मयं

6 “हत्यानि—निविषेन हत्या; सविग्यायं चतुर्मयं, न च वेतृतिविवेचन; …… नन्दे एकाभिधात्रि ” (भाग्यदिगिरि वंश्य)। "कार्त्तिकेय ‘व्यतिरिक्त ‘व्यतृतिविवेचन’ कार्योऽक्षणः” (भव, 2.1.14).
a means (ध्यान, दर्शनःतनि), as a mere indicative mark (परिष्कार विशेषण), as an expression (संस्कारः) — of the underlying Brahman.¹
The gradually evolving changes ² would appear to these people, merely as an instrument (परास्थ) for the realisation of the purpose (कार्यः) ³ — of the underlying Brahman. Thus there is no possibility of a conflict (विरोध) between the unity and the multiplicity here also.

After establishing his theory in his commentary on the Vedanta, Sankara has expressly recorded his remarks thus—

"The author of the Brahma-Sutras himself saw no reason for rejecting the manifested changing world (कार्यःपरस्थ). The Sutra-kanda adopts the विवेकवाद (i.e.,

¹ "मालयपादि……सबवाह परसावः स्थलः द्रव्यः-दुर्लभं भवति " (जातयो, 7.17.1) "विवेकान्तस्वरूपः क्रिया-पद्धति: कर्मण्यः। ...तत्त्वाय समादीनि प्राणायामि निपुःक्रमः, तेषुद्वारायामि सूर्यायाः तत्त्वं निपुःक्रियायां " (जातयो and जातयो)।

"संयम सर्प प्राणायामि रेखायारोपणः क्रिया, etc. (हृ, 4.4,25).

"पाणि पापायः……सर्प शजांति-विक्रिया—वीरोभास, 13.13." "सत्-संयमान्त्रित संयमान्त्रितत्वतो " (हृ, 6.2.2)। "सत्यवं संयमान्त्रित सत्यवं संयमान्त्रितत्वतो "

ibid.

"यथौ यमकातर परिशिलादि शृद्धते तत् ग्रामडःनोपयः लेकिन्ति विक्रियवते " तस्यन, 2.1.14).

² "मालयपादि प्राणायामि उत्तरोतिदिनेन्द्रियानि तत्त्वानि, विवेकान्तस्वरूपः तेषुविद्युट्टिदानं भूमायाः तथ" (जातयो) क्रियायः। "तारात्मिकःविक्रियायः " (कथ, 13.12)।

³ "क्षणेन नवंत्रेन परिशिल्यश्च केषानित्यमस्मृत्ति संहितामस्वभावं न दर्तेत् इत्यद् संहितानि 'परास्थेिलं दृष्टं " (कठयो, 5.5).
the principle of unity) as of supreme value; but he has also retained the fact of the multiplicity of changes) as of subordinate value and entirely dependent on the former.”

In his commentary on the Mandukya-kârikâ, Sankara himself expressly tells us that there is really no conflict between the Dvaita (the empirical world of changes and the Advaita (Non-Dualism, i.e., the fact of unity)—for the reasons advanced above.

Ananda-giri also in elaborating the idea of Sankara has by an illustration shown that no conflict really arises between the two standpoints—the empirical truth and the transcendental truth.

Vidyâranya in his padhâri, in explaining the vârasvâd, has shown that in Sankara—

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1 “सूक्ष्मस्वार्थोन्निपरसतार्थिविवेचन ‘तदनवलय’ निम्त्याय। नमाः कार्यावेंसे, परिशाद-प्रक्षेपाच्च भागयति ” (वेभशः, 2.1.14.).

2 “तेनां स्तुतमा भागतरुषो न विदेशते जेति:।।।।।। सर्वभूसेवौं ‘सर्वभूललत ’ वारेन्कालधन्यवस्था न विदेशते जेति:। यथा खंडकपादादिभिः।”
(सांका.भाष, 3.17-18).

3 “यथा परोपकारित पुल्लभासक्षकस्वावादुद्विवेचनी—‘ नांच सुरुहरू रखूं रूपसा। कर्कस्तिनिभिनिधिति ’। आनुभवभिनिधित। आनुभव सन्तोषपरापार्जन सुहास्यं परिस्थिति भोत। परावलय, तथा तथा विवेचनी वचनं सूचिपत्रादि विदेशी। तथा परसास्याभिलाल्यवस्तुन्येम् व्यवहारिक-जनानिदिवाचन भविष्यत् ” (सांका.भाष, 4.57).
Vedanta the परशास्वाद is not incompatible with the तिमेश्वाद.

Thus we find that no need arises to abolish परशास्त्र. Both the परशास्त्र and तिमेश्वाद can exist compatibly together.

It will be seen that we have tried in this chapter, as well as in others, to present Sankara before our readers, as he reveals himself in his own writings; and we hope that our readers will agree with us in thinking that it is not possible to come to any other conclusion than that which we have sought to reach here, from a deep and careful reading of his commentaries. It is our firm conviction that a great injustice has been done to this great philosopher of India in respect of this most vital point upon which rests his great साधारण—the Theory of Māyā.

1 "चौरस्व गृहांब्रह्म परिवार पुर:सर सब्दात्त्वरोसेलिनसिलिंधरं.- (महाशान, 13.51—टोका)। (In the case of चौर even, compare Sankara's idea—"न चौरस्व सब्दात्म-मांगः द्विभावार्थमेः—हौ सा")। Of. Sankara also—"पिण्डाः काला मितरितरम्बि परारुपिः, सुवास्पि श्रियात्"—हौ सा, 6.2.2.
CHAPTER IV

PLACE OF ETHICS AND RELIGION IN VEDANTA

1. It is very widely believed that one of the fixed tenets in the Vedanta is that the work or कः र्यः is, after all, a bondage which ties a man to this metempsychosis or Samsāra (संसार). One must try therefore to get rid of this bondage and secure his final release or मुक्ति from it. It necessarily follows from this that the Vedantic मुक्ति (Mukti) is equivalent to the emptying of the human soul, which directs all its energy to leave the human life devoid of all actions and thus to make it a barren desert. It is also generally held that human desires or कामांग्रस are condemned wholesale in this system of philosophy in no unequivocal language and unmistakable terms; and it is the desires which lie at the root of all works. To kill the desires outright is evidently the sole aim of the Vedanta and their total annihilation, it is thought, is enjoined in an authoritative tone, whose voice can be heard from every page of the Vedantic literature. In dealing with this subject, a writer has thus expressed his idea:—

"The Indian Theism, because of its bondage to the Karma idea, has been unable to rise to a high conception of the
Divine character. In making motive itself the fetter, instead of evil motive, it turned its back upon the ethical goal and suggested the endeavour to escape from the region of the ethical altogether. The endeavour to get rid of desire is an endeavour to pass beyond the good, and ends in confounding the conscience with covetousness."

As the entire man is thought to be a mere sum-total of "desires and works mechanically related," and as his virtues and vices are all relegated to the empirical region and are described as false and unreal;—it has been generally supposed that the destruction of the individuality which consists merely in the desires, works, pleasure, pain, etc., is the aim of this philosophy which seeks absorption of one's being in the "difference-less pantheistic empty void" which it calls Nirguna Brahman (निर्गुण ब्रह्म) and such absorption is the सुक्ति which it teaches.¹ The healthy enrichment and expansion of the human soul by the acquirement and cultivation of moral virtues, it is seriously maintained, is out of place in this system of philosophy. And a philosophical system which, it is very justly concluded, can shed no wholesome influence upon the life and conduct of man and human society, has very little practical interest which it can evoke and it stands condemned in its own teaching.

Such, in fact, are the ideas and conclusions which are to be found extensively gaining ground both in Europe and

¹ Cf., "The method of attaining to the Atmā according to the teaching of the Upanishads, is that of making the human spirit a desert.
***The goal of effort is an absorption in which all difference is lost. Every movement of the mind and heart must be cast forth and stilled."
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in India even among the best and the most sympathetic critics of the Adwaita philosophy.

We propose in this chapter to cautiously examine the validity of the assertions above referred to, and to see if such conclusions as have been drawn find any support from the writings of Sankara—the great interpreter and leader of this school of thought. We shall also try to discover what constitutes the real teaching of the Vedanta and to determine if Ethics and Religion do not form an integral and essential part of the Vedantic theory.

2. Every man is born endowed with a psychological disposition which may be traced to the origin of the human race, and which constitutes the most essential heritage for him to which he has succeeded. In this disposition are to be found imbedded all his natural instincts and habits, his love and hatred, his pleasure and pain, his appetites and passions, and his entire stock of impulses and desires. It is the receptacle of all the race-experience and his past impressions or संज्ञारस lying deep in it in a latent form, ready to rise up to the surface at the slightest notice or call. Sankara would call this disposition—जैवप्रकृति or खभाव or nature,¹ and man is passive (अभ्यतनः; अभवः) in respect of this खभाव (nature) which determines him and his actions,

¹ Of. Sankara's observations in the Taittiriya-bhasya—"अभ्यतनार-कृतसंयोगार्था...अभ्यतेन चिकित्सा च चिकित्सा; चिकित्सु कार्यसू प्रदर्शना चिकित्सा-विवाहितेष्वः." (१० भा, १.११). Of. also "दशलोग च कैवाचित्त कार्याविनेत्र्विनेत्र विख्याति विश्वायविनेत्र विख्याति अभ्यत्ते एव कौशिकः कार्याविनेत्र्विनेत्र भवन्ते। तथा विख्यातीनेषु खभावतः एव कैवाचित्त कौशिकः कौशिकः" (४.४.२).
and which is revealed when he is born. It is owing to this disposition that man has likings and dislikings for particular sense-objects;—that some men are seen from their childhood evincing natural attachment to mundane objects of enjoyments, and others developing natural aversion to temporal pleasures. ¹

An idea of how this ‘disposition’ (प्रकृति) has been described in the Vedanta-works can be formed from the following:

(a) “Nature (प्रकृति) is the Samskāra (the latent self-reproductive impression of the past acts of Dharma and a-Dharma) manifesting itself at the commencement of the present birth........All living beings follow their own nature.”

(b) “Nature (स्वभाव) is the tendency (Samskāra—Bāsā) in living beings acquired by them in the past births, and manifesting itself in the present birth ready to yield its effects, and this ‘nature’ is the source of the Guna, it being impossible for the Guna to manifest themselves without a cause.”

(c) “As regards all sense-objects, there necessarily arise in each case love (रस:) for an

¹ Sometimes, Sankara calls this ‘disposition’ as—“अभिव्य विशेषास्मि साधय:” (ष्ठैः भाषा, 8.19). Since, this disposition is the natural determinant of all our activities, and it is the root of our desires, pleasure and pain stimulated from it. The term avidya is used in its connection, because it is not the ‘true’ self but Sankara describes it as composed of 5 sheaths or “स्वभावार्हितः पूर्वाकृतिः विशेषास्मिनि अविद्यार्हिते: सूचितः सत्यायत्नः अस्तित्वस्य स्वभावस्य अविद्याय:” (ष्ठैः, 2.3).
agreeable object, and aversion (हेम:) for a disagreeable object. When desire (काम:) arises, it rouses the Rajas and urges the person to action.¹

This ‘nature’ or empirical character of the man is a gradual development in consequence of his education, association, society and the circumstances in which he is born and brought up. This is the unformed, undisciplined animal nature in man. Thus, man is born with a fund of animal impulses and inclinations which are the source of his movements or the tendency to activities. He is born subject to desires—love and hatred—राग-चेत— which colour his whole nature. Man is, at the beginning no better than an animal being. He is just emerged from nature; he is not yet a self-conscious being. He is simply ‘aware’ or ‘conscious’ of certain passive feelings aroused in him in consequence of his contact with the outward environment, and of certain impulses within, spontaneously rising and demanding their satisfaction—moving him towards, and repelling him from, the agreeable and disagreeable objects, as the case may be. In fulfilling his काम-क्रोध (impulses of love and hatred), he fulfils his life’s entire purpose. These impulsive movements are always accompanied by pleasure and pain which leave their impression upon the mind. Mere idea of pleasure, thus, becomes the guide of his life and the sole guide of his movements and actions.

¹ (a) “प्रकृतिरूपः भवत्वातीत्यदिश्यंक्तः वचः साधनम् भविष्यतः...तथः शहस्वेय शमो जनता सेवेने” (भौमान, 3.33).

(b) “साधन नारकलः संप्रतः वर्णः नाग्रामान्तु खकाः रावसुखवासामाबिष्यत:।
‘खकाः’...सुधाराद्वभैरवः निश्चय रणकामुप्पणः” (भौमान, 18.41).

(c) “ब्रह्मदिविवक्षः दृश्यारः; खण्डिका दृश्यः—प्रवेशंस्माभिनी।.....कामो
‘द’ जन्ती रज्जः प्रवेशं पुरुषं प्रविषयति” (भौमान, 3.34 and 37).
"Desire is the longing for a pleasure-giving agreeable object of experience when actually coming within the ken of our senses or heard of or remembered; and anger is the aversion for the disagreeable, for the cause of pain when being seen or heard of or remembered."

(Gītā-bhāṣya, 5. 23.)

Man is completely passive here and utterly at the mercy of these impulses. This is the empirical, actual self.

Sankara, as we remarked before, is reluctant to call this self a self at all. He is fond of calling it श्रवणक्ष. There is agency in this self no doubt; but this is no real agency at all. For, all the necessary elements constituting the agency of this self are reciprocally determined by their antecedents and consequents in time. The actions involving movements of the body, sense organs, manas, are necessarily mechanically determined by, and are the resultant of, their antecedent conditions in time—

वस्त्र श्रवणकर्यः श्रवणकर्यः श्रवणकर्यः

'कचरोधमिति' प्रवृत्तिदयागात्

(वी, 1866.)

None of these actions can, therefore, be called 'free.'

In such a life, there is no purpose, no end, no aim, no regulation. As we are enslaved by these impulses and passions and blinded by their influence, we cannot discern

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1 Vide Chap. II of this book.

2 "ये जी विद्वं विद्वं: प्रवशोऽत्र दुःखः: 'हेत्ते च भूमितिः'—स च भाविक्य दुःखाभ एव लभितम्

(वी, 28.)।

3 "कामनाथसारसूती—कामनाथसारसूती—चिन्तनविश्वास्य-चिन्तनविश्वास्यायता

लक्षाहितः नाम सद्यं—नामस्य दुःखाधिकारस्य अभियाति" (वी, 28, 265)।

4 "कामान्तिक जी सच्चार्धीली नियम (regulation) प्रवृत्तिः तद्राजाति चेतनार्थित

अविश्वासार्थेन उपयोगम्" (वी, 38, 1.1.)।
our right path, we cannot choose our true End—our व्रजनाथ—

“To one whose mind is subject to the passions of desire and aversion, there cannot indeed arise a knowledge of things as they are, even of the external world. And it needs no saying that to such a man whose intellect is thus overpowered by passions of desire and aversion—रक्षा-व्रज, there cannot arise a knowledge of the innermost self.”

3. But is this the ‘whole’ man? Is man’s environment without and his impulses within, the sole determinant? Is there no other nature higher in man than this his ‘animal nature’? Is there no राम—inner unity underlying these manifold impulses and instincts which is the true source of his action?

What a man speaks and acts is not the whole man. All that flows from him—all his words, actions and movements cannot be the exhaustive expression of the man. It is wrong to identify the man with all these. What the man actually thinks and acts can never be equivalent to what the man is in his essence. What he actually feels, thinks and does—falls infinitely short of what is possible for him to do. He is not a mere sum-total of his feelings, impulses, habits, gathered in the past. As much as he

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1 “रक्षा-व्रजः सुख-दुःखानाधीनामात्र। लम्बािकी भवतः यदा, तदा तौ सर्वाङ्गानां प्रजायः। रक्षापादानाभागा परसायंतस्वयम्मानोपि नीतिप्रित्यायबन्धार्य नौ जनयति।” (१००, ७.२७).

“नां रक्षा-व्रजः यवमीशस्वित्यं वयामूलायं विनाविनामुसृपहते चविरं। किमु वज्री तामातायिनु्भुदे: प्रकपायानि ज्ञाते नीतिपुष्पस्ते दति।” (१०० भाग, ७.२७).

* His actual life is swayed by each and every impulse as it is stimulated. How can there be unity and order in such life? The individual
did express himself in his past records, and as much as he expresses himself in his present deeds and thoughts—fall far short of what properly constitutes his ‘nature’ or ख़ाब. These will always remain imperfect expressions of that inner ‘nature’ which these seek to express. It is because man is something more than these. It is because Brahman which is infinite and inexhaustible (चलय), is revealed in man and is present behind him. It is for this reason that—no one of his expressions can fix the infinite and inexhaustible possibilities in man in a rigid and final form. 

Sankara has observed that infinite शास्त्रविचार (infinite knowledge and power, etc.) lies concealed in man under the cover of his actual thoughts and deeds.

self is thus described—“That which first shows itself as the Innermost self (प्रक्षेत्र) in the body, and turns out in the end to be identical with the supreme Reality—the Brahman.”

प्रतिविरेण प्रयोगार्थमावहः ‘ख़ाब’ : ...देहां क्रिय योगार्थमया प्रक्षेत्रः, ‘परमाध्यः’—

एवं भावार्थमहिंसात्—ख़ाबायोऽविचारस्वातः (भिव, 8.3.)

1 “सर्वसंप्राप्तमां करणे: ‘तदः’ भवति; एव ततोऽपि ‘अन्तकतः’ एतत् भवति” (१८० भिव).

