A HISTORY
OF
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

BY
SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA, M.A.,
Ph.D. (Cal. et Cantab.), D.Litt. (Hon.) (Rome)
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To the

HON. SRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

who went through great sufferings and hardships all his life in the cause of the liberation of his countrymen, and who is still labouring with almost superhuman effort for the unification of the subcontinent of India, and who is working with steady devotion and faith for the establishment of peace at home and among the nations of the world, the foremost Indian who is piloting the progress of the country through troubled waters in the most hazardous period of India's history, this work is most respectfully dedicated as a tribute of personal gratefulness
The second volume of this work was published as long ago as 1932. Among the many reasons which delayed the publication of this volume, one must count the excessive administrative and teaching work with which the writer is saddled; his continued illness; the regrettable failure of one eye through strenuous work, which often makes him depend on the assistance of others; and the long distance between the place of publication and Calcutta. The manuscript of the fourth volume is happily ready.

In writing the present volume the author has taken great trouble to secure manuscripts which would present a connected account of the development of theistic philosophy in the South. The texts that have been published are but few in number and the entire story cannot be told without constant reference to rare manuscripts from which alone the data can be collected. So far, no work has been written which could throw any light on the discovery and interpretation of a connected history of Vaiṣṇava thought. It would have been well if the Tamil and Telegu works could have been fruitfully utilized in tracing the history of Vaiṣṇavism, not only as it appeared in Sanskrit but also as it appeared in the vernaculars of the South. But the author limited himself as far as possible to Sanskrit data. This limitation was necessary for three reasons: first, the author was not master of the various vernaculars of South India; secondly, the inclusion and utilization of such data would have made the present book greatly exceed its intended scope; and thirdly, the inclusion of the data from the vernacular literature would not have contributed materially to the philosophical problems underlying the theistic speculations dealt with in this work. Looked at from the strictly philosophical point of view, some of the materials of the present book may be regarded as somewhat out of place. But, both in the present volume and the volume that will follow it, it will be impossible to ignore the religious pathology that is associated with the devotional philosophy which is so predominant in the South and which so much influenced the minds of the people not only in the Middle Ages but also in the recent past and is even now the most important element of Indian religions.
Preface

Philosophy in India includes not only morality but religion also. The most characteristic feature of religion is emotion or sentiment associated with a system of beliefs, and as such in the treatment of the dominant schools of philosophy that originated in South India one cannot help emphasizing the important pathological developments of the sentiment of devotion. The writer hopes, therefore, that he may be excused both by those who would not look for any emphasis on the aspect of bhakti or religious sentiment and also by those who demand an over-emphasis on the emotional aspect which forms the essence of the Vaiṣṇava religion. He has tried to steer a middle course in the interest of philosophy, which, however, in the schools of thought treated herein is so intimately interwoven with religious sentiment.

The writer has probably exceeded the scope of his treatment in dealing with the Ārvārs, whose writings are in Tamil, but there also he felt that without referring to the nature of the devotional philosophy of the Ārvārs the treatment of the philosophy of Rāmānuja and his followers would be historically defective. But though the original materials for a study of the Ārvārs are in Tamil, yet fortunately Sanskrit translations of these writings either in manuscript or in published form are available, on which are almost wholly based the accounts given here of these Tamil writers.

The treatment of the Pañcarātra literature offered some difficulty, as most of these works are still unpublished; but fortunately a large volume of this literature was secured by the present writer in manuscript. Excepting Schrader’s work, nothing of any importance has been written on the Pañcarātra School. Though there are translations of the bhāṣya of Rāmānuja, there has been no treatment of his philosophy as a whole in relation to other great philosophers of his School. Practically nothing has appeared regarding the philosophy of the great thinkers of the Rāmānuja School, such as Venkaṭa, Meghanādāri and others, most of whose works are still unpublished. Nothing has also been written regarding Vijnānabhhikṣu’s philosophy, and though Nimbārka’s bhāṣya has been translated, no systematic account has yet appeared of Nimbārka in relation to his followers. The writer had thus to depend almost wholly on a very large mass of published and unpublished manuscript literature in his interpretation and chronological investigations, which are largely based upon internal evidence;
though, of course, he has always tried to utilize whatever articles and papers appeared on the subject. The subjects treated are vast and it is for the scholarly reader to judge whether any success has been attained in spite of the imperfections which may have crept in.

Though the monotheistic speculations and the importance of the doctrine of devotion can be traced even to some of the Ṛg-veda hymns and the earlier religious literature such as the Gitā and the Mahābhārata and the Viṣṇupurāṇa, yet it is in the traditional songs of the Ārṣvaṅgīs and the later South Indian philosophical writers, beginning from Yāmuna and Rāmānuja, that we find a special emphasis on our emotional relation with God. This emotional relation of devotion or bhakti differentiated itself in many forms in the experiences and the writings of various Vaiṣṇava authors and saints. It is mainly to the study of these forms as associated with their philosophical perspectives that the present and the succeeding volumes have been devoted. From this point of view, the present and the fourth volumes may be regarded as the philosophy of theism in India, and this will be partly continued in the treatment of Śaiva and Śākta theism of various forms. The fourth volume will deal with the philosophy of Madhva and his followers in their bitter relation with the monistic thought of Śaṅkara and his followers. It will also deal with the theistic philosophy of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa and the theistic philosophy of Vallabha and the followers of Śrī Caitanya. Among the theistic philosophers the followers of Madhva, Jayatirtha and Vyāsatirtha occupied a great place as subtle thinkers and dialecticians. In the fifth volume, apart from the different schools of Śaiva and Śākta thinkers, the Tantras, the philosophy, of grammar, of Hindu Aesthetics, and of Hindu Law will be dealt with. It is thus expected that with the completion of the fifth volume the writer will have completed his survey of Hindu thought so far as it appeared in the Sanskrit language and thus finish what was begun more than twenty years ago.

A chapter on the Cārvāka materialists has been added as an appendix, since their treatment in the first volume was practically neglected.

The writer has a deep debt of gratitude to discharge to Dr F. W. Thomas—the late Boden Professor of Sanskrit at Oxford, and a highly esteemed friend of his who, in spite of his various activities,
Preface

pressure of work and old age, has been a true jñānabandhu to the author, helping him with the manuscript and the proofs, and offering him valuable suggestions as regards orthography, punctuation and idiomatic usage. Without this continued assistance the imperfections of the present work would have been much more numerous. The author is specially grateful to his wife, Dr Mrs Surama Dasgupta, Śāstrī, M.A., Ph.D. (Cal. et Cantab.) for the continued assistance that he received from her in the writing of this book and also in reading a large mass of manuscripts for the preparation of the work. Considering the author’s great handicap in having only one sound eye it would have been impossible for him to complete the book without this assistance. He is also grateful to Dr Satindra Kumar Mukherjee, M.A., Ph.D., for the help that he received from him from time to time.

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

June 1939

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CHAPTER XV

THE BHĀSKARA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

Date of Bhāskara.

Udayana, in his Nyāya-kusumāṅjali, speaks of Bhāskara as a commentator on the Vedānta in accordance with the traditions of the tridanda school of Vedānta and as holding the view that Brahman suffers evolutionary changes. Bhāṭṭojoyī Dīksita also, in his Tattva-viveka-ṭīkā-vivarana, speaks of Bhāṭṭa Bhāskara as holding the doctrine of difference and non-difference (bheda-bheda).

It is certain, however, that he flourished after Śaṅkara, for, though he does not mention him by name, yet the way in which he refers to him makes it almost certain that he wrote his commentary with the express purpose of refuting some of the cardinal doctrines of Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Brahma-sūtra. Thus, at the very beginning of his commentary, he says that it aims at refuting those who, hiding the real sense of the sūtra, have only expressed their own opinions, and in other places also he speaks in very strong terms against the commentator who holds the māyā doctrine and is a Buddhist in his views. But, though he was opposed to Śaṅkara, it was only so far as Śaṅkara had introduced the māyā doctrine, and only so far as he thought the world had sprung forth not as a real modification of Brahman, but only through māyā. For

1 Tridanda means “three sticks.” According to Manu it was customary among some Brahmins to use one stick, and among others, three sticks.

2 “Bhaṭṭabhäskaraṁ tu bheda-bheda-vedānta-siddhānta-vādī”; Bhāṭṭojoyī Dīksita’s Vedānta-tattva-ṭīkā-vivarana, as quoted by Paṇḍita Vindhyēśvari Prasāda in his Introduction to Bhāskara’s commentary.

3 sutrā-bhiprāya-saṃtyātyā svābhīprāya-prakāśanāt vyākhyātāṁ yair idāṁ śāstraṁ vyākhyeyāṁ tan-nivṛtaye.

Bhāskara’s Commentary, p. 1.

Also “ye tu bauddha-matāvalambino māyā-vādināṁ te’ pi anena nyāyena sūtra-kāraṇa’ va nirasthāḥ.” Ibid. ii. 2. 29.

In another place Śaṅkara is referred to as explaining views which were really propounded by the Mahāyāna Buddhists—vigīttaṁ vicchinnā-mūlaṁ māhāyānīka-bauddha-gāthitaṁ māyā-vādanti vyāvartanayanto lokāṁ vyāmohayanti. Ibid. i. 4. 25.
both Śaṅkara and Bhāskara would agree in holding that the Brahman was both the material cause and the instrumental cause (upādāṇa and nīmitta). Śaṅkara would maintain that this was so only because there was no other real category which existed; but he would strongly urge, as has been explained before, that māyā, the category of the indefinite and the unreal, was associated with Brahman in such a transformation, and that, though the Brahman was substantially the same identical entity as the world, yet the world as it appears was a māyā transformation with Brahman inside as the kernel of truth. But Bhāskara maintained that there was no māyā, and that it was the Brahman which, by its own powers, underwent a real modification; and, as the Pañcarātras also held the same doctrine in so far as they believed that Vāsudeva was both the material and the instrumental cause of the world, he was in agreement with the Bhāgavatas, and he says that he does not find anything to be refuted in the Pañcarātra doctrine. But he differs from them in regard to their doctrine of the individual souls having been produced from Brahman.

Again, though one cannot assert anything very positively, it is possible that Bhāskara himself belonged to that particular sect of Brahmins who used three sticks as their Brahmnic insignia in preference to one stick, used more generally by other Brahmins; and so his explanation of the Vedānta-sūtra may rightly be taken as the view of the tridāndī Brahmins. For in discussing the point that fitness for Brahma-knowledge does not mean the giving up of the religious stages of life (āśrama), with their customs and rituals, he speaks of the maintenance of three sticks as being enjoined by the Vedas.

Mādhavācārya, in his Śaṅkara-vijaya, speaks of a meeting of Śaṅkara with Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara, but it is difficult to say how far this statement is reliable. From the fact that Bhāskara refuted Śaṅkara and was himself referred to by Udayana, it is certain that he flourished some time between the eighth and the tenth centuries. Pandita Vindhyēśvari Prasāda refers to a copper-plate found by the

1 Vāsudeva eva upādāṇa-kāranaṁ jagato nīmitta-kāranaṁ ceti te manyante... tad etat sarvam śrutī-prasiddham eva taṁmān nātra nirākaraṇiyam paśyāmaḥ. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, II. 2. 41.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. III. 4. 26, p. 208; see also Pandita Vindhyēśvari’s Introduction.
4 Śaṅkara-vijaya, xv. 80.
late Dr Bhāvdājī in the Mārāṭhā country, near Nasik, in which it is stated that one Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa of the lineage (gotra) of Śāṇḍilya, son of Kaviccakravartī Trivikrama, who was given the title of Vidyāpati, was the sixth ancestor of Bhāskarācārya of Śāṇḍilya lineage, the astronomer and writer of the Siddhānta-śiromāṇī; and he maintains that this senior Vidyāpati Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa was the commentator on the Brahma-sūtra. But, though this may be possible, yet we have no evidence that it is certain; for, apart from the similarity of names, it is not definitely known whether this Vidyāpati Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa ever wrote any commentary on the Brahma-sūtra. All that we can say, therefore, with any degree of definiteness, is that Bhāskara flourished at some period between the middle of the eighth century and the middle of the tenth century, and most probably in the ninth century, since he does not know Rāmānuja.

Bhāskara and Śaṅkara.

There is a text of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, vi. i. i, which is treated from two different points of view by Śaṅkara and Bhāskara in connection with the interpretation of Brahma-sūtra, ii. 1. 14. Śaṅkara's interpretation of this, as Vācaspati explains it, is that, when clay is known, all clay-materials are known, not because the clay-materials are really clay, for they are indeed different. But, if so, how can we, by knowing one, know the other? Because the clay-materials do not really exist; they are all, and so indeed are all that pass as modifications (vikāra), but mere expressions of speech (vācārambhāṇam), mere names (nāmdheyam) having no real

1 Paṇḍita Vindhyeswarī Prasāda's Introduction.
2 We hear of several Bhāskaras in Sanskrit literature, such as Lokabhāskara, Śrāntabhāskara, Haribhāskara, Bhadantabhāskara, Bhāskaramiśra, Bhāskara-śāstri, Bhāskaradiśīta, Bhaṭṭabhāskara, Paṇḍita Bhāskarācārya, Bhaṭṭabhāskaramiśra, Trikāṇḍamāndana, Laugākṣibhāskara, Śāṇḍilyabhāskara, Vatsabhāskara, Bhāskara-deva, Bhāskaranṛsīṁha, Bhāskarāraṇya, Bhāskarānanandanātha, Bhāskarasena.
3 He makes very scanty references to other writers. He speaks of Śāṇḍilya as a great author of the Bhāgavata school. He refers to the four classes of Māheśvaras, Pāṣupata, Śaiva, Kapālicka and Kāṭhaka-siddhāntin, and their principal work Paṇcādhyāyi-śāstra; he also refers to the Paṇcarātrikas, with whom he is often largely in agreement.
4 tad-ananyatvatām ārambhāṇa-sabdādibhyoḥ. Brahma-sūtra, ii. 1. 14. yathā saumya ekena mṛt-piṇḍen asarvaṁ mṛtyumyaṁ vijñātaṁ syādvācāraṁbhāṇaṁ vikāro nāmdheyam mṛttike t'ev'eva satyaṁ (Ch. vi. 1. 1).
entities or objects to which they refer, having in fact no existence at all\(^1\).

Bhāskara says that the passage means that clay alone is real, and the purport of speech depends on two things, the objects and the facts implied and the names which imply them. The effects (kārya) are indeed the basis of all our practical behaviour and conduct, involving the objects and facts implied and the expressions and names which imply them. How can the cause and effect be identical? The answer to this is that it is true that it is to the effects that our speech applies and that these make all practical behaviour possible, but the effects are in reality but stages of manifestation, modification and existence of the cause itself. So, from the point of view that the effects come and go, appear and disappear, whereas the cause remains permanently the same, as the ground of all its real manifestations, it is said that the cause alone is true—the clay alone is true. The effect, therefore, is only a state of the cause, and is hence both identical with it and different from it\(^2\). The effect, the name (nāma-dheya), is real, and the scriptures also assert this\(^3\).

Bhāskara argues against Śaṅkara as follows: the arguments that the upholder of māyā (māyāvādīn) could adduce against those who believed in the reality of the many, the world, might be adduced against him also, in so far as he believes in monism (advaita). A person who hears the scriptures and philosophizes is at first under the veil of ignorance (avidya); and, if on account of this ignorance his knowledge of duality was false, his knowledge of monism might equally for the same reason be considered as false. All Brahma-knowledge is false, because it is knowledge, like the knowledge of the world. It is argued that, just as from the false knowledge of a dream and of letters there can be true acquisition

\(^1\) Bhāmatti, Brahmasūtra, II. 1. 14. Rāhu is a demon which is merely a living head with no body, its sole body being its head; but still we use, for convenience of language, the expression "Rāhu's head" (Rahoh sirah); similarly clay alone is real, and what we call clay-materials, jugs, plates, etc., are mere expressions of speech having no real objects or entities to which they can apply—they simply do not exist at all—but are mere vikalpa; vācā kevalam ārabhyate vikāra-jātaṁ na tu tattvato'sti yato nāmadheya-mātrām etat;...yathā rāhoḥ sirah...śabda-jñāna'-nūpāti vastu-sūnyo vikalpa iti; tathā cā'vastutayā anyantām vikāra-jātaṁ.

\(^2\) evād-indriyasya ubhayam ārambhavam vikāro nāmadheyaṁ...ubhayam ālambya vāg-eyavahārāḥ pravartate ghaṭena udakam āhare' ti mrnjamayam ity asya idam vyākhyaṁ...kāraṇam eva kāryābāhāṁ ghaṭatāvat avatīṣhtate...kāraṇasyā'vasthā-mātrāṁ kāryaṁ vyatīrikta-eyatīriktaṁ śūkṣ-rajatavaṁ āgamāpya-dharmaṁ ca anyantām anityam iti ca vyapadīṣyate. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, II. 1. 14.

\(^3\) atha nāma-dheyaṁ satasya satyamitā, etc. Ibid.
of good and evil or of certain meanings, so from the false knowledge of words and their meanings, as involved in the knowledge of monistic texts of the Upaniṣads, there may arise right knowledge. But such an argument is based on false analogy. When from certain kinds of dreams someone judges that good or evil will come to him, it is not from nothing that he judges, since he judges from particular dream experiences; and these dream experiences are facts having particular characters and features; they are not mere nothing, like the hare’s horn; no one can judge of anything from the hare’s horn. The letters also have certain shapes and forms and are definitely by common consent and agreement associated with particular sounds; it is well known that different letters in different countries may be used to denote one kind of sound. Again, if from a mistake someone experiences fear and dies, it is not from nothing or from something false that he dies; for he had a real fear, and the fear was the cause of death and was roused by the memory of a real thing, and the only unreality about it was that the thing was not present there at that time. So no example could be given to show that from false knowledge, or falsehood as such, there could come right knowledge or the truth. Again, how can the scriptures demonstrate the falsehood of the world? If all auditory knowledge were false, all language would be false, and even the scriptural texts would be non-existent.

Further, what is this “avidyā,” if it cannot be described? How can one make anyone understand it? What nonsense it is to say that that which manifests itself as all the visible and tangible world of practical conduct and behaviour cannot itself be described. If it is beginningless, it must be eternal, and there can be no liberation. It cannot be both existent and non-existent; for that would be contradictory. It cannot be mere negation; for, being non-existent, it could not bring bondage. If it brings bondage, it must be an entity, and that means a dual existence with Brahman. So the proposition of the upholder of māyā is false.

What is true, however, is that, just as milk gets curdled, so it is God Himself who by His own will and knowledge and omnipo
tence transforms Himself into this world. There is no inconsistency in God’s transforming Himself into the world, though He is partless;

1 yasyāḥ kāryam idām kṛṣṇaṁ vyavahārāya kalpate nirvaktum sā na śakye’ ti vacanaṁ vacanār-thakam. Bhāskara-bhāṣya.
for He can do so by various kinds of powers, modifying them according to His own will. He possesses two powers; by one He has become the world of enjoyables (bhogya-śakti), and by the other the individual souls, the enjowers (bhoktr); but in spite of this modification of Himself He remains unchanged in His own purity; for it is by the manifestation and modification of His powers that the modification of the world as the enjoyable and the enjower takes place. It is just as the sun sends out his rays and collects them back into himself, but yet remains in himself the same.

The Philosophy of Bhāskara's Bhāṣya.

From what has been said above it is clear that according to Bhāskara the world of matter and the selves consists only in real modifications or transformations (parināma) of Brahman’s own nature through His diverse powers. This naturally brings in the question whether the world and the souls are different from Brahman or identical with him. Bhāskara’s answer to such a question is that “difference” (bheda) has in it the characteristic of identity (abheda-dharmā ca)—the waves are different from the sea, but are also identical with it. The waves are manifestations of the sea’s own powers, and so the same identical sea appears to be different when viewed with reference to the manifestations of its powers, though it is in reality identical with its powers. So the same identical fire is different in its powers as it burns or illuminates. So all that is one is also many, and the one is neither absolute identity nor absolute difference.

The individual souls are in reality not different from God; they are but His parts, as the sparks of fire are the parts of fire; but it is the peculiarity of these parts of God, the souls, that though one with Him, they have been under the influence of ignorance, desires and deeds from beginningless time. Just as the ākāśa, which is all the same everywhere; and yet the ākāśa inside a vessel or a house is not just the same ākāśa as the boundless space, but may in some places.

1 Bhāskara-bhāṣya, II. 1. 27, also I. 4. 25.
2 abheda-dharmā ca bheda yathā mahodadher abhedah sa eva taraṅgādy-ātmānā vartamāna bheda ity utycate, na hi taraṅgā-dayah pāśānā-dīṣu dṛṣyante tasyāvata tāḥ śaktayaḥ śakti-śaktiśaktimātrasya ananyatvam anayatvam ca-palakṣyate yathā’yner dahana-prakāśanā-diśaktayaḥ... tasmāt sarvam ekā-neka-tmakam nā’lyantam abhināṃ bhināṃ vā. Ibid. II. 1. 18.
3 Ibid. I. 4. 21.
The Philosophy of Bhāskara’s Bhāsyā

sense be regarded as a part of it; or just as the same air is seen to
serve different life-functions, as the five *prāṇas*, so the individual
souls also may in some sense be regarded as parts of God. It is just
and proper that the scriptures should command the individual souls
to seek knowledge so as to attain liberation; for it is the desire for
the highest soul (*paramātman*) or God or Brahman that is the cause
of liberation, and it is the desire for objects of the world that is the
cause of bondage. This soul, in so far as it exists in association with
ignorance, desires and deeds, is atomic in nature; and, just as a drop
of sandal paste may perfume all the place about it, so does the
atomic soul, remaining in one place, animate the whole body. It is
by nature endowed with consciousness, and it is only with reference
to the knowledge of other objects that it has to depend on the pre-
sence of those objects. Its seat is in the heart, and through the skin
of the heart it is in touch with the whole body. But, though in a
state of bondage, under the influence of ignorance, etc., it is atomic,
yet it is not ultimately atomic in nature; for it is one with Brahman.
Under the influence of *buddhi*, *āhamkāra*, the five senses and the
five *vāyus* it undergoes the cycle of rebirths. But though this atomic
form and the association with the *buddhi*, etc., is not essential to the
nature of the soul, yet so long as such a relation exists, the agency of
the soul is in every sense real; but the ultimate source of this agency
is God Himself; for it is God who makes us perform all actions, and
He makes us perform good actions, and it is He who, remaining
within us, controls all our actions.

In all stages of life a man must perform the deeds enjoined by
the scriptures, and he cannot rise at any stage so high that he is
beyond the sphere of the duties of work imposed on him by the
scriptures. It is not true, as Śaṅkara says, that those who are fit to

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1 *rāgo hi paramātma-viśayo yaḥ sa mukti-hetuh viśaya-viśayo yaḥ sa bandha-
hetuh*. Bhāskara-bhāsyā.
3 Bhāskara-bhāsyā, I. 1. 1. In holding the view that the *Brahma-sūtra* is
ina sane sense continuous with the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, which the former must follow—
for it is after the performance of the ritualistic duties that the knowledge of
Brahman can arise, and the latter therefore cannot in any stage dispense with the
need for the former—and that the *Brahma-sūtras* are not intended for any
superior and different class of persons, Bhāskara seems to have followed Upa-
varaṇa or Upavaraṇacārya, to whose commentary on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* he refers
and whom he calls the founder of the school (*śāstra-sampradāya-pravartaka*).
*Ibid.* I. 1. 1, and II. 2. 27. See also I. 1. 4: *ätma-jñāna-dhiṅertasya karmaḥ vinā
apavargā-nupapattā jñānena karma samuccye ātāte.*
have the highest knowledge are beyond the duties of life and courses of ritualistic and other actions enjoined by the scriptures, or that those for whom these are intended are not fit to have the highest knowledge; in other words, the statement of Śaṅkara that there cannot be any combination (samuccayya) of knowledge (jñāna) and necessary ritualistic duties of life (karma) is false. Bhāskara admits that pure karma (ritualistic duties) cannot lead us to the highest perception of the truth, the Brahman; yet knowledge (jñāna) combined with the regular duties, i.e. jñāna-samuccita-karma, can lead us to our highest good, the realization of Brahman. That it is our duty to attain the knowledge of Brahman is also to be accepted, by reason of the injunction of the scriptures; for that also is one of the imperative duties imposed on us by the scriptures—a vidhi—the self is to be known (ātmā vā are draṣṭavyah, etc.). It is therefore not true, as Śaṅkara asserted, that what the ritualistic and other duties imposed on us by the scriptures can do for us is only to make us fit for the study of Vedānta by purifying us and making us as far as possible sinless; Bhāskara urges that performance of the duties imposed on us by the scriptures is as necessary as the attainment of knowledge for our final liberation.

Bhāskara draws a distinction between cognition (jñāna) and consciousness (caitanya), more particularly, self-consciousness (ātmā-caitanya). Cognition with him means the knowledge of objective things, and this is a direct experience (anubhava) arising out of the contact of the sense organ, manas, and the object, the presence of light and the internal action of the memory and the sub-conscious impressions (samskāra). Cognition is not an active operation by itself, but is rather the result of the active operation of the senses in association with other accessories, such that whenever there is a collocation of those accessories involving the operation of the senses there is cognition\(^1\). Bhāskara is therefore positively against the contention of Kumārila that knowledge is an entity which is not directly perceived but only inferred as the agent which induces the intellectual operation, but which is not directly known by itself. If an unperceived entity is to be inferred to explain the cause of the per

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\(^1\) jñāna-kriyā-kalpanāyām pramānā-bhāvāt... ālokendriya-mañah-samskāreṣu hi satsu samvedānām utpadyate iti tad-abhāte notpadyate, yadi punar aparāya jñānam kalpyate tasyāpy anyat tasyāpy anyad ity anuvasthā; na ca jñāna-kriyānumāne lingam asti, samvedānām iti cen na, agrhita-sambandhatvāt. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, 1.1.1.
ceived intellectual operation, then another entity might be inferred as the cause of that unperceived entity, and another to explain that and so on, and we have a vicious infinite (anavasthā). Moreover, no unperceived entity can be inferred as the cause of the perceived intellectual operation; for, if it is unperceived, then its relation with intellectual operation is also unperceived, and how can there be any inference at all? Thus, cognition is what we directly experience (anubhava) and there is no unperceived entity which causes it, but it is the direct result of the joint operation of many accessories. This objective cognition is entirely different from the subjective consciousness or self-consciousness; for the latter is eternal and always present, whereas the former is only occasioned by the collocating circumstances. It is easy to see that Bhāskara has a very distinct epistemological position, which, though similar to Nyāya so far as the objective cognition is concerned, is yet different therefrom on account of his admission of the ever-present self-consciousness of the soul. It is at the same time different from the Śaṅkarite epistemology, for objective cognition is considered by him not as mere limitation of self-consciousness, but as entirely different therefrom. It may also be noted that, unlike Dharmarājādhvarindra, the writer of the Sanskrit epistemological work, Vedānta-paribhāṣā, Bhāskara considers manas as a sense-organ.

As has already been said, Bhāskara does not think that liberation can be attained through knowledge alone; the duties imposed by the scriptures must always be done along with our attempts to know Brahman; for there is no contradiction or opposition between knowledge and performance of the duties enjoined by the scriptures. There will be no liberation if the duties are forsaken. The state of salvation is one in which there is a continuous and unbroken consciousness of happiness. A liberated soul may associate or not associate itself with any body or sense as it likes. It is as omniscient,
omnipotent and as one with all souls as God Himself. The attachment (rāga) to Brahman, which is said to be an essential condition for attaining liberation, is further defined to be worship (samārādhana) or devotion (bhakti), while bhakti is said to be attendance on God by meditation (dhyānādīnā paricaryā). Bhakti is conceived, not as any feeling, affection or love of God, as in later Vaiṣṇava literature, but as dhyāna or meditation. A question may arise as to what, if Brahman has transformed Himself into the world, is meant by meditation on Brahman? Does it mean that we are to meditate on the world? To this Bhāskara’s answer is that Brahman is not exhausted by His transformation into the world, and that what is really meant by Brahman’s being transformed into the world is that the nature of the world is spiritual. The world is a spiritual manifestation and a spiritual transformation, and what passes as matter is in reality spiritual. Apart from Brahman as manifested in the world, the Brahman with diverse forms, there is also the formless Brahman (niṣprapaṇica brahman), the Brahman which is transcendent and beyond its own immanent forms, and it is this Brahman which is to be worshipped. The world with its diverse forms also will, in the end, return to its spiritual source, the formless Brahman, and nothing of it will be left as the remainder. The material world is dissolved in the spirit and lost therein, just as a lump of salt is lost in water. This transcendent Brahman that is to be worshipped is of the nature of pure being and intelligence (sal-laksana and bodha-laksana). He is also infinite and unlimited. But, though He is thus characterized as being, intelligence, and infinite, yet these terms do not refer to three distinct entities; they are the qualities of Brahman, the substance, and, like all qualities, they cannot remain different from their substance; for neither can any substance remain without its qualities, nor can any qualities remain without their substance. A substance does not become different by virtue of its qualities.

Bhāskara denies the possibility of liberation during lifetime (jīvan-mukti); for so long as the body remains as a result of the

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2 Ibid. III. 2. 24.
3 Ibid. II. 2. 11, 13, 17.
4 Ibid. III. 2. 23.
5 na dharma-dharmi-bhedena svarūpa-bhedena iti; na hi guṇa-rahitaṃ dravyam asti na dravya-rahito guṇaḥ. Ibid. III. 2. 23.
previous *karmas*, the duties assigned to the particular stage of life (*āśrama*) to which the man belongs have to be performed; but his difference from the ordinary man is that, while the ordinary man thinks himself to be the agent or the doer of all actions, the wise man never thinks himself to be so. If a man could attain liberation during lifetime, then he might even know the minds of other people. Whether in *mukti* one becomes absolutely relationless (*niḥsam-bandhaḥ*), or whether one becomes omniscient and omnipotent (as Bhāskara himself urges), it is not possible for one to attain *mukti* during one’s lifetime, so it is certain that so long as a man lives he must perform his duties and try to comprehend the nature of God and attend on Him through meditation, since these only can lead to liberation after death\(^1\).

\(^1\) *Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, iii. 4. 26.
CHAPTER XVI

THE PAÑCARĀTRA.

Antiquity of the Pañcarātra.

The Pañcarātra doctrines are indeed very old and are associated with the *puruṣa-sūkta* of the Rg-veda, which is, as it were, the foundation stone of all future Vaiṣṇava philosophy. It is said in the *Sata-patha Brāhmaṇa* that Nārāyaṇa, the great being, wishing to transcend all other beings and becoming one with them all, saw the form of sacrifice known as pañcarātra, and by performing that sacrifice attained his purpose. It is probable that the epithets "*puruṣo ha nārāyaṇah*" became transformed in later times into the two ṛṣis Nara and Nārāyaṇa. The passage also implies that Nārāyaṇa was probably a human being who became a transcending divinity by performing the Pañcarātra sacrifice. In the later literature Nārāyaṇa became the highest divinity. Thus Veṅkaṭa Sudhī wrote a *Siddhānta-ratnāvalī* in about 19,000 lines to prove by a reference to scriptural texts that Nārāyaṇa is the highest god and that all other gods, Śiva, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, etc., are subordinate to him. The word *Brahman* in the Upaniṣads is also supposed in the fourth or the last chapter of the *Siddhānta-ratnāvalī* to refer to Nārāyaṇa. In the *Mahābhārata* (*Śānti-parvan*, 334th chapter) we hear of Nara and Nārāyaṇa themselves worshipping the unchanging Brahman which is the self in all beings; and yet Nārāyaṇa is there spoken of as being the greatest of all. In the succeeding chapter it is said that there was a king who was entirely devoted to Nārāyaṇa, and who worshipped him according to the *sātvata* rites. He was so devoted to Nārāyaṇa that he considered all that belonged to him, riches, kingdom, etc., as belonging to Nārāyaṇa. He harboured in his house great saints versed in the Pañcarātra system. When under the patronage of this king great saints performed sacrifices, they were unable to have a vision of the great Lord Nārāyaṇa, and Brhadspati became angry.

1 *Sata-patha Brāhmaṇa* XIII. 6. 1.
2 The *Siddhānta-ratnāvalī* exists only as a MS. which has not yet been published.
3 We have an old *Pañcarātra-samhitā* called the *Sātvata-samhitā*, the contents of which will presently be described.
Other sages then related the story that, though after long penance they could not perceive God, there was a message from Heaven that the great Nārāyaṇa was visible only to the inhabitants of Sveta-dvīpa, who were devoid of sense-organs, did not require any food, and were infused with a monotheistic devotion. The saints were dazzled by the radiant beauty of these beings, and could not see them. They then began to practise asceticism and, as a result, these holy beings became perceivable to them. These beings adored the ultimate deity by mental japa (muttering God's name in mind) and made offerings to God. Then there was again a message from Heaven that, since the saints had perceived the beings of Sveta-dvīpa, they should feel satisfied with that and return home because the great God could not be perceived except through all-absorbing devotion. Nārada also is said to have seen from a great distance Sveta-dvīpa and its extraordinary inhabitants. Nārada then went to Sveta-dvīpa and had a vision of Nārāyaṇa, whom he adored. Nārāyaṇa said to him that Vāsudeva was the highest changeless God, from whom came out Saṅkarṣaṇa, the lord of all life; from him came Pradyumna, called manas, and from Pradyumna came Aniruddha, the Ego. From Aniruddha came Brahmā, who created the universe. After the pralaya, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are successively created from Vāsudeva.

There are some Upaniṣads which are generally known as Vaiṣṇava Upaniṣads, and of much later origin than the older Pañcarātra texts. To this group of Upaniṣads belong the Āvyaktopaniṣad or Āvyakta-nṛsimhopaniṣad, with a commentary of Upaniṣad-brahmayogin, the pupil of Vāsudevendra, Kali-santaranopaniṣad, Kṛṣṇopaniṣad, Gauḍopaniṣad, Gopālatāpāini Upaniṣad, Gopālottarata-pāṇi Upaniṣad, Tārāsāropaniṣad, Tripād-vibhūti-mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad, Dattātreyaopaniṣad, Nārāyanopaniṣad, Nṛsimha-tāpini Upaniṣad, Nṛsimhottarata-tāpini Upaniṣad, Rāmatāpini Upaniṣad, Rāmottarottarata-tāpini Upaniṣad, Rāma-rahasya Upaniṣad, Vāsudevaopaniṣad, with the commentaries of Upaniṣad-brahmayogin. But these Upaniṣads are mostly full of inessential descriptions, ritualistic practices and the muttering of particular mantras. They have very little connection with the Pañcarātra texts and their contents. Some of them—like the Nṛsimha-tāpini, Gopālatāpāni, etc.—have been utilized in the Gaudīya school of Vaiṣṇavism.
The Position of the Pañcarātra Literature.

Yāmuna, in his *Agama-prāmāṇya*, discusses the position of the Pañcarātras as follows. It is said that any instruction conveyed through language can be valid either by itself or through the strength of the validity of some other proofs. No instruction of any ordinary person can be valid by itself. The special ritualistic processes associated with the Pañcarātra cannot be known by perception or by inference. Only God, whose powers of perception extend to all objects of the world and which are without any limitation, can instil the special injunctions of the Pañcarātra. The opponents, however, hold that a perception which has all things within its sphere can hardly be called perception. Moreover, the fact that some things may be bigger than other things does not prove that anything which is liable to be greater and less could necessarily be conceived to extend to a limitless extent. Even if it be conceived that there is a person whose perception is limitless, there is nothing to suggest that he should be able to instruct infallibly about the rituals, such as those enjoined in the Pañcarātra. There are also no *āgamas* which prescribe the Pañcarātra rites. It cannot be ascertained whether the authors of the Pañcarātra works based them on the teachings of the Vedas or gave their own views and passed them on as being founded on the Vedas. If it is argued that the fact that the Pañcarātra, like other texts of *Smrti* of Manu, etc., exist proves that they must have a common origin in the Vedas, that is contradicted by the fact that the Pañcarātra doctrines are repudiated in the *smrti* texts founded on the Vedas. If it is said that those who follow the Pañcarātra rites are as good Brahmins as other Brahmins, and follow the Vedic rites, the opponents assert that this is not so, since the Pañcarātrins may have all the external marks and appearance of Brahmins, but yet they are not so regarded in society. At a social dinner the Brahmins do not sit in the same line with the *Bhāgavatas* or the followers of the Pañcarātra.

1 atha ekasmin sātiyaye kenāpyanyena niratīṣayena bhavitavyam iti āhosvit samāna-jātyenaḥnyena nir-atīṣaya-dusām adhiruddhena bhavitavyam iti: na tāvad agrimah kalpah kalpyate'nupalambhataḥ na hi drṣṭaṃ sarāvādi vyomeva prāpta-vaiḥbhavam. *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, p. 3.
The very word *sātvata* indicates a lower caste\(^1\), and the words *bhāgavata* and *sātvata* are interchangeable. It is said that a *sātvata* of the *pañcama* caste who by the king’s order worships in temples is called a *bhāgavata*. As a means of livelihood the sātvatas worship images and live upon offerings for initiation and those made to temple gods; they do not perform the Vedic duties, and have no relationship with the Brahmans, and so they cannot be regarded as Brahmans. It is also said that even by the sight of a man who takes to worship as a means of livelihood one is polluted and should be purified by proper purificatory ceremonies. The Pañcarātra texts are adopted by the degraded sātvatas or the bhagavatas, and these must therefore be regarded as invalid and non-Vedic. Moreover, if this literature were founded on the Vedas, there would be no meaning in their recommendation of special kinds of rituals. It is for this reason that Bādarāyaṇa also refutes the philosophical theory of the Pañcarātra in the *Brahma-sūtra*.

It may, however, be urged that, though the Pañcarātra injunctions may not tally with the injunctions of Brahminic *Smṛti* literature, yet such contradictions are not important, as both are based upon the Vedic texts. Since the validity of the Brahminic *Smṛti* also is based upon the Vedas, the Pañcarātra has no more necessity to reconcile its injunctions with that than they have to reconcile themselves with the Pañcarātra.

The question arises as to whether the Vedas are the utterances of a person or not. The argument in favour of production by a person is that, since the Vedas are a piece of literary composition, they must have been uttered by a person. The divine person who directly perceives the sources of merit or demerit enjoins the same through his grace by composing the Vedas for the benefit of human beings. It is admitted, even by the Mīmāṁsakas, that all worldly affairs are consequent upon the influence of merit and demerit. So the divine being who has created the world knows directly the sources of merit and demerit. The world cannot be produced directly through the effects of our deeds, and it has to be admitted that there must be some being who utilizes the effects of our deeds, producing the world in consonance with them. All the scriptural

\(^1\) Thus Manu says:

\[
\text{vaɪs\text{'yāt tu jāyate vrātyāt suḍhanvācārya eva ca}
\text{bhāruṣaś ca niṇaṅghaś ca maitra-sātvata eva ca.}
\]

*Āgama-prāmāṇya*, p. 8.
texts also support the admission of such an omnipotent and omni-
scient God. It is this God who, on the one hand, created the Vedas,
directing the people to the performance of such actions as lead them
to mundane and heavenly happiness, and on the other hand created
the Pañcarātra literature for the attainment of the highest bliss by
the worship of God and the realization of His nature. There are
some who deny the legitimate inference of a creator from the crea-
tion, and regard the Vedas as an eternally existent composition,
uncreated by any divine being. Even in such a view the reason why
the Vedas and the consonant Smṛtis are regarded as valid attests
also the validity of the Pañcarātra literature. But, as a matter of
fact, from the Vedas themselves we can know the supreme being
as their composer. The supreme God referred to in the Upaniṣads
is none other than Vāsudeva, and it is He who is the composer of the
Pañcarātra. Further, arguments are adduced to show that the ob-
ject of the Vedas is not only to command us to do certain actions or
to prohibit us from doing certain other actions, but also to describe
the nature of the ultimate reality as the divine person. The validity
of the Pañcarātra has therefore to be admitted, as it claims for its
source the divine person Nārāyaṇa or Vāsudeva. Yāmuna then
refers to many texts from the Varāha, Liṅga and Matsya Purāṇas
and from the Manu-samhitā and other smṛtī texts. In his Puruṣa-
ninṇaya also, Yāmuna elaborately discusses the scriptural argu-
ments by which he tries to show that the highest divine person re-
ferred to in the Upaniṣads and the Purāṇas is Nārāyaṇa. This
divine being cannot be the Śiva of the Śaivas, because the three
classes of the Śaivas, the Kāpālikas, Kālamukhas and Pāṣupatas, all
prescribe courses of conduct contradictory to one another, and it is
impossible that they should be recommended by the scriptural
texts. Their ritualistic rites also are manifestly non-Vedic. The
view that they are all derived from Rudra does not prove that it is
the same Rudra who is referred to in the Vedic texts. The Rudra
referred to by them may be an entirely different person. He refers
also to the various Purāṇas which decry the Śaivas. Against the
argument that, if the Pañcarātra doctrines were in consonance with
the Vedas, then one would certainly have discovered the relevant
Vedic texts from which they were derived, Yāmuna says that the
Pañcarātra texts were produced by God for the benefit of devotees
who were impatient of following elaborate details described in the
Vedic literature. It is therefore quite intelligible that the relevant Vedic texts supporting the Pañcarātra texts should not be discovered. Again, when it is said that Śaṅḍilya turned to the doctrine of bhakti because he found nothing in the four Vedas suitable for the attainment of his desired end, this should not be interpreted as implying a lowering of the Vedas; for it simply means that the desired end as recommended in the Pañcarātras is different from that prescribed in the Vedas. The fact that Pañcarātras recommend special ritual ceremonies in addition to the Vedic ones does not imply that they are non-Vedic; for, unless it is proved that the Pañcarātras are non-Vedic, it cannot be proved that the additional ceremonies are non-Vedic without implying argument in a circle. It is also wrong to suppose that the Pañcarātra ceremonies are really antagonistic to all Vedic ceremonies. It is also wrong to suppose that Bādarāyana refuted the Pañcarātra doctrines; for, had he done so, he would not have recommended them in the Mahābhārata. The view of the Pañcarātras admitting the four evyūhas should not be interpreted as the admission of many gods; for these are manifestations of Vāsudeva, the one divine person. A proper interpretation of Bādarāyana’s Brahma-sūtras would also show that they are in support of the Pañcarātras and not against them.

Even the most respected persons of society follow all the Pañcarātra instructions in connection with all rituals relating to image-worship. The arguments of the opponents that the Bhāgavatas are not Brahmins are all fallacious, since the Bhāgavatas have the same marks of Brahrahood as all Brahmins. The fact that Manu describes the pañcama caste as sātvata does not prove that all sātvatas are pañcamas. Moreover, the interpretation of the word sātvata as pañcama by the opponents would be contradictory to many scriptural texts, where sātvatas are praised. That some sātvatas live by image-building or temple-building and such other works relating to the temple does not imply that this is the duty of all the Bhāgavatas. Thus Yāmuna, in his Āgama-prāmāṇya and Kāśmirāgama-prāmāṇya, tried to prove that the Pañcarātras are as valid as the Vedas, since they are derived from the same source, viz. the divine Person, Nārāyaṇa.1

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1 The Kāśmirāgama is referred to in the Āgama-prāmāṇya, p. 85, as another work of Yāmuna dealing more or less with the same subject as the Āgama-prāmāṇya, of which no MS. has been available to the present writer.
From the tenth to the seventeenth century the Śaivas and the Śrīvaiṣṇavas lived together in the south, where kings professing Śaivism harassed the Śrīvaiṣṇavas and maltreated their temple-gods, and kings professing Śrīvaiṣṇavism did the same to the Śaivas and their temple-gods. It is therefore easy to imagine how the sectarian authors of the two schools were often anxious to repudiate one another. One of the most important and comprehensive of such works is the Siddhānta-ratnāvali, written by Venkaṭa Sudhī. Veṅkaṭa Sudhī was the disciple of Veṅkaṭanātha. He was the son of Śriśaila Ṭatayāra, and was the brother of Śri Śaila Śrinivāsa. The Siddhānta-ratnāvali is a work of four chapters, containing over 300,000 letters. He lived in the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries, and wrote at least two other works, Rahasya traya-sāra and Siddhānta-vaijñayanti.

Many treatises were written in which the Pañcarātra doctrines were summarized. Of these Gopālasūri's Pañcarātra-rakṣā-samgraha seems to be the most important. Gopālasūri was the son of Kṛṣṇadeśika and pupil of Vedantaramānuja, who was himself the pupil of Kṛṣṇadeśika. His Pañcarātra-rakṣā deals with the various kinds of rituals described in some of the most important Pañcarātra works.

It thus seems that the Pañcarātra literature was by many writers not actually regarded as of Vedic origin, though among the Śrīvaiṣṇavas it was regarded as being as authoritative as the Vedas. It was regarded, along with the Śaṅkhyā and Yoga, as an accessory literature to the Vedas. Yāmuna also speaks of it as containing a brief summary of the teachings of the Vedas for the easy and immediate use of those devotees who cannot afford to study the vast Vedic literature. The main subjects of the Pañcarātra literature are directions regarding the constructions of temples and images,

1 Thus Veṅkaṭanātha, quoting Vyāsa, says:
   idam-maho-paniṣadām catur-veda-sam-anvītan
   sāṅkhyā-yoga-krīdāntenā pañca-rātra-muśabdītan.
   Śevāra-Mimamsā, p. 19.

Sometimes the Pañcarātra is regarded as the root of the Vedas, and sometimes the Vedas are regarded as the root of the Pañcarātras. Thus Veṅkaṭanātha in the above context quotes a passage from Vyāsa in which Pañcarātra is regarded as the root of the Vedas—"mahatv veda-vṛksasya mula-bhata mahan ayaṃ." He quotes also another passage in which the Vedas are regarded as the root of the Pañcarātras—"srutimūlam idam tantram pratamā-kalpa-sātravat." In another passage he speaks of the Pañcarātras as the alternative to the Vedas—"alābhē veda-mantrāṇām pañca-rātra-dītenā vā."
descriptions of the various rituals associated with image-worship, and the rituals, dealing elaborately with the duties of the Śrī-vaishṇavas and their religious practices, such as initiation, baptism, and the holding of religious marks. The practice of image-worship is manifestly non-Vedic, though there is ample evidence to show that it was current even in the sixth century B.C. It is difficult for us to say how this practice originated and which section of Indians was responsible for it. The conflict between the Vedic people and the image-worshippers seems to have been a long one; yet we know that even in the second century B.C. the Bhāgavata cult was in a very living state, not only in South India, but also in Upper India. The testimony of the Besnagar Column shows how even Greeks were converted to the Bhāgavata religion. The Mahābhārata also speaks of the sātvata rites, according to which Viṣṇu was worshipped, and it also makes references to the Vyūha doctrine of the Pāñcarātras. In the Nārāyanīya section it is suggested that the home of the Pāñcarātra worship is Śveta-dvipa, from which it may have migrated to India; but efforts of scholars to determine the geographical position of Śveta-dvipa have so far failed.

In the Purāṇas and the smṛti literature also the conflict with the various Brahminic authorities is manifest. Thus, in the Kurma purāṇa, chapter fifteen, it is said that the great sinners, the Pāñcarātrins, were produced as a result of killing cows in some other birth, that they are absolutely non-Vedic, and that the literatures of the Śaktas, Śaivas and the Pāñcarātras are for the delusion of mankind. That Pāñcarātrins were a cursed people is also noticed in the Parāśara purāṇa. They are also strongly denounced in the Vasiṣṭha-samhitā, the Śāmba-purāṇa and the Śūta-samhitā as great sinners and as absolutely non-Vedic. Another cause of denouncement was that the Pāñcarātrins initiated and admitted within their

1) kāpālam gāruḍam śaktom, bhairavam pūrva-paścimam, pāṇca-rātram, paśupatam tathānyāni sahasraśaḥ.

Kurma-purāṇa, Ch. 15.

(As quoted in the Tattva-kauṣṭubha of Dīkṣita but in the printed edition of the B.J. series it occurs in the sixteenth chapter with slight variations.)

The Skanda-purāṇa also says:

pancarātre ca kāpāle, tathā hālamukhe'pi ca.
śakte ca dhiṣita yūyam bhaveta brāhmaṇādhamāḥ.

2) deśīyam pāncarātre ca tantre bhāgavate tathā
dhiṣitās ca deśī nityam bhaveyur garhita hareḥ.

(As quoted by Bhaṭṭoṇi Dīkṣita in his Tattva-kauṣṭubha, MS. p. 4.)
sect even women and Śūdras. According to the Aśvalāyana-smṛti, no one but an outcast would therefore accept the marks recommended by the Pañcarātras. In the fourth chapter of the Vṛhan-nāradīya-purāṇa it is said that even for conversing with the Pañcarātrins one would have to go to the Raurava hell. The same prohibition of conversing with the Pañcarātrins is found in the Kūrma-purāṇa, and it is there held that they should not be invited on occasions of funeral ceremonies. Hemādri, quoting from the Vāyu purāṇa, says that, if a Brahman is converted into the Pañcarātra religion, he thereby loses all his Vedic rites. The Līṅga-purāṇa also regards them as being excommunicated from all religion (sarva-dharmavahīśka). The Āditya and the Agni-purāṇas are also extremely strong against those who associate themselves in any way with the Pañcarātrins. The Viṣṇu, Śatātapa, Hārīta, Bodhāyana and the Yama saṃhitās also are equally strong against the Pañcarātrins and those who associate with them in any way. The Pañcarātrins, however, seem to be more conciliatory to the members of the orthodox Vedic sects. They therefore appear to be a minority sect, which had always to be on the defensive and did not dare revile the orthodox Vedic people. There are some Purāṇas, however, like the Mahābhārata, Bhāgavata and the Viṣṇu-purāṇa, which are strongly in favour of the Pañcarātrins. It is curious, however, to notice that, while some sections of the Purāṇas approve of them, others are fanatically against them. The Purāṇas that are specially favourable to the Pañcarātrins are the Viṣṇu, Nāradīya, Bhāgavata, Gāruda, Padma and Varāha, which are called the Sāttvika purāṇas. So among the smṛtis, the Vaiśīṣṭha, Hārīta, Vyāsa, Pārāśara and Kaśyapa are regarded as the best. The Pramāṇa-samgraha takes up some of the most important doctrines of the Pañcarātrins and tries to prove their authoritativeness by a reference to the above Purāṇas and smṛtis, and also to the Mahābhārata, the Gitā, Viṣṇudharmottara, Prājāpatya-smṛti, Itihāsasamuccaya, Harivamśa, Vṛddha-manu, Śaṇḍilya-smṛti, and the Brahmnāṇḍa-purāṇa.

1 Thus the Pramāṇa-samgraha says:

\[ \text{vaiṣṇavaḥ nāradīyaḥ ca tathā bhāgavataḥ subhaḥ}
\text{gārudam ca tathā pādnam vārāham subha-darśane}
\text{sāttvikam purāṇāṁ viṁśeyāṁ ca saṁprthak.} \]

The Pañcarātra Literature.

The Pañcarātra literature is somewhat large and only a few works have been printed. The present writer, however, had the opportunity of collecting a large number of manuscripts, and an attempt will here be made to give a brief account of this literature, which, however, has no philosophical importance. One of the most important of these samhitās is the Sātvata-samhitā. The Sātvata is referred to in the Mahābhārata, the Ahirbudhnya-samhitā, the Īśvara-samhitā and other samhitās. In the Sātvata-samhitā we find that the Lord (Bhagavān) promulgates the Pañcarātra-Śāstra at the request of Saṃkarṣaṇa on behalf of the sages. It consists of twenty-five chapters which describe the forms of worshipping Nārāyaṇa in all His four Vyūha manifestations (vibhava-devatā), dress and ornaments, other special kinds of worship, the installation of images and the like. The Īśvara-samhitā says that the Ekāyana Veda, the source of all Vedas, originated with Vāsudeva and existed in the earliest age as the root of all the other Vedas, which were introduced at a later age and are therefore called the Vikāra-veda. When these Vikāra-vedas sprang up and people became more and more worldly-minded, Vāsudeva withdrew the Ekāyana Veda and revealed it only to some selected persons, such as Sana, Sanatsujāti, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, Kapila and Sanātana, who were all called ekāntins. Other sages, Marici, Atri, Āṅgirasa, Pulastya, Pulaha, Kratu, Vasiṣṭha and Svaṁabhuvä, learnt this Ekāyana from Nārāyaṇa, and on the basis of it the Pañcarātra literature on the one hand was written, in verse, and the various Dharma-śastras on the other hand were written by Manu and other rṣis. The Pañcarātra works, such as Sātvata, Pauśkara, and Jayākhya and other similar texts, were written at the instance of Saṃkarṣaṇa in accordance with the fundamental tenets of the Ekāyana Veda, which was almost lost in the later stage. Śaṅḍilya also learnt the principles of the Ekāyana Veda from Saṃkarṣaṇa and taught them to the rṣis. The contents of the Ekāyana Veda, as taught by Nārāyaṇa, are called the Sātvika-śāstra; those Śastraś which are partly based on the Ekāyana Veda and partly due to the contribution of the sages themselves are called the Rājasa-Śāstra; those which are merely the contribution of

1 Published at Conjeeveram, 1902.
human beings are called the Tāmasa Śāstra. The Rājasa Śāstra is of two kinds, the Pañcarātra and the Vaikhānasa. Sātvata, Pauskara and Jayākhyā were probably the earliest Pañcarātra works written by the sages, and of these again the Sātvata is considered the best, as it consists of a dialogue between the Lord and Saṃkaraṇa.

The Īṣvara-samhitā consists of twenty-four chapters, of which sixteen are devoted to ritualistic worship, one to the description of images, one to initiation, one to meditation, one to mantras, one to expiation, one to methods of self-control, and one to a description of the holiness of the Yādava hill1. The chapter on worship is interspersed with philosophical doctrines which form the basis of the Śrīvaishnava philosophy and religion.

The Hayāśīrṣa-samhitā consists of four parts; the first part, called the Pratisthā-kāṇḍa, consists of forty-two chapters; the second, the Saṃkaraṇa, of thirty-seven chapters; the third, the Liṅga, of twenty chapters; and the fourth, the Saura-kāṇḍa, of forty-five chapters2. All the chapters deal with rituals concerning the installation of images of various minor gods, the methods of making images and various other kinds of rituals. The Viṣṇu-tattva-samhitā consists of thirty-nine chapters, and deals entirely with rituals of image-worship, ablutions, the holding of Vaiṣṇava marks, purificatory rites, etc.2 The Parama-samhitā consists of thirty-one chapters, dealing mainly with a description of the process of creation, rituals of initiation, and other kinds of worship3. In the tenth chapter, however, it deals with yoga. In this chapter we hear of jñāna-yoga and karma-yoga. Jñāna-yoga is regarded as superior to karma-yoga, though it may co-exist therewith. Jñāna-yoga means partly practical philosophy and the effort to control all sense-inclinations by that means. It also includes samādhi, or deep concentration, and the practice of prāṇāyāma. The word yoga is here used in the sense of "joining or attaching oneself to." The man who practises yoga fixes his mind on God and by deep meditation detaches himself from all worldly bonds. The idea of karma-yoga does not appear to be very clear; but in all probability it means worship of Viṣṇu. The Parāśara-samhitā, which was also available

1 Published at Conjeeveram, 1921.
2 It has been available to the present writer only in MS.
3 This samhitā has also been available to the present writer only in MS.
only in manuscript, consists of eight chapters dealing with the methods of muttering the name of God.

The *Padma-samhitā*, consisting of thirty-one chapters, deals with various kinds of rituals and the chanting of *mantras*, offerings, religious festivities and the like\(^1\). The *Parameśvara-samhitā*, consisting of fifteen chapters, deals with the meditation on *mantras*, sacrifices and methods of ritual and expiation\(^2\). The *Pauṣkara-samhitā*, which is one of the earliest, consists of forty-three chapters, and deals with various kinds of image-worship, funeral sacrifices and also with some philosophical topics\(^2\). It contains also a special chapter called *Tattva-saṃkhya-paṇḍita*, in which certain philosophical views are discussed. These, however, are not of any special importance and may well be passed over. The *Prakāśa-samhitā* consists of two parts. The first part is called *Parama-tattva-nirnaya*, and consists of fifteen chapters; the second, called *Para-tattva-prakāśa*, consists of twelve chapters only\(^2\). The *Mahā-sanatkumāra-samhitā*, consisting of four chapters and forty sections in all, deals entirely with rituals of worship\(^2\). It is a big work, containing ten thousand verses. Its four chapters are called *Brahma-rātra, Śiva-rātra, Indra-rātra* and *Ṛṣi-rātra*. The *Aniruddha-samhitā-mahopanisad* contains thirty-four chapters and deals entirely with descriptions of various rituals, methods of initiation, expiation, installation of images, the rules regarding the construction of images, etc.\(^2\) The *Kāśyapa-samhitā*, consisting of twelve chapters, deals mainly with poisons and methods of remedy by incantations\(^3\). The *Vihagendra-samhitā* deals largely with meditation on *mantras* and sacrificial oblations and consists of twenty-four chapters. In the twelfth chapter it deals extensively with *pṛāṇāyāma*, or breath-control, as a part of the process of worship\(^2\). The *Sudarśana-samhitā* consists of forty-one chapters and deals with meditation on *mantras* and expiation of sins. *Agastya-samhitā* consists of thirty-two chapters. The *Vasiṣṭha* contains twenty-four chapters, the *Viśvāmitra* twenty-six chapters and the *Viṣṇu-samhitā* thirty chapters. They are all in manuscripts and deal more or less with the same subject, namely, ritualistic worship. The *Viṣṇu-samhitā* is, however, very much under the influence of Sāṃkhya and holds *Puruṣa* to be all-pervasive. It also invests *Puruṣa* with dynamic

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\(^1\) It has been available to the present writer only in MS.

\(^2\) These works also were available to the present writer only in MS.
activity by reason of which the *prakṛti* passes through evolutionary changes. The five powers of the five senses are regarded as the power of Viṣṇu. The power of Viṣṇu has both a gross and a transcendental form. In its transcendental form it is power as consciousness, power as world-force, power as cause, power by which consciousness grasps its objects and power as omniscience and omnipotence. These five powers in their transcendental forms constitute the subtle body of God. In the thirtieth chapter the *Viṣṇu-saṁhitā* deals with *yoga* and its six accessories (ṣaḍ-āṅga-yoga), and shows how the *yoga* method can be applied for the attainment of devotion, and calls it *Bhāgavata-yoga*. It may be noticed that the description of human souls as all-pervasive is against the Śrīvaishṇava position. The *aṣṭāṅga yoga* (*yoga* with eight accessories) is often recommended and was often practised by the early adherents of the Śrīvaishṇava faith, as has already been explained. The *Mārkaṇḍeya-saṁhitā* consists of thirty-two chapters, speaks of 108 *saṁhitās*, and gives a list of ninety-one *saṁhitās*. The *Viṣeṣaṭva-saṁhitā* consists of thirty-one chapters. It is a very old work and has often been utilized by Rāmakṛṣṇa, Saumya Jāmāṭr muni and others. The *Hiranya-garbha-saṁhitā* consists of four chapters.

**Philosophy of the Jayākhyā and other Saṁhitās.**

The Pañcarātra literature is, indeed, vast, but it has been shown that most of this literature is full of ritualistic details and that there is very little of philosophy in it. The only *saṁhitās* (so far as they are available to us) which have some philosophical elements in them are the *Jayākhyā-saṁhitā*, *Aḥirbudhnya-saṁhitā*, *Viṣṇu-saṁhitā*, *Vihatendra-saṁhitā*, *Parama-saṁhitā* and *Paḥkara-saṁhitā*; of these the *Aḥirbudhnya* and the *Jayākhyā* are the most important.

The *Jayā* starts with the view that merely by performance of the sacrifices, making of gifts, study of the Vedas, and expiatory penances, one cannot attain eternal Heaven or liberation from bondage. Until we can know the ultimate reality (*para-tattvav*) which is all-pervasive, eternal, self-realized, pure consciousness, but which through its own will can take forms, there is no hope of salvation. This ultimate reality resides in our hearts and is in itself

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1 These are also in MS. Schrader enumerates them in his *Introduction to Pañcarātra*. [CH]
devoid of any qualities (nir-guna), though it lies hidden by the qualities (guna-guhya) and is without any name (a-namaka).

A number of sages approached Śāṇḍilya in the mountain of Gandhamadana with inquiry concerning the manner in which this ultimate reality may be known. Śāṇḍilya in reply said that this science was very secret and very ancient, and that it could be given only to true believers who were ardently devoted to their preceptors. It was originally given to Nārada by Viṣṇu. The Lord Viṣṇu is the object of our approach, but He can be approached only through the scriptures (Sāstra); the Sāstra can be taught only by a teacher. The teacher therefore is the first and primary means to the attainment of the ultimate reality through the instructions of the scriptures.

The Jayākhya-samhitā then describes the three kinds of creation, of which the first is called Brahma-sarga, which is of a mythological character; it is stated that in the beginning Brahmā was created by Viṣṇu and that he, by his own egoism, polluted the creation which he made and that two demons, Madhu and Kaṭabha, produced from two drops of sweat, stole away the Vedas and thus created great confusion. Viṣṇu fought with them by His physical energies, but was unsuccessful. He then fought with them by His “mantra” energy and thus ultimately destroyed them.

The second creation is that of the evolution of the Śaṁkhya categories. It is said in the Jayākhya-samhitā that in the pradhāna the three guṇas exist together in mutual unity. Just as in a lamp the wick, the oil and the fire act together to form the unity of the lamp, so the three guṇas also exist together and form the pradhāna. Though these guṇas are separate, yet in the pradhāna they form an inseparable unity (bhinnam ekatma-laksanaṁ). These guṇas, however, are separated out from this state of union, and in this order of separation satta comes first, then rajas and then tamas. From the threefold unity of the guṇas the buddhi-tattva is evolved, and from this are produced the three kinds of ahamkāra, prakāśātma, vikṛtyātma and bhūtātma. From the first kind of ahamkāra, as taijasa or as prakāśātma, the five cognitive senses and the manas are produced. From the second kind of ahamkāra the five conative senses are evolved. From the ahamkāra as bhūtātma the five bhūta-yoni or sources of elements (otherwise called the five tanmātra) are produced, and from these are derived the five gross elements. The prakṛti is unintelligent and material in nature, and
so, as may well be expected, the evolution from *prakṛti* is also material in nature. The natural question in this connection is: how can matter begin to produce other material entities? The answer given to this question is that, though both a paddy seed and a piece of rice are material by nature, yet there is productivity in the former, but not in the latter; so, though the *prakṛti* and its evolutes are both material in nature, yet one is produced out of the other. The products of the unintelligent *prakṛti*, being suffused with the glow of the self as pure consciousness, one with Brahma, appear as being endowed with consciousness. Just as a piece of iron becomes endowed with magnetic powers, so the *prakṛti* also becomes endowed with intelligence through its association with the intelligent self in unity with Brahma. The question, however, arises how, since matter and intelligence are as different from each other as light from darkness, there can be any association between the unconscious *prakṛti* and the pure intelligence. To this the reply is that the individual soul (*jīva*) is a product of a beginningless association of *vāsanā* with pure consciousness. For the removal of this *vāsanā* a certain power emanates from Brahma and, impelled by His will, so works within the inner microcosm of man that the pure consciousness in the *jīva* is ultimately freed from the *vāsanā* through the destruction of his *karma*, and he becomes ultimately one with Brahma. The *karma* can bear fruits only when they are associated with their receptacle, the *vāsanā*. The self, or the soul, is brought into association with the *guna* by the energy of God, and it can thereby come to know its own *vāsanā*, which are non-intelligent by nature and a product of the *guna*.

As soon as the bond is broken, the self as pure consciousness becomes one with Brahma.

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1. *cid-rūpaṃ ātma-tattvam yad abhinnaṃ brahmaṇi sthitam
tenitaḥ churitaḥ bhāti aiccinmayavat devija.*

2. *māyāye devīa-dhāre gunā-dhāre tato jāde
saṃtyā saṃyojito hy ātmā vettī ātmīyāś ca vāsanāḥ.*

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*Jayākhyā-samhitā* (MS.), iii. 14.

When this section was written the *Jayākhyā-samhitā* was not published. It has since been published in the Gaekwad's oriental series.
The third creation is the pure creation (suddha-sarga), in which God, otherwise called Vāsudeva, evolved from out of Himself three subsidiary agents, Acyuta, Satya and Puruṣa, which are in reality but one with Him and have no different existence. In His form as Puruṣa God behaves as the inner controller of all ordinary gods, whom He goads and leads to work. And it is in this form that God works in all human beings bound with the ties of vāsanā, and directs them to such courses as may ultimately lead them to the cessation of their bondage.

God is pure bliss and self-conscious in Himself. He is the highest and the ultimate reality beyond all, which is, however, self-existent and the support of all other things. He is beginningless and infinite and cannot be designated either as existent or as non-existent (na sat tan nāsad ucyate). He is devoid of all gunas, but enjoys the various products of the gunas, and exists both inside and outside us. He is omniscient, all-perceiving, the Lord of all and all are in Him. He combines in Him all energies, and is spontaneous in Himself with all His activities. He pervades all things, but is yet called non-existent because He cannot be perceived by the senses. But, just as the fragrance of flowers can be intuited directly, so God also can be intuited directly. All things are included in His existence and He is not limited either in time or in space. Just as fire exists in a red-hot iron-ball as if it were one therewith, so does God pervade the whole world. Just as things that are imaged on a mirror may in one sense be said to be in it and in another sense to be outside it, so God is in one sense associated with all sensible qualities and in another sense is unassociated therewith. God pervades all the conscious and the unconscious entities, just as the watery juice pervades the whole of the plant. God cannot be known by arguments or proof. His all-pervading existence is as unspeakable and undemonstrable as the existence of fire in wood and butter in milk. He is perceivable only through direct intuition. Just as logs of wood enter into the fire and are lost in it, just as rivers lose themselves in the ocean, so do the Yogins enter into the essence of God. In such circumstances there is difference between the rivers and the ocean into which they fall, yet the dif-

1 sva-saṁvedyaṁ tu tad viddhi gandhah puṣpādiko yathā. Jayākhya-saṁhitā, iv. 76.
2 cetanā-cetanāḥ sarve bhūtāḥ sthāvara-janjanamāḥ pūritāḥ paramesena rasena uṣadhayo yathā. Ibid. iv. 93.
ference cannot be perceived. There is thus both a difference between the waters of the rivers and the ocean and an absence of difference, even as between the devotees of God and God. The doctrine here preached is thus a theory of bhedābheda or unity-in-difference.

Brahman is here described as being identical with consciousness, and all objects of knowledge (jñeya) are regarded as existing inside the mind. The true knowledge is unassociated with any qualifications, and it can rise only through the process of Yogic practice by those who have learnt to be in union with God.

When through the grace of God one begins to realize that all the fruits of actions and all that one does are of the nature of the guṇas of prakṛti, there dawns the spiritual inquiry within one, as to one’s own nature, and as to the nature of the essence of sorrow, and one approaches the true preceptor. When the devotee continues to think of the never-ending cycle of rebirths and the consequent miseries of such transitoriness and other afflictions associated with it, and also undergoes the various bodily disciplines as dictated by his Gurus, and is initiated into the “mantras,” his mind becomes disinclined to worldly joys and pure like the water in the autumn, or the sea without any ripple, or like a steady lamp unfluttered by the wind. When the pure consciousness dawns in the mind, all possible objects of knowledge, including the ultimate object of knowledge, arise in the mind, and the thought and the object become held together as one, and gradually the Supreme knowledge and cessation that brings “Nirvāṇa” are secured. All that is known is in reality one with the thought itself, though it may appear different therefrom. This ultimate state is indescribable through language. It can only be felt and realized intuitively without the application of logical faculty or of the sense-organs. It can be referred to only by means of images. It is transcendental by nature, ultimate and absolutely without any support. It is the mere being which reveals itself in the joy of the soul. Of the two ways of

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1 sarit-saṁghāda yathā toyam sampraviṣṭam maho-dadhaṁ alaksyavāś co’i dake bhedaṁ parasmin yogināṁ tathā. Jayākhyā-saṁhitā, iv. 123.
2 brahmā-bhinnaṁ vibhor jñānam śrotum icchāmi tattvataṁ yena samprāpyate jñeyam antaḥ-karaṇa-śaṁśhitam. Ibid. iv. 1.
3 sarvo’-pādā-viṁśṣuktam jñānam ekānta-nirmalam utpadyate hi yuktasya yogābhyaṁ kramena tat. Ibid. v. 2.
Samādhi which proceed through absorptive emotions (bhāva-jā) and the way of the practice of mantras it is the latter that is the more efficacious. The practice of mantras removes all obstacles to self-realization produced by māyā and its products.

In describing the emanation of Acyuta, Satya and Puruṣa from Vāsudeva, the Jayākhya-saṃhitā holds that such an emanation occurs only naturally and not as a result of a purposive will; and the three entities, Acyuta, Satya and Puruṣa, which evolve out of Vāsudeva, behave as one through mutual reflections, and in this subtle form they exist in the heart of men as the operative energy of God, gradually leading them to their ultimate destination of emancipation and also to the enjoyment of experiences.

The Jayākhya-saṃhitā describes knowledge as two-fold, as saṭṭākhya (static) and as kriyākhya (dynamic). The kriyākhya-jñāna involves the moral disciplines of yama and niyama, and it is by the continual habit and practice of the kriyākhya-jñāna of yama and niyama that the saṭṭākhya-jñāna, or wisdom, may attain its final fulfilment. The yama and the niyama here consist of the following virtues: purity, sacrifice, penance, study of the Vedas, absence of cruelty, and ever-present forgiveness, truthfulness, doing good to all creatures including one’s enemies, respect for the property of others, control of mind, disinclination of mind to all things of sensual enjoyment, bestowing gifts upon others according to one’s own power, speaking true and kind words, constancy of mind to friends and enemies, straightforwardness, sincerity and mercifulness to all creatures. The equilibrium of the three guṇas is called Āvidyā, which may be regarded as the cause of attachment, antipathy and other defects. Ātman is the term used to denote the pure consciousness, as tinged with guṇas, āvidyā and māyā.

The position described above leads to the view that God emanates from Himself as His tripartite energy, which forms the inner microcosm of man. It is by virtue of this energy that the pure consciousness in man comes into association with his root-instincts and psychosis in general, by virtue of which the psychical elements, which are themselves unconscious and material, begin to behave as intelligent. It is by virtue of such an association that experience becomes possible. Ultimately, however, the same indwelling energy separates the conscious principle from the unconscious elements and thereby produces emancipation, in which the conscious element
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of the individual becomes merged in Brahman. The association of the conscious element with the unconscious psychosis, which has evolved from prakṛti, is not due to a false imaging of the one or the other, or to an illusion, but to the operative power of the indwelling energy of God, which exists in us. The individual, called also the Atman, is the product of this forced association. When the complex element is disassociated from the psychosis and the root-instincts, it becomes merged in Brahman, of which it is a part and with which it exists in a state of unity-in-difference. The difference between this view and that of the Sāmkhya is that, though it admits in general the Saṃkhya view of evolution of the categories from prakṛti, yet it does not admit the theory of Puruṣa and the transcendental illusion of Puruṣa and prakṛti, which is to be found in the classical Sāmkhya of Īśvara krṣṇa. There is no reference here to the teleology in prakṛti which causes its evolution, or to the view that the prakṛti is roused to activity by God or by Puruṣa. Prakṛti is supposed here to possess a natural productive power of evolving the categories from out of itself.