2 “सम्य भूतिव...एवं भार्थ—अत्यन्तः अत्यन्तः पवित्र, तथौ भान्य चाश्चालिक (indivisible) प्रतिविरेण—देहेवदेह” (भिव, 18.20).

It is wrong to restrict what is inexhaustible to its actual deeds and thoughts, as if these are its exhaustive expressions. In the Gita such idea has been condemned as तदाद् खो देहभूतिः (i.e., यदृच्छिक देहभूतिः)....एवं भावार्थम् यस्ते चक्षुस्य देहं अत्यन्तं यथार्थम्—देहां देहं तां सास्त्रविचार सत्वम्” (१८.22). “यथापि कार्यार्थम सम्भवम् तत्त्वं च वज्जेत्, तमापि यथौ पूपलं तत्त्वं ज्ञेयं—पूपलं च तद्रूपेषु” (१८.2, 5.1.1).

1 “लिङ्गम कुलश्रुतालेखनयान्तिरावहः इत्यादिश्रुतिधनिःसिद्धिविद्वानिः

संस्कृतमेक: संस्कृतान्यतिरावहः “संस्कृतमेक: संस्कृतान्यतिरावहः” (१८.2.6).

‘विश्वासादपि सतू तिरीक्षितोऽविचारादिश्रुतः’। “विश्वासादिश्रुत: पितार्थित्वात् च यथाप्रविचारस्वातः...ख़ाबायो आयुर्वीर्य’ (१८.2, 3.2.5 and 35). “तत्त् यथौ अनुभूतस्तु देहायो अनुभूतस्तु” (१८.2.5).
"Atma," says Sankara, "has been expanded in man only. With other animals, eating and drinking alone constitute their sphere of knowledge. But man is entitled to approach and reach the supreme end of life (निर्माणयुक्त). He it is who desires to gain the highest end by appropriate means and by knowledge (वज्ञार्थिनः)."

"प्रयास सम्प्रतिस्वरूपः समुज दय साध्यात्मिकेऽः।
वैसं प्राप्तिः—अभिप्राप्तिः—भाविकाव्यार्थानं
ज्ञानार्थिनिदेहायान्तं"—

(सौ, भा, 10.34).

That is to say—"it is the actual presence of the Supreme End behind them—which constitutes the possibility for their future progress from the present stage to the next higher and higher stages—of those who are fit for such progress."

"Man's distinction lies in the fact that instead of being passively disposed of by his impulses and desires, he can bring them under the law of the rational self which the impulses envelop."

It is this presence, within us, of something inexhaustible which makes us desire more and more, and it is for this infinite possibility in us that we never feel satisfied with our actual thoughts and deeds.

1 यि पुनः प्राप्तिः? विभागाध्यायारः; ...प्रेमे लेघ भाविकाव्याभासः; स वि प्रमाणिन सम्प्रतिस्वरूपः; विभाग प्राप्ति चतुष्य...सृंचन चतुष्यं तुष्टिः। दत्तवेण पञ्चमा
सब्दा-पिपासे एव भाविकाव्यां" (सौ, भा, 2.1)। "सब्दं एव विशेषस्तथेऽद्व- निष्प्रेमिनांभासि अभिधित्व।... (दौ, 1.4.19).

24
Because of this *possibility* of man he is held responsible for the works—good or bad—done by him. How is it that we do not make animals accountable for their evil works? What is it that distinguishes a man from the lower animals? It is not at all *possible* for an animal to do otherwise than what is dictated to it by its *actual* nature, by its impulses and passions. But with man the case stands differently. He could have, had he only paused and deliberated, seen the consequences of his impulsive actions which he had indulged in. There was, in him, a possibility for a better course of action than what he had done, and this possibility he had ignored. Why did he, in following his evil impulse, stoop to an animal satisfaction? It is for this that we hold the man responsible for his evil deed and punish him for it. We all know, his actual life is not all-in-all to him; infinite possibility lies hidden in him. An infinite possibility either for good or for evil is always present in him. It is for this possibility within man that nobody can tell how he will express himself at the present crisis. It was for this possibility within him that the notorious Jagai (जागई) whose life had seemed irrevocably fixed in evil ways, was suddenly shocked into his real life and quite unexpectedly turned over a new leaf, resolving thence-forward to live a higher life,—when the famous saint of Nadia—Srichaitanya—had extended his arms of love towards him in return for the bleeding injury he had received from the cruel hand of the miscreant. It is this possibility or power which is the shaping or directing force (प्रभाव) within us, bringing man, step by step, to the ultimate realisation of his final end—his परमात्माये. Man’s *actual present* life is this possibility so far realised;—is the partial and imperfect
manifestation or expression of this inexhaustible possibility.

4. Sankara has observed in more places than one that—

"all the movements visible in the world, all its works and activities—must have a regulative purpose present behind them which shapes them for its own realisation."

"It not only holds good in the outward world, but it is also true in all the activities of the inner world." He continues—

"it is also the case with all the impulsive movements which go on within the human organism—all the actions of the sense-organs, all the functions of the man’s intellect and the like."

This is an observation the value of which, it is needless to add, cannot be overestimated. What are these movements and activities for? For what use do these aspirations, efforts and actions (सर्वोपरिक् प्रयत्नः) go on? Their value, Sankara points out, does not lie in that they exist alongside of Atma, but in the use (कार्यस्थितिसिद्धिः) which the Atma (the self) makes of them.

"इत्यर्वशेषार्थं चित्तविभागः विषयात्
सत्यं प्रकटः—‘ चेदिन्द्रेण भीते’
...‘प्रत्येकं च ज्ञाते ‘ ‘द्वं भास्याम’
—कालार्थ’।

Vide Gita, 9.10—

"सत्यार्थं प्रकटः सूयने सङ्करार्थं
विषयार्थशेषनाथो जगतु विपरिष्कर्ते"

Sankara explains the stanza in this way—‘The विपरिष्कर्त्व of the world, i.e., the continuously changing elements of the world are
All these activities of the organism have their only value in the fact that they may be used by the \( \text{एत्मम्} \) the rational “I” for his own purpose; that they may be utilised for his end; that they may prove useful (कर्मलापित or कर्ममुख) to him. Otherwise, all these actions and movements (प्रक्रिया:) will entirely lose their value.1 There is the \( \text{एत्मा} \) or the self within, other than these movements and activities, for whose sake they act. This remark proves the self (प्राणम्) to be a Purpose—and end—which is realised in these activities, and which utilises these for its own use.

Elsewhere, Sankara’s remarks in this connection are equally valuable and bring the same important truth into prominence—

“Suppose,” he says there, “no \( \text{एत्मा} \) (self) is present behind these activities (प्रक्रिया:); there are only these activities working, but there is no purpose to regulate them. An absurd consequence will follow, viz., nobody is present whose purpose they serve; nobody is there to use them, to utilise them—

moving to realise a Divine Purpose or end. The world with all its changing elements is moving for the realisation of the Final end.

1 “\( \text{कार्य-लोपसाधन चेरिनेन क्षयसिद्धम प्रक्रियात्मक प्रक्षण:} \)” [\( \text{वृष्टी} \) 3, 3.238].

All श्रव्स्तिः (activities) without the self to direct them are like काश लोपः.
"The activities would thus prove useless (अण्डा); they would be to no purpose. For, there is no regulation of these activities; no purpose to guide them. Thus there would be no order, no unity, no central purpose in the human life.

It has been stated elsewhere, as a general principle that—

"the works and activities (प्रक्रिया), if severed and cut off from their source, the self,—are entirely valueless or useless, like the broom, the stick, the dust on the road-side."*

This important truth is also expressed in the Kena-bhasya where the self has been established as a purpose—a will-power—an organising principle—and it is this

1 Vide Gita-Bhasya, 18-50. Here also the commentator remarks that the actions and the works point to something beyond them whose purpose they serve, for whose sake they act. Otherwise pleasure, pain, etc., would have to be supposed to be acting for the sake of pleasure and pain, etc.; the activities of the body are for the sake of the body. To avoid such absurd supposition, the existence of the self must be admitted whose purposes these activities realise. "न च सुखायु सुखं, दुःखायु वा दुःखं। चाभावाचावचाचायस्मात् सम्भवेनव्यावाणा।" All activities are moving for the realisation of the self (चाय) which is their final end (चक्षुशान). It is the self which connects and determines all these functions and activities for its own final realisation. This is the significance of the commentary here.

2 "खत: काष्ठ-कोषास्माति दृश्य तानि (चक्षुरार्दृश्यं द्रव्योपार्दृश्यं) चैत्यालक्षणेनिति:भूमानि" (वैद्यक्षेत्रो, 4.4.18). Cf. "काष्ठ-कीर्तस्मात चेतेतेना-प्रवतसितेष्या प्रक्षणश्चरयस्।" (वैद्यक्षेत्रो, 3.2.38). Cf. also "तेन दृश्य निरालम्बं क्षिप्रंवक्षराय चवक्षरते।"
purpose for whose sake all the elements of the body work. And this purpose is, in its nature, other than (सत्त्व) these activities which it directs and controls and moves for its own realisation—

“सत्त्वातं रक्षामार्गे शैव मण-पार्श्व-प्रेषितुम्” 1

Do not all these passages clearly imply that Sankara’s idea about the self was that it is an End-in-itself—a Purposive power—which purpose utilises all its impulsive movements for its own realisation? Can, in the face of such clear expressions embodied in these passages, Sankara’s self be treated as a “mere intelligence divorced from action”? We have gathered together principal passages on the subject and presented them before our readers with the hope that they may come to their own conclusion on this important point for themselves.

But we have not done with it as yet. To another passage which is found recorded in the Katha-Bhasya2 we now beg to request our readers to turn their attention. This passage will show that the self is a ‘free

1 Vide Kena-bhasya, 1.1. Sankara has observed here that “किच्छ यथार्थसिद्धिव गार्भेषसंपादनस्य हेषित्तूलः, जिवा संवासविधिविभास रक्षाणां रक्षामार्गे मण-पार्श्व-प्रेषितुम्” ? This power is distinguished from the actions of the body, organs, manas, etc.; it does not disintegrate into those activities, none of which endures. The self, as causal Power, does not yield to the impulsive activities, but it lies entirely outside these empirical series and determines them. “सन्न: न खर्तवे प्रबलितमितिविषयं अतुसुकुञ्जे कार्यं गङ्गामपि पति सन्।। तथादृष्टं गुणं एव बैतलित नितिः प्रथः।”

2 Vide कथा-भाष्य, 2.2.5. “सम्मदुर्भोगौ दुर्गोविकरं पुरुषं प्राप्त: येव: मैव तथा। चैव: नमस्ते भालोवं गुरुस्वामिं पुष्पक्क करोति, विविह च, श्रीव एव अभिवृद्धि, प्रेयोगिकान्ततलात्र श्रीयस।। तस्य सम्मदुर्भोगश्रेविवेकासामपि प्रेय:। पुष्पव्रातितलयः सम्मदुर्भोग-क्षेत्रशं हृदिः” —प्राकृति।
causality' which weighs its impulses and determines their activities for the realisation of its own End or purpose.

"The supreme good (श्रम:) and the mundane good (देश:) are confusedly presented to the man. The intelligent compare the two, and on mature reflection discern their relative value—their difference, the supreme good as worthier than the pleasurable. Then they adopt means to the attainment of the End chosen."

We thus compare, estimate our impulses, and they, thus, become objects of our contemplation. A sum-total of feelings, impulses, etc., cannot compare, deliberate and control any more than each feeling and impulse separately. Only a free self can do so which has them, which is above them. In a comparison between the impulses, in a preference among them of what is the highest good, we are agents and we are free. A man thus freely makes a choice from among his several objects of choice and desire which are qualitatively higher; and ultimately chooses what he rationally decides to be his highest-good. If it be true that—I often act in opposition to what is my strongest desire at the present moment, it follows that my self acts independently of pleasure, temperament, habit, etc.—

"सष्येण प्रवृत्तिः प्रभृति धीमः प्रज्ञोभिकृतः।
तत्तत्तवाः पृथविभावलीमः प्रज्ञोभिकृतः।
तत्तत्तवाः पृथविभावलीमः प्रज्ञोभिकृतः।"

(कठ-भाष, 1.28).

Similar remarks are found embodied in the Gita also—

"Man is man only so long as his antahkarana is competent to discriminate between right and wrong. When he is
unable to do so, he is debarred from attaining the highest of human aspirations. Hence at the very commencement he must rise above the sway of affection for and aversion to the sense-objects or pleasures and pains.” He must restrain these natural tendencies, he must exert himself with vigour to resist these natural impulses, and then the action of his will is in an opposite direction.”

“भयंतया प्रयालेग्र खामातप्रभिन्नरोच्च
कल्य, प्रतिक्रियात् प्रवेगमयित, प्रवर्गार्थां पञ्चित।

(कठ-भाष्य, 4.1)”

Unrestrained desire works mischief; and urged by uncontrolled desire, the man commits sin and evil. We are bent on selfish ends and are deluded by ‘egoism’—when uncontrolled desire urges us to action. We must, therefore, bring our impulses and desires under the law of rational self, into the path of our positive purpose of life which we have deliberately selected and which has filled up our entire being.

1 The conversion of undisciplined animal nature in man into a disciplined, moral and virtuous character involves great effort (सच्चता प्रयालेय). The effort of the whole man must be turned and concentrated from the natural direction to opposite direction.

The same idea occurs in the Vedanta-bhasya also—“यी विचिन्द्रः
प्रवेगे पठुः; गयच्छ स सदा खामात्प्रभिन्नरोच्च प्रव्रेगार्थे।
सत्साक्षात्कार्यार्थरूपानि विश्वासितव, खामातप्रभिन्न
कार्यार्थ-कर्षण-संघातप्रभिन्नगीतरूपुविश्वासित, 
प्रवर्गार्थामार्थस्या प्रवेगमयित्” (वैद्य भा०, 1.1.4).
5. The foregoing discussion has brought into clear light an important truth before our mind. Both—the gratification of impulsive desires and the realisation of the highest purpose of life—cannot be pursued by the same man as an object of desire. There exists a conflict between the selfish impulsive activities and the realisation of the supreme purpose of life. Both cannot be chosen by a man, as an object for his realisation.¹ There cannot be two ends of his life. Sankara has repeatedly shown that there is eternal conflict (विरोध) between Karma (कर्म) and Jnan (ज्ञान). Unless a man feels disgusted (विरक्त) with the pleasure-giving mundane ends, he cannot choose the realisation of self as his supreme and only End of life.

Sankara has expressed his own idea on the subject, thus:—

(a) "I desire to attain an End which is eternal, imperishable and transcendental; what shall I do with Karma which is opposite to it in its nature?"

(b) "Light and shade cannot co-exist. Interests in outward activities and interests in the inner self are mutually exclusive. The dualism between the spheres of virtue and prudence is an irreducible dualism whose rival claims it is impossible to adjust."

(c) "Unless our mind is turned away from the mundane objects, we are unable to

¹ This is the notorious कर्म-ज्ञान-विरोध, against which Sankara has written so much.
devote it to the realisation of the self. You cannot desire both—the outward objects and the inner self at the same moment. There is conflict between the two courses.”

(d) “In the world people revel with mundane goods. It is not so with the wise whose revels are centred in the self alone. For the unwise, there are many pleasures due to the sense-objects. But to the wise, their sole rejoicing proceeds from the self.”

(e) “A distinction has been made between Jnana-nishtha (ज्ञाननिष्ठा) and Karma-nishtha (कर्मनिष्ठा). Vedic works are intended for him only who has desires. The renunciation of these works is enjoined on him who seeks only the self.”

(f) “He who wishes to reach the eastern sea, cannot have the same road that the man who wishes to go to the western sea chooses. The difference between the knowledge (ज्ञान) and works (कर्म) is as wide as between a mountain and a mustard-seed.”

(g) “Emancipation being the result of knowledge, how can a man desire the result of works?”

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1 (a) “प्रथा नित्येः कृत्यायां बभवेन सुधिनाथेन अथी। न तत्त्वप्रधाने। अतः किं ज्ञानं कर्माय पंगमांप्यानै।” (सु° सा° 1.2.12)

(b) “न फे आज्ञायावाले; आन्तरिक अभिन्नं भक्त;। आज्ञायावालाक्षणं। निरीक्षात्; आज्ञायावालात्। फे आन्तरिक अभिन्नं भक्तं भक्तं। न फे तस्य:। प्रकाशयी तुंगप्रकाश स्फटिः। सम्बन्धित।” (सु° स्ता°, 3.1.4)
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We need not quote further passages. The passages quoted above all declare what really worked in the mind of Sankara, and what led him to make a distinction between ज्ञान and कर्म—knowledge and works. His purpose was not that we are to renounce all works—even the higher moral virtues; —and, as we shall presently see, he was not advocating inertia. These and other similar passages clearly indicate the truth that there can be only one ultimate End of life. ज्ञान and कर्म both cannot constitute the supreme End. Karma (कर्म) done to secure mundane pleasure or goods and Jnana (ज्ञान), i.e., the realisation of the self—cannot both be the ultimate ends of life.