The Jayākhyā-saṃhitā speaks of the devotee as a yogin and holds that there are two ways of arriving at the ultimate goal, one through absorptive trance, and the other through the practice of concentration on the mantras. In describing the process of Yoga, it holds that the yogin must be a man who has his senses within his absolute control and who is devoid of antipathy to all beings. Full of humility, he should take his seat in a lonely place and continue the practice of prāṇāyāma for the control of mind. The three processes of prāṇāyāma, viz. pratyāhāra, dhyāna, and dhāraṇā, are described. Then, Yoga is stated to be of three kinds, prakṛta, pauruṣa and aīśvarya, the meaning of which is not very clear. It may, however, be the meditation on prakṛti’s ultimate principle, or on Puruṣa, or the Yoga, which is intended for the attainment of miraculous power. Four kinds of āsanas are described, namely, that of Paryamka, Kamala, Bhadra and Svastika. The Yogic posture is also described. The control of the mind, which again is regarded as the chief aim of yoga, may be of two kinds, namely, of those tendencies of mind which are due to environments and of those that are constitutional to the mind. It is by increasing the sattva quality of the mind that it can be made to fix itself upon an object. In another classification we hear of three kinds of yoga, sakala
niskala and Visnu, or sabda, vyoma and sa-vigraha. In the sakala or the sa-vigraha type of yoga the yogin concentrates his mind on the gross idol of the deity; and then gradually, as he becomes habituated, he concentrates his mind on the notion of a glowing circular disc; then on the dimension of a pea; then on a human hair of the head; then on the human hair of the body; and as a consequence of the perfection of this practice the path of the brahma-randhra opens up for him. In the niskala type of yoga the yogin meditates upon the ultimate reality, with the result that his own essence as Brahman is revealed to him. The third form consists in the meditation on the mantras, by which course also the ultimate reality is revealed to the yogin. Through the process of the yoga the yogin ultimately passes out by the channel of his brahma-randhra and leaves his body, after which he attains unity with the ultimate reality, Vāsudeva

In the fourth chapter of the Viṣṇu-Samhitā (Manuscript) the three guṇas are supposed to belong to Prakṛti, which, with its evolutes, is called Kṣetra, God being called Kṣetrajña. The prakṛti and God exist together as it were in union. The prakṛti produces all existences and withdraws them within it in accordance with the direction or the superintendence of the Puruṣa, though it seems to behave as an independent agent. Puruṣa is described as an all-pervading conscious principle.

The Viṣṇu-samhitā, after describing the three kinds of egoism as sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa, speaks of the rājasa ahaṃkāra not only as evolving the conative senses but also as being the active principle directing all our cognitive and conative energies. As the cognitive energy, it behaves both as attention directed to sense-perception and also to reflection involving synthetic and analytic activities. The Viṣṇu-samhitā speaks further of the five powers of God, by which the Lord, though absolutely qualityless in Himself, reveals Himself through all the sensible qualities. It is probably in this way that all the powers of prakṛti exist in God, and it is in this

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1 Jayākhya-saṃhītā, Ch. 33. In Ch. 34 the process of yoga by which the yogin gradually approaches the stage of the final destruction of his body is described.

2 kṣetraḥ prakṛtyā prakṛtyā tasya kṣetra-jña eva Īśvaraḥ. Viṣṇu-saṃhitā, iv.

3 ubhayām cedam atyantam abhinnam iva tiṣṭhati. Ibid.

4 tan-niyogat svatantreva sute bhavān haraty api. Ibid.
sense that the kṣetra or the prakṛti is supposed to be abhinna, or one with God. These powers are (1) cic-chakti1, that is, power of consciousness, which is the unchangeable ground of all works. Second is His power as the enjoyer, or puruṣa. The third power is the causal power, manifested as the manifold universe. The fourth power is the power by which sense-objects are grasped and comprehended in knowledge. The fifth power is that which resolves knowledge into action. The sixth power is the power that reveals itself as the activity of thought and action2. It seems, therefore, that what has been described above as puruṣa, or enjoyer, is not a separate principle, but the power of God; just as prakṛti itself is not a separate principle, but a manifestation of the power of God.

The process of Bhāgavata-yoga described in Viṣṇu-saṃhitā consists primarily of a system of bodily and moral control, involving control of the passions of greed, anger, etc., the habit of meditation in solitary places, the development of a spirit of dependence on God, and self-criticism. When, as a result of this, the mind becomes pure and disinclined to worldly things, there arises an intellectual and moral apprehension of the distinction of what is bad and impure from what is good and pure, whence attachment, or bhakti, is produced. Through this attachment one becomes self-contented and loyal to one's highest goal and ultimately attains true knowledge. The process of prāṇāyāma, in which various kinds of meditations are prescribed, is also recommended for attainment of the ultimate union with God, which is a state of emancipation. The view here taken of bhakti, or devotion, shows that bhakti is used here in the simple sense of inclination to worship, and the means to the fruition of this worship is yoga. The so-called bhakti-school of the Bhāgavatas was so much under the influence of the yoga-system that a bhakta was required to be a yogin, since bhakti by itself was not regarded as a sufficient means to the attainment of salvation. In the tenth chapter of the Parama-saṃhitā the process of yoga is described in a conversation between Brahma and Parama. It is said there that the knowledge attained by yoga is better than any other

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1 cic-chaktiḥ sarva-kāryābhir kāstasthāḥ paramaśṭhitāh asau dvitiyā tasya yā saktiḥ puruṣābhidyā-vākriyā visvā'-khyā vividhā-bhāsā śrītiyā karmā'-tmikā
caturthā viṣayaṃ pāpya niṣytyā-ākhyā tathā pūrah. Viṣṇu-saṃhitā.

2 pūrva-jñāna-kriyā-śaktiḥ sarvābhidyā tasya pācami. Ibid.

3 tasmāt sarva-prayatnena bhākto yogī bhavet sadā. Ibid. Ch. 30.
kind of knowledge. When deeds are performed without yoga wisdom, they can hardly bring about the desired fruition. *Yoga* means the peaceful union of the mind with any particular object. When the mind is firmly fixed on the performance of the deed, it is called *karma-yoga*. When the mind is unflinchingly fixed on knowledge, it is called *jñāna-yoga*. He, however, who clings to the Lord Viṣṇu in both these ways attains ultimately supreme union with the highest Lord. Both the *jñāna-yoga* and the *karma-yoga*, as the moral discipline of *yama* and *niyama* on the one hand and *vairāgya* (disinclination) and *samādhi* on the other, are ultimately supported in Brahma. It may be remembered that in the *Gitā*, *karma-yoga* means the performance of the scriptural caste-duties without any desire for their fruits. Here, however, the *karma-yoga* means *yama* and *niyama*, involving *vrata*, fasting (*upavāsa*) and gifts (*dāna*), and probably also some of the virtues of diverse kinds of self-control. The term *vairāgya* means the wisdom by which the senses are made to desist from their respective objects; and the term *samādhi* means the wisdom by which the mind stays unflinchingly in the Supreme Lord. When the senses are through *vairāgya* restrained from their respective objects, the mind has to be fixed firmly on the Supreme Lord, and this is called *yoga*. Through continual practice, as the *vairāgya* grows firm, the *vāsanās*, or the root-instincts and desires, gradually fall off. It is advised that the yogin should not make any violent attempt at self-control, but should proceed slowly and gently, so that he may, through a long course of time, be able to bring his mind under complete control. He should take proper hygienic care of himself as regards food and other necessities for keeping the body sound and should choose a lonely place, free from all kinds of distractions, for his *yoga* practice. He should not on any account indulge in any kind of practice which may be painful to his body. He should further continue to think that he is dependent on God and that birth, existence and destruction are things which do not belong to him. In this way the pure *bhakti* will rise in his mind,

1. yat karoti samādhanam cittasya viṣaye kvacit
   anukūlam a-saṃkṣobham saṃyoga iti kīrtaye.
   Parama-saṃhitā, Ch. 10 (MS.).

2. yadi karmāṇi badhnanti cittam askhalaṁ naram
   karma-yogam bhavaty eṣāḥ sarva-pāpa-praṇāśanah.
   Ibid.

3. yadi tu jñāna evārthe cittam badhnāti nirvayathah
   jñāna-yogasya sa vijñeyayah sarva-siddhi-karaḥ śubhaḥ.
   Ibid.
through which he will gradually be able to extract the root of attachment. He should also train himself to think of the evils of alluring experiences which have not yet been enjoyed, and he should thus desist from attaching himself to such experiences.

As regards the preference of *karma-yoga* to *jñāna-yoga* and *vice versa*, the view maintained here is that there can be no rule as regards the preference. There are some who are temperamentally fitted for *karma-yoga* and others for *jñāna-yoga*. Those who are of a special calibre should unite both courses, *karma-yoga* and *jñāna-yoga*.

**Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-sāṁhitā.**

In the *Ahirbudhnya-sāṁhitā* Ahirbudhnya says that after undergoing a long course of penance he received from Saṁkarśaṇa true knowledge and that this true knowledge was the science of Sudarśana, which is the support of all things in the world. The ultimate reality is the beginningless, endless and eternal reality, which is devoid of all names and forms, beyond all speech and mind, the omnipotent whole which is absolutely changeless. From this eternal and unchangeable reality there springs a spontaneous idea or desire (*saṁkalpa*). This Idea is not limited by time, space or substance. Brahman is of the nature of intuition, of pure and infinite bliss (niḥśīma-sukhāmbhava-lakṣaṇa), and He resides everywhere and in all beings. He is like the waveless sea. He has none of the worldly qualities which we find in mundane things. He is absolutely self-realized and complete in Himself, and cannot be defined by any expressions such as "this" or "such." He is devoid of all that is evil or bad and the abode of all that is blissful and good. The Brahman is known by many names, such as "paramātman," "ātman," "bhagavān," "vāsudeva," "avyakta," "prakṛti," "pradhāna," etc. When by true knowledge the virtues and sins accumulated during many lives are destroyed, when the root-instincts or tendencies called *vāsanā* are torn asunder and the three guṇas and their products cease to bind a person, he directly realizes the nature of Brahman or the absolute reality, which can neither be described

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1. *sudarśana-svarūpaṁ tat procyamaṁ mayā śrṇu śrute yatraḥ khilādhāre saṁśayāṁ te na santi vai.*

*Ahirbudhnya-sāṁhitā*, iii. 2. 5.
nor defined by language as "this" or as "such." The Brahman intuitively perceives all things and is the soul of all, and therefore, the past, present and the future have all vanished away from Him. Brahman does not exist therefore in time, as He is beyond time. Similarly He is beyond all primary and secondary qualities, and yet he possesses the six qualities. Of the qualities knowledge is regarded as the first and the foremost. It is spiritual and self-illuminating; it enters into all things and reflects them, and is eternal. The essence of Brahman is pure consciousness, and yet He is regarded as possessing knowledge as a quality. The power (śakti) of Brahman is regarded as that by which He has originated the world. The spontaneous agency (kārtṛtva) of God is called His majesty (aīśvarya). His strength (bala) is that by virtue of which He is never fatigued in His untiring exertion. His energy (vīrya) is that by virtue of which, being the material cause of the world, He yet remains unchanged in Himself. His self-sufficiency (tejas) is that by virtue of which He creates the world by His own unaided efforts. These five qualities are, however, all regarded as qualities of knowledge, and knowledge alone is regarded as the essence of God. When such a Brahman, which is of the nature of knowledge and is endowed with all qualities, resolves Himself into the idea of splitting Himself into the many, it is called Sudarśana.

The powers of all things are in themselves of an unspeakable nature and cannot exist separately (a-prthak-sthita) from the substances in which they inhere. They are the potential or subtle states of the substance itself, which are not perceived separately in themselves and cannot be defined as "this" or "not this" in any way, but can only be known from their effects. So God has in Him the power (śakti) which exists as undifferentiated from Him, as the moonbeam from the moon. It is spontaneous, and the universe is but a manifestation of this power. It is called bliss (ānanda), be-

3. *Śaktayah sarva-bhāvānām acintyāḥ a-prthak-sthitāḥ svarūpe naiva dṛṇyante dṛṣyante kāryatas tu tāh sukṣmāvasthā hi sa teṣām sarva-bhāvā-nugāṁīm idantayā vidhātum sa na niśedhum ca sakyate.* Ibid. 2, 3.
cause it does not depend on anything (nirapeksatayananda); it is eternal (nitya), because it is not limited in time; it is complete (pūrna), because it is not limited by any form; it manifests itself as the world and is therefore called Lakṣmī\(^1\). It contracts itself into the form of the world and is therefore called Kuṇḍalini; and it is called Viṣṇu-śakti because it is the supreme power of God. The power is in reality different from Brahman; but yet it appears as one therewith. With this power He is always engaged in an eternal act of creation, untired, unfatigued, and unaided by any other agent (satatam kurvato jagat)\(^2\). The power of God manifests itself in two ways, as static entities such as avyakta, kāla and puruṣa and as activity. Śakti, or power of God as activity (kriyā), is spontaneous and of the nature of will and thought resulting in action\(^3\). This is also called samkalpa, or the Idea, which is irresistible in its movement whereby it produces all material objects and spiritual entities, such as avyakta, kāla and puruṣa\(^4\). It is this power, which is otherwise designated as lakṣmī or viṣṇu-śakti, that impels the avyakta into the course of evolution, and the puruṣa to confront the products of prakṛti and run through the experiences. When it withdraws these functions from these entities, there is pralaya or dissolution. It is by the force of this power that at the time of creation the prakṛti as the composite of the three guṇas is urged into creative evolution. The association of the puruṣa with the prakṛti also is brought about by the same power. This Idea is vibratory by nature and assumes diverse forms, and thus by its various transformations produces various categories\(^5\).

In the original state all the manifold world of creation was asleep, as it were, in an equilibrium in which all the qualities of God were completely suspended, like the sea when there are no waves ruffling its breast. This power, which exists in an absolutely static or suspended state, is pure vacuity or nothingness (śūnyatva-rūpiṇī); for it has no manifestation of any kind. It is self-dependent

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\(^1\) jagatayā lakṣyamāṇā sā lakṣmī iti gīyate. Ahirbudhnya-saṁhitā, III. 9.

\(^2\) Ibid. II. 59.

\(^3\) svātaṇtrya-mulā icchā-tmā prekṣā-rūpaḥ kriyā-phaḷaḥ. Ibid. III. 30.

\(^4\) unmeṣo yah susaṁkalpaḥ sarvatra vyāhataḥ kṛtāḥ avyakta-kāla-puruṣa-rūpaḥ cetanācetanātmikām. Ibid. III. 30, 31.

\(^5\) so yam sudarsanam nāma saṁkalpaḥ spandāna-tmakaḥ vibhajya bahudhā rūpaṁ bhāve bhāve vatiśṭhate. Ibid. III. 39.
and no reason can be assigned as to why it suddenly changes itself from a potential to an actual state. It is one and exists in identity with the Brahman, or the ultimate reality. It is this power which creates as its own transformation all categories pure and impure and all material forms as emanations from out of itself. It manifests itself as the kriyā, the vīrya, tejas and the bala of God, mere forms of its own expression and in all forms of duality as subject and object, as matter and consciousness, pure and impure, the enjoyer and the enjoyed, the experiencer and the experienced, and so on. When it moves in the progressive order, there is the evolutionary creation; and, when it moves in the inverse order, there is involution.

From a pair of two different functions of this power the different forms of pure creation come into being. Thus from knowledge (jñāna) and the capacity for unceasing work of never-ending creation (bala) we have the spiritual form of Saṃkarśaṇa. From the function of spontaneous agency (aiśvarya) and the unaffectedness in spite of change (vīrya) is generated the spiritual form of Pradyumna; and from the power that transforms itself into the world-forms (śakti) and the non-dependence on accessories (tejas) is produced the form as Aniruddha. These three spiritual forms are called vyūha (conglomeration) because each of them is the resultant of the conglomeration of a pair of gunas. Though the two gunas predominate in each vyūha, yet each vyūha possesses the six qualities (sad-guna) of the Lord; for these are all but manifestations of Viṣṇu. Each of these forms existed for 1600 years before the next form emanated from it, and at the time of the involution also it took 1600 years for each lower form to pass into the higher form. Schrader, alluding to the Mahā-Sanatkumāra-Samhitā, says: "Vāsudeva creates from His mind the white goddess Śānti and together with her Saṃkarśaṇa or Śiva; then from the left side of the latter is born the red goddess Śrī, whose son is Pradyumna or Brahman; the latter, again, creates the yellow Sarasvatī and to-

1. tasya staimitya-rūpā ya śaktiḥ śanyatva-rūpānt
svātantryād eva kasmāc cit kvacit sonmeṣam rechati
ātma-bhūtā hi ya śaktiḥ parasya brahmaṇo hareḥ. 
Ahirbudhnya-samhitā, v. 3 and 4.

2. vyāpti-mātraṇ guṇo' nmeṣo mūrti-kuśa iti triḍhā
cātur-ātmya-sthitiḥ viṣṇor guṇa-vyatikaro-dbhayā. 
Ibid. v. 21.
gether with her Aniruddha or Puruṣottama, whose Śakti becomes the black Rati, who is the threefold Māyā-kośa.”¹ Schrader further draws attention to the fact that these couples are all outside the brahmāṇḍa and are therefore different in nature from the mundane gods, such as Śiva, etc. The vyūhas are regarded as fulfilling three different functions, (1) the creation, maintenance and destruction of the world; (2) the protection of the mundane beings; and (3) lending assistance to those devotees who seek to attain the ultimate emancipation. Saṃkāraṇa exists as the deity superintending all the individual souls and separates them from the prakṛti². The second spiritual form superintends the minds (manas) of all beings and gives specific instruction regarding all kinds of religious performances. He is also responsible for the creation of all human beings and from among them such beings as have from the beginning dedicated their all to God and become absolutely attached to Him³. As Aniruddha, he protects the world and leads men to the ultimate attainment of wisdom. He is also responsible for the creation of the world, which is an admixture of good and evil (miśra-varga-sṛṣṭim ca karoti)⁴. These three forms are in reality but one with Vāsudeva. These avatāras are thus the pure avatāras of Viṣṇu.

In addition to these there are two other forms of manifestation, called āceśāvatāra and sākṣād-avatāra. The former is of two kinds, svarūpāvesa (as in the case of avatāras like Parasurāma, Rāma, etc.) and śakty-āvesa (as the influx of certain special functions or powers of God, e.g. in the case of Brahmā or Śiva, who are on special occasions endowed with certain special powers of God). These secondary āceśāvatāras are by the will of God produced in the form of human beings, as Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, in the form of animals, as the Boar, the Fish and the Man-lion, or even as a tree (the crooked mango tree in the Daṇḍaka forest). These forms are not the original transcendental forms of God, but manifest divine functions

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¹ Introduction to the Pañcarātra by Schrader, p. 36.
² so’yam samasta-jīvaṁ adhiśṭhātṛtayā sthitah saṃkāraṇas tu devēṣo jaṅgaḥ sṛṣṭi-manās tataḥ jīva-tattvam adhiśṭhāya prakṛtes tu vivicāya tat.
³ See quotations from Viśvaksena-samhitā in Tattva-traya, pp. 126, 127.
⁴ Ibtd. p. 128.
through the will of God\(^1\). The primary forms (\textit{sākṣād-avatāra}) of incarnation are derived directly from the part of the Lord just as a lamp is lighted from another, and they are thus of a transcendent and non-mundane nature. Those who seek to attain liberation should worship these transcendent forms, but not the others\(^2\). The \textit{Viśvakṣena-samhitā} quoted in the \textit{Tattva-traya} considers Brahman, Śiva, Buddha,Vyāsa, Arjuna, Pāvaka and Kuvera as inspired persons or \textit{āveśāvatāras} who should not be worshipped by those who seek liberation. Another \textit{samhitā} quoted there includes Rāma, Ātreya and Kapila in the list.

Again, from each \textit{vyūha} three subsidiary \textit{vyūhas} are said to appear. Thus from Vāsudeva we have, Keśava, Nārāyaṇa, and Mādhava; from Saṁkarṣaṇa arise Govinda, Viśṇu and Madhusūdana; from Pradyumna arise Trivikrama, Vāmana and Śrīdhara, and from Aniruddha arise Ĥṛṣikeśa, Padmanābha and Dāmodara. These are regarded as the deities superintending each month, representing the twelve suns in each of the \textit{rāsīs}. These gods are conceived for purposes of meditation. In addition to these, thirty-nine \textit{vibhava} (manifesting) \textit{avatāras} (incarnations) also are counted in the \textit{Ahirbudhnyasamhitā}\(^3\). The objects for which these incarnations are made are described by Varavara as, firstly, for giving com-

\(1\) \textit{prākṛta-svā-sādhārana-vigrahena saha gaunasya manuṣyasya divyā-prakṛta-svabhāvāh}
\(2\) \textit{parārthavās tu mukhyāh ye mad-āmiśatvād viśeṣataḥ}
\(3\) \textit{Ahirbudhnyasamhitā}, p. 46. According to the \textit{Viśvakṣena-samhitā} all the \textit{avatāras} have come straight from Aniruddha or through other \textit{avatāras}. Thus Brahman comes from Aniruddha and from him Mahēśvara; Ḥayaśīra comes from Matsya, a manifestation of Kṛṣṇa. According to the \textit{Padma-tantra}, Matsya, Kūrma and Varāha come from Vāsudeva, Nṛśimha, Vāmana, Śrīrāma, and Parasurāma from Saṁkarṣaṇa, Balarāma from Pradyumna and Kṛṣṇa and Kalki from Aniruddha (\textit{Padma-tantra}, \textit{t. 2. 31}, etc.). But according to the \textit{Lakṣmītantra} (\textit{t. 11. 55}) all the \textit{vibhavas} come from Aniruddha. There is another kind of \textit{avatāra}, called \textit{arcāvatāra}. The image of Kṛṣṇa, Nṛśimha, etc., when duly consecrated according to the \textit{Vaiṣṇava} rites, becomes possessed with the power of Viśṇu and attains powers and influences which can be experienced by the devotee (\textit{Viśvakṣena-samhitā}, quoted in \textit{Tattva-traya}). In the aspect in which Aniruddha controls all beings as their inner controller, he is regarded as the \textit{antaryāmin-avatāra}. There are thus four kinds of \textit{avatāras}, \textit{vibhava}, āveśa, arcā and \textit{antaryāmin}. The thirty-nine \textit{vibhava avatāras} are Padmanābha, ḍhruva, Ananta,
panionship in mundane forms to those saints who cannot live without it, and this is the interpretation of the word *paritrāṇa* (protection) in the *Gītā*; secondly, for destroying those who are opposed to the saints; thirdly, for establishing the Vedic religion, the essence of which is devotion to God.

In the form as *antaryāmin*, or the inner controller, the Lord resides in us as the inner controller of the self, and it is through His impulse that we commit evil deeds and go to Hell or perform good deeds and go to Heaven. Thus we cannot in any way escape Śākyatman, Madhusūdana, Vidyādhīrdeva, Kapila, Viśvarūpa, Vihaṅgama, Kroḍatman, Vaḍāväktra, Dharma, Vāgīśvara, Ekāṅhavasāyin, Kamāṭhesvara, Varāha, Narasimha, Piśāchāraṇa, Śrīpati, Kāntatman, Rāhu ījī, Kālanēgha, Pārijātahara, Lokaṇāthā, Śaṅtātman, Dattātreya, Nyagrodhasāyin, Ekāṅhīganatana, Vāmanadeva, Trivikrama, Nara, Nārāyaṇa, Hari, Kṛṣṇa, Parasūrāma, Rāma, Vedavid, Kalkin, Pātālaśayana. They are of the nature of *tejas* and are objects of worship and meditation in their specific forms, as described in the *Sātvata-samhitā* (xii), or in the *Āhirbudhyā-samhitā* (lxvi). In the Nārāyaṇīya section of the *Mahābhārata* Vihaṅgama or Hamsa, Kamāṭhesvara or Kūrma, Ekāṅhīganatana or Matsya, Varāha, Nṛsiṁha, Vāmana, Parasūrāma, Rāma, Vedavid and Kalkin are mentioned as the ten *avatāras*. The *avatāra* Kroḍatman, Lokaṇāthā and Kāntatman are sometimes spoken of as Yajñī Varāha, Manu Vaivasvata and Kāma respectively. The latter is sometimes spoken of probably as Dhanvantari (see Schrader’s *Pāñcarātra*, p. 45). The twenty-three *avatāras* spoken of in the *Bḥagavata-purāṇa* (1.3) are all included in the above list. It is, however, doubtful whether Vāgīśvara is the same as Hariścīrṣa, and Śaṅtata man as Sanaka or Nārada, as Schrader says. The *vibhava-avatāras* mentioned in Rūpa’s *Laghu-bḥagavatā- mṛta* are mostly included in the above list, though some names appear in slightly different form. Following the *Bṛhma-samhitā*, Rūpa, however, regards Kṛṣṇa as the real form (*svayam-rūpa*) of God. According to him, being one with God, He may have His manifestations in diverse forms. This is called *avatāra* as ekāṁma-rūpa. This ekāṁma-rūpa-avatāra may again be of two kinds, *sva-vilāsā* and *sva-āśa*. When the *avatāra* is of the same nature as the Lord in powers and other qualities, He is called a *svāmād-vatāra*. Thus, Vāsudeva is called a *sva- vilāsā-avatāra*. But when the *avatāra* has inferior powers, He is called a *svā-āśa- avatāra*. Śaṁkarasāṇa, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, Matsya, Kūrma, etc., are thus called *svā-āśa-avatāra*. When God, however, infuses one only with parts of His qualities, he is called an *āvēśa-avatāra*. Nārada, Sanaka, etc., are called *āvēśa- avatāras*. The manifestation of the Lord in the above forms for the good of the world is called *avatāra*.

*pūrvo-kta-viśva-kāryā-ṛthām a-pūrvā iva cet svayam
dvārā-ntareṇa va' vih-syr avatārās tadā smṛtiḥ*

*Laghu-bḥagavatāmṛta*, p. 22.

The *amśavatāra* is sometimes called *purusāvatāra*, while the manifestation of special qualities as in Brahmā, Viśnū, Śiva, etc., is called *guṇavatāras*. The *vibhavāvatāras* are generally regarded as *lilāvatāras*; vide also *Sātvata-samhitā*, Ch. ix (77–84) and Ch. xii.

1 *Tattva-traya*, p. 138. The word *sādu* is here defined as "*nirmatsarāḥ* maṇi-samārāyane pravṛttāḥ man-nāma-karma-svarūpāṇāṁ vān-manasā-gocaratayā mad-darśanena vinā ātma-dhāraṇa-poṣanādikām abhāmaṇāṁ kṣaṇa-mātra-kālaṁ kalpa-sahasraṁ manvāṇāḥ praśīthila-sarva-gātā bhāveyuh."
from this inner controller. In another of His forms He stays within our heart as the object of our meditation. Again, when certain images are made of earth, stone, or metals, and they are properly installed with proper ceremonials, these are inspired with the presence of God and with His special powers. These are called arcāvatāras, or image-incarnations, for purposes of worship by which all desirable ends may be achieved. There are thus five kinds of existence for the Lord: firstly as his absolute state (para), secondly as vyūha, thirdly as vibhavāvatāra (primary and secondary), fourthly as antaryāmin, and fifthly as arcāvatāra.

In the Ahirbudhnya-samhitā we hear also that by the power of sudarśana, or the divine Idea (by the activity of which the vyūha forms are produced), a divine location is produced which is of the nature of knowledge and bliss radiant with its (sudarśana's) glow. All the experiences that are enjoyed here are blissful in their nature, and the denizens of this transcendent spiritual world who experience them are also blissful in their nature, and their bodies are constituted of knowledge and bliss. The denizens of this world are souls emancipated in the last cycle. They remain attached, however, to the form of the deity to which they were attached in the mundane life.

The Lord in the highest form is always associated with His power (Śakti) Laksāmi or Śrī. In the Tattva-traya and its commentary by Varavara we hear of three consort deities, Laksāmi, Bhūmi and Nila. Schrader points out that these deities are identified (in the Vihagendra-samhitā and in the Sītā-upaniṣad) with will (ičchā), action (Kriyā), and the direct manifesting power (sākṣāt-śakti). In the Sītā-upaniṣad, to which Schrader refers, Sītā is described as the Mahālaksāmi which exists in the three forms, īchā, jñāna and kriyā. Sītā is there regarded as the power which exists different from, and as one with, the supreme Lord, constituting within herself all the conscious and unconscious entities of the universe. It exists also in three forms as Laksāmi, Bhūmi and

1 Tattva-traya, 139, 140.
2 See quotation from Viṣvaksena-samhitā quoted in Tattva-traya, p. 122.
3 sūdhd pāroditā srśīr yā sā vyāhā-di-bhedinti
deśah prābhavān vṛajaty uta
dhānānandamayī styānā desā-bhāvam vṛajaty uta
sa desāḥ paramaṁ vyoma nirmalaṁ puruṣāt param, etc.
Ahirbudhnya-samhitā, vi. 21–22.
4 Ibid. vi. 29.
5 Ibid. vi. 25.
Nilā, as benediction, power, and as the Sun, the Moon and Fire. The third form is responsible for the development of all kinds of vegetation and all temporal determinations¹.

In the sixth chapter of the Ahirbudhnya-samḥitā the intermediate creation is described. It is said there that the power of God as the supreme ego is at once one and different from Him. The Lord cannot exist without His power nor can the power exist without Him. These two are regarded as the ultimate cause of the world. The manifestations that are revealed as the vyūhas and the vibhavas are regarded as pure, for through their meditations the yogins attain their desired end². From the vyūha and the vibhava proceed the impure creation (śuddhetarā-ṣṛṣṭi)². Power is of two kinds, i.e. power as activity, and power as determinants of being or existence (bhūti-śakti). This bhūti-śakti may be regarded as a moving Idea (samkalpamayī mūrtī). The process of activity inherent in it may be regarded as manifesting itself in the form of ideas or concepts actualizing themselves as modes of reality. The impure creation is of a threefold nature as puruṣa, guṇa and kāla (time). Puruṣa is regarded as a unity or colony of pairs of males and females of the four castes, and these four pairs emanate from the mouth, breast, thighs and legs of Pradyumna. From the forehead, eyebrows, and ears of Pradyumna also emanate the subtle causal state of time and the guṇas (sūkṣma-kāla-guṇā-vasthā). After the emanation of these entities the work of their growth and development was left to Aniruddha, who by the fervour of his Yoga evolved the original element of time in its twofold form as kāla and niyati. He also evolved the original energy as guṇa into the three forms of sattva,

¹ Certain peculiar interpretations of the icchā-śakti, kriyā-śakti and sākṣāt-śakti are to be found in the Sitā-upanishad. The Sātvata-saṃhitā (ix. 85) describes twelve other energies such as

lakṣmī, puṣṭī, dayā nidrā, kṣamā, kāntīs sarasvati,
dhīrī maṅgī ratis tuṣṭī maṅgī dvādaśāmi smṛtā.

See also Schrader’s Introduction to Pañcarātra, p. 55. The theory of these energies is associated with the avatāra theory.

² Schrader, on the evidence of Padma-tantra, says that god as para or ultimate is sometimes identified with and sometimes distinguished from the vyuha Vāsudeva. The para Vāsudeva becomes vyuha Vāsudeva with His one half and remains as Nārāyaṇa, the creator of the primeval water (māyā). Pañcarātra, P. 53.

³ bhūtiḥ śuddhetarā viśnoḥ puruṣo dvi-caturmayaḥ
sa manunāṁ samāhāro brahma-ksattrādi-bhedānāṁ.

Ahirbudhnya-saṃhītā, vi. 8–9.
rajas and tamas in succession, i.e. the original primeval energy as guṇa (called sometimes prakṛti in cognate literature) was first evolved into sattva guṇa; from it evolved the rajas, and from the rajas evolved the tamas. This original undeveloped guṇa produced from Pradyumna (which, in other words, may be termed prakṛti) receives impregnation from the fervour of Aniruddha, and thereby evolves itself first into sattva, then into rajas, and then into tamas. This doctrine can therefore be regarded as sat-kārtya-vāda only in a limited sense; for without this further impregnation from the fervour of Aniruddha, it could not by itself have produced the different guṇas of sattva, rajas and tamas.\footnote{1}

Aniruddha, however, was directed by Pradyumna not only to develop the unconscious power (śakti) but also the puruṣa which exists as it were inside that power, which shows itself as niyati (destiny) and kāla (time). From the unconscious power as destiny and time evolves first the sattva and from it the rajas and from the rajas the tamas. According to the Viṣvaksena-saṃhitā, Aniruddha created Brahmā and Brahmā created all the men and women of the four castes.\footnote{2}

Buddhi evolves from tamas and from that ahaṃkāra and from that evolve the five tan-mātras, and also the eleven senses. From the five tan-mātras the five gross elements are produced, and from these, all things, which are the modifications of the gross elements.

The word puruṣa is used here in a special sense, and not in the ordinary Sāṃkhya sense. Puruṣa here signifies a colony of selves, like cells in a honeycomb. These selves are associated with the beginningless vāsanās or root-impressions. They are but the special

\footnote{1} antahstha-puruṣāṁ śaktīṁ tāṁ ādāya sva-mārtī-gāṁ
sanvardhayati yogena hy anirudhḥaḥ svat-ējasā.

\footnote{2} The Viṣvaksena-saṃhitā criticizes in this connection the Vedic people, who did not believe in the monotheistic God but depended on the Vedic sacrificial rituals and work for the attainment of Heaven and ultimately fell down to the course of mundane life (samsāra):

\begin{quote}
trayāṁ-mārgesu niṣṇātah phala-vāde ramanti te
devaṁ ēva nambānā na ca nāṃ menire param
Tamāṁ-prāyāṁ te ime kecin mama nindāṁ prakurvate
samālāpaṁ kurvate vyaḥram śāntah veda-vādeṣu niṣṭitiḥ
mām na jānanti mohena mayi bhakti-parāṁmukhāḥ
svargā-dīṣu ramanaty e te avasāne patanti te.
\end{quote}

\emph{Tattva-traya}, p. 128.

\begin{quote}
sarvātmanāṁ samaśīr yā koṣo maṛdu-kṛtāṁ ita.
\end{quote}

\emph{Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā}, vi. 33.
manifestations (bhūti-bhedāh) of God and are in themselves omniscient; but they are permeated by avidyā (ignorance) and the afflictions which are involved in its very nature, through the power of God acting in consonance with His thought-movement\(^1\). These selves thus rendered impure and finite are called jīvas, and it is they who thus suffer bondage and strive for salvation, which they afterwards attain. The puruṣa, being made up of these selves (jīvas), which are impure, is also partly impure, and is therefore regarded as both pure and impure (suddha-asuddhimaya, vi. 34). This puruṣa contains within it the germs of all human beings, which are called manus. They are in themselves untouched by afflictions (kleśa) and the root-impression (āśaya), and are omniscient and impregnated through and through by God. Their association with avidyā through the will of God is therefore external. The germ of the caste-distinction and distinction as male and female is regarded as primordial and transcendent (compare puruṣa-sūkta), and the distinction is said to exist even in these manus which are said to be divided in four pairs. The avidyā imitates the spiritual movement of thought, and through it the individual selves, though pure in themselves, are besmeared with the impurities of root-impressions. These selves remain in the stage of conglomeration or association through the desire of Viṣṇu, the Lord, and this stage is called puruṣa (puruṣa-pada)\(^2\). They are made to appear and disappear from the nature of God. Being a manifestation of His own nature, they are uncreated, eternally existing, entities which are the parts of the very existence (bhūty-amsāh) of God.

Through the impulse or motivation of the thought-activity of God, an energy (śakti) is generated from Aniruddha. Moved again by the desire of God, the aforesaid manus descend into this energy and remain there as a developing foetus (tiṣṭhanti kalalībhūtāh, vi. 45). The energy of Viṣṇu is of a twofold nature, as dynamic activity (kriyākhya) and as determining being (bhūti), the latter being the result of the former\(^3\). This dynamic activity is different

\(^{1}\) ațmano bhūti-bhedās te sarva-jūnāh sarvato-nukkhāh
bhagavat-cakrti-mayaivaṁ manda-titrād-bhārayā
tat-tat-sudarśano-nmeṣa-nmeṣā-nukṛtā-tmanā
sarvato'vidyayā viḍḍhoh kleśāmayā vaśākṛtāh.
Ahirbudhnya-saṁhitā, vi. 35, 36.

\(^{2}\) viśnoh saṁkalpa-rūpena sthitvāṁ pauruṣe pade. Ibid. vi. 41.

\(^{3}\) kriyākhya yo'yaṁ unmesah sa bhūti-parivartakah. Ibid. vi. 29.
from God, the possessor of this energy. It is designated variously Lakṣmī and desire (ṣaṃkalpa) or free will (svātantrya-mūla icchātmā). This will operates as an intellectual visualization (prekṣā-rūpah kriyā-phalaḥ), which again produces the other manifestations of God as avyakta, kāla and puruṣa. At the time of each creation He associates the avyakta with the evolutionary tendencies, the kāla with its operative movement (kalana) and the puruṣa with all kinds of experiences. At the time of dissolution these powers are withdrawn.

In the foetus-like condition of the manus in the energy (ṣakti) of God there exist the entities of guṇa and kāla. Through the operation of the supreme energy or will of God (Viṣṇu-ṣaṃkalpa-coditāḥ) there springs up from time-energy (kāla-ṣakti) the subtle Destiny (niyati), which represents the universal ordering element (sarva-niyāmakaḥ). The time and guṇa exist in the womb of the ṣakti. The conception of this ṣakti is thus different from that of prakṛti of the Sāmkhya-Pātañjalī in that the guṇas are the only root-elements, and time is conceived as somehow included in the operation of the guṇas. As the niyati is produced from the time-energy, the manus descend into this category. Later on there springs from niyati, time (kāla) through the will of God, and then the manus descend again into this category. It has already been said that the kāla energy and guṇa are co-existing elements in the primordial ṣakti of God. Now this guṇa-potential manifests itself in a course of gradual emergence through time. As the sattva-guṇa first manifests itself through time, the manus descend into that category and later on, with the emergence of rajas from sattva and of tamas from rajas, they descend into the rajas and the tamas. The emergence of rajas from sattva and of tamas from rajas is due to the operation of the will-activity of God (viṣṇu-ṣaṃkalpa-coditaḥ). Though the will-dynamic of Viṣṇu is both immanent and transcendent throughout the process of succeeding emergents, yet Viṣṇu is regarded as specially presiding over sattva, Brahma over rajas, and Rudra over tamas. Tamas is regarded as heavy (guru), agglutinative (viṣṭam-...
bhana), delusive (mohana) and statical (apravrttimat); rajas is always moving and sorrowful; sattva is described as light, transparent and devoid of impurities or defects and pleasurable. With the development of the three gunas through the will of God, a part of these gunas attains sameness of character, and this part is the unity of the three gunas (traigunya), the equilibrium of gunas (guna-sāmya), ignorance (avidyā), nature (svabhāva), cause (yonī), the unchangeable (akṣara), the causeless (ayoni), and the cause as guṇa (guṇa-yoni).

This participation in equal proportions (anyūnānatirikta) of the guṇas in a state of equilibrium (guna-sāmya), which is essentially of the nature of tamas (tamomaya), is called the root (mula) and the prakṛti by the Śaṅkhyaists, and the manus descending into that category by gradual stages are known by the names conglomeration (samasti), purusa, the cause (yonī), and the unchangeable (kūṭastha). The category of time, which is the transforming activity of the world (jagataḥ samprakalanam), associates and dissociates the purusa and the prakṛti for the production of the effects. The thought power of God, however, works through the tripartite union of time, prakṛti and the manus, behaving as the material cause, like a lump of clay, and produces all the categories beginning with mahat to the gross elements of earth, water, etc. Like water or clay, the prakṛti is the evolutionary or material cause, the purusa is the unchangeable category that contributes to the causal operation merely by its contiguity. The category of time is the internal dynamic pervading the prakṛti and the purusa. The trinity of prakṛti, purusa and kāla is the basis for the development of all the succeeding categories. In this

The passage is somewhat obscure, in so far as it is difficult to understand how the gunas become partially (amśataḥ) similar. The idea probably is that, when the gunas are moved forward for creative purposes, some parts of these gunas fail to show their distinctive features, and show themselves as similar to one another. In this stage the specific characters of only these evolving gunas are annulled, and they appear as one with tamas. The proportion of sattva that appears to be similar to tattva is also the proportion in which tamas becomes similar to rajas.

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trinity \textit{prakṛti} is the evolutionary cause that undergoes the transformation, \textit{puruṣa}, though unmoved in itself, is that which by its very presence gives the occasion for the transformation, and time is the inner dynamic that behaves as the inner synthetic or structural cause. But these causes in themselves are not sufficient to produce the development of the trinity. The trinity is moved to develop on the evolutionary line by the spiritual activity of God. \textit{Puruṣa} is regarded as the \textit{adhisthāna-kāraṇa}, \textit{kāla} as the principle of inner activity, and the spiritual activity of God as the transcendent and immanent agent in which the causal trinity finds its fundamental active principle. As the first stage of such a development there emerges the category of \textit{mahat}, which is called by different names, e.g. \textit{vidyā, gauḥ, yavanī, brāhmī, vadhū, vyddhi, mati, madhu, akhyāti, īśvara, and prajñā}. According to the prominence of \textit{tamas, sattva} and \textit{rajas}, the category of \textit{mahat} is known by three different names, \textit{kāla, buddhi} and \textit{prāṇa}, in accordance with the moments in which there are special manifestations of \textit{tamas, sattva} and \textit{rajas}. Gross time as moments, instants or the like, the intelligizing activity of thought (\textit{buddhi}) and the volitional activity (\textit{prāṇa}) may also be regarded as the tripartite distinction of \textit{mahat}. There seems to be a tacit implication here that the activity implied in both thought and volition is schematized, as it were, through time. The unity of thought and volition is effected through the element of time; for time has been regarded as the \textit{kalana-kāraṇa}, or the structural cause. The \textit{sattva} side of the \textit{mahat} manifests itself as virtue (\textit{dharma}), knowledge (\textit{jñāna}), disinclination (\textit{vairāgya}), and all mental powers (\textit{aīśvarya}). The opposite of these is associated with that moment of \textit{mahat} which is associated with the manifestation of \textit{tamas}.

With the evolution of the \textit{mahat} the \textit{manus} descend into it. From the \textit{mahat} and in the \textit{mahat} there spring the senses by which the objects are perceived as existent or non-existent. Again, from and in the \textit{mahat} there springs the \textit{ahāṃkāra} through the influence

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textit{kālo buddhis tathā prāṇa iti tredhā sa ghyate}
    \textit{tamas-sattva-rajo-bhedāt tat-tad-unmesa-saṅjñayā.}
    \textit{Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā, vii. 9.}
    \item \textit{kālas truti-lavādy atmā buddhir adhyavasāyinī}
    \textit{prāṇaḥ prayatanākāra ity' etā mahato bhiddāḥ.}
    \textit{Ibid. vii. 11.}
    \item \textit{bodhanam nāma vaidyam tadindriyam teṣu jāyate}
    \textit{yenārthān adhyavasyeyuḥ sad-asat-pravibhāgināḥ.}
    \textit{Ibid. vii. 14.}
\end{itemize}
of the spiritual energy of God. This *ahamkāra* is also called by the names of *abhimanā*, *prajāpati*, *abhimantā* and *boddhā*. The *ahamkāra* is of three kinds, *vaikārika*, *taijasa* and *bhūtādi*, in accordance with the predominance of *sattva*, *rajas* or *tamas*. The *ahamkāra* manifests itself as will, anger, greed, mind (*manas*), and desire (*trṣā*). When the *ahamkāra* is produced, the *manus* descend into it. From *ahamkāra* there is then produced the organ of thinking (*cintātmakam indriyam*) of the *manus* called *manas*. It is at this stage that the *manus* first become thinking entities. From the *tamas* side of *ahamkāra* as *bhūtādi* there is produced the *sabda-tan-mātra*, from which the *ākāśa* is produced. *Ākāśa* is associated with the quality of *sabda* and gives room for all things. *Ākāśa* is thus to be regarded as unoccupied space, which is supposed to be associated with the quality of sound. With the emergence of *ākāśa* the *manus* descend into that category. From the *vaikārika ahamkāra* there spring the organs of hearing and of speech. The *manus* at this stage become associated with these senses. Then from the *bhūtādi*, by the spiritual desire of God, the touch-potential is produced, and from this is produced the air (*vāyu*). By the spiritual desire of God the sense-organ of touch and the active organ of the hand are produced from the *vaikārika ahamkāra*. At this stage the *manus* become associated with these two receptive and active senses. From the *bhūtādi* there is then produced the light-heat potential from which is produced the gross light-heat. Again, from the *vaikārika ahamkāra* the visual organ and the active organ of the feet are produced, and the *manus* are associated with them. From the *bhūtādi* the taste-potential is produced, and from it is produced water. Further, from the *vaikārika ahamkāra* there is produced the taste-organ and the sex-organ, and the *manus* are associated with them. From the *bhūtādi* there is produced the odour-potential and from it the earth. Also, from the *vaikārika ahamkāra* there arises the cognitive sense of smelling and the active sense of secretion. The *manus* at this stage descend into this category through the spiritual creative desire of God.

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1 *vidyā udare tatrāhamkṛtir nāma jāyate. Ahirodhīṇya-saṁhitā, vii. 15.*
2 *sabdai'ka-guṇam ākāśam avakāśapradāyai ca. Ibid. vii. 22.*
3 *tadā vaikārika punah śrotām vāg iti viśūna-karme-nāraya-yugaḥ mune. Ibid. vii. 23–24.*
4 *Ibid. vii. 39, 40.*
The process of development herein sketched shows that one active sense and one cognitive sense arise together with the development of each category of matter, and with the final development of all the categories of matter there develop all the ten senses (cognitive and conative) in pairs. In the chapter on the gradual dissolution of the categories we see that with the dissolution of each category of matter a pair of senses also is dissolved. The implication of this seems to be that there is at each stage a co-operation of the material categories and the cognitive and conative senses. The selves descend into the different categories as they develop in the progressive order of evolution, and the implication of this probability is that the selves, having been associated from the beginning with the evolution of the categories, may easily associate themselves with the senses and the object of the senses. When all the categories of matter and the ten senses are developed, there are produced the function of imagination, energy of will (samrambha), and the five prānas from manas, ahaṃkāra and buddhi; and through their development are produced all the elements that may co-operate together to form the concrete personality. The order followed in the process of development in evolution was maintained in an inverse manner at the time of dissolution.

The above-mentioned manus produce in their wives many children, who are called mānavas. They in their turn produce many other children who are called the new mānavas, or the new men, in all the four castes. Those among them who perform their work for a hundred years with true discriminative knowledge enter into the supreme person of Hari. Those, however, who perform their karmas with motives of reaping their effects pass through rebirths in consonance with their actions. As has been said before, the manus may be regarded as the individuated forms of the original kūṭastha puruṣa. All the jīvas are thus but parts of Viṣṇu’s own self-realizing being (bhūty-amsa). Now the prakṛti, which is also called vidyā,

\[
\textit{saṃkalpaś caiva samrambhah prānāḥ pañcavidhās tathā}
\]  
\[
\textit{manasoḥaṃkṛtyer buddher jāyante pūrvaṃ eva tu}
\]  
\[
\textit{evaṃ sampūrṇa-sarpavāḥ prāṇāpāṇādī-saṃyutāḥ}
\]  
\[
\textit{sarve-ndriya-yutās tatra dehino manavo mune.}
\]

\textit{Ahirbudhnya-samhitā, vii. 42, 43.}

Thus from bhūtādi, acting in association with taijasa ahaṃkāra, are produced successively the five tan-mātras of śādā, sparśa, rūpa, rasa and gandha, from each of which in the same order are produced the five bhūtas of ākāśa, vāyu, tejas, ap and prthi. Again, from the associated work of taijasa and vaikārika ahaṃkāra there are produced the five cognitive and conative senses.
and which at the time of the creative process showers itself as rain and produces the food-grains, and which at the beginning of the dissolution shows itself as a drying force, begins to manifest itself as showering clouds and produces the food-grains. By consuming the food thus produced by nature men fall from their original state of perfect knowledge (jñāna-bhṛmaṣaṁ prapadyante). At such a stage the original manus produce the scriptures for the guidance of those men who have fallen from their original omniscience. Thence men can only attain their highest goal by following the guidance of the scriptures\(^1\). It thus appears that the power of Viṣṇu as consciousness, bliss and action splits itself into twofold form as the realizing activity and the object, called respectively the bhāvaka and the bhāvyā. The former is the thought-activity of the Lord and the latter is that part of Him which manifests itself as the object of this activity. This leads to the pure and the impure creation. The kūṭastha puruṣa of the four manus stands intermediate between the pure and the impure creation\(^2\). There is nothing whatsoever outside the sphere of the Sudarśana śakti of the Lord.

On the central question of the relation of God with the jīvas the general view of the Pañcarātra, as well as that of the Ahirbudhnya, seems to be that at the time of dissolution they return to God and remain in a potential form in Him, but again separate out at the time of the new creation. At the time of emancipation, however, they enter into God, never to come out of Him. But though they enter into Him, they do not become one with Him, but have an independent existence in Him or enter into the abode of Viṣṇu, the Vaikuṇṭha, which is often regarded as identical with Him. This is probably a state of what is found in many places described as the sālokya-mukti. In the fourteenth chapter of the Ahirbudhnya-saṁhitā mukti is described as the attainment of Godhood (bhaga-vattā-mayī mukti, or vaisṇavaṁ tad viśet padam)\(^3\). The means by

\(^1\) tat tu vaidyam payah prāṣya sarve mānava-manavāḥ jñāna-bhṛmaṣaṁ prapadyante sarva-jñāḥ svata eva te. Ahirbudhnya-saṁhitā, vii. 61, 62.

\(^2\) aṁśayoh puruṣo madhye yah sthitah sa catur-yugāḥ śuddhe-tara-mayaṁ viddhi kūṭasthaṁ tāṁ mahā-mune. Ibid. vii. 70.

\(^3\) Ibid. xiv. 3, 4 and 41.
which mukti can be attained is said to be a virtuous course of action without seeking any selfish ends. The jīvas are described as beginningless, infinite, and as pure consciousness and bliss, and as being largely of the nature of God (bhagavanmaya); but still they are described as owing their existence to the spiritual energy of God (bhagavad-bhāvitaḥ sadā). This idea is further clarified when it is said that side by side with the bhāvya and the bhāvaka powers of God we have a third power called the pum-śakti, of which we hear in the Gītā as Kṣetrajña-śakti and in the Gauḍīya school as taṭastha śakti. Apart from the three powers of God as creation, maintenance and destruction, He has a fourth and a fifth power called favour (anugraha) and disfavour (nigraha). The Lord is, of course, self-realized and has no unachieved end, and has absolutely unimpeachable independence; but still in His playful activity He acts like a king just as He wishes. This idea of krīḍā is repeated in the Gauḍīya school as līlā. All these activities of His are but the different manifestations of His thought-activity called sudarśana. In His own playful activity as disfavour He covers up the natural condition of the jīva, so that in place of His infinitude, he appears as atomic, in place of His omnipotence, he can do but little, in place of His omniscience, He becomes largely ignorant and possesses but little knowledge. These are the three impurities and the three types of bondage. Through this covering activity the jīva is afflicted with ignorance, egoism, attachment, antipathy, etc. Being afflicted by ignorance and the passions, and being goaded by the tendency towards achieving the desirable and avoiding the undesirable, He performs actions leading to beneficial and harmful results. He thus undergoes the cycle of birth and rebirth, and is infested with different kinds of root-instincts (vāsanā). It is through the power of this bondage and its requirements that the powers of creation, maintenance and destruction are roused and made active to arrange for rewards and punishments in accordance with the karmas of the jīvas. As proceeding from the very playful nature of God, which precedes time (kāla), and is beginningless, the bondage also is said to be beginningless. The above description of bondage as happening

1. sādhanāṁ tasya ca proktō dharmo nirabhisandhikāḥ. Ahibudhnya-sāmahitā, XIV, 4.
2. Ibid. 3. pum-śaktiḥ kālamavy anyā pumāṁ sō'yaṁ uditāḥ. Ibid. XIV. 10.
3. sarvair an-anuyojyaṁ tat svātantraṁ divyaṁ tītthūḥ avāpta-viśva-kāmo'pi krīḍate rājavad vaśi. Ibid. XIV. 13.
at some time through a process of fall from original nature is by way of analysis of the situation. Through the power of God as anugraha, or grace, God stops the course of karma for a jīva on whose condition of sorrow and suffering He happens to take pity. With the cessation of the good and bad deeds and their beneficent and harmful results through the grace of God the jīva looks forward to emancipation and is moved by a feeling of disinclination and begins to have discriminative knowledge. He then turns to scriptures and to teachers, follows the course of action dictated by Sāṃkhya and Yoga, and attains the Vedāntic knowledge, finally to enter the ultimate abode of Viṣṇu.

Lakṣmī is regarded as the ultimate eternal power of Viṣṇu, and she is also called by the names Gauri, Sarasvati and Dhenu. It is this supreme power that manifests itself as Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Thus, these separate powers are observable only when they manifest themselves, but even when they do not manifest themselves they exist in God as His great supreme power Lakṣmī. It is this Lakṣmī that is called Brahmā, Viṣṇu, or Śiva. The vyakti,atyakti, puruṣa and kāla or sāṃkhya and yoga are all represented in the Lakṣmī. Lakṣmī is the ultimate supreme power into which all the others resolve themselves. As distinct from the other manifested powers it is often called the fifth power. The emancipated person enters into this Lakṣmī, which is regarded as the highest abode of Viṣṇu (param dharma or paramaṇ padam), or the highest Brahmā. This power (sakti) is also regarded as having an inner feeling of bliss; and yet it is of the nature of bliss, and is designated as the bhāva form of Viṣṇu and also as the ujjvala (shining). This sakti is also regarded as discharging the five functions (pañca-kṛtya-kari) of creation, maintenance, destruction, grace and disfavour mentioned above. Brahmā, as associated with this sakti, is called the highest Viṣṇu as distinguished from the lower Viṣṇu, the god of maintenance. This sakti is always in a state of internal agitation though it may not be observed as such from outward appearance. This internal agitation and movement are so subtle that they may appear to be in a state of absolute calmness like that of the ocean. Thus sakti is also called the māyā of Viṣṇu.
It is a part of this power that transforms itself as the bhāvya and the bhāvaka śakti, of which the latter is also known by the name sudarśana. The bhāvya shows itself as the world, and its objective import is the world.

The thought-activity by which the concept shows itself in the ideal and in the objective world as thought and its significance, the object, is the epitome of the power of Sudarśana. When all the external movement of the objective is ideally grasped in the word, we have also in it the manifestation of the power of Sudarśana, or the supreme thought-activity of God. All the causality of the objective world is but a mode of the manifestation of the Sudarśana power. Thus not only all the movements of the external world of nature and the movement implied in speech, but the subjective-objective movement by which the world is held together in thought and in speech are the manifestation of the Sudarśana power. All expressions or manifestations are either in the way of qualities or actions, and both are manifestations of the Sudarśana power of God. Our words can signify only these two ways of being. For this reason they refer only to the Sudarśana, which is attributive to God, but cannot express the nature of God. Words, therefore, cannot reveal the nature of God. The word may hold the universe within it as its mystic symbol and may represent within it all its energies, but, in any case, though it may engulf within it the whole universe and secure the merging of the universe in itself and can identify itself with God, such identification can only be with the Sudarśana power of God, and the entrance into God, or the realization of Him through the word or thought, can only be through the Sudarśana power, which is a part of Lakṣmī. Thus unity with God can only mean union with Sudarśana, or entrance into Lakṣmī1.

Adoration (namah) means the spontaneous acceptance of the highest Lord as the master on the part of a man who has achieved it through a wise enlightenment2. Superiority (jyāyān) consists of greatness of qualities and existence in earlier time3. God alone is superior, and everything else is inferior. The relation between the latter and the former is that the latter exists for the former or is dependent on the former. This relation is called (śeṣa-śeṣitā). The

1 Ahirbudhnya-samhitā, LI. 69–78.
2 prekṣāvataḥ pravṛttiḥ yā praḥvī-bhāvā-imikā svatah ukiṣṭam param uddhiṣṭaḥ tan namaḥ pariglyate. Ibid. LII. 2.
3 kālato guṇapāla caiva prakṣaṇo yatra tiṣṭhati sabdas taṁ mukhyaśā vṛttyā jyāyān ity avalambate. Ibid. LII. 4.
relation between the two is that one should be the adorer and the other the adored (namā-nantavya-bhāva). True adoration is when such an adoration proceeds naturally as a result of such a relation, without any other motive or end of any kind—the only idea being that God is supremely superior to me and I am absolutely inferior to Him. This process of adoration not only takes the adorer to God, but also brings God to him. The presence of any motive of any kind spoils the effectuation of the adoration. This adoration is the first part of the process of prapatti, or seeking the protection of God. Now on account of the presence of beginningless root-impressions (vāsanā), and of natural insignificance of power and association with impurity, man’s power of knowledge or wisdom becomes obstructed; and when a man becomes fully conscious of such weakness, he acquires the quality of kārpanḍa or lowliness. A feeling or consciousness of one’s independence obstructs this quality of lowliness. The great faith that the supreme God is always merciful is called the quality of maha-viśvāsa. The idea that God is neutral and bestows His gifts only in proportion to one’s deeds obstructs this quality. The idea that, since He is all-merciful and all-powerful, He would certainly protect us, produces the quality of faith in God’s protective power. The notion that God, being qualityless, is indifferent to any appeal for protection obstructs this quality. Acceptance of the Lord as the supreme master whose commands should on no account be disobeyed produces the quality of docility (prātikūlya-vīvarjana). Service of God in a manner not prescribed in the scriptures obstructs this quality. The strong resolve of the mind to work in accordance with God’s wishes, with the full conviction that the sentient and the non-sentient of the world are but parts of His nature, produces the quality of submission. An inimical disposition towards the beings of the world obstructs this quality. A true adoration (namāḥ) to God must be associated with all the aforesaid qualities. True adoration must carry with it the conviction that the sense of possession that we have in all things, due to beginningless instinctive passions and desires, is all false, and the adorer should feel that he has neither independence nor anything that he may call his own. “My body, my

1 upādhi-rahitena' yam yena bhāvena cetanah
namatī jyāyase tasmai tad vā namanam ucyate.
Ahirbudhnya-samhitā, LI. 9.

2 phalepsā tad-virodhī. Ibid. LI. 15.
riches, my relations do not belong to me, they all belong to God”; such is the conviction that should generate the spirit with which the adoration should be offered. The adorer should feel that the process of adoration is the only way through which he can obtain his highest realization, by offering himself to God and by drawing God to himself at the same time. The purpose of adoration is thus the supreme self-abnegation and self-offering to God, leaving nothing for oneself. The world comes out of God and yet exists in a relation of inherence, so that He is both the agent and the material cause of the world, and the adorer must always be fully conscious of the greatness of God in all its aspects.

The above doctrine of prapatti, or nyāsa, or śaraṇā-gati, as the means of winning God’s grace, has also been described in Chapter xxvii and it virtually means the qualities just described. śaraṇā-gati is here defined as prayer for God’s help in association with the conviction of one’s being merged in sin and guilt, together with a belief in one’s absolute helplessness and a sense of being totally lost without the protecting grace of God. The person who takes to the path of this prapatti achieves the fruits of all tapas, sacrifices, pilgrimages and gifts, and attains salvation easily without resorting to any other methods. It is further said that on the part of the devotee following the path of prapatti all that is necessary is to stick firmly to the attitude of absolute dependence on God, associated with a sense of absolute helplessness. He has no efforts to make other than to keep himself in the prayerful spirit; all the rest is done by God. Prapatti is thus a upāya-jñāna and not a upāya; for it is a mental attitude and does not presuppose any action. It is like a boat on which the passenger merely sits, while it is the business of the boatman to do the rest.

1 śodhā hi veda-vidūṣo vadyanti enaṃ mohā-mune
ānukūlāvyaṃ sāmkalpāḥ prātiṅkūlāvyaṃ varjanāṃ
rakṣīyattī viśvāso gopīrṇa-varaṇāṃ tathā.
dīma-nikṣepa-kārpanye sad-vidhā śaraṇā-gatīḥ.
Ahirbudhṇya-saṃhitā, xxxvii. 27, 28.

2 aham asmy aparādhaṇām ālayo’kiñcano’ gatīḥ
tvam evo ‘pāyabhūto me bhave’ti prārthānā-matiḥ.
śaraṇāgatīr itty-ukīā să deve’smin prayujyatām.
Ibid. xxxvii. 30, 31.

3 Ibid. xxxvii. 34 and 35.

4 atra nāvi’ ti drśṭāntād upāya-jñānam eva tu
narena kṛtyam anyat tu nāvikasye’va taddhareh.
Ahirbudhṇya-saṃhitā.
Describing the process of pure creation, it is said that at the time of pralaya all effects are reduced to a dormant state, and there is no movement of any kind. All the six qualities of the Lord, namely jñāna, śakti, bala, aishvarya, virya and tejas described above, are in a state of absolute calmness like the sky without a puff of air in it. This assemblage of powers in a state of calmness is Lakṣmi, which exists as it were like the very void. From its own spontaneity it seems to wish to burst forth and turn itself into active operations. This power of God, though differentiated from Him, may be regarded as being His very nature. It is only when it thus comes out in active forms that it can be recognized as power, or śakti. When embedded in the potential form, it is indistinguishable from the Lord Himself. These gunas of God should not, however, be confused with the gunas of prakrti, which evolve at a much lower stage in the course of the process of impure creation.

As regards the vyūhas, it is said that Saṅkaraśāna carries in him the whole universe, as if it were a spot at the parting of the hairs (tilakālaka). The universe as it exists in Saṅkaraśāna is still in an unmanifested form. He is the support of the universe (aśeṣa-bhuvana-dhara). The manus, time and prakṛti came out of Pradyumna. It is through the influence of Pradyumna that men are actuated to perform their work in accordance with the śāstras. Aniruddha, also called Mahā-viṣṇu, is the god of power and energy, and it is through his efforts that the creation and the maintenance of the world are possible. It is he who makes the world grow. It is through him that the world lives without fear and ultimate salvation is possible. According to Śaṅkara’s account Saṅkaraśāna stands for the individual soul, Pradyumna for manus and Aniruddha for the Ego (ahaṁkāra). Such a view is rather rare in the existing Pañcarātra literature. In the Viṣvaksena-saṃhitā, as quoted in the Tatvā-traya, it is said that Saṅkaraśāna acts as the superintendent

*pūrṇa-stimita-śād-gunyaṃ asamtrā-mva-ro-pamam.
Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā, v. 3.

All the śāstras are said to have been produced by Saṅkaraśāna, and it is in him that they disappear at the time of pralaya. Ahirbudhnya, lv. 16.

Ibid. lv. 9–12. 4 Ibid. lv. 18. Pradyumna is also called Vira.

There are, however, many conflicting views about these functions of the different vyūhas. See Lakṣmi-tantra, iv. 11–20, also Viṣvaksena-saṃhitā, as quoted in the Tatvā-traya.

6 Vedānta-sūtra, ii. 2. 42, Śaṅkara’s commentary.
of the souls, and Pradyumna is described as manomaya or the mind, but nothing is said about Aniruddha. In the Lakṣmi-tantra, vi. 9–14, it is said that Saṃkarśaṇa was like the soul, buddhi and manas and Vāsudeva, the playful creative activity. In the Visvaksena-saṃhitā Aniruddha is regarded as the creator of the misra-varga (pure-impure creation, such as niyati), etc., and Saṃkarśaṇa is regarded as the being who separated the principle of life from nature and became Pradyumna. But in the Ahirbudhnya the difference between the puruṣa and prakṛti starts in the Pradyumna stage, and not in the Saṃkarśaṇa stage, and Aniruddha is regarded in the Ahirbudhnya as the superintendent of the satteva and therethrough of all that come from it and the manus1. According to the Ahirbudhnya Lakṣmi is described as the power of God, but according to Uttara-nārāyana we have Lakṣmi and Bhūmi, and according to the Tattva-traya Lakṣmi, Bhūmi and Nīlā. In the Vihagendra-saṃhitā, ii. 8, these three are regarded as icchā, kriyā and sākṣat-sakti of the Devi. In the Sītā-upaniṣad also we have the same interpretation, and this is also associated there with Vaikhānasa tradition. The Vihagendra speaks of the eight śaktis of Sudarśana, kīrti, śrī, vijaya, śraddhā, smṛti, medhā, dhṛti and kṣamā, and in the Sātrata-saṃhitā (ix. 85) we hear of the twelve śaktis emanating from the Śrivatsa of Viṣṇu: these are lakṣmī, puṣṭi, dayā, nīdrā, kṣamā, kānti, sarasvatī, dhṛti, maitri, rati, tuṣṭi and mati.

The Pañcarātra is based partly on the Vedic and partly on the Tāntric system2. It therefore believes in the esoteric nature of the mantras. It has already been said that the world has come into being from the Sudarśana power; so all the natural, physical and other kinds of energies and powers of all things in the world are but manifestation of the Sudarśana. The power of the Sudarśana also manifests itself in the form of all living beings and of all that is inanimate, of the course of bondage and also of emancipation. Whatever is able to produce is to be regarded as the manifestation of Sudarśana3. The mantras are also regarded as the energy of

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1 Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā, vi. 57.
2 vedā-tantramayo-dhūta-nānā-prasavaśālinī. Ibid. vi. 9.
3 sudarśanāhvyā devī sarva-kṛtya-karī vibhoḥ
tan-mayān viddhi saṃarthyaṁ sarvaṁ sarva-padarthaṁ
dharmasyārthasya kāmasya muḥkṣyā bandha-trasyaya ca
yad yat sva-kārya-sāmarthyam tat-tat-sudarśanam vapuḥ.

Ibid. xvi. 4 and 6.
Viṣṇu as pure consciousness. The first manifestation of this power, like a long-drawn sound of a bell, is called nāda, and it can only be perceived by the great yogins. The next stage, like a bubble on the ocean, is called bindu, which is the identity of a name and the objective power denoted by it. The next stage is the evolution of the objective power (nāmy-udaya), which is also called Śabda-brahman. Thus, with the evolution of every alphabetic sound there is also the evolution of the objective power of which it is the counterpart. Ahirbudhṇya then goes on to explain the evolution of the different vowel and consonant sounds from the bindu-power. By fourteen efforts there come the fourteen vowels emanating through the dancing of the serpent power (Kundali-śakti) of Viṣṇu. By its twofold subtle power it behaves as the cause of creation and destruction. This power rises in the original locus (mūlā-dhāra) and, when it comes to the stage of the navel, it is called pāśyantī and is perceived by the yogins. It then proceeds to the lotus of the heart and then passes through the throat as the audible sound. The energy of the vowel sounds passes through the suṣumnā nādi. In this way the different consonant sounds are regarded as the prototypes of different manifestations of world-energy, and these again are regarded as the symbols of different kinds of gods or superintendents of energy. An assemblage of some of these alphabets in different orders and groups, called also the lotus or the wheel (cakra), would stand for the assemblage of different types of complex powers. The meditation and worship of these cakras would thus be expected to bring the objective powers typified by them under control. The different gods are thus associated with the different cakras of mantras; and by far the largest portion of the Pañcarātra literature is dedicated to the description of the rituals associated with these, the building of corresponding images, and the temples for these subsidiary deities. The meditation of these mantras is also regarded as playing diverse protective functions.

In consonance with the ordinary method of the Tantric works

\[ sākṣād viṣṇoh kriyā-śaktih sūddha-samvinnayī para. \]
\[ Ahirbudhṇya-samhitā, xvi. 10. \]

This kriyā-śakti is also called sāmarthya or yoga or pārāmeṣṭhya or māhātejas or māyā-yoga. Ibid. xvi. 32.

\[ nātī'va kundali-śaktir ādhyā viṣṇor viṣṇhvībhate. \]
\[ Ibid. xvi. 55. \]

\[ viṣṇu-śaktimayā varṇā viṣṇu-samkalpa-jñābhītah adhiṣṭhitā yathā bhāvenis tathā tan me niśāmaya. \]
\[ Ibid. xvii. 3. \]
the *Ahirbudhnya* describes the nervous system of the body. The root (*kānda*) of all the nerves is said to be at about nine inches above the penis. It is an egg-shaped place four inches in length and breadth and made up of fat, flesh, bone and blood. Just two inches below the penis and about two inches from the anus we have a place which is called the middle of the body (*sarīra-madhyā*), or simply the middle (*madhyā*). It is like a quadrilateral figure, which is also called the *āgniya-maṇḍala*. The place of the root of the *nādiḥ* is also called the navel-wheel (*nabhi-cakra*), which has twelve spokes. Round the *nabhi-cakra* there exists the serpent (*kundali*) with eight mouths, stopping the aperture called *brahma-randhra* of the *susumnā* by its body. In the centre of the *cakra* there are the two *nādiḥ* called the *alambuṣa* and *susumnā*. On the different sides of the *susumnā* there are the following *nādiḥ*: *Kuṭu, Vaṭuṇa, Yaśasvinī, Piṅgalā, Pūṣā, Payasvinī, Sarasvatī, Śaṅkhini, Gāndhāri, Idā, Hasti-jīhvā, Viśvodarā*. But there are on the whole 72,000 *nādiḥ* in the body. Of these, *Idā, Piṅgalā* and *susumnā* are the most important. Of these, again, *susumnā*, which goes to the centre of the brain, is the most important. As a spider remains inside the meshes of its thread, so the soul, as associated with *prāṇa* or life-force, exists inside this navel-wheel. The *susumnā* has five openings, of which four carry blood, while the central aperture is closed by the body of the *Kuṇḍali*. Other *nādiḥ* are shorter in size and are connected with the different parts of the body. The *Idā* and the *Piṅgalā* are regarded as being like the sun and the moon of the body.

There are ten *vāyuḥ*, or bio-motor forces of the body, called *prāṇa, apāṇa, samāṇa, udāna, vyāna, nāga, kūrma, kṛkara, deva-datta* and *dhanaṇjaya*. The *prāṇa vāyuḥ* remains in the navel-wheel, but it manifests itself in the regions of the heart, mouth and the nose. The *apāṇa vāyuḥ* works in the anus, penis, thighs, the legs, the belly, the testes, the lumbar region, the intestines, and in fact performs the functions of all the lower region. The *vyāna* exists between the eyes and the ears, the toes, nose, throat and the spine. The *udāna* works in the hands and the *samāṇa* through the body as a whole, probably discharging the general circulation. The func-

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1 *Ahirbudhnya-samhitā*, xxxii. 11. This is indeed different from the description found in the *Śākta Tantras*, according to which the *Kuṇḍali* exists in the place down below described as the *sarīra-madhyā*.

2 Ibid. xxxii. 33-37. These locations and functions are different from what we find in the *Āyur-Veda* or the *Śākta Tantras*.
tion of the prāṇa is to discharge the work of respiration; that of the vyāna, to discharge the work of turning about towards a thing or away from it. The function of the udāna is to raise or lower the body, that of the samāna, to feed and develop it. The function of eructation or vomiting is performed by the nāga vāyu, and devadatta produces sleep and so on. These nāḍīs are to be purified by inhaling air by the īḍā for as long as is required to count from 1 to 16. This breath is to be held long enough to count from 1 to 32, and in the interval some forms of meditation are to be carried on. Then the yogin should inhale air in the same manner through the piṅgalā and hold that also in the same way. He should then exhale the breath through the Īḍā. He should practise this for three months thrice a day, three times on each occasion, and thus his nāḍīs will be purified and he will be able to concentrate his mind on the vāyus all over his body. In the process of the praṇāyāma, he should inhale air through the Īḍā long enough to count from 1 to 16. Then the breath is to be retained as long as possible, and the specific mantra is to be meditated upon; and then the breath is to be exhaled out by the piṅgalā for the time necessary to count from 1 to 16. Again, he has to inhale through the Piṅgalā, retain the breath and exhale through the Īḍā. Gradually the period of retention of the breath called kumbhaka is to be increased. He has to practise the praṇāyāma sixteen times in course of the day. This is called the process of praṇāyāma. As a result of this, he may enter the stage of samādhi, by which he may attain all sorts of miraculous powers, just as one may by the meditation of the wheel of mantras.

But before one begins the purification of the nāḍīs described above one should practise the various postures (āsanas) of which cakra, padma, kūrma, mayūra, kukkuṭa, viṣṇu, svastika, bhadra, simha, mukta and gomukha are described the Ahirbudhnya. The practice of these postures contributes to the good health of the yogins. But these physical practices are of no avail unless one turns to the spiritual side of yoga. Yoga is defined as the union of the lower and the higher soul. Two ways for the attainment of the highest reality are described in the Ahirbudhnya—one is that of self-offering or self-abnegation (ātma-samarpana or hṛd-yāga) through the meditation on the highest in the form of some of His powers, as this

\[ \text{samyo}_\text{go yoga ity ukto jivātm-paramā-tmanoḥ.} \]

Ahirbudhnya-samhitā, xxxi. 15.
and that specific deity, by the practice of the *mantras*; and the other is that of the *yoga*. *Ahirbudhṇya*, however, concentrates its teachings on the former, and mentions the latter in only one of its chapters. There are two types of soul, one within the influence of the *prakṛti* and the other beyond it. The union with the highest is possible through *karma* and *yoga*. *Karma* is again of two kinds, that which is prompted by desires (*pravartaka*) and that which is prompted by cessation of desires (*nivartaka*). Of these only the latter can lead to emancipation, while the former leads to the attainment of the fruits of desires. The highest soul is described as the subtle (*sūkṣma*), all-pervading (*sarva-ga*), maintaining all (*sarva-bhṛt*), pure consciousness (*jñāna-rūpa*), without beginning and end (*anādy-ananta*), changeless (*a-vikārin*), devoid of all cognitive or conative senses, devoid of names and class-notions, without colour and quality, yet knowing all and pervading all, self-luminous and yet approachable through intuitive wisdom, and the protector of all. The *yoga* by which a union of our lower souls with this highest reality can be effected has the well-known eight accessories, *yama*, *niyama*, *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, *pratyāhāra*, *dārāṇa*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi*.

Of these, *yama* is said to consist of beneficial and yet truthful utterance (*satya*), suffering at the sufferings of all beings (*dayā*), remaining fixed in one’s path of duty even in the face of dangers (*dṛṣṭi*), inclination of all the senses to adhere to the path of right conduct (*sauca*), absence of lust (*brahma-carya*), remaining unruffled even when there is a real cause of anger or excitement (*kṣamā*), uniformity of thoughts, deeds and words (*ārjava*), taking of unprohibited food (*mitāhāra*), absence of greed for the property of others (*asteya*), cessation from doing injury to others by word, deed or thought (*ahimsā*). *Niyama* is described as listening to Vedāntic texts (*siddhānta-śravaṇa*), gifts of things duly earned to proper persons (*dāna*), faith in scriptural duties (*mati*), worship of Viṣṇu through devotion (*iśvara-pūjana*), natural contentment with
whatever one may have (santosa), asceticism (tapah), faith in the ultimate truth being attainable only through the Vedas (aṭṭikya), shame in committing prohibited actions (ḥṛtī), muttering of mantras (japa), acceptance of the path dictated by the good teacher (vrata). Though the Yoga is here described as the union of the lower and the higher soul, the author of the Ahirbudhnya was aware of the yogāṇuśāsana of Patañjali and his doctrine of Yoga as the repression of mental states (citta-vṛti-nirodha).

The Ahirbudhnya defines pramāṇa as the definite knowledge of a thing as it really exists (yathārtha-vadhaṇam), and the means by which it is attained is called pramāṇa. That which is sought to be discovered by the pramāṇas as being beneficial to man is called pramāṇārthā. This is of two kinds, that which is supremely and absolutely beneficial, and that which indirectly leads thereto, and as such is called hita and sādhanā. Oneness with God, which is supremely blissful, is what is called supremely beneficial (hita). Two ways that lead to it are those of dharma and jñāna. This knowledge is of two kinds, as direct intuition (śākṣātkāra) and as indirect or inferential (parokṣa). Dharma is the cause of knowledge, and is of two kinds, one which leads directly, and the other indirectly, to worship of God. Self-offering or self-abnegation with reference to God is called indirect dharma, while the way in which the Yogin directly realizes God is called the direct dharma, such as is taught in the Pañcarātra literature, called the sātvata-sāsana. By the Sāṃkhya path one can have only the indirect knowledge of God, but through Yoga and Vedānta one can have a direct intuition of God. Emancipation (mokṣa) is as much an object of attainment through efforts (sādhyā) as dharma, artha and kāma, though the last three are also mutually helpful to one another.

1 Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā, pp. 23–30. This list is also different from that of Patañjali, who counts sauca, santosa, tapah, svādhyāya and iṣvara-pranidhāna only as niyamas. See Yoga-sūtra, n. 32.
2 Ibid. xiii. 27, 28.
3 Ibid. xiii.
CHAPTER XVII

THE ĀRVĀRS.

The Chronology of the Ārvārs.

In the Bhāgavata-purāṇa, xi. 5. 38–40, it is said that the great devotees of Viṣṇu will appear in the south on the banks of Tāmraparṇī, Kṛtamaḷā (Vaigai), Payasvinī (Palar), Kāverī and Mahānādi (Periyar). It is interesting to note that the Ārvārs, Nāmm-ārvār and Madhura-kaviy-ārvār, were born in the Tāmraparṇī country, Periy-ārvār and his adopted daughter Āṇḍāl in the Kṛtamaḷa, Poygaiy-ārvār, Bhūtatt-ārvār, Pēy-ārvār and Tiru-marīṣai Pirān in the Payasvini, Toṇḍar-āḍī-podiy-ārvār, Tiru-pāṇ-ārvār and Tiru-māṅgaiy-ārvār in the Kāverī, and Periy-ārvār and Kula-śekhara Perumāl in the Mahānāda countries. In the Bhāgavata-māhātmya we find a parable in which Bhakti is described as a distressed woman who was born in the Drāvidā country, had attained her womanhood in the Carnatik and Mahārāṣṭra, and had travelled in great misery through Guzerat and North India with her two sons Jñāna and Vairāgya to Brindaban, and that owing to the hard conditions through which she had to pass her two sons had died. This shows that at least according to the traditions of the Bhāgavata-purāṇa Southern India was regarded as a great stronghold of the Bhakti cult.

The Ārvārs are the most ancient Vaiṣṇava saints of the south, of whom Saroyogin or Poygaiy-ārvār, Pūtayogin or Bhūtatt-ārvār, Mahadyogin or Pēy-ārvār, and Bhaktisāra or Tiru-marīṣai Pirān are the earliest; Nāmm-ārvār or Saṭṭhakopa, Madhura-kaviy-ārvār, Kula-śekhara Perumāl, Viṣṇucittan (or Periy-ārvār) and Goda (Āṇḍāl) came after them and Bhaktāṅghrirenu (Toṇḍar-āḍī-podiy-ārvār), Yogivāha (Tiru-pāṇ-ārvār) and Parakāla (Tiru-māṅgaiy-

1 This implies that the Bhāgavata-purāṇa in its present form was probably written after the Ārvārs had flourished. The verse here referred to has been quoted by Veṅkaṭanātha in his Rahasya-traya-sāra. The Prapannā-mṛta (Ch. 77) however refers to three other Vaiṣṇava saints who preceded the Ārvārs. They were (i) Kaśārayogin, born in Kānhi, (ii) Bhūtayogindra, born in Mallipura, (iii) Bhrānta-yogindra called also Mahat and Mahārīya who was the incarnation of Viṣvakṣena. It was these sages who advised the five sanskāras of Vaiṣṇavism (tāpaḥ paumḍras tathā nāma mantra yāgaś ca paṁcamah). They preached the emotional Vaiṣṇavism in which Bhakti is realized as maddening intoxication associated with tears, etc. They described their feelings of ecstasy in three works, comprising three hundred verses written in Tamil. They were also known by the names of Mādhava, Dāśārya and Saroyogin.
The Ārvārs [CH.

ārvār) were the last to come. The traditional date ascribed to the earliest Ārvār is 4203 B.C., and the date of the latest Ārvār is 2706 B.C., though modern researches on the subject bring down their dates to a period not earlier than the seventh or the eighth century A.D. Traditional information about the Ārvārs can be had from the different "Guru-paramparā" works. According to the Guru-paramparā, Bhūtatt-, Poygaiy- and Pey-ārvārs were incarnations of Viṣṇu's Gaddā, Śaṅkha and Nandaka, and so also Kadan-mallai and Mayilai, while Tiru-maṛiṣai Pirān was regarded as the incarnation of the cakra (wheel) of Viṣṇu. Nāmm'-ārvār was incarnation of Viṣvaksena and Kula-śēkhara Peru-māl of the Kaus-tubha of Viṣṇu. So Periy-ārvār, Toṇḍar-aḍi-poḍiy-ārvār and Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār were respectively incarnations of Garaḍā, Vanamālā and Śāṅga of Viṣṇu. The last Ārvār was Tiru-pān-ārvār. Āṇḍā], the adopted daughter of Periy-ārvār, and Madhura-kaviy-ārvār, the disciple of Nāmm'-ārvār, were also regarded as Ārvārs. They came from all parts of the Madras Presidency. Of these seven were Brahmins, one was a Kṣattriya, two were śūdras and one was of the low Panar caste. The Guru-paramparās give incidents of the lives of the Ārvārs and also fanciful dates B.C. when they are said to have flourished. Apart from the Guru-paramparās there are also monographs on individual Ārvārs, of which the following are the most important: (1) Divya-sūri-carita by Garaḍā-vāhana Paṇḍita, who was a contemporary of Rāmānuja; (2) Guru-paramparā-prabhāvatam of Pinb'-aṛagīya Peru-māl Jiyar, based on the Divya-sūri-carita and written in mani-pravāla style, i.e. a mixture of Sanskrit and Tamil; (3) Periya-tiru-mudiy-adaivu of Anbillai Kaṇḍāda-yappan, written in Tamil; (4) Upadeśa-ratna-mālai of Manavāla Mā-muni, written in Tamil, contains the list of Ārvārs; (5) Yatindra-pravāna-prabhāvatam of Pillai Lokācāryar. The other source of information regarding the Ārvārs is the well-known collection of the works of Ārvārs known as Nāl-āyira-divya-prabandham. Among these are the commentaries on the Divya-prabandham and the Tiru-vāy-moṛi of Nāmm'-ārvār. In addition to these we have the epigraphical evidence in inscriptions scattered over the Madras Presidency.

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1 Early History of Vaiṣṇavism in South India, by S. K. Aiyangar, pp. 4-13; also Sir R. G. Bhandarkar's Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Sects, pp. 68, 69.
2 Sir Subrahmanya Ayyar Lectures, by the late T. A. Gopi-nātha Rāu, 1923.
Maṇavāla Mā-muni, in his *Yatindra-pravāna-prabhāvam*, says that the earliest of the Ārvārs, Pēy-ārvār, Bhusatt’-ārvār, Poygaiy-ārvār, and Tiru-maṛiṣai Pirān, flourished at the time of the Pallavas, who came to Kānci about the fourth century A.D. Again, Professor Dubreuil says that Mamallai, the native town of Bhusatt’-ārvār, did not exist before Narasimhavarman I, who founded the city by the middle of the seventh century. Further, Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār praised the Vaiṣṇava temple of Kānci built by Paramesvarvarman II. It seems, therefore, that the Ārvārs flourished in the eighth century A.D., which was the period of a great Vaiṣṇava movement in the Cola and the Pāṇḍya countries, and also of the Advaitic movement of Śaṅkara.

According to the traditional accounts, Nāmm’-ārvār was the son of Kāri, holding a high post under the Pāṇḍyas, and himself bore the names of Kārimāraṇ, Parāṅkuṣa and Śaṭhakopa, that his disciple was Madhura-kaviy-ārvār, and that he was born at Tirukkurgur. Two stone inscriptions have been found in Madura of which one is dated at Kali 3871, in the reign of King Parāṇṭaka, whose *uttara-mantrin* was the son of Māra, who was also known as Madhura-kaviy-ārvār. The other is dated in the reign of Māraṇ-jadaiyan. The Kali year 3871 corresponds to A.D. 770. This was about the year when Parāṇṭaka Pāṇḍya ascended the throne. His father Parāṅkuṣa died about the year A.D. 770. Māraṇkāri continued as *uttara-mantrin*. Nāmm’-ārvār’s name Kārimāraṇ shows that Kāri the *uttara-mantrin* was his father. This is quite in accordance with the accounts found in *Guru-paramparā*. These and many other evidences collected by Gopi-nātha Rāu show that Nāmm’-ārvār and Madhura-kaviy-ārvār flourished at the end of the eighth century A.D. or in the first half of the ninth century. Kulaśekhara Peru-māḷ also flourished probably about the first half of the ninth century. Periy-ārvār and his adopted daughter Āṇḍāl were probably contemporaries of Śrīvallabhadeva, who flourished about the middle of the ninth century A.D. Toṇḍar-adi-poḍiyy-ārvār was a contemporary of Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār and Tiru-pāṇ-ārvār. Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār referred to the war drum of Pallavamalla, who reigned between A.D. 717 and A.D. 779, and these Ārvārs could not have flourished before that time. But Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār, in his praise

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1 Sir Subrahmanya Ayyar Lectures, by the late T. A. Gopi-nātha Rāu, 1923, p. 17.
of Viṣṇu at Kāṇci, refers to Vairamegha Pallava, who probably flourished in the ninth century. It may therefore be supposed that Tiru-маŋgaiy lived about that time. According to Mr S. K. Aiyangar the last of the Ārvārs flourished in the earlier half of the eighth century A.D.1 Sir R. G. Bhandarkar holds that Kula-śekhara Peru-māḷ flourished about the middle of the twelfth century. He was a king of Travancore and in his Mukunda-māḷā he quotes a verse from the Bhāgavata-purāṇa (xi. 2. 36). On the basis of the inscriptional evidence that Permadī of the Senḍa dynasty, who flourished between 1138-1150, conquered Kula-śekharānka, and identifying Kula-śekhara Peru-māḷ with Kula-śekharānka, Bhandarkar comes to the conclusion that Kula-śekhara Peru-māḷ lived in the middle of the twelfth century A.D., though, as we have already seen, Mr Rāu attempts to place him in the first half of the ninth century. He, however, does not take any notice of the views of Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, who further thinks that the earliest Ārvārs flourished about the fifth or the sixth century A.D. and that the order of the priority of the Ārvārs as found in the Guru-parampara lists is not reliable. One of the main points of criticism used by Aiyangar against Bhandarkar is the latter’s identification of Kula-śekhara Peru-māḷ with Kula-śekharānka. The works of the Ārvārs were written in Tamil, and those that survive were collected in their present form in Rāmānuja’s time or in the time of Nāthamuni; this collection, containing 4000 hymns, is called Nāl-āyirādīvya-prabandham. But at least one part of it was composed by Kuruttalvan or Kuruttama, who was a prominent disciple of Rāmānuja, and in a passage thereof a reference is made to Rāmānuja also2. The order of the Ārvārs given in this work is somewhat different from that given in the Guru-parampara referred to above, and it does not contain the name of Nāmm’-ārvār, who is treated separately. Again, Pillān, the disciple and apostolic successor of Rāmānuja, who commented on the Tiru-vāy-moṛi of Nāmm’-ārvār, gives in a verse all the names of the Ārvārs, omitting only

1 Indian Antiquary, Vol. xxxv, pp. 228, etc.
2 This part is called Rāmānuja-nurrūndādi. The order of the Ārvārs given here is as follows: Poygaiy-ārvār, Bhūtatt’-ārvār, Pēy-ārvār, Tiru-pān-ārvār, Tiru-marīśai Pirān, Toṇḍar-adi-podiy-ārvār, Kula-śekhara, Periy-ārvār, Āṇḍāl, Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār. Venkatanatha, however, in his Prabandha-sāram records the Ārvārs in the following order: Poygaiy-ārvār, Bhūtatt’-ārvār, Pēy-ārvār, Tiru-marīśai Pirān, Nāmm’-ārvār, Madhura-kaviy-ārvār, Kula-śekhara, Periy-ārvār, Āṇḍāl, Toṇḍar-adi-podiy-ārvār, Tiru-pān-ārvār, Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār.
Therefore it appears that Kula-śekhara was accepted as an Ārvār in Rāmānuja's time. In Vēṅkaṭanātha's (fourteenth-century) list, contained in one of his Tamil Prabandham, all the Ārvārs excepting Āndal and Madhura-kaviy-ārvār are mentioned. The Prabandham contains also a succession list of teachers according to the Vaḍakalai sect, beginning with Rāmānuja.

Kula-śekhara, in his Mukunda-mālā, says that he was the ruler of Kolli (Uraiyūr, the Cola capital), Kudal (Madurā) and Koṅgu. Being a native of Travancore (Vaṇākulaṁ), he became the ruler of the Paṇḍya and Cola capitals, Madurā and Uraiyūr. After A.D. 900, when the Cola king Parāntaka became supreme and the Cola capital was at Tanjore instead of at Uraiyūr, the ascendancy of the Travancore country (Kerala) over the Cola and the Paṇḍya kingdoms would have been impossible. It could only have happened either before the rise of the great Pallava dynasty with Narasimharavarman I (A.D. 600) or after the fall of that dynasty with Nandivarman (A.D. 800). If Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār, the contemporary of Vairamegha, be accepted as the last Ārvār, then Kula-śekhara must be placed in the sixth century A.D. But Gopi-nātha Rāu interprets a passage of Kula-śekhara as alluding to the defeat and death of a Pallava king at his hands. He identifies this king with the Pallava king Dantivarman, about A.D. 825, and is of the opinion that he flourished in the first half of the ninth century A.D. In any case Bhandarkar's identification of Kula-śekhara with Kula-śekharāṇka (A.D. 1150) is very improbable, as an inscription dated A.D. 1088 makes a provision for the recital of Kula-śekhara's "Tettarumtiral." Aiyangar further states that in several editions of the Mukunda-mālā the quotation from the Bhāgavata-purāṇa referred to by Bhandarkar cannot be traced. We may thus definitely reject the view of Bhandarkar that Kula-śekhara flourished in the middle of the twelfth century A.D.

There is a great controversy among the South Indian historians and epigraphists not only about the chronological order of the

1 Bhītaṁ Sarāi ca Mahad-amvaya-Bhaṭṭānātha-
Śrī-Bhaktisāra-Kulaśekhara-Yogivāhan
Bhaktāṅghriyenu-Parakāla-Yatindramiśrān
Śrī-mat-Parāṅkuśa-muniṇi praṇato soma niśtam.
Verse quoted from Aiyangar’s Early History of Vaiṣṇavism.

2 Rāmānuja’s preceptor was Periya Nambi, then come Alavandar, Manakkal Nambi, Uyyakkondar, Nāthamuni, Śaṭhakopa, Viṣvaksena (Senai Nathan), Mahālakṣmi and Viṣṇu. Aiyangar, Early History of Vaiṣṇavism, p. 21.

3 Ibid. p. 33.
different Ārvārs, but also regarding the dates of the first and the last, and of those who came between them. Thus, while Aiyangar wished to place the first four Ārvārs about the second century A.D., Gopi-nātha Rāu regards them as having flourished in the middle of the seventh century A.D. 1 Again, Nām’-ārvār is placed by Aiyangar in the middle of the sixth century, while Gopi-nātha Rāu would place him during the first half of the ninth century. While Aiyangar would close the history of the Ārvārs by the middle of the seventh century, Gopi-nātha Rāu would place Kula-sekhara in A.D. 825, Periy-ārvār in about the same date or a few years later, and Toñdar-aḍi-poḍiy-ārvār, Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār and Tiru-pān-ārvār (contemporaries) about A.D. 830. From comparing the various matters of controversy, the details of which cannot well be described here, I feel it wise to follow Gopi-nātha Rāu, and am inclined to think that the order of the Ārvārs, except so far as the first group of four is concerned, is not a chronological one, as many of them were close contemporaries, and their history is within a period of only 200 years, from the middle of the seventh century to the middle of the ninth century.

The word Ārvār means one who has a deep intuitive knowledge of God and one who is immersed in the contemplation of Him. The works of the Ārvārs are full of intense and devoted love for Viṣṇu. This love is the foundation of the later systematic doctrine of prapatti. The difference between the Ārvārs and the Aragiya, of whom we shall speak later on, is that, while the former had realized Brahman and had personal enjoyment of His grace, the latter were learned propounders who elaborated the philosophy contained in the works of the Ārvārs. Poygaïy, Bhūtatt’ and Pēy composed the three sections of one hundred stanzas each of Tiru-vantādi 2. Tiru-maṛiṣai Pirān spent much of his life in Triplicane, Conjeevaram and Kumbakonam. His hymns are the Nan-mukham Tiru-vantādi, containing ninety-six stanzas, and Tiru-chanda-vṛuttam. Nām’-ārvār was born of a Sudra family at Kurukur, now Alvārtirunagari in the Tinnevelly district. He was the most voluminous writer

1 These are Pēy-ārvār, Bhūtatt’-ārvār, Poygaïy-ārvār and Tiru-maṛiṣai Pirān, the first three being known as Mudal-ārvārs among the Śrivaishnavas.

2 As a specimen of Tiru-vantādi one may quote the following passage: "With love as lamp-bowl, desire as oil, mind melting with bliss as wick, with melting soul I have kindled the bright light of wisdom in the learned Tamil which I have wrought for Nārāyaṇa."—Bhūtam, quotation from Hooper’s Hymns of the Ālvārs, p. 12, n.
among the Ārvārs and a great mass of his poetry is preserved in the Nāl-āyira-divya-prabandham. His works are the Tiru-vṛuttam, containing one hundred stanzas, Tiru-vāşiriyam, containing seven stanzas, the Periya tiru-vantādi of eighty-seven stanzas, and the Tiru-vāy-mori, containing 1102 stanzas. Nāmm'-ārvār’s whole life was given to meditation. His disciple Madhura-kavi considers him an incarnation of Viṣṇu. Kula-śekhara was a great devotee of Rāma. His chief work is the Peru-māl-tiru-mori. Periy-ārvār, known as Viṣṇucitta, was born at Śrībittiputtūr. His chief works are Tirupall'-āṇḍu and Tiru-mori. Āṇḍāḷ, adopted daughter of Periy-ārvār, was passionately devoted to Kṛṣṇa and considered herself as one of the Gopīs, seeking for union with Kṛṣṇa. She was married to the God Raṅganātha of Śrīraṅgam. Her chief works are Tiru-pāvai and Nacchiyār. Tirumoṛi Toṇḍar-adī-podi-y-ārvār was born at Mandangudi. He was once under the seduction of a courtesan called Devādevi, but was saved by the grace of Raṅganātha. His chief works are Tiru-mālai, and the Tiru-pāliv-eruchi. Tiru-pān-ārvār was brought up by a low-caste childless pānar. His chief work was Amalan-āḍibirān in ten stanzas. Tiru-maṅgaḷi was born in the thief-caste. His chief works are Periya-tiru-mori, Tirukurun-dāṇḍakam, Tiru-neḍun-dāṇḍakam, Tiru-verugūtt-irukkai, Śiriya-tiru-maḍal and Periya-tiru-maḍal. Tiru-maṅgaḷi was driven to brigandage, and gained his divine wisdom through the grace of Raṅganātha. The Nāl-āyira-divya-prabandham, which contains the works of the Ārvārs, is regarded in the Tamil country as the most sacred book and is placed side by side with the Vedas. It is carried in procession into the temple, when verses from it are recited and they are recited also on special occasions of marriage, death, etc. Verses from it are also sung and recited in the hall in front of the temple, and it is used in the rituals along with Vedic mantras.

The Philosophy of the Ārvārs.

As the hymns of the Ārvārs have only a literary and devotional form, it is difficult to utilize them for philosophical purposes. As an illustration of the general subject-matter of their works, I shall try to give a brief summary of the main contents of Nāmm'-ārvār’s (Ṣaṭṭhakopa) work, following Abhirāmavārācārya’s Dramidoṉaṇiṣat-tātparya1. The feeling of devotion to God felt by Ṣaṭṭhakopa

1 MS. from Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras.
could not be contained within him, and, thus overflowing, was expressed in verses which soothed all sufferers; this shows that his affection for suffering humanity was even greater than that of their own parents. Śaṭhakopa’s main ideal was to subdue our so-called manhood by reference to God (puruṣottama), the greatest of all beings, and to regard all beings as but women dependent on Him; and so it was that Śaṭhakopa conceived himself as a woman longing for her lover and entirely dependent on him. In the first of his four works he prayed for the cessation of rebirth; in the second he described his experiences of God’s great and noble qualities; in the third he expressed his longings to enjoy God; and in the fourth he described how all his experiences of God’s communion with him fell far short of his great longings. In the first ten stanzas of his first centum he is infused with a spirit of service (dāsyya) to God and describes his experiences of God’s essential qualities. In the next ten stanzas he describes the mercy of God and recommends every one to give up attachment to all other things, which are of a trifling and temporary nature. Then he prays to God for his incarnation on earth with Lakṣmi, His consort, and pays adoration to Him. He continues with a description of his mental agonies in not attaining communion with God, confessing his own guilt to Him. He then embraces God and realizes that all his failings are his own fault. He explains that the spirit of service (dāsyya) does not depend for its manifestation and realization on any elaborate rituals involving articles of worship, but on one’s own zeal. What is necessary is true devotion (bhakti). Such a devotion, he says, must proceed through an intense enjoyment of the nature of the noble qualities of God, so that the devotee may feel that there is nothing in anything else that is greater than them. With a yielding heart he says that God accepts the service of those who, instead of employing all the various means of subduing a crooked enemy, adopt only the means of friendliness to them. God is pleased with those who are disposed to realize the sincerity of their own spirit, and it is through this that they can realize God in themselves. God’s favour does not depend on anything but His own grace, manifesting itself in an all-embracing devotion. He says, in the second sataka, that the devotee, having,
on the one hand, felt the great and noble qualities of God, and yet being attached to other things, is pierced through with pangs of sorrow in not realizing God in communion, and feels a bond of sympathy with all humanity sharing the same grief. Through the stories of God related in the Purānas, e.g. in the Bhāgavata, Śathakopa feels the association of God which removes his sorrow and so increases his contact with God. He then describes how the great saints of the past had within their heart of hearts enjoyed an immersion in the ocean of God’s bliss, which is the depository of all blissful emotion; and he goes on to express his longings for the enjoyment of that bliss. Through his longings for Him there arose in Śathakopa great grief of separation, devoid of any interest in furthering unworthy ends; he communicated to Him his great sorrow at his incapacity to realize Him, and in so doing he lost consciousness through intensity of grief. As a result God Kṛṣṇa appeared before him, and he describes accordingly the joy of the vision of God. But he fears to lose God, who is too mighty for him, and takes refuge in his great attachment to Him. Next he says that they only realize God who have a sense of possession in Him. He describes God’s noble qualities, and shows that the realization of the proximity of God is much more desirable than the attainment of emancipation. He says that the true definition of mokṣa is to attain the position of God’s servant

In the beginning of the third centum he describes the beauty of God. Then he bemoans the fact that, on account of the limitations of his senses and his mind, he is unable to enjoy the fullness of His beauty. Next he describes the infinitude of God’s glory and his own spirit of service to Him. Then he envisages the whole world and the words that denote the things of the world as being the body of God. Then he expresses the pleasure and bliss he feels in the service of God, and says that even those who cannot come into contact with God in His own essence can find solace in directing their minds to His image and to the stories of Kṛṣṇa related in the
He then absorbs himself in the grief of his separation from God and hopes that by arresting all the inner senses he may see God with his own eyes. He also regrets the condition of other men who are wasting their time in devotion to gods other than Kṛṣṇa. He goes on to describe the vision of God and his great joy therein.

In the fourth centum he describes the transitoriness of all things considered as enjoyable, and the absolute superiority of the bliss of pleasing God. He goes on to explain how, through cessation of all inclination to other things and the increase of longing for God in a timeless and spaceless manner, and through the pangs of separation in not realizing Him constantly, he considers himself as a woman, and through the pangs of love loses his consciousness. Then he describes how Hari is pleased with his amour and satisfies his longings by making Him enjoyable through the actions of mind, words and body by His blissful embraces. Next he shows how, when he attempted to realize Kṛṣṇa by his spiritual zeal, Kṛṣṇa vanished from his sight and he was then once more filled with the grief of separation. Again he receives a vision of God and feels with joy His overwhelming superiority. He further describes how his vision of God was like a dream, and how, when the dream ceased, he lost consciousness. To fill up the emptiness of these occasional separations, he sorrowfully chanted the name of God, and earnestly prayed to Him. He wept for Him and felt that without Him everything was nothing. Yet at intervals he could not help feeling deep sympathy for erring humanity which had turned its mind away from God. According to him the real bondage consists in the preference man gives to things other than God. When one can feel God as all-in-all, every bond is loosened.

In the fifth centum he feels that God’s grace alone can save man. He again describes himself as the wife of God, constantly longing for His embrace. In his grief and lamentation and his anxiety to meet God, he was overcome by a swoon which, like the night, dimmed all his senses. At the end of this state he saw the orna-

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1 tam puruṣā-rtham itarā-rtha-rucer niyṛttyā
sāndra-sphṛhah samaya-deśa-viḍāragam ca
ipsuh śucā tad-an-avāpti-bhuvā dvītiye
strī-bhāvanām samadhiγamya munir mumoha.

Dramidoṇaniṣat-tātparya. MS.

2 prtitah paraṃ harir amuṣya tadā svabhāvād
etan-mano-vacana-deha-kṛtā-kriyābhih
srāk-candana-pramukha-sarva-vidha-svabhogyah
saṁśīṣṭavān idam uvāca munis tṛtiye.

Ibid.
ments of God, but could not see Him directly, and was thus filled both with grief and happiness. As a relief from the pangs of separation he found enjoyment in identifying himself in his mind with God and in imitating His ways, thinking that the world was created by Him. In a number of verses (seventy or eighty) he describes how he was attached to the image of the God Kṛṣṇa at Kumbhakonam and how he suffered through God’s apathy towards him in not satisfying him, His lover, with embraces and other tokens of love, and how he became angry with His indifference to his amorous approaches and was ultimately appeased by God, who satisfied him with loving embraces and the like. Thus God, who was divine lord of the universe, felt sympathy and love for him and appeased his sorrows in the fashion of a human lover. He describes his great bliss in receiving the embrace of God. Through this rapturous divine love and divine embrace he lost all mundane interest in life.

In the ninth centum the sage, finding he could not look at the ordinary things of life, nor easily gain satisfaction in the divine presence of God in the whole world, fixed his mind on His transcendental form (aprākṛta-vapuh) and became full of wailing and lamentation as a means of direct access to it. A great part of this centum is devoted to laments due to his feeling of separation from God. He describes how through constant lamentation and brooding he received the vision of God, but was unhappy because he could not touch Him; and how later on God took human form in response to his prayers and made him forget his sufferings. In many other verses he again describes the emotions of his distress at his separation and temporary union with God; how he sent messages to God through birds; how he felt miserable because He delayed to meet him; how he expected to meet Him at appointed times, and how his future actions in Heaven should be repeated in

1. $\text{śokaṃ ca tām pari-jihtrṣur ivākhilānāṃ}$
   $\text{sargā-di-kartur anukāra-rasena saureḥ}$
   $\text{tasya pramaśītīr akhilā racitā maye' ti}$
   $\text{tad-bhāva-bhāvita-manā munir āha śaśthe.}$

   Dramiḍopaniṣat-tātparya. MS.

2. $\text{kopam mama praṇaya-jām praśamayya kṛṣṇa}$
   $\text{svā-dhīnaṁ ātānute’ ti sa-vismayaḥ saḥ}$
   $\text{svyāṁ viruddha-jagad-aṅkiṣītāṁ ca tena}$
   $\text{sandarśītāṁ anubabhīva munis trītye.}$

   Ibid.

3. $\text{saṅgāṁ nivartttya mama saṃśrīti-maṇḍale māṁ}$
   $\text{saṃśthāpayan katham aśty anucoditena}$
   $\text{āścaryya-loka-tanustām api darśayīvatā}$
   $\text{vismāritaḥ kila sucaṃ hariṇāś śāme' sau.}$

   Ibid.
earth and how his behaviour to God was like that of the Gopīs, full of ardent love and eagerness. In the concluding verses, however, he says that the real vision of God can come only to a deeply devoted mind and not to external eyes.

Hooper gives some interesting translations from the Tiruvṛuttam of Nāmm'ārvār, a few of which may be quoted here to illustrate the nature of his songs of love for God:

> Long may she love, this girl with luring locks,
> Who loves the feet that heavenly ones adore,
> The feet of Kanñan, dark as rainy clouds:
> Her red eyes all abrim with tears of grief,
> Like darting Kayal fish in a deep pool.
> Hot in this village now doth blow the breeze
> Whose nature coolness is. Hath he, this once,
> The rain-cloud hued, his sceptre turned aside
> To steal the love-glow from my lady, lorn
> For tulasī, with wide eyes raining tears.

In separation from the lord the Ārvār finds delight in looking at darkness, which resembles Kṛṣṇa's colour:

> Thou, fair as Kanñan's heaven, when he's away
> What ages long it is! He here, a span!
> Whether friends stay for many days, or go,
> We grieve. Yet, be this spreading darkness blest
> In spite of many a cunning trick it has.
> What will befall my girl with bracelets fair,
> With tearful eyes like gleaming Kayal big,
> Who wanders with a secret pain at heart
> For blooms of tulasī fresh from the Bird's Lord
> Who with that hill protected flocks in storm?

The Ārvār then laments and pleads with swans and herons to take his message:

> The flying swans and herons I did beg,
> Cringing: "Forget not, ye, who first arrive,
> If ye behold my heart with Kanñan there
> Oh, speak of me and ask it 'Sir not yet
> Hast thou returned to her? And is it right?'"

1 Hymns of the Ālvārs, by J. S. M. Hooper, pp. 61-88.
2 The maid who is represented as speaking here stands for Ārvār's disciple, and the lady in love is the mistress, and Kanñan is Kṛṣṇa, the Lord.
3 This is also a speech from the maid, and tulasī stands for Kṛṣṇa.
4 The time of separation is felt to be too long, and the time of union is felt to be too short.
5 Lamentation of the mother for the girl, the Ārvār.
The Ārvār then laments that the clouds will not take his message. He speaks of the resemblance between the clouds and the Lord:

Tell me, ye clouds, how have ye won the means
That we are thus like Tirumāl’s blest form?
Bearing good water for protecting life,
Ye range through all the sky. Such penance, sure,
As makes your bodies ache, has won this grace!

The friend speaks of the callousness of the lord:

E’en in this age-long time of so-called night
When men must grope, he pities not that she
Stands in her deep immitigable grief....
The jungle traversed by the fawn-eyed girl
With fragile waist, whom sinful I brought forth
After long praise of Kaṇṇan’s lotus feet....

The Ārvār sees a likeness of his lord in the blue water-lily, and sees the lord’s form everywhere:

All places, shining like great lotus pools
On a blue mountain broad, to me are but
The beauties of his eye—the lord of earth
Girt by the roaring sea, heaven’s lord, the lord
Of other good souls, black-hued lord—and mine!

The Ārvār speaks of the greatness of the lord:

Sages with wisdom won by virtuous toil
Assert “His colour, glorious beauty, name,
His form—are such and such.” But all their toil
Has measured not the greatness of my lord:
Their wisdom’s light is but a wretched lamp.

The foster-mother pities the mistress unable to endure the length of the night:

This child of sinful me, with well-formed teeth,
Round breasts and rosy mouth, keeps saying, “These
Fair nights eternal are as my desire
For tulāsi!”....

Again the foster-mother pities the girl as too young for such ardent love:

Breasts not yet full, and short her tresses soft;
Skirt loose about the waist; with prattling tongue
And innocent eyes....
Again the lord replies to a friend’s criticism of his infatuation for his mistress:

Those lilies red, which are the life of me—
The eyes of her who’s like the heaven of him...

The mistress is unable to endure the darkness and is yet further vexed by the appearance of the moon:

Oh, let the crescent moon which cleaves the dark
Encompassing of night, cleave me as well!
Ah, does it issue forth in brightness now,
That happy bloom may come to desolate me
Who only long for flowers of tulasi?

The mistress’s friend despairs at the sight of her languishing:

...Ah! as she sobs and lisps
The cloud-hued’s names, I know not if she’ll live
Or if her frame and spirit mild must pass!

Again in Kula-śekhara’s *Tirumal-Tirumori*, C. 5:

Though red fire comes itself and makes fierce heat,
The lotus red blooms not
Save for the fierce-rayed one
Who in the lofty heavens has his seat.
Vitruvakōḍu’s Lord, Thou wilt not remove
My woe, my heart melts not save at Thy boundless love...

With gathered waters all the streams ashine
Must spread abroad and run
And enter the deep sea
And cannot stand outside. So refuge mine,
Save in the shining bliss of entering Thee, is none,
Vitruvakōḍu’s Lord, thick cloud-hued, virtuous one!¹

Again from the same book²:

No kinship with the world have I
Which takes for true the life that is not true.
“For thee alone my passion burns,” I cry,
“Raṅgan, my Lord!”

No kinship with this world have I—
With throngs of maidens slim of waist:
With joy and love I rise for one alone, and cry
“Raṅgan, my Lord!”

Again in the Tiru-pāvai, a well-known section of the Nāl-āyira-divya-prabandham, the poetess Āṇḍāḷ conceives herself as a Gopī, requesting her friends to go with her to wake the sleeping Kṛṣṇa,

After the cows we to the jungle go
And eat there—cowherds knowing nought are we,
And yet how great the boon we have, that thou
Wast born among us! Thou who lackest nought,
Gōvinda, kinship that we have with thee
Here in this place can never cease!—If through
Our love we call thee baby names, in grace
Do not be wroth, for we—like children—we
Know nought—O Lord, wilt thou not grant to us
The drum we ask? Ah, Ėlōrembāvāy!1

Again Periy-ārvār conceives himself as Yaśodā and describes the infant Kṛṣṇa as lying in the dust and calling for the moon!

(1) He rolls round in the dust, so that the jewel on his brow keeps swinging, and his waist-bells tinkle! Oh, look at my son Gōvinda’s play, big Moon, if thou hast eyes in thy face—and then, be gone!

(2) My little one, precious to me as nectar, my blessing, is calling thee, pointing, pointing, with his little hands! O big Moon, if thou wishest to play with this little black one, hide not thyself in the clouds, but come rejoicing!2

Again, Tiru-maṅgaïy says:

Or ever age creep on us, and we need
The staff’s support; ere we are double bent
With eyes fix’d on the ground in front, and feet
That totter, sitting down to rest, all spent:
We would worship Vadari
Home of him who mightily
Suck’d his feigned mother’s breast
Till she died, ogress confest.

Again Āṇḍāḷ says:

Daughter of Nandagōpāl, who is like
A lusty elephant, who fleeth not,
With shoulders strong: Nappinnāi, thou with hair
Diffusing fragrance, open thou the door!
Come see how everywhere the cocks are crowing,
And in the māṭhavi bower the Kuyil sweet
Repeats its song.—Thou with a ball in hand,
Come, gaily open, with thy lotus hands
And tinkling bangles fair, that we may sing
Thy cousin’s name! Ah, Ėlōrembāvāy!

1 Hooper, op. cit. p. 57.
Ibid. p. 37.
Thou who art strong to make them brave in fight,
Going before the three and thirty gods,
Awake from out thy sleep! Thou who art just,
Thou who art mighty, thou, O faultless one,
Who burnest up thy foes, awake from sleep!
O Lady Nappinnāi, with tender breasts
Like unto little cups, with lips of red
And slender waist, Lakshmi, awake from sleep!
Proffer thy bridegroom fans and mirrors now,
And let us bathe! Ah, Elōrembāvāy!!

In describing the essential feature of the devotion of an Ārvār like Namm'-ārvār, called also Parāṅkuśa or Śaṭhakopa, Gōvindāchāryar, the author of *The Divine Wisdom of the Drāvida Saints* and *The Holy Lives of the Āzhvārs*, says that according to Nāmm'-ārvār, when one is overcome by bhakti-exultation and self-surrendering devotion to God he easily attains truth. Nāmm'-ārvār said that God’s grace is the only means of securing our salvation, and no effort is required on our part but to surrender ourselves to Him. In the following words Nāmm'-ārvār says that God is constantly trying to woo us to love Him:

Blissful Lord, heard I; anon my eyes in floods did run,
Oh what is this? I asked. What marvel this? the Perfect one,
Through friendly days and nights, elects with me to e'er remain,
To union wooing me, His own to make; nor let me “lone.”

Nāmm'-ārvār again writes that God’s freedom is fettered by His mercy. Thus he says: “O mercy, thou hast deprived God of the freedom of His just will. Safe under the winds of mercy, no more can God Himself even of His will tear Himself away from me; for, if He can do so, I shall still exclaim, I am Victor, for He must pur-
chase the freedom of His will by denying to Himself mercy.”

Illustrating the position, he refers to the case of a devout lady who clasped the feet of the Lord in Varadarāja’s shrine at Kāṇeḻi and said: “God I have now clasped thy feet firmly; try if thou canst, spurn me and shake thyself off from me.”

Nāmm'-ārvār used the term *Tuvalīl* or *Ninru kumirume*, a Tamil expression of love, which has been interpreted as signifying a continuous whirling emotion of love boring deeper and deeper, but never scattering and passing away. This circling and boring of

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love in the heart is mute, silent and incapable of expression; like the cow, whose teats filled with milk tingle, cannot withal express by mouth her painful longing to reach her calf who is tethered away from her. Thus, true love of God is perpetual and ever growing. The difference between the love of Nāmm'-ārvār and of Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār is said to have been described by Yāmuna, as reported in the Bhagavad-vishayam, as of two different kinds. Tiru- maṅgaiy-ārvār's love expresses the experience of a constant companionship with God in a state of delirious, rapturous reciprocation of ravishing love. He was immersed in the fathomless depth of love, and was in the greatest danger of becoming unconscious and falling into a stupor like one under the influence of a narcotic. Nāmm'-ārvār, however, was in a state of urgent pursuit after God. He was thus overcome with a sense of loneliness and unconscious of his individual self. He was not utterly intoxicated. The energy flowing from a mind full and strong with the ardent expectation of meeting his bridegroom and beloved companion still sustained him and kept him alive. This state is described in Tiru-vāy-mori in the following manner:

Day and night she knows not sleep,
In floods of tears her eyes do swim.
Lotus-like eyes! She weeps and reels,
Ah! how without thee can I bear;
She pants and feels all earth for Him.

This love of God is often described as having three stages: recollection, trance and rallying. The first means the reminiscence of all the past ravishment of soul vouchsafed by God. The second means fainting and desolation at such reminiscences and a consciousness of the present absence of such ravishing enjoyments. The third is a sudden lucidity whilst in the state of trance, which being of a delirious nature may often lead to death through the rapid introduction of death-coma.

The Ārvārs were not given to any philosophical speculation but only to ecstatic experiences of the emotion of love for God; yet we sometimes find passages in Nāmm'-ārvār's works wherein he reveals his experience of the nature of soul. Thus he says: "It is not possible to give a description of that wonderful entity, the soul

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2 See the Bhagavad-vishayam, Bk. vi, p. 2865; also Divine Wisdom, pp. 130, 131.
3 Bhagavad-vishayam, Bk. vii, p. 3194; also Divine Wisdom, p. 151.
(ātmā)—the soul which is eternal, and is essentially characterized by intelligence (jnāna)—the soul which the Lord has condescended to exhibit to me as His mode, or I related to Him as the predicate is to the subject, or attribute is to substance (or consonants to the vowel A)—the soul, the nature of which is beyond the comprehension of even the enlightened—the soul, which cannot be classed under any category as this or that—the soul whose apperception by the strenuous mental effort called yoga (psychic meditation) is even then not comparable to such perception or direct proof as arises from the senses conveying knowledge of the external world—the soul (as revealed to me by my Lord) transcending all other categories of things, which could be grouped as ‘body’ or as ‘the senses,’ or as ‘the vital spirit’ (prāṇa), or as ‘the mind’ (manas), or as ‘the will’ (buddhi), being destitute of the modifications and corruptions to which all these are subject;—the soul, which is very subtle and distinct from any of these;—neither coming under the description ‘good,’ nor ‘bad.’ The soul is, briefly, an entity which does not fall under the cognizance of sense-knowledge."

Soul is here described as a pure subtle essence unassociated with impurities of any kind and not knowable in the manner in which all ordinary things are known. Such philosophical descriptions or discussions concerning the nature of reality, or an investigation into the logical or epistemological position of the religion preached by them, are not within the scope and province of the Ārvārs. They sang songs in an inspired manner and often believed that they themselves had no hand in their composition, but that it was God who spoke through them. These songs were often sung to the accompaniment of cymbals, and the intoxicating melody of the music was peculiar to the Ārvārs and entirely different from the traditional music then current in South India. A study of the works of the Ārvārs, which were collected together by the disciples of Rāmānuja at his special request, and from which Rāmānuja himself drew much inspiration and food for his system of thought, reveals an intimate knowledge of the Purānic legends of Kṛṣṇa, as found in the Viṣṇu-purāṇa and the Bhāgavata. There is at least one passage, already referred to, which may well be interpreted as

1 Divine Wisdom, p. 169; also Tiru-vāy-mori, viii. 5–8.
2 Sir R. G. Bhandarkar notes that the Ārvār Kula-śekhara, in his work Mukunda-mālā, quotes a passage from the Bhāgavata-purāṇa (xi. 2. 36) (The
alluding to Rādhā (Nappinnāi), who is described as the consort of Kṛṣṇa. The Ārvārs refer to the legends of Kṛṣṇa’s early life in Brindavan and many of them play the role either of Yośodā, the friends of Kṛṣṇa, or of the Gopis. The spiritual love which finds expression in their songs is sometimes an earnest appeal of direct longing for union with Kṛṣṇa, or an expression of the pangs of separation, or a feeling of satisfaction, and enjoyment from union with Kṛṣṇa in a direct manner or sometimes through an emotional identification with the legendary personages associated with Kṛṣṇa’s life. Even in the Bhāgavata-purāṇa ( XI, xii) we hear of devotional intoxication through intense emotion, but we do not hear of any devotees identifying themselves with the legendary personages associated with the life of Kṛṣṇa and expressing their sentiment of love as proceeding out of such imaginary identification. We hear of the Gopi’s love for Kṛṣṇa, but we do not hear of any person identifying himself with Gopi and expressing his sorrow of separation. In the Viṣṇu-purāṇa, Bhāgavata-purāṇa and the Harivamsa, the legendary love tales are only episodes in the life of Kṛṣṇa. But they do not make their devotees who identified themselves with the legendary lovers of Kṛṣṇa realize their devotion through such an imaginary identification. All that is therein expressed is that the legendary life of Kṛṣṇa would intensify the devotion of those who were already attached to Him. But the idea that the legend of Kṛṣṇa should have so much influence on the devotees as to infuse them with the characteristic spirits of the legendary personages in such a manner as to transform their lives after their pattern is probably a new thing in the history of devotional development in any religion. It is also probably absent in the cults of other devotional faiths of India. With the Ārvārs we notice for the first time the coming into prominence of an idea which achieved its culmination in the lives and literature of the devotees of the Gauḍīya school of Bengal, and particularly in the life of Caitanya, which will be dealt with in the fourth volume of the present work. The trans-

Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems, p. 70). This has been challenged by S. K. Aiyangar, in his Early History of Vaiṣṇavism in South India, who says that this passage is absent from all the three editions (a Kannada, a Grantha, and a Devanāgarī Edition) which were accessible to him (p. 28). It is further suggested there that the allusion in the passage is doubtful, because it generally occurs at the end of most South Indian books by way of an apology for the faults committed at the time of the recitation of holy verses or the performance of religious observances.
fusion of the spirits of the legendary personages in the life-history of Kṛṣṇa naturally involved the transfusion of their special emotional attitudes towards Kṛṣṇa into the devotees, who were thus led to imagine themselves as being one with those legendary personalities and to pass through the emotional history of those persons as conceived through imagination. It is for this reason that we find that, when this spirit was emphasized in the Gaudīya school and the analysis of erotic emotions made by the rhetorical school of thinkers from the tenth to the fourteenth century received recognition, the Gaudīya Vaiṣṇavas accepted the emotional analysis of the advancing stages of love and regarded them as indicating the stages in the development of the sentiment of devotion. As is well illustrated in Rūpa Gosvāmī's Ujjvala-nilā-maṇi, the transition from ordinary devotion to deep amorous sentiment, as represented in the legendary lives of Gopīs and Rādhā, was secured by sympathetic imitation akin to the sympathetic interest displayed in the appreciation of dramatic actions. The thinkers of the rhetorical school declare that a spectator of a dramatic action has his emotions aroused in such a manner that in their excess the individual limitations of time and space and the history of individual experiences which constitute his ordinary personality vanish for the time being. The disappearance of the ordinary individual personality and the overflow of emotion in one direction identify the person in an imaginary manner not only with the actors who display the emotion of the stage, but also with the actual personalities of those dramatic figures whose emotions are represented or imitated on the stage. A devotee, may, by over-brooding, rouse himself through auto-intoxication to such an emotional stage that upon the slightest suggestion he may transport himself to the imaginary sphere of a Gopī or Rādhā, and may continue to feel all the earnest affections that the most excited and passionate lover may ever feel.

It seems fairly certain that the Ārvārs were the earliest devotees who moved forward in the direction of such emotional transformation. Thus King Kula-śekhara, who was an Ārvār and devotee of Rāma, used to listen rapturously to the Rāmāyaṇa being recited to him. As he listened he became so excited that, when he heard of Rāma's venturing forth against Rāvana, his demon opponent, he used to give orders to mobilize his whole army to march forward towards Laṅkā as an ally of Rāma.
The devotional songs of the Ārvārs show an intense familiarity with the various parts of the legendary life of Kṛṣṇa. The emotions that stirred them were primarily of the types of parental affection (as of a mother to her son), of friends and companions, servants to their masters, sons to their father and creator, as also that of a female lover to her beloved. In the case of some Ārvārs, as that of Nāmm’-ārvār and Tiru-maṅgaiy-ārvār, the last-mentioned type assumes an overwhelming importance. In the spiritual experiences of these Ārvārs we find a passionate yearning after God, the Lord and Lover; and in the expressions of their love we may trace most of the pathological symptoms of amorous longings which have been so intensely emphasized in the writings of the Vaiṣṇavas of the Gauḍiya school. In the case of the latter, the human analogy involving description of the bodily charms of the female lover is often carried too far. In the case of the Ārvārs, however, the emphasis is mostly on the transcendent beauty and charm of God, and on the ardent longings of the devotee who plays the part of a female lover, for Kṛṣṇa, the God. The ardent longing is sometimes expressed in terms of the pitiable pathological symptoms due to love-sickness, sometimes by sending messengers, spending the whole night in expectation of the Lord, and sometimes in the expressions of ravishing joy felt by the seemingly actual embrace of the Lord. We hear also of the reciprocation of love on the part of the Lord, who is described as being infatuated with the beauty and charms of the beloved, the Ārvār. In the course of these expressions, the personages in the legendary account of Kṛṣṇa’s life are freely introduced, and references are made to the glorious episodes of His life, as showing points that heighten the love of the lady-lover, the Ārvār. The rapturous passions are like a whirlpool that eddies through the very eternity of the individual soul, and expresses itself sometimes in the pangs of separation and sometimes in the exhilaration of union. The Ārvār, in his ecstatic delight, visualizes God everywhere, and in the very profundity of his attainment pines for more. He also experiences states of supreme intoxication, when he becomes semi-conscious, or unconscious with occasional breaks into the consciousness of a yearning. But, though yearning after God is often delineated on the analogy of sex-love, this analogy is seldom carried to excess by studied attempts at following all the pathological symptoms of erotic love. It therefore represents a very
chaste form of the expressions of divine love in terms of human love. The Ārvārs were probably the pioneers in showing how love for God may be on terms of tender equality, softening down to the rapturous emotion of conjugal love. The Śaivism of South India flourished more or less at the same time. The hymns of the Śaivas are full of deep and noble sentiments of devotion which can hardly be excelled in any literature; but their main emphasis is on the majesty and the greatness of God and the feeling of submission, self-abnegation and self-surrender to God. The spirit of self-surrender and a feeling of clinging to God as one's all is equally dominant among the Ārvārs; but among them it melts down into the sweetness of passionate love. The Śaiva hymns are indeed pregnant with the divine fire of devotion, but more in the spirit of submissive service. Thus, Māṇikka-vāchakar, in his *Tiru-vācha kam*, speaking of Śiva, says:\(^1\):

And am I not Thy slave? and did'st Thou not make me Thine own, I pray?  
All those Thy servants have approached Thy Foot; this body full of sin I may not quit, and see Thy face—Thou Lord of Čiva-world!—I fear,  
And see not how to gain the sight!

All false am I; false is my heart; and false my love; yet, if he weep,  
May not Thy sinful servant Thee, Thou Soul's Ambrosial sweetness, gain?  
Lord of all honied gladness pure, in grace unto Thy servant teach  
The way that he may come to Thee!

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There was no love in me towards Thy Foot,  
O Half of Her with beauteous fragrant locks!  
By magic power that stones to mellow fruit  
converts, Thou mad'st me lover of Thy Feet.  
Our Lord, Thy tender love no limit knows.  
Whatever sways me now, whate'er my deed,  
Thou can'st even yet Thy Foot again to me  
display and save, O Spotless Heavenly One!

The devotee also felt the sweetness of God's love and the fact that it is through Divine Grace that one can be attracted towards Him and can love Him:

\(^1\) Pope's translation of the *Tiru vācha-kam*, p. 77.
Honey from any flower sip not, though small
as tiniest grain of millet seed!
When'e'r we think of Him, when'e'r we see,
when'e'r of Him our lips converse,
Then sweetest rapture's honey ever flows,
till all our frame in bliss dissolves!
To Him alone, the mystic Dancer, go;
and breathe His praise, thou humming-bee!

Ārvārs and Śrī-vaiśṇavas on certain points of
controversy in religious dogmas.

The Āragiyas Nathamuni, Yāmana, Rāmaṇuja and their adherents largely followed the inspirational teachings of the Ārvārs, yet there were some differences of opinion among them regarding some of the cardinal points of religious faith. These have been collected in separate treatises, of which two may be regarded as most important. One of them is called Āṣṭādaśa-rahasyārtha-vivaraṇa, by Rāmaṇuja himself, and the other is called Āṣṭādaśa-bhedā-nirṇaya.1 Veṅkaṭanātha and others also wrote important treatises on the subject. Some of these points of difference may be enumerated below.

The first point is regarding the grace of God (svāmi-krpa). It is suggested by the Ārvārs that the grace of God is spontaneous and does not depend on any effort or merit on the part of the devotee. If God had to depend on anything else for the exercise of His divine prerogative grace, it would be limited to that extent. Others, however, say that God’s grace depends on the virtuous actions of the devotees. If that were not so, all people would in time be emancipated, and there would be no need of any effort on their part. If it was supposed that God in His own spontaneity extended His grace to some in preference to others, He would have to be regarded as partial. It is therefore to be admitted that, though God is free in extending His mercy, yet in practice He extends it only as a reward to the virtuous or meritorious actions of the devotee. God, though all-merciful and free to extend His mercy to all without effort on their part, does not actually do so except on the occasion of the meritorious actions of His devotees. The extension of God’s mercy is thus both without cause (nirhetuka) and with cause (sahetuka).2

1 Both these are MSS.
2 kṛpa-sva-rāpato nir-hetukah, rākṣaṇa-samaye cetanā-kṛta-suṣṭena sa-hetuko bhūtvā rākṣati. (Āṣṭādaśa-bhedā-nirṇaya, MS. p. 2.)
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Here the latter view is that of Rāmānuja and his followers. It must, however, be pointed out in this connection that the so-called differences between the Ārvārs and the Rāmānujists on the cardinal points of religious faith are a discovery of later research, when the writings of the Ārvārs had developed a huge commentary literature and Rāmānuja’s own writings had inspired many scholars to make commentaries on his works or to write independent treatises elucidating his doctrines. The later scholars who compared the results of the Ārvār and the Rāmānuja literatures came to the conclusion that there are some differences of view between the two regarding the cardinal faith of religion. This marks a sharp antithesis between the Ārvāric Teṅgalai school and the Vaiḍagalai school, of which latter Veṅkaṭa was the leader. These differences are briefly narrated in the Aṣṭādaśa-bhedā-nirṇaya. The cardinal faith of religion according to Rāmānuja has been narrated in the Aṣṭādaśa-rahasyārtha-vivarana. The main principle of religious approach to God is self-surrender or prapatti. Prapatti is defined as a state of prayerfulness of mind to God, associated with the deep conviction that He alone is the saviour, and that there is no way of attaining His grace except by such self-surrender. The devotee is extremely loyal to Nārāyaṇa and prays to Him and no one else, and all his prayers are actuated by deep affection and no other motive. The virtue of prapatti involves within it universal charity, sympathy and friendliness even to the most determined enemy. Such a devotee feels that the Lord (svāmī), being the very nature of his own self, is to be depended on under all circumstances. This is called the state of supreme resignation (nirbhāratva) in all one’s affairs. The feeling of the devotee that none of the assigned scriptural duties can be helpful to him in attaining the highest goal

1 an-anya-sādhya svābhīṣṭe mahā-viśvāsa-pūrvakam
tad-eko' pāyata yācāḥ prapattiḥ śaranā-gatiḥ.
Aṣṭādaśa-rahasyārtha-vivarana, p. 3.

Rāmānuja, in his Gadya-trayam, says that such a state of prayerfulness of mind is also associated with confessions of one’s sins and shortcomings and derelictions, and with a feeling that the devotee is a helpless servant of God extremely anxious to get himself saved by the grace of the Saviour. See the Gadya-trayam, Saranā-gati-gadyam, pp. 52–54.

2 This is technically known as Prapatti-naśṭikam (Aṣṭādaśa-rahasyārtha-vivarana, pp. 3–7). Cf. the parables of the pigeon and the monkey in the above section.

3 The interpretation is forced out of the conception of the word “svāmin,” which etymologically involves the word “svām” meaning “one’s own.”
is technically called "upāya-sānyatā," i.e. the realization of the uselessness of all other means. The devotee always smiles at all the calamities that may befall him. Considering himself to be a servant of God, he cheerfully bears all the miseries that may be inflicted on him by God's own people. This is technically called "pāratantrya," or supreme subordination. The devotee conceives his soul as a spiritual essence which has no independence by itself and is in every respect dependent on God and exists for God. The Vaiṣṇavas are often called ekāntins, and have sometimes been wrongly considered as monotheists; but the quality of ekāntitva is the definite characteristic of self-surrender and clinging to God in an unshaken manner—the fullest trustfulness in Him under all adverse circumstances. The devotee's mind is always exhilarated with the divine presence of the Lord who animates all his senses—his inclinations, emotions and experiences. The fullness with which he realizes God in all his own activities and thoughts, and in everything else in the universe, naturally transports him to a sphere of being in which all mundane passions—antipathy, greed, jealousy, hatred—become impossible. With the divine presence of God he becomes infused with the spirit of friendship and charity towards all beings on earth.

1 jñāna-mayo hi ātmā seṣa hi paramā-tmanaḥ iti jñānā-nandamayo jñānā-nanda-guṇakah san sva-rūpaṁ bhagavad-adhānaṁ sa tad-arthaṁ eva tiṣṭhathī ti jñātvaṁ vatiṣṭhate iti yad etat tad-a-prākṛtavat.

Aṣṭādaśa-rahasyārttha-vivaraṇam, p. 11.

2 This virtue is technically called nitya-raṅgitva.

3 The five samśkaras that a paramāikāntin must pass through are as follows: vāpaḥ paṇḍras tathā nāma mantra yāgaḥ ca pañcamah amī te pañca samśkārāḥ paramāikānti-hetavah. Ibid. p. 15.

4 This is technically called sambandha-jñānīttavam. The conception that everything exists for God is technically called seṣa-bhūttavat. Ibid. p. 18.

This naturally implies that the devotee must work and feel himself a servant of God and of His chosen men. The service to humanity and to God then naturally follow from the philosophical conception of the dependence of the human souls, and of the universe, on God as a part of Him and to be controlled by Him in every way. This is again technically called seṣa-urtī-paratva. Ibid. pp. 19-20.
presence in its fullness must easily lead to the complete control of all our senses. Through the realization of God’s presence in them, the devotees play the part of moral heroes, far above the influences of the temptation of the senses. The normal religious duties, as prescribed in the Vedas and the smrtis, are only for the lower order of the people; those who are given entirely to God with the right spirit of devotion need not follow the ordinary code of duties which is generally binding for all. Such a person is released by the spontaneous grace of God, and without performing any of the scriptural duties enjoys the fruits of all. He is always conscious of his own faults, but takes no notice of the faults of others, to which he behaves almost as a blind man; he is always infused with the consciousness that all his actions are under the complete sway of the Lord. He has no enjoyment for himself, for he always feels that it is the Lord who would enjoy Himself through all his senses.

In the Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-nirñaya it is said that according to the Ārvārs, since emancipation means the discovery of a lost soul to God or the unlimited servitude of God, emancipation is for the interest of God and not of the devotee. The service of the servant is for the servitude of God alone. It has therefore no personal interest for the devotee. According to the Aragiyas, however, emancipation, though primarily for the interest of the Lord, is also

1 This is technically called the nitya-śrāvatvā.
2 jñāna-niytho vīrakto vā mad-bhakto hy a-napeksakaḥ sa lingān āśramān tyaktvā caryed a-viđhi-gocarāḥ ity evam iṣṭa-traya-vinirmuktas san bhagavan-nir-hetuka-kaṭākṣya eva mokṣa-pāyaḥ iti tīṣṭhāti khalu so’dhikārī sakala-dharmaḥnām avaiyo bhavati. Aṣṭādaśa-rahasya-rāhtarā-vīvarana, p. 23
3 This spirit of following God, leaving all other scriptural duties, is technically called a-viđhi-gocaratvā. In another section of this work Rāmānuja describes mokṣa or salvation as the conviction that the nature of God transcends, in bliss, power and knowledge, all other conceivable things of this or any other universe. A desire to cling to God as a true means of salvation is technically called numukṣa. The doctrine of a-viđhi-gocaratvā herein described seems to be in conflict with Rāmānuja’s view on the subject explained in the bhāṣya as interpreted by his many followers. This may indicate that his views underwent some change, and these are probably his earlier views when he was under the influence of the Ārvārs.

4 This is technically called parā-kāsatva (Ibid. pp. 23–24). The attitude of worshipping the image as the visible manifestation of God is technically called upāya-suvarūpa-jñāna. The cessation of attachment to all mundane things and the flowing superabundance of love towards God, and the feeling that God is the supreme abode of life, is technically called atmā-rāmatvā.

phalam mokṣa-rūpam, tad bhagavata eva na svārtham yathā pranaṣṭa-dṛṣṭa-dravya-lābhā dravyavata eva na dravyasya; tathā mokṣa-phalam ca svāmina eva
at the same time for the interest of the devotee, because of the intense delight he enjoys by being a servant of God. The illustration of lost objects discovered by the master does not hold good, because human beings are conscious entities who suffer immeasurable sorrow which is removed by realizing themselves as servants of God. Though the devotee abnegates all the fruits of his actions in a self-surrender, yet he enjoys his position in the servitude of God and also the bliss of the realization of Brahman. Thus, those who take the path of knowledge (upāsaka) attain Brahma knowledge and the servitude of God, and those who take the path of self-surrender (prapatti) also attain Brahma knowledge and the servitude of God. In the state of salvation (mukti) there is no difference of realization corresponding to the variation of paths which the seekers after God may take. Again, in the Ārvār school of thought, besides the four ways of scriptural duties, philosophic wisdom, devotion to God and devotion to teachers, there was a fifth way, viz. that of intense self-surrender to God, i.e. prapatti. But the Aragiyas thought that apart from prapatti there was only one other way of approaching God, namely devotion, bhakti-yoga. Rāmānuja and his followers maintain that karma-yoga and jñāna-yoga only help to purify the mind, as a preparation for bhakti-yoga. The devotion to the preceptor is regarded only as a form of prapatti; so there are only two ways of approach to God, viz. bhakti-yoga and prapatti.

Further, Śrī occupies an important position in Śrī-vaiṣṇavism. But as there are only three categories in the Śrī-vaiṣṇava system, a question may naturally arise regarding the position of Śrī in the threefold categories of cit, acit and paramēśvara. On this point the view of the older school, as described in Ramya-jāmāṭ r muni’s Tattva-dīpa, is that Śrī is to be identified with human souls and is therefore to be regarded as atomic in nature. Others, however, think that Śrī is as all-pervasive as Viṣṇu. Filial affection (vātsalya)
for God is interpreted by the older schools as involving an attitude in which the faults of the beloved devotee are points of endearment to Him. In the later view, however, filial affection is supposed to involve an indifference or a positive blindness towards the faults of the devotee. God’s mercy is interpreted by the older school as meaning God’s affliction or suffering in noticing that of others. Later schools, however, interpret it as an active sympathy on His part, as manifested in His desire to remove the sufferings of others on account of His inability to bear such miseries.

**Prapatti**, otherwise called nyāsa, is defined by the older school as a mere passivity on the part of the Lord in accepting those who seek Him or as a mental state on the part of the seeker in which he is conscious of himself only as a spirit; but such a consciousness is unassociated with any other complex feeling, of egoism and the like, which invests one with so-called individuality. It may also mean the mental state in which the seeker conceives himself as a subsidiary accessory to God as his ultimate end, to Whom he must cling unburdened by any idea of scriptural duties; or he may concentrate himself absolutely on the supreme interest and delight that he feels in the idea that God is the sole end of his being. Such a person naturally cannot be entitled without self-contradiction to any scriptural duty. Just as a guilty wife may return to her husband, and may passively lie in a state of surrender to him and resign herself, so the seeker may be conscious of his own true position with reference to God leading to a passive state of surrender. Others think that it involves five elements: (i) that God is the only saviour;


It is further suggested that, if a devotee takes the path of prapatti, he has not to suffer for his faults as much as others would have to suffer.

2 The first alternative is defined as para-duhkha-duhkhitvam dayā. The second alternative is svārtha-nirapekṣa-para-duhkha-sahīṣṇutā dayā; sa ca tan nirākarayecchā. In the first alternative dayā is a painful emotion; in the second it is a state of desire, stirred up by a feeling of repugnance, which is midway between feeling and volition. *Ibid.* p. 6.


According to some, any of these conditions would define prapatti “ato’prati-sedhādy-anyatamai” va iti kecit kathayanti.” *Ibid.*

(ii) that He is the only end to be attained; (iii) that He alone is the supreme object of our desires; (iv) that we absolutely surrender and resign ourselves to Him\(^1\); and (v) supreme prayerfulness—all associated with absolute trustfulness in Him.

There are some who define the prapanna, or seeker of God, as one who has read the Ārvār literature of prabandhas (adhitaprabandha prapannah). Others, however, think that the mere study of the prabandhas cannot invest a man with the qualities of prapatti. They think that he alone is entitled to the path of prapatti who cannot afford to adopt the dilatory courses of karma-yoga, jñāna-yoga and bhakti-yoga, and therefore does not think much of these courses. Again, the older school thinks that the person who adopts the path of prapatti should give up all scriptural duties and duties assigned to the different stages of life (āśrama); for it is well evidenced in the Gitā text that one should give up all one’s religious duties and surrender oneself to God. Others, again, think that the scriptural duties are to be performed even by those who have taken the path of prapatti. Further, the older school thinks that the path of knowledge is naturally against the path of prapatti; for prapatti implies the negation of all knowledge, excepting one’s self-surrendering association with God. The paths of duties and of knowledge assume an egoism which contradicts prapatti. Others, however, think that even active self-surrender to God implies an element of egoism, and it is therefore wrong to suppose that the paths of duties and of knowledge are reconcilable with prapatti on account of its association with an element of egoism. The so-called egoism is but a reference to our own nature as self, and not to ahaṅkāra, an evolute\(^2\). Again, some think that even a man who has

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\(^1\) In the second alternative it is defined as follows:

*an-anya-sādhye svā-bhūṣte mahā-viśvāsa-pūrvakam
tad-eko'-pāyata yācchā prapattiś saranā-gatiḥ.*

These are the five angas of prapatti, otherwise called nīkṣeṣa, tyāga, nyāsa or saranā-gati (Aṣṭādāsa-bheda-nīrṇaya, pp. 6, 7). The difference between the first and second alternative is that, according to the former, prapatti is a state of mind limited to the consciousness of its true nature in relation to God; on the part of God also it indicates merely a passive toleration of the seekers flocking unto Him (a-nīcāraṇa-mātram). In the second alternative, however, prapatti is defined as positive self-surrendering activity on the part of the seekers and unconditional protection to them all on the part of God. It is, therefore, that on the first alternative the consciousness of one’s own true nature is defined in three ways, any one of which would be regarded on that alternative as a sufficient definition of prapatti. The first one is merely in the cognitive state, while the second involves an additional element of voluntary effort.

adopted the path of *prapatti* may perform the current scriptural duties only with a view to not lending any support to a reference to their cases as pretexts for neglect of normal duties by the un-enlightened and the ignorant, i.e. those that have adopted the path of *prapatti* should also perform their duties for the purpose of *loka-samgraha*. Others, however, think that the scriptural duties, being the commandments of God, should be performed for the satisfaction of God (*bhagavat-prity-artham*), even by those who have taken the path of *prapatti*. Otherwise they would have to suffer punishment for that.

The accessories of *prapatti* are counted as follows: (i) A positive mental attitude to keep oneself always in consonance with the Lord's will (*ānukūlyasya sankalpaḥ*); (ii) a negative mental attitude (*prātikūlyasya varjanam*), as opposing anything that may be conceived as against His will; (iii) a supreme trustfulness that the Lord will protect the devotee (*raksisyatītī viśvāsah*); (iv) prayer to Him as a protector (*goptīteva-varanam*); (v) complete self-surrender (*ātma-nikṣepah*); (vi) a sense of complete poverty and helplessness (*kārpanyam*). The older school thinks that the man who adopts the path of *prapatti* has no desires to fulfil, and thus he may adopt any of these accessories which may be possible for him according to the conditions and inclinations of his mind. Others, however, think that even those who follow the path of *prapatti* are not absolutely free from any desire, since they wish to feel themselves the eternal servants of God. Though they do not crave for the fulfilment of any other kind of need, it is obligatory upon them to perform all the six accessories of *prapatti* described above.

The older school thinks that God is the only cause of emancipation and that the adoption of the path of *prapatti* is not so; the later school, however, thinks that *prapatti* is also recognized as the cause of salvation in a secondary manner, since it is only through *prapatti* that God extends His grace to His devotees\(^1\). Again, the older schools think that there is no necessity for expiation (*prāyaścitta*) for those who adopt the path of *prapatti*; for with them God's grace is sufficient to remove all sins. The later schools, however, think that, if the follower of the path of *prapatti* is physically fit to perform the courses of expiation, then it is obligatory on him. According to the older school a man possessing the eight kinds of devo-

\(^1\) *Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-nirṇaya*, p. 10.
tation (bhakti), even if he be a mleccha, is preferred to a Brahman and may be revered as such. According to the later schools, however, a devotee of a lower caste may be shown proper respect, but he cannot be revered as a Brahman. Again, on the subject of the possibility of pervasion of the atomic individual souls by God, the older schools are of opinion that God by His infinite power may enter into the atomic individuals; the later schools, however, think that such a pervasion must be of an external nature, i.e. from outside. It is not possible for God to penetrate into individual souls\(^1\). As regards Kaivalya the older schools say that it means only self-apperception. He who attains this state attains the highest stage of eternity or immortality. The later school, however, thinks that he who has merely this self-apperception cannot attain immortality through that means only; for this self-apperception may not necessarily mean a true revelation of his nature with reference to God. He can realize that only as he passes through higher spheres and ultimately reaches Vaikuntha—the abode of God, where he is accepted as the servant of the Lord. It is such a state that can be regarded as eternal\(^2\).

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\(^1\) \textit{Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-nirṇaya}, p. 12. The view is supported by a reference to Varadācārya’s \textit{Adhikaraṇa-cintāmani}.

\(^2\) The eighteen points of dispute as herein explained have been collected in the \textit{Aṣṭādaśa-bheda-nirṇaya}, according to the ancients in a verse quoted from them as follows:

\begin{verbatim}
bhedah svami-kṛpā-phalā-nya-gatiṣu śrī-vyāpty-upāyatvayos
tad-vātsalya-dayā-nirukti-vacasornyāse ca tat kartari
dharma-tyāga-virodhayos sva-vihite nyāśā-ūga-hetutvayoh
prāyāscitta-vidhau tadāya-bhajane nuyāpti-kaivalyayoh.
\end{verbatim}  
CHAPTER XVIII

AN HISTORICAL AND LITERARY SURVEY OF
THE VIŚIṢṬĀ-DVĀTA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

The Aṟagiyas from Nāṭhamuni to Rāmānuja.