Sankara thus contrasts the result of the two—Jnana (ज्ञान) and Karma (कर्म) :

If you desire the realisation of the self as your highest end, how can you choose works or कर्म? For, works or Karma

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(c) "न यह ज्ञानात् प्राप्तीर्मीतिकथायितने, ब्रह्माणेएवेककोशमुपासितं बुझिः प्रवचितम्। व्यवस्थायमातिरतिभिरवृत्ति।" (श्लोक 1.6.1)। "न यह ज्ञानविषयायो बुझिं प्रवचितम्। प्रव्यवस्थायमातिरतिभिरवृत्ति।" (कठभ 4.1)।

(d) "तदावस्थनात् रति तोर्म्। ब्रह्माणेएवे साहित्यकोश | किंत ताहि? भास्कर्यानिबिष्टेन उभये मन्त्रित...इहितिनिं साहितं साहित्यविवेक। न तथा विवेक। किंत ताहि? भास्कर्यानिबिष्टेन साहितं।" (श्लोक 7.25.2)।

(e) "ज्ञान-कर्मिनिविष्णुविवेकशोभनारं...निर्विवेकवाच्यं संहितात् कर्मीकारविद्येशौ दर्शीदीनि हितरितानि। तेहस्रोऽधार्मिकं चार्माणं लोकानिमंत्रेऽस्मास्मि चिन्तितं।" (श्लोक 2.11)।

(f) "न यह पूर्वकुस्तुं जिगियोऽऽति, धार्मिकेऽधार्मिक प्रव्यवस्थायमातिरतिभिरवृत्ति। प्रव्यवस्थायमातिरतिभिरवृत्ति। जानविषयात्...शान्तिः | शान्तिः। प्रव्यवस्थायमातिरतिभिरवृत्ति। कर्मिनिविष्णुविवेकशोभनारं...विष्णुविवेक।। (श्लोक 18.55)।

(g) "न ज्ञानविषयात् कर्मिनिविष्णुविवेकशोभनारं...विष्णुविवेक।। ज्ञानविषयात् ज्ञानविषयात् ज्ञानविषयात्...विष्णुविवेक।। (श्लोक 18.66)।
can be chosen only for the following purposes:—

(i) You can choose Karma, if you are desirous of producing something which is as yet non-existent (प्रत्यय). But as the self is what is already in you eternally existent,—how can Karma produce it?

(ii) If you desire to reach a place or an object, you must perform certain activities or Karma for it (चाल). But the self is what is always within your reach, no Karma is needed at all for it.

(iii) For the purpose of effecting a change or transformation to a thing, work or Karma may prove necessary (व्रताण्य). But as the self is beyond change, as it is subject to no transformation—is immutable—Karma is out of place here.

(iv) If you desire to effect purification to your mind or something else, work or Karma proves useful for the purpose (वश्चाण्य). But what would action do to the self which is always pure? ¹

Now, from the foregoing discussion it follows that there can be but one object of our desire, one supreme end of our life, and that is—the realisation of the self. And works or Karmas are only needed for the purification of our mind or antahkarana.

¹ Vide Vedanta-Bhāṣya, 1-1-4, and Brihadāranyaka-bhāṣya, 3-3-1, and other places for this discussion.
6. We have seen above that we are naturally selfish beings. We seek always the gratification of our pleasure, to appropriate which to ourselves, we do not hesitate to work mischief to others. Our mind is, by nature, filled with desire for agreeable objects and aversion to disagreeable—राग-द्वेष,—and driven by these impulses, we work blindly for our selfish ends and often quarrel with others to secure pleasure to ourselves. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, for us to purify our mind from these selfish desires and inclinations, and to free it from their influences. Unless this purification can be effected, the realisation of the self is out of the question.

The purification of the mind or antahkaraṇa can be effected by restraining these egoistic impulses and tendencies to action (negatively), and by performing higher kinds of works (positively). By exerting ourselves always for the good of the community and by the performance of unselfish and disinterested works, our mind may become gradually free from selfish passions and desires; and when these impurities are thus removed, it is prepared for the supreme realisation. But a caution is needed here. These unselfish works ought not to be done, nay they cannot be done—as ends-in-themselves. As there can only be one supreme End, viz., the realisation of the self which is the only object of our desire; higher disinterested works can be done only as a means of helping that realisation. This, in brief, is the view of Sankara.

Works done with impulsive and selfish motives have been condemned in the Vedanta, as Sakāma-karmas. And as such works have always been looked upon as the source of bondage, with a view to supplant and supersede these self-seeking activities, higher disinterested kinds of works have been prescribed and the
aspirants after emancipation (सुभुत्र) are called upon to
diligently perform such works. These higher works are
considered indispensable for the purification of the mind
(विषय्यजीभि or स्वभावित), infested as it is with selfish impulses
and desires. And as these are done for emancipating the
mind from the influence of the lower natural tendencies,
which would ultimately lead to the realisation of the true
self, these works cannot prove a bondage. If, however,
the supreme end is forgotten, and these are done
as ends-in-themselves, only then they will prove a
bondage.

An idea prevails among many that in Sankara’s
System of Vedanta no room has
been left for works and that his aim
was to get rid of all works altogether.
To our mind, this is an idea which
cannot be accepted and which must be condemned
as erroneous, with all the emphasis which we can
command. We have said above that as our mind
is naturally swayed by selfish passions and desires, it
needs purification in order to prepare it finally for
the realisation of the ultimate End which constitutes
the only object of our desire. How this purification
is to be executed will appear from the following

(a) “When a man performs higher kinds of
works (Nitya-karmas or obligatory works),
his mind or antahkarana, unsoiled by

\[1\] “एतेऽकार्मोऽन्यत्र हृदान्तः कर्मादान्तः
प्रथायं खर्दं च बलित्रं थदा, तदा निर्युष्म्व प्रथायः
सात्” (सुभुत्र भाषा, 3.1.8).

“इत्यतः कर्मात्मकः कर्म-संगीति रग्नविषिष्ठि,
विद्याविस्मृतिपिष्यति” (सुभुत्र भाषा, 4.8).
desire for results,—without attachment and longing for results—becomes *regenerated and pure*. When thus purified, the mind becomes fit for contemplation of the self. Thus the man whose mind has been purified by the performance of obligatory works (नियमकर्म) and who is thus *prepared* to acquire the self-realisation, may gradually attain to ज्ञाननिष्ठा (the final End).”

(b) “The three higher kinds of action should be performed; for, they cause *purity* in those who have no desire for fruits... These actions should be performed by a seeker of liberation, though they form the cause of bondage in the case of one who has an attachment for the actions and a desire for their fruits.”

(c) “The seekers of liberation must perform ritual works and other obligatory duties without any longing for the fruits of such works. When performed, the works prove useful as a *means* to the birth of spiritual regeneration of the mind (निःनीत्य).”

(d) “He who is free from a desire for the fruits of action and performs action as a bounden duty (नित्यकर्म) not as a काम्यकर्म; he who performs actions thus, is superior to those who perform action in a different spirit....... One who is devoted to action abandoning attachment for the results of action—performs for the purification of the mind
(ललिति) is said to be a Sanyāsin and a Jogin."

(c) "Works are meant for the purification of the mind. Selfish desires and passions are impediments to self-realisation. Unselfish prescribed duties when not done with self-seeking motives remove these impediments, effect purification of the mind, and thus help the final realisation."¹

We need not multiply instances. Such observations are to be found everywhere in the Vedanta works. The readers will judge for themselves if such observations at all favour the idea of inertia prevalent among the critics of the Sankara's theory. We find Sankara everywhere teaching that higher works which are described as Nityakarmas must be done for the purification of the mind.

¹ (a) "य: निख्य कालौ करोति, तथा पलिरागाहिना बकालियोकियामानवन:-करथ, निख्य कर्मधिद: संहितसमायं गैस्यसान। गैस्यसान प्रस्तुतसाकारानिषयां भवति। तत्त्व निख्यकालियोकियामानवन: करथ, भारमानासियिहुक्तस करिय तन्लितास खालु।" (२० भाव, १८,१०)

(b) "य: शाराकार्तत्र तत्प्रैव पावानिँ गैस्यसानविषयां फलानिष्यालोक्लियामाना।...... साखास फलानिंच्छीना वासम्तहं एतानवापि कालपिवाचु: करियं विश्विन भवन्तासायेः।" (२० भाव, १८,५ और ६)

(c) "चन्द्रमंगन्यायः हर्षसुीन्तितिनि य: शाराकार्तत्र फलानिष्यालोक्लियामाना। भवन्ति प्रवतीत...चन्द्रमंगन्यायः विवायः: सम्भवति।" (२० भाव, ३-४-२७ और ३ इत्यादि)

(d) "य: वि कालसियोत्त्वानु, स कालपकनकार्तत्रति भवति। चन्द्र सुति तत्प्रैवोः... भागानिल: करियंतलमहुसितितिनि...स कालपिवाचु: विश्वििसायेः।"..."किं ततो? कालिकाचिपि। कालसियोत्त्वानु सरसाय, कालियोकसुनितिहुः सुतितिनि—" च सम्भवती च वोवचिल च' भवतीत वूरोते।" (२० भाव ६-१; और intro.)

(e) "कालपित्वांगिः विहितियोकियामान। करियंौ: संहितसमायं गैस्यसानविषयां विवायं।... एव गैस्यसमायं निख्य कालपित्वां गैस्यसानिषयां भवन्तासायेः। एवं कालियोकियामान सुष सम्भवनातामस्त्तति।" (२० भाव, ४,४,२२)
But a word of caution is again necessary. These are never to be performed as an End, i.e., as an object of desire. For, as we have seen, there can only be one object of desire,—one End, viz., the realization of the true self.

As a corollary to the above proposition, we may mention here another fact. The reader will find an objection raised by Sankara himself in several places of his works that—if the self-realisation be the only End which we must pursue, all works necessarily become useless. And the work-section (कार्यक्ष) of the Veda—in which rules and prescriptions have been elaborately laid down for the performance of works—does also prove utterly valueless. To meet this objection, Sankara replies:

“Only the selfish works (Sakāmākarmas) are to be considered useless. The higher disinterested works (Nityakarmas) have always a value in the Vedanta; they are never to be considered useless. For they are meant for the purification of the mind. Disinterested works always help the realisation of the self.”\(^1\)

The reply suggested by Sankara in his commentary on the Gitā is still more valuable and deserves our particular consideration—“Our theory does not lead to the conclusion that the sruti teaching

\(^1\) “न च निमूच्योजनं प्रवचनः | ...यदि व्य क्षाव्यविधिः नार्त्यक्षाविधिभिः परिसमा जायते कथा; तत: ‘प्रवाहस्तादि पदस्य दूरास्तादेव वर्’ प्रति चतुर्थम एव कार्यः: श्रीयात। ...एवं शुक्लस्य, न विश्वासः। तत्सत्तु संस्काराविभिः पदकार्यः सवत्तमनि एव कार्यात्रिह सयनि। ... विश्वासः तु श्रावस्त्रयादितिष्ठतस्य-प्रसर्वादिः सयति। तथ्यास्त्रस्य-विश्वासः तु, चनार्थति—निर्यथाकालतः” (कौमो वा साध, 1.1)”
works proves useless. For, by restraining the first natural activities one after the other, and thereby gradually inducing fresh and higher activities, it serves to create an aspiration to reach the innermost self."^1

From these passages the readers will find a very clear enunciation of Sankara's position about the works. It is not true that works have no place in his philosophy and that he considered all works as fetters. On the contrary, higher and higher works, as we have just seen, must always be performed—so long as we have not reached the final End where all works, all our duties, find their completion and highest fulfilment—

"न च यथार्थम् सम्बन्धं वै, सम्बन्धमाना काम्यप्रतिप्रश्रव्यजानन
कैवयिस्तु प्रतिनिधातु यत् कं "— (३० भाषा, 4.3.14);
"यत् कार्यं तत् साधृ, भगवतं विदिते
वर्तं विदेत; न च भव्यता कार्यं परियम्यते
कृश्चिदु।"—
(३० भाषा, 15.20)

But here we must remind the readers of the note of warning which Sankara had sounded. No works, however high their nature, should be done as an end-in-itself; no work ought to be made an object of your desire (न इत्यलेन). For, as an object of desire, work will constitute itself as an end. Wherefore it is that, everywhere it has been laid

^1 न च यथार्थ्य ब्रह्मविभुतः प्रासादम्। प्रपूयाय्य प्रतिप्रश्रव्यजानन, चतुरीवर्षाय्यां—
प्रसादमवर्षाय्यां प्रासादविषयसु विषयं प्रवृचुरामपादायः " (३० भाषा, 18.66).
Again of. "भगवतं कार्यं यथायतं चापि कार्यं यत्, ते च चतुरीवर्षाय्यां—
प्रासादविषयसु प्रासादमवर्षायः।" (३० भाषा, 18.66).
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down that works are not to be performed with a desire for their fruits (फलाकारण). Since, there can only be one object of desire, one ultimate End of life. Works ought not to be abandoned—

"न वेद्यन्, कार्यंतेव तत्त्"—18.5

They must be done for the purification of our mind—

"पाशसा नमीखी "

which is full of impure thoughts and tendencies to activity. Only they must not be done as ends-in-themselves—as if they possess a primary and independent value in themselves. But their performance is always indispensably needed as a means (उपायलेन)1; they must be utilised by us, so that they may prove useful for the ultimate purpose we have in view, viz., the realisation of the final goal. The works, nay—everything of the world—have value, not as they exist alongside of the îtîına, but only so far as they are used by us—how we use them—

"तत्तिथयां उपारकल्यन्" (३० भास्, 4.5.15).

"अर्थव-सा-साहवा० दश्वं दशां प्रति
'उपारकालयन्" (३० भास्, 1.11).

"नामित्वाय दशेयुद्धिंतानि दशानार्थि
सुमुखि: बालंसाधारि नमीखनि" (३० भास्, 3.4.27).2

1 "परिभयं म्रोपवि विभावतापियलेन एते परिभयं न दशालेन" (३० भास्, 3. 3.12) [Here 'उपायल' stands in contrast with 'दशाल'.

उपायल useful as means, न दशालेन—i.e., not as an End.]

* All the good and disinterested works and virtues are means useful for the realisation of the final End. They are to be looked upon as instruments (साधनानि) which we must use (उपारंकर्) as helps to the realisation of the self. They have value, only because they are utilised by the self for its own purpose.

"उपायसाधनिं दि कार्यं संज्ञावारिष्ठ भानिः"—श्रीमान धर्मावान्, Int.
In this way, by the performance of disinterested higher works, the man is regenerated from the undisciplined ‘animality’ (पशुल—पशुरुल) to the disciplined ‘rationality’ (िवल). In the Brihadâranyaka, the yielding of the mind to the natural inclinations and instincts has been called as Ashura-bhâva (चुरुस्माउ—पशुल), and the doing of higher disinterested works for the good of the community, under the prescriptions of the śastras, with higher and unselfish purposes and inclinations has been designated as Deva-bhâva (िभवभाउ). If men follow passively the natural bents of their mind and permit them to become the sole guide of their life, they are no higher than animals. But if they obey the injunctions of the śastras and work for social good and public utility—such disinterested motives and works will exalt them to the higher attributes of benevolent gods (िवल). This high lesson the Vedanta teaches. How to make men possessors of godly qualities while on earth is the aim of Vedanta. But here again the Vedanta has not stopped. Its ultimate aim is to carry the man beyond the world to final realisation and to fulfil his transcendental destiny.

7. We have said that the higher forms of works—

Higher, disinterested works cannot be hypo-
postatised as an End.
Two reasons stated. They are to be used
as a means.

Nityakarmas—works done with dis-
interested motives cannot be treated
as ends-in-themselves, but always as
means—as a sādhana (साधन) useful,
through the purification of mind, for
the attainment of the true self which is our ultimate End.

1 "कर्मभिविभी राज्-देशी चासितृयु, यहा चम्पवास्तान-प्राष्ट्रिण भर्षीरावधी
भवति, तदा स ‘रेव.’। यदाहि भाषित-राजष्ट्र प्राष्ट्रिण भर्षीरावधी भवति,
तदा ‘भुरु.’।”—जीलामाधवशास्त्रवां मधुसूदनः।
If, however, these works are treated as ends, as is generally done, some serious consequences will follow. Let us consider these consequences now.

We are all members of a social whole. We belong to Varnāsrama-community, of which we are the members. Certain rules and laws we find recorded in the śāstras for our guidance. These laws are authoritative for us; because they form the collective experiences and opinions of the best selves of the community. It is generally held that certain rules and acts which have been evolved within the community for its own preservation, are imposed upon its individual members, so that each of them may observe and act up to these rules. Thus the preservation or the good of the community becomes the end for which the individual members live and act. These actions are known as Varnāsrama-Dharma (वर्णाश्रम-धर्म) and we must all perform these Dharmas or duties for the good of the Varnāsrama-community, of which we, as members, form parts. Its prescriptions (विधि) and its prohibitions (निषेध) are all binding upon us which each of us must obey. This is the generally accepted and usual view with regard to Varnāsrama-Dharma. The individuals can have no other purpose in their life, but to perform these duties or Dharmas. Regarded in this way the individuals have only an instrumental value;—they are reduced to a machine somehow constructed to produce certain works beyond themselves, for the good of the community. They exist for these duties which they owe to the community of which they form quite an insignificant part; they have value only for these works. The community thus annexes the individuals to itself. The moral value of the individuals entirely depends upon their works—their service—their utility—to the community as a whole. Their moral criterion is judged only by some outward result which
they can produce. The individual is thus entirely resolved into his works. If the outward works are regarded as ends in themselves, such inevitable consequence is bound to follow.

But this cannot be the right view of the works. Sankara urges his objections against this view of the works thus—

He points out—

(I) Man cannot be made an object of command (निवेद-विषय) from outside. Man is not a thing to be passively moulded and shaped from outside. He may be persuaded from the inner side, not controlled passively from the outside. Sankara has told us that—

‘‘रामच दि माझे, न कार्यः।’’

‘‘Man chooses his end according to his own light. The Sástras only present before him the lower and higher lines of conduct, but do not compel him to select a particular course of action. The Sástras do not mould the man to their own ideas of good; they can only appeal to his inner self.’’