A. GōVIDĀCHĀRYAR has written a book, *The Holy Lives of the Āḻvārs*, based upon a number of old works¹. The writings of the Āṟvārs may be sub-divided generally into three rahasyas (or mystical accounts) called *Tiru-mantra-churukku*, *Dvaya-churukku*, *Carama-sloka-churukku*. These three rahasyas have also been dealt with in later times by very prominent persons, such as Veṅkaṭanātha, Rāghavācārya and others. Some account of these, in the manner of these later writers, will be briefly given in the proper place, since the scope of this work does not permit us to go into the details of the lives of the Āṟvārs. The hagiologists make a distinction between the Āṟvārs and the Aṟagiyas in this, that, while the former were only inspired men, the latter had their inspirations modified by learning and scholarship. The list of Aṟagiyas begins with Nāṭhamuni. There is some difficulty in fixing his age. The *Guru-paramparā*, the *Divya-sūrī-carita* and the *Prapannāmṛta*, are of opinion that he was in direct contact with Nāṭhamuni, otherwise called Śaṭhakopa, or Karimārāṇ, or rather with his disciple Madhura-kaviy-āṟvār. Thus, the *Prapannāmṛta* says that Nāṭhamuni was born in the village called Viranārāyaṇa, near the Cola country. His father’s name was Īśvara Bhaṭṭa, and his son was Īśvaramuni². He went on a long pilgrimage, in the course of which he visited the northern countries, including Mathurā, Vṛndāvana and Haridvāra, and also Bengal and Purī. After returning to his own place he found that some of the

¹ (1) *Divya-sūrī-carita* (an earlier work than the *Prapannāmṛta*, which often alludes to it) by Garuda-vāhana Paṇḍita, contemporary and disciple of Rāmānuja; (2) *Prapannāmṛta*, by Ananta-sūrī, disciple of Śaila-raṅgeśa guru; (3) *Prabhanda-sūra*, by Veṅkaṭanātha; (4) *Upadeśa-ratna-mālai* by Ramyajāmātṛ-mahā-muni, otherwise called Varavara-muni or Periya-jiyar or Maṉavāla Māmuni; (5) *Guru-paramparā-prabhāvam* by Pīnbi-aṟagiyam Perū-māḷ Jiyar; and (6) *Pazhanadai-vilakkan*.

² It is said that he belonged to the lineage of Śaṭhakopa or Śatha-marṣaṇa. His other name was Śrī-raṅga-nāṭha. (See introduction to *Catuh-sloki*, Ananda Press, Madras, p. 3.)
Śrīvaiśñavas, who came from the Western countries to the temple of Rājagopāla, recited there ten verses by Kaṭimāra. Nāthamuni, who heard those hymns, realized that they were parts of a much bigger work and decided to collect them. He went to Kumbhakoṇa, and under the inspiration of God proceeded to the city of Kurakā, on the banks of Tāmraparṇī, and there met Madhura-kaviy-ārvār, the disciple of Nāmm'-ārvār, and asked him if the hymns of Nāmm'-ārvār were available. Madhura-kaviy-ārvār told him that after composing a big book of hymns in Tamil and instructing Madhura-kaviy-ārvār the same, Nāmm'-ārvār had attained salvation. The work could not, therefore, obtain currency among the people. The people of the locality had the misconception that the study of the work would be detrimental to the Vedic religion. So they threw it into the river Tāmraparṇī. Only one page of the book, containing ten verses, was picked up by a man who appreciated the verses and recited them. Thus only these ten verses have been saved. Nāthamuni recited twelve thousand times a verse composed by Madhura-kaviy-ārvār in adoration of Nāmm'-ārvār, and, as a result of that, Nāmm'-ārvār revealed the purport of the whole work to him. But when Nāthamuni wanted to know all the verses in detail he was advised to approach an artisan of the place who was inspired by Nāmm'-ārvār to reveal all the verses to him. So Nāthamuni received the entire work of Nāmm'-ārvār from the artisan. He then gave it to his pupil Puṇḍarikākṣa, and Puṇḍarikākṣa gave it to his disciple Rāma Miṣra, and Rāma Miṣra gave it to Yāmuna, and Yāmuna gave it to Goṣṭhīpurṇa, and Goṣṭhīpurṇa gave it to his daughter Devaki Śrī. Nāthamuni brought the hymns together, and, through his two nephews, Meḷaiyagaṭṭārvār and Kilaiyagaṭṭārvār, set them to music in the Vedic manner; from that time forward these hymns were sung in the temples and were regarded as the Tamil Veda.\textsuperscript{1} The oldest Guru-paramparā and Divya-sūri-carita, however, say that Nāthamuni obtained the works of Nāmm'-ārvār directly from him. The later Śrīvaiśnavas found that the above statements did not very well suit the traditional antiquity of the Ārvārs, and held that Madhura-kaviy-ārvār was not the direct disciple of Nāmm'-ārvār and that Nāthamuni attained the high age of three hundred years. But, if, as we found before, Nāmm'-ārvār's date be fixed in the ninth century, no such supposition

\textsuperscript{1} Prapannāmṛta, Chs. 106 and 107.
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becomes necessary. Gopinātha Rāu refers also to a Sanskrit inscription in the middle of the tenth century, in which it is stated that the author of the verses was a disciple of Śrīnātha. If this Śrīnātha is the same as Nāṭhamuni, then the computation of Nāṭhamuni’s date as falling in the tenth century is quite correct. He had eleven disciples, of whom Puṇḍarīkakṣa, Karukānātha and Śrīkṛṣṇa Lakṣmīnātha were the most prominent. He wrote three works, Nyāya-tattva, Puruṣa-ninnaya and Yoga-rahasya. Nāṭhamuni is also described as a great yogin who practised the yoga of eight accessories (aṣṭāṅga-yoga). The Prapannāmṛta says that he died by entering into yoga in the city of Āgaṅgā (probably Gaṅgikondacholapuram). Gopi-nātha, however, thinks that he could not have died in that city, for it was not founded by Rajaṅdracola, otherwise called Gaṅgikondasolā, before 1024, which must be later than the date of Nāṭhamuni. Nāṭhamuni lived probably in the reign of Parāntaka Cola I, and died before or in the reign of Parāntaka Cola II, i.e. he lived eighty or ninety years in the middle of the tenth century. He had made an extensive tour in Northern India as far as Mathurā and Badarī-nātha and also to Dvārakā and Purī. Śrīkṛṣṇa Lakṣmīnātha, disciple of Nāṭhamuni, wrote an extensive work on the doctrine of prapatti. He was born at a place called Kṛṣṇamaṅgala. He was well-versed in the Vedas, and was a specialist in Vedānta and also a great devotee, who constantly employed himself in chanting the name of Viṣṇu (nāma-sanīkīrtana-rataḥ). He used often to go about naked and live on food that was thrown to him. The hagiologists say that he entered into the image of the temple and became one with God. Puṇḍa-

1 The Nyāya-tattva is referred to by Veṅkaṭanātha in his Nyāya-pariśuddhi (p. 13) as a work in which Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtras were criticized and refuted:

   bhagavan-nātha-munibhir nyāya-tattva-samāhvayā
   avadhiryā kṣapādādān nyāya-paddhatih

   Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 13.

2 The practice of aṣṭāṅga-yoga was not a new thing with Nāṭhamuni. In giving an account of Tiru-mariṣai Pirān, also called Bhaktisāra, the Prapannāmṛta says that he first became attached to the god Śiva and wrote many Tamil works on Śaiva doctrines; but later on the saint Mahārya initiated him into Vaishnavism and taught him aṣṭāṅga-yoga, through which he realized the great truths of Vaishnavism. He then wrote many works in Tamil on Vaishnavism. Bhakti-sāra also wrote a scholarly work, refuting the views of other opponents, which is known as Tattvārthasa. Bhakti-sāra also used to practise aṣṭāṅga-yoga and was learned in all the branches of Indian philosophy. Bhakti-sāra had a disciple named Kanikṛṣṇa, who wrote many extremely poetical verses or hymns in adoration of Viṣṇu. Kula-śekhara Peru-māl is also said to have practised yoga.
rikākṣa Uyyakondār is supposed to have very much influenced the character of Kurukāṇātha, who in the end entered into yoga and died. Rāma Miśra was born in the city of Saugandhakulya, in a Brahmin family, and was a pupil of Puṇḍarikākṣa. The name of Puṇḍarikākṣa’s wife was Āṇḍāl. Puṇḍarikākṣa asked Rāma Miśra (Manakkal-lambej) to teach Yāmuna all that he was taught. Yāmuna, however, was not born during the life of Puṇḍarikākṣa, and Puṇḍarikākṣa only prophesied his birth in accordance with the old prophecy of Nāthamuni. Rāma Miśra had four disciples, excluding Yāmuna, of whom Lakṣmī was the most prominent. He used to stay in Śrīraṅgam and expound the doctrines of the Vedānta.

Yāmunaçārya, otherwise called Ālavandār, son of Īśvaramuni and grandson of Nāthamuni, was born probably in a.D. 918 and is said to have died in a.D. 1038. He learned the Vedas from Rāma Miśra, and was reputed to be a great debater. Becoming a king, he was duly married and had two sons named Vararaṅga and Śoṭṭhapūrṇa. He lived happily for a long time, enjoying his riches, and took no notice of Rāma Miśra. But Rāma Miśra with some difficulty obtained access to him and availed himself of the opportunity to teach him the Bhagavad-gītā, which aroused the spirit of detachment in him, and he followed Rāma Miśra to Śrīraṅgam and, renouncing everything, became a great devotee.

1 (1) Taivattuk-k-arasu-Nambi; (2) Gomathattut-tiruvinnagar-appan; (3) Sirup-pullur-udaya-Pillai; (4) Vangi-puratt-acchi. (See The Life of Rāmānuja, by Govindāchāryar, p. 14.)

2 The Prapannāmṛta relates a story of Yāmuna’s debating power at the age of twelve. The king of the place of the name of Akkaialvan, who was a great debater. Yāmuna challenged him and defeated him in an open debate held in the court of the king. He was given half the kingdom as a reward. He seems to have been very arrogant in his earlier days, if the wording of his challenge found in the Prapannāmṛta can be believed. The words of challenge run as follows:

ā sailād adri-kanyā-carāṇa-hisalaya-nyāsa-dhanyopakaṇṭhād
ā rakṣo-ntta-sītā-mukha-kamala-samullāsa-hetoś ca setoḥ
ā ca prācyā-praticya-kṣiit-dhara-yuga tadarhacandvataṃsaṃ
dīnāṃśa-sāstra-yugma-īrama-cimāla-maṇā nyayatāni mādṛśo’nyaḥ

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3 A story is told in the Prapannāmṛta that, when Yāmuna became a king and inaccessible to him, Rāma Miśra was concerned how he could carry out the commands of his teachers and initiate Yāmuna to the path of devotion. He got in touch with Yāmuna’s cook, and for six months presented some green vegetables (aiarka-śikha) which Yāmuna very much liked. When, after the six months, the king asked how the rare vegetables found their way into the kitchen, Rāma Miśra stayed away for four days praying to Raṅganātha, the deity, to tell him how he could approach Yāmuna. In the meanwhile the king missed the green vegetables and asked his cook to present Rāma Miśra when next he should come to the kitchen. Rāma Miśra was thus presented to Yāmuna.
instructions of Rāma Misra was to direct him to go to Kurukānātha (Kurugai-kkaval-appan) and learn from him the āstāṅga-yoga, which had been left with him (Kurukā) by Nathamuni for Yamuna. Yamuna had many disciples, of whom twenty-one are regarded as prominent. Of these disciples, Mahāpūrṇa belonged to the Bhāradvāja gotra, and had a son named Puṇḍarikākṣa and a daughter named Attutaiyī. Another disciple, called Śrisailapūrṇa, was known also by the name Tātācārya. Another of his disciples, Goṣṭhīpūrṇa, was born in the Pāṇḍya country, where also, in the city of Śrīmadhurā, was born another of Yamuna’s disciples, Mālādhara. In the city of Maraner in the Pāṇḍya country was born another disciple, Maraner Nambi, a śūdra by caste; a further disciple, Kaṅcīpūrṇa, who was also of the śūdra caste, was born in the city of Punamalli. Yamuna used to invest all his disciples with the five Vaiṣṇava saṃskāras, and he also converted the Cola king and queen to the same faith and made over the kingdom he had hitherto enjoyed to the service of the deity Raṅganātha of Śrīraṅgam. Śrisailapūrṇa, or Bhūri Śrisailapūrṇa, or Mahāpūrṇa had two sons, two sisters and two daughters. The elder sister, Kāntimati, was married to Keśava Yajvan, also called Āsuri Keśava, Rāmānuja’s father, and the second sister, Dyutimati, was married to Kanalākṣa Bhāṭṭa, and a son was born to them called Govinda. Kuresā, who was long in association with Rāmānuja, was born of Ananta Bhāṭṭa and Mahādevī, and this Kuresā was the father of Anantācārya, writer of the Prapannāmṛta. Dāsāraṭhī was born of Ananta Dīkṣita, of Vadhūla gotra, and Lakṣmī. Dāsāraṭhī had a son called Kaṇḍādaṇāṭha, who was also called Rāmānujaḍāsa. They are all associates of Rāmānuja, who had seventy-four prominent disciples.

Yamuna was very fond of Nāmm’-āṭvār’s works, the doctrines of which were often explained to the people. Yamuna wrote six works: (i) Stotra-ratnam, in adoration to the deity Varada; (ii) Catuḥ-śloki; (iii) Agama-prāmāṇya; (iv) Siddhi-traya; (v) Gitārtha-samgraha; (vi) Mahā-puruṣa-nirṇaya. Of these the Siddhi-traya is the most important, and the section on Yamuna in this volume has been based almost entirely on it. The Agama-prāmāṇya is a work in which he tries to establish the high antiquity and undisputed
authority of the Pañcarātra literature, which is supposed to be the
canon of the Śrīvaiṣṇavas. The Stotra-ratnam, Catuh-ślokī and
Gitārtha-samgraha were all commented upon by various persons,
but the most important of the commentaries is that of Veṇkaṭanātha¹.
The Stotra-ratnam consists of sixty-five verses in which Yāmuna de-
scribes the beauty of the Lord Kṛṣṇa, as set forth in the Purāṇas, and
confesses to Him the deep affliction of all his sins and guilt, frailties
and vices, and asks for forgiveness of them. He also describes the
greatness of the Lord as transcendent and surpassing the greatness
of all other deities, as the supreme controller and Upholder of the
universe. He narrates his own complete surrender to Him and en-
tire dependence on His mercy. If the mercy and grace of the Lord
be so great, there is none so deserving of mercy in his wretchedness
as a sinner. If the sinner is not saved, the mercy of the Lord be-
comes meaningless. The Lord requires the sinner in order to
realize Himself as the all-merciful. Yāmuna further describes how
his mind, forsaking everything else, is deeply attracted to the Lord;
and the sense of his supreme helplessness and absolute abnegation².
The devotee cannot bear any delay in his communion with God,
and is extremely impatient to meet Him; it is galling to him that
God should heap happiness after happiness on him and thus keep
him away. The fundamental burden of the hymns is an expression
of the doctrine of prapatti; this has been very clearly brought out
in the commentary of Veṇkaṭanātha. It is said that it was after
reading these hymns that Rāmānuja became so deeply attracted to
Yāmuna. The Catuh-ślokī consists of only four verses in praise of
Śrī or Lakṣmi³.

In the Gitārtha-samgraha Yāmuna says that the means to the

¹ The commentary on the Catuh-ślokī by Veṇkaṭanātha is called Rahasya-
raḵşa, and the commentary on the Stotra-ratnam goes also by the same name.
The commentary on the Gitārtha-samgraha, by Veṇkaṭanātha, is called Gitārtha-
samgraha-raḵsha.

² Two specimen verses may be quoted from the Stotra-ratnam:
na dharma-miśho’smi na cā’ tma-vedi na bhaktimāṁś tvac-caraṇā-ravinde
a-kincano nā’n ya-gatiś śaṇanyā tvat-pāda-mūlaṁ śaṇaṁ praṇadey.

 Śl. 22.

na ninditaṁ karma tad asti loke
sahasraśo yan na mayā vyadhāyi
soḥ ham viṣṭa-vasare mukunda
krandāmi sampratī a-gatis tavāgre. Śl. 23.

³ Veṇkaṭanātha, in his commentary on the Catuh-ślokī, discusses the position
of Lakṣmi according to the Vaiṣṇava tradition. Lakṣmi is regarded as a being

7-2
attainment of the ultimate goal of life is devotion, which is produced as a result of the performance of scriptural duties and the emergence of self-knowledge. According to Yamuna, yoga in the Gitā means bhakti-yoga. So the ultimate object of the Gitā is the propounding of the supreme importance of bhakti (devotion) as the ultimate object, which requires as a precedent condition the performance of the scriptural duties and the dawning of the true spiritual nature of the self as entirely dependent on God.

It is related in the Prapannāṁṛta that Yamuna was anxious to meet Rāmānuja, but died immediately before Rāmānuja came to meet him. So Rāmānuja could only render the last homage to his dead body.

Rāmānuja².

It has already been said that Mahāpurṇa (Nambi), disciple of Yamuna, had two sisters, Kantimati and Dyutimati, of whom the former was married to Keśava Yajvan or Āsuri Keśava of Bhūtapuri and the latter to Kamalākṣa Bhaṭṭa. Rāmānuja (Ilāya Perumal), son of Keśava Yajvan, was born in A.D. 1017. He received his training, together with his mother’s sister’s son Govinda Bhaṭṭa, from Yādavaprakāśa, a teacher of Vedānta of great reputation. The details of Yādavaprakāśa’s views are not known, but it is very probable that he was a monist³. Before going to study with different from Nārāyaṇa, but always associated with Him. He thus tries to refute all the views that suppose Lakṣmī to be a part of Nārāyaṇa. Lakṣmī should also not be identified with māyā. She is also conceived as existing in intimate association with Nārāyaṇa and, like a mother, exerting helpful influence to bring the devotees into the sphere of the grace of the Lord. Thus Lakṣmī is conceived to have a separate personality of her own, though that personality is merged, as it were, in the personality of Nārāyaṇa and all His efforts, and all her efforts are in consonance with the efforts of Nārāyaṇa (parasparā-mukulatayā sarvatra sāmakāraṇam). On the controversial point whether Lakṣmī is to be considered a jīva and therefore atomic in nature, the problem how she can then be all-pervasive, and the view that she is a part of Nārāyaṇa, Venkāṭānātha says that Lakṣmī is neither jīva nor Nārāyaṇa, but a separate person having her being entirely dependent on God. Her relation to Nārāyaṇa can be understood on the analogy of the relation of the rays to the sun or the fragrance to the flower.

1. svadharma-jñāna-vairāgya-sādhyā-bhakty-eka-gocaraḥ
nārāyaṇaḥ param brahma gitā-stāstre samuditaḥ

Gītārtha-saṁgraha, verse 1.

² Most of the details of Rāmānuja’s life are collected from the account given in the Prapannāṁṛta by Anantacārya, a junior contemporary of Rāmānuja.

³ Yadava held that Brahman, though by its nature possessing infinite qualities, yet transforms itself into all types of living beings and also into all kinds of inanimate things. Its true nature is understood when it is realized that it is one
Yādavaprakāśa, Rāmānuja was married at the age of sixteen, by his father, who died shortly afterwards. His teacher Yādavaprakāśa lived in Kāṇḍī. So Rāmānuja left Bhūtapuri his native place with his family and went to Kāṇḍī. In the early days of his association with Yādavaprakāśa, it is said that Yādavaprakāśa became annoyed with him, because he had cured the daughter of a certain chief of the place from possession by a spirit, which his teacher Yādavaprakāśa had failed to do. Shortly after this there was a difference of opinion between Yādava and Rāmānuja on the interpretation of certain Upaniṣad texts, which Yādava interpreted in the monistic manner, but Rāmānuja on the principle of modified dualism. Yādava became very much annoyed with Rāmānuja and arranged a plot, according to which Rāmānuja was to be thrown into the Ganges while on a pilgrimage to Allahabad. Govinda divulged the plot to Rāmānuja, who was thus able to wander away from the company and retire to Kāṇḍī, after suffering much trouble on the way. While at Kāṇḍī he became associated with a devout person of the śūdra caste, called Kāṇcīpūrṇa. Later Rāmānuja was reconciled to his teacher and studied with him. When Yāmuna once came to Kāṇḍī he saw Rāmānuja at a distance among the students of Yādava marching in procession, but had no further contact with him, and from that time forward was greatly anxious to have Rāmānuja as one of his pupils. Rāmānuja again fell out with his teacher on the meaning of the text kapyāśam puṇḍarīkam (Chāndogya, p. 167). As a result of this quarrel, Rāmānuja was driven out by Yādava. Thenceforth he became attached to the worship of Nārāyaṇa on Hastisaila in Kāṇḍī, where he first heard the chanting of the Stotra-ratnam of Yāmuna by Mahāpūrṇa, his maternal uncle and pupil of Yāmuna. From Mahāpūrṇa Rāmānuja learnt much of Yāmuna and started for Śrīraṅgam with him. But before he could reach Śrīraṅgam Yāmuna died. It is said that after his death three fingers of Yāmuna were found to be twisted and Rāmānuja thought that this signified three unfulfilled desires: (1) to convert the people to the prapattī doctrine of Vaiṣṇavism, making them well versed in
the works of the Ārvārs; (2) to write a commentary to the Brahmasūtra according to the Śrīvaisāna school; (3) to write many works on Śrīvaisānavism. Rāmānuja, therefore, agreed to execute all these three wishes. He returned to Kāṇcī and became attached to Kāṇcipūrṇa, the disciple of Yāmuna, as his teacher. Later he set out for Śrīraṅgam and on the way was met by Mahāpūrṇa, who was going to Kāṇcī to bring him to Śrīraṅgam. He was then initiated by Mahāpūrṇa (the ācārya), according to the fivefold Vaiṣṇava rites (pāṇca-saṃskāra). Rāmānuja, being annoyed with his wife’s discourteous treatment with Mahāpūrṇa’s wife, and also with people who came to beg alms, sent her by a ruse to her father’s house, and renounced domestic life when he was about 30 or 32 years of age. After establishing himself as a sannyāsin, his teaching in the Śastra began with Dāsarathī, son of his sister, and Kūrana, son of Anantabhaṭṭa. Yādavaprakāśa also became a disciple of Rāmānuja. Eventually Rāmānuja left for Śrīraṅgam and dedicated himself to the worship of Raṅgaśa. He learnt certain esoteric doctrines and mantras from Goṣṭhipūrṇa who had been initiated into them by his teacher. Later on Rāmānuja defeated in discussion a Śaṅkarite named Yajñamūrti, who later became his disciple and wrote two works in Tamil called Jñāna-sāra and Prameya-sāra. He now had a number of well reputed disciples such as Bhaktagrāma-pūrṇa, Marudha-grāma-pūrṇa, Anantārya, Vara-dācārya and Yajñēśa. Rāmānuja first wrote his Gadya-traya. He then proceeded to the Śaradā-mātha with Kuresa, otherwise called Śrīvatṣāṅka Miśra or Kuruttālyan, procured the manuscript of the Bodhāyana-ṣṭiti, and started towards Śrīraṅgam. The keepers of the temple, however, finding the book missing, ran after him and

1 Prapannāmṛta, IX, p. 26. The interpretation of this passage by Govindācārya and Ghoṣa seems to me to be erroneous; for there is no reference to Śaṭhakopa here. Kuresa, or Śrīvatṣāṅka Miśra, had two sons; one of them was baptized by Rāmānuja as Parāśara Bhāttārya and the other as Rāmadeśika. Rāmānuja’s maternal cousin, Govinda, had a younger brother, called Bāla Govinda, and his son was baptized as Parāṅkuśa-pūrṇārya.

2 The name of Dāsarathī’s father is Anantaḍikṣita.

3 His baptismal name was Govindadāsa. After his conversion he wrote a book entitled Yati-dharma-samuccaya. This Govindadāsa must be distinguished from Govinda, son of the aunt of Rāmānuja, who had been converted to Śaivism by Yādavaprakāśa and was reconverted to Śrīvaisānavism by his maternal uncle Śrīsailapūrṇa, pupil of Yāmuna. Govinda had married, but became so attached to Rāmānuja that he renounced the world. Śrīsailapūrṇa wrote a commentary on the Sahasra-gūḍṭi. Rāmānuja had another disciple in Pundarikākṣa, Mahāpūrṇa’s son.

4 His baptismal names were Devarat and Devamānātha.
took it away. Fortunately, however, Kureśa had read the book during the several nights on the way, had remembered its purport and so was able to repeat it. Rāmānuja thus dictated his commentary of Śrī-bhāṣya, which was written down by Kureśa. He also wrote Vedānta-dīpa, Vedānta-sāra and Vedārtha-samgraha. The Śrī-bhāṣya was written probably after Rāmānuja had made extensive tours to Tirukkovalur, Tirupati, Tiruppūṭkuli, Kumbhakoṇam, Ālāṅkōoil, Tiruppullani, Ārvār-Tirunagari, Tirukkurungudi, Tiruvanparisaram, Tiruvattar, Tiruvanandapuram, Tiruvallikeṇi, Tirunirmalai, Madhurantakam and Tiruvaigundipuram. Later on he made extensive tours in Northern India to Ajmir, Mathurā, Brindāvan, Ayodhyā and Bādarī, defeating many heretics. He also went to Benares and Purī and at the latter place established a matha. He forcibly tried to introduce the Pañcarātra rites into the temple of Jagannātha, but failed. According to the Rāmānujārya-dīvya-charitai, the Śrī-bhāṣya was completed in 1077 saka or A.D. 1155, though two-thirds of the work were finished before the Cola persecution began. But this date must be a mistake; for Rāmānuja died in 1059 saka or A.D. 1137. The eyes of Mahāpūrṇa (Periyalnāmbi) and Kureśa were put out by the Cola king Koluttunga I, probably in the year 1078-1079, and this must be the date when Rāmānuja was forced to take refuge in the Hoysala country. It was in A.D. 1117, on the death of Koluttunga I, that Rāmānuja again returned to Śrīraṅgam, where he met Kureśa and finished the Śrī-bhāṣya. In a Madhva work called Chalaṇi-smṛti it is said that in 1049 saka, that is A.D. 1127, it was already an established work. It is therefore very probable that the Śrī-bhāṣya was completed between A.D. 1117 and 1127. Gopī-nātha Rāu thinks that it was completed in A.D. 1125.

Rāmānuja fled in the garb of an ordinary householder from

1 Rāmānuja had asked Kureśa to check him if he were not correctly representing the Bodhayana-trīttī, and in one place at least there was a difference of opinion and Rāmānuja was in the wrong.

2 See Gopī-nātha Rāu’s Lectures, p. 34, footnote.

3 See Ibid.

4 Rāmānujārya-dīvya-charitai (a Tamil work), p. 243, quoted in Gopī-nātha Rāu’s Lectures.


Chalaṇi-smṛti, quoted in Gopī-nātha Rāu’s Lectures, p. 35.
The Visistā-dvaita School

Śrīrangam to Toṇḍāṇuṛ, to escape from the persecution of Koluttuṅga I or Rājendra Cola, otherwise called Kṛṣṇikanṭha, a Śaiva king. He was successful in converting the Jain king Bittideva of the Hoysala country, who was renamed Viṣṇuvardhanadeva after the Vaiṣṇava fashion. Mr Rāu says that this conversion took place some time before A.D. 10991. With the help of this king he constructed the temple Tirunarayanapperumal at Melukot (Yādavādri), where Rāmānuja lived for about twelve years2. According to the Rāmānujārya-dīvya-charitai Rāmānuja lived for eleven years after his return to Śrīrangam (some time after the death of Koluttuṅga I in 1118) and died in A.D. 1137. He thus enjoyed an extraordinary long life of one hundred and twenty years, which was spread over the reigns of three Cola kings, Koluttuṅga I (A.D. 1070–1118), Vikrama Cola (A.D. 1118–1135), and Koluttuṅga II (A.D. 1123–1146)3. He had built many temples and mathas in his lifetime, and by converting the temple superintendent of Śrīraṅgam got possession of the whole temple.

Rāmānuja’s successor was Parāśara Bhaṭṭārya, son of Kureśa, who wrote a commentary on the Sahasra-gīti. Rāmānuja had succeeded in securing a number of devoted scholars as his disciples, and they carried on his philosophy and forms of worship through the centuries. His religion was catholic, and, though he followed the rituals regarding initiation and worship, he admitted Jains and Buddhists, Śūdras and even untouchables into his fold. He himself was the pupil of a Śūdra and used to spend a long time after his bath in the hut of an untouchable friend of his. It is said that he ruled over 74 episcopal thrones, and counted among his followers 700 ascetics, 12,000 monks and 300 nuns (Keṭṭi ammās). Many kings and rich men were among his disciples. Kureśa, Daśarathi, Naḍādur Ārṇā and the Bhaṭṭāra were dedicated to scholarly discourses. Yajñaṁūrti performed the function of the priest; one disciple was in charge of the kitchen; Vaṭāpūrṇa or Andhrapūrṇa and Gomāṭham Siṭṭivārvān were in charge of various kinds of personal service; Dhanurdāsa was trea-

1 Mr Rice, however, says in the Mysore Gazetteer, vol. 1, that the conversion took place in 1039 sāka or A.D. 1117. But Rāu points out that in the Epigraphia Carnatica we have inscriptions of Biṭṭideva as early as sāka 1023 (No. 34 Arsiker), which call him Viṣnu-vardhana.

2 The general tradition is that Rāmānuja kept away from Śrīraṅgam for a total period of twelve years only; but Rāu holds that this period must be about twenty years, of which twelve years were spent in Yādavādri.

Rāmānuja

surer; Ammaṅgi of boiled milk; Ukkal Ārvān served meals; Ukkal-ammal fanned, and so on. Rāmānuja converted many Saivas to Vaiṣṇavism, and in the conflict between the Śaivas and the Vaiṣṇavas in his time; though he suffered much at the hands of the Cola king Kṛmikanṭha who was a Śaiva, yet Kṛmikanṭha's successor became a Vaiṣṇava and his disciple, and this to a great extent helped the cause of Śrīvaiṣṇavism.

The sources from which the details of Rāmānuja's life can be collected are as follows: (1) Divya-sūri-charitai, written in Tamil by Garuḍavāha, a contemporary of Rāmānuja; (2) Gurū-paramparā-prabhāva, written in maṇipracalā in the early part of the fourteenth century by Pinb-āragiya Perū-māl Jiyar; (3) Pillai Lokamjiyar’s Rāmānujayya-divya-charitai, written in Tamil; (4) Ānbillai Kaṇḍādaiyappan’s brief handbook of Ārvārs and Aragiyas called Periya-tiru-mudiy-adaiva, written in Tamil; (5) Prappannāmyta, by Anantācārya, a descendant of Andhrapūrṇa, and pupil of Śailarāngeśa-guru; (6) the commentaries on the Tiru-vāy-mori which contain many personal reminiscences of the Aragiyas; (7) other epigraphical records.

The Precursors of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Philosophy and the contemporaries and pupils of Rāmānuja.

The bheda-bheda interpretation of the Brahma-sūtras is in all probability earlier than the monistic interpretation introduced by Śaṅkara. The Bhagavad-gītā, which is regarded as the essence of the Upaniṣads, the older Purāṇas, and the Pañcarātra, dealt with in this volume, are more or less on the lines of bheda-bheda. In fact the origin of this theory may be traced to the Puruṣa-sūkta. Apart from this, Dramiḍācārya, as Yāmuna says in his Siddhi-traya, explained the Brahma-sūtra, and that it was further commented upon by Śrīvatsāṅka Miśra. Bodhāyana, referred to by Rāmānuja as Vṛttī-kāra and by Śaṅkara as Upavarsa, wrote on the Brahma-sūtras a very elaborate and extensive vṛtti, which formed the basis of Rāmānuja's bhāṣya. Ānandagiri also refers

1 The Life of Rāmānuja, by Govindachāryar, p. 218.
2 Venkaṭanātha in his Tattva-tīkhī says “Vṛttī-kāraśya Bodhāyanasyaśya hi Upavarsa iti syān nāma.” In his Seśvara-mimāṃsā, however, he refutes the view of Upavarsa, for in the Vaivāyanti lexicon Kṛtakoṭi and Halabhūti are said to be names of Upavarsa.

See also the second volume of the present work, p. 43 n.
to Drāviḍa-bhāṣya as being a commentary on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, written in a simple style (ṛju-vivarāṇa) previous to Śaṅkara’s attempt. In the Saṁkṣeṣa-pārīraka (III. 217–27) a writer is referred to as Atreya and Vākya-kāra, and the commentator Rāmatirtha identifies him with Brahmanandin. Rāmānuja, in his Vedārtha-samgraha, quotes a passage from the Vākya-kāra and also its commentary by Drāmiḍācārya. While the Vākya-kāra and Drāmiḍācārya, referred to by Rāmānuja, held that Brahman was qualified, the Drāmiḍācārya who wrote a commentary on Brahmanandin’s work was a monist and is probably the same person as the Drāmiḍācārya referred to by Anandagiri in his commentary on Śaṅkara’s bhāṣyopadgīta on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. But the point is not so easily settled. Sarvajñātma muni, in his Saṁkṣeṣa-pārīraka, refers to the Vākya-kāra as a monist. It is apparent, however, from his remarks that this Vākya-kāra devoted the greater part of his commentary to upholding the parināma view (akin to that of Bhāskara), and introduced the well known example of the sea and its waves with reference to the relation of Brahman to the world, and that it was only in the commentary on the sixth prāṇāhaka of the Chāndogya that he expounded a purely monistic view to the effect that the world was neither existent nor non-existent. Curiously enough, the passage referred to Sarvajñātma muni as proving decidedly the monistic conclusion of Atreya Vākya-kāra, and his commentator the Drāmiḍācārya is referred to by Rāmānuja in his Vedārtha-samgraha, as being favourable to his own view. Rāmānuja, however, does not cite him as Brahmanandin, but as Vākya-kāra. The commentator of the Vākya-kāra is referred to by Rāmānuja also as Drāmiḍācārya. But though Sarvajñātma muni also cites him as Vākya-kāra, his commentator, Rāmatirtha, refers to him as Brahmanandin and the Vākya-kāra’s commentator as Drāmiḍācārya, and interprets the term “Vākya-kāra” merely as “author.” Sarvajñātma muni, how-

1 Vedārtha-samgraha, p. 138. The Vākya-kāra’s passage is “yuktam tad-guṇopāsanād,” and Drāmiḍācārya’s commentary on it is “yady-api sać-citto na nirbhujna-dāvivatam guṇa-ganam mamasā nudhāveta tathāpy antar-guṇam eva deva-tām bhujata iti tatrāpi sa-guṇa’va devatatā prāpyata iti.” The main idea of these passages is that, even if God be adored as a pure qualityless being, when the final release comes it is by way of the realization of God as qualified.

MM.S. Kuppusvāmi Sāstrī, M.A., identifies Drāmiḍācārya with Tiru-maṅsaï Pirān, who lived probably in the eighth century A.D. But the reasons adduced by him in support of his views are unconvincing. See Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1924, pp. 468–473.
ever, never refers to Brahmanandin by name. Since the passage quoted in the *Samkṣeṣa-pāda-sārīraka* by Sarvajñātma muni agrees with that quoted by Rāmānuja in his *Vedārtha-saṃgraha*, it is certain that the *Vākyka-kāra* referred to by Sarvajñātma muni and Rāmānuja, and the Dramiḍācārya referred to by Sarvajñātma, Rāmānuja and Ānandagiri are one and the same person. It seems, therefore, that the *Vākyka-kāra*’s style of writing, as well as that of his commentator Dramiḍācārya, was such that, while the monists thought that it supported their view, the Śrīvaiṣṇavas also thought that it favoured them. From Sarvajñātma muni’s statement we understand that the *Vākyka-kāra* was also called Ātreyya, and that he devoted a large part of his work in propounding the *bheda-bheda* view. Upavarṣa is also referred to by Śaṅkara as a reputed exponent of the Mīmāṃsa philosophy and the *Bṛhma-sūtra*; and as having been the author of one *tantra* on Mīmāṃsa and another on the *Bṛhma-sūtra*¹. Our conclusion, therefore, is that we have one *Vākyka-kāra* who wrote a commentary on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, and that he had a commentator who wrote in a clear and simple style and who was known as Dramiḍācārya, though he wrote in Sanskrit and not in Tamil. If we believe in Rāmatīrtha’s identification, we may also believe that his name was Brahmanandin. But, whoever he may be, he was a very revered person in the old circle, as the epithet “*bhagavān*” has been applied to him by Sarvajñātma muni. Regarding Upavarṣa we may say that he also was a very revered person, since Śaṅkara applies the epithet “*bhagavat*” to him, and quotes him as an ancient authority in his support. He seems to have flourished sometime before Śabara Svāmin, the great Mīmāṃsa commentator². Ānandagiri and Venkaṭanātha, in the fourteenth century, identify Upavarṣa with the *Vṛtti-kāra*, and Venkaṭanātha further identifies

¹ *ata eva ca bhagavatra*  pavaṃṣeṇa prathame tantrye ātmā-sitvā-bhidhāna-prasaktvau sārīrake vyakṣyāma ity uddhāraḥ kṛtaḥ. Śaṅkara’s *bhāṣya* on *Bṛhma-sūtra*, III. 3. 53.

² Savara, in his *bhāṣya* on the *Mīmāṃsa-sūtra*, I. 1. 5, refers to Upavarṣa with the epithet “*bhagavān*” on the subject of *sphoṭa*. 
him in a conjectural manner with Bodhayana. Even if Upavarsa was the *Vṛtti-kāra*, it is doubtful whether he was Bodhayana. On
this point we have only the conjectural statement of Venkaṭanātha referred to above. Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1. 3. 28, refers again to Upavarsa in support of his refutation of the *sphoṭa* theory. But this point is also indecisive, since neither Śaṅkara nor the Śrīvaïśnavas admit the *sphoṭa* theory. There seems, however, to be little evidence. We are therefore not in a position to say anything about Upavarsa, the *Vṛtti-kāra* and Bodhayana. If the testimony of the *Prapannāmṛta* is to be trusted, Bodhayana's *Vṛtti* on the *Brahma-sūtra* must have been a very elaborate work, and Dramiḍācārya's work on the *Brahma-sūtra* must have been a very brief one. This was the reason why Rāmānuja attempted to write a commentary which should be neither too brief nor too elaborate.

Now we have in MS. a small work called *Brahma-sūtrārtha-saṅgraha* by Śaṭhakopa, and we do not know whether this is the Dramiḍā commentary referred to in the *Prapannāmṛta*. Yāmuna, in his *Siddhi-traya*, refers to a *bhāṣya-kāra* and qualifies him as "parimīta-gambhirā-bhāṣiṇā," which signifies that it was a brief treatise pregnant with deep sense. He further says that this *bhāṣya* was elaborated by Śrīvaṭsaṅka-Miśra. The views of these two writers were probably consonant with the views of the Śrīvaïśnav school. But Yāmuna mentions the name of Taṅka, Bhartr-prapaṃca, Bhartṛmitra, Bhartṛhari, Brahmadatta, Śaṅkara and Bhāskara. An account of Bhartṛprapaṃca's interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra* has been given in the second volume of the present work. An account of Bhāskara's view has been given in the present volume. Nothing is definitely known about the interpretations of Taṅka, Bhartṛmitra, Bhartṛhari and Brahmadatta, except that they were against the views of the Śrīvaïśnavas.

Rāmānuja, in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, says that Bodhayana wrote a very elaborate work on the *Brahma-sūtra* and that

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1 *vānā eva tu śabdāḥ iti bhagavan upavarṣaḥ*. Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1. 3. 28.

Deussen's remark that the entire discussion of *sphoṭa* is derived from Upavarsa is quite unfounded. According to *Kathā-sarit-sāgara* Upavarsa was the teacher of Pāṇini.

2 Savara, also, in his commentary on the 5th *sūtra* of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, 1. 1. 5, refers to a *Vṛtti-kāra*, a Mīmāṃsā writer prior to Savara. The fact that in the *bhāṣya* on the same *sūtra* Savara refers to bhagavan Upavarsa by name makes it very probable that the *Vṛtti-kāra* and Upavarsa were not the same person.
this was summarized very briefly by the older teachers. He says, further, that in making his bhāṣya he has closely followed the interpretation of the Sūtra, as made by Bodhāyana\(^1\). Rāmānuja also owes a great debt of gratitude to Yāmuna’s Siddhi-traya, though he does not distinctly mention it in his bhāṣya. It is said that Yāmuna had a large number of disciples. Of these, however, Mahāpūrṇa, Gosṭhipūrṇa, Mālādhara, Kāṅcīpūrṇa, Śrīśailapūrṇa, also called Tātācārya (Rāmānuja’s maternal uncle), and Śrīraṅganāthagāyaka were the most important. Śrīśailapūrṇa’s son Govinda, the cousin and fellow-student of Rāmānuja with Yādavaprakāśa, became later in life a disciple of Rāmānuja\(^2\). Of the seventy-four prominent disciples of Rāmānuja, Praṇātārtihara of ĀTreya gotra, Kureśa or Śrīvatsānka Miśra, Dāsarathti, Andhrapūrṇa or Vaṭapūrṇa, Varadaviśṇu, Yatiśekhara-bhārata, Yādava-prakāśa or Govinda and Yaṭāmūrti are the most important\(^3\). Of these Dāsarathti of Vādhūla gotra and Varadaviśṇu or Varadaviśṇu Miśra were the sister’s sons of Rāmānuja. Varadaviśṇu was better known as Vātśya Varadaguru. Kureśa or Śrīvatsānka Miśra had a son by Āṇḍāl, called Parāśara Bhāṭṭārya, who defeated the Vedāntin Mādhavadāsa and afterwards became the successor of Rāmānuja\(^4\). Parāśāra Bhāṭṭārya had a son called Madhya Pratoli Bhattarya or Madhya-vāthi Bhāṭṭārya. Kureśa had another son named Padmanetra; Padmanetra’s son was called Kurukeśvara\(^5\). Kurukeśvara’s son was Puṇḍarikākṣa, and his son was Śrīnivāsa. Śrīnivāsa had a son Nṛśimhārya. They belonged to the Śrīśaila lineage, probably from the name of Bhūri Śrī Śailapūrṇa, Kureśa’s father. Nṛśimhārya had a son called Rāmānuja. Rāmānuja had two sons,

\(^1\) Sudarśana Sūrī, in his commentary on the bhāṣya called the Śruta-prakāśikā, explains the word “pūrvācārya” in Rāmānuja’s bhāṣya as Dramidā-bhāṣya-kārādayaḥ. On the phrase bodhāyana-mata’nusāreṇa sūtra-kṣarāṇi vyākhyāyante, he says “na tu svo-treksitamata-ntarenā sūtra-kṣarāṇi sūtra-padānāṁ prakṛti- pratyaya-vibhāgā-nugunā maṇaḥ na tu svo-treksita-rtheṣu sūtraṇī yathā-kathāṇi cit dyotayitavyāṇi.”

\(^2\) It is interesting to note that Yāmuna’s son Vararaṅga later on gave instruction to Rāmānuja and had his younger brother Sottanambi initiated as a disciple of Rāmānuja. Vararaṅga had no son. He had set the Sahasra-gītī to music. Prapamāṁṣṭa, 23. 45.

\(^3\) Rāja Gopalacāriyar also mentions the name of Tirukuruqapiran Pillai as a prominent disciple of Rāmānuja. He wrote a commentary on Nāmān’āvrār’s Tiru-vāyanoji.

\(^4\) Kureśa had another son named Śrī Rama Pillai or Vyāsa Bhāṭṭār.

\(^5\) It is rather common in South India to give one’s son the name of his grandfather.
Nṛṣimhārya and Raṅgācārya, who lived probably in the fifteenth century. Rāmānuja’s disciple, Yajñamūrti, was an exceedinglylearned man. When Rāmānuja accepted him as a disciple, he changed his name to Devarat or Devamānātha or Devarāja and had a separate maṭhā established in Śrīraṅgam for him. Yajñamūrti had written two very learned works in Tamil, called Ṣānā-sāra and Prameya-sāra. Rāmānuja had four of his disciples, Bhaktagrāma-pūrṇa, Marudha-grāma-pūrṇa, Anantārya and Yajñesā, initiated into Vaiṣṇavism by Yajñamūrti. Another pupil of Rāmānuja, Tirukkugai-piran Pillai, wrote a commentary of Nāmm’ārvār’s Tiruvāy-mori. Praṇatārtihara Pillai, another pupil of Rāmānuja, of Ātreya gotra, had a son Rāmānuja, a disciple of Nadaḍur Ammal of the lineage of Vatsya Varada. This Rāmānuja, alias Padmanābha, had a son called Śrī Rāmānuja Pillai, a disciple of Kidambi Rāmānuja Pillai. This Padmanābha had a son called Rāmānuja Pillai and a daughter Tōṭāramba, who was married to Anantasūri, the father of Veṅkaṭanāṭha. Rāmānuja’s other disciple and nephew, Dāsarathi, of Vādhūla gotra, had a son called Rāmānuja, who had a son called Toḍappā or Vāraṇāḍriśa or Lokārya or Lokācārya. After Parāśara Bhaṭṭārya the Vedānti Māḍhavādāsa, called also Nanjiyar, became his successor. Māḍhavādāsa’s successor was Nambilla or Namburi Varadārya or Lokācārya. He had two wives Āṇḍal and Śrīraṅganāyakī and a son called Rāmānuja 3. Nambilla’s other name was Kalijit or Kalivair. Now Vāraṇāḍriśa became a disciple of Nambilla or the senior Lokācārya. Vāraṇāḍriśa was known as Pillai Lokācārya. Namburi Varada had a pupil called Māḍhava. Varada had a son called Padmanābha who had a disciple called Rāmānujadāsa. Rāmānujadāsa had a son called Devarāja, who had a son called Śrīśailānātha, and Śrīśailanātha had a pupil called Saumya Jāmāṭr muni or Ramyajāmāṭr muni, also called Varavara muni or Yatindrapraṇava or Manavalamahāmuni or Periya-jiyar. It is said that he was the grandson of Kattur-āragiṇa-vanavaḷapillai. All these people were influenced by the Sahasra-giti-vyākhyā of Kuresā. Namburi Varadārya, otherwise called Kalijit, had two other pupils called Udak-pratoḷi-kṛṣṇa, and Kṛṣṇa-samāḥbhaya, also called Kṛṣṇapāda. Kṛṣṇapāda’s son Lokācārya was a pupil of

1 See Prapannāṁrta, Ch. 26.
2 See Govindāchāryar’s Life of Rāmānuja.
3 He wrote two works called Sārā-rṣṭha-saṅgraha and Rahasya-traya. Prapannāṁrta, 119/3.
Kalijit, and Kṛṣṇapāda himself. Kṛṣṇapāda’s second son was Abhirāma-Varādhīśa.

Rāmānuja’s brother-in-law Devarāja, of Vātsyya gotra, had a son called Varadavisṇu Miśra or Vātsyya Varada, who was a pupil of Viṣṇucitta, a pupil of Kureśa. This Vātsyya Varada was a great writer on Vedāntic subjects. Kureśa had a son called Śrī Rama Pillai, or Vedavyāsa Bhaṭṭa, who had a son called Vādivijaya, who wrote Kṣamā-ṣodasi-stava. Vādivijaya had a son called Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa, who was a pupil of Vātsyya Varada, a contemporary of Varadavisṇu. Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa was the famous author of the Śruta-prakāśikā. The celebrated Ānṇayācārya also was a pupil of Pillai Lokācārya, the pupil of Kalijit. Śrīśaila Śrīnivāsa, or Śrīśailanātha, was the son of Ānṇayācārya. Ramyajāmāṭr muni had a number of disciples, such as Rāmānuja, Paravastu Prativādibhayaṅkara Ānṇayācārya, Vamanamalai-jīyar, Periya-jīyar, Koyilkandādaiṅnan, etc.1 Of Vēṅkatanātha’s pupils two are of most importance: his son Nainārācārya, otherwise called Kumāra-Varānta-deśīka, Varadanātha or Varadaguru, who wrote many Vedāntic works, and Brahmatantra-jīyar. Parakālādāsa and Śrīraṅgācārya were probably pupils of Kṛṣṇapāda, or Kṛṣṇasūri, the pupil of Kalijit or Namburi Varadārya. Abhirāma Varādhīśa was a pupil of Rāmānuja, son of Saumya Jāmāṭr muni. The pontifical position of Śrīvaishnavism was always occupied in succession by eminent men in different important maṭhas or temples, and there arose many great preachers and teachers of Vedānta, some of whom wrote important works while others satisfied themselves with oral teachings. The works of some of these have come down to us, but others have been lost. It seems, however, that the Viṣistā-dvaita philosophy was not a source of perennial inspiration for the development of ever newer shades of thought, and that the logical and dialectical thinkers of this school were decidedly inferior to the prominent thinkers of the Śaṅkara and the Madhva school. There is hardly any one in the whole history of the development of the school of Rāmānuja whose logical acuteness can be compared with that of Śrīhariṣa or Citsukha, or with that of Jayatīrtha or Vyāsatīrtha. Vēṅkaṭānātha, Meghanādārī or Rāmānujacārya, called also Vādīhaṃsa, were some of the most prominent writers of this school; but even with them philosophic

1 The Tamil names of some of the disciples have been collected from the Life of Rāmānujacārya by Govindāchāryar.
criticism does not always reach the highest level. It was customary for the thinkers of the Śaṅkara and the Madhva schools in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to accept the concepts of the new School of Logic of Mithilā and Bengal and introduce keen dialectical analysis and criticism. But for some reason or other this method was not adopted to any large extent by the thinkers of the Śrīvaishṇava school. Yet this was the principal way in which philosophical concepts developed in later times.

In dealing with the names of teachers of the Rāmānuja school, one Guru-paramparā mentions the name of Paravādibhayāṅkara, who was a pupil of Ramyajāmātṛ muni and belonged to the Vātsyya gotra. Prativādibhayāṅkara was the teacher of Śaṭhakopa Yati. The treatise speaks also of another Ramyajāmātṛ muni, son of Anantārya, grandson of Prativādibhayāṅkara and pupil of Śrīveṅkaṭaḍā. It also mentions Vedāntaguru; of the Vātsyya gotra, a pupil of Ramyajāmātṛ muni and Varadārya; Sundaradesīka, of the Vātsyya gotra, son of Prativādibhayāṅkara; Aparyātmāṁḍācārya, son of Śrīveṅkaṭaḍāguru and grandson of Prativādibhayāṅkara. This Veṅkaṭācārya had a son called Prativādibhayāṅkara. Ramyajāmātṛ muni had a son called Śrikrṣṇa-desīka. Puruṣottamārya, of the Vātsyya gotra, was the son of Śrīveṅkaṭaḍācārya. Śrikrṣṇa-desīka had a son called Ramyajāmātṛ muni, who had a son called Kṛṣṇa Sūri. Anantaguru had a son called Veṅkaṭa-desīka. Śrīnivasaguru was pupil of Veṅkaṭaṛya and Vātsyya Śrīnivāsa, who had a son called Anantārya. It is unnecessary to continue with the list, as it is not very useful from the point of view of the development of the Śrīvaishṇava school of philosophy or literature. The fact that the names of earlier teachers are reverently passed on to many of those who succeeded them makes it difficult to differentiate them one from the other. But the history of the school is unimportant after the sixteenth or the early part of the seventeenth century, as it lost much of its force as an intellectual movement. In the days of the Ārvārs the Śrīvaishṇava movement was primarily a religious movement of mystic and intoxicating love of God and self-surrender to Him. In the days of Rāmānuja it became intellectualized for some time, but it slowly relapsed into the religious position. As with Śaṅkara, and not as with Madhva, the emphasis of the school has always been on the interpretations of Vedic texts, and the intellectual appeal has always been subordinated to the appeal to the Upaniṣadic texts and their
interpretations. The chief opponents of the Rāmānuja school were the Śaṅkarites, and we may read many works in which copious references are made by writers of the Śaṅkara school who attempted to refute the principal points of the bhāṣya of Rāmānuja, both from the point of view of logical argument and from that of interpretations of the Upaniṣadic texts. But unfortunately, except in the case of a few later works of little value, no work of scholarly refutation of the views of Rāmānuja by a Śaṅkarite is available. The followers of Rāmānuja also offered slight refutation of some of the doctrines of Bhāskara, Jādava-prakāśa, and Madhva and the Śaivas. But their efforts were directed mainly against Śaṅkara.

It has already been noted that Rāmānuja wrote a bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra, Vedārtha-samgraha, Vedānta-sūra and Vedānta-dīpa, a commentary on the Śrīmad-bhagavat-gitā, Gadya-traya, and Bhagavad-ārādhana-krama. According to traditional accounts, Rāmānuja was born in A.D. 1017 and died in 1137. The approximate dates of the chief events of his life have been worked out as follows: study with Yādavaprakāśa, 1033; first entry into Śrīraṅgam to see Yāmuna, 1043; taking holy orders, 1049; flight to Mysore for fear of the Cola king's persecution, 1096; conversion of Bitti-deva, the Jain king of Mysore, the Hoysala country, 1098; installing the temple God at Melukot, 1100; stay in Melukot, up to 1116; return to Śrīraṅgam, 1118; death, 1137. His nephew and disciple Dāsarāthi and his disciple Kuresā were about fifteen or sixteen years junior to him. Rāmānuja's bhāṣya, called also Śrī-bhāṣya, was commented on by Sudarṣāna Sūri. His work is called Śruti prakāśikā, and is regarded as the most important commentary on the Śrī-bhāṣya. According to traditional accounts, Rāmānuja was born in A.D. 1017 and died in 1137. The approximate dates of the chief events of his life have been worked out as follows: study with Yādavaprakāśa, 1033; first entry into Śrīraṅgam to see Yāmuna, 1043; taking holy orders, 1049; flight to Mysore for fear of the Cola king's persecution, 1096; conversion of Bitti-deva, the Jain king of Mysore, the Hoysala country, 1098; installing the temple God at Melukot, 1100; stay in Melukot, up to 1116; return to Śrīraṅgam, 1118; death, 1137. His nephew and disciple Dāsarāthi and his disciple Kuresā were about fifteen or sixteen years junior to him. Rāmānuja's bhāṣya, called also Śrī-bhāṣya, was commented on by Sudarṣāna Sūri. His work is called Śruti prakāśikā, and is regarded as the most important commentary on the Śrī-bhāṣya. According to traditional accounts, Rāmānuja was born in A.D. 1017 and died in 1137. The approximate dates of the chief events of his life have been worked out as follows: study with Yādavaprakāśa, 1033; first entry into Śrīraṅgam to see Yāmuna, 1043; taking holy orders, 1049; flight to Mysore for fear of the Cola king's persecution, 1096; conversion of Bitti-deva, the Jain king of Mysore, the Hoysala country, 1098; installing the temple God at Melukot, 1100; stay in Melukot, up to 1116; return to Śrīraṅgam, 1118; death, 1137. His nephew and disciple Dāsarāthi and his disciple Kuresā were about fifteen or sixteen years junior to him. Rāmānuja's bhāṣya, called also Śrī-bhāṣya, was commented on by Sudarṣāna Sūri. His work is called Śruti prakāśikā, and is regarded as the most important commentary on the Śrī-bhāṣya.

1. Reference to the Vedārtha-samgraha of Rāmānuja is also found in the same work.

2. Govindācārya’s Life of Rāmānuja. Yāmuna, according to the above view, would thus have died in 1042, corresponding with the first visit of Rāmānuja to Śrīraṅgam; but Gopi-nātha Rāu thinks that this event took place in 1038. The date of the Cola persecution is also regarded by Gopi-nātha Rāu as having occurred in 1078–79, which would correspond to Rāmānuja’s flight to Mysore; and his return to Śrīraṅgam must have taken place after 1117, the death of the Cola king Koluttunga. Thus there is some divergence between Govindācārya and Gopi-nātha Rāu regarding the date of Rāmānuja’s first visit to Śrīraṅgam and the date of his flight to Mysore. Gopi-nātha Rāu’s views seem to be more authentic.

Apart from the Sahasra-gītt-bhāṣya, Kuresā wrote a work called Kuresā-vijaya.

D III 8
Rāmānuja Literature.

As already noted, the principal commentary on Rāmānuja’s bhāṣya, was the Śrūta-prakāśikā by Sudarsana Sūri. Even before this Śrūta-prakāśikā was written, another commentary, called Śrī-bhāṣya-vivrti, was written by Rāma-miśra-deśīka, a disciple of Rāmānuja, under his own direction. This work was written in six chapters and was not a commentary in the ordinary sense, but a study of the principal contents of Rāmānuja’s bhāṣya. This Rāma Miśra was a different man from Rāma Miśra, the teacher of Yāmuna. The Śrūta-prakāśikā had a further study, entitled Bhāva-prakāśikā, by Virarāghavādāsa. Criticisms of this work were replied to in a work called Bhāṣya-prakāśikā-dūṣanoddhāra by Śaṭhakopācārya, a writer of the sixteenth century. The Śrūta-prakāśikā had another commentary, called Tūlikā, by Vadhūla Śrīnivāsa, a writer who probably belonged to the fifteenth century. The contents of the Śrūta-prakāśikā were summarized in a work called Śrūta-prakāśikā-sāra-saṅgraha. The bhāṣya of Rāmānuja was further commented on in the Tattva-sāra, by Vātsyāya Varada, a nephew of Rāmānuja. The name of the commentator’s father was Devarāja, and his mother was Kamalā, a sister of Rāmānuja. He was a pupil of Śrīviśnucītta, a disciple of Kureśa. This Tattva-sāra provoked a further criticism, called Ratna-sārim, by Vīra-rāghava-dāsa, son of Vadhūla Nara-simha-guru and pupil of Vadhūla Varadaguru, son of Vadhūla Vēṅkaṭācārya. He also himself wrote a commentary on the Śrī-bhāṣya, called Tātparya-dīpikā. Vīra-rāghava-dāsa lived probably in the later half of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century. Rāmānuja’s views were also collected together in a scholarly manner in a work called Naya-mukha-mālikā, by Apyaya-dīkṣīta, who was born in the middle of the sixteenth century. Rāmānuja’s bhāṣya is also dealt with by the famous Vēṅkaṭanātha, in his work Tattva-tīkā. The Śrī-bhāṣya had another commentary called Naya-prakāśikā, by Meghanādārī, a contemporary of Vēṅkaṭanātha of the fourteenth century. A further commentary is

1 Meghanādārī’s great work, Naya-dyu-mani, has been treated in detail in a later section. He was the son of Āṭreyanātha and his mother’s name was Adhvaranāyikā. He had three brothers, Hastadṛṇātha or Vāraṇādriśa, Varadarāt, and Rāma Miśra. This Vāraṇādriśa should not be confused with Dāśarathī’s grandson, who was of Vadhūla gotra. Meghanādārī’s other works are Bhāva-prabodha and Mumuṣū-pāya-saṅgraha.
called *Mita-prakāśikā*, by Parakāla Yati, probably of the fifteenth century. Parakāla Yati had a disciple called Raṅga Rāmānuja, who wrote a study of the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, called *Mūla-bhāva-prakāśikā*. One Śrīnivāsācārya also criticized the *Śrī-bhāṣya* in *Brahma-vidyā-kaumudi*. It is difficult to guess which Śrīnivāsa was the author of the work, there being so many Śrīnivāsas among the teachers of the Rāmānuja school. Campakesa, disciple of Veṅkaṭanātha, also dealt with the *Śrī-bhāṣya*. Suddhasattva Lakṣmaṇacārya also wrote on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, a work entitled *Guru-bhāva-prakāśikā* which was based upon the *Guru-tattva-prakāśikā* of Campakesa. This work was in reality a commentary on the *Śruta-prakāśikā*. The author was the son of Suddhasattva Yogindra. He descends from the line of Rāmānuja’s mother’s sister, in which there were born eighteen teachers of Vedānta; he was the pupil of Saumya Jāmāṭr muni and flourished probably in the latter half of the sixteenth century. This *Guru-bhāva-prakāśikā* was commented on in the *Guru-bhāva-prakāśikā-vyākhya*. Sudarśana Sūri also seems to have written a commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, called *Śruti-dīpikā*. Śrīnivāsa, the son of Tātayāra and Lakṣmī-devi, of Śrīśaila lineage and pupil of Aṅnayāra and Koṅḍinna Śrīnivāsa-dīksita, wrote another digest on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, called *Tattva-mārtanda*. He probably lived in the latter half of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century. The name of his grandfather was Aṅṅa-guru. He wrote *Natva-darpana*, *Bheda-darpana*, *Śiddhānta-cintāmaṇi*, *Śāra-darpana*, and *Virodha-nirodha*. He is also known as Śrīśaila Śrīnivāsa, and he wrote other books, e.g. *Jñāna-ratna-darpana*, *Naya-dyu-mani-dīpikā*, and *Naya-dyu-mani-samgraha*. The *Naya-dyu-mani* of *Naya-dyu-mani-dīpikā* is not to be confused with the *Naya-dyu-mani* of Meghanādāri; for it is a summary in verse of Rāmānuja’s *bhāṣya* with a commentary in prose. The *Naya-dyu-mani-samgraha* is a work in

1 In his *Virodha-nirodha* he makes reference to a *Mukti-darpana* (MS. p. 82), *Jñāna-ratna-darpana* (MS. p. 87), and in his *Bheda-darpana* (MS. p. 96) he refers to his *Guna-darpana*. In his *Virodha-nirodha* he makes further reference to his other works, *Advaita-vana-kṣṇādha* and *Bheda-māni* (MS. p. 37), to his *Bheda-darpana* (MS. p. 66) and to his *Śāra-darpana* (MS. p. 87). His *Śāra-darpana* gives the principal contents of Rāmānuja’s philosophy. In his *Virodha-nirodha* (MS. p. 37) he refers to a *Virodha-bhaṇḍjana*, by his elder brother Aṅṅayāra and to his own *Śiddhānta-cintāmaṇi* (MS. p. 12). In referring to his elder brother he says that his *Virodha-nirodha* is largely a rearrangement of the arguments adduced by him in his *Virodha-bhaṇḍjana*, some of which had been elaborated and others condensed and rearranged in his *Virodha-nirodha*. The *Virodha-nirodha* is thus admitted by the author to have been based materially on *Virodha-bhaṇḍjana* by Aṅṅayāra, his elder brother.
prose on the bhāṣya of Rāmānuja, and the first four sūtras intended to refute the criticisms made by his opponents. The Naya-duyumaṇi-samgraha is a much smaller work than the Naya-duyu-māṇi, which is often referred to by the author for details. It makes constant reference to objections against Rāmānuja without mentioning the name of the critic. In the Naya-duyu-māṇi the author has made detailed discussions which are summarized by him in this work.

Thus Śrīnivāsa wrote three works Naya-duyu-māṇi, Naya-duyu-māṇi-samgraha, and Naya-duyu-māṇi-dīpīkā. In his Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi Śrīnivāsa tries mainly to uphold the theory that Brahman is the only cause of all creation, animate and inanimate. In this work he tries to refute at every point the theory of Brahma-causality, as held by Śaṅkara.

Again, Deśikācārya wrote a commentary on the Śrī-bhāṣya, called Prayoga-ratna-mālā. Nārāyaṇamuni wrote his Bhāva-pradīpīkā, and Puruṣottama his Subodhinī also as commentaries on the Śrī-bhāṣya. These writers probably lived some time about the seventeenth century. Vīra-rāghava-dāsa also criticized the Śrī-bhāṣya in the Tātparya-dīpīkā. His name has already been mentioned in connection with his study, Rat.ia-sārīni, on Vātsyā Varada's Tattva-sāra. Śrīnivāsa Tātacārya wrote his Laghu-prakāśikā, Śrīvatsāṅka Śrīnivāsa his Śrī-bhāṣya-sārārtha-samgraha, and Śaṅhakopa hia Brahma-sutrārtha-samgraha as commentaries on the Śrī-bhāṣya. These writers seem to have flourished late in the sixteenth century. Śrīvatsāṅka Śrīnivāsa's work was further summarized by Raṅgācārya in his Śrīvatsa-siddhānta-sāra. Appaya-dīkṣita, of the middle of the seventeenth century, wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, called Naya-mukha-mālikā, closely following the ideas of Rāmānuja. Raṅga Rāmānuja also wrote a commentary, called

1 bhāṣyā-ṃavam avatirṇo vīśṭirṇām yad avadāṃ Naya-duyu-māṇau santāśīpya tat paroktīr vīśīpya karoti tuṣaṇāṃ viduṣām.
   Naya-duyu-māṇi-samgraha, MS.

   The general method of treatment followed in the book is to indulge in long discussions in refutation of the views of opponents and to formulate, as conclusion, the positive contentions of the Viṣistā-dvaita theory on the special points of interest. Thus at the end of a long discussion on the Brahma-sūtra, l. l. 2, he says: rāddhāntas tu na janmādīnāṃ viśeṣanatve viṣeṣyā-bheda-prasaṅgah, avirdhiḥ viśeṣaṇānāṃ ārāya-bheda-bhājakatvāt na caivaṃ viśeṣanatve-vacchedena na vyāvartau-aṅgagah tad-un-ārāya-jīvādi-vyāvartakatvenaita tad-asiddheḥ. (Naya-duyu-māṇi, MS. p. 126.)

2 Lakṣmanārya-hṛdayāmasārint likhyate Naya-mālikā.
   Naya-mukha-mālikā, printed in Kumbakonam, 1915, p. 3.
Sārīraka-sāstrārtha-dīpikā, on the Brahma-sūtra, following the interpretations of Rāmānuja. His Mūla-bhāva-prakāśikā, a commentary on the Śrī-bhāṣya, has already been referred to in this section. He wrote also a commentary on the Nyāya-siddhāṅjana of Veṅkaṭanātha, called Nyāya-siddhāṅjana-avyākhyā. He was a pupil of Parākāla Yati and probably lived in the sixteenth century. He wrote also three other works, called Viṣṇava-vākyā-dīpikā, Chāndaguo-pānīsad-bhāṣya, and Rāmānuja-siddhāṅta-sāra. Rāmānujadāsa, called also Mahācārya, lived probably early in the fifteenth century, and was a pupil of Vādhuśa Śrīnivāsa. This Vādhuśa Śrīnivāsa, author of the Adhikaraṇa-sārārtha-dīpikā, must be an earlier person than Śrīnivāsadāsa, author of the Yatindra-mata-dīpikā, who was a pupil of Mahācārya. Mahācārya wrote a work called Pārāśarya-vijaya, which is a thesis on the general position of the Rāmānuja Vedānta. He wrote also another work on the Śrī-bhāṣya called Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣyopanyāsa. Mahācārya’s other works are Brahma-vidyā-vijaya, Vedānta-vijaya, Rahasya-traya-mīmāṃsā, Rāmānuja-carita-culuka, Aṣṭādaśa-rahusyārtha-nirnaya, and Caṇḍa-mārūta, a commentary on the Śata-dūṣanī of Veṅkaṭanātha. He should be distinguished from Rāmānujacārya, called also Vādihaṃsāmbuvāha, uncle of Veṅkaṭanātha.

There is a work called Śrī-bhāṣya-vārttika, which, unlike most of those above, has already been printed; but the author does not mention his name in the book, which is composed in verse. Senānātha, or Bhagavat Senāpati Miśra, who is an author of later date, wrote Sārīraka-nyāya-kālāpa. Vijayindra Bhikṣu was the author of Sārīraka-mīmāṃsā-vṛtti, and Raghunāthārya of Sārīraka-sāstrā-saṅgati-sāra. Sundarārāja-deśika, an author of the sixteenth century, wrote a simple commentary on the Śrī-bhāṣya called Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya-avyākhyā. Veṅkaṭācārya, probably an author of the sixteenth century, wrote a commentary on the Śrī-bhāṣya called Śrī-bhāṣya-avyākhyā. Veṅkaṭanāthārya wrote a work called Śrī-bhāṣya-sāra. Śrīvatsānka Śrīnivāsācārya was the author of Śrī-bhāṣya-sārārtha-saṅgraha. Śrīraṅgācārya composed Śrī-bhāṣya-siddhāṅta-sāra and Śrīnivāsācārya wrote a work called Śrī-bhāṣyopanyāsa. There are two other commentaries, called
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Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya-saṃgraha-vivaraṇa and Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣyā-rambha-prayaṇa-samarthana; but the names of the authors are missing in the manuscripts. Veṅkaṭanātha, of the thirteenth century, wrote Adhikaraṇa-sārāvalī, and Maṅgācārya Śrīnīvāsa, Adhikaraṇa-sārārtha-dīpikā. Varadārya or Varadanātha, son of Veṅkaṭanātha, wrote a commentary on the Adhikaraṇa-sārāvalī called Adhikāra-cintāmaṇi. There is another work on similar subjects called Adhikaraṇa-yuktī-vilāsa; but, though the author offers an adoration to Śrīnīvāsa, he does not mention his name and it is difficult to discover who this Śrīnīvāsa was. Jagannātha Yati wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sūtra on the lines of Rāmānuja's bhāṣya, and it was called Brahmadeśī-sāttra-dīpikā. It will thus be seen that Rāmānuja's bhāṣya inspired many scholars and thinkers and a great literature sprang up on its basis. But it must be noted with regret that this huge critical literature on Rāmānuja's bhāṣya, is not in general of much philosophical importance. Rāmānuja's Vedārtha-saṃgraha was commented on by Sudarṣana Śūri of the fourteenth century, in Tātparya-dīpikā. He was the son of Vāgyājaya, or Viśvājaya, and pupil of Vātsyāya Varada. In addition to his study of Rāmānuja's bhāṣya already referred to, he wrote a Sandhyā-vandana-bhāṣya. Rāmānuja's Vedānta-dīpa (a brief commentary on the Brahma-sūtra) was dealt with by Ahobila Raṅganātha Yati, of the sixteenth century. Rāmānuja's Gadya-traya was criticized by Veṅkaṭanātha, and Sudarṣanācārya also wrote a commentary; Kṛṣṇapada, a later author, also wrote another commentary. Rāmānuja's commentary on the Gītā also was commented on by Veṅkaṭanātha. The Vedānta-sāra was a brief commentary on the Brahma-sūtra by Rāmānuja himself, based on his Śrī-bhāṣya.

Rāmānujācārya, called also Vādhiḥsāṁbhuvāhācārya of Ātreya gotra, son of Padmanābha and maternal uncle of Veṅkaṭanātha, lived in the thirteenth or fourteenth century; he wrote an important work, called Naya-kuliśa or Nyāya-kuliśa, which has been noticed before. He composed also Dīvya-sūri-prabhāva-dīpikā, Sarva-darsana-sīromāṇi, and Mokṣa-siddhi, to which he himself refers in his Nyāya-kuliśa. It might seem that the Nyāya-kuliśa was one of the earliest logical or ontological treatises of the Viśiṣṭā-dvaita school; but we find that there were other treatises of this type

1 I have not been able to procure a MS. of the Mokṣa-siddhi, and, so far as I can guess, the book is probably lost.
written during this period and even earlier than Rāmānuja. Thus Nāthamuni wrote a Nyāya-tattva, in which he refuted the logical views of Gautama and founded a new system of Logic. Viṣṇucitta, a junior contemporary of Rāmānuja, wrote two works, Prameya-samgraha and Saṁgati-mālā. Varadāviṣṇu Miśra, who flourished probably in the latter half of the twelfth century, or the beginning of the thirteenth century, wrote a Māṇa-yāthāmya-nirṇaya. Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka, who flourished before Venkaṭanātha, also wrote a Prajñā-paritrāṇa. Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka, who also probably lived in the thirteenth century, wrote a Tatva-ratnakara. These works have been referred to by Venkaṭanātha in his Nyāya-parisuddhi; but the manuscripts were not available to the present writer. Vātsyya Varada’s works have been mentioned in a separate section.

Venkaṭanātha, called also Vedānta-desīka, Vedāntācārya, and Kavitārkikasimha, was one of the most towering figures of the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita. He was born at Tuppale in Kanjivaram in A.D. 1268. His father was Ananta Sūri, his grandfather’s name was Puṇḍarikākṣa, and he belonged to the Viśvāmitra gotra; his mother was Tōtārāmbā, sister of Ātreya Rāmānuja, otherwise called Vādikalaḥamsāmbuvāhācārya. He studied with his uncle Ātreya Rāmānuja, and it is said that he accompanied him to Vātsyā Varadācārya’s place, when he was five years old. The story goes that even at such an early age he showed so much precocity that it was predicted by Vātsyā Varadācārya that in time he would be a great pillar of strength for the Viśiṣṭā-dvaita-vāda school and that he would repudiate all false systems of philosophy. It appears that he also studied with Varadācārya himself. It is said that he used to live by uṛccha-vṛtti, receiving alms in the streets, and spent all his life in

1 He is said to have written another work, called Nyāya-sudarśana, mentioned in the introduction to the Tatva-muktā-kālāpa (Mysore, 1933).
2 He also wrote another work, called Bhagavad-guṇa-darpaṇa.
3 utprekṣyate budha-janair upapatti-bhūmīya
ghaṁṭā hareḥ samajāniṣṭa jādātmānti
dratiṣṭhāpita-vedāntaḥ pratikṣipta-bahir-mataḥ
bhūyās traipvidya-māṇyas tvam bhūri-kalyāṇa-bhājanam.

It is said that he was blessed by Varadācārya in the aforesaid verse, in which he describes Venkaṭanātha as an incarnation of the bell of God. Vaiṣṇavite Reformers of India, by T. Rajagopalachariar.
4 śrutvā rāmānujāyāt sad-asad-Śī tattva-muktā kālāpaṁ
vyātāntā vṛṇkaṭeśo varaḍa-guru-krpā-lambhito-ddāna-bhūmā.

Tattva-muktā-kālāpa, sl. 2.
writing philosophical and religious works. In the *samkalpa-sūryodaya* he says that at the time when he was writing that work he had finished the *Śrī-bhāṣya* for the thirtieth time. While he lived in Kāṇcī and Śrīraṅgam, he had to work in the midst of various rival sects, and Pillai Lokācārya, who was very much senior to him in age and was the supporter of the Teṅgalai school, against which Veṅkaṭanātha fought, wrote a verse praising him. Scholars are in general agreement that Veṅkaṭanātha died in 1369, though there is also a view that he died in 1371. He enjoyed a long life and spent much of his time in pilgrimage to various northern countries such as Vijayanagara, Mathurā, Brindāban, Ayodhya, and Puri. The story of Vidyārānyā’s friendship with Veṅkaṭanātha may be true or false; but we know that Vidyārānyā was acquainted with the *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*, and he quotes from it in his account of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* view in *Sarva-dārśana-saṅgraha*. When Veṅkaṭanātha was middle-aged, Sudārṣāna Sūri, writer of the *Śrūta-prakāśikā*, was already an old man, and it is said that he called Veṅkaṭanātha to Śrīraṅgam and handed over to him his commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, so that it might get a greater publicity. Veṅkaṭanātha himself also wrote a commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, called the *Tattvatīkā*. Though an extremely kind man of exemplary and saintly character, he had many enemies who tried to harass and insult him in countless ways. A great difference in interpretation of the nature of *prapatti*, or self-surrender to God, was manifested at this time in the writings of different Śrīvaishṇava scholars. Two distinct sects were formed, based mainly on the different interpretation of the nature of *prapatti*, though there were minor differences of a ritualistic nature, such as the marks on the forehead, etc. Of these two sects, the leader of the Vadakalai was Veṅkaṭanātha, and that of the Teṅgalai was Pillai Lokācārya. Later on Saumya Jāmāṭṛ muni became the accepted leader of the Teṅgalai school. Though the leaders themselves were actuated by a spirit of sympathy with one another, yet their followers made much of these little differences in their views and constantly quarrelled with one another, and it is a well known fact that these sectarian quarrels exist even now.

It was during Veṅkaṭanātha’s life that Malik Kafur, a general of ’Alā-ud-dīn, invaded the Deccan in 1310. He easily conquered the countries of Warangal and Dvārasamudra and pushed to the extreme south, spreading devastation and plundering everywhere.
In 1326 the Mahomedans invaded Śrīraṅgam and pillaged the city and the temple. About 1351 the Hindu Kingdom in Vijayanagar was established by King Bukka I. When the Mahomedans pillaged the temple of Śrīraṅgam, the temple-keepers had fled away to Madura with the God Raṅganātha, who was established in Tirupati and was worshipped there. Bukka’s son Kampana began to make conquest in the south and eventually Gopana, a general of Kampana, succeeded in restoring Raṅganātha to Śrīraṅgam. This affair has been immortalized by a verse composed by Veṅkaṭanātha, which is still written on the walls of the temple of Śrīraṅgam, though certain authorities think that the verse was not by him, but is only attributed to him. This story is found in a Tamil work, called Kavilologu, and is also recorded in the Vadakalai Guru-paramparā of the fifteenth century. During the general massacre at Śrīraṅgam, Veṅkaṭanātha hid himself among the dead bodies and fled ultimately to Mysore. After having spent some years there he went to Coimbatore, and there he wrote his Abhiti-stava, in which he makes references to the invasion of the Mahomedans and the tragic condition at Śrīraṅgam. When he heard that by Gopana’s endeavours Raṅganātha was restored to Śrīraṅgam he went there and wrote a verse applauding his efforts.

Veṅkaṭanātha was a prolific writer on various subjects and also a gifted poet. In the field of poetry his most important works are the Yādavābhuyudaya, Hamsa-samdeśa, Subhāṣita-nīvi, and Samkalpa-sūryodaya, an allegorical drama in ten acts. The Yādavābhuyudaya was a work on the life of Kṛṣṇa, which was commented upon by no less a person than Appaya-dīkṣita. The Subhāṣita-nīvi, a didactic poem, was commented upon by Śrīnivāsa Śuri of the

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1 अन्यानील-स्रिष्णा-द्युती-राचिता-जगद-राणजानाद अण्जानात्रार्थी चेर्चायं आराध्या कान्ति समायम अथ निहत्योर्धानुशंकान्त तुलुश्कान्त लक्ष्मी-भुम्यादुख्भाह्याम साहा निजा-नागरे स्तथापयान राणजानाथान् समयान्-तवयान् सपार्यान् पुनर्मक्रिता याशो-दर्पणाम गोपपाणां-र्याह।


This fact has also been recorded in Doddācārya’s Vedānta-deśika-vaibhava-prakāśikā and Yāttindra-pravāna in the following verse:

jitvarī tulasī bhuvi goppanandro
raṅgā-dhipam sthāpitavān sva-deie
ityevam ākarnya guruk havindro
dhrīṣṭovad Yas tam aham prapadye.

According to the commentary, the aforesaid Vaibhava-prakāśikā, Veṅkaṭanātha was born in 1260 and died in 1369. Goppanārya’s reinstalment of Śrīraṅganātha took place in 1371.
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Śrīśaila lineage, son of Venkaṭanātha. He lived in all probability in the fifteenth century. Venkaṭanātha's other poem was Ḍhamṣa-sandesā. In his Samkalpa-sūryodaya he dramatically describes, after the pattern of the Prabodha-candro-daya, the troubles and difficulties of the human soul in attaining its final perfection. He wrote about thirty-two adoration hymns such as the Haya-grīva-stotra, and Devanāyaka-pańcāsāt and Pādukā-sahasra-nāma. He also wrote many devotional and ritualistic pieces, such as the Vajñopavīta-pratiṣṭhā, Ārādhana-krama, Hari-dina-tilaka, Vaiśvadeva-kārikā, Śrī-pańcarātra-rakṣā, Sac-caritra-rakṣā and Nikṣepa-rakṣā. He also collected from various sources the verses regarding the doctrine of prapatti, and wrote the Nyāsa-vimśati and a further work based on it, called the Nyāsa-tilaka, which was commented upon by his son Kumāra-Vēḍānta-deśika in a work called Nyāsa-tilaka-tyākhyā. Due notice of his Pańcarātra-rakṣā has been taken in the section on Pańcarātra of the present volume. He wrote also a work called Śilpārtha-sāra, two works on medicine called Rasa-bhaumāmyta and Vṛkṣa-bhaumāmyta, a Purāṇika geography called Bhu-gola-nirṇaya, and a philosophical work called Tatvamuktā-kalāpa in verse with his own commentary on it called Sarvārtha-siddhi, which have been noticed in some detail in the special section on Venkaṭanātha. This work has two commentaries, called Ananda-dāyini or Ananda-vallari (in some manuscripts) or Nṛśimha-rājiya and Bhāva-prakāśa, of which the latter is of an annotative character. The commentary called Ananda-dāyini was written by Vatsya Nṛśimhadeva, son of Narasimha-sūri, and Totāramba and Devaraja Sūri. Nṛśimhadeva's maternal grandfather was Kauśika-Śrībhāya-Śrīnivāsa, who was also his teacher. He had another teacher, named Appayācārya. This Devaraja Sūri was probably the author of the Vimbha-tattva-prakāśikā and Caramopāya-tātparya. Nṛśimhadeva's other works were Para-tattva-dīpikā, Bheda-dhikkāra-nyākāra, Mani-sāra-dhikāra, Siddhānta-nirṇaya, a commentary on Venkaṭanātha's Nikṣepa-rakṣā, called Nṛśimha-rājiya, and a commentary on the Śata-dūṣanī. This Nṛśimhadeva lived probably in the sixteenth century. The commentary called Bhāva-prakāśa was written by Navyarāṅgeśa. He describes himself as a disciple of Kalijit; but this must have been a different Kalijit from the well-known Lokācārya; for the Bhāva-prakāśikā commentary, as it refers to the topics of the Ananda-dāyini, is a later one. It must have been
written late in the sixteenth or at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

Veṅkaṭaṭhā also wrote the *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, a comprehensive logical work of the *Viśiṣṭā-dvaita* school. It was criticized by Śrīnivāsadāsa, son of Devarājācārya, who was a disciple of Veṅkaṭaṭhā. He may have been an uncle and teacher of Nṛṣimha-deva, author of the *Ānanda-dāśīnī*. His commentary was called *Nyāya-sāra*. The *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* had two other commentaries, *Nīkāśa*, by Śaṭṭhakopa Yati, a disciple of Ahovila and *Nyāya-pariśuddhi-vyākhyā*, written by Kṛṣṇatātācārya.

Veṅkaṭaṭhā wrote a work supplementary to the *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, called *Nyāya-siddha-ṉjana*, the contents of which have been noted in the separate sections on Veṅkaṭaṭhā. He also wrote another work called *Para-mata-bhaṅga*, and a polemical work called *Śata-dūṣāṇi*. The name *Śata-dūṣāṇi* signifies that it contains a hundred refutations; but actually, in the printed text available to me, I can trace only forty. The best-known commentary, by Rāmānujadāsa, pupil of Vādhūla Śrīnivāsa, is called *Canda-māruta*. All important discussions contained in the *Śata-dūṣāṇi*, which are directed mainly against the Śaṅkara school, have been duly noticed in a different section. It had another commentary, by Nṛṣimharāja, which is also called *Canda-māruta*, and another, by Śrīnivāsācārya, called *Sahasra-kirāṇī*.

Veṅkaṭaṭhā, in addition to his *Tattva-tīkā* commentary on the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, wrote a summary of the general topics of the *Śrī-bhāṣya* discussion, called *Adhikaraṇa-sārāvali*, which was commented upon by his son Kumāra Vedantācārya or Varadanātha, in a work called *Adhikaraṇa-sārāvali-vyākhyā* or *Adhikaraṇa-cintāmaṇi*. He also wrote two small pamphlets, called *Cakāra-samarthana* and *Adhikaraṇa-darpaṇa*; a commentary on the *Īsopaniṣat*; one on Yāmuna’s *Gitārtha-saṅgraha*, called *Gitārtha-saṅgraha-raksā*, and a commentary on Rāmānuja’s *Gitā-bhāṣya*, called *Ṭātparya-candrikā*. He also criticized Rāmānuja’s *Gadya-traya*, in a work called *Ṭātparya-dīpikā*, and wrote commentaries on Yāmuna’s *Catuh-śloki* and *Stotra-ratnākara*, which are called *Rahasya-raksā*. In addition he composed thirty-two works in the *mani-pravāla* style, some of which have been translated into Sanskrit. These works are *Sampradāya-pariśuddhi*, *Tattva-padāvī*, *Rahasya-padāvī*, *Tattva-navanītām*, *Rahasya-navanītām*, *Tattva-
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Yerikatanātha also wrote a small pamphlet called Vādi-traya-khanḍana, in which he tried to refute the views of Śaṅkara, Yādavaprabāsa, and Bhāskara. Most of the arguments are directed against Śaṅkara, whereas the views of Yādavaprabāsa and Bhāskara were but slightly touched. He also wrote two works on Mīmāṁśa, called Mīmāṁśa-pāḍukā and Seśvara-mīmāṁśa. In the last work Veṅkaṭanātha tries to interpret the Mīmāṁśa-sūtra of Jaimini in a manner different from that of Sabara. His main intention was to interpret the Mīmāṁśa-sūtra in such a manner that it might not be in conflict with the Brahma-sūtra, but might be regarded as a complementary accessory to the teachings of the Brahma-sūtra. Thus, in interpreting the first sūtra of Jaimini, he says that the injunction of reading the Vedas is satisfied with the mere study of the Vedas. The injunction does not include an enquiry into the meaning of the texts and a study of the Mīmāṁsa, which comes out of the natural desire for knowing the meanings of the texts and their applications. The study of the Mīmāṁsa may therefore be undertaken even after the final bath of the brahma-cārina. Thus, a man may, after finishing his obligatory studies as a brahma-cārin in the house of his teacher, still continue to live there for the study of Mīmāṁsa, but the latter is no part of his obligatory duty. Again, in defining the nature of dharma, Veṅkaṭanātha says that dharma is that which contributes to our good and is also in accordance with the injunctions.

1 The list of these Tamil works, which were not accessible to the present writer, has been collected from the introduction to the Mysore edition of the Tattva-muktā-kalāpa.

2 Codanā-lakṣaṇāttra-viśeṣitam evāthe sādhanatvam dharma-lakṣaṇam, Ītvara-mīmāṁśa, p. 18.
the word dharma may be otherwise used by some persons, yet its accepted meaning, as defined above, remains unaltered. The instructions of the Smrtis, Purāṇas, Pañcarātras, Brahma-sūtras, etc., are to be regarded as dharma, as being based upon the Vedas, which are their source. The validity of the nature of dharma cannot be determined by a reference to any other pramāṇa than the scriptural texts. In all matters of doubt and dispute the Mīmāṁsā-sūtra should be interpreted in such a manner that it does not come in conflict with the views of Bādarāyaṇa, who was the teacher of Jaimini.

Veṅkaṭanātha’s son was also a great writer on Vedānta. He was called Kumāra Vedāntācārya, Varadārya or Varadānātha or Varada Desīkācārya or Varadarāja Śūri or Varadanāyaka Śūri or Varadaguru. He wrote a Tattva-traya-culuka-samgraha, a work in Sanskrit prose, in which he summarizes the contents of the Tamil Tattva-traya-culuka of Veṅkaṭanātha, describing the fundamental Śrīvaiṣṇava doctrines regarding soul, matter and God1. His other works are Vyacchāraika-satyatva-khaṇḍana, Prapatti-kārikā, Rahasya-traya-culuka, Carama-guru-nirṇaya, Phala-bheda-khaṇḍana, Ārādhana-samgraha, Adhikarana-cintāmaṇi, Nyāsa-tilaka-vyākhyā, Rahasya-traya-sārārtha-samgraha. The last three works are commentaries on Veṅkaṭanātha’s Adhikaraṇa-sārāvali, Nyāsa-tilaka, and Rahasya-traya-sāra. Varadārya lived till the end of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century.

Meghanādāri lived probably in the twelfth and the early thirteenth centuries. He was closely associated with his elder brother Rāma Miśra, a pupil of Rāmānuja. He wrote a Naya-prakāśikā, a commentary on the Śrī-bhāṣya, Bhāva-prabodha, Mumuksū-pāya-samgraha, and Naya-dyu-mañi. The last work is one of the most recondite works on the Viśiṣṭādva ita school of thought, and its main contents have been noted in a separate section. He was the son of Ātreyanātha and Adhvara-nāyikā. He had three brothers, Hastyadrinātha, Varadarāt, and Rāma Miśra.

Rāmānujadāsa or Mahācārya wrote a Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣyopanīṣa, a commentary on the Śrī-bhāṣya. He wrote also a Pārāśarya, in which he tried to show that the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Madhva and others were not in consonance with the Sūtras of

1 It is also called cid-acid-ēvara-tattva-nirūpaṇa, or Tattva-traya.
Bādarāyāna. Some account of this will be found in the fourth volume of the present work. He also wrote a Rāmānuja-caritaculuka, Rahasya-traya-mīmāṁsa-bhāṣya, and Caṇḍa-mārūta, a learned commentary on the Śata-duśanī of Veṅkaṭanātha. Sudarśanaguru wrote a commentary on his Vedaṇta-vijaya, called Maṅgala-dīpikā. He wrote a big treatise called Vedaṇta-vijaya, which was divided into several more or less independent, though inter-related parts. The first part is Gurūpasatti-vijaya, in which the methods of approaching the teacher are discussed. The manuscript is fairly voluminous, containing 273 pages, and the modes of discussion are on the basis of Upaniṣadic texts. The second part is called Brahma-vidyā-vijaya (a MS. containing 221 pages), in which he tries to prove, on the basis of Upaniṣadic texts, that Brahmā means Narāyaṇa and no other deity. The third part, called Sad-vidyā-vijaya, contains seven chapters and is philosophical and polemical in spirit. I have in a later section given an account of its principal contents. The last part is called Vijayollāsa (a MS. of 158 pages), in which he seeks to prove that the Upaniṣads refer to Narāyaṇa alone. I have not been able to trace the fourth part. Sudarśanaguru wrote a commentary on this Vedaṇta-vijaya. This Sudarśana is different from Sudarśanācārya. He wrote also an Advaita-vidyā-vijaya, a work in three chapters, based principally on Upaniṣadic texts. The three chapters are Prapāca-mithyāṭva-bhaṅga, Jīveśvaraikya-bhaṅga, and Akhaṇḍārthatva-bhaṅga. He also composed another work, called Upaniṣad-maṅgala-dīpikā, which was not accessible to the present writer. He describes himself sometimes as a pupil of Vadhūla Śrīnivāsa and sometimes as a pupil of his son Prajñānīdhī. He lived probably in the fifteenth century. He was the disciple of Vadhūla Śrīnivāsa, who wrote the Tūlīkā commentary on the Śrūta-prakāśikā.

Raṅga Rāmānuja Muni lived probably in the fifteenth century. He was the disciple of Vatsya Anantārya, Tātāyārya, and Parakāla Yati or Kumbha-koṇa Tātāyārya. He wrote a commentary on the Śrībhāṣya, called Mūla-bhāca-prakāśikā, and one on the Nyāya-siddhānta, called Nyāya-siddhānta-cyākhya. He also wrote a Drāmīḍopaniṣad-bhāṣya, Viṣāya-vākyā-dīpikā, Rāmānuja-siddhānta-sāra, a commentary on the Chāndogya-paniṣad, called Chandogyopaniṣad-prakāśikā, and one on the Brhad-āranyako-paniṣat-prakāśikā. He wrote an independent commentary on the Brahma-sūtra,
called Śārīraka-Śāstrārtha-dīpikā. Aufrecht reports, in his Catalogus Catalogorum, that he wrote also the following works (which, however, are not accessible to the present writer): Upaniṣad-vākya-vivaraṇa, Upaniṣat-prakāśikā, Upaniṣad-bhāṣya, Dravidopaniṣat-sāra-ratnāvali-vyākhyā, Kathavally-upaniṣat-prakāśikā, Kaśita-kopaniṣat-prakāśikā, Taittiriyoṇiṣat-prakāśikā, Praṇopaniṣat-prakāśikā, Māṇḍūkyopaniṣat-prakāśikā, Muṇḍakopaniṣat-prakāśikā, Śvetāśvataropaniṣat-prakāśikā, Śruta-bhāva-prakāśikā, Guru-bhāva-prakāśikā.

Rāṅga Rāmānuja’s teacher, Parakāla Yati, otherwise called Kumbha-konā Tatayārya, wrote the following works: Draviḍa-śruti-tattvārtha-prakāśikā, Tiruppalāṇḍu-vyākhyāna, Tiruppalavai-vyākhyāna, Kaṇṭṭhunū-sīrattāmbu-vyākhyāna, Adhikāra-samgraha-vyākhyā. He wrote also a Vijayīndra-parājaya in refutation of the Para-tattva-prakāśikā of Vijayīndra.

Śrīnīvāsadāsa, of the lineage of Mādhava, son of Devarāja-cārya and a pupil of Veṅkaṭanātha, wrote a Nyāya-sāra, a commentary on the Nyāya-parīṣuddhi, and also a commentary called Sata-dūṣanī-vyākhyā-sahasra-kīrāṇī. It is possible that the Śrīnīvāsādāsa who wrote the Viśīṣṭā-devaita-siddhānta, Kaivaly-sāta-duśanī, Durupadeśa-dhikkāra, Nyāsa-vidyā-vijaya, Mukti-sābda-vicāra, Siddhya-upāya-sudārśana, Śāra-niśkara-sātippanī and Vādādri-kuliśa is the same as the author of the Nyāya-sāra. He lived late in the fourteenth and in the fifteenth century. This Śrīnīvāsa must be distinguished from Śrīśaila Śrīnīvāsa, whose works have been treated in a separate section. Śrīśaila Śrīnīvāsa also lived probably in the fifteenth century.

We have another Śrīnīvāsa, who wrote an Adhikaraṇa-sārārtha-dīpikā. On some interpretations of the colophon he may probably be styled as Vādhūla Śrīnīvāsa, in which case he would be the teacher of Mahācārya.

There is another Śrīnīvāsa, who was the pupil of Mahācārya, alias Rāmānujadāsa, and son of Govindārya. He wrote a commentary on the Śruta-prakāśikā and also the Yatindra-mata-dīpikā, or Yati-pati-mata-dīpikā. The author says that in writing this elementary treatise on the fundamental principle and doctrines of Śrīvaiṣ-

1 See Aufrecht’s Catalogus Catalogorum, pp. 488–9.
2 On the other interpretation the adjective Vādhūla-kula-tilaka applies to his teacher Samara-punagavācārya. This Śrīnīvāsa was known also as Maṅgācārya Śrīnīvāsa.
The book *Yatindra-mata-dipikā* contains ten chapters. The first chapter enumerates the different categories, gives the definition of perception and shows how other sources of knowledge, such as memory, recognition, and non-perception, can all be included within this definition. It then gives a refutation of the various theories and establishes the theory of *sat-khyāti*. It denies the claim of verbal cognition to be regarded as a case of perception, refutes the definition of indeterminate cognition, and does not admit the possibility of any inference regarding God.

In the second chapter the writer defines "inference," classifies it and enumerates the rules regarding the validity of it and also gives a list of fallacies that may arise out of the violation of these rules. He includes analogy (*upamiti*) and proof by implication (*arthāpatti*) in the definition of inference and names the different modes of controversy.

In the third chapter we get the definition of "verbal testimony." The authority of the scriptures is established, and an attempt has been made to show that all words convey the sense of Nārāyaṇa the Lord.

The fourth chapter is longer than all the others. The author here refutes the categories of the *Nyāya* school of thought such as the universals, the relation of inherence, the causality of the atoms, and gives his own view about the genesis of the different categories, the mind-stuff, the body, the senses, the five primordial elements of earth, air, heat, water, sky, and so on.

The fifth chapter gives an account of time and establishes its all-pervasive and eternal nature. The sixth chapter enumerates the eternal, transcendental attributes of pure *sattva*, which belongs both to *īśvara* and *jīva*.

The seventh chapter is more philosophical. It contains a de-

tailed discussion as to how knowledge may be both an attribute and a substance, so that it may be a quality of the self and also constitute its essence. Attempts are here made to show that all mental states, including that of feeling, can be reduced to that of knowledge. Devotion and the attitude of self-surrender are discussed and the three courses, knowledge, action, and devotion, are elaborated. The writer also brings out the futility of the means of salvation prescribed by other systems of thought.

In the eighth chapter the author enumerates the attributes common to both ātma and iswāra, and deals at great length with the true nature of the individual self, refuting the theory of the Buddhists on this point. He gives also a description of the devotees and their twofold classification, and enumerates the attributes of the emancipated ātma.

The ninth chapter is devoted to the definition of God, and establishes Him as the instrumental, material and the accessory cause of the world. It refutes the theory of māyā of the monists (advaitins) and gives an account of the fivefold aspects of God such as vibhavas, avatāras, etc. The tenth chapter enumerates and defines ten categories other than substance, such as the sattva, rajas, tamas, śabda, śparśa, and the relation of contact, etc.

There was another Śrīnivāsadāsa, of the Āṇḍān lineage, who was author of a Natva-tattva-paritṛāṇa. He tried to prove that the word Nārāyaṇa is not an ordinary compound word, but a special word which stands by itself indicative of the name of the highest God. There was yet another Śrīnivāsa, called Śrīnivāsa Rāghavadāsa and Caṇḍa-mārūta, who wrote a Rāmānuja-siddhānta-samgraha.

This Śrīnivāsa again must be distinguished from another Śrīnivāsa of the lineage of Śathamāraṇa, who wrote at least one work known to the present writer, Ānanda-tāratamya-khaṇḍana. In this small treatise he tries to refute, by a reference to scriptural passages, the view that there are differences in the state of salvation.

A few other Śrīnivāsas and their works are also known to the present writer, and it is possible that they flourished in the fifteenth or the sixteenth century. These are Śrīvatsāṅka Miśra, who wrote a small work called Śrī-bhāṣya-sārārtha-samgraha; Śrīnivāsa Tātārya, who wrote Laghu-bhāva-prakāśikā; Śrīśaila Yogendra,
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who wrote a work called Tyāga-sabdārtha-tippani; Śrīśaila Rāghava-vārya, grandson of Venkaṭanātha, who wrote a Vedānta-kaustubha; Śrīśailadāsa, son of Raṅgadāsa, who wrote Siddhānta-saṃgraha; Sundararājadesīka, author of Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya-vyākhyā (an elementary commentary). These minor writers flourished probably in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Śrīnivāsa-dikṣīta, son of Śrīśaila Śrīnivāsa Tātāyārya, grandson of Anṇayārya, and a pupil of Ācārya-dikṣīta, wrote a work called Virodha-varūthinī-pramāthinī. This must be distinguished from the Virodha-varūthinī-pramāthinī of Raṅgācārya dealt with in a different section. Śrīnivāsa-sudhī also wrote Brahma-jūna-nirāsa, which records the controversy which the author had with Tryambaka Paṇḍīta, a follower of Śaṅkara. It generally follows a line of argument adapted in the Sata-dūṣanī in refuting the monistic Vedānta of Śaṅkara. It is difficult to say whether the works Naya-mani-kalikā, Lakṣmaṇārya-siddhānta-saṃgraha, and Hari-guṇa-maṇimālā should be attributed to this author or to the Śrīnivāsa who wrote the Virodha-nirodhā.

Sudarsanā Śūri, who lived in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, of the lineage of Hārīta, son of Vāgvijaya and pupil of Vatsya Varada, has been already mentioned. He wrote a treatise on the commentary of Rāmānuja from whose works all succeeding writers drew their inspiration. The title of his commentary is Śruta-prakāśikā, which incorporates, often word for word, what he heard from his teacher Vatsya Varada¹. He also wrote a Sandhyā-vandana-bhāṣya, Vedānta-saṃgraha-tātparya-dīpikā, a commentary on the Vedārtha-saṃgraha of Rāmānuja, and another work, called Śruta-pradīpikā. He was often called Vedavyāsa Bhaṭṭārya. This Sudarśana must be distinguished from Sudarśanaguru who wrote a commentary on the Vedānta-vijaya of Mahācārya. Śaṭhakopamuni, who was a pupil of Śaṭhārī Śūri and often known as Śaṭhakopa Yati, lived probably towards the end of the sixteenth century. He wrote the following works: Brahma-lakṣaṇa-vākyārtha-saṃgraha, Brahma-saṃgraha-tīcāra, Vākyārtha-saṃgraha, Brahma-sūtrārtha-saṃgraha, Brahma-lakṣaṇa-vākyārtha, Dīvyaprabandha and Bhāva-prakāśikā-dūṣanoddhāra. The last work is an attempt at

¹ gurubhyo rthah śrutah śabdais tat-prayuktaiś ca yojitaḥ
saukaryādyā bhubhūtsānām saṁkalayā prakāṣyate.
Introductory verses to the Śruta-prakāśikā.
refutation of the criticism of the *Bhāva-prakāśikā*, a commentary on *Śruti-prakāśikā*, by Varada Viṣṇu Śūri.

Ahobila Raṅganātha Yati, who flourished at the beginning of the fifteenth century, wrote a *Nyāsa-viérti*, in which he deals with the topics of *nyāsa* as expounded in Veṅkaṭanātha’s *Nyāsa-tilaka*. Ādivāraḥa Vedāntācārya wrote a *Nyāya-ratnāvali*. Kṛṣṇatātācārya, who flourished in the fifteenth century and belonged to the Śrīśaila lineage, wrote a commentary on the *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, called *Nyāya-pariśuddhi-vyākhyā* and some small treatises called *Dūrārtha-dūrīkaraṇa*, *Brahma-sabdārtha-vicāra* and *Nyātra-candrikā*. Kṛṣṇapāda-lōkaguru, probably of the same century, wrote a *Rahasya-traya-mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya*, *Divya-prabandha-vyākhyā*, *Catuh-ślokī-vyākhyā*, and a number of Tamil works. Campakeśa, of the fifteenth century, wrote a *Guru-tattva-prakāśikā*, and a *Vedānta-kanṭako-ddhāra*. In the last work he tried to refute the criticisms of the Śrī-bhāṣya¹. He was a pupil of Veṅkaṭanātha. Another Tātācārya, who was grandfather of Veṅkaṭādhvarī, the author of the *Vīṣvaguṇādaṇḍa*, wrote a *Tātācārya-dīna-cāryā*. He was the maternal uncle of Appaya-dīkṣita. Again, Deśikācārya, who wrote the *Prayoga-ratna-mālā* as a commentary on the Śrī-bhāṣya, also wrote a book on the commentary on Veṅkaṭanātha’s *Pāṇīkā* on the *Taittirīyopaniṣat*, which was called the “*Asti-brahmeti-śruti-artha-vicāra*.” Doḍḍāyācārya, who lived probably in the fifteenth century, wrote a *Parikāra-vijaya*, often referred to in Mahācārya’s works, and a life of Veṅkaṭanātha, called *Vedānta-deśika-vaiḥavapraḥāśikā*. Nārāyaṇa muni wrote a *Bhāva-pradīpika*, *Gitārthasamgraha*, *Gitā-sāra-rakṣā*, *Gitā-saṃgraha-vibhāga*, *Rahasya-traya-jīvātū*. He was the son of Śrīśaila Tātāyārya, grandson of Anantārya and pupil of Rāmanujācārya, probably Mahācārya. He lived perhaps late in the fifteenth century. Nṛśimharāja, who wrote a commentary on the *Śata-duṣṭā*, called *Śata-duṣṭā-vyākhyā*, was probably the same person who wrote an *Ānanda-dāyini* on the *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*. Nṛśimhasūrī, a much later writer, wrote a *Śārīra-bhāvādhihīkāraṇa-vicāra* and *Tat-kratu-nyāya-vicāra*. Para-

¹ Sudhhasattvalakṣaṇārāya wrote a work called *Guru-bhāva-prakāśikā* as a commentary on the *Śruti-prakāśikā*, which he based upon the Guru-tattva-prakāśikā of Campakeśa. He was the disciple of Sudhhasattvācārya, son of Saunyā Jāmāṭ muni. In his commentary he constantly refers to the Tūlīkā commentary of Vadhula Śrīnīvāsa. He lived probably in the sixteenth century, and may have been a contemporary of Mahācārya.
vastu Vedântâcârya, son of Ādivârâhâcârya, composed a Vedânta-
kaustubha. Puruṣottama wrote a commentary on the Śrî-bhâsya
called Subodhinî, and Bhagavat Senâpati Miśra wrote a Śârîraka-
nyâya-halâ.

Pela Puradeśika wrote a work called Tattva-bhâskara. It is
divided into two parts, in the first of which he tries to ascertain the
meaning of mâyâ and elucidates the nature of God on the basis of
Dravidian and Sanskrit texts. The second part is of a ritualistic
nature. Raṅgârâja, who lived probably in the sixteenth century,
was the author of Advaita-vâhiśkâra. Raṅgânâthâcârya wrote an
Aṣṭâdasa-bheda-vicâra, Puruṣârtha-ratnakara, Vicâdârtha-sam-
graha, Kâryâdhikaraṇa-veda and Kâryâdhikaraṇa-tattva. The con-
tents of the last two works have been dealt with in a different
section. He lived perhaps in the sixteenth century, and was a pupil
of Saumya Jâmâṭr muni. A Râmânuja called Vedanta Râmânuja
wrote a Divya-sûri-prabhâca-dipikâ and a Sarcâ-dârśana-śiromâni.
Râmânujadâśabhîkṣu wrote Sauri-râja-caranâravinda-śarana-gati-
sûra, and Râma Subrahmanyasâstrî Viṣṇu-tattva-rahasya. These
two writers flourished probably in the seventeenth or late in the
sixteenth century.

Ātreya Varada wrote a Rahasya-traya-sâra-eyâkhyâ, a com-
mentary on Veṅkaṭanâtha’s Rahasya-traya-sâra. Varadâsâ wrote
Nyâsa-vidyâ-bhûsana and Vâdi Keśârî Miśra the following:
Adhyâtma-cintâ, Tattva-dîpa-samgraha-kârikâ, Tattva-dîpa and
Rahasya-traya-kârikâ. These small works are of little value. Only
the Tattva-dîpa contains some philosophical materials inspired by
the Śruta-prakâśikâ of Sudarśana. Vîra-râghava-dâsa, son of
Vâdhûla Narasîmha and pupil of Vâdhûla Varadaguru, produced
a commentary on the Śrî-bhâsya, called Tātparya-dipikâ, and one
on Vâtsyâ Varada’s Tattva-sâra, called Ratna-sârînî. Veṅkaṭa
Sudhî wrote a voluminous work in four chapters, called Siddhânta-
ratnâvali, in which he tried to prove that Narâyaṇa and not Śiva is
the supreme Lord and the cause of the world, and dealt with many
sectarian doctrines which are of no philosophical value. He was
the pupil of Veṅkaṭanâtha and son of Tâtâcârya of Saṭhamaṛṣâṇa
lineage. Some notice of the work will be taken in the section on
Pancârâtra. Veṅkaṭadâsa, called also Vucci Veṅkaṭâcârya, the
third son of Aṇṇayârya, of Saṭhamaṛṣâṇa lineage, composed a work
called Vedântakârikâvali. Veṅkaṭâdhvari wrote a work called Yatî-

Anayārya, brother of Śrīśaila Śrīnīvaśa, wrote Saptati-ratna-mālikā, Vyavahārikaṭva-khaṇḍana-sāra, Mithyāṭva-khaṇḍana, Ācārya-vimśatī, Ananda-tāratamya-khaṇḍana. Appaya-diksita of the sixteenth century commented on the Brahma-sūtra in accordance with the views of Rāmānuja, in a work called Naya-mukha-mālikā. Anantārya of the nineteenth century wrote a number of works of which the following have been published: Nyātva-tattva-vibhūṣaṇa, Śatakoti-khaṇḍana, Nyāya-bhāskara, Ācāra-locana (a refutation of widow-remarriage), Śastraṃbha-samarthana, Samāsa-vāda, Viṣayatā-vāda, Brahma-śakti-vāda, Śastraikya-vāda, Mokṣa-karaṇatā-vāda, Nirviśeṣa-pramāṇa-vyuddha, Saṃveṇ-nāṇātva-samarthana, Śnāna-yāthārthya-vāda, Brahma-laksāṇa-vāda, Iksatya-ādhiḥkaraṇa-vicāra, Pratijñā-vāda, Akāśādhiḥkaraṇa-vicāra, Śribhaṣya-bhāvāṅkura, Laghu-sāmānādhiḥkaraṇya-vāda, Guru-sāmānādhiḥkaraṇya-vāda, Śārīra-vāda, Siddhānta-siddhānța, Vidhisudhākara, Sudarṣana-sura-drumba, Bheda-vāda, Tat-kratu-nyāya-vicāra, Drśyavā-नunāṇa-nirāśa. These treatises are mostly short papers, though a few are more elaborate. The Nyāya-bhāskara is a refutation of the Gauḍa-brahmāṇandi commentary on the Advaita-siddhi, in refutation of the Nyāyamṛta-taraṅgini. It consists of twelve topics, and the refutations are mostly of a scholastic nature following the style of the new school of logic in Bengal which found fault with the definitions of their opponents. Some of the most important works of this writer have been referred to in the relevant places of this work.
The Influence of the Ārvārs on the followers of Rāmānuja.

We have already referred to the Divya-prabandhas, written by the Ārvārs in Tamil, which exerted a profound influence on all teachers of the Śrīvaishṇava school. Kureśa (Tirukkurukaippiran Pillai) wrote a commentary of 6000 verses on a selection of Nāmm'-ārvār's one thousand verses called the Sahasra-giti. Parāśara Bhaṭṭāryā wrote a commentary of 9000 verses. Under the directions of Kalijit (Lokacarya) Abhaya-prada-raja wrote a commentary of 24,000 verses. Kṛṣṇapāda, pupil of Kalijit, wrote another commentary of 3600 verses. Saumya Jamatr muni wrote 12,000 verses interpreting the views of Nāmm'-ārvār. The commentaries of Abhaya-prada-raja on the Divya-prabandhas helped the later teachers to understand the esoteric doctrine of the later works. The commentaries on the Divya-prabandhas written by Saumyajāmāṭr muni, the younger brother of Pillai Lokacarya, had already become rare in the time of Abhirāma Varācārya, the translator of the Upadeśa-ratna-mālā and the grandson of Saumya Jāmāṭr muni.

It is thus seen that Parāśara Bhaṭṭārya, the successor of Rāmānuja in the pontifical chair, and his successor Vedānti Mādhava, called also Nanjiyar, and his successor Namburi Varadarāja, called also Kalijit or Lokacarya I, and his successor Pillai Lokacarya, all wrote works dealing not so much with the interpretation of Rāmānuja's philosophy, as with the interpretation of devotion as dealt with in the Sahasra-giti and the Divya-prabandhas. Their writings are mostly in Tamil, only a few have been translated into Sanskrit.

These Divya-prabandhas are four thousand in number. Thus Poygaiy-ārvār wrote Muḍal-tiru-vantādi of 100 stanzas; Bhūtatt'-ārvār, Iraṇḍam-tiru-vantādi of 100 stanzas; Pēy-ārvār, Mūrṇām-tiru-vantādi of 100 stanzas; Tiru-mariṇai Pirān, Nān-mukam Tiru-vantādi and Tiru-chanda-vruttam of 96 and 120 stanzas respectively; Madhura-kaviy-ārvār wrote Kaṇṭhinun-sirattāmbu of 11 stanzas; Nāmm'-ārvār wrote Tiru-vrutram of 100 stanzas, Tiru-vāśiriyam, Periya-tiru-vantādi of 87 stanzas and Tiru-vāy-moṛi of 1102 verses; Kula-śekhara Perumāḷ wrote Perumāl-tirumolā of 105 stanzas, Periy-ārvār-tiruppālandu and Periy-ārvār-tirumoli of 12 and 461 stanzas, Aṇḍal, Tiruppāvai and Nācchyār-tirumoli of 30 and 143 stanzas; Tondar-adi-poḍiy-ārvār, Tiru-poḍiy-eruchi and Tiru-māḷai of 10 and 45 stanzas respectively; Tiru-pān-ārvār, Amalanāḍi-pirān of 10 stanzas; Tiru-māṅgaṇi-ārvār wrote Periya-tirumoli of 1084 verses, Tirukkarundāndakam of 20 stanzas, Tirunendāndakam of 30 stanzas, Tiruvēlkir-tirukkai of 1 stanza, Siṇiyā-tirumadal of 77 stanzas and Periya-tirumadal of 148 stanzas, thus making a total of 4000 verses in all. They are referred to in the Upadesā-ratna-mālā of Saumya Jāmāṭr muni (junior) and in its introduction by M. T. Narasimhiengar.
and in the present work notice is taken only of the Sanskrit works of these writers (mostly in the manuscript form) which have been available to the present writer. Both Pillai Lokācārya and Saumya Jāmāṭr muni, called also Vādikeśarī, were sons of Kṛṣṇapāda, but this Saumya Jāmāṭr muni must be distinguished from a later Saumyajāmāṭr muni, called also Yatindrapravanācārya, who was a much more distinguished man. Parāśara Bhaṭṭārya was probably born before A.D. 1078 and he died in A.D. 1165. He was succeeded by Vedāntī Madhava or Nanjiyar, who was succeeded by Namburi Varadarāja or Lokācārya I. He was succeeded by Pillai Lokācārya, a contemporary of Vēṅkaṭanātha, and Śruta-prakāśikācārya or Sudarśana Śūri. It was in his time that the Mahomedans attacked Śrīraṅgam. as has already been mentioned in connection with our account of Vēṅkaṭanātha. The Mahomedans were expelled from Śrīraṅgam by Goppanārya, and the image of Raṅgānātha was re-installed in A.D. 1293. It was at this time that the famous Saumya Jāmāṭr muni (junior) was born. The senior Saumya Jāmāṭr muni, younger brother of Pillai Lokācārya, called also Vādikesarī, wrote some commentaries on the Divya-prabandhas, a work called Dīpa-prakāśa, and Piyaruli-ceyalare-rahasya. He is referred to by the junior Saumya Jāmāṭr muni, called also Vara-vara muni, in his Upadeśa-ratna-mālā, Tattva-traya-bhāṣya and Śrīvacana-bhūṣana-vyākhyā. We cannot be sure whether the Adhyātma-cintāmani, in which Vādhūla Śrīnivāsa is adored as his teacher, was written by Saumya Jāmāṭr muni. Mahācārya also described himself as a pupil of Vādhūla Śrīnivāsa, and, if the senior Saumya Jāmāṭr and Mahācārya were pupils of the same teacher, Mahācārya must have lived in the fourteenth century. If, however, the junior Saumya Jāmāṭr wrote the Adhyātma-cintāmani, Mahācārya will have to be placed at a later date.

The present writer has been able to trace only three books in Sanskrit by Pillai Lokācārya: Tattva-traya, Tattva-śekhara, and Śrīvacana-bhūṣana. The Tattva-traya is a very useful compendium of the Śrīvaiśṇava school of thought, in which the nature of the inanimate (acit), the souls, God and their mutual relations are dealt

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The Viśiṣṭā-dvaita School

There is an excellent commentary by Varavara muni. The Tattva-ṣekhara is a work in four chapters. The first chapter quotes scriptural evidences in support of the view that Nārāyaṇa is the highest God and the ultimate cause; in the second chapter he describes the nature of self by reference to scriptural testimony. The same description of the nature of self is continued in the third chapter. In the fourth chapter he deals with the ultimate goal of all souls, self-surrender to God. He says that the ultimate sumnum bonum (puruṣārtha) consists in the servitude (kaṇḍikārya) to God roused by love of Him (priti-kārīta), due to the knowledge of one’s own nature and the nature of God in all His divine beauty, majesty, power and supreme excellence. Not all servitude is undesirable. We know in our ordinary experience that servitude through love is always pleasurable. In the ordinary idea of emancipation, a man emphasizes his own self and his own end. This is therefore inferior to the sumnum bonum in which he forgets his own self and regards the servitude of God as his ultimate end. Lokācārya then refutes the various other conceptions of the ultimate goal in other schools of philosophy. He also refutes the conception of the sumnum bonum as the realization of one’s own nature with a sense of supreme subordination (para-tantratvena svā-nubhava-mātram na puruṣārthaḥ). This is also technically called kaivalya in the Śrīvaiśṇava system. Our ultimate end is not cessation of pain, but enjoyment of bliss. Positive bliss is our final aim. It is held that in the emancipation as described above the individual realizes himself in close association with God and enjoys supreme bliss thereby; but he can never be equal to Him. Bondage (bandha) is true and the removal of bondage is also true. Prapatti, or self-surrender to God, is regarded as a means to cessation of bondage. This prapatti may be direct (a-vyavahita) and indirect (vyavahita). In the first case the self-surrender is complete and absolute and done once for all. The

1 Prapatti is defined as follows:


Just as the Śaṅkarites hold that, once the knowledge regarding the unity of the individual with Brahman dawns through the realization of the meaning of such texts, there remains nothing to be done. So here also the complete self-surrender to God is the dawning of the nature of one’s relation to God, and, when this is once accomplished, there is nothing else to be done. The rest remains with God in His adoption of the devotee as His own.
direct *prapatti* is the continual meditation on God through love of Him, along with the performance of the obligatory duties and the non-commission of prohibited actions. This is decidedly the lower stage; the more deserving ones naturally follow the first method.

The main contents of Pillai Lokācārya's *Śrī-vacana-bhūṣaṇa* follow in a separate section in connection with the account of the commentary on it and sub-commentary by Saumya Jāmāṭr muni (junior) and Raghūttama. The *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa* consists of 484 small sentences longer than the *Śūtra*-phrases, but often shorter than ordinary philosophical sentences. Lokācārya followed this style in his other works also, such as his *Tattva-traya* and *Tattva-śekhara*.

Ramya-jāmāṭr muni or Saumya Jāmāṭr muni, called also Maṉāvalāma muni or Periya-jīyar, was the son of Tikalakkidandāntirunāṉirdaiyāṕirān-Tāṭar-āṇṇar, a disciple of Pillai Lokācārya and grandson of Kollikavaladasar, who was also a disciple of Pillai Lokācārya. He was born in the Tinnevelly district in A.D. 1370 and lived for seventy-three years, that is till A.D. 1443. He first obtained training from Śrīśaileśa, called also Tiru-māṟai Āṟvār, in Tiru-vāy-mōrī. One of the first works of his early youth was a poem called *Yati-rāja-vimsati*, in honour of Rāmānuja, which is incorporated and published in Varavara muni's *Dina-caryā*. On account of his deep devotion for Rāmānuja he was also known as Yatindra-pravāṇa, and wrote a commentary on a short life of Rāmānuja called *Prapanna-saṁvīṭrī* or *Rāmānuja-nurandādi* of Tiruvarangatt-amudandr. After completing his studies under Śrīśaileśa he remained at Śrīraṅgam and studied the commentaries on the *Divya-prabandhas*, the *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa* and other *Drāvīda Vedānta* works. In his study of the *Divya-prabandhas* and the Gītā-bhāṣya he was helped by his father Tāṭar-āṇṇar. He also studied with Kidambi-Tirumalai-Nāyinar, called also Kṛṣṇadesīka, the Śrībhāṣya and *Sruta-prakāśikā*. He also studied the *Ācārya-hṛdaya* with Aṭṭayācārya, called also Devarājguru, of Yādavādī. He renounced the world, became a *sannyāsin*, and attached himself to the Pallava-māṭha at Śrīraṅgam, where he built a *vyākhyāna-māṇḍapa*, in which he used to deliver his religious lectures. He was very proficient in the *Drāvīda Vedānta*, produced many works in the *maṇi-pravāla* style (mixture of Sanskrit and Tamil), and had hundreds of followers. He had a son, called Rāmānujārya, and a grandson, called Viṣṇucitta. Of his pupils eight were very famous: Bhaṭṭa-
nātha, Śrīnivāsa-yati, Devarājaguru, Vādhūla Varada Narāyaṇaguru, Pratīvādibhayaṅkara, Rāmānuja-guru, Sutākhyā, and Śrī-vānacala Yogindra. These eight disciples were great teachers of Vedānta. He taught the Bhāṣya to Raṅgarāja. There were many ruling chiefs in South India who were his disciples. Among his works the following are noteworthy, Yatī-rāja-vimśati, Gitā-tātparya-dīpa, a Sanskrit commentary on the Gitā, Śrī-bhāsyā-ratha, Taittirīyo-paniṣad-bhāṣya, Para-tattva-nirṇaya. He wrote also commentaries on the Rahasya-traya, Tattva-traya and Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa of Pillai Lokācārya and the Ācārya-hṛdaya of the senior Saumya Jāmāṭr muni, called also Vādikeśari, brother of Pillai Lokācārya; commentaries on Priyālvar-tiru-mori, jñāna-sāra and Prameya-sāra of Devarāja, and the Sapta-gāthā of Viṃśolai-ppillai; glosses on the authorities quoted in the Tattva-traya, Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa, and commentaries on the Divya-prabandha called the Idu; many Tamil verses, such as Tiruvāymin-nurundadi, Ārtti-prabandha, Tiruvāṟudhana-krama, and many Sanskrit verses. He occupied a position like that of Rāmānuja, and his images are worshipped in most Vaiṣṇava temples in South India. Many works were written about him, e.g. Varavara-muni-dinacāryā, Varavara-muni-satāka, Varavara-muni-kāvya, Varavara-muni-campu, Yatīndra-praṇava-prabhāva, Yatīndra-praṇava-bhadra-campu, etc. His Upadeśa-ratna-mālā is recited by Śrīvaiṣṇavas after the recital of the Divya-prabandha. In his Upadeśa-ratna-mālā he gives an account of the early Āravārs and the Āragiyas. It was translated into Sanskrit verse by his grandson Abhirama-varācārya, whose Aṣṭādaśa-bhedā-nirṇaya has already been noted in the present work. He also wrote another book called Nakṣatra-mālikā in praise of Śaṭhakopa. Though Mr Narasimhiengar says that a commentary on the Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa was written by Saumya Jāmāṭr muni (junior) in the mani-pravāla style, yet the manuscript of the commentary, with a sub-commentary on it by Raghūtama, which was available to the present writer, was a stupendous volume of about 750 pages, all written in Sanskrit. The main contents of this work will appear in a separate section.

1 See Prapannāṁrta, Ch. 122.
2 The present writer is indebted for some of his information regarding the works of Saumya Jāmāṭr muni to M. T. Narasimhiengar’s Introduction to the English translation of the Upadeśa-ratna-mālā.
CHAPTER XIX
THE PHILOSOPHY OF YAMUNĀCĀRYA

THOUGH in later days Bodhāyana is regarded as the founder of the Vaiṣṇava systems, yet, as his commentary on the Brahma-sūtras is not now available, we may look upon Yāmuna as being the earliest of the latter-day Vaiṣṇava philosophers. We hear that many other people, such as Taṅka, Dramiḍa and Bharuchi, wrote in accordance with the teachings contained in the commentary of Bodhāyana, endeavouring to refute the views of other systems of thought. Dramiḍa wrote a Bhāṣya which was elaborated by Śrīvatsāṅka Miśra and is frequently referred to by Yāmuna. The sage Vakulā-bharana, called Saṭhakopācārya, also wrote an elaborate treatise in the Tamil language on the bhakti creed, but this also is hardly available now. Thus the history of modern Vaiṣṇavism should, for all practical purposes, begin with Yāmuna, who flourished during the latter part of the tenth and the earlier part of the eleventh century. Yāmuna was said to be the preceptor of Mahāpurṇa from whom the great Rāmānuja had his initiation. So far as I am aware, Yāmuna wrote four books, namely, Siddhi-traya, Agama-prāmāṇya, Puruṣa-ninnaya, and Kāśmīrāgama. Of these only the first two have been printed.

Yāmuna's doctrine of Soul contrasted with those of others.

We have seen that from the Cārvākas to the Vedāntists there had been many schools of philosophy and each of them had its own theory of soul. We made but a scanty reference to Cārvākism in the first volume, and we have generally omitted the discussions against Cārvākism in which other systems usually indulged. The most important of the doctrines held by the Cārvākas is that there is no self other than the body; some of them, however, regarded the senses as the self, and others as Manas. They held that there were only four elements and that out of them life and consciousness sprang forth. Our notion of self also referred to the body, and there was no separate soul, apart from the body. The Cārvāka literature
has, however, vanished from India, and we can know only from references in other works that their original writings were also in the form of *sūtras*.

Yāmuna’s philosophy was directly opposed to the doctrine of the Cārvākas. It is best therefore that we should deal here with Yāmuna’s theory of soul in connection with the pretensions of the Cārvākas. Yāmuna takes his stand on the notion of self-consciousness. He says that our preception “I know” distinctly points to the self as the subject, as distinguished from the perception of the body as “this is my body,” which is closely akin to other objective perceptions such as “this is a jug,” “this is a piece of cloth.” When I restrain my senses from external objects and concentrate myself on myself, I have still the notion of my self as “I,” which arises in me without the least association of my hands or feet or any other parts of the body. The body as a whole cannot be said to be indicated by my perception, when none of the parts of the body shine forth in it. Even when I say “I am fat,” “I am lean,” the notion of “I” does not refer to the external fat or lean body, but to some mysterious entity within me with which the body is wrongly associated. We should not forget that we also say “this is my body” as we should say “this is my house,” where the body is spoken of as being different from the self as any external object. But it may be objected that we also say “my self” (*mamātmā*); but this is only a linguistic usage which expresses that difference, whereas the entity perceived is just the same and identical. The confusion which is felt in the fact that the notion of “I” refers to the body is due to this, that the self has no perceivable shape or form as have ordinary external objects (such as jug, cloth, etc.), by virtue of which they are distinguished from one another. Those who are not sufficiently discriminating cannot rest content with the formless self, and consequently confuse the soul with the body, more particularly because they find that corresponding to any and every desire of the soul there is a corresponding change of the body. They think that, since, corresponding to any mental change, such as new feeling, thought, or desire, there is a corresponding physical or physiological change of the body, there is no other soul different from the body. But, if

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1 The first *sūtra* of Brhaspati is *atha tattvam vyākhyaśyāmah*; the second is *prithivy-at-tejo-vāyur iti tattvānī* and the third is *tebhyaś caitanyam kiṃvādi-bhyo mada-saktīvaṭ*. 
we try to find out by a deeper self-introspection what we mean by "I," we find that it is an entity, as the subject, as the "I," as distinct from the objects which are not self and which are indicated as this or that. Had the notion "I know" referred to the body, the bodily parts would surely have been manifested in the notion, as external objects shine forth in all external perception as this or that. But it is not so; on the contrary, by introspection I find that the self is an entity which is independent in itself, and all other things of the world are for the sake of my self; I am the enjoyer, whereas everything else is the object of my enjoyment; I am not for the sake of any body; I am an end in myself and never a means for anything else (a-parārtha). All combinations and collocations are for the sake of another, whom they serve; the self is neither the result of any collocation nor does it exist for the sake of serving another.

Moreover, consciousness cannot be regarded as being a product of the body. Consciousness cannot be thought to be like an intoxicating property, the product of the four elements; for the combination of the four elements cannot produce any and every sort of power. There is a limit to the effects that a certain cause can produce; in the production of the intoxicating property it is the atoms which happen to possess that property; intoxication is not to be compared with consciousness; nor has it any similarity to any physical effect; nor can it be thought that there are atoms in which the property of consciousness is generated. Had consciousness been the result of any chemical change, such as we find in the production of the red colour by the combination of lime with catechu, there would have been particles of consciousness (caitanya) produced, and our consciousness would then have been the sum total of those particles of consciousness, as in the case of any material chemical product; the red colour produced by the combination of lime with catechu belongs to an object every particle of which is red; so, if consciousness had been a chemical product of the material of this body, there would have been generated some particles of consciousness, and thus there would have been perceptions of many selves in accordance with each particle of consciousness, and there would be no identity of consciousness and experience. Thus it must be admitted that consciousness belongs to an entity, the soul, which is different from the body.

Nor can consciousness belong to the senses; for, if it belonged
to each of the senses, then that which was perceived by one sense (e.g. the eye) could not be perceived by another sense (e.g. the touch), and there would not rise the consciousness "I touch that which I had seen before." If all the senses together produced consciousness, then we could not perceive anything with one sense (e.g. the eye), nor could we have any consciousness, or the memory of the object of any particular sense after that sense was lost; when a man was blinded, he would lose all consciousness, or would never remember the objects which he had seen before with his eyes.

Nor can the *manas* be regarded as *ātman*; for it is only an organ accepted as accounting for the fact that knowledge is produced in succession and not in simultaneity. If it is said that the *manas* may be regarded as being a separate organ by which it can know in succession, then practically the self, or *ātman*, is admitted; the only difference being this, that the Cārvākas call *manas* what we (Yaśmuna and his followers) call *ātman*.

The *Vijñānavādin* Buddhists held that knowledge, while self-manifesting, also manifested the objects and so knowledge should be regarded as the self (*ātman*). Against these Buddhists Yaśmuna held that, if any permanent seat of knowledge was not admitted, then the phenomenon of personal identity and recognition could not be explained by the transitory states of self-manifesting knowledge; if each knowledge came and passed, how could one identify one’s present experiences with the past, if there were only flowing states of knowledge and no persons? Since there was no permanence, it could not be held that any knowledge persisted as an abiding factor on the basis of which the phenomenon of self-identity or recognition could be explained. Each knowledge being absent while others came, there was no chance of even an illusion of sameness on grounds of similarity.

The doctrine of the Śaṅkara school, that there is one qualityless permanent pure consciousness, is regarded by Yaśmuna as being against all experience. Thus, consciousness is always felt as belonging to a person and as generated, sustained for a time, and then lost. At the time of deep sleep we all cease to possess knowledge, and this is demonstrated by our impression on waking that we have slept for so long, without consciousness. If the *antahkaraṇa*, which the Advaitins regard as the substratum of the notion of "I," had been submerged during the sleep, then there could not have been
on waking the notion that “I slept so long.” Nobody has ever experienced any pure knowledge. Knowledge as such must belong to somebody. The Śaṅkarites say that the rise of knowledge means the identity of the knowledge with the objects at the time. But this is not so; for the truth of the knowledge of an object is always with reference to its limitations of time and space and not to the intrinsic quality of the thing or the knowledge. The assertion also that knowledge is permanent is without any foundation; for whenever any knowledge arises it always does so in time and under the limitations of time. Nobody has ever experienced any knowledge divested of all forms. Knowledge must come to us either as perception or as inference, etc.; but there cannot be any knowledge which is absolutely devoid of any forms or modifications and absolutely qualityless. The Śaṅkarites regard the self as pure consciousness or anubhūti, but it is apparent that the self is the agent of anubhūti, or the knower, and not knowledge or pure consciousness. Again, as in Buddhism, so in Śaṅkarism, the question of recognition remains unsolved; for recognition or personal continuity of experience means that the knower existed in the past and is existing even now—as when we say, “I have experienced this”—but, if the self is pure consciousness only, then there cannot be any perceiver persisting in the past as well as in the present, and the notion “I have experienced this” is not explained, but only discarded as being illusory. The consciousness of things, however, is never generated in us as “I am consciousness,” but as “I have the consciousness of this”; if all forms were impure impositions on pure consciousness, then the changes would have taken place in the consciousness, and instead of the form “I have consciousness” the proper form of knowledge ought to have been “I am consciousness.” The Śaṅkarites also hold that the notion of the knower is an illusory imposition on the pure consciousness. If that be so, the consciousness itself may be regarded as an illusory imposition; if it is said that the pure consciousness is not an imposition, since it lasts till the end—the stage of emancipation—then, since the result of right knowledge (tattva-jñāna) is this, that the self ceases to be a knower, false knowledge should be welcomed rather than such a right knowledge. The notion “I know” proves the self to be a knower and apart from a knower so manifested no pure consciousness can be experienced. The notion “I” at once distinguishes the knower from the body,
the senses, the manas, or even the knowledge. Such a self is also called a sākṣī (perceiver), as all objects are directly perceived by it.

The Sāmkhya view is that it is the ahaṅkāra or buddhi which may be regarded as the knower; for these are but products of prakṛti, and thus non-intelligent in themselves. The light of pure consciousness cannot be regarded as falling on them and thereby making them knowers by the reflection of its light; for reflection can only happen with reference to visible objects. Sometimes it is held by the Śaṅkarites that true consciousness is permanent and unchangeable, that the ego (ahaṅkāra) derives its manifestation from that and yet reveals that in association with itself, just as a mirror or the surface of water reflects the sun; and, when these limitations of ahaṅkāra, etc., are merged during deep sleep, the self shines forth in its own natural light and bliss. This also is unintelligible; for if the ahaṅkāra, etc., had all been manifested by the pure consciousness, how can they again in their turn manifest the consciousness itself? Actually it cannot be imagined what is the nature of that manifestation which pure consciousness is made to have by the ahaṅkāra, since all ordinary analogies fail. Ordinarily things are said to be manifested when obstructions which veil them are removed, or when a lamp destroys darkness, or when a mirror reflects an object; but none of these analogies is of any use in understanding how consciousness could be manifested by ahaṅkāra. If, again, consciousness requires something else to manifest it, then it ceases to be self-manifesting and becomes the same as other objects. It is said that the process of knowledge runs on by successive removals of ajñāna from the consciousness. Ajñāna (na-jañāna—not knowledge) may be understood as absence of knowledge or as the moment when some knowledge is going to rise, but such an ajñāna cannot obstruct consciousness; the Śaṅkarites hold, therefore, that there is an indefinable positive ajñāna which forms the stuff of the world. But all this is sheer nonsense. That which manifests anything cannot make that thing appear as a part of itself, or as its own manifestation. The ego, or ahaṅkāra, cannot also manifest another consciousness (which is different from it) in such a way that that consciousness shall appear as its own manifestation. So it has to be admitted that the self is not pure consciousness, but the self-conscious ego which appears in all our experience. The state of deep sleep (susupti) is often put forward as an example of pure
consciousness being found unassociated with other limitations of ego, etc. But this is not possible, as we have already seen. Moreover, when the later experience of the waking moment testifies that “I did not know anything,” it can well be urged that there was no pure consciousness during deep sleep; but that the ego existed is proved by the fact that at the waking moment the perception which identifies the ego (ahaṅkāra) as the self, also testifies that the ego as the self had persisted during deep sleep. The self which shines forth in us as the ego therefore remains the same during deep sleep; but it has no knowledge at that time. After rising from deep sleep we feel “I did not know anything, I did not know even myself.” The Śaṅkarites assert the experience that during deep sleep there is no knowledge even of the ego. This, however, is hardly true; for the perception “I did not know even myself” means that during deep sleep all the personal associations (e.g. as belonging to a particular family, as occupying a particular position, etc.) were absent, and not that the ego itself was absent. When the self is conscious of itself, there is the notion of the “I,” as in “I am conscious of myself.” During deep sleep also, when no other objects are manifested, there is the self which is conscious of itself as the ego or the “I.” If during emancipation there was no consciousness as the self, the ego, the “I,” then it is the same almost as the absolute nihilism of the Buddhists. The sense of “I,” the ego, is not a mere quality extraneously imposed on the self, but the very nature of the self. Even knowledge shines forth as a quality of this ego or “I,” as when we say “I know it.” It is the “I” who possesses the knowledge. Knowledge thus appears to be a quality of the “I.” But no experience of ours ever demonstrates that “I” is a quality of pure knowledge. We say “I have this knowledge” and not that the knowledge has the “I.” If there is no “I,” no one who experiences, no subject who is existent during emancipation, who would strive to attain emancipation? If even the “I” is annihilated after emancipation, who would care to take all the trouble, or suffer the religious restraints, etc., for such an undesirable state? If even “I” should cease to exist, why should I care for such a nihilistic state? What am I to do with pure consciousness, when “I” ceases to exist? To say that “I” is such an object as “you” or “he” or “this” or “that,” and that this “I” is illuminated by pure consciousness, is preposterously against all experience. The “I” manifests of itself
without the help of any other manifesting agency, now as well as
during emancipation; for the manifestation of the self has always
the sole form of "I"; and, if during emancipation the self mani-
фests, it must do so as "I." From the sacred texts also we find that
the emancipated sages, Vāmadeva and Manu, thought of their own
selves as the "I." Even God is not devoid of this notion of His
personality as "I," as is attested by the Upaniṣad sayings, in which
He declares: "I have created this world." The notion of "I" is
false when it is identified with the body and other extraneous
associations of birth, social rank, etc., and when it gives rise to pride
and boastfulness. It is this kind of ahaṅkāra which has been re-
garded as false in the scriptures. The notion "I," when it refers to
the self, is, indeed, the most accurate notion that we can have.

All our perceptions of pleasure and pain also are manifested as
qualities of the "I," the self. The "I" manifests itself to itself and
hence must be regarded as being of non-material stuff (ajāda). The
argument, that since the notion of "I" is taken along with know-
ledge (saḥopalambha), knowledge alone exists, and that "I" is not dif-
ferent from it, may well be repudiated by turning the table and with
the same argument declaring that "I" alone exists and that there is
no knowledge. All persons experience that knowledge is felt to be
as distinct from the "I," the knower, as the known object. To say
that self is self-manifesting by nature is not the same thing as to say
that the self is knowledge by nature; for the self is independent of
knowledge; knowledge is produced as a result of the perceptual
process involving sense-contact, etc.; the self is the knower, the
"I," which knows things and thereby possesses knowledge.

The "I," the knower, the self, manifests itself directly by self-
consciousness; and hence those who have attempted to demonstrate
the self by inference have failed to do so. Thus, the Naiyāyikas
think that the self is proved as that in which qualities such as
knowledge, desire, pleasure, pain, etc., inhere. But, even though by
such an inference we may know that there is something in which
the qualities inhere, it cannot be inferred therefrom that this thing
is the self in us. Since nothing else is found in which knowledge,
will, etc., might inhere, it may as well be argued that knowledge,
etc., are not qualities at all, or that there is no law that qualities must
necessarily inhere in a thing. They are regarded as guṇas (qualities)
only by their technical definition; and the Naiyāyikas can accept these
as *guṇas*, and on that ground infer that there must be some other entity, self (which is not testified by any other proof), as the basis in which the aforesaid *guṇas* may inhere. It is hardly justifiable to accept a new substance, soul (which cannot be obtained by any other proof), simply on the ground that there must be some basis in which *guṇas* must inhere; it is the maxim of the opponents that *guṇas* must exist in some substance and that there are knowledge, willing, etc., which they are pleased to call *guṇas*; one cannot take further advantage in holding thereby that, since there is no other substance in which these so-called *guṇas* (knowledge, willing, etc.) might inhere, the existence of some other substance as the self must be inferred.

The Śaṃkhyaists also make the same mistake, when they hold that all the movements of this non-intelligent *prākṛti* must be for the sake of the *puruṣa*, for whom the *prākṛti* is working. The objection to such a view is this, that even though such entities for which the *prākṛti* is working may be inferred, yet that cannot prove that those entities are not themselves also combinations of many things and objects requiring further superintendents for themselves; or that the *puruṣas* should be the same pure intelligence as they are required to be. Moreover, that alone can be the end of a certain combination of events or things, which can be in some way benefitted, moved or affected by those combinations. But the *puruṣas*, as the passive pure intelligence, cannot in any way be affected by the *prākṛti*. How then can they be regarded as the end for which the *prākṛti* works? The mere illusion, the mere semblance on the part of the *puruṣa* of being affected or benefitted cannot be regarded as a reality, so that by it the purposes of the movements of the *prākṛti* might be realized. Moreover, these so-called affections, or illusions of affection, themselves belong to *prākṛti* and not to the *puruṣas*; for the *puruṣas*, as pure intelligences, are without the slightest touch of modifications of the *guṇas*. All mental modifications are, according to the Śaṃkhya, but modifications of the *buddhi*, which, being unintelligent, cannot be subject to illusion, error, or mistake. Moreover, no explanation can be found in the supposition that the reflection of the *puruṣas* falls upon the *buddhi*; for, as the *puruṣa* is not a visible object, it cannot be reflected in the *buddhi*. If it is said that there is no real reflection, but the *buddhi* becomes like the pure intelligence, the *puruṣa*, then that also is not possible; for, if the *buddhi* is to become as qualityless as the *puruṣas*, then all
mental states have to be abrogated. If it is said that the buddhi does not become like pure intelligence, but as if it was as intelligent as the puruṣa, then that also is not possible; for puruṣa is according to the Sāṃkhya pure intelligence, not intelligent. There is no intelligent knower in the Sāṃkhya, and that is its trouble. If it is said that what is meant by the belief that puruṣa is the end of all guṇa-movements is simply this, that, though it is absolutely incapable of any change or transformation, yet by its very presence it sets the guṇas in motion and is thus the end for which all the guṇa modifications take place, just as if the puruṣa were a king for whom the whole dominion works and fights. But since the puruṣa, unaffected by them, is only the seer of them all, this also is not possible; for the analogy does not hold, since the king is really benefited by the movements of the people of his dominions but the puruṣa, which merely implies seeing, cannot be regarded as a seer.

The nature of the self, as we have described it, is also attested by the verdict of the Upaniṣads. This self is directly revealed in its own notion as “I,” and pleasure, pain, attachment, antipathy are but its states, which are also revealed along with the revelation of its own self as the “I.” This self is not, however, perceived by any of the senses or even by the organ manas, as Kumārila supposed. For the question arises as to when, if the self is believed to be perceived by the manas, that takes place? It cannot take place precisely at the moment when the knowledge of an object arises; for then the notions of the self and the objects, as they occur at the same moment, could not so appear that one (the self) was the cognizer or determiner, and the others (the objects) were the cognized or the determined. If the knowledge of the objects and the self arose at two different moments as separate acts, it would be difficult to conceive how they could be related as cognizer and cognized. So it cannot be held that the self, though it always manifests itself to us in self-consciousness, could yet be perceived by any of the senses or the manas. Again, Kumārila held that knowledge was a new product, and that when, as a result of certain sense activities, knowledge or the jñāna movement was generated in us, there was also produced an illumination (jñātatā or prākatya) in objects in association with the self, and that from such an illumination the jñāna-kriyā or knowledge movement could be inferred, and the self, as being the possessor of this knowledge, could be perceived by the manas. But such
a theory that the self is conscious not by itself, but by an extraneous introduction of knowledge, is hardly acceptable; for no one imagines that there exists in him such a difference when he perceives a thing which he had not before that perception. Moreover, since the act of knowledge did not directly reveal the self, there might also be doubts as to whether the self knew things or not, and the self would not shine forth directly in all conscious experience, as it is found to do.

Again, some hold that the self is known from the objective consciousness and not directly by itself. It is easy to see that this can hardly be accepted as true; for how can objective consciousness, which refers to the objects, in any way produce the consciousness of the self? According to this view it is difficult to prove even the existence of knowledge; for this, since it is not self-manifested, requires something else to manifest it; if it is thought that it is self-manifesting, then we should expect it to be manifested to all persons and at all times. It may be said that, though knowledge is self-manifesting, yet it can be manifested only in connection with the person in whom it inheres, and not in connection with all persons. If that be so, it really comes to this, that knowledge can become manifested only through its connection with a person who knows. If, in answer to this, it is said that knowledge does not require its connection with a person for its own existence, but only for its specific illumination as occurring with reference to a certain subject and object, then that cannot be proved. We could have accepted it if we had known any case in which pure consciousness or knowledge had been found apart from its specific references of subject and object. If it is still asserted that consciousness cannot be separated from its self-manifesting capacities, then it may also be pointed out that consciousness is never found separated from the person, the subject, or the knower who possesses it. Instead of conceding the self-manifesting power to the infinite number of states of consciousness, is it not better to say that the self-manifestation of consciousness proceeds from the self-conscious agent, the subject and determiner of all conscious experiences? Even if the states of consciousness had been admitted as self-manifesting, that would not explain how the self could be self-manifesting on that account. If, however, the self, the knower of all experiences, be admitted as self-manifesting, then the manifestation of the con-
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conscious experiences becomes easily explained; for the self is the perceiver of all experiences. All things require for their manifestation another category which does not belong to their class; but since also there is nothing on which the self can depend for its consciousness, it has to be admitted that the self is a self-manifesting intelligent entity. Thus the jug does not require for its manifestation another jug, but a light, which belongs to an altogether different class. The light also does not require for its manifestation another light, or the jug which it manifests, but the senses; the senses again depend on consciousness for the manifestation of their powers. Consciousness, in its turn, depends upon the self; without inhering in the self it cannot get itself manifested. The self, however, has nothing else to depend upon; its self-manifestation, therefore, does not depend on anything else.

The states of consciousness have thus to be regarded as being states of the self, which by its connection with different objects manifests them as this or that consciousness. Knowledge of this or that object is thus but different states of consciousness, which itself again is a characteristic of the self.

If consciousness had not been an inseparable quality or essential characteristic of the self, then there might have been a time when the self could have been experienced as being devoid of consciousness; a thing which is so related with another thing that it never exists without it must necessarily be an essential and inseparable characteristic thereof. It cannot be said that this generalization does not hold, since we are conscious of our self in connection with the body, which is not an essential characteristic of the self; for the consciousness of the self as “I,” or as “I know,” is not necessarily connected with a reference to, or association with, the body. Again, it cannot be said that, if consciousness were an essential and inseparable characteristic of the self, then the states of unconsciousness in deep sleep and swoon could not be explained; for there is nothing to prove that there is no consciousness of the knowing self during those so-called stages of unconsciousness. We feel on waking that we had no consciousness at the time because we cease to have any memory of it. The reason therefore why states of unconsciousness are felt in the waking stage to be so is this, that we have no memory of those states. Memory is only possible when certain objects are apprehended and the impression of these ob-
jects of consciousness is left in the mind, so that through them the object of memory may be remembered. During deep sleep no objects are perceived, and no impressions are left, and, as a result, we cease to have any memory of those states. The self then remains with its characteristic self-consciousness, but without the consciousness of anything else. The self-conscious self does not leave any impression on the organs of the psychosis, the manas, etc., as they all then cease to act. It is easy to understand that no impression can be made upon the self; for, if it could and if impressions had been continually heaped on the self, then such a self could never manage to get rid of them and could never attain emancipation. Moreover, it is the characteristic of the phenomenon of memory that, when a perception has once been perceived, but is not being perceived continually, it can be remembered now, when those past impressions are revived by association of similar perceptions. But the self-conscious self has always been the same and hence there cannot be any memory of it. The fact that on waking from deep sleep one feels that one has slept happily does not prove that there was actually any consciousness of happiness during deep sleep; it is only a happy organic feeling of the body resulting from sound sleep which is interpreted or rather spoken of as being the enjoyment of happiness during deep sleep. We say, "I am the same as I was yesterday," but it is not the self that is remembered, but the particular time association that forms the content of memory.