1 Vide Ved. bhasya, 3.2.21 and 2.3.48. “शासन प्रमाणजन्य, यथास्थायविषय। न तत्रियमत्तेमाति कार्यितुं वचये; न च प्रतिवेदमत्तेमाति कार्यितुं वचये। वचुतस्य किं तत्र। वासोद्विं निविोसाभाव।” (3.2.21).

“‘‘न तु माझे यथावत्व वचमानु निबिष्यिति निबिष्यति व। ...प्रवचनः राजस्वीयं यथावति स्वाभाविकं प्रवचनं। यथा यथावात्, स तथा यथा पुनर्वव प्रस्तृति तद्यथ; प्रवचन साधनानि चापदिते।” (२० मा०, २.१.२०). Hence, how can you say that the rules prescribed by the community (through its Sástras) are the ends to which the man is entirely subordinated? As if the man is a mere means for the performance of these prescribed duties as his end.”
(II) Again, Sankara points out that the ideas of good works (virtues) and bad works (vices) evolved within the community cannot be regarded as ends in themselves. For, he says, we find the ideas of virtue and vice in a particular epoch of society differ from the ideas of virtue and vice in the next or another epoch. Again, “in the same epoch of the community different people select different works as ends.” “What are looked upon as good works in a particular time and place are regarded otherwise in a different time and place.”

(III) It is also laid down in the Vedanta-bhasya that “in the progressively higher and higher worlds, the virtues and vices are being evolved in higher and higher forms up to Brahma-loka where they are perfected.”

1 “तपायसेन्यो प्रसृतः फलवृत्तिः उत्तराखिनः तपासनी दश्यति …ःप्रताद्धि तु कर्म फलवृत्तिः सत्तुः कर्मोपविचारस्तु” (भा.मात., 4.3.16). “विख्यं ‘साधनं’ विख्यं विभवप्रवृत्तिः भवति एव विवाहं, i.e., virtues काल्मुक्तं अतिक्रमं आत्मवर्जितं …..न विख्यं ‘पदं’ सुखः …..न सुखोपयो तत्क्षणं निविर्वलितवित्तिः भवति ……..तत्त्वं विशारदीत्वं विवृतिमयां समवृ भवति ” (भा.मात., 3.4.52).

2 “तथाच यदायकुलायाविवचनं विवाहसाधिकिरितानां भविष्यं पयः गमनं; केवलीदिष्टपूर्वकप्राप्तसाधने: दृष्टिमेति पया …..तत्तवं साधन-साधनं सूचये ” (भा. मात., 1.1.4).

3 “यथानृ दैवति साधनं सत्तिः च यो कर्मोपकुटियते, स एव दैवकालिकिनिर्मितं अध्ययनं सत्तिः ” (भा., 3.1.25).

3 “मधुरलाल्प्रकट सङ्कारेण इत्यं उच्चतारतं च सूचयं, तत्तथ ताह्रो-भारावापि साधतं गमनं ” (भा., 1.1.4).
All these clearly show that virtues (and vices) are constantly evolving in higher and higher forms, and they are constantly growing with the progressively growing communities and the worlds. They cannot therefore be regarded as the ultimate end of life.

We can do no better than to repeat in this place the utterances of Sankara himself which embody his general views on the Varnasrama-duties (वर्णाश्रम-पञ्चाक्र). These remarks are important and we invite particular attention of our readers to them. These remarks bring the relation between the higher karmas (कर्म) and Jnāna (ज्ञान) very forcibly home to the mind; and the valuable bearing which the works have upon the self-realisation stands palpably revealed. Sankara writes—

"These duties, respectively enjoined on the several castes, lead, when rightly performed, to swarga as their natural result. But from the operation of a new cause, a higher result accrues; viz., worshipping the Lord (लक्ष्मण) by performing his duty, man attains perfection, through his being qualified for the Jnāna-nisthā." ¹

(Gitā-bhāṣya, 18.44.45.)

"Can this perfection be attained directly by the mere performance of one's duty? No;—how then? ........The perfection

¹ "एवं ज्ञानलिङ्गौ वर्णाश्रमयुक्तावं ज्ञानप्राप्तिः मध्ये स्वभावतः।
...कार्यमेतत् इति वर्णमायं ज्ञानं।...ज्ञानमेवहुत्तत्त्वं च विशिष्टेः सति, जायं- निष्ठायं वर्गायते द्वीपगात्यावालक्षणं संविचित्रं ब्रम्भते।"
accruing in worshipping the Lord through one's own duties qualifies the aspirant for the Jnana-nishthá which culminates in Moksha.” (18-56).1

In this manner—

"the works which are held as a bondage are converted into a means for self-realisation." 2

From these observations, we can now conclude that the works (Karma) when regarded as ends, as objects of desire—do prove a bondage, and they come into conflict with the Jnána (i.e., the self-realisation). But taken as a means, and used as such, this conflict (विरोध) between them vanishes, and instead of offering opposition to Jnána, the works prove a very useful ally—

"तेष्यो निरस्त्रमन्यो नियवानो कर्मविश्
भारादुपकारकलती; सीम-साधनाः मिति
कर्मविश् भवनीति—न विरुध्दस: (3° भा°, 3.3.1)."

The right, therefore, of Karma as separate and rival interests, as rival ends-in-themselves—must die; because Karma is superseded and included in one supreme interest or end of life. All works thus become an element in this one interest, and organic to this one central purpose.3

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1 "किंचि संसारसहस्राणन्त प्राणात् विकट: | न; कार्यं लघुं...हस्तशापा
तस्माय विश्वम शेषसार, ज्ञानसीमायोग्यतालक्षणां विकृत्व विद्वति मानव: |...ज्ञानसीमा
लोकसंसारार्था " (भा°, 18.45).

2 "ततु वस्त्रेऽवस्त्रां कर्मविश् कार्यं सीमशिवाय?
वापसमाप्यविशीिवाहि 'तक्षाँ' 'वायुविशिि" (सत्यरुपप् gloss).

3 Cf. "ज्ञानसीमा दि प्रापेक सरु कार्यं प्रकाष्ठा शीघ्रकार्यं संभवस:। तवात्
कर्मविश् प्राप्तं ज्ञानसंसुधाय सीघ्रकार्यं।” (व० मात°, 4.1.10). And also cf.
सत्यरुपप्स्ताः शीघ्रतयोजनोऽस्मी कालं—प्रतिभावतार्जीपायदित्यात्येतृत्वार्जी—
रश्निवाद्या सरु 'एतकार्यं' संभवस् ” (व० मात°, 4.1.18).
All works now become the medium, the vehicle, the opportunity, for the realisation, in and through them, of the spiritual purpose—

"सबकै क्रियाकारण प्राप्त ज्ञान परिषमायते।" 4.33.

8. The foregoing discussion has brought us to the conclusion that the life of higher works—of unselfish virtuous deeds, is not the ultimate goal of human life. Virtuous deeds possess value in that they purge our mind from selfish, self-seeking propensities which know no other higher end than gratification of the sense-pleasures, and thus to prepare it for the realisation which alone constitutes the ultimate goal of our life. One deed of virtue leads to another, which again leads to a still higher deed of virtue and so on perpetually. Sankara has pointed out that one work done is succeeded by another work which awaits you for its accomplishment. Moral or virtuous life is therefore a life of incessant endeavours for, and aspirations after, higher and higher virtues (पुण्योपाधि), which cannot be completed here under mundane conditions. It is, thus, a life of constant progress; it is marked by incessant advancement from lower to higher deeds; such a life therefore cannot itself be an end but always points to the End, to a goal beyond it, where all its aspirations after higher and higher goods will reach their fulfilment and complete satisfaction.

1 क्रियाकारणेन तद्वितियोऽत्सवं कार्याकारणन्तः क्रियाकारणं तद्वितियाः कार्याकारणन्तः । कर्महृदयमात्रत्वं तद्वितियाः कार्याकारणाः कर्महृदयमात्रत्वं तद्वितियाः कार्याकारणाः कर्मनिविधानां सामान्यान्तः ज्ञानसाधनाः ज्ञानसाधनाः।

2 "पुण्योपाधिकृतः ज्ञानसाधितः, तावत् तावत् पुण्योपाधिकृतः। तद्भविष्यते पुण्योपाधिकृतः नीचो भविष्यति ज्ञानसाधनः। तावत् तावत् पुण्योपाधिकृतः। तावत् तावत् पुण्योपाधिकृतः। तावत् तावत् पुण्योपाधिकृतः। तावत् तावत् पुण्योपाधिकृतः। " (४.३.२४)
life of virtue will reach its perfection in a Transcendental goal which is the End towards which it is perpetually moving.

We have seen before that the performance of higher works and virtuous deeds is not an end in itself—is not the ultimate goal of human life. These virtuous deeds are needed for the purification of our mind from selfish propensities and tendencies and for constant preparation for the ultimate End. The higher works, in this way, prove to be an indirect cause for the attainment of Mukti or the final goal.¹ They cannot directly produce Mukti; for, in that case, these works would themselves become the ultimate End. The readers will realise that Sankara’s position in this respect remains logically unassailable. As the ultimate goal is transcendent, no mundane works or attributes can have power to directly produce it.² For, in that

¹ “विद्यापद्विकल्पणं विद्यासन्नत: पुढळः—चालरुढऽः रागेवमस्नायसु—
सुद्दः विद्यविधिमिथ्यायः। ततां सवां भवतःकर्मण्य सक्ष्मम धृति: भवति सक्ष्माः
विशेषयस्मिन प्रमीतं यत एतत् ‘उत्सर्गार्जनं’ (progressively higher and higher)
चालरुढिं सूख, तथामाः दा जयम्” (४.४.९)। “पूरते पुष्पकवल्लभ, पुनश्चल्लणः: परमाय:—मेयिनचि चामिरिधिः” ।

² There must therefore always be a negative relation between the mundane life (and its works) and its transcendental goal (towards which it moves and where it will be perfected). Yet it is the same life. This mundane life would become transformed into supra-mundane life.

“चत्वष्ट्वा चालरुढिः कर्मीचि: जस्यमयात्, कर्मण्य च कर्मोपलयं विद्यापद्विकल्पणं
पुढळयात्” (४.४.२)।
case, what is transcendent would become merely mundane; — the distinction between the two worlds or lives would disappear: the mundane works would themselves become the final end or goal: mere performance of higher works would give us perfection, and moral life, as it is known to us here, will cease. In the system of Sankara, ethical or moral progress points to a transcendental goal beyond, where the infinite aspirations after higher and higher deeds will reach final satisfaction and all our higher and higher desires and aspirations reach final fulfilment.¹ Thus, morality or ethics ends in religion, in the Vedanta system; it cannot be pursued for its own sake. Ethics, without religion for its fulfilment, is incomplete. Hence we find that the life’s End cannot be realised ultimately, merely by the performance of civic duties or शिष्यमन् which we have already considered. All the life’s duties reach their final fulfilment in a higher life than this, i.e., in a transcendental goal.—

¹ "अङ्किताम् प्रमाणं...नातृतं निलवितं अष्टकमांस्ति। न तु भाषाकल्वति-
विस्तर भविष्यसनीरीयोहिति, य: भाषाकल्” (वेदी २।१४)।...
"पुस्तिविश्वसनिरुपणिः...तथा व य विदुषां तुष्टानुभवार्दिदर्शनात्” (२।३।१४).

² In Vedanta-bhasya, 4. 3. 14, it is shown that mere performance of social duties (शिष्यमन्) is not sufficient. Life cannot be made perfect here by doing civic works. For, there is no completion of our works in this world. One work accomplished finds other works waiting for their accomplishment and so on. Such is the characteristic of the mundane life. All our duties can reach their final accomplishment only when the Transcendental goal, i.e., Brahman is reached.

appiness; अभिमृत्यु; अभिमृत्यु; परिश्रमिति।” Similar arguments occur in the Giṣa-bhasya also.
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"न च प्रवचनं कर्तव्यं परिसमाचयते कर्त्वेत्।
भगवानं विद्वते यत् सत्। 'कर्तव्यं' तत्स्थितं
क्रमं भवेत्।" ।
(शी. भा. 15.20).

"नाष्टे सम्बूद्धसे नियते, 'यज्ञानर'
किचिदः मांसितः शेषः। कर्तव्यः
कर्त्वायामां दृढ्यति...न किचिद्वैतं 'क्रिया'
मवषयते।" ।
(वेदा भा. 4.1.2).

9. We are now in a position to enumerate some of the higher virtues, ethical and moral qualities, the cultivation of which has been deemed useful for the realisation of the self, through the purification of the mind. But before we proceed to do so, it may be found instructive to make a rapid survey of the entire position which we have tried to sketch in the preceding pages.

A rapid survey of the position thus far reached:
Moral endeavour passes into a higher fulfilment and is completed in the Transcendental goal.

Man is, we have found, naturally a selfish and egoistic being, seeking the gratification of his own pleasure and depriving others of it; and all his activities are impelled by impulsive, self-seeking motives. As man is thus subject to sensibility, he commits sin and evil, under its influence. But man is also a higher being in whom God has been revealed, and a life of infinite Divine possibility is implanted in him, and this is the true man within him. Man is thus endowed with a discriminative knowledge of right and wrong.—

"The ignorant, natural man regards desire (राज-चेत) as a friend at the time when he thirsts for objects. The mind, when allowed to be engrossed in the thoughts of various pleasurable objects, loses its discriminative knowledge of the self and the
not-self and turns towards the sense-objects." But as man is a rational animal, he must bring his impulses under the law of the rational self which those desires envelop. In fact, he exerts himself actively with vigour to resist and control such impulses and consequently his action is in an opposite direction—

"अतिक्रमणे विषयावर्तमा विषयाविनिर्देशेऽवर्तम्"।

Sankara further observes—

"Man is man only so long as his Antahkarana is competent to discriminate between right and wrong. When he is unable to do so he is debarred from attaining the highest of human aspirations (परम-पुष्पायेः). Hence at the very commencement, he must rise above the sway of राग-चेत-affection for and aversion to sense objects of pleasure and pain. He must restrain these natural tendencies by means of their enemy, i.e., by actively cultivating the virtues, which are the enemies (प्रतिपक्ष) of love and aversion."

When the man, thus, cultivates these ethical and moral virtues, he is no longer subject to his own nature (प्रकृति). These virtues are the means (रथ-साधन) for attaining the

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1 "कायाकार्याभिषेकविषयविशेषाप्रचारस्य भवति: सर्वस्य नाभर दृष्टिः। तद्वैव पुष्पायेः वादवत्ते: सर्वस्य तद्वैव विकार्योविशेषविशेषाय, तदव्यथोपेत पुष्पायेः विशेषायभवति...पुष्पाभवायोग्यी भवति" (गी० भा०, 2-63). "तदार्थं पुष्पार्थं (human free-will) विवृय दृष्टिः...यथा पुष्पः प्रकृति: सा रागेष्वपुरः: सत्वेत्रेव खासायेः पुष्पेऽप्रभृत्यति (man is passivo here)...यथा युगः: रागः-वेषी तपस्तिपच्छेष्ट नियमतिः, तदात्मा शास्त्रविक्रियेऽपयो भवति न प्रकृतिष्वः: (actively free) तथातु तदोपेत नागद्वै तु" (गी० भा०, 3.34).
self-knowledge which is his highest end. ¹ Natural राग-चेतन creates the idea of separateness or exclusiveness; but as these are supplanted by the moral virtues, his true unity with his fellow-beings will gradually remove this idea of exclusiveness. ² The term देवी-सम्पत्त (Daivi-Sampat) used in the Gita covers under it the virtues which man must cultivate in the place of the natural selfish impulses for which the term असुरी-सम्पत्त (Asuri-Sampat) has been used.³ These virtues have been described as—

"the virtues leading to liberation from Samsāra."

Is it not, we ask, wrong, in the face of all these remarks of Sankara, to suppose—as has been supposed by many—that the Vedanta "insists upon the emptying of the human mind, making it a barren desert?" Is it not wrong to hold that "no moral virtues are taught in the Vedanta" and that "all actions are treated as a bondage and therefore liberation from this bondage is the goal or aim of the Vedanta?"

From what has been stated above, the readers must have seen that such remarks as these⁴ do the greatest injustice to Sankara's own views and his writings.

¹ These are called as चक्षुपूर्ण (ती० मा०, 12.13) and they are means of the highest realisation.

" भाज-साधननाथ, यथी० सति आेशिन्जाले वीमै० भवित। भाज-साधनलात् भाजचन्द्रकाठ" (ती० मा०, 13.7).

" भाज-निविष्णुलात् भाजसुकाले।" (ती० मा०, 13-12).

² "यथा तत सुषुरसनित तथा सुषुरसरिखिनां। वषु हुः तस सत प्रतिमुखसौङ्ग" तथा सुषुरसिखिनां।...सुषुः...तत्तथतया सुषुरसरिखिनां संस्कृति, न कस्मिन्तु प्रतिमुख सारसरिखिनां।" (ती० मा०, 6.32).

³ "देवी सम्पत् विनिशिष्ट, विनिशिष्टसुरी सता।" (ती० 16-5).

"द्विया: दावालाय, द्विया।, परिभाषांगाय।" (ती० मा०, 16-1).