Perception of objects is generated in us when consciousness comes in contact with the physical objects in association with this or that sense of perception. It is on that account that, though the self is always possessed of its self-consciousness, yet it is only when the consciousness of the self is in touch with an external object in association with a sense-organ that we get that particular sense-perception. This self is not all-pervading, but of an atomic size; when it comes in association with any particular sense, we acquire that particular sense-perception. This explains the fact that no two perceptions can be acquired simultaneously: where there is an appearance of simultaneity, there is only a succession of acquirement so rapid that changes cannot be noticed. Had the soul been all-pervading, we should have had the knowledge of all things at once, since the soul was in touch with all things. Thus it is proved that the self has consciousness as its essential characteristic; knowledge
or consciousness is never produced in it, but when the obstructions are removed and the self comes into touch with the objects, the consciousness of these objects shines forth.

God and the World.

As we have already noted, the Mīmāṃsikās do not admit the existence of Īśvara. Their antitheistic arguments, which we have not considered, can be dealt with here in contrast to Yāmuna’s doctrine of Īśvara. They say that an omniscient Īśvara cannot be admitted, since such an assumption cannot be proved, and there are, indeed, many objections to the hypothesis. For how can such a perception of omniscience be acquired? Surely it cannot be acquired by the ordinary means of perception; for ordinary perception cannot give one the knowledge of all things present and past, before and far beyond the limits of one’s senses. Also the perception of Īśvara generally ascribed to the Yogins cannot be admitted; for it is impossible that the Yogin should perceive past things and things beyond the limits of his senses, by means of his sense-organs. If mind (antahkarana) be such that it can perceive all sense-objects without the aid of the senses, then what is the use at all of the senses? Of course it is true that by great concentration one can perceive things more clearly and distinctly; but no amount of concentration or any other process can enable a man to hear by the eye or to perceive things without the help of the senses. Omniscience is therefore not possible, and we have not by our senses seen any such omniscient person as Īśvara. His existence cannot be proved by inference; for, since He is beyond all perceptible things, there cannot be any reason (hetu) which we could perceive as being associated with Him and by reason of which we could make Him the subject of inference. It is urged by the Naiyāyikās that this world, formed by collocation of parts, must be an effect in itself, and it is argued that, like all other effects, this also must have taken place under the superintendence of an intelligent person who had a direct experience of world materials. But this is not necessary; for it may very well be conceived that the atoms, etc., have all been collocated in their present form by the destinies of men (adṛṣṭa)—according to the karma, of all the men in the world. The karmas of merit and demerit exist in us all, and they are moulding the world-
process, though these cannot be perceived by us. The world may thus be regarded as a product of the *karmas* of men and not of *Īśvara*, whom no one has ever perceived. Moreover, why should *Īśvara*, who has no desire to satisfy, create this world? This world, with all the mountains, rivers and oceans, etc., cannot be regarded as an effect produced by any one.

Yāmuna follows the method of the *Nyāya* and tries to prove that the world is an effect, and, as such, must have been produced by an intelligent person who had a direct knowledge of the materials. He also has a direct knowledge of the *dharma* (merit) and *adharma* (demerit) of men, in accordance with which He creates the whole world and establishes an order by which every man may have only such experiences as he deserves. He, by His mere desire, sets all the world in motion. He has no body, but still He carries on the functioning of His desire by His *manas*. He has to be admitted as a person of infinite knowledge and power; for otherwise how could He create this world and establish its order?

The Śaṅkarites had held that, when the Upaniṣads say that nothing exists but one Brahman, it means that Brahman alone exists and the world is false; but that is not the sense. It means simply that there is no other *Īśvara* but *Īśvara*, and that there is none else like Him. When the Upaniṣads declare that Brahman is all that we see and that He is the sole material of the world, it does not mean that everything else does not exist and that the qualityless Brahman is the only reality. If I say there is one sun, it does not mean that He has no rays; if I say there are the seven oceans, it does not mean that the oceans have no ripples, etc. The only meaning that such passages can have is that the world has come out of Him, like sparks from fire, and that in Him the world finds its ultimate rest and support; from Him all things of the world—the fire, the wind, the earth—have drawn their powers and capacities, and without His power they would have been impotent to do anything. If, on the contrary, it is held that the whole world is false, then the whole experience has to be sacrificed, and, as the knowledge of Brahman also forms a part of this experience, that also has to be sacrificed as false. All the Vedānta dialectic employed to prove that the perception of difference is false is of very little use to us; for our experience shows that we perceive differences as well as relations. We perceive the blue colour, the lotus, and also that the lotus has
the blue colour; so the world and the individuals may also be conceived in accordance with the teaching of the Upaniṣads as being inseparably related to Him. This meaning is, indeed, more legitimate than the conception which would abolish all the world manifestation, and the personality of all individual persons, and would remain content only to indicate the identity of their pure intelligence with the pure intelligence of Brahman. There is not any pure, all-absorbing, qualityless intelligence, as the Śaṅkarites assert; for to each of us different and separate ideas are being directly manifested, e.g. our feelings of individual pleasures and pains. If there were only one intelligence, then everything should have shone forth simultaneously for all times. Again, this intelligence is said to be both Being (sat), intelligence (cit), and bliss (ānanda). If this tripartite form be accepted, it will naturally destroy the monistic doctrine which the Śaṅkarites try to protect so zealously. If, however, they assert that these are not separate forms or qualities, but all three represent one identical truth, the Brahman, then that also is not possible; for how can bliss be the same as intelligence? Pleasure and intelligence are experienced by all of us to be entirely different. Thus, in whichever way we try to scrutinize the Śaṅkarite doctrines, we find that they are against all experiences and hardly stand the strain of a logical criticism. It has, therefore, to be admitted that our notions about the external world are correct and give us a true representation of the external world. The manifold world of infinite variety is therefore not merely an illusory appearance, but true, as attested by our sense-experience.

Thus the ultimate conclusion of Yāmuna's philosophy demonstrates that there are, on the one side, the self-conscious souls, and, on the other, the omniscient and all powerful Īśvara and the manifold external world. These three categories are real. He hints in some places that the world may be regarded as being like sparks coming out of Īśvara; but he does not elaborate this thought, and it is contradicted by other passages, in which Īśvara is spoken of as the fashioner of the world system, in accordance with the Nyāya doctrine. From the manner in which he supports the Nyāya position with regard to the relation of Īśvara and the world, both in the Siddhi-traya and in the Agama-prāmāṇya, it is almost certain that his own attitude did not differ much from the Nyāya attitude, which left the duality of the world and Īśvara absolutely unre-
solved. It appears, therefore, that (so far as we can judge from his
Siddhi-traya) Yāmuna's main contribution consists in establishing
the self-consciousness of the soul. The reality of the external world
and the existence of Īśvara had been accepted in previous systems
also. Yāmuna thus gives us hardly any new ideas about Īśvara and
His relation to the souls and the world. He does not make inquiry
into the nature of the reality of the world, and rests content with
proving that the world-appearance is not false, as the Śaṅkarites
supposed. He says in one place that he does not believe in the ex-
istence of the partless atoms of the Naiyāyikas. The smallest particle
of matter is the trasareṇu, the specks of dust that are found to move
in the air when the sun's rays come in through a chink or hole. But
he does not say anything more than this about the ultimate nature
of the reality of the manifold world or how it has come to be what
it is. He is also silent about the methods which a person should
adopt for procuring his salvation, and the nature and character-
istics of that state.

Yāmuna, in his Āgama-prāmāṇya, tried to establish that the
Pāṇca-rātra-saṃhitā had the same validity as the Vedas, since it was
uttered by Īśvara himself. Viśṇu, or Vāsudeva, has been praised in
the Purusa-sūkta and in other places of the Vedas as the supreme
Lord. The Pāśupata-tantra of the Śaivas is never supported by the
Vedas, and thus the validity of the Pāśupata-tantra cannot be com-
pared with that of the Pāṇcarātra-saṃhitā.

God according to Rāmānuja, Veṅkaṭanātha
and Lokācārya.

Bhāskara had said that, though Īśvara is possessed of all good
qualities and is in Himself beyond all impurities, yet by His Śakti
(power) He transformed Himself into this world, and, as all con-
ditions and limitations, all matter and phenomena are but His
power, it is He who by His power appears as an ordinary soul and
at last obtains emancipation as well. Rāmānuja holds that on this
view there is no essential form of Brahman which transcends the
limits of all bonds, the power (Śakti) which manifests itself as all
phenomena. Brahman, being always associated with the power
which exists as the world-phenomena, becomes necessarily subject
to all the defects of the phenomenal world. Moreover, when a
Śakti, or power of Brahman, is admitted, how can Brahman be said
to suffer any transformation? Even if the Śakti (power) be regarded as its transformation, even then it cannot be accepted that it (Brahman) should combine with its Śakti to undergo a worldly transformation.

Another Vedāntist (probably Yādavaprakāśa, the Preceptor of Rāmānuja in his early days) held that Brahman, in its own essence, transformed itself into the world; this theory also is open to the objection that the Brahman, being transformed into the world, becomes subject to all the impurities and defects of the world. Even if it is held that in one part it is transcendent and possesses innumerable good qualities and in another suffers from the impurities associated with its transformation into the world, then also that which is so impure in one part cannot have its impurity so counter-balanced by the purity of its other half that it can be called Īśvara.

Rāmānuja, therefore, holds that all the changes and transformations take place in the body of the Īśvara and not in His essence. So Īśvara, in His pure essence, is ever free from all impurities, and the possessor of all the best qualities, untouched by the phenomenal disturbances with which His body alone is associated. The matter which forms the stuff of the external world is not what the Sāṃkhya calls the guṇa substances, but simply the prakṛti or the primeval causal entity, possessing diverse qualities which may be classified under three different types—the sattva, the rajas and the tamas. This prakṛti, however, in its fine essence, forms the body of Īśvara and is moved into all its transformations by Īśvara Himself. When He withholds prakṛti from all its transformations and annuls all its movement, we have the state of pralaya, in which Īśvara exists in the kārana or causal state, holding within Him the prakṛti in its subtle state as His body. Prakṛti is a body as well as a mode (prakāra) of Īśvara, and, when it is in a manifested condition, we have the state of creation. Prakṛti undergoes its transformations into tan-mātra, ahaṅkāra, etc.; but these are yet the subtle substance forming parts of Īśvara's body. The transformations through which prakṛti passes in the origination of tan-mātra, ahaṅkāra, etc., are not the results of the collocation of the guṇa reals, as we saw in the case of the Sāṃkhya, but may be regarded as the passing of prakṛti through different stages, each stage being marked out by the special character of the prakṛti while passing through that stage. The word guṇa here has then its ordinary meaning of quality; and it is supposed that the prakṛti, as it is moved by Īśvara, continues to ac-
quire new qualities. The present state of the world also represents prakṛti in a particular state wherein it has acquired the qualities which we note in the phenomenal world of ours.

We have seen before that the existence of Isvara was inferred by Yāmuna on Nyāya lines. But Rāmānuja thinks that there is as much to be said in favour of the existence as against it. Thus he says that, even supposing that the hills, etc., are effects, it cannot be said that they were all created by one person; for even all jugs are not made by the same person; Isvara may also be denied, after the Sāṁkhya mode, and it may be imagined that in accordance with the Karma of men the world arose out of a combination of the original guṇas. There is thus as much to be said against the existence of Isvara as in favour of it. Rāmānuja holds that Isvara cannot be proved by inference, but is to be admitted on the authority of the sacred texts\(^1\). The Nyāya and Yoga, moreover, conceived Isvara to be only the nimitta-kāraṇa, or instrumental cause; but according to Rāmānuja Isvara is all-pervading in all space and in all time. This all-pervasiveness of God does not mean that His reality is the only reality everywhere, or that He is identical with the world-reality, and all else is false. It means, as Sudarśanācārya has said in his Śruta-prakāśikā on the Rāmānuja-bhāṣya, 2nd sūtra, that there is no measure with which He may be limited by any spatial relation. Varada and Nārāyaṇa, however, and Veṅkaṭanātha, agree in interpreting all-pervasiveness as the absence of any limit to His good qualities (iyad-guṇaka iti pariccheda-rahitāḥ)\(^2\). There is nothing else than Isvara’s body, so by His body also He may be conceived as pervading the whole world. Thus, Isvara is not only nimitta-kāraṇa but also upādāna-kāraṇa, or material cause as well. Veṅkaṭa establishes in some detail that the highest Isvara is called Nārāyaṇa and His power, as presiding over matter and souls, is called Lakṣmī. Isvara has His manas, and His eternal senses do not require any body or organs for their manifestation. Veṅkaṭa also mentions three modified forms of manifestation of Lord Vasudeva, namely Saṃkarsaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. This vyūha doctrine of the Pañcarātra has been briefly discussed in Varavara’s bhāṣya on the Tatvta-traya of Lokācārya. These three, Saṃkarsaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha,

\(^1\) See Rāmānuja’s Bhāṣya, 3rd sūtra.
\(^2\) See Nyāya-siddhānta of Veṅkaṭanātha.
are said to be the three different forms of Vāsudeva, by which He controls the individual souls (jīva), the manas and the external world. That form of activity by which the jīvas were separated from the prakṛti at the beginning of the creation is associated with a form of Īśvara called Saṅkarṣaṇa. When this separating activity passes and dominates over men as their manas and ultimately brings them to the path of virtue and good, it is said to be associated with a form of Īśvara called Pradyumna. Aniruddha is that form of Īśvara by which the external world is generated and kept in order, and in which our experiences and attempts to attain right knowledge are fulfilled. These forms are not different Īśvara, but are imagined according to the diversity of His function. Īśvara's full existence is everywhere; He and His forms are identical. These forms are but manifestations of the power of Vāsudeva and are therefore called Vibhava. Such manifestations of His power are also to be found in great religious heroes such as Vyāsa, Arjuna, etc. Lokācārya, in describing Him further, says that in His real essence Īśvara is not only omniscient, but this omniscience is also associated with complete and eternal joy. His knowledge and powers do not suffer any variation or comparison, as they are always the very highest and the most inconceivable by any one else. He moves us all to action and fulfils our desires according to our karmas. He gives knowledge to those who are ignorant, power to those who are weak, pardon to those who are guilty, mercy to the sufferers, paternal affection and overlooking of guilt to those who are guilty, goodness to those who are wicked, sincerity to the crooked, and goodness of heart to those who are wicked at heart. He cannot bear to remain separated from those who do not want to be separated from Him, and puts Himself within easy reach of those who want to see Him. When he sees people afflicted, He has mercy on them and helps them. Thus all His qualities are for the sake of others and not for Himself. His affection for us is of a maternal nature, and out of this affection He neglects our defects and tries to help us towards the ideal of good. He has created this world in Himself, not in order to satisfy any wants but in a playful manner, as it were through mere spontaneity (līlā). As in creation, so in keeping the created world in order, and in dissolution, His playful spontaneity upholds everything and brings about everything. Dissolution is as much of His play as creation. All this is created in Himself and out of Himself.
Visista-dvaita doctrine of Soul according to Ramanuja and Venkatanatha.

The existence of souls as separate self-conscious entities, in contradistinction to the doctrines of other systems, had been established by Yāmuna, as we have shown in some detail in our section on his doctrine of soul. The soul is atomic in its size, as we have already found stated by Yāmuna. Barada, Viṣṇu Miśra and Veṅkaṭanātha held that in the ordinary phenomenal state its knowledge expands and contracts. At the time of emancipation it has its highest expansion in which it pervades the whole world. The cause of its contraction and expansion is its karma, which is also called avidyā. Rāmānuja, in his Vedāṇta-dīpa, indulged in the simile of the ray of a lamp in explaining the rise of knowledge in different parts of the body, despite the atomic soul being located in only one part. The soul exists in one part of the body and spreads out its knowledge over all other parts of the body, like the rays of a lamp. Rāmānuja says thatĪśvara allows the individual self-conscious souls to perform whichever action they have a desire to attempt. Movement is possible only through the approval byĪśvara of the desires of individual souls. The self-conscious souls desire things according to their own free will, and in this they are not hampered byĪśvara;Īśvara always allows the individual souls to act, i.e. to move their limbs according to their desires. This is a sort of occasionalism, which holds that, in every action which I am performing, I am dependent onĪśvara’s will. I can move my limbs because He wishes it. Apart from this general law thatĪśvara is a supporter of all actions, there are some exceptions of particular favour and disfavour. To those who are particularly attached to Him He is more favourably disposed, and by His grace generates in them such desires that they adopt actions by which they may easily win Him. Into those who are particularly opposed to Him He imports such desires that they are led farther away from Him1.Īśvara exists in us all as the inner controller. This inner controller is represented by our individual soul. This individual soul is free in all its desires, knowledge, and attempts2. This freedom of will, knowledge, etc., is given to us all byĪśvara, and He also arranges that the movements in the material world may take place in ac-

1 See Varavara’s commentary on the Tattva-traya.
2 See Rāmānuja’s Bhāṣya, ii. 3. 40, 41.
cordance with our desires. Thus He not only gives us freedom of will, but also helps the realization of that will in the external world, and ultimately grants good and evil fruits according to our good and evil deeds\(^1\). Thus Īśvara’s control over us does not rob us of our freedom of will. Even His favour and disfavour consist in the fulfilment of a devotee’s eager desire to be associated with Him, and His disfavour consists in fulfilling the desire of a confirmed sinner, leading him away into worldly pleasures farther from Him. The self is often called jñāna, or consciousness, because of the fact that it is as self-revealing as consciousness\(^2\). It reveals all objects, when it comes in touch with them through its senses. The souls are, however, all held in Īśvara. Rāmānuja had spoken of the souls only as being the body of Īśvara; but Lokācārya and Varavara further hold that, as the external material objects exist for the sake of the souls, so the souls exist for the Īśvara; as Man is the end for which the external objects of enjoyment exist, so Īśvara is the end (śeṣa) for which Man exists as the object of His control and support (śeṣī).

The self, though pure in itself, becomes associated with ignorance and worldly desires through coming into touch with matter (acit). Avidyā, or ignorance, here means want of knowledge, misapplication of characteristics, false knowledge, etc. This ignorance, or avidyā, which is the cause of many worldly desires and impure instincts, is generated by the association of the souls with matter; when this association is cut away, the self becomes divested of the avidyā and emancipated\(^3\).

Rāmānuja says in his Vedārtha-samgraha that Īśvara grants emancipation from worldly bonds to a person, when he, after acquiring true knowledge from the śāstras according to the instruction of good teachers, engages himself every day in self-control, penance, purity; practises forgivingness, sincerity, charity, non-injury; performs all the obligatory and ceremonial duties; refrains from prohibited actions, and afterwards surrenders himself completely to the Lord; praises Him, continually thinks of Him, adores Him, counts His names, hears of His greatness and goodness, speaks of it, worships Him, and has all the darkness of his soul removed.

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\(^1\) See Rāmānuja’s Bhāṣya, xi. 3. 40, 41.

\(^2\) See Rāmānuja’s Bhāṣya, ii. 111. 29, 30.

\(^3\) See Varavara’s commentary on the Tattva-traya, Cit-prakaraṇa.
by His grace. The ordinary obligatory and ceremonial duties have to be performed; all the highest ethical virtues have to be practised and a true knowledge attained from the śāstras. It is only when a man has thus qualified himself that he can ultimately attain emancipation from all worldly bonds by supreme self-surrender and bhakti to the Lord. Bhakti, or devotion, with Rāmānuja means continual thinking of Him. Without it pure knowledge cannot give us emancipation. The special feature of bhakti is this, that by it a man loses all interest in everything else than that which is done for the sake of the dearest. Finally bhakti is not with Rāmānuja feeling, but a special kind of knowledge (jñāna-viśeṣa) which seeks to ignore everything that is not done for the sake of Iśvara, the dearest to us all.¹

Veṅkaṭanātha says that the performance of karmas makes a man fit to inquire into true knowledge, and the acquirement of true knowledge makes a man fit to attain devotion, or bhakti. When a man is fit to inquire after true knowledge, he may give up the karmas. Bhakti is, according to Veṅkaṭanātha, the feeling of joy (pṛiti) in the adorable, and not mere knowledge. Emancipation as sāyujya (sameness of quality) with Iśvara is the result of such bhakti. In this state of sāyujya, the human soul participates in the qualities of omniscience, bliss, etc., of Iśvara. The human soul cannot, of course, wholly participate with Iśvara, and such of His qualities as the power of creating and controlling the world, or of granting emancipation to human souls, remain ever with Iśvara alone. Human souls can participate only in His knowledge and bliss and can be as omniscient and as blissful as He. In this state of emancipation Man remains in an eternal and infinite blissful servitude to Iśvara. This servitude to Iśvara is not painful in the least, like other services. When a man forgoes all his personal vanity and merges all his independence in His service, and considers himself as His servant whose only work is to serve Him, this is indeed the state of bright joy. Veṅkaṭanātha, however, further differentiates this Vaiṣṇava emancipation, as the thinking of the Iśvara as the most supreme, and thereby deriving infinite joy, from the other type of kaivalya, in which Man thinks of himself the Brahman and attains kaivalya. There also the association with avidyā and the world is indeed destroyed, and the man is reduced to oneness; but

¹ See Vedārtha-samgraha, p. 146.
this is hardly a desirable state, since there is not here the infinite joy which the Vaiṣṇava emancipation can bring. Rāmānuja has written of mukti as a state which a man can acquire when he is divested of all avidhyā, and has the natural intuition of the Supreme Soul and his relations with Him. He had distinguished this state from that mukti in which a man is divested of all karmas and realizes himself, as obstructing the qualities of Īśvara from him. This kaivalya, or realization of one’s own self as the highest, is thus distinctly a lower emancipation. It is not out of place to say that Veṅkaṭanātha had pushed bhakti and the human goal of mukti distinctly further on to the side of feeling, by defining bhakti as a feeling of joy and mukti as servitude to Īśvara.

Acit or Primeval Matter: the Prakṛti and its modifications.

Proceeding to describe the nature of matter, Veṅkaṭanātha tries to disprove the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of atoms. The smallest particle of matter is that which is visible in the sun’s rays coming in through a chink or hole. The imagination of still finer particles, which may be called dyads or atoms, is not attested by experience; for these cannot be perceived. They cannot be compared to the small invisible pollen of flowers which makes the air carrying it fragrant; for these small particles possess the quality of smell, whereas atoms are subtle particles which do not possess any perceiveable characteristic. Even inference cannot establish these atoms; for, if we suppose that particles when divided could be further divided until we could arrive at the limit of division, beyond which no division was possible, and that these subtlest particles could be called atoms, this would be impossible, for the atoms of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are not only the smallest particles but they are considered to have a special kind of measure (pārimāṇḍalya) as their characteristic, and this we have no data for inferring. If only the smallness is the criterion, we may better stop at the trasā-reṇu (the dust particles in the air). There are also other objections against the atomic theory, such as have been propounded by Śaṅkarācārya, that the partless atoms cannot come into touch with other atoms or form together into one whole, or that the pārimāṇḍalya measure of the paramāṇu should not generate a different kind of measure in the dyad (dvya-anuṣka), or that the dyad ought not to
generate quite another kind of measure in the *trasa-renu*. The world cannot thus be accepted as due to the conglomeration of atoms or *trasa-renus*. *Prakṛti* containing the three qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* has thus to be admitted as the primal matter. The state of it just preceding *ahaṅkāra* and just following its state as *prakṛti* (the state in which, all its three qualities being the same, there is no manifestation of any particular quality) is called *mahat*. The next state, which follows *mahat* and precedes the senses, is called *ahaṅkāra*. The *mahat* and *ahaṅkāra* are not subjective states of *buddhi* or ego, as some Śāmkhyists would think, but are two successive cosmic stages of the *prakṛti*, the primeval cosmic matter. The *ahaṅkāra* is of three kinds, *sattvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*. The senses are not products of elements, as the Vaiśeṣika supposed, but represent the functional cognitional powers in association with the eye, nose, skin, etc. It is *manas* whose states are variously called imagination, determination, etc. Lokācārya describes *prakṛti* as being of three kinds, namely (1) that which contains the purest *sattva* characters and forms the material of the abode of *Īśvara*; (2) that which contains the threefold characters of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* and forms the ordinary world for us. This is the field of *Īśvara*’s play. It is called *prakṛti* because it produces all transformations, *avidyā* because it is opposed to all true knowledge, and *māyā* because it is the cause of all diverse creations. As we have mentioned before, the *gunas* of *prakṛti* are its qualities, and not the Śāmkhya reals. Creation is produced by the rise of opposite qualities in the *prakṛti*. The *tan-mātras* are those states of matter in which the specific elemental qualities are not manifested. The order of the genesis of the *tan-mātras* is described by some as follows: first the *bhūtādi*, from it *śabda-tan-mātra*, and from that the *ākāśa*; again, from *ākāśa* comes *sparśa-tan-mātra* (vibration-potential), followed by *vāyu*; from *vāyu* comes the *rūpa-tan-mātra* (light-potential) and from that *tejas* (light and heat); from *tejas* comes *rasa-tan-mātra* (taste-potential), and thence water; from water comes *gandha-tan-mātra* (smell-potential), and from that earth. Other theories of the genesis of the *bhūtas* are also described, but we omit them here, as they are not of much value. Varavara says that time is regarded as the *prakṛti* without its *sattva* quality, but Veṅkaṭa-nātha speaks of time as existing in the nature of *Īśvara* as a special form of His manifestation. Space (*dik*) is not an entity different
from ākāśa, which offers room for the movement of things. Ākāśa is not a mere vacuity or non-occupiedness, but a positive entity.

Thus it is seen that the indeterminate matter of prakṛti, with its three qualities, passes through many stages and at last exhibits the phenomenal world, which produces happiness and misery in accordance with a man’s destiny (adrṣṭa) and good or bad deeds. The force of adrṣṭa is not a separate entity, but the favour and disfavour of Īśvara, which works in accordance with the good or bad deeds of men.
CHAPTER XX

PHILOSOPHY OF THE RĀMĀNUJA
SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja on the nature of Reality
as qualified or unqualified.

Śaṅkara says that Brahman, as pure intelligence (cin-mātram) entirely divested of any kind of forms, is the ultimate reality (paramārtha), and that all differences of the knower, the known, and the diverse forms of cognition are all imposed on it and are false. Falsehood with him is an appearance which ceases to exist as soon as the reality is known, and this is caused by the defect (doṣa), which hides the true nature of reality and manifests various forms. The defect which produces the false world appearance is ignorance or nescience (avidyā or māyā), which can neither be said to be existent nor non-existent (sad-asad-anirvacanīyā), and this ceases (nivṛtta) when the Brahman is known. It is, indeed, true that in our ordinary experience we perceive difference and multiplicity; but this must be considered as faulty, because the faultless scriptures speak of the one truth as Brahman, and, though there are the other parts of the Vedas which impose on us the performance of the Vedic duties and therefore imply the existence of plurality, yet those texts which refer to the nature of Brahman as one must be considered to have greater validity; for they refer to the ultimate, whereas the Vedic injunctions are valid only with reference to the world of appearance or only so long as the ultimate reality is not known. Again, the scriptures describe the Brahman as the reality, the pure consciousness, the infinite (satyam jñānam anantam brahma); these are not qualities which belong to Brahman, but they are all identical in meaning, referring to the same differenceless identical entity, absolutely qualityless—the Brahman.

Rāmānuja, in refuting the above position, takes up first the view of Śaṅkara that the Brahman as the ultimate reality is absolutely unqualified (nirviśeṣa). He says that those who assert that reality can be unqualified have really no means of proving it; for all proofs are based on the assumption of some qualified character. This unqualifiedness could not be directly experienced, as they believe;
for there can be no experience without the assumption of some qualified character, since an experience, being my own unique experience, is necessarily qualified. Even if you tried to prove that one's own experience, which is really qualified in nature, is unqualified, you would have to pick up some special trait in it, in virtue of which you would maintain it was unqualified; and by that very fact your attempt is defeated, for that special trait would make it qualified. Intelligence is itself self-revealing, and by it the knower knows all objects. It may also be shown that even during sleep, or swoon, the experience is not characterless. Even when the Brahman is said to be real, pure consciousness, and infinite, it means that these are the characters of Brahman and it is meaningless to say that they do not indicate some character. The scriptures cannot testify to the existence of any characterless reality; for they are a collection of words arranged in order and relation, and each word is a whole, comprising a stem and a suffix, and the scriptures therefore are by nature unable to yield any meaning which signifies anything that is characterless. As regards perception, it is well established that all determinate perception (sa-vikalpa-pratyakṣa) manifests an entity with its characters; but even indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa) manifests some character for its indeterminateness means only the exclusion of some particular character; and there can be no perception which is absolutely negative regarding the manifestation of characters. All experiences are embodied in a proposition—"This is so"—and thus involve the manifestation of some characters. When a thing is perceived for the first time, some specific characters are discerned; but, when it is perceived again, the characters discerned before are revived in the mind, and by comparison the specific characters are properly assimilated. This is what we call determinate perception, involving the manifestation of common characters or class characters as distinguished from the perception of the first moment which is called indeterminate perception. But it does not mean that indeterminate perception is not the perception of some specific characters. Inference is based on perception and as such must necessarily reveal a thing with certain characteristics; and so not one of the three sources of our knowledge, perception, scriptures and inference, can reveal to us any entity devoid of characteristics.

It is urged by Śaṅkara and his followers that perception refers
to pure being and pure being alone (san-mdtra-gråhī); but this can never be true, since perception refers to class-characters and thus necessarily involves the notion of difference; even at that one particular moment of perception it grasps all the essential characteristic differences of a thing which distinguish it from all other objects. If perception had reference only to pure being, then why should it manifest to us that “here is a jug,” “here is a piece of cloth”; and, if the characteristic differences of a thing are not grasped by perception, why are we not contented with a buffalo when we need a horse? As pure being they are all the same, and it is being only which, it is urged, is revealed by perception. Memory would not then distinguish one from the other, and the cognition of one thing would suffice for the cognition of everything else. If any distinctive differences between one cognition and another is admitted, then that itself would baffle the contention of the characterlessness of perception. Moreover, the senses can grasp only their characteristic special feature, e.g. the eye, colour, the ear, sound, and so on, and not differencelessness. Again, Brahman is said to be of the nature of pure being, and, if the same pure being could be experienced by all the senses, then that would mean that Brahman itself is experienced by the senses. If this were so, the Brahman would be as changeable and destructible as any other objects experienced by the senses, and this no one would be willing to admit. So it has to be granted that perception reveals difference and not pure characterlessness.

Again, it has been argued that, since the experience of a jug, etc., varies differently with different space and time, i.e. we perceive here a jug, there a piece of cloth, and then again at another moment here a toy and there a horse, and we have not the one continuous experience of one entity in all space and time, these objects are false. But why should it be so? There is no contradiction in the fact that two objects remain at the same place at two different points of time, or that two objects remain at two different places at one and the same point of time. Thus there is nothing to prove that the objects we perceive are all false, and the objects are by nature pure being only.

Again, it has been urged that experience or intuition (e.g. as involved in perception) is self-revealing (svayam-prakāśa); but this is true only with reference to a perceiver at the particular time of
his perception. No intuition is absolutely self-revealing. The experience of another man does not reveal anything to me, nor does a past experience of mine reveal anything to me now; for with reference to a past experience of mine I only say "I knew it so before," not "I know it now." It is also not true that no experience can be further experienced; for I can remember my own past experience or can be aware of it, as I can be aware of the awareness of other persons; and, if the fact that one awareness can be the object of another would make it cease from being an experience or intuition (saṃvid or anubhūti), then there would be no anubhūti or experience at all. If a man could not be aware of the experiences of others, he could use no speech to express himself or understand the speech of other people, and all speech and language would be useless. That jug, etc., are not regarded as intuition or experience is simply because their nature is altogether different therefrom and not because they can be objects of cognition or experience; for that would be no criterion at all.

It is again urged that this intuition or experience (anubhūti or saṃvid) is never produced, since we do not know any stage when it was not in existence (prāg-abhāvādy-abhāvād utpattī nirasyate). It is also urged that any experience or awareness cannot reveal any state in which it did not exist; for how can a thing reveal its own absence, since it cannot exist at the time of its absence? Rāmānuja, in reply to such a contention on Śaṅkara's side, debates why it should be considered necessary that an experience should reveal only that which existed at the same time with it; for, had it been so, there would be no communication of the past and the future. It is only sense-knowledge which reveals the objects which are existing at the time when the senses are operating and the sense-knowledge is existing; but this is not true with regard to all knowledge. Memory, inference, scriptures, and intuitive mystic cognition (yogi-pratyakṣa) of sages can always communicate events which happened in the past or will happen in the future. Arguing in the same way, one could say that even in the case of the experience of ordinary objects such as jug, etc., it can be said that the perception which reveals their presence at any particular time does not reveal their existence at all times. That they are not so revealed means that the revelation of knowledge (saṃvid or anubhūti) is limited by time. If revelation of knowledge were not itself limited in time, then the objects re-
revealed by it would also not be limited in time, which would be the same thing as to say that these objects, such as jug, etc., are all eternal in nature; but they are not. This sort of argument may also be applied to the revelation of knowledge in inference; and it may well be argued that, since the objects must be of the same type as the knowledge which reveals them, then, if the knowledge is not limited in time and is eternal, the objects also will be eternal. For there can be no knowledge without an object. It cannot be said that at the time of sleep, drunkenness, or swoon, the pure experience is experienced as such without there being an object. If the pure experience were at that time experienced as such, one would remember this on waking; for except in the case of experiences at the time of universal destruction (pralaya), and in the period when one’s body is not in existence, all that is experienced is remembered. No one, however, remembers having experienced an experience at the time of sleep or swoon, so that no such pure revelation of knowledge exists at that time. What Rāmānuja maintains here, as will be shown later on, is that during sleep or swoon we have a direct experience of the self and not the pure formless experience of the revelation of pure consciousness. Thus there cannot be any state in which knowledge is pure revelation without an object. Hence it cannot be argued that, because knowledge does not reveal the state in which it did not exist, it must always be in existence and never be produced; for as each cognition is inseparably associated with its object, and as all objects are in time, knowledge must also be in time.

Again, the argument that, since knowledge is unproduced, it cannot suffer any further modification or change, is false. Granting for the sake of argument that knowledge is unproduced, why should it on that account be necessarily changeless? The negation preceding a particular production (prāga-bhāva) is beginningless, but it is destroyed. So is the avidyā of the Śaṅkarites, which is supposed to be beginningless and yet to be suffering all kinds of changes and modifications, as evidenced by its false creations of the world-appearance. Even the self, which is beginningless and destructionless, is supposed to be associated with a body and the senses, from which it is different. This apprehension of a difference of the self from avidyā means a specific character or a modification, and if this difference is not acknowledged, the self would have to be considered
identical with avidyā. Again, it is meaningless to say that pure intelligence, consciousness, experience or intuition (anubhūti or samvid), is pure self-revelation; for, were it so, why should it be called even self-revelation, or eternal, or one? These are different characters, and they imply a qualified character of the entity to which they belong. It is meaningless to say that pure consciousness is pure self-revelation; for, were it so, why should it be called even self-revelation, or eternal, or one? These are different characters, and they imply a qualified character of the entity to which they belong.

It is meaningless to say that pure consciousness is characterless; for at least it has negative characters, since it is distinguished from all kinds of material, non-spiritual or dependent objects which are considered to be different from this pure consciousness. Again, if this pure consciousness is admitted to be proved as existing, that must itself be a character. But to whom is it proved? It must be to the self who knows, and in that case its specific character is felt by the self who is aware of it. If it is argued that the very nature of the self-revelation of consciousness is the self, then that would be impossible; for knowledge implies a knower who is different from the knowledge which reveals certain objects. The knower must be permanent in all his acts of knowledge, and that alone can explain the fact of memory and recognition. The consciousness of pleasure, pain and of this or that object comes and goes, whereas the knower remains the same in all his experiences. How then can the experience be identified with the person who experiences? "I know it," "just now I have forgotten it"—it is in this way that we all experience that our knowledge comes and goes and that the phases are different from ourselves. How can knowledge or consciousness be the same as the knower or the self?

It is held that the self and ego or the entity referred to by "I" are different. The entity referred to by "I" contains two parts, a self-revealing independent part as pure consciousness, and an objective, dependent non-self-revealed part as "myself," and it is the former part alone that is the self, whereas the latter part, though it is associated with the former, is entirely different from it and is only expressed, felt, or manifested by virtue of its association with the former. But this can hardly be admitted. It is the entity referred to by "I" which is the subjective and individual self and it is this which differentiates my experience from those of others. Even in liberation I am interested in emancipating this my individual self, for which I try and work and not in a so-called subject-object-less consciousness. If "I" is lost, then who is interested in a mere consciousness, whether that is liberated or not? If there is
no relation with this ego, the self, the "I," no knowledge is possible. We all say "I know," "I am the knower"; and, if this individual and subjective element were unsubstantial and false, what significance would any experience have? It is this ego, the "I," which is self-luminous and does not stand in need of being revealed by anything else. It is like the light, which reveals itself and in so doing reveals others as well. It is one whole and its intelligent nature is its self-revealing character. So the self-luminous self is the knower and not a mere revelation. Revelation, cognition or knowledge means that something is revealed to someone, and so it would be meaningless to say that the self and the knowledge are identical. Again, it has been maintained that self is pure consciousness; for this pure consciousness alone is what is non-material (ajāda) and therefore the spirit. But what does this non-materiality mean? It means with the Śaṅkarites an entity whose nature is such that its very existence is its revelation, so that it does not depend on anything else for its revelation. Therefore, pleasures, pain, etc., are also self-revealing. There cannot be a toothache which is present and yet is not known; but it is held that pleasures and pains cannot be revealed, unless there is a knower who knows them. Well the same would be true for knowledge even. Can consciousness reveal itself to itself? Certainly not; consciousness is revealed always to a knower, the ego or the self. As we say "I am happy," so we say "I know." If non-materiality (ajaja) is defined as revealing-to-itself in the above sense, such non-materiality does not belong to consciousness even. It is the ego, the "I," that is always self-revealed to itself by its very existence, and it must therefore be the self, and not the pure consciousness, which stands as much in need of self-revelation as do the pains and pleasures. Again, it is said that, though pure consciousness (anubhūti) is in itself without any object, yet by mistake it appears as the knower, just as the conch-shell appears by illusion as silver. But Rāmānuja contends that this cannot be so; for, had there been such an illusion, people would have felt "I am consciousness" as "this is silver." No one makes such a mistake; for we never feel that the knowledge is the knower; but, as a matter of fact, we always distinguish the two and feel ourselves different from the knowledge—as "I know" (aham anubhavāmi).

It is argued that the self as changeless by nature cannot be the
agent of the act of cognition and be a knower, and therefore it is only the changeful modifications of prakṛti, the category of ahaṅkāra, to which can be ascribed the capacity of being a knower. This ahaṅkāra is the inner organ (antaḥkaraṇa) or mind, and this alone can be called a knower; for the agency of an act of cognition is an objective and dependent characteristic, and, as such, cannot belong to the self. If the agency and the possibility of being characterized by the notion of ego could be ascribed to the self, such a self would have only a dependent existence and be non-spiritual, like the body, since it would be non-self-revealing. Ramanuja, in answer to such an objection, says that, if the word ahaṅkāra is used in the sense of antaḥkaraṇa, or the mind, as an inner organ, then it has all the non-spiritual characteristics of the body and it can never be considered as the knower. The capacity of being a knower (jñātytva) is not a changeful characteristic (vikriyātmaka), since it simply means the possession of the quality of consciousness (jñāna-guṇāśraya), and knowledge, being the natural quality of the eternal self, is also eternal. Though the self is itself of the nature of consciousness (jñāna-svarūpa), yet, just as one entity of light exists both as the light and as the rays emanating from it, so can it be regarded both as consciousness and as the possessor of consciousness (maṇi-prabhātinām prabhāśrayatevam iva jñānāśrayatevam api aviruddham). Consciousness, though unlimited of itself (svayam aparicchinnam eva jñānam), can contract as well as expand (saṅkocavikāśārham). In an embodied self it is in a contracted state (saṅkucita-svarūpam) through the influence of actions (karmaṇā), and is possessed of varying degrees of expansion. To the individual it is spoken of as having more or less knowledge¹, according as it is determined by the sense-organs. Thus one can speak of the rise of knowledge or its cessation. When there is the rise of knowledge, one can certainly designate it as the knower. So it is admitted that this capacity as knower is not natural to the self, but due to karma, and therefore, though the self is knower in itself, it is changeless in its aspect as consciousness. But it can never be admitted that the non-spiritual ahaṅkāra could be the knower by virtue of its being in contact with consciousness (cet); for consciousness as such can never be regarded as a knower. The ahaṅkāra also is not the knower, and therefore the notion of the knower could not be explained on such a

¹ Śrī-bhāṣya, p. 45.
view. It is meaningless to say that the light of consciousness falls on the non-spiritual *ahaṅkāra* through contiguity; for how can the invisible consciousness transmit its light to the non-spiritual *ahaṅkāra*?

Even in sleep one feels the self as "I"; for on waking one feels "I have slept happily." This also shows that during sleep it is the "I" that both knew and felt happy. It has to be admitted that there is a continuity between the "I" before its sleep, the "I" during its sleep, and the "I" after its sleep; for after waking the "I" remembers all that it had experienced before its sleep. The fact that one also feels "I did not know anything all this time" does not mean that the "I" had no knowledge at all; it means only that the "I" had no knowledge of objects and things which it knows on waking. There can be no doubt that the "I" knew during the sleep, since even a Śaṅkarite would say that during dreamless sleep the self (*ātman*) has the direct intuitive perception (*sākṣi*) of ignorance (*ajñāna*), and no one can have any direct intuitive perception without also being a knower. Thus, when after sleep a man says "I did not know even myself, I slept so well," what he means is that he did not know himself with all the particulars of his name, caste, parentage, etc., as he knows when he is awake. It does not mean that he had absolutely no knowledge at all. Even on liberation the entity denoted by "I" (*aham-artha*) remains; for it is the self that is denoted. If there is no one to feel or to know in the state of liberation, who is it that is liberated, and who is to strive for such a liberation? To be revealed to itself is self-consciousness and implies necessarily the knower as the "I" that knows, and therefore the notion of "I" denotes the self in its own nature as that which knows and feels. But the entity denoted by the notion of "I" (*aham-artha*) should be distinguished from the non-spiritual category of mind or the *antahkarana*, which is but a modification of *prakṛti* or the false feeling of conceit, which is always regarded as bad and is the cause of the implication of insult towards superior persons and this is clearly due to ignorance (*avidyā*).

The next point of discussion raised by Rāmānuja in this connection, to prove his point that there is no reality which can be regarded as characterless and unqualified in any absolute sense, is in the attempt that he makes to refute Śaṅkara's contention that the scriptures give us sufficient ground for acknowledging such a
reality, and their authority is to be considered as the highest and as absolutely irrefutable. Śaṅkara had urged that the testimony of the scriptures was superior to that of perception. But the scriptures are based on the assumption of plurality, without which no language is possible. These are for that reason false. For the superiority that is ascribed to the scriptures was due to their teaching of the doctrine that all plurality and difference are false, and that the reality is absolutely differenceless; but yet since the meaning and the expressions of the scriptures are themselves based on the assumption of difference, how can the teaching of the scriptures be anything but false? Again, since they are as faulty as perception on account of their assumption of plurality, why should they be regarded as having an authority superior to perception? When the scriptures are based on error, what is communicated by them must likewise be erroneous, though it may not be directly contradicted by experience. If a man who is absolutely out of touch with all men has an eye-disease which makes him see things at a great distance double, then his vision of two moons in the sky, though it may not be contradicted by his or any one else's experience, is yet false. So, when there is defect, the knowledge produced by it must be false, whether it is contradicted or not. Hence, _avidyā_ being false, the Brahman communicated by it through its manifested forms, the scriptures, must also be false. And one may well argue, that, since Brahman is the object of knowledge produced by means tainted by _avidya_, it is false, just as the world is false (Brahma _mithyā avidyādy-utpanna-jñāna-visayatevāt prapañcavat_). In anticipation of such objections Śaṅkara urges that even false dreams can portend real good or bad happenings, or an illusory sight of a snake may cause real death. Rāmānuja's answer to this is that what is meant by saying that dreams are false is that there is some knowledge, corresponding to which there are no objects; so there is knowledge in illusion and real fear due to such knowledge, but the corresponding external object does not exist. So in these cases also the communication of truth, or a real thing, or a real fact, is not by falsehood, but real knowledge; for no one doubts that he had knowledge in his dream or in his illusion. So far as the fact that there was knowledge in dream is concerned, dreams are true, so that it is useless to say that in dreams falsehood portends real fact.

Thus, from whatever point of view it may be argued, it is im-
possible to prove that the reality is characterless and differenceless, whether such a reality be pure being, or a unity of being, intelligence and bliss, or pure intuitional experience, and such a contention will so much cripple the strength of the scriptures that nothing can be proved on their authority and their right to supersede the authority of perception can hardly be established. But the scriptures also do not speak of any characterless and unqualified reality. For the texts referring to Brahman as pure being (Ch., vi. 2. 1), or as transcendent (Mund., I. 1. 5), or where the Brahman is apparently identified with truth and knowledge (Tait., II. 1. 1), can actually be proved to refer to Brahman not as qualityless, but as possessing diverse excellent qualities of omniscience, omnipotence, all-pervasiveness, eternity and the like. The denial of qualities is but a denial of undesirable qualities (heya-gūnān pratiṣiddhya). When Brahman is referred to in the scriptures as one, that only means that there is no second cause of the world to rival him; but that does not mean that His unity is so absolute that He has no qualities at all. Even where Brahman is referred to as being of the essence of knowledge, that does not mean that such an essence of knowledge is qualityless and characterless; for even the knower is of the essence of knowledge, and, being of the essence of knowledge, may as well be considered as the possessor of knowledge, just as a lamp, which is of the nature of light, may well be regarded as possessing rays of light ¹.

Refutation of Śaṅkara's avidyā.

It is urged by Śaṅkara that the self-luminous differenceless one reality appears as the manifold world through the influence of defect (doṣa). This defect, called avidyā, hides its own nature and produces various appearances and can neither be described as being nor as non-being: for it cannot be being, since then the illusion and the realization of its being an error would be inexplicable, and it cannot be non-being since then the world-appearance, as well as its realization as being wrong, would be inexplicable.

¹ jñāna-svarūpasyaiva tasya jñānā-dravyatvam maṇi-dyumani-pradīpā-dīvad ity uktam eva. Śrī-bhāṣya, p. 61.

The above is based on the discussions in the Śrī-bhāṣya known as mahā-pūrva-paṅga and mahā-siddhānta. Śrī-bhāṣya, p. 10 et seq.
Rāmānuja, in refuting avidyā, says that this avidyā is impossible since it must lean on some other thing for its support (āśraya), and it is clear that individual souls cannot be its support, since they themselves are regarded as being the products of avidyā. The Brahman also cannot be its support; for it is self-luminous consciousness and is hence opposed to avidyā, which is regarded as being liable to be recognized as illusory as soon as the true knowledge dawns. It cannot be argued that it is only the knowledge that Brahman is of the nature of pure knowledge, and not pure knowledge forming the essence of Brahman, that destroys avidyā; for there is no difference between these two, between knowledge as the essence of Brahman and knowledge as removing avidyā. The nature of Brahman that is revealed by the knowledge that Brahman is of the nature of pure knowledge is already present in His pure self-luminous nature, which must necessarily on that account destroy avidyā. Moreover, in accordance with Śaṅkara’s view, Brahman, being of the nature of pure intuition, cannot further be the object of any other knowledge, and hence the nature of Brahman should not be further the object of any other concept. So, if knowledge is to be opposed to ignorance or avidyā, it must be in its own essence as it is, in itself, and so Brahman, as pure knowledge, ought to be opposed to avidyā. Moreover, to say that Brahman, which is of the nature of pure self-illumination, is hidden by avidyā is to say that the very nature of Brahman is destroyed (śvarūpa-nāśa); for, since pure self-illumination is never produced, its concealment can only mean that it is destroyed, since it has no other nature than pure self-illumination. Again, if the contentless pure self-luminous intuition is said to assume diverse forms on account of the defect of avidyā, which is supported by it, then the question may be asked, whether this defect is real or unreal. If it is real, then the monism fails, and, if it is unreal, then the question arises, how is this unreal defect brought about? If it is brought about by some other defect, then, that also being unreal, the same question will again arise, and hence there will be a vicious infinite (anavasthā). If it is held that even without any real basis one unreal defect may be the cause of another unreal defect and so on in a beginningless series, then we

1 Sudarśana Sūri says here that, if there is such a difference between Brahman as essence and Brahman as destroying avidyā, that would mean that one form of Brahman is different from its other form, or, in other words, that it is qualified. Śruta-prakāśikā, Pandit edition, Benares, vol. IX, p. 658.
virtually have nihilism (Mādhya-ya-paṣa or Śūnya-vāda)\(^1\). If, to escape these criticisms, it is held that the defect is the very essence of intuition (anubhūti) or Brahma, then, Brahma being eternal, the defect also will be eternal, and emancipation, or the cessation of the world-appearance, will never take place. Again, this avidyā is said to be indefinable, being different from both the existent and the non-existent (sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa). But how can this be? A thing must be either existing or not existing; how can there be anything which is neither existing nor not-existing?

Referring to the arguments of the Śaṅkarites in favour of the existence of ajñāna (nescience) as a positive entity and as directly perceived in such perceptions as “I am ignorant,” “I do not know myself or any others,” Rāmānuja says that such perceptions refer only to the non-existence of the knowledge of an object prior to its apprehension (prāga-bhāva). Rāmānuja argues that the ignorance perceived cannot refer to its specific and determinate object; for, if it did, then the object would be known and there would be no ignorance at all; and if the ajñāna does not refer to any specific object, how can the ajñāna or ignorance, standing by itself, be perceived or realized? If it is urged that ajñāna refers to indistinct (a-viṣada-sva-rūpa) knowledge, then also it may be said that this

\(^1\) Sudarśana Sūri here points out that the Śaṅkarites try to evade the vicious infinite in three ways: firstly, those who think that ignorance (āvidyā) is associated with jīva (jīva-jñāna-vādi) explain it by affirming it so as to involve an infinite series like the seed-and-the-shoot (viśajñākara), but not a vicious infinite; since on their view jīva is produced by āvidyā and āvidyā is again produced by jīva (āvidyādām jīvah jñādā vidyā). Those again who think that āvidyā belongs to Brahma (Brahma-jñāna-vādi) hold that āvidyā is by nature beginningless and the irrationality or unreasonableness of its nature is nothing surprising. As regards the beginninglessness of āvidyā in an infinite series (pravāha-mādḥvā) of jīva and āvidyā and āvidyā and jīva as propounded in the first view of the jīva-jñāna-vādins, the refutation of it by those who hold that the ajñāna belongs to Brahma is enough. For they have pointed out that such a view goes against the universally accepted doctrine of the eternity of souls, since it held that the souls came out through āvidyā and āvidyā through souls. The other view, that the illusory series is by itself beginningless, is no better; for, if one illusion were the basis of another illusion in a beginningless series, this would be practically identical with the nihilistic philosophy. Moreover, even if the illusion is admitted to be beginningless in nature, then also that must await some other root primary cause (miśa-dosāpeksa) from which this successive series of illusions springs, and from that another, and so there will arise the vicious infinite. If no such root cause is awaited, the world-appearance may itself be regarded as āvidyā, and there will be no need to suppose the existence of any root cause as āvidyā. Again, if āvidyā is held to be irrational in nature, why should it not affect the emancipated souls and also Brahma? If it is answered that it does not do so because the emancipated souls and Brahma are pure, then that means that this āvidyā is rational and wise and not irrational. Śruti-prakāśikā, in Pandit, vol. ix, pp. 636–665.
may be regarded as the absence of the rise of distinct knowledge. Thus, even if a positive ignorance is admitted, it must somehow be related to something else to which it refers. In whatever way one may attempt to explain ājñāna (ignorance), either as want of knowledge, or as other than knowledge, or as opposed to knowledge, it can be made possible only by a knowledge of the very fact of which it will be the opposite. Even darkness has to be conceived as being opposed to light; and hence one must have knowledge of light in order to understand darkness, as being opposed to it. But the ājñāna (ignorance) of the Śaṅkarites cannot stand by itself, and so must show its content by a reference to the object or entity of which there is ignorance. Therefore, in the aforesaid experiences, “I am ignorant,” “I do not know myself or any one else,” it should be admitted that what is felt is this want of rise of knowledge and not any positive ignorance, as the latter is equally found to be relative to the object and the subject and has no advantage over the former. Moreover, the Brahman, which is ever free and ever the same pure self-luminous intelligence, cannot at any time feel this ignorance or avidyā. It cannot hide Brahman; for Brahman is pure intelligence, and that alone. If it is hidden, that amounts to the destruction of Brahman. Again, if Brahman can perceive ājñāna, it can as well perceive the world appearance; if by hiding Brahman the ājñāna makes itself perceived by Brahman, then such ājñāna cannot be removed by true knowledge, since it has the power of concealing knowledge and of making itself felt by it. Further, it cannot be said that avidyā hides the Brahman only partially; for Brahman has no part. So the above experience of “I did not know anything,” as remembered in the awakened state and referring to experiences of deep sleep, is not the memory of ājñāna or ignorance directly experienced in deep sleep (suṣupti), but an inference during the awakened state of not having any knowledge during deep sleep on account of there being no memory. Inference also is unavailing for proving the existence of any ājñāna; for not only would such premises of inference involve a faulty reason, but no proper example could be found which could satisfy the claim of reason by a reference to any known case where a similar thing happens. More-

1 ato na kuśic avediṣam iti jñānam na smaranaṁ kintu asmaranaṁ-līṅgakaṁ jñanā-bhāva-viṣayam anumiti-rūpam. Śruta-prakāśikā, p. 178. (Nirṇayasāgar ed. (916).)
over, it is quite easy to formulate other series of inferences to disprove the possibility of such ajñāna as is accepted by the Śaṅkarites¹.

Rāmānuja’s theory of Illusion—All knowledge is Real.

Rāmānuja says that all illusion may briefly be described as perception in which a thing appears to be different from what it is (anyasya anyathāvabhāsaḥ). It is unreasonable to imagine that the illusory content of perception must be due to no cause, or is something wholly unperceived or wholly unknown (atyantā-paridṛṣṭā-kāraṇaka-vastu-kalpanā-yogāt). If such a wholly chimerical thing is imagined to be the content of illusory perception, then it must be inexpressible or indescribable (anirvacanīya); but no illusory object appears as indescribable; it appears as real. If it appeared as an inexpressible entity, there would be neither illusion nor its correction. So it has to be admitted that in all illusions (e.g. in conch-shell–silver illusion) one thing (e.g. the conch-shell) appears in another form (e.g. silver). In all theories of illusion, whatever may be the extent of their error, they have ultimately to admit that in all illusions one thing appears in the form of another. Speaking against the Śaṅkarites, it may be asked, he urges, how is their inexpressible (anirvacanīya) silver produced? The illusory perception cannot be the cause; for the perception follows only the production of the indescribable silver and cannot precede it to be its cause. It cannot be due to the defects in our sense-organs; for such defects are subjective and therefore cannot affect the nature of objective reality or object. Moreover, if it is inexpressible and indescribable, why should it appear under certain circumstances in the specific form of a particular kind of appearance, silver? If it is urged that this is due to the fact of there being a similarity between silver and conch-shell, it may again be asked whether this similarity is real or unreal. It cannot be real, since the content is illusory; it cannot be unreal since it has reference to real objects (e.g. the real silver in a shop). So such a theory of illusion is open to many criticisms.

Rāmānuja seems to have himself favoured the anyathā-khyāti theory of illusion, and says that there will be no explanations of contradiction of knowledge involved in illusory knowledge, or of consequent failure of behaviour as suggested by such knowledge,

unless error is ultimately explained as the wrongful appearance of one thing as another. He also says that all the other theories of illusion (except possibly the yathārtha-khyāti view, as suggested in the Śrūta-prakāśikā commentary—yathārtha-khyāti-vyatirikta-pakṣaṇa anyathā-khyāti-pakṣah prabalah) would ultimately have to accept the analysis of error as the wrongful appearance of one thing as another (khyāty-antarāṇāṁ tu sudūram api gatvā anyathāvabhāsāḥ āśrayanīyāḥ—Rāmānujabhāṣya). Rāmānuja further points out that even the akhyāti theory of illusion (i.e. illusion considered as being due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the presentation of the “this” of the conch-shell and the memory of silver) is a form of anyathā-khyāti; for ultimately here also one has to accept the false identification of two characters or two ideas. Veṅkaṭaṇātha, commenting on this point in his Nyāya-pariṣuddhi, says that the appearance of one thing as another is the indispensable condition of all errors, but the non-apprehension of difference must always be granted as an indispensable condition which must exist in all cases of false identification and has therefore the advantage of a superior simplicity (lāghava); yet the anyathā-khyāti theory gives the proper and true representation of the nature of illusion, and no theory of illusion can do away with the need of admitting it as a correct representation of the phenomenon of illusion. So Veṅkaṭaṇātha says that Rāmānuja, while he agrees with the anyathā-khyāti view as a theory of illusion, yet appreciates the superior simplicity of the akhyāti view as giving us the indispensable condition of all forms of illusion.

But, though Rāmānuja himself prefers the anyathā-khyāti view of illusion, he could not very well pass over the yathārtha-khyāti view, as advocated by the senior adherents and founders of the school of thought which he interpreted, viz. Bodhāyana, Nāṭhanumuni and Varada Viṣṇu Miśra. Rāmānuja is thus faced with two different theories, one that he himself advocated and the other that was advocated by his seniors. Fortunately for him, while his own theory of anyathā-khyāti was psychological in character, the other theory of yathārtha-khyāti was of an ontological character, so that it was possible for one to hold the one view psychologically and the other view ontologically. Rāmānuja, therefore, offers the yathārtha-khyāti view as an alternative. Veṅkaṭaṇātha says that this yathārtha-khyāti view can only be put forward as a theory based on scriptural
Rāmānuja’s theory of Illusion

evidence, but cannot be supported as a philosophical theory which can be experienced and therefore as a scientific theory of illusion. We have to make up our minds between the two plausible alternative theories of anyathā-khyāti and akhyāti.

Rāmānuja, to distinguish the yathārtha-khyāti theory of his seniors, whom he refers to by the term “Vedic school” (veda-vidām matam), develops this view in a number of verses and says that he understands on the strength of the scriptural texts that the material world was created by the intermingling of the three elements, fire, water and earth, so that in each object there are all the three elements. When a particular element predominates in any material object, it is found to possess more qualities of that element and is designated by its character, though it still holds the qualities of other elements in it. Thus it may in some sense be said that all things are in all things. A conch-shell possesses also the qualities of tejas, or silver, and it is on that account that it may be said to resemble silver in some sense. What happens in the case of illusion is that through defects of organs, etc., the qualities or characters in a conch-shell representing other elements are not noticed and hence the perception can only grasp the qualities or characters of silver existing in the conch-shell, and the conch-shell is perceived as silver. So the knowledge of silver in a conch-shell is neither false, nor unreal, but is real, and refers to a real object, the silver element existing in the conch-shell. In this view of illusion all knowledge is regarded as referring to a real object (yathārtha-khyāti). The difference between this view and that of Prabhākara is this, that, while Prabhākara was content with the negative condition of non-apprehension of the difference between the present perception of a glittering conch-shell and the memory of silver in the shop as the cause of the illusion, and urges that knowledge is real either as perception or as the memory, and that illusion has been the result of non-apprehension of the distinction of the two, Rāmānuja is more radical, since he points out that the perception of silver in a

1 See Śruta-prakāśikā, pp. 183–6.
2 According to Sudarśana Sūri this view is the traditional view (sāmpya dāyikā) accepted by Bodhāyana, Nāthamuni, Rāma Miśra and others, which Rāmānuja, as a faithful follower of that school, had himself followed. Thus, Rāmānuja says:

yathā-rtham sarva-vijñānam iti veda-vidām matam
śruti-smṛtibhyāḥ sarvasya sarvātmavat-pratīttah.

Bhāṣya and Śruta-prakāśikā, p. 183.
conch-shell is due to the real perception of the element of silver in a conch-shell and the non-apprehension owing to defects (doṣa) of the other elements present in it which would have shown its difference from silver. So what is called the illusory perception of silver in the conch-shell has a real objective basis to which it refers.

Dreams are explained by Rāmānuja as being creations of God, intended to produce corresponding perceptions in the minds of the dreamers. The case of the appearance of a conch-shell as yellow to a person with jaundiced eyes is explained by him as due to the fact that yellow colour emanates from the bile of his eyes, and is carried to the conch-shell through the rays of the eyes which turn the white shell yellow. The appearance of the conch-shell as yellow is therefore a real transformation of the conch-shell, noticed by the eye of a jaundiced person, though this transformation can be noticed only by him and not by other persons, the yellow being very near his eyes.

The akhyāti and the yathārtha-khyāti views agree in holding that the imposed idea has a real basis as its object. But, while the former holds that this real basis is a past presentation, the latter holds that it is given as a presentation along with the object, i.e. the silver element, being mixed up with the conch-shell element, is also presented to the senses, but owing to some defects of circumstances, organs of sight, etc., the conch-shell, which ought to be the main part, is not perceived. Thus, it is only the silver part that forms the presentation, and hence the error. So non-perception of the conch-shell part is common to both the views; but, while the akhyāti view holds that the silver part is only a reproduced image of past experience, the yathārtha-khyāti view grounds itself on the trivrt-karana texts of the Upaniṣads and holds that the silver part is perceived at the time. But Sudarṣana Sūri refers to the views of other teachers (kecid ācāryāḥ) and says that the trivrt-karana view may well explain the misapprehension of one element (bhūta) for another; but in the cases of misapprehension due to similarity trivrt-karaṇa is not of much use, for trivrt-karaṇa and pañci-karaṇa

1 Other types of errors or illusions are similarly explained by Rāmānuja as having a real objective existence, the error being due to the non-apprehension of other elements which are objectively existent and associated with the entity which is the object of illusory perception, but which owing to defects are not perceived. See ibid. pp. 187, 188.
can explain the intermixture of bhūtas, but not of the bhautikas, or the later modifications of the five elements into the varied substances such as conch-shell and silver, which are mutually mis-apprehended for each other on account of their similarity. It has, therefore, to be maintained that in these bhūta-modifications also the triyért-karana principle applies to a certain extent; for here also the molecules or atoms of things or substances are made up of large parts of some bhūta-modification and smaller parts of one or more of other bhūta-modifications. The conch-shell molecules are thus made up of large parts of conch-shell material and smaller parts of the silver material, and this explains the similarity of the one element to the other. The similarity is due to the real presence of one element in the other, and is called the pratinidhi-nyāya, or the maxim of determining similarity by real representation. So in all cases of misapprehension of one thing as another through similarity there is no misapprehension in the strict sense, but a right apprehension of a counterpart in the other object constituting the basis of the similarity, and the non-apprehension of the bigger and the larger part which held the counterpart coeval with it. It is because the conch-shell contains a major part of conch-shell element (sukty-amśa) and only a minor part of silver that it passes as conch-shell and not as silver. Conch-shell cannot serve the purpose of silver, despite the silver element in it, on account of the obstruction of the major part of the conch-shell element; and it is also on account of this that under normal circumstances the silver element in it is hidden by the conch-shell element, and we say that we perceive conch-shell and not silver. When it is said that this is conch-shell and not silver (nedam rajatam), the “not silver” has no other meaning than that of the conch-shell, the apprehension of which dispelled the idea of silver. It is the conch-shell that is designated in its negative aspect as “not silver” and in its positive aspect as conch-shell.

Rāmānujācārya, alias Vādihamsāmbuvāhācārya, the maternal uncle of Veṅkaṭanātha, seems to support the Rāmānuja method of sat-khyāti by showing that all the other three rival theories of illusion, such as that of anyathā-khyāti, akhyāti, and the anireva-caniya-khyāti, cross each other and are therefore incompatible. But he takes great pains to show that the sat-khyāti theory may be supported on the basis of the logical implications involved in both the
anyathā-khyāti and the akhyāti types of realism. He starts the discussion by taking for granted the akhyāti type of realism and its logical implications. He holds that it also would ultimately lead to anyathā-khyāti, and that therefore (excepting the sat-khyāti), of all the khyātis, anyathā-khyāti is perhaps the best. He says in his Nyāya-kulisa that, since the way of knowledge requires that the sense-organs should reach their objects, even in illusory perception there must be some objects which they reach; for they could not convey any knowledge about an object with which they were not in contact. The defect (doṣa) cannot account for the production of new knowledge, for it only serves to obstruct anything from being perceived or known. Defects only obstruct the course of the natural sequence of cause and effect, just as fire would destroy the natural shooting powers of seeds. Moreover, taking the old example of the conch-shell–silver, it may be asked how, if there was no silver at all objectively present, there could be any knowledge of such an absolutely non-existing thing? Since our awareness cannot refer to non-existing entities, all forms of awareness must guarantee the existence of corresponding objects. What happens in the case of the illusion of conch-shell–silver is that there is memory of silver previously experienced and the “this,” which is experienced at the time of the illusion; and it is on account of the defects (doṣa) that it is not grasped that the silver is only a memory of past experience, while it is only the “this” in front of us that is experienced at the time (doṣāt pramūṣita-tadavamanārāh).

Vādihamsāmbuvāha, weighing the various arguments of the rival theories of anyathā-khyāti and akhyāti, deals with the arguments of the anyathā-khyāti view which holds that it is the conch-shell that appears as silver. As against the objections raised by such a view in opposition to the akhyāti view, viz., if each thing is different from every other thing, how can an illusion be explained as being due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the silver remembered and the “this” perceived directly in experience? Arguing in its favour, he says that the difference which is not

2 dosānām kārya-tīghāta-mātra-heitvena kāryā-ntaro-pajanakatvā-yogāt, na hy agni-samsprastyā kalāma-viśasya ankuro-tpādane sāmarthyam asti. Ibid.
3 idam iti puro-vastitni anubhavaḥ rajatam iti ca pūrvā-nubhāta-rajata-viśaya snṛthi. Ibid.
apprehended here consists of that characteristic which exists in things by virtue of which one thing is not confused with or misapprehended as another thing, and it is the non-apprehension of this differentiating characteristic that causes the misapprehension of the conch-shell as silver (saṁsarga-virodhi-vaidhrmya-viśeṣa-rūpa-bhedā-grahaḥ pravr̥tti-hetuḥ)¹. But the real objections to holding this akhyāti view of illusion to be ultimately sufficient consists in the fact that it cannot do away with the necessity of the synthetic operation (saṁsarga-vyāpāra) consisting of a thing being regarded as such-and-such, as found in all discussions of disputants, in all our behaviours and concepts of error and illusion. This forces us to accept the anyathā-khyāti view as an unavoidable and ultimate explanation². Vādihaṃsāmbuvāha urges that, since the silver is felt to be in that which is only a piece of conch-shell, this must imply the imposition of the one on the other (which is the essential part of anyathā-khyāti). Just as in the real perception of a piece of silver the object before us is experienced as silver, so in the conch-shell–silver illusion, the object before us is experienced as silver,

¹ Madras Govt. MS. No. 4910.
² Like the seniors referred to by Rāmānuja, Prabhākara also considers all knowledge to be valid (yathārtham sarvam eva vijñānam iti, Prakaraṇa-pañcikā, p. 32), though the former does so on ontological grounds and the latter on psychological and experiential grounds. Śālikanātha, representing Prabhākara’s view, says that, whatever is the content of awareness, that alone is known, and at the time of the conch-shell–silver illusion, what is known is “this is silver,” but there is no knowledge of conch-shell, since it is not the content of awareness at the time. Thus it cannot be said that the illusory knowledge consists of knowing the conch-shell as silver, but of the “this” as silver; for, when there is the knowledge of illusory silver, there is no knowledge of conch-shell. What happens in illusory perception is that through defects the differentiating characteristics of the conch-shell are not apprehended and the conch-shell is perceived only in its general character as an object. Then there is memory of silver, and through a defect in the mental process (mano-dosāt) the silver is not remembered with its original association of time and place as that silver which was perceived there, but is simply remembered as an image of silver (tad-itya-amśa-parāmśa-vivarjitaṁ). Though there is no such definite experience that I remember silver, yet the idea of silver has to be admitted to be due to memory; for it cannot be due either to perception or to inference or to any other source of knowledge. Thus, through the elimination of all other sources of knowledge, silver has to be admitted to be due to memory (ananya-gatitaḥ smrtir atrāvagamyate). On account of the absence of a feeling that I remember a past experience, the memory of silver cannot be distinguished from a percept; for it is only these facts that distinguish a present percept from a reproduced image; and so we fail to differentiate between this memory and the actual perception of some object before us (the differentiating characteristics of which are entirely lost to us through defects of sense-organs or the like). On account of the non-apprehension of the distinction, these two different kinds of awareness themselves produce the illusion of a direct and immediate perception of silver which is not there at the time, and even tempt us to
and here also it is the conch-shell that appears as silver. When the illusion is dispelled, we say that “this is not silver”; this cannot mean the mere presence of the conch-shell, but it must mean the denial of the imposition that was made previously. For, if negations could be treated as positive entities, then there would be no difference between positives and negatives (bādhyasya vidhīriṇātve vidhīniśedha-vyatyāsāṃ ca niśedhe bādhā iti tulyārthatvāt). The akhyāti view speaks of non-apprehension of absence of association (e.g. of conch-shell–silver, asamsargāgraha) to be the cause of illusion. It may well be asked, What is this absence of association? It cannot be the mere thing itself; for, had it been so, we should expect that the thing itself (say the conch-shell) is not perceived and this alone constitutes error, which is impossible. Moreover, the silver is felt to be in front of us as the object we perceive and not as something which we remember. We know that, when we perceive illusorily that “this is silver,” there is the perception of a false association (bādhaka-saṁsarga-grahaṃ); but the concept of non-apprehension of difference (bhedāgraha) never seems to be practically realized in experience. If we inquire into the nature of what constitutes falsity or contradiction (e.g. in conch-shell–silver), we find that it is not the fact that a conch-shell when burnt becomes ash while silver, when burnt, may be made into a finger-ring that constitutes error, but the fact that what was believed to be capable of being rendered into a finger-ring by being put into fire cannot be so done (yadi tv-aṅgulīyakādi-hetutayābhimataśya vyavahārasya bhasma-hetutvako hy atra viśeṣāḥ). If this is what is really meant by falsehood, it is nothing but the apprehension of the cause of one kind of action as being another cause (anyā-hetuvyavahāro ’nya-hetutayāvagataḥ). This will be anyathā-khyāti; for, if even here it is urged to be non-apprehension of difference, then

stretch our hands to pick it up, as if there were a real piece of silver before us. (See Prakārama-paṅcikā, Ch. iv, Naya-vitiḥ.)

Sudarśana Sūri, commenting on the akhyāti view in his Śruta-prakāśikā in connection with his commentary on the vathārtha-khyāti view of Rāmānuja’s seniors, says that the akhyāti view has the advantage of superior simplicity or the minimum assumption, viz. that in illusion only an indefinite object is seen, and the distinction between this and the image roused in memory by it is not apprehended. This has to be admitted in all theories of illusion, and in addition other assumptions have to be made.

1 Nyāya-kulīṣa of Vādiḥamsāmbūvaḥ Rāmānujacārya, Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4910.
the experience in such cases of the belief of one thing as another is not explained\(^1\). In all such cases the final appeal must be made to experience, which attests all cases of illusion as being the appearance of one thing as another\(^2\).