⁴ For other similar remarks, vide p. 178 of this book where they are quoted.
Man cannot find final satisfaction of his self in any earthly and temporal order of things. He seeks in Brahman the fulfilment of the good he is trying to realise in his own life. The supreme good (प्रयत्न) — which is working and revealing itself in the worldly objects, — of which they are but imperfect manifestations — is the highest end of human pursuits. The higher and lower objects are therefore only the proximate ends and these can be made to be embraced and included in the supreme End. But as Brahman transcends the temporal order of things, man must not rest satisfied with these lesser ends, but must move through them for a final realisation of the supreme good.

“प्रयत्नस्य चाकृत्याऽपि प्रयत्नस्याऽपि च तत्ततां तत्ततां
श्राद्धं ये भाष्यः।” 1.4.8.

The self-realisation, therefore, is the life’s highest End. This End, says Sankara, which has been deliberately chosen, must be steadily kept in view and resolutely maintained against all other partial interests and ends. For, it is only when one perceives the End of knowledge that one will endeavour to cultivate the attributes which are the means of attaining that knowledge. The inner purity of the mind consists of the removal from it of

1 भाषामात्रिययीः, भाषारमण इत्यप्रायऽपादानप्राप्तः, भाषार्मण
इत्यपादान, इत्यपादान किये॥ (४५ भाग, 1.4.8).

3 भाषार्मण इत्य भाषार्मण भाषार्। भाषार्मण इत्यप्रायऽपादानप्राप्तः
चालितम् इत्यप्रायऽपादानप्राप्तः।। यो हौं इत्य प्रायऽपादानप्राप्तः
अभाषार्मण इत्यपादानप्राप्तः।। अभाषार्मण इत्यपादानप्राप्तः।।…ज्ञानार्थार्थाद्वितीयसमाप्तिः
(४५ भाग, 1.4.8).

3 “चाष्ठार्थप्राप्ता तत्त्त्वाद निरुपमः। चाष्ठार्थप्राप्ता तत्त्त्वाद निरुपमः।
भाषामात्रिययीः भाषार्मणां
भाषार्मणाः। भाषामात्रिययीः भाषार्मणां
भाषार्मणाः।। भाषार्मणाः।। चाष्ठार्थप्राप्ता
(५० भाग, 13. 11).
the stain of attachment and other passions (राग-वेदांत),
by cultivating the ideas that are inimical to them.¹

"These attributes or moral virtues are conducive to
knowledge. What are opposed to these, viz., pride, hypocrisies, ignorance, cruelty, insincerity, impatience—should be
shunned as tending to bondage and samsāra."²

A glance at these ‘moral virtues’ as elaborated and
explained by Sankara in his commentaries on the Gita and
the Upanishads will convince one of their social or
civic character, and their inestimable value will be found in
our daily and hourly dealings with our fellow-beings. If
one fails or neglects to cultivate these virtues, the purifica-
tion of the mind or inner organ which is naturally vitiated
by impure thoughts and impulsive tendencies would be
hindered and the possibility of self-expansion and self-
realisation would be debarred.

10. We now proceed to give below a list of these
virtues (चच्च-पुरुष) and must rest content
with referring our readers to the
elaborate explanation of each of the
factors constituting this list, as given
in the commentaries of Sankara.

The ethical or moral virtues to be cultiva-
ted are—

¹ "शर्म नमस्‌ ‘प्रतिपादावनया’ (तमानिति सन्निरूक्षणान्तरसागरस्यावनया—
(शुष्ट) टीकाया) रागादीसमायनम्‌”” (वी. १०, १३.७)। "एते: ति संस्कृतात
मर्यादिणीतयि तत्सङ्गोपनपि तत्र”” (केऔि ६०, ४.८)।

² "एते: चच्छानिकायि…नामानिति श्रीरात्मकात्, नामानिलिमितात्।
सन्तान—यज्ञार्थादिवत्य विपर्ययेऽथ। साति, दश्मिति, हिंदु, अध्यात्म, भक्तिः
काञ्चि ‘भक्ति’ मिष्यत्, परिरंगाय संसारसन्धिकाराधणात्” (वी. १०, १३.११)।
(e) The first group of moral virtues described by Patanjali in his Yoga-philosophy is this—


dhātā-roadā-jñāna-pārārośānya

śuddha-dhātva-māyā-vidyānā

abhidhānā-trimśabhāsān

Before we proceed to explain this group, we should like to invite our readers’ attention to the remarks made by Madhusūdana when elaborating the commentaries of Sāṅkara on the moral virtues enumerated in the Gitā. Madhusūdana observes to the effect that this group of moral virtues together with the two other groups given in the Gitā—form three groups and all these must be cultivated. These virtues properly cultivated and developed would remove and supplant the natural evil desires (rāga-vedānā) and gradually create the healthy idea of our unity with our fellow-beings.

Now, to explain the first group stated above—

“मेहक or sympathy is the identity of feeling with the object of the emotion which one experiences on seeing happiness or misery. If we see one happy, our feeling must be identical. Compassion (कलच्छ) is the same feeling for misery of whatever kind. It implies, besides the emotion, action, on

1 Cf. here Madhusūdana’s observations—“रा च वाक्या विविधा—वाक्या,

पूर्वा च। पूर्वा—दैवी सम्बन्ध। सम्बन्ध—चावरी सम्बन्ध। तात्त्वक साक्षात् परिवर्तन नां—सचिवालय-विवाद—साक्षात्।” Sāṅkara himself also expresses the same idea “तथा पुनः रागाद्विन्द्रता तत्त्वातिपश्च निदर्शयति, तथा...म

मद्यमिनः पुनः—प्रकट पुनर्वा तत्त्वातिपश्च निदर्शयति” (वीरे भाषा, y.34).

2 “सैद्धांतिक चित्तरूपं विचारार्थं—विवादादिस्वरूपं कामचं। ‘मध्य

कन्यकाव्यं’ विचारार्थं, ‘भगवद्गृहीलं’ वषोद्योगं समाप्तिको विद्यार्थी—

कामचं। साक्षात्वाङ्गार्थरूपं।”
the part of him who feels the emotion, as
lies in his power. Complacency (सूक्ष्म) is
joy at the sight of virtue and the
sacrifices incidental to its practice. As to
vice which enters so largely in the compo-
sition of the human society, the least that
one should do is entire indifference (विवेका).
If he can help to cure the one and remove
the other, it is sacrifice of a superior kind;
but generally indifference is the best
attitude to maintain." ¹

(6) The second group of moral virtues is given
and explained in Gitá-bhâṣya 13.7-11—
Absence of self-esteem and self-assertion;
doing no injury to any living being, and
not being affected when others have done
any injury; inner purity ² consisting in
the removal from the mind of the stain
of attachment and other passions;
direction, to the right path, of the body
and its organs which are naturally
attracted in all directions; thinking of
what evil there is in birth, age, disease and
death; non-attachment to things which
may form object of attachment; constant

¹ This explanation is mainly taken from the "Yoga-Sutra" of
Patanjali edited by Manilal Nabhubhai Dvivedi.

² Truthfulness (सत) in conduct, speech and mind—is a most
important virtue stated in त्रि-, द्रि-, कृति and other Upanishads.
“सत्यतिष्ठति शनि पार्वतीस्माः सार्व: कायाम।”
“तैब फ़ि वायुक्ति विवा दे पंक्याति; नामुरण्णकृति मायाविशु...सवश सावलाना-
निष्ठयशाऽपशार्य” (कृति  ग्य,  4.8)।  “कुशक-साह-शत्याक्षार-दशामुद-वाजेः:”—हृश  मा,  3.1.6.
equanimity consisting in not being jubilant over attaining the desirable and in not chafing on attaining the undesirable; the society of disciplined men, because such society is an aid to self-realisation and distaste for society of ordinary undisciplined men.”

(c) The Third group is embodied in Gita-bhāṣya, 16.1.3—

“Abandonment of deception, dissimulation, falsehood and the like, in all our practical transactions; reflection and recognition of the true nature of things (व्यवस्थान्)²; concentration through the subjugation of the senses; constant steadiness of our attitude; abstaining from injury to sentient beings; speaking of things as they are without giving utterance to what is unpleasant or false; suppression of anger arising when reviled or beaten; compassion to those in suffering; absence of fickleness.”

¹ “चन्द्रिविवेकनदिम्बालाकृतिसंतापादर्शिते
भाषायिनीयोजने शीर्षक अथापितविनियमः।
दक्षिणायणे वैराग्यमनासः पर च।
अंतःसुखजनाव्यापि दृष्टिकोण गुहेः॥
श्वकन्ठमन्दिरं युजप्रसादीवधानुं।
निषिद्ध समविशेषाः स्वविशेषतिपरित्य।
निषिद्धभिषेकमहतात्वालंतक्षंसङ्करं।—हवादि।

N. B.—“संसारवस्त्री विगीताम् संसर्त, तथा मानोपपारकात्मकत:।

² This is विश्वार. Vide p. 182, note.

³ चन्द्रिविवेकनदिम्बालाकृतिः।
द्राम दुस्म धन्व वाक्याधर्म ज्ञातः॥
परिश्रत्स्त्वास्वद्विजवसागरं वातारंभव।
भूताः भूतावशोद्याशानं ज्ञाता ज्ञात्सन्॥—हवादि।
(d) It has been laid down as a general principle that those characteristics in the disposition and conduct, which have grown habitual and natural with a Mukta, i.e., a man who has already realised the ultimate good are to be considered as the Sadhanas for a Mumukshu, i.e., an aspirant after self-realisation. With diligence and good care these are to be constantly cultivated as virtues by him.\(^1\)

(e) The surrender of the self to the supreme self (i.e., Brahman) and meditation on His Swarupa. A man cannot hope to be Mukta, unless Brahman’s grace falls upon

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Cf. “अयोध्येभूतिः शुभाचार्यिः; भागवताधापकार-प्रकस्यापि” —गीता, 11.55.

N.B.—All these virtues have been mentioned in all the Upanishad-bhasyas also.

Cf.—“वेदांबाह्यदृष्टिः साधरणतिः—“भागवतमप्पकार-प्रकस्यापि”... ...

\(^1\) “सर्वाणि परमार्था साधिकानां यथाविधम्। "सत्यावेणु सुमुखस्। अनुभूति च अवताराये। ज्ञानं ज्ञातो ज्ञातव्यो निर्दिष्टो ज्ञातव्यो। (नवी, भागा, 4.8).

“सर्वाणि परमार्था साधिकानां यथाविधम्। "सत्यावेणु सुमुखस्। अनुभूति च अवताराये। ज्ञातो ज्ञातव्यो निर्दिष्टो ज्ञातव्यो। (नवी, भागा, 4.8).

Some of the habitual characteristics of a Mukta are given in Gita, ch. 12.13-19—

“यथार्थ सर्वभूतानां, सत्यं्। बहुश: एव सत्यं्। निर्दिष्ट निर्दिष्टरः; समुद्रःसुमुखः। वयान्त: मुखार्थं लोकोऽवतारुष्ट: नीतिभवने च यः। समः च निर्वेचः च तथा सातासामानयोः।” —प्राणै।
him, unless He helps him graciously in the task.”

“তদ্ধু বহুবিধেয়ে বিশ্বাস সোপাতিভূতত্বত” (দৌ মা, 2.3.41).

In connection with the cultivation of these ethical virtues, Sankara has remarked at one place that these virtues cannot be developed in a day or two, but it requires time to gradually make them more and more matured (পরিপাক), developed and perfected. So long as these are not perfected, the self-realisation would remain incomplete. It is necessary therefore to make life-long endeavours towards the maturity and perfection of these virtues, so that man may gain a thorough and perfect mastery over the impulsive self (প্রতিপাপিভূত), such that his true self may be realised in it.

\((\text{f})\) For the completion of the list on the moral virtues, we must mention here the fact that the list includes in it the performance of certain ritual works (যজ্ঞ)—Yajnas—which, when done with a higher motive for the final realisation, certainly help the purification (সাধন-পুর্ণ) of the mind which forms the object of all other higher works or virtues.

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1 “বিশ্বাসধীর কৌশল ধারণার নির্দেশিত মনেনামান্তনাত। বহুবিধেয় বিশ্বরীড়িত সম্বন্ধে মনেনামান্তনাত।” (দৌ মা, 3.2.5).
2 “তেজস্য বৈষ্ণবঃ যজ্ঞেত গত্যং সাধনাত।” (গৌর মা, 18.62).
3 “সেবান্‌ কর্ম শ্রেয়ঃ সাধনাত ইত্যাদিতেন্দ্রমূল: বিষাণুপ্রায়ক্ষুত।” (গৌর মা, 10.11).
The views of Sankara on the Yajnas (००) will appear in the following paragraphs where we have gathered together his opinions, for the benefit of our readers:—

Certain portions of those Upanishads which are regarded as most reliable and ancient are found to contain discussions about the manner in which Yajnas are to be performed. This shows that कर्मकार्य is not really antagonistic to the राजकार्य as some scholars hold. The former has an intimate relation to the latter, and far from being hostile it forms a necessary part of the latter. There is no real conflict between the two sections of the Veda. The purpose of the rituals is to purify the mind—exclusively and deeply engrossed in the attachment for the pleasure-giving sensible objects,¹ so as to prepare it for the dawn of perfect knowledge. The actions which are done from a lower motive for the enjoyment of pleasure, and which have only selfish and self-seeking ends—have been condemned as Sakáma. Those who are naturally selfish and are deeply absorbed in the sensual pleasures and worldly objects, cannot at once be raised to the contemplation of an ideal which is exalted beyond all sensual conditions. Their minds are to be gradually worked upon by the gradual

¹ अरण्णी भजनियों राजनिष्ठासम्बन्धी—‘क्षणिरिवेष कर्मीयोऽयुगि कर्मी-
निष्ठा तन्म सिद्धे सर्व्वेचे।’ (ँडशा आ, ८)।
change of the ideal to which they are attached.¹

Three different ideals for three different classes of people according to three distinct types of culture received by them have been laid down side by side in the Rig-Veda²; and these three types of people are to be found, we believe, in every stage of society.—

(a) Those who travelled on the lowest plane and whose mind could not and did not receive any spiritual culture, and who had desires and longings for self-seeking pleasures, worshipped the gods; and to these, the gods appeared endowed with sensible attributes and each seemed to have a distinct existence of its own and each capable of fulfilling the desires of the devotees.

(b) But to the people of higher types, these gods appeared not as self-existing and independent entities, but only manifestations of one Power working within them

¹ "मन्दिरोहिणी दिनियाधिकेव वालिनि एवं भाविन च चाज्ञाते सच्चा परबायविषया कपसु" ओि। अनितिकः च रणः ओ पुजःवायैविषिदितः। अनिविषिदितः विषयः वात्स्यायनसिदितः विषयः विषयः रूपः ओ सच्चा निबस्थितः ओ यथा। सैयानि-'रोजः खूँटियारा रूपः मूर्तिस्तरच विषारिविषयच शास्त्रादिला, तदितिस्निखायये दक्षिणार्थे दक्षिणार्थे नानाधीनिति निर्मितिरिति "—ज्यादि (स्त्रृ भा., 8.1.1; 7.1.1).

Of. "न हि चाप्लेकारियाय दक्षिणी। न च रुप्पणी, तव, स्ववदेह, भसी, दसीरुप्पणी—दक्षिणार्थपि 'दक्षिणी' विषारिविषयी साष्ट्रादिला निर्मिति। आपारादिला-दक्षिणार्थि च वल्लिति "—स्त्रृ भा., विधावकी, 1.11.

² Vide our Introduction appended to the third Volume of our work, "Upanishadupadéśa" in which various arguments from the Rig-Veda have been collected and discussed in support of this position.
and realising its purpose in and through these manifestations. For these, the Veda has enjoined "conjunction of work with knowledge" (ग्रामविष-सम्बन्ध).

(c) But there are still higher types of people to whom, owing to the superior spiritual culture they received through good works done in the previous states of existence, the Veda holds out the ideal of Brahman—both immanent and transcendent—and for these, no ritual duties were thought useful and necessary, but only the exercise and repetition of contemplation, altruistic thoughts and works, cultivation of moral virtues ('चतुर्विद्या') were deemed as the only means for the attainment of this ideal. ज्ञानवाच्य has, thus, its own efficacy and purpose and is not in any way conflicting and antagonistic to the ग्रामविष. We for these reasons find it difficult to subscribe to the view that at the Vedic period the Vedic people could not rise above the idea of duality and from the planes of selfish ends.¹

Such, briefly, is the view of Sankara on the Karma-kānda of the Veda and in this manner he has attempted a reconciliation of the Karma section with Jñāna section of the Veda—

¹ We cannot also agree with the view that the Vedic people—one and all without exception—could not rise to the grasp of the highest unity धर्म— and that all of them worshipped as gods the striking phenomena of nature which by their grand and impressive features captured their imagination. This view goes against the conclusion arrived at by Sankaracharyya and others.
11. Before we take leave of the subject under discussion, we must try to estimate the real purport of certain passages found scattered in the Bhāsyas of Sankara which may, possibly, create some confusion in the mind of the readers.

(i) Let us first consider such passages in which "abandonment of all kinds of works" has been taught. Such passages, to all outward appearances, demand, no doubt, from all, the renunciation of all sorts of works including even the disinterested higher nitya-karmas. But when these passages are considered, not isolating them from, but taking and reading them in connection with, the contexts in which they occur, and in the light of Sankara's general position on the Karmas which we have tried to exhibit in this chapter,—the right import and true solution of these passages cannot but stand revealed before the readers in their own light.

When an aspirant has already attained the self-knowledge, has reached the final goal, no further need arises for him to

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1 Of. "अनं कर्मबन्धितं निबं यो नैराश्रयं भवेन दशमोपायवरभेष्य भूषकाण्डवल्ल प्रतिपद्यते".

2 Compare such passages as—"सर्वकार्यावश: कर्मशः," etc., etc.
perform any kind of works—lower or higher. Sankara suggests this truth in the line—

"उपरामार्गमः पत भनामः निरंभकतात्"

(वैदिक-वा-भा., 1.1)

For, when the man has attained the Transcendental goal (वैदिकभा.). all his duties have reached their fulfilment. All contrast between lower and higher works, all succession of time-order, all his higher and higher endeavours and aspirations have ceased for him to have any further meaning. ¹ "For him who has realised the Ātmā, no further work remains to be done."

"न च वैदिकान्त्यतिबद्धतान: विचिन्द्रततु कस्य अवस्थिति"

(वैदिक-भा., 4.1.2)

We find therefore that the "abandonment of works" mentioned in those passages is meant only for the ‘Ātma-vid,’ i.e., for those who have already realised the final End, which is the completion of all desire.

(ii) We now come to consider the nature of some other passages. There are some passages in the Bhāsyas, which speak of the higher Nitya-karma in terms no better than the Sakāma impulsive activities. Like our selfish works the nitya-karmas are sometimes described as

¹ "न च नस्यापि सत्येन-निर्भावमेरकीर्तितस्य चपरश्चे—उत्तरातिः हि सिद्धम् भवति" (वैदिक-भा., 3.4.52)
the "product of avidyā, and of love and hatred (राग-चेत)." Take such passages as—

"युद्धिः महाध्वस्तं निंयं कर्म, लघुपि
विविधाणं एव अयं
"

(तीरं मा, 18.66)

i.e., the Nitya-karmas are done by him who is influenced by passions and other lower tendencies.¹

For the solution of this apparent difficulty, we must call our reader's attention to the fact that our outward actions are always the outcome of our inner motives, and intentions;—our outward works entirely depend upon our inner motives, of which they are the expressions. It follows therefore that our selfish activities may, by changing our inner motives, be converted into disinterested actions; and our un-selfish works might change their disinterested character, if they are done with selfish ends in view. Sankara’s idea is—’ even the virtuous deeds (पवित्रकर्म) may be done with a lower motive—with a desire to gain some mundane end, such as social position, prosperity, higher regions

¹ Cf. विषयाध्वस्तिविनिविनिविविहारः गुरुः गुरीजययति देव देव हिष्टेषु....ति: भवाः।सत्द्वस्तिविनिविनिविनिविनिविनिविनिवि:। विषयाध्वस्तिविनिविनिविनिविनिविनिविनिवि:। देवेणि (सूर्य सा, 3.2.2). Also cf. such passage—"कामार्थित्वंहृत्वं-पुण्याप्रवृत्ताति...संयायः कारणं" (तीरं मा, 4.4.5). "कीर्त्व-प्रयायं...साध्वं विषं कर्मेण प्रकृतीप्रन्यानिर्देशं
विष्याँ देवेणि विषं देवोपनिविर्देशं...प्रकृत्यानिर्देशं एव साधवं कर्मेण।" (तीरं, 2.11).
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or Devatās, and the like; and when so performed, the virtuous deeds become ends in themselves, not means. His idea therefore is that the value must be placed not upon the outward deeds—not even upon virtuous deeds—but upon the inner intention.¹

Man has always an infinite possibility either for good, or for evil; man's nature cannot be exhaustively expressed in his past and present achievements. Man is always more than what he actually is. If he allows himself to be passively guided by the impulses (चिन्तामय), his actions are selfish. If he keeps himself alive to his rational nature, he is unselfish.

Thus the apparent difficulty is solved.

¹ “दत्ता ओ काम्यालोकानां मातृविना तालाकाकारणी हि धार्मिकानां मेघवृक्षवात च। तथा भिन्ननिर्यातितवेदीवाचकीपारमेतेजचिन्तामय।” (१३२ भाग, 4.24)। “यथैव दर्शनान्तरेऽपादास्तेजचिन्तामय मुक्तं च। तदः दातुर्वेदीवाचकीपारमेतेजचिन्तामय।” (१३२ भाग, 4.4.5)।

“सामस्यावला निवामविन्यासं कर्मोऽपि तेजचिन्तामय। तेषां दातुसा निर्कालादास्तेजचिन्तामय। तेतर्यादिनिवामविन्यासं कर्मदिवावि अवश्यर्य न विद्वद्यते।” (१३२ भाग, 3.3.1)।

i.e., Even these higher works when done for gaining a higher world or for gaining identity with the Devatās, still involve avidya since they are done for pleasure. But when these are done to gain final realisation (through purification of self), they are done with higher motives.

“येवमातृविना तेजचिन्तां, तेषां विनिवामविन्यासं श्रीस्वामिन् श्रीयान्तु मेघवृक्षवाऽधीकारेऽनां निवामविन्यासं कर्मदिवाविंतित (३.३.१)।
12. We ought to look upon the world of emergent nāma-rūpas *from the standpoint of unity*, always in connection with the underlying Brahman. In that case, no difference, no भेद, will appear to us. All the so-called differences would appear as higher and higher *revelations* of that underlying unity.

But such is the perversity of the human intellect that we ignore the underlying unity and identify it with the emergent nāma-rūpas. And the emergent differences alone become the only standpoint to us from which we look upon the world. Everything appears to be composed of parts (चतुष्कोण) and one part lying outside another part and one part being distinct and different from another part—

खामाभिष्ठक खामाभिष्ठक...नाम-ब्वोपापि-
हतिवेच मभवि खामाभिष्ठक”

This false view of the world is entirely due to our avidyā, our intellectual error. It is our intellect which entirely identifies the underlying unity with the emergent differences and thus imagines *parts* in the unity. Really there can be no such identity. The underlying Brahman

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1 In नैसां सां Sankara has shown that ब्रजेश्वर is not वचन or property of the self. It is the property of our intellect, understanding (नैसां, 2.8) (In, 5, S. calls it विष्कम्भना and द्विवेद्य-सरया).

2 As there is always an unchanging ground in which the changing विकार are grounded (1.3.1., नैसा), we are liable to take these as parts of the ground of which it is composed. It is विकम्भना, द्विवेद्य. We must keep the ground apart from the विकारs.

There are people who from the use of the term विकार conclude that the विकार are all our mental phantasm and these are unreal. But that is not the true sense.
retains its unity, maintains its own nature, in these emerging diversities of nāma-rūpa. Sankara has pointed out—

“न नित्य परिवर्तितं चयनं
परमार्थे सत्वपल्लि” ।— ।

i.e., our intellect has no power to effect any actual change in the object. The unity does not change to multiplicity, simply because our intellect imagines parts (चयन) in it, identifies the two.

“Can the mirage actually wet the surface of the desert?”

We must make earnest effort to change our intellectual outlook. We must try to look upon the world from the standpoint of the unity, from the standpoint of Brahman. Sankara says—

“There can be no object—subtle or gross—past or present—distant or near—which can remain separated from the underlying Brahman—either in space or in time.”

“न नित्य भावनिः अद्वितीयं
सूचयितं भूतं भविष्यति वस्तु विविधते’’—

(तैं भा०, २१६)।

No difference will appear again to our changed outlook now, as it used to appear before. Everything—all differences of nāma-rūpa will now appear as revelations of Brahman’s nature, as higher and higher manifestations of the underlying unity which is realising itself in them. The diversities of nāma-rūpa being only the manifestations of

1 चर्चन्यागतिकिल्ले दीपिष्ठ तद्वर्यं परमार्थं वस्तु न दृष्टि।
मरीवंथ महाय ज्ञात्वैः। दीपिष्ठ ज्ञातः साहसीववपगः।। न च निष्ठा-
वानं परमार्थं दृष्ट्व। दृष्ट्व।। (१६ भा०, २१६)। चर्चन्याकिल्ले: सत्वोऽध्वं:
विकारसम्मानातीपणः...अनंतमानातीपणः चर्चन्याते:।। (हा० भा०,
१२१९)।
Brahman's nature, how can these have a nature of their own which can be called different from the nature of Brahman? It is the self-same nature of Brahman which is present before us now in the form of diverse nāma-rūpas. Hence, this world of nāma-rūpas cannot be looked upon as something different from the nature of Brahman. They are merely the expressions of the nature of Brahman, which we used to call erroneously as this or that thing, which we so long used to regard as different from Brahman. And this idea of separateness (सम्बन्ध—सम्बन्ध) is due to the deep-rooted and inveterate error of our intellect (प्रभुत्व). This erroneous idea, says Sankara, stands between our self and Mukti or the final realisation. All our endeavours are to be directed to the extirpation of this illusion born of the habits of our thought. All phenomenal objects, all activities are to be looked upon as means, instruments (प्रभुत्वगीत्रप्रयोग) for the realisation of the Divine Purpose.

1 यथा सति ‘रूपवलंकर’ परिकान्तू पुनस्य वैधशव्राप रूपुपाप्य: प्रधाःपािणां जह चक्षुं कृते वाचिकाः:; न तथा चाम्बि: सतोपवलंकर परिकान्तूं तास्मात्। सदेव ह ज्ञात्वज्ञातः च च ज्ञातववायुः। यथा रत्न रत्ने सर्धुपुराणे सर्ध चाम्बीयाः। यथा वा विक-चटादाय बदीयुपुराणे विष्क-प्रतादायवेगे चाम्बीयाः” (शा भा, ११११)।

8 (a) “अन्त: इत्यान्तप्राप्ताः विद्याबिधियो विद्याबिधियो यत्यत: यथास” (शा ४.३.२०)। (c) “वदुःशयम् पदुःशयम्” (सी २.८)।

(d) “च च चाम्बहिः सत्य च चाम्बत्तामस्तिः निर्देशः। अन्त्यान्तप्राप्ताः चाम्बशास्त्रान्तरस्तिः निर्देशः। परमान्तप्राप्ताः चाम्बिहिः प्रधाःपािणां” (शा ५.१.१)।

(e) “अन्त्यान्तप्राप्ताः चाम्बिहिः सत्यांशार्योऽस्मात: चाम्बशास्त्रान्तरस्तिः। कपिलस्य:” (शा ४.४.२०)। (f) “दीर्घाणि भूतानि सतीयाणि सामायाणि: सामायाणि।” (शा ८.१२.१)।

(g) “चाम्बशास्त्रान्तरस्तिः...चाम्बिहिः (चाम्ब व्रत) इस प्रधाःपािणां।” (सी २.८)।

(h) “न चाम्बशास्त्रान्तरस्तिः चाम्बिहिः (शा ४.४.२०)। (i) चाम्बिहिः (शा ४.४.६)।

(j) “चाम्बिहिः चाम्बिहिः” (शा ४.३.२३)। (k) “रूपवलंकर चाम्बिहिः, चाम्बिहिः चाम्बिहिः, चाम्बिहिः चाम्बिहिः, चाम्बिहिः” (सी २.८)।
working in them. Sankara calls this—Sarvātma-bhāva (सर्वात्मावर्तित). This idea of सर्वात्मावर्तित, i.e., the idea of taking all emergent nāma-rūpas, all emergent activities, as higher and higher expressions of the Divine purpose is to substitute the former false idea, i.e., the idea of separate-ness (पर्वतव्रृत्ति). When this सर्वात्मावर्तित is firmly established in the place of पर्वतावृत्ति—Mukti or the final realisation is reached. This is Mukti in the Sankara’s system.1

The individual Ego is not a component part, a mere phase, of Brahman. But as we have already seen, all Egos have a ‘nature,’ have infinite possibility in them; and this possibility has become so far expressed in our actual states and activities. Through our constant endeavour, through the constant cultivation of the moral virtues and performance of higher moral works, and also by विषय 2 we must purify our sense-organs, manas, intellect and our mental capacities more and more. We shall, then, be able to comprehend and realise more and more, through these, the infinite wealth of the inexhaustible nature of Brahman.

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1 "(a) सर्वात्मावर्तित: स्वाभाविकः। यत्र सर्वात्मावर्तित….स्वाभाविका भविष्यः…सर्वात्मावर्तिता सीचः।" (4.3.20).

(b) "सर्वात्मावर्तित: पाराचार्यनिविदित्वः। निविद्ये वि पाराचार्यः सर्वात्मावर्तित व्यवहारसंग्रहः। तत्त्वातु सत्विविषयाभावागलिता-व्यतिरिक्ता न तत्त्वातु ज्ञानावधारी विनिवेयते। पाराचार्याविनिक्ता पाराचार्यो भवतीति नामाभावः।" (४० भा, ४.४.२०).

(c) "परमार्थतो विनेति……निविदित्व ‘बलवतर्तित’ पाराचार्य पुलचन्दः।…यथा तु पाराचार्यां भविष्याः सुप्रायसिता, तत्र पाराव-व्यतिरिक्त ‘व्यवह’ का समावः।" (२.४.१४).

(d) "पाराचार्यो: सर्वात्मावर्तितायपपि राक्षितावृतः—यदव सर्वात्मावर्तितावृतः।" (४०, ८.१२.११).

2 विषय is—"पर्वतावृत्तिः” (गीता भा), i.e., to look behind the changing particulars to their underlying universals. This is—contemplation of the Beautiful.
which is present in our finite self as the infinite possibility or purpose. In our higher and higher progress to the higher and higher worlds, we shall build up higher organisms. And through these higher organs and organisms, we would be able realise Brahman in a higher and superior form. In this progress, there is no breach of memory.

This realisation, by the Ego, of the inexhaustible Brahman in him has been beautifully described by Sankara by an illustration. "The union of man with Brahman," he says, "is like the union between man and his beloved wife in marriage." "When a man embraces in love and affection his beloved wife, he forgets the presence of the objects near him and loses his consciousness of himself and everything else in the perfect happiness born of this

1 "यथार्थ विभाजनः कामो-कामो युक्तेऽर्ग च ईश्वरप्रकारितपुपपोयसा साधनम्, तथाद विभाजयी वस्मवेद समासेरे यथा यथादेख सत्यगीत्यवेदी स्वाति।" (४.४.२).

"वृहस्पति: बिधिलसे कार्ये-कार्ये संसुगे असभय सलि प्रकाशब्दिनेशार्य दरे्" (५.१.४.२).

"कायमयार्यां ज्ञानश्वकोमुयातालचन्त सिद्धि समति।" (१८.४५).

विभाजयीः विभाजन युक्तम्.........रागभवनीहरसंगम विभाजन्यां ...सत्यां वस्मवेद स्तुतमेल्या युक्तम:....भविष्यति स्तुतिमेल्वः। यत: एतत् 'पदरोपत' चाहरुक्ष्यानूपूणा तथादृश सायां्" (१०.७.२६.२).

9 "अत्तरोपिः ते तत्कारण तत्कारण प्रयत्नं तत्त्त अर्प्य:....परिसुविष्ट-स्वतः एत। ईश्वरप्रकारितविभाजन निधशैय ईश्वर धर्मिन्यति।" (४.३.३२). In ज्ञानश्वका, it is stated that a Mukta possesses his, organs, intellect, purified and perfect—"स वे सुतक: सत्यगीता अवस्मानयां: सम्भवोत् सन्नाचार्य: समू: एतानौ सन्ना कानन्य: प्रयाण रसते।" (१०.८.१२.५).
mutual union."¹ The readers will realise from this illustration that this सच्चीर्मभाव, the result of the union—is not the actual abolition of the objects of the world as unreal,² leaving Brahman as the only reality. This is also not the absorption of the Ego in Brahman—which is his true essence.

And this सच्चीर्मभाव is the Vedantic Mukti ;—it is simply the cessation of the idea of separateness or भाव-वीच—

ज्ञानभावविनिषेध चार्मभावी भवति (५ 4.4.11).
“सच्चीर्मभावी नीच उस्,” (५ 4.4.6).³

¹ “यथा मिया मिया सम्पर्शस्त्री...न वाच्य विश्व वेद—सच्: ‘चचन्तस्’ ड़लि; अन्यां चतुर्थाः तया, ‘प्रकाश्या’ जाताति सार्थे। एवं पुश्चः: लोकव: भूत-मार्गामितेत्; ‘प्रविष्टः’ (i.e., चन्द्र द्व:,...स्माक्रिययों भाषणा सम्पर्शस्त्री:...‘सच्चीर्म’ न वाच्य ‘वन्दा’ वेद” (५ 4.3.21). “सेवकालाय सच्चीर्म भाषणा भाषणात।” (५ 3.10.5). “कथासच्चीर्मव्ययमविवर्ताय—

² It is simply looking upon everything as not ‘anyā’ (अन्या) from the self. “द्रश्च रघुनाथ’ सच्चोऽयय भाषाताः न पञ्चाति...मुक्तायां सच्चं कलात् समानेनिहीतियामभावः—‘क्यों क पञ्चाति? ’ ड़लि च उक्तमेव” (५ 8.12.3).
[For the sense of ‘क्यों क पञ्चाति? ’—vide Chap. III of this book where such expressions have been explained.]