But though Vādīhamsāmbuvāhācārya thus tries to support the anyathā-khyāti view of illusion, yet he does not dismiss the akhyāti view of error curtly, but admits that it may also properly explain facts of illusion, when looked at from another point of view. For, if there was not the non-apprehension of difference between silver and conch-shell, the conch-shell could not be mistaken as silver. So, even in anyathā-khyāti, there is one element of akhyāti involved; for in order that one may behave towards a piece of conch-shell in the same way as one would do to a piece of silver, it is necessary that one should not be able to distinguish between what one sees before one and what one remembers. But, though the negative fact of akhyāti, i.e., non-apprehension of difference, may be regarded in many cases as a necessary stage, yet the positive fact of association (saṃsarga) or synthesis has to be admitted as an indispensable process, connecting the different elements constituting a concrete perception. The root-cause of all our behaviour and action, being of the nature of synthetic association, it would be wrong to suppose that non-apprehension of difference could by itself be made a real cause of our actions (na ca māla-bhūte saṃsarga-jñāne pravṛtti-kāraṇe siddhe tat-upajīvino nirantarajñānasya pravṛttihetutvam iti yuktaṁ vaktum)\(^1\). Although Vādīhamsāmbuvāhā spends all his discussions on the relative strength of akhyāti and anyathā-khyāti as probable theories of illusion, yet he refers to the view of illusion mentioned by Rāmānuja that all things are present in all things and that therefore no knowledge is illusory. He considers this view as the real and ultimately correct view. But, if this were so, all his discussions on the akhyāti and anyathā-khyāti theories of illusion would be futile. Vādīhamsāmbuvāhā does not, however, attempt to show how, if this theory be admitted, the other theories of akhyāti or anyathā-khyāti could be sup-

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\(^1\) yadi cātṛā'pi bhedā-grahah śaraṇam syāt tato'bhimāna-viśeṣa-krta-bādha-vyavastha na sidhyet. Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4910.

\(^2\) katham ayaṁ loka-vyavahāro vṛtta iti, na hi kañcid upādhim anālambya loke śabda-prayogo'vakaλpyate, tasmiād bādhya-bādhaka-bhāva-nyathā-nupāpattyā anyathā-khyāti-siddhiḥ. Ibid.

\(^3\) Ibid.
He further criticizes the *anirvacaniya-khyāti* (illusion as the indescribable creation of, say, the appearance of silver in the conch-shell-silver illusion), a view of illusion as held by the Śaṅkarites, in the stereotyped form with which we are already familiar.

Anantācārya, a writer of the nineteenth century, laid stress on the view of illusion which held that all things were contained in all things, and hence the perception of conch-shell as silver was neither false knowledge nor non-apprehension of the difference between what is perceived and what is remembered; for the perception “this is silver” is a complex of two perceptions, “this” and “silver.” Had not this been a case of actual perception, we should not have felt as if we perceived the “this” before us as “silver.” The function of *doṣa* (defect) was only to hide the conch-shell part (mixed up with the silver part) from perception. To say that all perceptions have objective entities corresponding to them (*yathā-rātha*) does not mean that things are as they are perceived, but it means that it is not true that what is perceived has not an objective basis corresponding to it. That sort of *tejas*-substance which forms the material cause of silver certainly exists in the elemental *tejas*, and, the earth-particles forming the material cause of conch-shells being present in the elemental earth-substances, these substances get mixed in the primitive stage of compounding by *trīṣṭ-karaṇa*, and this explains the presence of the objective substratum of silver in the illusory perception of silver. It is evident, argues Anantācārya, that conch-shell cannot appear as silver; for, since conch-shell is not silver, how can it appear as silver? In order properly to account for the perceptual experience “this is silver,” it is necessary to assume that the two constituents, “this” and “silver,” of the complex “this is silver” are both perceptually determined; for it is only in this way that one can justify the perception “I perceive this silver.”

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1  yady api ṛtuṁāṁ paṇcikaraṇa-labdha-paraspara-vyāptyā śūktikāyām api sādṛśyāt rajatai-kadeśo vidyata eva iti siddhantāḥ tathāpi na vidyata iti krtvā cintyate vādī-udāharaṇa-prasiddhī-anurodhāya. Govt. Oriental MSS. No. 4910.

This is an answer to the already noted objection raised by the *Srūta-prakāśikā*.
Failure of theistic proofs.

The existence of God can be known by the testimony of the scriptures (śāstra-pramāṇaḥ), and by that alone. All other proofs which seem to demonstrate the existence of God ultimately fail to do so, since suitable counter-arguments may always be successfully arrayed to destroy the efficacy of such arguments.

God cannot be perceived either by any of the sense-organs or by the mind; for the former can make known only those objects with which they have come in contact, and the latter (excepting in the direct communication of feelings like pleasure, pain, etc.) cannot make external objects known to us without depending on the sense-organs. Further, God cannot be perceived by the special perception of saints (yogi-pratyakṣa); for these are of the nature of memory, and do not convey any facts previously unknown through the senses. The saints can perceive only what has been already perceived, though these may not be present to the senses at the time. Objects too small for the senses cannot be perceived; for there cannot be any sense-contact with them. No reason can be perceived by means of which a necessary inference could be drawn regarding the existence of a supreme person who has a direct acquaintance with all things and the power of making them all. The ordinary argument that is offered is from effect to cause—since the world is "effect" (kārya), it must have a cause, a maker, who has direct acquaintance with all its materials and their utility and enjoys them. The world is "effect" because, like all effects, it is made up of parts (sāvaya); like a healthy human body, therefore, it is under the guidance and superintendence of one person and one alone. But the point is that the two cases are not analogous. The human body is neither produced nor maintained in existence by its superintendent, the soul. The production of the body of a person is due to the adṛṣṭa (unseen effects of deeds) not only of that person, but also of beings who are benefited or in some way connected with it. Its existence as connected parts is due to the union of its parts, and does not depend for that on the living person who superintends it. Its existence as living is wholly unique and cannot be found in the case of the world as a whole. The superintendence of one person need not be considered as the invariable cause of all movements; for it is well known that many persons unite their
efforts to move some heavy object which could not otherwise be moved.

Moreover, if such a maker of the universe is to be admitted, could not the making of the world be better ascribed to one or more individual souls? They have a direct acquaintance with the materials of the world. It is not necessary that the maker should be acquainted with the inner efficiencies or power of things; for it is enough if the objects containing those powers are directly known. We see also that in all examples of making, such as the making of a jug, a cloth, or the like, the maker is an ordinary human being. Since the inference of the existence of a cause of the world is inspired by these examples, it will be only fair to assume that the maker of the universe belongs to the same class of beings as the makers of the ordinary mundane effects, such as a jug or a cloth. Thus, instead of assuming a supreme being to be the maker of the universe, we might as well assume an individual soul to be the maker of the universe. Hence it is difficult to prove the existence of God by inference. Ordinarily inferences are applied for the knowing of an object which may also be known in other ways, and in all such cases the validity of any inference is tested by these. But in the case of the application of inference for the knowing of God this is not possible; for God cannot be known by any other direct or indirect method. So the application of inference is not of any use here, since there is nothing which can test the validity of the inference or can determine that inference in a particular way and in that way alone. Therefore, since all sorts of inferences can be made from diverse propositions, it is not possible to determine that any particular kind of inference would be more acceptable than any other.

There are some who would still want to support the cosmological argument on the ground that no less than a supreme person, entirely different from the individual persons, could be regarded as the maker of this vast universe; for the individuals cannot have the power of perceiving subtle things, or things which are obstructed from our view, or things which are far away. Thus it is necessary to hold that the maker of the universe must be a being of unlimited powers. From the effect we infer its cause; and again from the nature of the effect we infer the nature of the cause. So, if the cause of the universe is to be inferred, then only such a cause
can be inferred as really has the unlimited powers required for producing such an effect. It is irrelevant to infer such a cause as cannot produce it. Also the unessential conditions of ordinary causes need not be imported by suggesting that, just as in the case of ordinary human beings there must be a body and also instruments by which they can operate and produce the effect, so also in the case of the supreme cause it might be expected that He should have a body and should have instruments by which He could operate. This cannot be; for we know that many effects are wrought by sheer force of will and desire (sānkalpa) and neither will nor desire needs a body for its existence, since these are generated not by body, but by mind (manas). The existence of manas also is independent of the existence of body; for the mind continues to exist even when it is dissociated from body. Since limited beings, who are under the sway of virtue and vice, are unable to produce this manifold universe of such wonderful and diverse construction, it has to be admitted that there exists a supreme person who has done it. Moreover, since the material cause is seen in all known examples to be entirely different from the cause as agent or doer, there cannot be a Brahman which is both the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) and the cause as agent (nimitta-kāraṇa) of this universe.

To this, however, it may be replied that it is admitted that the world is effect and that it is vast, but it is not known that all parts of this vast world originated at one time and from one person. Not all jugs are made at one time and by one person. How can any room be made for an unknown supreme person and the possibility be ruled out that different individual souls, by virtue of special merit and special powers, should at different times create the different parts of the world, which now appear as one unified whole created by one person at one time? It is quite possible that the different parts of the world were created at different times and will similarly be destroyed at different times. To imagine the existence of one such supreme person who could create all this manifold may well be regarded as almost chimerical. From the fact that the world is effect all that can be argued is that it must have been produced by an intelligent being, but there is nothing to infer that it is necessarily the creation of one intelligent being. This infinite universe could not have sprung into being at any one moment, and there is no proof that it did so. And, if it came into being gradually, it may
well be supposed that there were many intelligent beings who brought it into being gradually. Moreover, God, being absolutely complete in Himself, could not be conceived as having any need to effect such a creation, and He has neither body nor hands with which He could create. It is true that mind does not die with the body, but it is not found in any active state when it is not associated with the body. If it is admitted that God has a body, then He cannot be eternal. If His body could be eternal, though having parts, then on the same grounds the world too might be regarded as eternal. If the world is admitted to have come into being by His mere wish, that would be so strange as to be entirely dissimilar to all known cases of cause and effect. So, if one has to argue the existence of God as cause of the world on the basis of the analogy of known causes and effects as experienced by us, and if such a God is endowed with all the attributes with which He is generally associated, and with strange ways of creating this world, He must be such a cause as could never be inferred on the basis of the similarity of known causes and their modes of creating the effect. Thus, God can never be proved by inference. His existence has to be admitted on the testimony of scriptural texts and of that alone.

Bhāskara and Rāmānuja.

Every careful reader of Bhāskara and Rāmānuja must have noticed that Rāmānuja was largely indebted for his philosophical opinions and views to Bhāskara, and on most topics their doctrines are more or less the same. It is possible that Rāmānuja was indebted for his views to Bodhāyana or other Vaishnava writers, but, however that may be, his indebtedness to Bhāskara also was very great, as a comparative study of the two systems would show. However, the two systems are not identical, and there is an important point on which they disagree. Bhāskara believed that there is Brahman as pure being and intelligence, absolutely formless, and the causal principle, and Brahman as the manifested effect, the world. According to Bhāskara there is no contradiction or difficulty in such a conception, since all things have such a dual form as the one and the many or as unity and difference. "Unity in difference" is the nature of all things. Rāmānuja, however, holds that difference and unity cannot both be affirmed of the same thing. Thus, when we affirm "this is like this," it is not true that the same
entity is both the subject and the predicate. For example, when "this" in the above proposition stands for a cow, the predicate "like this" stands for its particular and unique description of bodily appearance. The latter is only the attribute of the former and determines its nature and character. There is no meaning in asserting the identity of the subject and the predicate or in asserting that it is the same entity that in one form as unity is "subject" and in another form as difference is the predicate. Bhāskara argues that the conditions and the conditioned (avasthā-taadvasthaś ca) are not wholly different; nor are the substance and its attributes, the cloth and the whiteness, entirely different. There are no qualities without substance and no substance without qualities. All difference is also unity as well. The powers or attributes of a thing are not different from it; the fire is the same as its power of burning and illuminating. So everything is both unity and difference, and neither of them may be said to be wholly reducible to the other. But Rāmānuja maintains that all propositions are such that the predicate is an attribute of the subject. The same attributive view is applicable to all cases of genus and species, cause and effect, and universals and individuals. The "difference" and the "unity" are not two independent forms of things which are both real; but the "difference" modifies or qualifies the nature and character of the "unity," and this is certified by all our experience of complex or compound existence. According to Rāmānuja the affirmation of both unity and difference of the same entity is self-contradictory. The truth of "difference" standing by itself is not attested by experience; for the difference of quality, quantity, etc., always modifies the nature and character of the subject as "unity," and it is this alone that is experienced by us.

Bhāskara urges that, though there is the twofold Brahman as the manifested many and as the unmanifested formless identity of pure being and intelligence, it is only the latter that is the object of our highest knowledge and worship. Rāmānuja, however, denies this formless and differenceless Brahman and believes in the qualified complex Brahman as the transcendent and immanent God holding within Him as His body the individual souls and the world of matter. Regarding the relation of Brahman and the individual souls (jīva) Bhāskara says that a jīva is nothing but Brahman

1 Vādi-traya-khandana.
narrowed by the limitations of the mind substance (antahkarana-padhy-avacchinna). When it is said that jīva is a part (amśa) of Brahman, it is neither in the sense of part or of cause that the word “amśa” is used, but in the technical sense of being limited by the limitation of mind. This limitation is not false or unreal, and it is on account of it that the individual souls are atomic. According to Rāmānuja “difference” is felt as a result of ignorance and the difference is therefore unreal. With Rāmānuja the identity of Brahman with the individual souls is the last word. The apparent difference of imperfection, finiteness, etc., between the individual souls and the perfection and infiniteness of Brahman is due to ignorance (avidyā), and is found to be false as soon as the souls realize themselves to be forming the body of Brahman itself. “Difference” as such has no reality according to Rāmānuja, but only modifies and determines the character of the identical subject to which it refers. The subject and its character are identical. Bhāskara considers identity and difference as two modes, both of which are alike independently true, though they are correlated to each other. In criticism of Bhāskara it is said that, if the limitations of Brahman were also true, then they would wholly limit Brahman, since it has no parts, and thus it would be polluted in its entirety. This objection to Bhāskara’s view in some of its subtle aspects is made with dialectical skill by Rāmānuja. But it does not appear that it has much force against Bhāskara, if we admit his logical claim that unity and plurality, cause and effect, are two modes of existence of the same reality and that both these forms are equally real. It does not seem that the logical position of Bhāskara has been sufficiently refuted.

Rāmānuja also speaks of Brahman as being identical with individual souls or the material world and yet different therefrom, but only in the sense in which a character or a part may be said to be at once identical with and different from the substance possessing the character or the whole to which the part is said to belong. The individual souls and the inanimate creation cannot stand by themselves independently, but only as parts of Brahman. So from the fact that they are parts of Brahman their identity (abheda) with Brahman becomes as primary as their difference (bheda), inasmuch

1 Rāmānuja’s Bhāṣya, pp. 265, 266, with the Śruta-prakāśikā, Nirṇayāsāgara Press, Bombay, 1916.
as the substance may be considered to be different from its attributes\(^1\). The main difference that remains on this point between Bhāskara and Rāmānuja is this, that Bhāskara does not think it necessary to introduce the conception of body and parts, or substance and attributes. According to his doctrine Brahman is immanent and transcendent at the same time, identity and difference can be affirmed of a thing at one and the same time; and this can be illustrated from the cases of cause and effect, or substance and attributes, etc.

**Ontological position of Rāmānuja’s Philosophy.**

The entire universe of wondrous construction, regulated throughout by wonderful order and method, has sprung into being from Brahman, is maintained by Him in existence, and will also ultimately return to Him. Brahman is that to the greatness of which there is no limitation. Though the creation, maintenance and absorption of the world signify three different traits, yet they do not refer to different substances, but to one substance in which they inhere. His real nature is, however, His changeless being and His eternal omniscience and His unlimitedness in time, space and character. Referring to Śaṅkara’s interpretation of this sūtra (I. i. 2), Rāmānuja says that those who believe in Brahman as characterless (nirviśeṣa) cannot do justice to the interpretation of this attribute of Brahman as affirmed in Brahma-sūtra I. i. 2; for instead of stating that the creation, maintenance and absorption of the world are from Brahman, the passage ought rather to say that the illusion of creation, maintenance, and absorption is from Brahman. But even that would not establish a characterless Brahman; for the illusion would be due to ajñāna, and Brahman would be the manifest of all ajñāna. This it can do by virtue of the fact that it is of the nature of pure illumination, which is different from the concept of materiality, and, if there is this difference, it is neither characterless nor without any difference\(^2\).

This raises an important question as regards the real meaning

1 \(jīvāvat-prthak-siddhy-anarha-viśeṣaṇatvena acid-vastuno brahṇā-ṃsātvam; viṣiṣṭa-vastu-eka-deśatvena abheda-vyavahāro mukhyah, viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣayayoh svārūpa-svabhāva-bhedena bheda-vyavahāro ‘pi mukhyah. Śrī-bhāṣya, III. 2. 28.\)

2 \(jagaj-janmādi-bhrano yatat tad brahme’ ti svat-prekṣā-paṅṣe’pi na nirviśeṣa-\)

vastu-siddhiḥ, etc. *Ibid.* I. i. 2.
of Śaṅkara’s interpretation of the above sūtra. Did he really mean, as he is apparently stated by Rāmānuja to have said, that that from which there is the illusion of creation, etc., of the world is Brahman? Or did he really mean Brahman and Brahman by itself alone is the cause of a real creation, etc., of the world? Śaṅkara, as is well known, was a commentator on the Brahma-sūtras and the Upaniṣads, and it can hardly be denied that there are many passages in these which would directly yield a theistic sense and the sense of a real creation of a real world by a real God. Śaṅkara had to explain these passages, and he did not always use strictly absolutist phrases; for, as he admitted three kinds of existence, he could talk in all kinds of phraseology, but one needed to be warned of the phraseology that Śaṅkara had in view at the time, and this was not always done. The result has been that there are at least some passages which appear by themselves to be realistically theistic, others which are ambiguous and may be interpreted in both ways, and others again which are professedly absolutist. But, if the testimony of the great commentators and independent writers of the Śaṅkara school be taken, Śaṅkara’s doctrine should be explained in the purely monistic sense, and in that alone. Brahman is indeed the unchangeable infinite and absolute ground of the emergence, maintenance and dissolution of all world-appearance and the ultimate truth underlying it. But there are two elements in the appearance of the world-phenomena—the ultimate ground, the Brahman, the only being and truth in them, and the element of change and diversity, the māyā—by the evolution or transformation of which the appearance of “the many” is possible. But from passages like those found in Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra, I. 1. 2, it might appear as if the world-phenomena are no mere appearance, but are real, inasmuch as they are not merely grounded in the real, but are emanations from the real: the Brahman. But, strictly speaking, Brahman is not alone the upādāna or the material cause of the world, but with avidyā is the material cause of the world, and such a world is grounded in Brahman and is absorbed in Him. Vācaspati, in his Bhāmati on Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya on the same sūtra (Brahma-sūtra, I. 1. 2), makes the same remark. Prakāśātman, in his Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, says that the creative functions here spoken of do

\[ \text{avidyā-sahita-brahmo pādānaṃ jagat brahmany evāsti tatrāyvā ca ityate. Bhāmati, I. 1. 2.} \]
not essentially appertain to Brahman and an inquiry into the nature of Brahman does not mean that he is to be known as being associated with these qualities. Bhāskara had asserted that Brahman had transformed Himself into the world-order, and that this was a real transformation—parināma—a transformation of His energies into the manifold universe. But Prakāsātman, in rejecting the view of parināma, says that, even though the world-appearance be of the stuff of māyā, since this māyā is associated with Brahman, the world-appearance as such is never found to be contradicted or negated or to be non-existing—it is only found that it is not ultimately real. Māyā is supported in Brahman; and the world-appearance, being transformations of māyā, is real only as such transformations. It is grounded also in Brahman, but its ultimate reality is only so far as this ground or Brahman is concerned. So far as the world-appearances are concerned, they are only relatively real as māyā transformations. The conception of the joint causality of Brahman and māyā may be made in three ways; that māyā and Brahman are like two threads twisted together into one thread; or that Brahman, with māyā as its power or sakti, is the cause of the world; or that Brahman, being the support of māyā, is indirectly the cause of the world. On the latter two views māyā being dependent on Brahman, the work of māyā—the world—is also dependent on Brahman; and on these two views, by an interpretation like this, pure Brahman (suddha-brahma) is the cause of the world. Sarvajñātma muni, who also thinks that pure Brahman is the material cause, conceives the function of māyā not as being joint material cause with Brahman, but as the instrument or the means through which the causality of pure Brahman appears as the manifold and diversity of the universe. But even on this view the stuff of the diversity is the māyā, though such a manifestation of māyā would have been impossible if the ground-cause, the Brahman, had been absent. In discerning the nature of the causality of Brahman, Prakāsātman says that the monistic doctrine of Vedānta is upheld by the fact that apart from

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the cause there is nothing in the effect which can be expressed or described (upādāna-vyatirekena kāryasya anirūpanād advitiyatā). Thus, in all these various ways in which Śaṅkara's philosophy has been interpreted, it has been universally held by almost all the followers of Śaṅkara that, though Brahman was at bottom the ground-cause yet the stuff of the world was not of real Brahman material, but of māyā; and, though all the diversity of the world has a relative existence, it has no reality in the true sense of the term in which Brahman is real. Śaṅkara himself says that the omniscience of Brahman consists in its eternal power of universal illumination or manifestation (yasya hi sarva-vaśayāvabhāsana-kṣamam jñānam nityam astī). Though there is no action or agency involved in this universal consciousness, it is spoken of as being a knowing agent, just as the sun is spoken of as burning and illuminating, though the sun itself is nothing but an identity of heat and light (pratatauṣṇya-prakāśepi savitari dahati prakāśayatti svātantrya-vyapadeśa-darśanāt... evam asaty api jñāna-karmanī Brahmaṇas tad aikṣata iti kartṛte-vyapadeśa-darśanāt). Before the creation of the world what becomes the object of this universal consciousness is the indefinable name and form which cannot be ascertained as "this" or "that". The omniscience of Brahman is therefore this universal manifestation, by which all the creations of māyā become the knowable contents of thought. But this manifestation is not an act of knowledge, but a permanent steady light of consciousness by which the unreal appearance of māyā flash into being and are made known.

Rāmānuja's view is altogether different. He discards the view of Śaṅkara, that the cause alone is true and that all effects are false.

1 Pañca-pādikā-vivarana, p. 221.
2 Prakāśātman refers to several ways in which the relation of Brahman and māyā has been conceived, e.g. Brahman has māyā as His power, and the individual souls are all associated with avidyā; Brahman as reflected in māyā and avidyā is the cause of the world (māyā-vidyā-pratibimbam brahma jagat-kāranaṁ); pure Brahman is immortal, and individual souls are associated with avidyā; individual souls have their own illusions of the world, and these through similarity appear to be one permanent world; Brahman undergoes an apparent transformation through His own avidyā. But in none of these views is the world regarded as a real emanation from Brahman. Pañca-pādikā-vivarana, p. 232.

Regarding the question as to how Brahman could be the cause of beginning-less Vedas, Prakāśātman explains it by supposing that Brahman was the underlying reality by which all the Vedas imposed on it were manifested. Ibid. pp. 203, 231.

3 kiṃ punas tat-karma? yat prāg-utpattar Īsvara-jñānasya viśayo bhavatitī. tattvāntvātvaḥbhāyām anirvacanīte nāma-rūpe avyākṛte vyācikṛṣite iti brūmaḥ. Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, 1. 1. 5.
One of the reasons adduced for the falsity of the world of effects is that the effects do not last. This does not prove their falsehood, but only their destructible or non-eternal nature (anityatva). When a thing apparently existing in a particular time and space is found to be non-existing at that time or in that space, then it is said to be false; but, if it is found to be non-existing at a different place and at a different time, it cannot be called false, it is only destructible or non-eternal. It is wrong to suppose that a cause cannot suffer transformation; for the associations of time, space, etc., are new elements which bring in new factors which would naturally cause such transformation. The effect-thing is neither non-existent nor an illusion; for it is perceived as existing in a definite time and place after its production from the cause until it is destroyed. There is nothing to show that such a perception of ours is wrong. All the scriptural texts that speak of the world’s being identical with Brahman are true in the sense that Brahman alone is the cause of the world and that the effect is not ultimately different from the cause. When it is said that a jug is nothing but clay, what is meant is that it is the clay that, in a specific and particular form or shape, is called a jug and performs the work of carrying water or the like; but, though it does so, it is not a different substance from clay. The jug is thus a state of clay itself, and, when this particular state is changed, we say that the effect-jug has been destroyed, though the cause, the clay, remains the same. Production (utpatti) means the destruction of a previous state and the formation of a new state. The substance remains constant through all its states, and it is for this reason that the causal doctrine, that the effect exists even before the operation of causal instruments, can be said to be true. Of course, states or forms which were non-existent come into being; but, as the states have no existence independently from the substance in which they appear, their new appearance does not affect the causal doctrine that the effects are already in existence in the cause. So the one Brahman has transformed Himself into the world, and the many souls, being particular states of Him, are at once one with Him and yet have a real existence as His parts or states.

The whole or the Absolute here is Brahman, and it is He who has for His body the individual souls and the material world. When Brahman exists with its body, the individual souls and the material world in a subtler and finer form, it is called the “cause” or Brah-
man in the causal state (kāraṇāvasthā). When it exists with its body, the world and souls in the ordinary manifested form, it is called Brahmā in the effect state (kāryāvasthā)¹. Those who think that the effect is false cannot say that the effect is identical with the cause; for with them the world which is false cannot be identical with Brahmā which is real². Rāmānuja emphatically denies the suggestion that there is something like pure being (san-mātra), more ultimately real than God the controller with His body as the material world and individual souls in a subtler or finer state as cause, as he also denies that God could be regarded as pure being (san-mātra); for God is always possessed of His infinite good qualities of omniscience, omnipotence, etc. Rāmānuja thus sticks to his doctrine of the twofold division of matter and the individual souls as forming parts of God, the constant inner controller (antar-yāmin) of them both. He is no doubt a sat-kārya-vādin, but his sat-kārya-vāda is more on the Sāṃkhya line than on that of the Vedānta as interpreted by Śaṅkara. The effect is only a changed state of the cause, and so the manifested world of matter and souls forming the body of God is regarded as effect only because previous to such a manifestation of these as effect they existed in a subtler and finer form. But the differentiation of the parts of God as matter and soul always existed, and there is no part of Him which is truer or more ultimate than this. Here Rāmānuja completely parts company with Bhāskara. For according to Bhāskara, though God as effect existed as the manifested world of matter and souls, there was also God as cause, Who was absolutely unmanifested and undifferentiated as pure being (san-mātra). God, therefore, always existed in this His tripartite form as matter, soul and their controller, and the primitive or causal state and the state of dissolution meant only the existence of matter and souls in a subtler or finer state than their present manifest form. But Rāmānuja maintains that, as there is difference between the soul and the body of a person, and as the defects or deficiencies of the body do not affect the soul, so there is a marked difference between God, the Absolute controller, and His body, the individual souls and the world of matter, and the defects

¹ Śrī-bhāṣya, pp. 444, 454, Bombay ed., 1914.
² This objection of Rāmānuja, however, is not valid; for according to it the underlying reality in the effect is identical with the cause. But there is thus truth in the criticism, that the doctrine of the "identity of cause and effect" has to be given a special and twisted meaning for Śaṅkara's view.
of the latter cannot therefore affect the nature of Brahman. Thus, though Brahman has a body, He is partless (niravasya ava) and absolutely devoid of any *karma*; for in all His determining efforts He has no purpose to serve. He is, therefore, wholly unaffected by all faults and remains pure and perfect in Himself, possessing endless beneficial qualities.

In his *Vedārtha-samgraha* and *Vedānta-dīpa*, Rāmānuja tried to show how, avoiding Śaṅkara’s absolute monism, he had also to keep clear of the systems of Bhāskara and of his own former teacher Yādavaprakāśa. He could not side with Bhāskara, because Bhāskara held that the Brahman was associated with various conditions or limitations by which it suffered bondage and with the removal of which it was liberated. He could also not agree with Yādavaprakāśa, who held that Brahman was on the one hand pure and on the other hand had actually transformed itself into the manifold world. Both these views would be irreconcilable with the Upaniṣadic texts.

**Veṅkaṭanātha’s treatment of *pramāṇa*.

As the nihilistic Buddhists (*śūnya-vāda* or *mādhyamika*) are supposed to deny the valid existence of any fact or proposition, so the Śaṅkarites also may be supposed to suspend their judgment on all such questions. In the preliminary portions of his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khaḍya*, in answer to the question whether all discussions (*kathā*) must presuppose the previous admission of validity and invalidity as really referring to facts and propositions, Śriharṣa says that no such admission is indispensable; for a discussion can be conducted by the mutual agreement of the contending persons to respect certain principles of reality or unreality as decided by the referee (*madhyastha*) of the debate, without entering into the question of their ultimate validity. Even if validity or invalidity of certain principles, facts, or propositions, were admitted, then also the mutual agreement of the contending persons to these or other principles, as ruled by the referee, would be an indispensable preliminary to all discussions¹. As against these views Veṅkaṭanātha,

¹ *na ca pramāṇādānāṁ sattā pie ittham eva tābhyaṁ anāṅgharum ucitā; tārāva-vyavahāra-nīyama-mātreṇairo kāthā-pravṛttī-upapatteḥ. pramāṇādi-sattām abhyupetaya’pi tathā-vyavahāra-nīyama-vyatireke kāthā-pravṛttim vinā tatvā-nirnayasya jayasya vā abhilaśītasya kathakayor aparyavasāṁtī, etc. Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khaḍya, p. 35.*
the best-reputed philosopher of the Rāmānuja school, seeks to determine the necessity of the admission of validity (prāmāṇya) or invalidity (a-prāmāṇya) as naturally belonging to certain propositions or facts, as a preliminary to our quest of truth or objective and knowable facts. If the distinction of valid and invalid propositions is not admitted, then neither can any thesis be established, nor can practical affairs run on. But, though in this way the distinction between valid and invalid propositions has to be admitted on the basis of its general acceptance by people at large, yet their real nature has still to be examined. Those who deny such a distinction can have four alternative views, viz. that all propositions are valid, that all propositions are invalid, that all propositions mutually contradict one another, or that all propositions are doubtful. If all propositions are valid, then the negation of such a proposition is also valid, which is self-contradictory; if they are all invalid, then even such a proposition is invalid and hence no invalidity can be asserted. As to the third alternative, it may be pointed out that invalid propositions can never contradict the valid ones. If one valid proposition restricts the sphere of another valid proposition, this does not mean contradiction. A valid proposition has not to depend on other propositions for making its validity realized; for a valid proposition guarantees its own validity. Lastly, if you doubt everything, at least you do not doubt that you doubt; so then you are not consistent in saying that you doubt everything; for at least in one point you are certain, viz. that you doubt everything. Thus it has to be admitted that there are two classes of propositions, valid and invalid. But, though the general distinction between valid and invalid propositions be admitted, yet proper inquiry, investigation, or examination, is justified in attempting to determine whether any particular proposition is valid or invalid. That only is called a pramāṇa which leads to valid knowledge. In the case of perception, for example, those which would lead to valid knowledge would be defectless eyes, mind-contact as attention, proper proximity of the object, etc., and these would jointly constitute pramāṇa. But in the

1 This remark naturally reminds one of Descartes—sarvam sandhyam iti te nipunasayasti niścayaḥ, sanśayaś ca na sandhyah sandhīdāvaita-vādinaḥ. Nyāya-pariśuddhi. p. 34. Chowkhamba s.s.

2 A distinction is here made between karana-pramāṇya and āśraya-pramāṇya (pramāṇarasya tīvarasya pramāṇam anigkṛtaṁ). Nyāya-sāra commentary on Nyāya-pariśuddhi by Śrīnīvāsa, p. 35.
case of testimony it is the faultlessness of the speaker that constitutes the validity of the knowledge. The scriptures are valid because they have been uttered by God, Who has the right knowledge of things. The validity of the Vedas is not guaranteed by absence of defect in our instruments of knowledge. Whatever that may be, the ultimate determination of pramāṇa is through pramāṇa, or right knowledge. That by which one can have right knowledge is pramāṇa. Vedas are valid, because they are uttered by God, Who has right knowledge. So it is the rightness of knowledge that ultimately determines the validity of pramāṇa.

Vātsya Śrīnīvāsa, a successor of Veṅkatanātha of the Rāmānuja school, defines pramāṇa as the most efficient instrument amongst a collocation of causes forming the immediate, invariable and unconditional antecedents of any right knowledge (pramāṇa). Thus, in the case of perception, for example, the visual organ is a pramāṇa which leads to right visual knowledge, through its intermediary active operation (avāntara-vyāpāra)—the sense-contact of the eye with its objects. Jayanta, the celebrated Nyāya writer, had, however, expressed a different view on the point in his Nyāya-maṭijāri. He held that no member in a collocation of causes producing the effect could be considered to be more efficient or important than the other members. The efficiency (atiśaya) of the causal instruments means their power of producing the effect, and that power belongs to all the members jointly in the collocation of causes; so it is the entire collocation of causes producing right knowledge that is to be admitted as its instrument or pramāṇa. Even subject and object cannot be regarded as more important; for they manifest themselves only through the collocating causes producing the desired relation between the subject and the object. With Nyāya this

1 karaṇa-pramāṇyasya āśraya-pramāṇyasya ca jñāna-pramāṇyā-dhīna-jñāna-
2 pramāṇa-karanam pramāṇam ity uktam ācāryaiḥ siddhānta-sāre pramo-
tpādaka-sāmagrī-madhye yad atiśayena pramāṇa-gūnakam tat tasyāḥ kāraṇam; atiśayai ca vyāpāraḥ, yad dhī yad janayitva eva yad janayet tat tatra tasyāvāntara-
vyāpāraḥ, sākhākāri-pramāṇā indriyoy kāraṇam indriyā-rtha-samyojog eva vāntara-
3 sa ca sāmagry-antar-gatasya na kasayaic ēkaya kāraṇasya kathayitum pāryte, sāmagryaś tu so tiśayaih svacchāḥ saṁhitiḥ cēt sāmagrī sampannam eva phalam iti. Nyāya-maṭijāri, p. 13.
4 sākalya-prasāda-labha-pramiti-sambandha-nibandhanah pramāṭy-pramey-
collocation of causes consists of ideational and non-ideational (bodhā-bodha-svabhāva) factors!

If the view of the Vedānta-paribhāṣā is to be accepted, then the Śaṅkarite view also is very much like the Rāmānuja view on this point; for both Dharmarājādādhvarinda and Rāmakṛṣṇa agree in defining pramāṇa as the instrument of right knowledge. In the case of visual perception or the like the visual or the other sense organs are regarded as pramāṇa; and the sense-contact is regarded as the operation of this instrument.

The difference between the Nyāya view and the Rāmānuja view consists in this, that, while the Nyāya gives equal importance to all members of the collocation, the Rāmānuja view distinguishes that only as the instrumental cause which is directly associated with the active operation (evāpāra). Even the Śaṅkarites agree with such a productive view of knowledge; for, though they believe consciousness to be eternal and unproduced, yet they also believe the states of consciousness (vṛtti-jñāna) to be capable of being produced. Both the Rāmānuja and the Śaṅkara beliefs accept the productive view of knowledge in common with the Nyāya view, because with both of them there is the objective world standing outside the subject, and perceptual knowledge is produced by the sense-organs when they are in operative contact with the external objects. A distinction, however, is made in the Rāmānuja school between kāraṇa (cause) and karana (important instrument), and that cause which is directly and intimately associated with certain operations leading to the production of the effect is called a karana. It is for this reason that, though the Rāmānuja view may agree regarding the sāmagrī, or collocation as causes, in some sense it regards only the sense-organ as the chief instrument; the others are accessories or otherwise helpful to production.

There are Buddhists also who believe that it is the joint collocation of mental and extra-mental factors of the preceding moment which produce knowledge and external events of the later moment; but they consider the mental factors to be directly producing knowledge, whereas the extra-mental or external objects are mere accessories or exciting agents. Knowledge on this view is determined

1 bodhā-bodha-svabhāva sāmagrī pramāṇam. Nyāya-maṅjari, p. 15.
a priori from within, though the influence of the external objects is not denied. With reference to the operation of causality in the external world, they believe that, though the mental elements of the present moment influence them as accessories, immediate causal operation is to be sought among the external objects themselves. The mental and extra-mental elements of the preceding moment jointly determine every phenomenon of the later moment in the world, whether mental or physical; but in the determination of the occurrence of knowledge, the mental factors predominate, and the external factors are accessories. In the determination of external phenomena mental elements are accessories and the external causes are immediate instruments. Thus, in the production of knowledge, though the specific external objects may be regarded as accessory causes, their direct and immediate determinants are mental elements.

The idealistic Buddhists, the vijnāna-vādins, who do not distinguish between ideas and their objects, consider that it is the formless ideas that assume different forms as "blue," "red," etc.; for they do not believe in any external objects other than these ideas, and so it is these ideas in diverse forms and not the sense-organs or other collocations which are called pramāṇas. No distinction is here made between pramāṇa and pramāṇa-phala or the result of the process of pramāṇa. They, however, fail to explain the difference that exists between the awareness and its object.

The Mīmāṁsaka school of Kumārila thinks that, following the soul-sense-mind-object contact, there is a process or an act (jñāna-vyāpāra) which, though not directly perceived, has to be accepted as an operation which immediately leads to the manifestation of objects of knowledge (artha-dṛṣṭatā or viśaya-prakāśatā). It is this unperceived, but logically inferred, act of knowledge or jñāna-

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The objection against this view as raised by Jayanta is this, that, if both mental and physical entities and events are determined by the joint operation of mental-physical entities of the preceding moments, we ask what determines the fact that one is mental and the other physical, that one is perceiver and the other perceived.

2 nirākārasya bodha-rūpasya nīla-pīttādy-aneka-visāya-sādhāraṇatvād jana-katvasya ca caṇḍur-ādāv api bhāvenātiprāsaṅgāt tad-ākārabhavam eva jñāna-karma-nīyamam acagaruchantah sākāra-vijnīnam pramāṇam... arthas tu sākāra-jñāna-vādino na samasty eva. Ibid. p. 16.
vyāpāra that is called pramāṇa. Jayanta, of course, would not tolerate such an unperceived operation or act of knowledge; for, according to Nyāya, the only kind of action that is accepted is the molecular motion or vibration (parispanda or calana) produced by a collocation of causes (kāraka-cakra).

The Jains, however, repudiate the idea of the combined causality of the collocation, or of any particular individual cause such as any sense-organ, or any kind of sense-contact with reference to sense-knowledge, or of any other kind of knowledge. Thus Prabhācandra contends in his Prameya-kamala-mārtanda that none of the so-called individual causes or collocations of causes can lead to the production of knowledge. For knowledge is wholly independent and self-determined in leading us to our desired objects or keeping us away from undesirable objects, and in no sense can we attribute it to the causal operation of the sense-organs or collocations of sense-organs and other entities. Thus knowledge (jñāna) should itself be regarded as pramāṇa, leading us to our desired objects.

The whole point in these divergent views regarding pramāṇas consists in the determination of the nature of the relation of the sense-organs, the objects and other accessory circumstances to the rise of knowledge. As we have seen, knowledge is in the Rāmānuja view regarded as the product of the operation of diverse causal entities, among which in the case of sense-perception the sense-organs play the most important, direct and immediate part. Both the Jains and the idealistic Buddhists (though they have important and most radical differences among themselves) agree in holding the view of self-determination of knowledge independent of the sense-organs or the operation of objective entities which become the objects of knowledge and are revealed by it.

1 nānyathā hy artha-sadbhāvo drṣṭaṁ sam upapadyate jñānam cennetyataḥ paścāt pramāṇam upajayate. Śloka-vārttika, Śūnya-vāda, 178.
Veṅkaṭanātha’s treatment of Doubt.

Veṅkaṭanātha defines doubt as the appearance of two or more alternatives (which are in themselves incompatible) owing to the non-perception of their specific contradictory qualities and the perception of some general characteristics common to them both; e.g. when a tall thing only is seen, which may be either a man or a stump, both of which it could not be, they being entirely different from one another. So the two alternatives are not to be entirely different, and from what is seen of the object it cannot be known that it must be the one and not the other, and this causes the doubt. Veṅkaṭanātha tries to justify this analysis of doubt by referring to other earlier authorities who regarded doubt as an oscillating apprehension in which the mind goes from one alternative to another (dolā-vegavat atra sphuraṇa-kramaḥ), since it would be contradictory that the same object should be two different things at the same time. The author of the Ātma-siddhi has therefore described it as the loose contact of the mind with two or more things in quick succession (bahubhir-yugapad a-dṛḍha-samyoγaḥ). Doubt may arise either from the apprehension of common characteristics—such as from tallness, whether the object perceived be a tree-stump or a man—or from not having been able to decide between the relative strength of the various opposite and different possibilities suggested by what is perceived or otherwise known (a-grhyamāna-bala-tāratamya-viruddha-neka-jñāpako-paṣṭhāpanam iha-vipratipattih). So, whenever there are two or more possibilities, none of which can be ruled out without further verification, there is doubt1.

1 The Nyāya analysis of doubt, as found in Vātsyāyana’s bhāṣya, 1. 11. 23, is as follows: When the common characteristics of two possible things are noticed, but not the specific quality which would decide for the one or the other, the anguish of the mind in determining or deciding in favour of the one or the other is called doubt. Doubt may also arise from conflicting opinions (vīpratipateh), e.g., some say that there is a soul, while others hold that there is no soul. Doubt may also arise from the perception of determining qualities (production through division, vibhāga-jatva) which a thing (e.g. sound) has in common with other things (e.g. substance, attributes, and actions). Doubt may arise from perception of things which may be illusorily perceived even when non-existent (e.g. water in mirage), out of a desire for certainty and also from a non-perception of things (which may yet be there, though non-evident), out of a desire to discover some traits by which one could be certain whether the thing was there or not. The special contribution of Venkaṭanātha consists in giving a general analysis of doubt as a state of the mind instead of the specification of the five specific forms of doubt. Venkaṭanātha points out that doubt need not be of five kinds only but
Thus, doubt arises between a true and a false perception as when I perceive a face in the mirror, but do not know whether it is a real face or not until it is decided by an attempt to feel it by touch. So, between valid and invalid inference, when I judge from smoke that the hill is on fire, and yet through not perceiving any light doubt that it is on fire; between opposition of scriptural texts, "jīva has been said to be different from Brahman and to be one with it," whether then the jīva is different from Brahman or one with it; between conflicting authorities (e.g. the Vaiśeṣika philosophers and the Upaniṣadic doctrines) such as "are the senses material or are they the products of the ego?" Between perception and inference (e.g. in the case of the illusory perception of yellow conch-shell, the perceiving of it as yellow and the inferring that it could not be yellow because it is a conch-shell and hence the doubt, whether the conch-shell is white or yellow, and so forth).

In referring to the view of Varadanārāyaṇa in his Prajñā-paritrāṇa, Venkaṭanātha says that the threefold division of doubt that he made, due to perception of common characteristics, apprehension of different alternatives, and the opposition of scholars and authorities, is in imitation of the Nyāya ways of looking at doubt1, for the last two forms were essentially the same. Venkaṭanātha further refutes the Nyāya view of doubt in which Vātsyāyana, in explaining Nyāya-sūtra, i. 11. 23, says that there can be doubt even from special distinguishing qualities. Thus, earth has smell as a distinctive characteristic which is not possessed either by eternal substances, such as self, or by non-eternal substances, such as water, etc.; and there can naturally be a doubt whether earth, being different from eternal substances, is non-eternal, or whether, being different from non-eternal substances, it is eternal. Venkaṭanātha points out that here doubt does not take place owing to the fact that earth possesses this distinguishing quality. It is simply because the possession of smell is quite irrelevant to the determination of eternity or non-eternity, as it is shared by both eternal and non-

can be of many kinds which, however, all agree in this, that in all states of doubt there is an oscillation of the mind from one alternative to another, due to the indetermination of the relative strength of the different possible alternatives on account of the perception of merely certain common characteristics without their specific determining and decisive features.

1 sādhāranā-kyte drṣṭyā'nekhā-kāra-grahāt tathā
vipaścitām vivādāc ca tridhā samāyā iṣyate.

Prajñā-paritrāṇa, quoted in Nyāya-pariṣuddhi, p. 62.
eternal substances. Doubt would continue until a distinguishing characteristic, such as is possessed by eternal or non-eternal substances alone, is found in earth (vyatireki-nirūpaṇa-vilambāt), on the strength of which it could be determined whether it is eternal or not. Venkatañātha, in various illustrations, shows that doubt consists essentially of an oscillation of the mind, due to indecision between two possible alternatives. He would admit even such inquiries as “What may be the name of this tree?” as doubt, and not mere indecision or want of knowledge (an-adhyavasāya). Such inquiries can rightly be admitted as doubts; for they involve doubt regarding two or more alternative names, which are vaguely wavering in the mind and which are followed by a desire to settle or decide in favour of one or the other. So here also there is a want of settlement between two alternatives, due to a failure to find the determining factor (avacchedā-darśanāt an-avacchimna-koṭi-višeṣaḥ). Such a state of oscillation might naturally end in a mental reckoning in favour of or against the possible or probable alternatives, which is called ūha (but which must be distinguished from ūha as tarka in connection with inference), which leads to the resolution of doubt into probability. However, Anantārya, a later writer of the Rāmānuja school, further described doubt as being a state of mind in which one perceived only that something lay before him, but did not notice any of its specific features, qualities or characters (puro-vṛtti-mātram a-grhita-višeṣaṇam anubhūyate). Only the two alternatives (e.g. “a tree stump or a man”—sthānu-puruṣau) are remembered. According to the Sarvārtha-siddhi, the imperfect observation of something before us rouses its corresponding subconscious impression (saṃskāra), which, in its turn, rouses the subconscious impressions leading to the simultaneous revival in one sweep of memory of the two possible alternatives of which neither could be decided upon. The point disputed in this connection is between a minority party of interpreters, who think that the perception of something in front of us rouses an impression which in its turn rouses two different subconscious impressions leading to

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one memory joining up the two alternative entities (e.g. tree-stump and man), and a majority party, who think that the perception of something in front of us leads directly to the memory of two different alternatives, which is interpreted as doubt. The former view, by linking up the two memories in one act of knowledge, supposes the oscillating movement to be one act of judgment and so holds the opinion that in doubt also there is the false substitution of one judgment for another, which is in accordance with the anyathā-khyāti (illegitimate substitution of judgments) theory of illusion. The latter view, which holds that there are two separate memories of the two possible alternatives, interprets Rāmānuja as an upholder of realism of knowledge (jñāna-yāthārtha-vāda), or the view that whatever is known or perceived has an objective and a real basis.

Error and Doubt according to Veṅkaṭanātha.

Error is defined by Veṅkaṭanātha as occurring when one or more incompatible characters are predicted of an entity without any notion of their incompatibility or contradictions. It is generally due to a wrong psychological tendency in association with other vicious perceptual data, as in the case of the perception of the conch-shell as yellow, the perception of one big moon as small and two, the relativistic (anekānta) assertion of contradictory predicates with reference to one thing or the predication of both reality and unreality in regard to world-appearance by the Śaṅkarites¹. Doubt, on the other hand, occurs when a perceived characteristic is not incompatible in predication with regard to two or more entities which are felt to be exclusive and opposed to one another, and which therefore cannot both at the same time be affirmed. This state is therefore described by some as an oscillatory movement of the mind from one pole to another. Decision results from a unipolar and firm direction of mind to one object; doubt results from a multipolar oscillation, as has been set forth in the Ātma-siddhi. Absence of firmness of the direction of the mind is due to the natural constitution of mind, which has necessarily to reject a particular alternative before it can settle down in its opposite. Bhaṭṭārakaguru repeats the same idea in his Tattva-ratnakara, when he defines

¹ See Nyāya-pariśuddhi, pp. 54-5.
doubt as the association of two contrary or contradictory qualities with any particular entity. Doubt, according to Veṅkaṭanātha, is of two kinds: from samāna-dharma and from vipratipatti, i.e. when different indications point to two or more conclusions and the relative strength of these indications cannot be conclusively decided. The condition of doubt in the first case is the uncertainty caused by the fact that two contrary possibilities, the relative strength of which cannot be determined on account of certain similar traits (samāna-dharma-vipratipattibhyām), claim affirmation. Thus, when we see something tall before us, two possibilities may arise—the tall object may be a man or a post, since both these are tall. When the relative strength of the different sources of knowledge, e.g. perception, illusion, inference, testimony, etc., leading to different conclusions (a-grhyamāṇa-bala-tāratamya) cannot be determined, both claim affirmation with regard to the same object or conclusion, and doubt arises as to which is to be accepted. Thus, when one sees in the mirror the image of one’s face, which is not corroborated by touch, there arises the doubt as to the reality of the reflection. Again, there may be a doubt arising from two possible inferences regarding the existence of fire in the hill from smoke, and its possible non-existence from the existence of light. Again, as there are texts in the Upaniṣads some of which are monistic and others dualistic, a doubt may arise as to which is the right view of the Upaniṣads, and so forth. Doubt may also arise from two opposing contentions, such as those of the atomists and the Upaniṣadists regarding the question as to whether the senses have sprung from matter or from the ego. It may also arise regarding the opposing assertions of two ordinary individuals; between perception (e.g. illusory perception of conch-shell as yellow) and inference which indicates that the conch-shell cannot be yellow; between perception of the self as an embodied being and the scriptural testimony concerning the self as atomic.

Doubt may also arise between inferential knowledge of the world as atomic and the scriptural knowledge of the world as having Brahman as its substance. The Naiyāyikas, however, think that doubt can also arise regarding the two different contentions of opposing parties\(^1\). Veṅkaṭanātha points out that both the Nyāya-

\(^1\) samāna-neha-dharmanopapattavipratipattau upalabdhy-anupalabdhy-avy-avasthātaēcavīśēṣa-pekṣovimarśah samāyayah. Nyāya-sūtra, 1. 1. 23. The in-
sūtra and the Prajñā-parātrāṇa are wrong in giving the perception of similar traits (samāna-dharma) and of special characteristics (aneka-dharma) as two independent reasons for the origin of doubt. The explanation given with regard to the doubt arising from a special characteristic such as odorousness is that, as this characteristic is not possessed by non-eternal substances, one may be led to think of including earth under eternal substances; and, again, as this characteristic is not to be found in any of the eternal substances, one may be led to include earth under non-eternal substances. But the doubt here is due not to the perception of a special characteristic, but to the delay of the mind in determining the ultimate differentia (vyatireki-nirupana-vilambat) which may justify one in including it under either of them. Odorousness as such is not an indispensable condition of either eternity, or non-eternity; so naturally an inquiry arises regarding such common features in eternal or non-eternal substances as may be possessed by the odorous earth and may lead to a classification. The doubt here is due not to the fact that odorousness is a special characteristic of earth, but to the fact that earth possesses such characteristics as are possessed by eternal things on the one hand and by non-eternal things on the other. Even when it is urged that the odorous character distinguishes earth from eternal and non-eternal substances, the interpretation given by Uddyotakara is that in all cases of doubt there are three factors, viz. knowledge of the (1) common or (2) special features, (3) opposite assertions and contending persons associated with a non-determinate state of mind due to the want of definite realization of any of the contrary possibilities, and a hankering to know the differentia. Uddyotakara thinks that doubt can arise not only from a conflict of knowledge, but also from a conflict of opinions of contending persons, vipratipattih being interpreted by him as vādi-vipratipattih. This view is also held by the Prajñā-parātrāṇa by Varadaviṣṇu Miśra, as is evident from the following śloka:

sadhārana-kṛtṛ drṣṭyā-nēkā-hāra-grahāt tathā,
viśācitām vivādāc ca triḍhā saṁśaya iyate.

Prajñā-parātrāṇa, quoted in the Nyāya-parśuddhi, p. 61.

This view is criticized by Venkaṭanātha as a blind acceptance of the Nyāya view.

As an example of doubt arising from perception of similar traits, Vātsyāyana gives the example of man and post, in which the common traits (viz. height, etc.) are visible, but the differentia remains unnoticed. The example given by him of doubt arising from perception of special characteristics is that odorousness, the special character of earth, is not characteristic of dravya (substance), karma (action), and guṇa (quality), and this may rouse a legitimate doubt as to whether earth is to be classed as substance, quality, or action. Similarly, from the special characteristic of odorousness of earth a doubt may arise as to whether earth is eternal or non-eternal, since no other eternal or non-eternal thing has this characteristic.
substances and that this is the cause of doubt, it may be pointed out that doubt is due not to this distinguishing characteristic, but to the fact that earth possesses qualities common to both eternal and non-eternal substances. There are some who think that doubt through vipratipatti (i.e. through uncertainty arising from reasoned assertions of contending persons) may also be regarded as a case of doubt from samāna-dharma (i.e. perception of similar traits), because the opposed assertions have this similarity amongst themselves that they are all held as true by the respective contending persons. Venkaṭanātha, however, does not agree with this. He holds that doubt here does not arise merely on the strength of the fact that the opposed assertions are held as true by the contending persons, but because of our remembering the diverse reasons in support of such assertions when the relative strength of such reasons or possibilities of validity cannot be definitely ascertained. Thus, vipratipatti has to be accepted as an independent source of doubt. Doubt arises generally between two possible alternatives; but there may be cases in which two doubts merge together and appear as one complex doubt. Thus, when it is known that one or other of two persons is a thief, but not which of them, there may be a doubt—“this man or that man is a thief”. In such a case there are two doubts: “this man may or may not be a thief” and “that man may or may not be a thief,” and these merge together to form the complex doubt (samśaya-devaya-samāhāra). The need of admitting a complex doubt may, however, vanish, if it is interpreted as a case where the quality of being a thief is doubted between two individuals. Doubt, however, involves in it also an assertory aspect, in so far as it implies that, if one of the alternatives is ruled out, the other must be affirmed. But, since it cannot be ascertained which of them is ruled out, there arises the doubt. There is, however, no opposition between doubt and the assertory attitude; for all doubts imply that the doubtful property must belong to one or other of the alternatives.

But there may be cases in which the two alternatives may be such that the doubtful property is not in reality affirmable of either of them, and this is different from those cases in which the alternatives are such that, if the doubtful property is negated of the one,

\[1 \text{ sarvasminn api samśaye dharmy-amśādau nirṇayasya dustyajatvāt. Nyāya-pariṣuddhi, p. 66.} \]
it is in reality affirmable of the other. From these two points of view we have further twofold divisions of doubt. Thus, when a volume of smoke arising from a heap of grass on fire is subject of doubt as being either an elephant or a hill, in this case negation of one alternative does not imply the actual affirmation of the other. Uncertainty (*an-adhyavasāya*, e.g. "what may be the name of this tree?") cannot be regarded as an independent state of mind; for this also may be regarded as a case of doubt in which there is uncertainty between a number of possible alternative names with which the tree may be associated. It seems, however, that Vēṅkaṭanātha has not been able to repudiate satisfactorily the view of those who regard uncertainty or inquiry as a separate state of mind. *Uha* (in the sense of probability such as "that must be a man") does not involve any oscillation of the mind between two poles, but sets forth an attitude of mind in which the possibility of one side, being far stronger, renders that alternative an object of the most probable affirmation and so cannot be classed as doubt. Where such a probable affirmation is brought about through perception, it is included under perception, and when through inference it is included under inference.

Vēṅkaṭanātha, following Rāmānuja, admits only three *pramānas*, viz. perception, inference, and scriptural testimony. Rāmānuja, however, in his commentary on the *Gītā*\(^1\), includes intuitive yogic knowledge as a separate source of knowledge; but Vēṅkaṭanātha holds that intuitive yogic knowledge should be included under perception, and its separate inclusion is due to the fact that the yogic perception reveals a special aspect of perception\(^2\). Correct memory is to be regarded as a valid *pramāṇa*. It should not be classed as an independent source of knowledge, but is to be included within the *pramāṇa* which is responsible for memory (e.g. perception)\(^3\).

Meghanādārī, in discussing the claim of memory to be regarded as *pramāṇa*, says that memory satisfies the indispensable condition of *pramāṇa* that it must not depend upon anything else for its self-manifestation; for memory, being spontaneous, does not depend

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2. Viśnucitta also, in his *Prameya-samgraha*, holds that Rāmānuja admitted only three *pramānas.*
3. This view has been supported by Bhaṭṭarakaguru in his *Tatvau-ratnakara*. Varadaviśnū Mīśra, in his *Prajñā-paritrāṇa*, includes *dītya* (i.e. intuitive knowledge through the grace of God) and *svayam-siddha* (natural omniscience) as separate sources of knowledge, but they are also but modes of perception.
upon anything else for its manifestation. It is true, no doubt, that the revelation of objects in memory depends upon the fact of their having been perceived before, but the functioning of memory is undoubtedly spontaneous\(^1\). But it may be argued that, since the objects revealed in memory can never be manifested if they were not perceived before, memory, though partly valid in so far as its own functioning is concerned, is also invalid so far as the revelation of the object is concerned, since this depends on previous perception and cannot, therefore, be regarded as spontaneous manifestation, which is the indispensable condition of a pramāṇa. To this Meghanādārī’s reply is that the criticism is not sound; for the spontaneous manifestation is also at the same time revelation of the object remembered, and hence the revelation of the remembered object does not depend on any other condition. Memory, therefore, is valid both in its own manifestation and in the revelation of its object. It may be pointed out in this connection that the revelation of knowledge necessarily implies the revelation of the object also. The revelation of the object should not, therefore, be regarded as depending on any other condition, it being spontaneously given with the revelations of knowledge\(^2\).

In many other systems of philosophy the definition of a pramāṇa involves the condition that the object apprehended should be such that it was not known before (an-adhigatā-rtha-gantr), since in these systems memory is excluded from the status of pramāṇa. Meghanādārī objects to this. He says that the condition imposed does not state clearly whether the apprehension of the object which is intended to be ruled out should be of the perceiver or of other persons. In the case of permanent objects such as the self or the sky these have all been perceived by many persons, and yet the validity of the perception or inference of the present knower is not denied\(^3\). It also cannot be said that the object of valid perception or inference should be such that it has not been perceived before by the present perceiver; for when a person seeks to find out an object which he knew before and perceives it, such a perception would be invalid; and similarly, when an object perceived by the eye is re-perceived

\(^2\) jñāna-sphūrtivad viśaya-sphūrtih. Ibid.
\(^3\) sthāyiteṇā-balātā-kāśā-deḥ pūrvair avagatata-sambhavāt tad-viśaya-nimānāder aprāmāṇya-praśaṅgāt. Ibid.
by touch, the tactile perception will be invalid. The reply is often given (e.g. Dharmarājadhvarindra in his Vedānta- pari-bhāṣā) that, when an object known before is again perceived, it has a new temporal character, and so the object may be regarded as new and thus its later perception may be regarded as valid. Meghaṇadārī’s criticism against this is that, if the new temporal character can constitute the newness of the object, then all objects will be new, including memory. Hence there will be nothing which would be ruled out by the condition that the object must be new (an-adhigata-rtha-gantr).

There are others who hold that the validity of a pramāṇa of any particular sense-knowledge, or of inference, is conditioned by the fact of its being attested by the evidence of other senses, as in the case where a visual perception is corroborated by the tactile. These philosophers regard corroboration (a-visaṃdvāditva) as an indispensable condition of the validity of pramāṇa. Meghaṇadārī criticizes this by pointing out that on such a view the validity of each pramāṇa would have to depend upon others, and thus there would be a vicious circle. Moreover, the determinate knowledge of the Buddhists, which is corroborative, would, under the supposition, have to be regarded as a pramāṇa.

Unlike Veṇkaṭaṇātha, Meghaṇadārī holds that Rāmānuja admitted five pramāṇas, viz. perception, inference, analogy, scripture and implication.

Perception is defined by Veṇkaṭaṇātha as direct intuitive knowledge (sāksātkāri-pramāṇa). This may be regarded either as a special class of cognition (jāti-rūpa) or knowledge under special conditions (upādhi-rūpa). It is indefinable in its own nature, which can only be felt by special self-consciousness as perception (jñāna-svabhāva-visēṣaḥ svātma- sākṣikāḥ). It may be negatively defined as knowledge which is not generated by other cognitions, as in the case of inference or verbal knowledge and memory. Varadaviṣṇu also, in his Māna-yāthātya-nirṇaya, has defined perception as clear and

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2 pramāṇa-ntarasyā- pyavisamvādā-rtham pramāṇa-ntarā-neṣeṇena-navasthā. Ibid.

3 jñāna-karana-jñāna-smṛti-rahitā matir aparokṣam. Veṇkaṭaṇātha’s Nyāya-parisuddhi, pp. 70–71. This view has also been supported in the Prameya-saṅgraha and Tattva-ratnakara.
vivid impression (*pramāyā āparokṣyam nāma viśādā-vabhāsatvam*). Clearness and vividness with him mean the illumination of the special and unique features of the object, as different from the appearance of generic features as in the case of inference or verbal knowledge.

Meghanādārī also defines perception as direct knowledge of objects (*arthā-paricchedaka-sākṣāj-jñānam*). The directness (*sākṣāttvam*) consists in the fact that the production of this knowledge does not depend on any other *pramānas*. It is, no doubt, true that sense-perception depends upon the functioning of the senses, but this is no objection; for the senses are common causes, which are operative as means in the perception of the *hetu*, even in inference. The directness of perceptual knowledge, as distinguished from inference, is evident from the fact that the latter is produced through the mediacy of other cognitions. Meghanādārī criticizes the definition of perception as vivid impression (*viśādā-vabhāsa*), as given by Varadaviṣṇu Miśra, on the ground that vividness is a relative term, and even in inference there are different stages of vividness. Clearness of awareness, "*dhi-sphutatā*," also cannot be regarded as defining perception; for all awarenesses are clear so far as they are known. The definition of perception as sense-knowledge is also open to criticism; for in that case it would only apply to indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) knowledge, in which certain specific characters of the object are imprinted through the functioning of the senses, but which it did not carry further for the production of determinate knowledge (*savikalpa*).

Both Veṅkaṭanātha and Meghanādārī hold that the pure objective substance without any character or universals is never apprehended by sense-perception. Following Rāmānuja, they hold that objects are always apprehended with certain characters at the very first instance when they are grasped by the visual sense; otherwise it is difficult to explain how in the later instance they are apprehended in diverse characters. If they were not apprehended in the first instance, they could not have been known in the later

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1 *indriyānām satā-kāraṇatvena karanatvā-bhāvāt*. *Naya-dyu-mañi.*

2 The word *sākṣāttvam* is explained by some as *svarūpa-dhi* (its own awareness). But such an explanation is exposed to criticism; for even inferential knowledge reveals some features of the object. If *svarūpa* is taken to mean "nothing but the nature of the object," then the definition would not be applicable even to perception; for perception reveals not merely the object, but also its relation to other objects, and thereby transcends the limit of the object merely as it is.
instance in their fullness in a related manner. So it has to be admitted that they were all grasped in the first instance, but could not manifest themselves in their fullness in the short span of the first moment. In the Vedārtha-saṁgraha of Rāmānuja the determinateness of all perceptions has been illustrated by the case of their apprehension of universals at the first moment of perception. This has led some interpreters to think that the apprehension of determinate characters in the first moment of perception applies only to the universals on account of the fact that it involves the assimilation of many individuals in one sweep which must be started at the very first moment in order that it may be manifested in its full form in the second moment. But Meghanādārī holds that the apprehension of other characters also, such as colours, etc., has specific differences when the object is near or at a distance. This involves the grasping of diverse shades of colour in one colour-perception, and thus they also are apprehended at the first moment of perception, on the same grounds which led to the affirmation of the apprehension of universals at the first moment of perception.

It is objected that the concept of determinateness or relatedness (viśīṭatva) of all knowledge is incomprehensible and indefinable. What exist are the two relata and the relation. The relatedness cannot be identical with them or different; for we do not know "relatedness" as an entity different from the two relata and the relation. Also relatedness cannot be defined either as the manifestation of two entities in one cognition or the appearance of two cognitions without any break or interval; for in a concrete specific illustration, as in such awareness as "jug-and-pot," though two different cognitions have appeared without any break, they have not lost their unique separateness, as may well be judged by the duality implied in such awareness. Thus, there is no way in which the concept of determinateness, as distinguished from that of the relata and the relation, can be arrived at.

To this Meghanādārī's reply is that, in such a sentence as "bring a white cow," the verb refers to a qualified being, the "white cow," and not to the separate elements, "the whiteness" and "the cow." Both the relation and the relata are involved in the determinate conception, the "white cow." In contactual perception, such as "a man with a stick," the contactual relation is directly perceived. The conception of a determinate being is not thus dif-
Error and Doubt according to Venkaṭanātha

Different from the relation and the relata, but implies them. The relations and the relata thus jointly yield the conception of a determinate being. The unifying trait that constitutes determinateness is not an extraneous entity, but is involved in the fact that all entities in this world await one another for their self-manifestation through relations, and it is this mutual awaitedness that constitutes their bond of unity, through which they appear connectedly in a determinate conception. It is this mutual awaitedness of entities that contributes to their apprehension, as connected in experience, which is simultaneous with it, there being no mediation or arresting of thought of any kind between the two. The fact that all our perceptions, thoughts and ideas always appear as related and connected is realized in universal experience. All linguistic expressions always manifest the purport of the speech in a connected and related form. Had it not been so, communication of ideas through our speech would have been impossible.

Nirvikalpa knowledge is a cognition in which only some fundamental characters of the object are noted, while the details of many other characters remain unelaborated. Savikalpa knowledge, on the other hand, is a cognition of a number of qualities and characters of the object, together with those of its distinctive features by which its differentiation from other objects is clearly affirmed.

On the analogy of visual perception, the perception of other senses may be explained. The relation of *samavāya* admitted by the Naiyāyikas is discarded by the Rāmānuja view on account of the difficulty of defining it or admitting it as a separate category. Various relations, such as container and contained, contact and the like, are revealed in experience in accordance with the different directions in which things await one another to be related; and

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3. *viśiṣṭatva-dīḥ-viṣayatve ca teṣāṁ sāpeksatvāṁ ca yaugaṁpyāt tatra virāmā-prattiteh sāpeksatā siddhā ca.* Ibid.

Venkaṭanātha however defines savikalpa and nirvikalpa knowledge as "sa prayatvamaraśa-pratyakṣaṁ savikalpakaṁ" and "tad-rahitam prayatvam nirvikalpakaṁ." Nāya-parisuddhi, p. 77.
these determine the nature of various relations which are perceived in sense-experience. Veṅkaṭanātha also points out that the very same collocations (sāmagrī) that manifest the awareness of substance and attribute also manifest the awareness of relations; for, if the relations were not grasped at the first moment of perception, they could not originate out of nothing at the later moment. The relatedness being a character of entities, the awareness of entities necessarily means the awareness of relations.

**Perception in the light of elucidation by the later members of the Rāmānuja School.**

Rāmānuja and his followers admitted only three kinds of pramāṇas: perception, inference and scriptural testimony. Knowledge, directly and immediately experienced, is perception (sākṣāt-kāринī pramāṇa pratyākṣam). The special distinguishing feature of perception is that it is not knowledge mediated by other knowledge (jñānā-karaṇaka-jñānatvam). Perception is of three kinds: God's perception, perception of yogins, and perception of ordinary persons. This perception of yogins includes intuitive perception of the mind (mānasa-pratyakṣa) or perception of sages (ārṣa-pratyakṣa), and the yogi-pratyakṣa is due to the special enlightenment of yoga practice. Ordinary perception is said to be of two kinds, savikalpa, or determinate, and nirvikalpa, or indeterminate. Savikalpa pratyakṣa is the determinate perception which involves a spatial and temporal reference to past time and different places where the object was experienced before. Thus, when we see a jug, we think of it as having been seen at other times and in other places, and it is this reference of the jug to other times and other places, and the

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The nirvikalpaka is the knowledge involving the notion of certain positive features and rousing the subconscious memory resulting in the first moment of perception through the direct operation of the sense. Savikalpaka knowledge involves the noting of differences consequent upon the operation of memory. They are thus defined by Viśnucitta:

sāṃskāro-dbodha-sahakre-nādiya-janyam jñānam savikalpakaṁ iti eka-jātiyeṣu prathamā-pinda-grahānām dvitiyā-di-pinda-grahānēṣu prathamā-kṣa-saṅnipātam jñānam nirvikalpakaṁ iti.

And in the Tattva-ratnakara:

viśeṣanām stā-yoga-vyāśāttir avikalpake
savikalpe'nya-yogasya vyāśātīthi samjñinā tathā.

Nyāya-parisuddhi, p. 82.
associations connected with it as involved in such reference, that constitutes the determinate character of such perceptions, by virtue of which they are called *savikalpa*. A perception, however, which reveals the specific character of its object, say a jug as a jug, without involving any direct references to its past associations, is called indeterminate perception or *nirvikalpa jñāna*. This definition of *nirvikalpa* perception distinguishes the Rāmānuja conception of *nirvikalpa* knowledge from the types formulated by many other systems of Indian philosophy.

It is now obvious that according to Rāmānuja philosophy both the *savikalpa* and the *nirvikalpa* knowledges are differentiated and qualified in their nature, referring to objects which are qualified in their nature (*ubhaya-vidham api etad viśiṣṭa-viśayam eva*). Venkaṭa says that there is no evidence whatsoever of the existence of indeterminate and unqualified knowledge, at even its first stage of appearance, as is held by the Naiyāyikas; for our experience is entirely against them, and even the knowledge of infants, dumb persons, and the lower animals, though it is devoid of concepts and names, is somehow determinate since the objects stand as signs of things liked or disliked, things which they desire, or of which they are afraid. For if these so-called indeterminate perceptions of these animals, etc., were really absolutely devoid of qualitative colouring, how could they indicate the suitable attractive or repulsive behaviour? The Naiyāyikas urge that all attribute-substance-complex or determinate knowledge (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) must first be preceded by the knowledge of the simpler element of the attribute; but this is true only to a limited extent, as in the case of acquired perception. I see a piece of sandal to be fragrant; fragrance cannot be seen, but the sight of the colour, etc., of a piece of sandal and its recognition as such suggest and rouse the nasal impressions of fragrance, which is then directly associated with

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2. *ekasyąm vyaktau ghatatva-prakāram ayaṁ ghaṭa iti yaj jñānam janye taṁ nirvikalpāṁ.* Ibid.
vision. Here there must first be the perception of the attributes of the sandal as perceived by the visual organ, as rousing sub-conscious impressions of fragrance associated with the nasal organ and giving rise to its memory, and finally associating it with the attributes perceived by the visual organ. But in the perception of attribute and substance there is no necessity of assuming such a succession of the elements constituting a complex; for the data which give rise to the perception of the attribute and those which give rise to the perception of substance are presented to the senses simultaneously and are identically the same (ekā-sāmagrī-vedya-viśeṣāṇeṣu tan-nirāpeksatvāt). The main point of this discussion consists in our consideration of the question whether relations are directly perceived or not. If relations are regarded as being the very nature of the things and attributes that are perceived (svārūpa-sambandha), then, of course, the relations must necessarily be perceived with the perceived things and attributes at the first moment of sight. If the relation of attributes to things be called an inherent inseparable relation (svāvaśya), then this, being an entity, may be admitted to be capable of being grasped by the eye; and, since it constitutes the essence of the linking of the attributes and the thing, the fact that it is grasped by the eye along with the thing and the attribute ought to convince us that the relatedness of attribute and thing is also grasped by the eye. For, if it is admitted that svāvaśya is grasped, then that itself makes it unexceptionable that the attribute and things are grasped, as the former qualifying the latter. Like the attribute and the thing, their relation as constituting their relatedness is also grasped by the senses (dharma-veda dharma-vac ca tat-sambandhasya-py aindriyakatvā-viśeṣena grahaṇa-sambhavāt).

For, if the relation could not be grasped by the senses at the time of the perception of the thing and the object, it could not be grasped by any other way at any other time.

In the savikalpa perception, the internal impressions are roused in association with the visual and other senses, and they co-operate with the data supplied by the sense-organs in producing the inner act of analysis and synthesis, assimilation and differentiation, and

2 Ibid. p. 79.
mutual comparison of similar concepts, as involved in the process of savikalpa perception. What distinguishes it from memory is the fact that memory is produced only by the rousing of the subconscious impressions of the mind, whereas savikalpa perception is produced by the subconscious impressions (samskāra) working in association with the sense-organs. Though the roused subconscious impressions co-operate with sense-impressions in savikalpa perception, yet the savikalpa can properly be described as genuine sense-perception.

It may be pointed out in this connection that difference is considered in this system not as a separate and independent category, but as apprehended only through the mutual reference to the two things between which difference is realized. It is such a mutual reference, in which the affirmation of one makes the affirmation of the other impossible, that constitutes the essence of “difference” (bheda).