³ As an example of सच्चीर्मभाव, Sankara (५ 1.1.4) has quoted the Vedic sentence ‘चष्ट नस्तर्मस्य सूययेष, एतस्य’, etc., etc., and this he takes as “तदन्ते” which shows that when सच्चीर्मभाव is realised, the existence of महत्त् सूययेष and other objects of the world is not abolished. These objects will then be looked upon as simply the expressions of ब्रह्म’s nature ( ब्रह्मध्येन्द्रियमात्रान्ते ) and hence they are not something ब्रह्म absolutely, but there is unity in difference. Readers are requested to note this. Similarly in ५, in describing the experience of a सुख पुरुष it is stated as “सेवकालाय सच्चीर्मध्रवः...समानेनिहीतियायाय गायनू,” etc. Here also, everything appears to a सुख as ‘ब्रह्म’ really. There is no question of abolition at all.

Of. also what Sankara has spoken of a सुखपुरुष;—“एष्ट विशीष्ये विद्युतः,

४गोपी विष्णुरेव संख्यानि...पुष्यगयानि न पञ्चाति”—अभासनिधिपथ (१००)।
Index of Sanskrit References.

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*Sankara's Commentary
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*Commentary on Aitareya-A'branyaka.*

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Works by the same Author.

1. The Outlines of the Vedanta Philosophy.—
   (Published by the Calcutta University).
   (Second Edition). Re. 1.

2. Adwaita-Va’da (Bengali).—(Published by the
   Calcutta University). (Second Edition)
   Rs. 3.

3. Upanishader Upadesh (Bengali).—
   Vol. I. Chandogya and Brihadaranyaka.

   Vol. II. Katha and Mundaka. (Third

   Vol. III. Isha, Kena, Prasna, Aitareya,
   Rs. 2/8.

[In each volume, complete translation with elaborate
exposition of the commentaries of Sankara has been
given. Three Introductions have been appended to
the three volumes. Highly spoken of by eminent
scholars and the Press. Each volume has been tran-
slated into Hindi by Pandit Nandakishore Sukla in
Oudh.]
EXTRACTS FROM OPINIONS.

1. Professor A. Berriedale Keith, D.Litt., D.C.I., University of Edinburgh—
   "...... Your book is a remarkably able and highly interesting contribution to the interpretation of Sankara. Its collection of passages alone would be of very high value, for the extent of Sankara's writings is so great as to render easy reference impossible without such aid, and I fully appreciate the labour which has been involved in the selection of the texts cited. Even greater value applies to your powerful exposition of the realistic element in Sankara. Your restatement of his position in terms of modern philosophical conception shows very great skill and will demand the most careful consideration from those who seek to apprehend the true force of the teachings of the Acharyya. It is a striking tribute to his great philosophical power that the question of the interpretation of his doctrines still presents the most interesting problem of Indian Philosophy......I shall not fail to mention your work in my next publication now in the press....."

2. Professor S. V. Lesny, Ph.D., University of Prague, Austria—
   "I have read your valuable book with great interest. It will be reviewed by me in one of our periodicals, but it can be said at once, that the teaching of your great countryman—Sankara—has been treated by you in a very happy way and to much profit of your readers. The problem of Sankara's Adwaita Philosophy is complicated and I am of opinion that our understanding of his teaching may be far more furthered by Indian scholars and books like yours which treat the problem in a scholarly way, than by European scholars who very often treat the matter too much in the light of our European Philosophy...... There is one point more which I like in your book, that are the accurate quotations, at least as far as I can see. The merit of the book is not diminished by some misprints, as for instance Asat-karjya-vada instead of—(káryya)......on the whole, your work displays complete acquaintance with the problems derived certainly from the extensive reading of Sankara's writings."

3. Professor E. Washburn Hopkins, Ph.D., LL.D., Yale University, America—
   "I beg leave to acknowledge with many thanks the receipt of your very valuable book, Adwaita Philosophy, which has been at hand for some months. I should have thanked you for it before, but I wanted to study it first......Now to speak of the book itself, I will confess that
at first it rather bewildered me, since in several particulars it con- 
travenes general opinion very drastically. But on a second reading, which 
I found necessary owing to the weighty matter in it (for though the 
book is small it is of profound significance), I discovered that my 
primary revolt against your conclusions diminished in proportion as I 
read more carefully your citations tending to uphold your conten- 
tions step by step. My final judgment is that you have made a most 
important contribution to our knowledge of Sankara's Philosophy. Your 
powerful analysis of the Iswara idea and of the Ego leaves the onus 
probandi on the shoulders of those who would still believe in an unreal 
God and empty individual self. Having just published a little book 
on Hindu Ethics, I was particularly interested in your final words on 
the Ethical reality of the Vedanta and am glad to see so forcible a 
presentation of this matter. As I have phrased it in my book—"there can be no religion without morality, no morality without religion" 
(In B. G. and Vedanta). I have not yet done with your "Adwaita," 
in fact I wish to go through your citations again and perhaps make 
public note of your position. In my view, you have done a great 
service in composing this work."

4. Prof. Julius Jolly, Ph.D., University of Wurzburg, Bavaria—
"Your valuable book has been duly received. This work contains 
an excellent exposition, I think, of the main principles of the Adwaita 
system and an equally excellent vindication of this against the 
reproaches raised by scholars wrongly interpreting its technical terms. 
The numerous original Sanskrit texts quoted in your work make it 
easy to control the doctrines contained in it. It is to be certainly 
hoped that the study of your work will give a just impetus to Adwaita 
Philosophy both in India and in Western countries, and will remove 
the misunderstandings concerning it."

5. Prof. Louis De la Yallee-Poussin, University of Brussels, 
Belgium—
"I am happy to say that I have read your book with great pleasure. 
I am willing also to think that the views of many controversists on 
this great system are wrong, because they do not realise that Sankara, 
although he is a great rationalist, is also a mystic. It is not the 
intention of Sankara to deny the existence of a personal, all-knowing 
and all-powerful God, nor the existence of the human souls, or of the 
world. I believe that your great endeavour—"

अब्जयः यवः"

"to purify the Mimansa from all misinterpretations—"

कौस्यः"

—is on the whole successful. Do you not admit that there are in his system a 
number of theses which obscure this general tendency and the main 
lines? Mayā—was an unfortunate word to express the idea that the 
"Transcendental one" is able to create beings who are not its sub-
stratum, although their existence depends upon it;—beings who are 
both Śvārtha and P ārārtha. I beg you to accept my best thanks and 
to believe that I very strongly sympathise with your work."
6. **Prof. J. H. Muirhead, M.A., LL.D., University of Birmingham**—

"...... I have read the Central Chapter on the 'Pure Ego as Active Power' and find it so entirely on the line of my own thought in connexion with what I am at present writing that even although the book had not been your gift I should have desired to write to thank you for the valuable help I have got from it. I think that now we have from Professor Radhakrishnan and others competent histories of Indian philosophy as a whole, the next step is more detailed work such as yours, and I think nothing could be more valuable than your book......I hope you will pursue your admirable researches and publish them as opportunities come."

7. **Professor Rudolph Otto, Ph.D., of Marburg, Germany**—

"Many thanks for your very interesting book. You emphasise correctly those elements in Sankara which people had so long very much neglected. On the whole, it appears to me that the standpoint which you have taken is that of Bhedâ-bheda which also Chaitanya adopted. I have just studied Sankara's commentaries on the Gitâ and Mândukya and am filled with wonder at the extent of his thought which comes out more clear and prominent than in the Vedanta Sutra alone."

8. **Dr. P. K. Roy, D.Sc. (London and Edinburgh), late Professor and Principal, Presidency College, Calcutta**—

"...... The Preface is well conceived as well as well written, and the book bears evidence of your labour and thought to give correct interpretations and to remove misinterpretations in all disputed and difficult points. You have done a very great service to the cause of the true Religion of the Hindus by publishing this English version. I hope it will have an extensive circulation not only in India but also in England, Germany and America ...... In my old age there cannot be a greater joy than in witnessing the success of my old pupil and his devotion to the subject of my devotion."

9. **Professor S. Radhakrishnan, King George V Professor of Philosophy, University of Calcutta**—

"I thank you for your valuable gift of Adwaita Philosophy, which I read with the greatest interest. As you may imagine, I appreciate very much your strenuous attempt to repudiate the popular view of the world-negating character of Sankara's Philosophy. Though your representation of the Adwaita Vedanta brings it very near Râmânuja's view, you have made out a very strong case for it. What struck me most in your book, apart from its wealth of learning, was your independence of mind which is rather rare among Indian thinkers of the present day."
10. Sir George A. Grierson, K.C.I.E., Ph.D., D.Litt., LL.D.—late Vice-President, Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland—

"...... I have read a good deal of it and found it very interesting and instructive...... your book shows evidence of much original research, and I hope that you will continue your studies of this and other important Systems of Indian Philosophy."

11. Professor M. Winternitz, Ph.D.,—University of Prague, Czecho-Slovakia—

"...... It seems to me to be an excellent Introduction to the system of Sankara in its different aspects. As I am specially interested in the Ethics of the Indian systems, I have read the IVth Chapter on the 'Place of Ethics and Religion in Vedanta' more attentively. You have very well shown that for the Advaita, altruistic Karma is required as a means for purification of mind, and that Sankara endeavours to harmonize कर्मकाल्प and ज्ञानकाल. I am not sure that this subordination of moral action to ज्ञान is the best way to strengthen social and ethical feelings in the masses and in mankind generally. But there is something in the idea of Adwaita which seems to me of high ethical value—the idea of unity of all that is, which may lead to the idea that there is no difference between my own self and that of my neighbour, whence there is no reason why I should care more for myself than for another. This has well come out in Mahayana Buddhism—in my opinion under the influence of Vedanta...... Your book, as you see from my remarks, is very suggestive."


"...... Your book is a work of considerable merit."

13. Professor J. Wackernagel, Basil, Switzerland—

"...... 'Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy' is a valuable book ...... I shall not fail to make it known and accessible to fellow-workers interested in Indian Philosophy, and hope it will be appreciated universally according to its merits."

14. Professor Hermann Jacobi, Ph.D.—University of Bonn, Germany—

"...... A look into the book convinced me that it is a work of much thought and deep reasoning. I determined, instead of simply acknowledging it with some complimentary remarks to regularly study it. I am reading your book now and hope to write you at more length......... I have read this novel exposition of Sankara's system with interest and profit, whether one entirely agrees with the author's theory or not, one will admire his ingenuity and be grateful for many valuable suggestions...... It is an admirable book...... I have the highest esteem for you personally." (The learned Professor writes here a long criticism mainly on the Unreality of God and the
World. This has been printed separately and incorporated in the second edition.)

15. Rev. W. S. Urquhart, M.A., Ph.D.—Principal, Scottish Churches College, and Fellow of the Calcutta University—

"......It is an exceedingly useful treatment of the subject from your point of view and will, no doubt, have the effect of removing certain misunderstandings and reconciling contradictions which are a puzzle to many students of Sankara's Philosophy. But it seems to me that in some cases you have transferred your allegiance from Sankara to Rámanuja. For, is it that there is no fundamental difference between them?"

16. Professor W. Caland, M.A., Ph.D., University of Utrecht, Holland—

"......I can assure you that I have read your very clear exposition of the Adwaita Philosophy with profit."

17. Professor Richard Schmidt, Ph.D.—University of Munster, Germany—

"......I do not hesitate to furnish you with the expression of my warmest appreciation of your work on Adwaita Philosophy. I am not able, it is true, to say whether or not the great commentator and philosopher Sankara will satisfy to modern Indian or European aims, but surely your book is an admirably suitable introduction to that most magnificent achievement of Indian thought, the knowledge of which will be very useful to all those students and general readers who are interested not only in the system of Adwaita, but in the evolution of human mind generally spoken. From this point of view, your book is not only a highly interesting contribution to the interpretation of Sankara's writings, but also in every way a new argument of the justness of the "Ex Orienti lux." I therefore wish you best success.—

"चिंतनात्मक शीरूल्लालयम्, विद्विदीजानि विवेकारिषा।
स सदा फलमालिकाभिषेपं किया, शरदस्वायमाभिषिक्तम्॥"

18. Professor Otto Jespersen, M.A., Ph.D., University of Copenhagen, Denmark—

"Allow me to thank you most cordially for your extreme kindness in sending me your valuable "Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy." I am not an expert in Indian Philosophy, but I have seen enough of your book to say that it is a most painstaking and thorough work which I very greatly appreciate......"

19. Professor Alfred Hillebrandt, M.A., Ph.D., University of Breslau, Germany—

"I beg to express my best thanks for your very interesting—‘Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy.’ A temporary disease of eyes
prevented me from answering sooner and congratulating you on this elucidation of the views of the great champion and interpreter of the Vedanta—Sankara. It is obvious that your work marks a great progress by the brilliant exposition which Sankara's views have found therein, by your painstaking labour and judicious treatment. Every one, who will make himself acquainted with his philosophy and has no time to go through all his various works, finds now the way opened and will be indebted to you for this masterly introduction.

"I fully appreciate the value of your scholarly work which I think a perfect success. Allow me to repeat my opinion that your work represents a high standard of Indian scholarship."

20. Professor Dr. L. Stcherbatsky, University of Leningrad, Russia—

"I have received your valuable book about Adwaita. Please accept my greatest thanks. I am full of admiration for your wonderful knowledge of Sankara, and have profited a great deal from its perusal .......The attacks on Sankara from the stand-point of Christian missionaries are never regarded very much, it is biased and official stand-point.......In reading your book I got the impression that you wish to protect Sankara against aggressors who are much below him........"

21. Professor James H. Woods, Ph.D., University of Harvard, America—

"Your book on the Vedanta has given me the greatest pleasure. It is coherently written and the arguments move forward with logical precision and at the same time keep close to the text of the Vedanta. I found the book extremely valuable and I hope it will be the first one of a series. Your work has impressed me so much that I am sending you an invitation........"

22. Professor Richard Garbe, Ph.D., University of Tubingen, Germany—

"I thank you much for your valuable work—'An Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy.' It is more than the title indicates: not only an able introduction, but a very important contribution to the history of Indian Philosophy. Especially Chapter III—'On the falsity of the world' with its sharp distinctions seems to me to be of particular importance, as, according to it, the current notions about Sankara's conception of the world have to be corrected. Inaccuracies in the transliteration of Sanskrit words may easily be removed in a second edition of your book which I hope will be necessary in a short time....... I have always been a stern and modest worker in the field of Indian philosophy and philology, but I am glad to find that my endeavours are acknowledged in the land of my studies. I wish you all success which your learning and diligence deserve."
23. M. E. Senart, Esq., Ph.D., of Paris—

"...... I have indeed read enough of your book to value your thorough knowledge of Sankara’s writings and your ingenuous industry in bringing together scattered utterings of his doctrines and presenting them in clear translations. Of course we cannot forget that the illustrious thinker has expressed his ideas in the garb of commentaries to many works which, although different in age and origin and diversely influenced, in our opinion, by independent speculations, are nevertheless all considered by him as equally authoritative. So appear several of his discussions less a spontaneous expression of his doctrine than a secondary adaptation to it through subtle commentations, of tenets originally derived from other currents of thought. Anyhow, your deep justice to the old master—Sankara—and your remarkable command of the difficult literary materials cannot but meet the grateful acknowledgment of all interested in this line of research."

24. Professor Maurice Bloomfield, John Hopkins University, America—

"...... you must not think of me at all disregarding your kind letters, you must do so least of all as regards your valuable book on Sankara’s Adwaita. I have had time to read it, but not enough time to comment upon it in print. I am glad to say to you that your book is, I am convinced, a most valuable contribution to our knowledge of India’s high thought; your exposition of Sankara is that of a loving disciple, but, at the same time, critical as well as sympathetic. Your Chapter on Mayá is especially illuminating, but I remember every page of the book as full of clarifying information. No Indologist can possibly read it without being grateful to you for your first-hand, trustworthy help in this difficult field—a field which shows Hindu thought on its very pinnacle. I hope that you will continue to send me your valuable writings. Even if I should not find occasion to review them formally, I shall without doubt sooner or later refer to them in print."

25. Dr. Sylvain Levi, Ph.D., Professor, College de France, Paris—

"......I am sorry, very sorry that I have been so slow in thanking you for your excellent work—"An Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy." Could you realise what kind of life I am living here, you would be ready to excuse me......... Your book is of a lasting value. You have mastered Sankara’s works as a real Pandit, and you know to expose his doctrines perfectly as a modern scholar. Never did I realise before so fully the perfect unity of Sankara’s teachings. Your book is a Concordancy, a Cyclopaedia of Sankara’s philosophy. The quotations are well selected, thoroughly clear, conclusive; a glance over the notes at the foot of the pages shows they are a substantial reading, affording the सार of Sankara’s thoughts. It was indeed
safe and wise to exclude from your expositions any other source than Sankara himself;—here we have him genuine, telling his own tale in his own words, not having to carry on his powerful shoulders the burden of another's responsibility. I hope you will publish some more essays of the same value."

26. Professor Carlo Formichi, M.A., Ph.D., University of Rome, Italy—

"...... I thank you most sincerely for the very valuable gift of your book on Adwaita Philosophy. I myself shall review it in one of the next numbers of our journal. In the meantime, I congratulate you on your excellent work, the offspring both of knowledge and of love."

27. Dr. G. Tucci, University of Rome—

"...... I know you are the author of a very interesting book on the Adwaita Philosophy, which competent scholars have judged the best exposition we have of Sankara school. As particularly interested in Indian philosophical thought, and Director of "Studi E. Materiali de Storia Delle Religion" and Colabourator for Indian section of the "Recista Dept.—Study Oriental" edited by the professors of the University of Rome, I shall be very grateful to you, if you would be so kind as to send me a copy of your book. I shall be very glad to publish a review of it in our journals so that it will be presented to our public."

28. The Honourable Dr. Justice W. Ewart Greaves, Kt.—Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University—

"As Europe is proud of Kant, so is India proud of Sankara—the have received such high praise from Dr. Keith of Edinburgh University, and this University is proud of the honour which comes to it from your association with it. ....... I am sure Sir Asutosh, had he been alive, would have been proud of your work."

29. The Prager Presse (A German Periodical), No. 169—July, 1925.

"As Europe is proud of Kant, so is India proud of Sankara—the great teacher and philosopher of the end of the 8th and the beginning of the 9th Century. There appears every year a good number of books which represents and expounds the philosophy of Sankara. One of the most important of such publications is "An Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy" by Kokileeswar Sastriti that appeared in Calcutta last year. This Introduction distinguishes itself from the average publications of its kind in a considerable measure. The author is conversant with all the minutest details of the subject, interprets it correctly and intelligently in a scientific method; and his book is therefore a valuable contribution towards the right understanding of India's national philosophy. One of the great merits of the book is the clearness of the representations and the synoptical arrangement of
Sankara's philosophy. The doctrine most well-known in Europe is that the world is an illusion (Māyā); the only true reality belongs to the Divine Brahman that is one without a second (Advaitam). The world is really nothing but one of the many-sided manifestations of Brahman, of his creative, unending and inexhaustible power. Upon this preliminary presumption, it goes on to explain all phenomena, the individuality and activity of man and the ethical character of this religious-philosophical doctrine. As regards the last point, Sastrī's book is particularly a beautiful addition to Sankara-literature. According to Vedanta, our Karman ties us to this world. As the only safe resort of the individual components or phases of Brahman consists in recognising the fact that man is not distinguished from Brahman, but is a means of the realisation of Brahman;—the last goal of the individual is to tear asunder the chains that bind us to this painful world. This would mean a reduction of the works of man and would make his life a fruitless waste. Kokileśwar Sastrī shows that that is not the case, and that Sankara's philosophy even provides for man a full field for his moral activity. It is desirable that this book would be frequently read in Europe, because it corrects many familiar notions and gives rise to discussions."

(Translated from original German.)

30. The Indian Review (of Madras), May, 1925—

"The Advaita Philosophy as propounded by the great Sankara, was a most magnificent achievement of Indian thought, and any work aiming to simplify and popularise that difficult system of Philosophy, should meet with public favour. The present work under review is an able treatise in that direction, and the learned author has endeavoured to furnish the student and the general reader with the right views about the teachings of Sankara on each of the topics treated therein. No pains have been spared to make the work a suitable introduction to the study of Vedanta, and the subject-matter has been arranged in such a way as to make the book an indispensable companion for any full understanding of Sankara's position. It presents also to beginners an opportunity of making themselves acquainted with antagonistic views on various points and supplies them with materials to combat those views. The book is wholly expository and contains the teachings of Sankara in a simple language."

31. The Calcutta Review, July, 1925—

"Some of the publications of the Calcutta University have by their real worth and originality shed a lustre on the scholars who have undertaken research work as one of the important activities of an up-to-date University.

This brilliant expositions by Pandit Kokileśwar Sastra, M.A., of one of the most abstruse systems of Indian philosophy and abstract speculation presenting even to trained minds extraordinary difficulty in rightly interpreting the precise position taken by Sankara, India's
greatest thinker, bids fair to hold a prominent place among those scholarly productions of the premier University of India.

Pandit Kokilaswar Sastri is already known among the savants of the East and the West and we are glad to see that he has well maintained the high tradition of scholarship for which his family is famous in Bengal.

It is not possible to overestimate the value of a book like this to the students of Philosophy who will surely find much help in properly appreciating Sankara's true philosophical position in Pandit Sastri's exposition and interpretation so thorough, lucid and elaborate, and in his method, as scientific.

The quotations of text and citations from commentaries are so generously extensive that the book will serve to many busy scholars as a storehouse of ready reference. Another merit of the book is due to the author's extraordinary power of co-ordinating the individual scattered passages found in Sankara's voluminous works (especially his extensive Commentaries) with the masterly ease of a real scholar. One, perhaps, may just wish that more reference had been made to treatises like Aparokshanubhuti, Vivekachudamani, Adwaita-kaustubham, Vedanta-muktabali and Vivekadarsha.

Another distinct advantage is that the author is deeply versed in both Eastern and Western philosophical lore. This knowledge has stood him in good stead in the elucidation in Western terminology or in terms of modern philosophical ideas of many an abstruse point of the Sankara-school of Vedantism and some of the baffling technical expressions used in his various Commentaries.

The ably written preface throws light on a number of controversial points besides precisely indicating the scope of the volume. Rightly does it claim that "an endeavour has been made to discover the real teaching of Sankara," though the author's innate modesty leads him to describe his work as only a "suitable introduction to the proper study of the originals." Happily, he does not permit this modesty to interfere with the strong conviction with which he has put forward his new interpretation and defence of Sankara without any halting hesitancy in the face of the formidable body of very adverse criticism made by Western writers some of whom make up the deficiency of their qualification as competent judges by their reckless audacity.

We do not pretend to attempt within our space limit anything like a detailed criticism of the volume before us and have to rest content for the present with a rapid survey of the work divided (as it is) into only four well-defined and comprehensive chapters.

The first chapter "On Brahma as Creator" tackles very ably the much- vexed problem of the true relation between Brahma and Isvara and attempts to present in a clear and undisputed light the character
of Sankara’s theory of causality (I, Sec. 6) and corrects the view that in Sankara’s system finite individuals have been divested of their "personality" and therefore of "responsibility" for their acts. It shows that according to Sankara, Brahma is not an abstract Intelligence but a self-conscious Knower and a Directive or Purposive Power whose purpose in the creation of the universe is the complete realisation of the Atma as the final end or realisation of the Infinite in the finite (viz., in human beings and the world—i.e., in man and nature), Brahma itself being the highest purpose or end. It also establishes that Sankara’s theory of causality involves his attitude of opposition to Pantheism by means of his emphatic recognition of Individuality or responsible Personality and by reason of the special stress laid on the idea of the "nature" of Brahma (his स्वतंत्र and गुणम् and on the distinction between सांस्कृत्य and विशेष (pp. 34-35).

The second chapter deals with the important question of the distinction in Sankara’s system between the real and the empirical self and establishes the truth that Pure Ego is an active power, the agent and source of all activities and not merely a being or knowledge. Practically a good part of this chapter is devoted to the refutation beyond all legitimate controversy of the erroneous charge of Pantheism levelled against him.

Here the author begins by distinguishing after Sankara empirical from the real self (pp. 46, 48-49). The real self is the indwelling Brahma—the Ideal or Final End—and it underlies all manifested states and all activities of man. This End ensures infinite possibilities of progressive growth in future and is the real agent in man—"स्वस्व-प्रतिमानांब्रह्मयथसमांवचिन्तानि". This End (which is man’s higher self and his real nature) is the true determining agent and stands above the time-series and is called प्रत्यक्ष or प्रत्यक्षत्व and अवस्था ज्ञान in Vedanta-bhashya I. I. This real self is चेतन and ख्याति (self-existent intelligence) and नवतित्त (self-sufficient).

The empirical self in which human nature and its elements are manifested has its temporal importance and instrumental value only as a means or medium for the realisation of the true end of the real self. Such is also the value (as means) of the external world and its manifold changes and varied manifestations.

Acidya (which, by the way, is explained after Sankara on pp. 108-109) is responsible for the identification of the empirical with the true self. The activities of the empirical self are determined mechanically in an unbroken time-series; free activity—eternal, changeless, independent of the influence of the external world—being the quality only of the true self. The activities of the चेतन ब्रह्म and the human self are both called the End; yet the idea of the final realisation of the supreme End transcends the sphere of Nature and its elements. This is the goal to which the whole creation moves.
In this important chapter the author repeatedly emphasises the absolute need of carefully bearing in mind that the individual (like Brahma) has a distinct "nature" of his own—his खात्स्य or सांस्कृतिक which is permanent (संस्कृत) and which ever maintains its "unity" amidst all diversities and equally preserves its identity in the midst of the phenomenal changes which this खात्स्य underlies and which are transient and impermanent (pp. 55-56 and 66-68).

The conclusion arrived at (p. 64) is that to Sankara the real character of the Pure Ego is not merely a being or a knowledge but an active power and a source of activities (समान) which, again, can never be reduced to or resolved into its manifested activities (i.e., into pantheism).

In the third chapter the principle of causality (संकराचार्य) is thoroughly investigated (pp. 98-101) with a view to particularly refute the erroneous charge of pantheism brought so often against Sankara's Advaita philosophy and as a result it shows the true significance of the idea of the falsity of the world. The conclusion here reached (pp. 103-104 and p. 113) is that the world of phenomenal changes is the manifestation of the "nature" (खात्स्य) of the self which changes serve to gradually reveal this खात्स्य, but when these changes (called the many) are erroneously separated (as something independent) from Brahma (the One), then and only then, they become unreal or false (वैद्य, pp. 103-104, 113 and 121). In Sankara's language—सतीदार्शने प्रकटता. If Brahma is erroneously resolved into the world and the two are made identical, the world becomes unreal or false. The correct interpretation of Sankara is that Brahma realises itself in the form of the world which is never identical with Brahma but must be "taken as the means through which the 'nature' (खात्स्य) of Brahma is ever being realised in a higher and higher form." "The world cannot be looked upon as unreal or false" as such (p. 107). There is a further elaboration of this conclusion in the re-statement of Sankara's exact position regarding the falsity or otherwise of the world on pp. 122-125.

The exposition given by the author and the interpretation adopted by him are represented as logically resulting from a correct appreciation of the Vedantic theory of causality as also of Sankara's vigorous refutation of Pantheism (वैद्य pp. 98-101 and footnote to p. 102). The puzzling technical term प्रकटता explained by the Tikā-Kāra in his way (p. 101) and rendered by Western scholars as "identical" has been sought to be properly explained by our author at some length on pages 25, 26, 52, 72, 83, 100 and 109.

The end systematically kept in view in these three chapters which practically constitute the book itself is to remove the misconceptions
formed regarding Sankara’s position and his Advaitavad by the West since Hegel’s time who started this wrong interpretation by assuming without sufficient first-hand knowledge that Brahma in the Vedanta system is no better than an empty abstraction without purpose and without activity—a sort of negative infinitude. Later Western critics have repeated this criticism with individual variations. The function of ‘Maya’ has also been much misunderstood and the result is that the empirical self in its relation to the real Self has been presented in a wrong light. Pantheism has, therefore, also been wrongly fastened upon the Advaita philosophy on the basis of a wrong interpretation of the true significance of the well-known Vedantic formula of Twattam-asi (द्वात्मस्वि)—‘Thou are That.’

The fourth chapter has been added evidently to emphasise the value of the practical aspect or side of the Vedanta which is often considered by these Western critics as a mere speculation. The last chapter (Chap. IV) starts with a statement of all the serious allegations made against the Indian theism based on the Vedanta and its ideal of salvation (मुक्ति) on the assumption that the Vedantic system is “opposed to ethical theism and religion.” The author’s aim, as he avers, is to “cautiously examine the validity of the assertions” so made (vide pp. 126-128). Incidentally there is a summary of Sankara’s views on the Hindu socio-religious organisation वाणिज्यिक and finally follows an explanation of a large number of perplexing “anomalous passages” scattered here and there in the various commentaries of Sankara that are likely to “cause confusion” especially to those who are not to the manner born. The elaborate enumeration of the ethical virtues and their classification (pp. 166 et seq.) in sec. 10 of the chapter will also serve a very useful purpose.

The investigation here begins with an analysis of the psychological disposition (विभाविति) with which man is born and which determines his nature or empirical character (व्यभिचार) and actions and to which is due his love for agreeable and aversion to disagreeable objects रागदिवशः. Sankara calls this empirical self no real self at all (चनालका), the true self being a self-determining End-in-itself guided by the rational regulator as a free agent of all purposive activities (called विषय).

The aim of man’s life is not merely to attain pleasure and avoid pain—his supreme end (परमस्वप्नार्थ) is bliss (संयोग्य) through realisation of Brahma (कामचित्त) (cf. Kathabhashya, II. 2. 5).

There is an eternal conflict between enlightenment and impulsive activities and the soul’s emancipation is achieved by true knowledge of Brahma.

Sankara does not demand renunciation of all activities but he insists on their proper regulation in order to secure the realisation of the highest self through purification of the mind (and body) (i.e., वैशिष्ट्य), by means of well-regulated Karma, from selfish desires
and impulsive proclivities, passions and inclination to self-gratification. Even if good work is done as an end in itself it proves to be a bondage—good work must be done as a means of spiritual regeneration (विभीषण). Thus “ethical or moral progress” in Sankara’s system “points to a transcendental goal” (p. 161).

“चेतानाम्ब्रह्मानुजोऽनुज्ञानाभ्यासः दिप्यति” * * “अवसतस्वमेव भवेत् ज्ञानात्पत्तिः शान्ति * * असंविदयः शान्ति * * ताश्च निद्रावाहः”

Sankara definitely and positively avers that man is a free agent (p. 155) and the Sáuristic injunctions (whether as prescriptions of duties or prohibitions) are not, therefore, a mandate from the outside imposed on man—the Sástras only indicating the course of action to be adopted (vide footnote to p. 155). According to the present author’s interpretation, Sankara does not consider Jnana and Karma as antagonistic (pp. 172-173), for he has attempted a reconciliation of Karmakánda with Jnanakánda and Karma is needless only in the case of those who have realised Brahma—प्रभुस्वरूपः.

Finally, Sankara’s position with regard to Advaita or Aveda (i.e., extirpation of the notion of difference and separateness between Brahma and the empirical world of नामसूप्त is that the idea of such difference (द्विवेदित्त) is the work of Avidya which is destroyed by the idea of taking all emergent activities as higher and higher expressions of the Divine Purpose (जगात्मक अभाव) which supplants the sense of separateness (साधविवेद) This साधविवेद leads to emancipation (सुतन्त्र) which, again, is not absorption of the Ego in Brahma (pp. 182-184).

By way of general criticism we may say that the author has rightly started his whole investigation with an enquiry about the real significance of Prana-spandan which forms the subject-matter of the fourth section of the second chapter of Vedantadorshasam and is also referred to in I. 1. 23, 28-31 and which is considered in Sankara’s system to be the primal and earliest manifestation of Brahma’s nature—Brahma being प्राप्तवेदः—viz., that which differentiates itself as the phenomena of the world (cf. Chandyogya and Isha Bhashya). Section 4 of Chapter I contains an original interpretative contribution to the discussion of the true nature of Brahma often misunderstood and represented as “pure undifferented being.” In that view, Brahma is not regarded in both the transcendental and immanent aspects which, again, are inseparable. Here the author has very rightly and properly laid great stress on Brahma’s underlying nature (सूक्ष्म). Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter III are equally important in this respect with regard to the much-vexed question which has long baffled and often misled Western critics as to Sankara’s true attitude towards the empirical world.

Even when we fail to see eye to eye with our author’s interpretation, supported though it is by closely-reasoned arguments and exten-
sive quotations, we have to admit that he has for the first time cleared the atmosphere to enable an open mind to distinctly discern how Sankara has been misunderstood and misinterpreted by his Western critics. The author's own view regarding the right interpretation of Sankara has nothing hazy or equivocal and there is no halting statement, no vacillation, no lurking doubt anywhere in his mind as to the correctness of this interpretation made in the light of Sankara's own utterances combined together from a very large number of Sankara's commentaries.

In section 3 of this Chapter (vide page 101 et seq. and also pp. 21-23) we have a convincing restatement of the salient points in Sankara's powerful criticism of the purely Pantheistic position wrongly ascribed by Western writers to Sankara but really held by one of his opponents—the Vrittikára (vide pp. 75-76, 78-80, 82-83). Yet candour leads the author to admit there is some reason for the misinterpretation to which Sankara has made himself liable. The grounds of this misapprehension are next sought to be removed.

Now, the real trouble is that Hindu metaphysical concepts can hardly be appropriately and accurately rendered into the alien form of Western terminology, because the very back-ground of thought-movement is so fundamentally different in the two philosophical cultures even when both of them happen to be monistic or transcendental. Pandit Kokileswar Sastri possesses, as we have stated, a special qualification through his mastery of Eastern and Western philosophy.

In the discussion of 'Ethics and Religion in Vedanta' (Ch. IV) the author has, however, relied more on Sankara's Geétá-bháshyam than his Vedanta-bháshyam especially in the attempt to prove his thesis regarding the precise place assigned in the Sankara system to what are known as ethical virtues. The problem of ethics does not, in fact, form an integral part of the Vedanta at any rate in the same definite and categorical form as in the Bhagabatgeétá, even though some of the Upanishads on which the Brahma-sutra is particularly based are made at all events by Sankara's Commentaries on them and his method of interpretation to lend a strong support to the exposition of this problem which the present author too successfully endeavours to expound in this "Adwaita Philosophy."

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One naturally expects that a University publication should be free from printing mistakes. We have unfortunately noticed too large a lot of them to be mentioned. There are a few other mistakes too but we have preferred to point them out to the author for necessary correction in a second edition of the book which, considering its importance and worth, may reasonably be looked for within a short time.

The busy reader may object that the book is full of repetitions which may appear to be tiresome, but it should be remembered that
the book is an attempt to refute the interpretation authoritatively given to Sankara's system by a number of distinguished Western scholars of great repute who so justly carry so much weight and hence the present writer may have felt, we presume, the need of making his own stand-point and exposition as elaborate and convincing as possible. There is an apology for his method implied in the author's remarks in section 5, page 118, paragraph 1."