Veṅkaṭanātha strongly controverts the Śaṅkarite view of nirvikalpa pratyakṣa in the case where a perception, the materials of which are already there, is made on the strength of auditory sensation in the way of scriptural instructions. Thus, when each of ten persons was counting upon leaving himself out of consideration, and counting nine persons instead of ten, another observer from outside pointed out to the counting person that he himself was the tenth. The Śaṅkarites urge that the statement or affirmation “thou art the tenth” is a case of direct nirvikalpa perception. But Veṅkaṭanātha points out that, though the entity indicated by “thou” is directly perceived, the proposition itself cannot be directly perceived, but can only be cogitated as being heard; for, if whatever is heard can be perceived, then one can also perceive or be directly acquainted with the import of such propositions as “thou art virtuous”—dharmavāṁs tvam. So the mental realization of the import of any proposition does not mean direct acquaintance by perception. It is easy to see how this view controverts the Śaṅkarite position, which holds that the realization of the import of the proposition “thou art that”—tat tvam asi—constitutes direct ac-

quaintance with the identity of self and Brahman by perception (pratyakṣa)\(^1\).

It has already been pointed out that nirvikalpa perception means a determinate knowledge which does not involve a reference to past associations of similar things (anuvṛtty-avīśayaka-jñāna), and savikalpa perception means a determinate knowledge which involves a reference to past association (anuvṛtti-विशयaka). This anuvṛtti, or reference to past association, does not mean a mere determinateness (e.g. the perception of a jug as endowed with the specific characteristics of a jug—gyata-प्रकारकम ayaṃ ghatāḥ), but a conscious reference to other similar objects (e.g. jugs) experienced before. In savikalpa knowledge there is a direct perception by the visual organ of the determinate characters constituting a complex of the related qualities, the thing and the relatedness; but that does not mean the comprehension or realization of any universals or class concepts involving a reference to other similar concepts or things. Thus, the visual organs are operative equally in savikalpa and nirvikalpa, but in the former there is a conscious reference to other similar entities experienced before.

The universals or class concepts are not, however, to be regarded as a separate independent category, which is comprehended in savikalpa perception, but a reference or assimilation of similar characteristics. Thus, when we refer to two or more cows as possessing common characteristics, it is these common characteristics existing in all individual cows that justify us in calling all these animals cows. So, apart from these common characteristics which persist in all these individual animals, there is no other separate entity which may be called jāti or universal. The commonness (anuvṛtti) consists in similarity (सूचक्षत्वमeva gotvā-दिनाम anuvṛttih)\(^2\). Similarity is again defined as the special cause (आसधिरान-कारण) which justifies our regarding two things as similar which exist separately in these things and are determined by each other. The application of a common name is but a short way of signifying the fact that two things are regarded as similar. This similarity is of two kinds: similarity of attributes (धर्मासधिर्या) as in substances, and similarity of essence (स्वारुपासधिर्या)

\(^1\) atā eva tat tvam-asy-ādi-सङ्गदध वा-विशया-रज्ञामप्रत्यक्षा-jñāna-janakah... ity-ादिजुसमास्वाज्ञानम निरस्ताम. Nyāya-परिशुध्दि, p. 89.

\(^2\) ayaṁ sāsād Vimān ayaṁ api sāsād Vimān iti sāsādir eva anuvṛttā-यववाहारविशयो ध्ययते. Rāmānuja-siddhānta-saṁgraha, MS. No. 4988.
as in all other categories of qualities which are not substance (a-dravya)\(^1\).

In perception two kinds of sense-contact are admitted: sense-contact with the object (samyoga) and sense-contact with the qualities associated with the object (samyuktā-śraya). Thus, the perception of a jug is by the former kind of contact, and the perception of its qualities is by the latter\(^2\).

### Venkatanātha’s treatment of Inference.

Inference according to the Rāmānuja school is very much the same as inference according to the Naiyāyikas. Inference is the direct result of parāmarśa, or knowledge of the existence of reason (associated with the knowledge of its unblemished and full concomitance with the probandum) in the object denoted by the minor term\(^3\). Inference is a process by which, from a universal proposition which includes within it all the particular cases, we can make an affirmation regarding a particular case.\(^4\) Inference must therefore be always limited to those cases in which the general proposition has been enunciated on the basis of experience derived from sensible objects and not to the affirmation of ultra-sensual objects—a reason which precludes Rāmānuja and his followers from inferring the existence of Īśvara (God), who is admitted to be ultra-sensual (atindriya) (ata eva ca vayam atyantā-tīndriya-vastv-anumānam nechāmah)\(^5\).

As formulated by the traditional view of the school, the principle of concomitance (vyāpti) holds that what in the range of time or space is either equal or less than another is called the “pervaded” (vyāpya) or the hetu, while that which in the range of time or space is either equal or greater than it, is called vyāpaka or the probandum\(^6\). But this view does not cover all cases of valid con-

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\(^1\) MSS. No. 4988.

\(^2\) The sense-contact with remote objects can take place in the case of the visual and the auditory organs by means of a mysterious process called tṛṭṭī. It is supposed that these senses are lengthened as it were (āpyāyamāna) by means of their objects. *Ibid.*

\(^3\) parāmarśa-janyā pramitir anumitiḥ. *Ibid.*


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comitance. The example given for spatial and temporal co-existence is that between date-juice (rasa) and sweetness (guda), or between the shadow thrown by our bodies and the specific position of the Sun. But such spatio-temporal co-existences do not exhaust all cases, as, for example, the sunset and the surging of the sea. This led the later Rāmānujas to adopt a stricter definition of comitance as unconditional and invariable association (nirupā-
dhikatayā niyataḥ sambandho vyāptih)\(^1\).

Regarding the formation of this inductive generalization or comitance, we find in Tattva-ratnakara, an older authority, that a single observation of comitance leading to a belief is sufficient to establish a general proposition\(^2\). But Veṅkaṭanātha urges that this cannot be so and that a wide experience of comitance is indispensable for the affirmation of a general proposition of comitance.

One of the important points in which Rāmānuja logic differs from the Nyāya logic is the refusal on the part of the former to accept kevala-vyatireki (impossible-positive) forms of inference, which are admitted by the latter. Thus, in the kevala-vyatireki forms of inference (e.g. earth is different from other elements on account of its possession of smell) it is argued by the Nyāya logic that this difference of earth with other elements, by virtue of its possession of the specific property of smell not possessed by any other element, cannot be proved by a reference to any proposition which embodies the principle of agreement in presence anvaya. This view apparently seems to have got the support of the earlier Rāmānuja logicians such as Varadaviśu Maśra and Bhaṭṭāракa-guru (in his Tattva-ratnakara); but both Veṅkaṭanātha (in his Nyāya-pari-
śuddhi) and the author of the Rāmānuja-siddhānta-saṅgraha point

\[1\] Nyāya-pariśuddhi.

\[2\] Nyāya-pariśuddhi, sambandho’yam sakṛd grāhyoh pratiti-sva-rasāt tathā pratītayo hi sva-rasād dharma-dharmy-avadhīn viduh. Tattva-ratnakara MS.

The author of the Tattva-ratnakara urges that, since the class-concept (e.g. of dhūma-dhūmatva) is associated with any particular instance (e.g. of smoke), the experience of any comitance of smoke and fire would mean the comprehension of the concomitance of the class-concept of smoke with the class-concept of fire. So through the experience of any individual and its class-concept as associated with it we are in touch with other individuals included within that class-concept —samnihitā-dhūmā-vidya-saṃyuktasya indriyasya tad-aśrita-dhūmatvādāh saṃyuktā-iritah, tad-aśrayatvena vyakty-antarāṇi saṃyuktāni, etc. Nyāya-
pariśuddhi, p. 105. (Chowkhamba.)
out that, since Yamuna rejects the *kevala-vyatireki* form of argument in his lecture on *Atma-siddhi*, it is better to suppose that, when the previous authors referred to spoke of *kevala-vyatireki* as a form of inference, it was not admission of their acceptance of it, but only that they counted it as being accepted by the Nyāya logicians¹. The author of the *Rāmānuja-siddhānta-samgraha* points out that it may very well be brought under *anvaya-vyatireki*. Thus we may argue "body is earthly by virtue of its possession of smell; for whatever possesses smell is earthly and whatever does not possess smell is not earthly." So in this form it may be put forward as a *anvaya-vyatireki* form of argument. The possession of smell (*gandhavattva*) may very well be put forth as "reason" or *hetu*, the presence of which determines earthiness and the absence of which determines non-earthiness or difference from non-earthiness.

Rāmānuja logic admits the necessity of "*tarka*" (cogitation regarding the relative possibilities of the alternative conclusions by a dialectic of contradictions) as an indispensable means of inferential conclusions. Regarding the number of propositions, Veṅkaṭanātha says that there is no necessity of admitting the indispensable character of five propositions. Thus it must depend on the way in which the inference is made as to how many propositions (*avayavā*) are to be admitted. It may be that two, three, four or five propositions are deemed necessary at the time of making an inference. We find it said in the *Tattva-ratnakara* also that, though five propositions would make a complete statement, yet there is no hard and fast rule (*aniyama*) regarding the number of propositions necessary for inference¹.

Veṅkaṭanātha urges that inference is always limited to perceptible objects. Things which entirely transcend the senses cannot be known by inference. Inference, though irrefragably connected with perception, cannot, on that account, be regarded as a mode of perception; for the knowledge derived from perception is always indirect (*a-parokṣa*). Inference cannot also be regarded as due to memory; for it always reveals new knowledge. Further, it cannot be said to be a form of mental intuition, on account of the fact that inference works by rousing the subconscious impressions of the mind; for such impressions are also found to be active in percep-

1 *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* and *Rāmānuja-siddhānta-samgraha*.
2 Ibid.
tion, and on that analogy even perception may be called mental intuition.

*Vyāpti* (concomitance) may be defined as that in which the area of the probandum (*sādhyā*) is not spatially or temporally less than *(a-nyūna-desa-kāla-vṛttī)* that of the reason, *hetu*—and reason is defined as that, the area of which is never wider than that of the probandum *(a-nadhik-desa-kāla-niyataṃ vyāpyam)*. As an illustration of spatial and temporal co-existence (*yaugapadya*) Veṅkaṭanātha gives the instance of sugar and sweetness. As an illustration of temporal co-existence *(yaugapadya)* he gives the example of the measure of the shadow and the position of the sun. As a case of purely spatial co-existence he gives the instance of heat and its effects. Sometimes, however, there is concomitance between entities which are separate in space and time, as in the case of tides and their relation to the sun and the moon.

Such a concomitance, however, between the probandum and the reason can be grasped only by the observation of numerous instances *(bhūyo-darsana-gamya)*, and not by a single instance, as in the case of Śaṅkara Vedānta as expounded by Dharmārajā-dhvarīndra. Bhaṭṭārakaguru, in his *Tattva-ratnakara*, in explaining the process by which the notion of concomitance is arrived at, says that, when in numerous instances the concomitance between the probandum and the reason is observed, the result of such observation accumulates as subconscious impressions in favour of the universal concomitance between all cases of probandum and all cases of the reason, and then in the last instance the perception of the concomitance rouses in the mind the notion of the concomitance of all probandum and all reason through the help of the roused subconscious impressions previously formed. Veṅkaṭanātha admits concomitance through joint method of Agreement and Difference *(anvyaya-vyatireki)* and by pure Agreement *(kevalā-nvayi)*, where negative instances are not available. Ordinarily the method of difference contributes to the notion of concomitance by demonstrating that each and every instance in which the probandum does not occur is also an instance in which the reason does not occur. But in the case of *kevalā-nvayi* concomitance, in which negative instances

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are not available, the non-existence of the reason in the negative instance cannot be shown. But in such cases the very non-existence of negative instances is itself sufficient to contribute to the notion of kevala-nvayi concomitance. The validity of kevala-nvayi concomitance is made patent by the fact that, if the reason remains unchanged, the assumption of a contrary probandum is self-contradictory (vyāhata-sādhyā-viparyayāt), and this distinguishes it from the forms of kevala-nvayi arguments employed by Kulārka in formulating his Mahā-vidyā doctrines.

Rāmānuja’s own intention regarding the types of inference that may be admitted seems to be uncertain, as he has never definitely given any opinion on the subject. His intention, therefore, is diversely interpreted by the thinkers of his school. Thus, Meghanādāri gives a threefold classification of inference: (1) of the cause from the effect (kāramā-numāna); (2) of the effect from the cause (kāryā-numāna); and (3) inference by mental association (anubhavā-numāna—as the inference of the rise of the constellation of Rohiṇi from the Kṛttikā constellation). As an alternative classification he gives (1) the joint method of agreement and difference (anvaya-vyatireki); (2) inference through universal agreement in which no negative instances are found (kevala-nvayi); and (3) inference through exclusion, in which no positive instances are found (kevala-vyatireki). Bhaṭṭārakaguru and Varadaviśṇu Miśra, who preceded Venkatanātha in working out a consistent system of Rāmānuja logic, seem also to admit the three kinds of inference, viz. anvaya, kevala-nvayi, and kevala-vyatireki, as is evident from the quotation of their works Tattva-ratnakara and Māna-yāthātmyanirṇaya. Venkatanātha, however, tries to explain them away and takes great pains to refute the kevala-vyatireki form of argument. His contention is that there can be no inference through mere negative concomitance, which can never legitimately lead to the affirmation of any positive character when there is no positive proposition purporting the affirmation of any character. If any such positive proposition be regarded as implied in the negative proposition, then also the contention that there can be inference from purely negative proposition fails. One of the conditions of validity

1 Venkatanātha points out that Yāmunācārya, also the accredited teacher of Rāmānuja, did not admit the kevala-vyatireki form of inference in his Siddhi-traya.
of inference is that the hetu or reason must exist in the sa-pakṣa (that is, in all such instances where there is the sādhyā), but in the vyatirekhī form of inference, where there are no positive instances of the existence of the hetu and the sādhyā excepting the point at issue, the above condition necessarily fails. The opponent might say that on the same analogy the kevalā-nyayī form of argument may also be denied; for there negative instances are found (e.g. idam vācyam prameyatvāt). The reply would be that the validity of a kevalā-nyayī form of argument is attested by the fact that the assumption of a contrary conclusion would be self-contradictory. If the contention of the opponent is that the universal concomitance of the negation of the hetu with the negation of the sādhyā implies the absolute coincidence of the hetu and the sādhyā, then the absolute coincidence of the hetu and the sādhyā would imply the absolute coincidence of the opposites of them both. This would imply that from the absolute coincidence of the hetu and the sādhyā in a kevalā-nyayī form of inference the absolute coincidence of their opposites would be demonstrable. This is absurd. Thus, the Naiyāikas, who admit the kevalā-nyayī inference, cannot indulge in such ways of support in establishing the validity of the kevala-vyatirekā form of argument. Again, following the same method, one might as well argue that a jug is self-revealing (sva-prakāśa) because it is a jug (ghatatvāt); for the negation of self-revealing character (a-sva-prakāśatvā) is found in the negation of jug, viz. the cloth, which is impossible (yan naivam tan naivam yathā pāṭah). Thus, merely from the concomitance of two negations it is not possible to affirm the concomitance of their opposites. Again, in the above instance—anubhūtīr anubhāgyaḥ anubhūtītvāḥ (immediate intuition cannot be an object of awareness, because it is immediate intuition)—even the existence of an-anubhāvyatva (not being an object of awareness) is doubtful; for it is not known to exist anywhere else than in the instance under discussion, and therefore, from the mere case of

1 The typical forms of vyatirekā inference are as follows: anubhūtīr anubhāgyaḥ anubhūtītvāḥ, yan naivam tan naivam yathā ghatah. prthivāḥ itarebhyaḥ bhidyate gandhavattvaḥ yan naivam tan naivam yathā jalam. In the above instance an-anubhāvyatva (non-cognizability) belongs only to immediate intuition. There is thus no sa-pakṣa of anubhūtī where an-anubhāvyatva was found before.

2 idam vācyam prameyatvāt (this is definable, because it is knowable) would, under the supposition, imply that the concomitance of the negation of vācyatva and prameyatva, viz. a-vācyatva (indefinable) and a-prameyatva (unknowable), would be demonstrable; which is absurd, since no such cases are known.
concomitance of the negation of *an-anubhāvyatva* with the negation of *anubhūti* the affirmation of *an-anubhāvyatva* would be inadmissible. Moreover, when one says that that which is an object of awareness (*anubhāvyata*) is not immediate intuition, the mere affirmation of the negative relation makes *anubhūti* an object of awareness in a negative relation, which contradicts the conclusion that *anubhūti* is not an object of awareness. If, again, the character that is intended to be inferred by the vyatireki *anumāna* is already known to exist in the *pakṣa*, then there is no need of inference. If it is known to exist elsewhere, then, since there is a *sa-pakṣa*¹, there is no *kevala-vyatireki* inference. Even if, through the concomitance of the negation of the *hetu* and the *sādhyā*, the *sādhyā* is known to exist elsewhere outside the negation of the *hetu*, its presence in the case under consideration would not be demonstrated. Again, in the instance under discussion, if, from the concomitance of the negation of not being an object of awareness and the negation of immediate intuition, it is argued that the character as not being an object of awareness (*a-vedyatva*) must be present somewhere, then such conclusion would be self-contradictory; for, if it is known that there is an entity which is not an object of awareness, then by that very fact it becomes an object of awareness. If an existent entity is ruled out from all possible spheres excepting one, it necessarily belongs to that residual sphere. So it may be said that “willing, being an existent quality, is known to be absent from all spheres excepting the self; it, therefore, necessarily belongs thereto.” On such an interpretation also there is no necessity of *vyatireki anumāna*; for it is really a case of agreement (*anvaya*); and it is possible for us to enunciate it in a general formula of agreement such as “an existent entity, which is absent from all other spheres excepting one must necessarily belong to that residual sphere.” Again, in such an instance as “all-knowingness (*sarva-vittva*), being absent in all known spheres, must be present somewhere, as we have a notion of it, and therefore there must be an entity to which it belongs, and such an entity is God,” we have the well known ontological argument which is of *vyatireki* type. Against such an inference it may well be contended with justice that the notion of

1 *sa-pakṣa* are all instances (outside the instance of the inference under discussion) where the *hetu* or reason is known to co-exist with the *sādhyā* or probandum.
a hare's horn, which is absent in all known spheres, must necessarily belong to an unperceived entity which is obviously false.

It may be contended that, if the vyatireki inference is not admitted, then that amounts to a denial of all defining characters; for a defining character is that which is absent everywhere except in the object under definition, and thus definition is the very nature of vyatireki inference. The obvious reply to this is that definition proceeds from the perception of special characteristics which are enunciated as the defining characteristics of a particular object, and it has therefore nothing to do with vyatireki inference\(^1\). It may also be urged that defining characteristics may also be gathered by joint method of agreement and difference, and not by a vyatireki inference as suggested by the opponents. In such an instance as where knowability is defined as that which is capable of being known, no negative instances are known but it still remains a definition. The definition of definition is that the special characteristic is existent only in the object under definition and nowhere else (a-sādhāraṇa-vyāpako dharma laksanam)\(^2\). In the case where a class of objects is defined the defining class-character would be that which should exist in all individuals of that class, and should be absent in all other individuals of other classes. But when an individual which stands alone (such as God) is defined, then we have no class-character, but only unique character which belongs to that individual only and not to a class. Even in such cases, such a defining character differentiates that entity from other entities (Brahmā, Śiva, etc.) with which, through partial similarity, He might be confused. Thus, the definition is a case of agreement of a character in an entity, and not a negation, as contended by those who confuse it with vyatireki inference. Therefore, the kevala-vyatireki form of inference cannot be supported by any argument.

On the subject of propositions (avayava) Veṅkaṭanāṭha holds that there is no reason why there should be five propositions for all inference. The dispute, therefore, among various logicians regarding the number of propositions that can be admitted in an inference is meaningless; for just so many propositions need be admitted for an inference as are sufficient to make the inference appeal to the

\[\text{arītha-sādhāraṇā-kāra-pratipatti-nibandhanam}\]
\[\text{saṣāṭṭya-tijāṭṭya-vyayavacchedena laksanam.}\]

\[^{1}\] Tattva-ratnākara, quoted in Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 143.

\[^{2}\] Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 145.
person for whom it may be intended. Thus, there may be three, four, or five propositions, according to the context in which the inference appears.

In addition to inference Veṅkaṭanātha also admits śabda, or scriptural testimony. No elaboration need be made here regarding the śabda-pramāṇa, as the treatment of the subject is more or less the same as is found in other systems of philosophy. It may be remembered that on the subject of the interpretation of words and sentences the Naiyāikas held that each single element of a sentence, such as simple words or roots, had its own separate or specific sense. These senses suffer a modification through a process of addition of meaning through the suffixes of another case-relation. Viewed from this light, the simple constituents of sentences are atomic, and gradually go through a process of aggregation through their association with suffixes until they grow into a total meaning of the sentence. This is called the abhihitā-nvaya-vāda. The opposite view is that of anvītā-bhidhāna-vāda, such as that of Mīmāṃsaka, which held that no sentence could be analysed into purely simple entities of meaning, unassociated with one another, which could go gradually by a process of aggregation or association. Into however simple a stage each sentence might be capable of being analysed, the very simplest part of it would always imply a general association with some kind of a verb or full meaning. The function of the suffixes and case-relations, consists only in applying restrictions and limitations to this general connectedness of meaning which every word carries with itself. Veṅkaṭanātha holds this anvītā-bhidhāna-vāda against the abhihitā-nvaya-vāda on the ground that the latter involves the unnecessary assumption of separate specific powers for associating the meaning of the simplest word-elements with their suffixes, or between the suffixed words among themselves and their mutual connectedness for conveying the meaning of a sentence\(^1\). The acceptance of anvītā-bhidhāna was conducive to the philosophy of Rāmānuja, as it established the all-connectedness of meaning (visiṣṭā-rtha).

Rāmānuja himself did not write any work propounding his views of logic consistent with his system of philosophy. But Nāthamuni had written a work called Nyāya-tattva, in which he criticized

\(^1\) abhihitā-nvaye hi padānām padā-rthe padā-rthānām vākyā-rthe padānām ca tatra iti śakti-traya-kalpanā-gauravāṃ syāt. Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 369.
the views of Gotama's logic and revised it in accordance with the *Viṣiṣṭa-dvaita* tradition. Viṣṇucitra wrote his *Sāṅgati-mālā* and *Prameya-samgraha*, following the same lines, Bhaṭṭārakaguru wrote his *Tattva-ratnakara*, and Varadaviśṇu Miśra also wrote his *Prajñā-paritrāṇa* and *Māṇa-yāthātmya-nirṇaya*, working out the views of *Viṣiṣṭa-dvaita* logic. Veṅkaṭanātha based his *Nyāya-parīṣuddhi* on these works, sometimes elucidating their views and sometimes differing from them in certain details. But, on the whole, he drew his views on the *Viṣiṣṭa-dvaita* logic from the above writers. His originality, therefore, in this field is very limited. Meghaṇādārī, however, seems to differ very largely from Veṅkaṭanātha in admitting *Upamāṇa* and *arthāpatti* as separate *pramāṇas*. He has also made some very illuminating contributions in his treatment of perception, and in his treatment of inference he has wholly differed from Veṅkaṭanātha in admitting *vyātireki anumāṇa*.

Meghaṇādārī admits *upamāṇa* as a separate *pramāṇa*. With him *upamāṇa* is the *pramāṇa* through which it is possible to have the knowledge of similarity of a perceived object with an unperceived one, when there was previously a knowledge of the similarity of the latter with the former. Thus, when a man has the knowledge that the cow which he perceives is similar to a bison, and when later on, roaming in the forest, he observes a bison, he at once notes that the cow which he does not perceive now is similar to a bison which he perceives. This knowledge, Meghaṇādārī contends, cannot be due to perception, because the cow is not before the perceiver; it also cannot be due to memory, since the knowledge of similarity dawns before the reproduction of the cow in the mind. Meghaṇādārī holds that no separate *pramāṇa* need be admitted for the notion of difference; for the knowledge of difference is but a negation of similarity. This interpretation of *upamāṇa* is, however, different from that given in Nyāya, where it is interpreted to mean the association of a word with its object on the basis of similarity, e.g. that animal is called a bison which is similar to a cow. Here, on the basis of similarity, the word "bison" is associated with that animal. Meghaṇādārī tries to explain this by the function of recognition, and repudiates its claim to be regarded as a separate *pramāṇa*¹. He also admits *arthāpatti* as a separate *pramāṇa*. *Arthāpatti* is generally translated as "implication," where a certain hypothesis, without the

¹ See MS. *Nyāya-dyu-mani*. Chapter on *Upamāṇa*. 
assumption of which an obscured fact of experience becomes inexplicable, is urged before the mind by the demand for an explanation of the observed fact of experience. Thus, when one knows from an independent source that Devadatta is living, though not found at his house, a natural hypothesis is urged before the mind that he must be staying outside the house; for otherwise either the present observation of his non-existence at his house is false or the previous knowledge that he is living is false. That he is living and that he is non-existent at his house can only be explained by the supposition that he is existing somewhere outside the house. This cannot be regarded as a case of inference of the form that “since somewhere-existing Devadatta is non-existent at his house, he must be existent somewhere else; for all somewhere-existing entities which are non-existent at a place must be existent elsewhere like myself.” Such an inference is meaningless; for the non-existence of an existing entity in one place is but the other name of its existing elsewhere. Therefore, the non-existence of an existing entity in one place should not be made a reason for arriving at a conclusion (its existence elsewhere) which is not different from itself. Arthāpatti is thus to be admitted as a separate pramāṇa.

Epistemology of the Rāmānuja School according to Meghanādāri and others.

Veṅkaṭanātha, in his Nyāya-pariśuddhi, tries to construct the principles of Logic (Nyāya or Nīti) on which Rāmānuja’s system of philosophy is based. He was not a pioneer in the field, but he followed and elaborated the doctrines of Viśiṣṭa-dvaita logic as enunciated by Nāthamuni, the teacher of Yāmuna, in his work called Nyāya-tattva, and the works of Parāśara Bhaṭṭa on the subject. Regarding the system of Nyāya propounded by Gotama, Veṅkaṭa’s main contention is that though Gotama’s doctrines have been rejected by Bādarāyana as unacceptable to right-minded scholars, they may yet be so explained that they may be made to harmonize with the true Vedantic doctrines of Viśiṣṭa-dvaita. But the interpretations of Gotama’s Nyāya by Vātsyāyana take them far away from the right course and have therefore to be refuted. At any rate Veṅkaṭa, like Viṣṇucitta, is not unwilling to accept such doctrines of Gotama as are not in conflict with the Vedānta view. Thus, there may be a divergence of opinion regarding the sixteenfold classi-
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ication of logical categories. There can be no two opinions regarding the admission of the fact that there are at least certain entities which are logically valid; for if logical validity is denied, logic itself becomes unfounded. All our experiences assume the existence of certain objective factors on which they are based. A general denial of such objective factors takes away the very root of experience. It is only when such objective factors are admitted to be in existence in a general manner that there may be any inquiry regarding their specific nature. If everything were invalid, then the opponent’s contention would also be invalid. If everything were doubted, then also it would remain uncontradictory. The doubt itself cannot be doubted and the existence of doubt would have to be admitted as a decisive conclusion. So, even by leading a full course of thoroughgoing doubt, the admission of the possibility of definite conclusion becomes irresistible. Therefore, the contention of the Buddhists that there is nothing valid and that there is nothing the certainty of which can be accepted, is inadmissible. If, therefore, there are things of which definite and valid knowledge is possible, there arises a natural inquiry about the means or instruments by which such valid knowledge is possible. The word *pramāṇa* is used in two senses. Firstly, it means valid knowledge; secondly, it means instruments by which valid knowledge is produced. *pramāṇa* as valid knowledge is defined by Venkaṭa as the knowledge which corresponds to or produces a behaviour leading to an experience of things as they are (*yathā-vasthita-vyavahāra-mugnam*). The definition includes behaviour as an indispensable condition of *pramāṇa* such that, even though in a particular case a behaviour may not actually be induced, it may yet be *pramāṇa* if the knowledge be such that it has the capacity of producing a behaviour which would tally with things as they are. The definition

1 vyavahāra hi jagato bhavaty ālbhane kvacit
na tat sāmānyato nāsti kathantā tu parīkṣayate
sāmānya-niścitā-rthena viśeṣe tu bhūhutsitam
parīkṣāḥ hy ucyātā sve-śta-pramāṇo-tpādanā-ṃtikā...

2 sarvam sandīghdham iti te nipunasyāstī niścayāḥ
saṃśayaḥ ca na sandīghdham sandīghdā-dvaita-ṛddhinaḥ.
Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 31 (Chowkamba edition).

3 anuguna-padaṃ vyavahāra-janana-śvarūpa-yogya-param tenājamita-vyavahāre yathā-rtha-jiśāna-viśeṣe nāveyāptih. Śrīnivāsa’s Nyāya-sāra on Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 36.
of pramāṇa as knowledge leading to a behaviour tallying with facts naturally means the inclusion of valid memory within it. An uncontradicted memory is thus regarded as valid means of knowledge according to the Rāmānuja system. Veṅkaṭa urges that it is wrong to suppose the illicit introduction of memory as the invariable condition of illusion, for in such illusory perception as that of yellow conch-shell, there is manifestly no experience of the production of memory. The conch-shell directly appears as yellow. So in all cases of illusions the condition that is invariably fulfilled is that one thing appears as another, which is technically called anyathā-khyāti. But it may as well be urged that in such an illusion as that of the conch-shell—silver, the reason why the conch-shell appears as the silver is the non-apprehension of the distinction between the subconscious image of the silver seen in shops and the perception of a shining piece before the eyes, technically called akhyāti. Thus, in all cases of illusion, when one thing appears as another there is this condition of the non-apprehension of the distinction between a memory image and a percept. If illusions are considered from this point of view, then they may be said to be primarily and directly due to the aforesaid psychological fact known as akhyāti. Thus, both these theories of illusion have been accepted by Rāmānuja from two points of view. The theory of anyathā-khyāti appeals directly to experience, whereas the akhyāti view is the result of analysis and reasoning regarding the psychological origin of illusions. The other theory of illusion (yathārtha-khyāti), which regards illusions also as being real knowledge, on the ground that in accordance with the pāṇcī-karana theory all things are the result of a primordial admixture of the elements of all things, is neither psychological nor analytical but is only metaphysical, and as such does not explain the nature of illusions. The illusion in such a view consists in the fact or apprehension of the presence of such silver in the conch-shell as can be utilized for domestic or ornamental purposes, whereas the metaphysical explanation only justifies the perception of certain primordial elements of silver in the universal admixture of the elements of all things in all things.

1. smṛti-mātrā-pramāṇatvam na yuktam iti vakṣyate
   abāḍhita-smṛtī-loke pramāṇatva-parirgrahāt.
   Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 38.

2. idaṁ rajatam anubhavāṁty ekāteṣvai'va prātyamāṇāyāḥ prattīrt
grahaṇa-smaraṇā-tmakatvam anekaṭvāṃ ca yuktītāḥ sādhyamānaṃ na pratiti-
In refuting the ātma-khyāti theory of illusion of the Buddhists, Veṅkaṭa says that if the idealistic Buddhist can admit the validity of the different awarenesses as imposed on the one fundamental consciousness, then on the same analogy the validity of the perceived objects may also be admitted. If the different subjective and objective awarenesses are not admitted, then all experiences would be reduced to one undifferentiated consciousness, and that would be clearly against the Buddhistic theory of knowledge. The Buddhist view that entities which are simultaneously apprehended are one, and that therefore knowledge and its objects which are apprehended simultaneously are one, is wrong. Knowledge and its objects are directly apprehended as different, and therefore the affirmation of their identity is contradicted in experience. The Mādhyaṃika Buddhists further hold that, just as in spite of the falsehood of the defects (dosa), illusions happen, so in spite of the falsehood of any substratum or any abiding entity, illusions may appear as mere appearances without any reality behind them. Against such a view, Veṅkaṭa says that whatever is understood by people as existent or non-existent has always a reference to a reality, and mere phenomena without any basis or ground on reality are incomprehensible in all our experience. Hence the pure phenomenalism of the Mādhyaṃika is wholly against all experience ¹. When people speak of non-existence of any entity, they always do it with some kind of spatial or temporal qualification. Thus, when they say that the book does not exist, they always qualify this non-existence with a “here” and a “there” or with a “now” or a “then.” But pure unqualified non-existence is unknown to ordinary experience ². Again all positive experience of things is spatially limited (e.g. there is a jug “here”); if this spatial qualification as “here” is admitted, then it cannot be held that appearances occur on mere nothing (nir-adhisthāna-bhramā-nupapatthyā). If, however, the limitation of a “here” or “there” is denied, then no experience is possible (pratīti apah年由 eva syāt).

Criticizing the a-nirvacaniya theory of illusion of the Vedāntists Veṅkaṭanātha says that when the Śaṅkarites described all things as

indefinable (*a-nirvacaniya*), the word "indefinable" must mean either some definite trait, in which case it would cease to be indefinable, or it might mean failure to define in a particular manner, in which case the Śaṅkarites might as well accept the Rāmānuja account of the nature of the universe. Again when the Śaṅkarites are prepared to accept such a self-contradictory category as that which is different both from being and non-being (*sad-asad-vyatirekah*), why cannot they rather accept things as both existent and non-existent as they are felt in experience? The self-contradiction would be the same in either case. If, however, their description of the world-appearance as something different from being and non-being is for the purpose of establishing the fact that the world-appearance is different both from chimerical entities (*tuccha*) and from Brahman, then Rāmānujists should have no dispute with them. Further, the falsity of the world does not of itself appeal to experience; if an attempt is made to establish such a falsity through unfounded dialectic, then by an extension of such a dialectic even Brahman could be proved to be self-contradictory. Again the assertion that the world-appearance is non-existent because it is destructible is unfounded; for the Upaniṣads speak of Brahman, the individual souls and the prakṛti as being eternal. The Śaṅkarites also confuse destruction and contradiction (*na cai'kyāṁ naśa-bādhayoh*)¹.

The followers of Patañjali speak of an illusory comprehension through linguistic usage in which we are supposed to apprehend entities which have no existence. This is called *nirvīṣaya-khyāti*. Thus, when we speak of the head of Rāhu, we conceive Rāhu as having an existence apart from his head, and this apprehension is due to linguistic usage following the genitive case-ending in Rāhu, but Veṅkaṭa urges that it is unnecessary to accept a separate theory of illusion for explaining such experience, since it may well be done by the akhyāti or anyathā-khyāti theory of illusion, and he contends that he has already demonstrated the impossibility of other theories of illusion.

Meghanādārī, however, defines pramāṇa as the knowledge that determines the objects without depending on other sources of knowledge such as memory².

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¹ *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*, pp. 48–51.
² "*tatrā'nya-pramāṇa-napekṣam artha-paričchedakam jñāṇam pramāṇam, artha-paricchede 'nya-pramāṇa-sāpekṣa-smṛtāv atisyāpti-parihāre 'nya-pramāṇa-napekṣam iti."* Naya-dyu-maṇi, Madras Govt. Oriental MS.
Though knowledge is self-revealing (sva-mūrtav api svayam eva hetuḥ), and though there is a continuity of consciousness in sleep, or in a state of swoon, yet the consciousness in these stages cannot reveal objects of cognition. This is only possible when knowledge is produced through the processes known as pramāṇa. When we speak of the self-validity of knowledge, we may speak of the cognition as being determined by the objects that it grasps (artha-paricchinnam pramāṇam). But when we speak of it from the perceptual point of view or from the point of view of its determining the objects of knowledge, we have to speak of knowledge as determining the nature of objects (artha-paricchedaha) and not as being determined by them. Knowledge may thus be looked at from a subjective point of view in self-validity of cognition (svatah-pramṛṇya). Then the self-validity refers to its content which is determined by the objects of comprehension. It has also to be looked at from the objective point of view in all cases of acquirement of knowledge and in our behaviour in the world of objects, and then the knowledge appears as the means by which we determine the nature of the objects and measure our behaviour accordingly. The definition of knowledge as that which measures the nature of objects (artha-pariccheda-kārī jñānam pramāṇam), as given by Meghanādārī is thus somewhat different from that given by Veṅkaṭa, who defines it as that which corresponds to or produces a behaviour leading to an experience of things as they are (yathā-vasthita vyavahāra-nugunam). In the case of Veṅkaṭa, knowledge is looked at as a means to behaviour and it is the behaviour which is supposed to determine the nature of correspondence. In Meghanādārī’s definition the whole question of behaviour and of correspondence is lost sight of, or at least put in the background. The emphasis is put on the function of knowledge as determining the objects. The supposition probably is that in case of error or illusion also the real object is perceived, and the illusion is caused through the omission of other details, a correct perception of which would have rendered the illusion impossible. We know already that according to the yathārtha-khyāti theory of Rāmānuja there are elements of all things in all things, according to the Upaniṣadic theory of “trīvṛt-karṇaṇa” and its elaboration in the pāṇcī-karṇaṇa doctrine. What happens therefore in illusion (e.g. the conch-shell-silver) is that the visual organ is in contact with the element of
silver that forms one of the constituents of the conch-shell. This element of silver no doubt is infinitesimally small as compared with the overwhelmingly preponderating parts—the conch-shell. But on account of the temporary defect of the visual organ or other distracting circumstances, these preponderating parts of the conch-shell are lost sight of. The result is that knowledge is produced only of the silver elements with which the sense-organ was in contact; and since the conch-shell element had entirely dropped out of comprehension, the silver element was regarded as being the only one that was perceived and thus the illusion was produced. But even in such an illusion the perception of silver is no error. The error consists in the non-perception of the preponderating part—the conch-shell. Thus, even in illusory perception, it is undoubtedly a real object that is perceived. The theory of anyathā-khyāti is that illusion consists in attributing a quality or character to a thing which it does not possess. In an indirect manner this theory is also implied in the yathārtha-khyāti theory in so far that here also the characters attributed (e.g. the silver) to the object of perception (purovarti vastu) do not belong to it, though the essence of illusion does not consist in that, and there is no real illusion of perception. Meghanādārī thus holds that all knowledge is true in the sense that it has always an object corresponding to it, or what has been more precisely described by Anantācārya that all cognitive characters (illusory or otherwise) universally refer to real objective entities as objects of knowledge.¹ We have seen that Veṅkata had admitted three theories of illusion, namely, anyathā-khyāti, akhyāti and yathārtha-khyāti, from three different points of view. This does not seem to find any support in Meghanādārī’s work, as he spares no effort to prove that the yathārtha-khyāti theory is the only theory of illusion and to refute the other rival theories. The main drift of Meghanādārī’s criticism of anyathā-khyāti consists in the view that since knowledge must always refer to an object that is perceived, it is not possible that an object should produce a knowledge giving an entirely different content, for then such a content would refer to no object and thus would be chimerical (tuccha).

only by the content of knowledge, and since such an object is denied in the case of illusory perception where we have such a knowledge, what is the guarantee that the object should be present in other cases? In those cases also it is the knowledge that alone should determine the presence of the object. That is to say, that if knowledge alone is to be the guarantor of the corresponding object, it is not right to say in two instances where such knowledge occurs that the object exists in one case and not in the other.

In refuting the anirvacanīya-khyāti Meghanādāri says that if it is supposed that in illusions an indefinable silver is produced which is mistaken for real silver, then that is almost the same as the anyathā-khyāti view, for here also one thing is taken as another. Moreover, it is difficult to explain how the perception of such an indefinable silver would produce the real desire for picking it up which is possible only in the case of the perception of real silver. A desire which can be produced by a real object can never be produced by a mere illusory notion. Nor can there be any similarity between a mere illusion and the real shining entity, viz. silver. The so-called indefinable silver is regarded either as being of the nature of being and non-being, or as different from being and non-being, both of which are impossible according to the Law of Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle. Even if it be admitted for the sake of argument that such an extra-logical entity is possible, it would be difficult to conceive how it could have any similarity with such a positive entity as ordinary silver. It cannot be admitted that this complex of being and non-being is of the nature of pure vacuity, for then also it would be impossible to conceive any similarity between a vacuum entity and real silver.

1 na ca tadbajjāne'stvūti vācyam. tad-ākārasaya satyatve bhāntitvā-nupapatthi asatve tu na tasya jñānā-kārata, tucchasya vaste-ākārata-nupapatteh. tad-ākāratve ca khyātir eva tuche'ti suktikādau na rajata-rthi-pravṛttiḥ. Meghanādāri, Naya-dyu-manī (MS.).

The general drift of Meghanādāri's theme may be summed up in the words of Anantācārya in his Jñāna-yāthārthiya-vāda (MS.) as follows: "tathā ca rajatacaṇaḥ svātī-nīṣṭha-vaśayata-vaçchedakatvā-bhāvavat svāti-avṛttatvā yad-avṛttih sa tan-nīṣṭha-dharma-nirūpitā-vaçchedakatvā-bhāvavan iti sāmāṇya-vyāptau danda-nīṣṭha-kāraṇata-vaçchedakatvā-bhāvavad danda-avṛtti ghatatvādaikāṁ drṣṭāntah."

2 "tasāṁ nīrācaya rajatacaṇaḥ grahanād viśārada-khyāta-pacca-paṭaḥ...sama-vyā-.rajata-dhīri prāçavṛtī-avitum...tasya praṭīty-ātmakā-vaśte-ātmakāyana bhās-varatvā-di-sādṝṣyā-bhāvaiḥ." Ibid.

3 ekasya yugapat sad-asadā-tmaṇaḥ dharmavatvā-nupapatteḥ. tad-upapatte api sādṝṣyā-nupapatteṣaḥ...sūnya-vastunī pramāṇā-bhāvāt. tat-sad-bhāvēpi tasya rajata-sādṝṣyā-bhāvāca tato na pravṛttiḥ. Ibid.
Again it is said that the illusory silver is called indefinable (anirvacaniya) because it is different from pure being such as the self which is never contradicted in experience (ātmano bādhā-yogāt) and from non-being such as the chimerical entities like the hare’s horn which can never be objects of knowledge (khyāty-ayogāt). But in reply to this it may very well be urged that the being of the self cannot itself be proved, for if the self were the object of knowledge it would be as false as the world appearance; and if it were not it could not have any being. It cannot also be said to have being because of its association with the class concept of being, for the self is admitted to be one, and as such cannot be associated with class concept. Again want of variability cannot be regarded as a condition of reality, for if the cognitive objects are unreal because they are variable, the knower himself would be variable on account of his association with variable objects and variable relations, and would therefore be false. Again being (sattā) is not as universal as it is supposed to be, for it is different from the entities (jug, etc.) to which it is supposed to belong and also from negation in the view that holds negation to be a positive category. If the self is regarded as self-luminous, then it may also be contended that such self-luminosity must be validly proved; and it may also be urged that unless the existence of the self has already been so proved its character cannot be proved to be self-luminous.

Again the akhyāti view is liable to two different interpretations, in both of which it may be styled in some sense as yathārtha-khyāti. In the first interpretation the illusion is supposed to be produced in the following manner: the visual organ is affected by the shining character of something before the eyes, and this shining character, being of the same nature as that of the silver, the shining character of the silver is remembered, and since it is not possible to dis-
tistinguish whether this shining character belongs to silver or to something else, and since the object in front is associated with such an undiscriminated shining character, the shining character cannot be treated as a mere self-ejected idea, but has to be taken as having its true seat in that something before the eye; thus, the notion of silver is a result of a true perception. It would have been a false perception if the conch-shell had been perceived as silver, but in such a perception it is not the conch-shell, but "this" in front, that is perceived as silver. The general maxim is that the idea which corresponds to any particular kind of behaviour is to be regarded as a true representation of the object experienced in such a behaviour (yad-artha-cyavahārā-nugunā ya dhīḥ sā tad-arthā). This maxim has its application here inasmuch as the "this" in front can be experienced in practical behaviour as such, and the silvery character has also a true reference to real silver. So the notion "this silver" is to be regarded as a complex of two notions, the "this" and the "silver." Thus, the perception involved in the above interpretation is a true perception according to the akhyāti view. In the above explanation it is contended that just as the two different notions of substance and quality may both appear in the same concept, so there cannot be any difficulty in conceiving of a legitimate unity of two different notions in one illusory perception as "this silver." Such a fusion is possible on account of the fact that here two notions occur in the same moment and there is no gap between them. This is different from the anyathā-khyāti view, in which one thing is supposed to appear as another. The objections against this view are: firstly, that a defect cannot possibly transmute one thing into another; secondly, if illusions be regarded as the appearance of one thing as another, then there is scope for such a fear, even in those cases which are regarded as correct perception; for all knowledge would be exposed to doubt, and this would land us in scepticism. If, therefore, it is suggested that illusion is due to a non-comprehension of the difference between the presence of a conch-shell and the memory-image of silver, that also would be impossible. For if "difference" means only the different entities (bheda vastu-svarūpam-eva), then non-comprehension of difference (which is regarded as the root-cause of illusion in the present view) would mean the comprehension of the identity of the memory-image and the percept, and that would not account for the qualified concept where
one notion (e.g. the silver) appears as qualifying the other notion (the “this” before the eye). Moreover, if two independent notions which are not related as substance and quality be miscomprehended as one concept, then any notion could be so united with any other notion, because the memory-images which are stored in our past experiences are limitless. Again the silver that was experienced in the past was experienced in association with the space in which it existed, and the reproduction of the silver and memory would also be associated with that special spatial quality. This would render its mis-association with the percept before the perceiver impossible on account of the spatial difference of the two. If it is contended that through the influence of defects the spatial quality of the memory-image is changed, then that would be the anyathā-khyāti theory, which would be inadmissible in the akhyāti view. Again since all sensible qualities must be associated with some kind of spatial relation, even if the original spatial quality be transmuted or changed, that would be no reason why such a spatial image should be felt as being in front of the perceiver. It must also be said that the distinctive differences between the memory-image and the percept are bound to be noted; for if such a distinctive difference were not noted, the memory-image could not be distinguished as “silver-image.” It cannot also be said that though the percept can be distinguished from the memory-image the latter cannot be distinguished from the former, for the discriminative character is a constituent of both, and it is nothing but the white shining attribute. If it is urged that the spatial and other distinctive qualities are not noted in the memory-image and it appears merely as an image, then it may well be objected that any and every memory-image may be confused with the present percept, and even a stone may appear as silver.

Since both the a-nirvacaniya-khyāti and the akhyāti are in some sense yathārtha-khyāti, Meghanādāri refuted these two theories of illusion and attempted to show that the yathārtha-khyāti would be untenable in these views. Now he tries to show that all other possible interpretations of yathārtha-khyāti are invalid. The fundamental assumption of yathārtha-khyāti is that all knowledge must correspond to a real object like all right knowledge¹. Thus, in other

interpretations, the yathārtha-khyāti or the correspondence theory, might mean that cognition is produced by a real object or by the objective percept or that it means uncontradicted experience. The first alternative is untenable because even in the illusion of the conch-shell–silver the notion of silver has been produced by a real object, the conch-shell; the second view is untenable, for the object corresponding to the illusory percept of silver is not actually present in the conch-shell according to other theories; and so far as the operation of the memory impression of the silver as experienced in the past is concerned (pūrvā-nubhūta-rajata-samskāra-dvārā) its instrumentality is undeniable both in right and in illusory cognitions. The third alternative is untenable because contradiction refers to knowledge or judgment and not to things themselves. If it is said that the cognition refers to the illusory appearance and hence it is the illusory entity existing outside that is the object of perception, the obvious objection would be that perception refers to a non-illusory something in front of the perceiver, and this cannot be obviated. If non-illusory something is a constituent in the cognition, then it would be futile to say that the mere illusory perceptual form is all that can be the object of perception.

It cannot also be said that the illusory perception has no object (nirviṣaya-khyāti) and that it is called cognition, because, though it may not itself be amenable to behaviour as right cognitions are, it is similar to them by producing an impression that it also is amenable to behaviour, just as autumn clouds, which cannot shower, are also called clouds. The illusory cognition has for its content not only the illusory appearance but also the non-illusory “this” to which it objectively and adjectively refers. The truth, however, is that it is not indispensable for constituting the objectivity of a cognition that all the characters of the object should appear in the cognition; if any of its characters are manifested, that alone is sufficient to constitute the objectivity of an entity with regard to its cognition. The position, therefore, is that all cognitions refer and correspond to certain real entities in the objective world, and this cannot be explained on any other theory than on the supposition of a metaphysico-cosmological theory akin to the theory of homoiomeriae.

Anantācārya, in his Jñāna-yāthārtha-vāda, more or less repeats the arguments of Meghanādārī when he says that no cognition can
be possible without its being based on a relation of correspondence to an objective entity. The content of knowledge must therefore have a direct correspondence with the objective entity to which it refers. Thus, since there is a perception of silver (in the illusory perception of conch-shell-silver), it must refer to an objective substratum corresponding to it. The Mīmāṃsā supposition that errors are produced through non-discrimination of memory-image and perception is also wrong, because in that case we should have the experience of remembering silver and not of perceiving it as an objective entity before us. Both Meghanādāri and Anantācārya take infinite pains to prove that their definition of error applies to all cases of illusions of diverse sorts, including dreams, into the details of which it is unnecessary for our present purposes to enter.

The Doctrine of Self-validity of Knowledge.

Pramāṇa, or valid knowledge, is defined as the cognition of objects as they are (tathā-bhūtā-rtha-jñānam ātmanāt pramāṇam ucyate), and apramāṇa, or invalid knowledge, is described as cognition representing a wrong notion of an object (a-tathā-bhūtā-rtha-jñānam ātmanāt pramāṇam). Such a validity, it is urged by Meghanādāri, is manifested by the knowledge itself (tathātvā-vadārāṇā-īmakaṃ prāmāṇyam ātmanaiva nisīcyate). This does not expose it to the criticism that knowledge, being passive, cannot at the same moment be also regarded as active, determining its own nature as valid (na ca karma-kartrā-virodhah); for since it is of the nature of a faithful representation of the object, the manifestation of its own nature as such is an affirmation of its validity. If knowledge had no power by itself of affirming its own validity, there would be no way by which such a validity could be affirmed, for the affirmation of its validity by any other mediate process, or through any other instrumentality, will always raise the same question as to how the testimony of those processes or instruments can be accepted. For on such a supposition, knowledge not being self-valid, each such testimony has to be

2 rajata-smarane idam-paddrtha-grahana-rūpa-jñāna-dvaya-kalpane rajatam smaromeṇa tatrānubhava-prasangah, na tu rajatam paśyāmīti, sākṣat-kartrā-vyāñjaka-vaśayatāvyāḥ smaranebhāvāt. Ibid.
3 (a) Ibid, (b) Meghanādāri, Naya-dyu-mani.
corroborated by another testimony, and that by another, and this will lead us to infinite regress.

In repudiating other views Meghanādārī points out that if validity is admitted as belonging to the collocative causes of knowledge (involving the self, the senses, and the object), then even the object would have to be regarded as a pramāṇa, and there would be no prameya or object left. Again, if affirmation is regarded as being of the nature of awareness, then even memory-knowledge has to be regarded as valid, since it is of the nature of awareness. Further, if affirmation of validity be of the nature of power, then such power, being non-sensible, has to be manifested by some other means of knowledge. If, again, validity is supposed to be produced by the causes of knowledge, then the dictum of the self-manifestation of validity would have to be given up. Uncontradicted behaviour also cannot be regarded as a definition of validity, for in that case even memory has to be regarded as valid by itself. It cannot also be defined as merely knowledge as such, for knowledge, not being able to turn back on itself to apprehend its own validity, would have to depend on something else, and that would imply the affirmation of validity through extraneous reference (paratah-prāmāṇya). Again in those cases where the cause of error is known, the cognition, though known as erroneous, irresistibly manifests itself to us (e.g. the movement of the sun). The assumption that all knowledge is associated with its validity is inapplicable to such cases. If, again, it is held that, whenever a later cognition rejects the former, we have a clear case as to how the invalidity of the previous cognition is demolished by the valid knowledge of a later moment; it may be urged that, when the generic knowledge of an object is replaced by a cognition of details, we have a case when one cognition replaces another, though it does not involve any criticism of the former knowledge.

In the Bhāṭṭa view, where it is supposed that when the object attains its specific cognized character its knowledge as an internal operation is inferred, both validity and invalidity ought to depend upon the objects. If, however, it is urged that the notion of validity shows itself in the faultless character of the instruments and condition of cognition, that would also imply the notion of validity as of extraneous origin. In the Prābhākara view, where knowledge is supposed to reveal the knower, the object and knowledge in one
sweep, we have a much better case in so far that here knowledge has not to depend on anything extraneous. In this case self-invalidity may apply only to memory which has to depend on previous perception. To this the Nyāya objection is that since memory is also knowledge, and since all knowledge is self-revealing, the Prabhākaraṇas ought consistently to admit the self-validity of memory.

Meghanādārī holds that all these objections against the self-validity of knowledge are invalid; for if the knowledge of the validity of any cognition has to depend on other pramāṇas, then there is an infinite regress. If, however, an attempt is made to avoid the regress by admitting the self-validity of any later pramāṇa, then it virtually amounts to the admission of self-validity (anavasthā-parihārāya kasyacet svatastvā-ṅgihāre ca na parataḥ-pramānyam). It may be urged that we are not necessarily prompted to action by a consciousness of validity, but through the probability of the same which is sought to be tested (ajñātatayā jñātatayai'va) by our efforts in the direction of the object. But in such a supposition there is no meaning in the attempt of our opponents in favour of the doctrine of the validity of cognition through extraneous means (parataḥ-pramāṇya), for such a supposition is based on the view that our efforts are produced without a previous determination of the validity of cognition. When we see that a person, having perceived an object, makes an effort towards it, our natural conclusion is that he has, as the basis of the effort, a knowledge of the validity of his perception, for without it there can be no effort. It is hopeless to contend that there is validity of cognition in such cases without the knowledge of validity, for validity of knowledge always means the consciousness of such validity. The fact is that what constitutes a pramāṇa constitutes also its validity. It is wrong to think that validity appertains to anything else outside the cognition in question. When we see fire, its validity as a burning object is grasped with the very notion of fire and does not wait for the comprehension of any super-sensible power or burning capacity of fire. The comprehension of fire as a burning object involves the knowledge of its association with its burning capacity. The knowledge of the burning capacity by itself cannot induce any action on our part, for we are always led to act by the comprehension of objects and not by their capacities. It is, therefore, wrong to separate the capacity from the object and speak of it as the cause of our effort. So the cognition of a pramāṇa
involves with it its validity. Thus validity cannot be dissociated from the cognition of the object. Further, validity cannot be defined as uncontradictedness, for if that test is to be applied to every knowledge it would lead to infinite regress. If, however, the knowledge of the validity of any cognition has to depend upon the knowledge of the defectlessness or correctness of the means and conditions of cognition, then, since validity of such knowledge has to depend upon another knowledge for the correctness of the means and condition, and that upon another, there is obviously an infinite regress. Since knowledge normally corresponds to the object, ordinarily there should not be any fear of any error arising from the defects of the causes and conditions of such knowledge; it is only in specific cases that such doubts may arise leading to special inquiries about the correctness or incorrectness of the means and conditions of knowledge. If there is an inquiry as to the validity of every knowledge, we should be landed in scepticism. Thus, validity means the manifestation of any form of content not awaiting the confirmation by other means of knowledge (pramāṇa-ntarā-ṇapekṣaya’rthā-vacchinnattvam), and such a conviction of validity is manifested along with the cognition itself. Memory, however, depends upon a prior cognition, and as such the conviction of its validity depends upon the validity of a prior knowledge, and hence it cannot be regarded as self-valid.

Rāmānujacārya, the teacher and maternal uncle of Veṅkaṭaṇātha, anticipates the objection that if self-validity of cognition is to be

1 Rāmānujacārya, the maternal uncle of Veṅkaṭaṇātha, anticipates an objection that perceptual cognition reveals only the content (vastu). The revelation of such a content does not also involve the knowing relation which must necessarily be of a very varied nature, for a knowledge may refer to a content in infinitely diverse relation. The revelation of the mere content, therefore, without the specific knowing relation, does not involve the judgmental form, though the truth of this content may be ascertained at a later moment when it is reduced to a judgmental form as “I know it.” There is no possibility of the affirmation of any validity at the moment of the revelation of the content. In reply to this, Rāmānujacārya says that the revelation of a content necessarily implies all its knowing relations in a general manner; and therefore, by the mode of its revelation at any particular moment, the mode of its specific knowing relation at any particular moment is grasped along with the content. Thus, since the revelation of the content implies the specific knowing relation, all cognitions may be regarded as implicitly judgmental, and there cannot be any objection to the self-validity of such knowledge.

If the content and knowledge were regarded as entirely distinct, as they must be, and if the knowing relation were not given implicitly along with the content, then all knowledge would be contentless, and as such any future attempt to relate them would be impossible. Nyāya-kulīsa (MS.).
admitted, then no doubt could arise with reference to any cognition. The reply of Rāmānujacārya is that all cognitions are associated with a general conviction of their self-validity, but that does not prevent the rise of doubt in a certain specific direction. Self-validity in this view means that all cognitions produce by themselves a general conviction regarding their validity, though it does not rule out misapprehension in a specific direction.

The Ontological categories of the Rāmānuja School according to Veṅkaṭanātha.

(a) Substance.

Veṅkaṭanātha in his Nyāya-siddhāṇjana and Tattva-muktā-kalāpa, tries to give a succinct account of the different categories, admitted or presumed, in the philosophy of Rāmānuja which the latter did not bring prominently to the view of his readers. The main division is that of the substance (dravya) and that which is non-substance (adravya). Substance is defined as that which has states (daśāvat) or which suffers change and modification. In admitting substance he tries to refute the Buddhist view that there is no substance, and all things are but a momentary conglomeration of separate entities which come into being and are destroyed the next moment. The Vaibhāṣika Buddhists say that there are four ultimate sense-data, viz. colour, taste, touch, and smell, which are themselves qualities and are not themselves qualities of anything. These can be grasped by our specific senses. The Vātsiputriya school includes sound as a separate sense-data which can be perceived by the ear. Against this Veṅkaṭa urges that in all perception we have a notion that we touch what we see; such a perception cannot be false, for such a feeling is both invariable and uncontradicted in experience (svārasika-bādhā-ḍṛṣṭer ananyathā-siddhesca).

Such a perception implies recognition (pratyabhijñā) involving the notion that it is a permanent entity in the objective field which is perceived by a constant and unchangeable perceiver, and that the two sense-qualities refer to one and the same object. This recognition does not refer merely to the colour sensation, for the colour

2. Nyāya-kulīṣa, p. 27 (MS).
sensation does not involve the tactile; nor does it refer merely to the tactile, as that does not involve colour. Perception, therefore, refers to an entity to which both the colour and the tactile qualities belong. Such a perception of recognition also repudiates the Buddhist view of the conglomeration of entities. For such a view naturally raises the question as to whether the conglomeration is different from or the same as the entities that conglomerate. In the latter case there cannot be any recognition of the object as one entity to which both the colour and the tactile quality belong. In the former case, when conglomeration is regarded as extraneous to the conglomerated entities, such a conglomeration must either be positive or negative. In the first alternative it amounts virtually to an admission of substances, for the assumption of the existence of merely the complex characters is inadmissible, since there cannot be anything like that which is neither a substance, nor quality, nor a qualifying relation. In the second alternative, if the conglomeration (saṁghāta) is non-existent, then it cannot produce the recognition. If conglomeration be defined as absence of interval between the perceived qualities, then also, since each sense quality has an appeal only to its own specific sense-organ, it is impossible that the perception of two different sense-qualities by two different organs should point to a common entity. Conglomeration cannot also be defined as spatial identity, for it must also involve temporal identity in order to give the notion of conglomeration. It cannot also be said that time and space are identical, for such a view which is true of momentariness, will be shown to be false by the refutation of momentariness. Space cannot also be of the nature of ākāśa, which in the Buddhist view means unobstructedness and is not a positive concept. Space cannot also be regarded as material identity with the sense-qualities, for the different sense-qualities are regarded as the unique nature of different moments. If it means that the different sensible qualities have but one material behind them, that amounts to the admission of substance. If the sensible qualities be regarded as a conglomeration on account of their existence in the same material object, then the material object would have to be described as a conglomeration by virtue of the existence of its elemental entities.

2 eko-pādānatve tu tad eva dravyam. Ibid.
in some other entity and that again in some other entity, and thus we have a vicious infinite. It cannot also be urged that the tactile sensation is inferred from the colour sensation, for such an inference would involve as its pre-condition the knowledge of the concomitance of the colour datum and the tactile, which is not possible unless they are known to belong to the same object. Neither can it be urged that the tactile and the colour-data are mutually associated; this gives rise to the notion that what is seen is touched, for the two sensations are known to be different in nature and originate through different sense-organs. It cannot also be said that our apperception that we touch what we see, being due to the operation of our instinctive root-desire (vāsanā), is false, for proceeding on the same analogy and following the Yogācāra view, one may as well deny all external data. If it is said that the sense-data are never contradicted in experience and thus that the idealistic view is wrong, then it may as well be pointed out that our notion that we experience an object to which colour and the tactile sensations belong is also never contradicted in experience. If it is urged that such an experience cannot be proved to be logically valid, then it may be proved with equal force that the existence of external sense-data cannot be logically proved. Therefore, our ordinary experience that the object as a substance is the repository of various sense-qualities cannot be invalidated. The view that all the other four elements, excepting air (vāyu), are themselves of diverse nature and are hence perceived as coloured, as touchable, etc., and that they are capable of being grasped by different senses is also false, as it does not necessarily involve the supposition that they are the repository of different sense-qualities; for experience shows that we intuit the fact that the objects are endowed with qualities. No one perceives a jug as being merely the colour-datum, but as an object having colour. It is also impossible that one neutral datum should have two different natures; for one entity cannot have two different natures. If it is said that two different qualities can abide in the same object, then that amounts to the admission of a substance in which different qualities inhere. It is also wrong to suppose that since the colour-datum and the tactile are grasped together they are identical in nature, for in the case of one error where a white conch-shell appears as yellow, the conch-shell is grasped without its white character, just as the yellow colour is grasped without its
corresponding object. And it cannot be said that a separate yellow conch-shell is produced there; for such a view is directly contradicted in experience when we perceive the yellow colour and assert its identity with the conch-shell by touch. So, by the simultaneity of perception, coherence of qualities in an object is proved and not identity.

Moreover, even the Buddhists cannot prove that the tactile and the colour sensations occur simultaneously. If this were so, the testimony of the two different senses naturally points to the existence of two different characters. When an object is near we have a distinct perception of it, and when it is at a distance perception is indistinct. This distinctness or indistinctness cannot refer merely to the sense-character, for then their difference as objects would not be perceived. It cannot also refer to the size (parimāṇa), for the notion of size is admitted to be false by the Buddhists. Under the circumstances, it is to be admitted that such perceptions should refer to the objects.

The Buddhists are supposed to urge that if qualities are admitted to be separate from the substance, then it may be asked whether these qualities (dharma) have further qualities themselves or are without quality. In the latter alternative, being qualitiless, they are incapable of being defined or used in speech. In the former alternative, if qualities have further qualities, then the second grade qualities would have to be known by further qualities adhering to it, and that again by another, and thus we have a vicious infinite. Again, qualitiness (dharmatva) would itself be a quality. And it cannot be said that qualitiness is the very nature of quality, for a thing cannot be explained by having reference to itself. If qualitiness is something different from the quality, then such a concept would lead us in infinite regress. To this Veṅkaṭa's reply is that all qualities are not qualitiless. In some cases quality appears as itself qualified, as testified by experience. In those cases where a quality is not demonstrable with particularizing specification, such as "this quality is so and so" (ittham-bhāva), it does not depend for its comprehension on any other quality. Such qualities may be illustrated in the case of all abstract qualities and universals, and the opposite may be illustrated in the case of adjectival qualities such as the word "white" in the case of "white horse." There may be further specification regarding the nature of whiteness in the
white horse, whereas when the word “whiteness” stands by itself any inquiry regarding its further specification becomes inadmissible. Logically, however, there may be a demand of further specification in both the cases and the fear of an infinite regress, but it is not felt in experience\(^1\). Moreover, one might imagine a vicious infinite in the necessity of having an awareness of an awareness, and then another and so on, but still this is only hyper-logical; for the awareness, in manifesting itself, manifests all that needs be known about it, and there is actually nothing gained by continuing the series. Thus a quality may be supposed to have further qualities, but whatever could be manifested by these may be regarded as revealed by the quality itself\(^2\). Again the assertion that if qualities are themselves without quality then they are unspeakable would involve the Buddhists themselves in a great difficulty when they described the nature of all things as unique; for obviously such a uniqueness (\textit{svalaksanya}) is without quality, and if that which has no quality cannot be described, then its specification as unique or \textit{svalaksana} is impossible\(^3\).

It may be urged that a quality may belong to that which has no quality or to that which has it. The former alternative would imply the existence of an entity in its negation which is impossible; for then everything could exist everywhere, and even the chimerical entities, which are not regarded as existing anywhere, would be regarded as existing. In the other alternative a quality would exist in a quality, which is an absurd conception, being only a circular reasoning (\textit{ātmāśraya}). The reply of Venkata to this is that he does not hold that the quality belongs to the locus of its negation or to that which has it already, but he holds that a qualified entity possesses the quality not as a qualified entity but as taken apart from it\(^4\). It cannot be urged that this virtually implies the old objection of the existence of a quality in the locus of its negation. To this Venkata’s reply is that the special feature of a qualified entity does

\[\text{svākṣṭaṇḍa saṁvedana-saṁvedane śabda-śabdādau svā-para-nirvāhakatvam. Ibid.}\n
\[\text{kīcča sava-lakṣaṇā-ṛṇām jātyā-ṛṇāca samvyṛti-siddhāṇām nirdeṣham atve’pi kathāṇcid abhākṛṣṭaḥ hatvām tvaya’pi grāhyam. Ibid.}\n
\[\text{vastutas’ tad-viśiṣṭe viśeṣye tad viśiṣṭa-vṛty-abhāve tac-chūnye vṛtti syād eva. Ibid. p. 17.}\n
\[\text{Ibid. p. 17.}\]
not belong to any of its constituents, and qualities of any of the constituents may not belong to the constituted entity. If by the hyper-logical method the manner of the subsistence of a quality in a qualified entity is criticized, then it might lead to the view that the conception of qualified entity is without any sufficient ground, or self-contradictory, or that such a conception is itself inadmissible. All such views are meaningless, for the wildest criticism of opponents would involve the very notion of qualified entity in the use of their logical apparatus. So it has to be admitted that qualities adhere in qualified entities and that such an adherence does not involve infinite regress.

(b) Criticism of the Sāmkhya Inference for Establishing the Existence of Prakṛti.

Veṅkaṭanātha admits the doctrine of prakṛti as the theory of materiality, but he thinks that such a doctrine can be accepted only on the testimony of scriptures and not on inference. He therefore criticizes the Sāmkhya inference as follows. Neither prakṛti nor any of its evolutes such as mahat, ahamkāra, tanmātras, etc., can be known through perception. Neither prakṛti nor any of its evolutes can also be known by inference. The Sāmkhyists hold that the effect has the same qualities as the cause. The world of effects, as we find it, is pleasurable, painful or dulling (mohātmaka); so its cause also must have, as its nature, pleasure, pain and a feeling of dullness. To this the question naturally arises regarding the relation of the causal qualities with the effects. They cannot be identical—the whiteness of the cloth is not identical with the thread of which it is made; the effect as a substance is not identical with causal qualities, for the white and the cloth are not identical. Further it cannot be said that the identity of the cause and the effect means merely that the effect is subordinate to the cause, as when one says that the effect, cloth, exists only in the samavāya relation in the cause and in no other form (adṛṣṭer eva tantu-samavetatvāt paṭasya tantu-guṇatvoktiḥ), for the obvious reply is that the Sāmkhya itself does not admit the samavāya relation or any ultimate distinction between the whole and the part. If it is said that all that is intended is that the effect exists in the cause, then it may be pointed out that merely by such an affirmation nothing is gained; for that would not explain

1 na ca ghatavati bhūtale vartamānānāṃ guṇādināṃ ghatāpi vṛttter adṛṣṭeh. Tattva-muktā-kalāpa, Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 18.
why the causal matter (*prakrti*) should have the nature or qualities as the effect substance (*na kāraṇā-vasthasya sukha-duḥkhā-dyā-tmakatva-siddhiḥ*). If it is held that the effect shares the qualities of the cause, then also it is against the normal supposition that the effect qualities are generated by the cause qualities; and, moreover, such a supposition would imply that the effect should have no other quality than those of the cause. It cannot also be said that the effect is of the same nature as the cause (*saṭṭiya-gunavattvam*), for the Śaṅkhyists admit the *mahat* to be a different category existent in the *prakṛti* as its cause (*vilakṣaṇa-mahatvā-dy-adhikaranaḥ*). If it is held that the effect must have only qualities similar to the cause, then they may be admitted with impunity; if the effect has all its qualities the same as those of the cause, then there will be no difference between the effect and the cause. If, again, it is held that only certain specific traits which are not inappropriate in the cause can be supposed to migrate to the effect, and that the relation of the transmission of qualities from cause to the effect can thus be limited by a specific observation of the nature of the essential trait of the cause, then such cases in which living flies are produced from inanimate cow-dung would be inexplicable as cases of cause and effect\(^1\).

The Śaṅkhyists are supposed to argue that if pure intelligence were supposed naturally to tend to worldly objects, then there would be no chance of its attaining liberation. Its association, therefore, must needs be supposed through the intermediary of some other category. This cannot be the senses, for even without them the mind alone may continue to imagine worldly objects. Even when the mind is inactive in sleep, one may dream of various objects. And this may lead to the assumption of the category of ego or *ahamkāra*; and in dreamless sleep, when the operation of this category of *ahamkāra* may be regarded as suspended, there is still the functioning of breathing, which leads to the assumption of another category, *viz.* *manas*. But as this has a limited operation, it presupposes some other cause; if that cause is also regarded as limited, then there would be an infinite regress. The Śaṅkhyists, therefore, rest with the assumption that the cause of *mahat* is unlimited, and this is *prakṛti* or *avyakta*. The reply of Venkaṭa

to this is that the association of pure intelligence with worldly objects is through the instrumentality of karma. It is also not possible to infer the existence of Manas as a separate category through the possibility of the thinking operation, for this may well be explained by the functioning of the subconscious root-impressions; for even the assumption of mind would not explain the thinking operation, since manas, by itself, cannot be regarded as capable of producing thought. Manas, being merely an instrument, cannot be regarded as playing the role of a substance of which thought may be regarded as a modification. In the state of dream also it is not necessary to assume the existence of a separate category of ahamkāra to explain dream experiences, for this may well be done by mind working in association with subconscious root-impression. The breathing operation in deep, dreamless sleep may also be explained by ordinary bio-motor functions, and for this there is no necessity for the assumption of mahat.

It is also wrong to suppose that the cause must be of a more unlimited extent than the effect, for it is not testified in ordinary experience, in which a big jug is often found to be made out of a lump of clay of a smaller size. It is also wrong to suppose that whatever is found to abide in an effect must also be found in its cause (na hi yad yenā' nugatam tat tasya kāraṇam iti niyamaḥ), for the various qualities that are found in a cow are never regarded as its cause. Following the same assumption, one would expect to find a separate cause of which the common characteristics of the prakṛti and its evolutes are the effects, and this would involve the admission of another cause of the prakṛti itself (vyaktā-vyakta-sādhāraṇa-dharmānām tad-ubhaya-kāraṇa-prasaṅgāt tathā ca tattvā-dhikya-prasaṅgaḥ). Thus, the argument that an effect must have as its cause qualitative entities that inhere in it is false. The earthiness (mṛttva) which inhere in the jug is not its cause, and the earthy substance (mṛda-draṣṭya) which shows itself in its unmodified form or its modified form as jug cannot be said to be inherent in the jug. Again the argument that things which are related as cause and effect have the same form is also false; for if this sameness means identity, then no distinction can be made between cause and effect. If this sameness means the existence of some similar qualities, then there may be such similarity with other things (which are not cause and effect) as well. Again applying the same analogy to the Sāṁkhya doctrine
of puruṣas (which are admitted to have the common characteristic of intelligence), the Sāṃkhyaists may well be asked to hold a new category as the cause of the puruṣas. Further, two jugs which are similar in their character are not for that reason produced from the same lump of clay; and, on the other hand, we have the illustration of production of effects from an entirely different cause, as in the case of production of insects from cow-dung. Thus, from our experiences of pleasure, pain, and dullness it does not follow that there is a common cause of the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness, for these experiences can in each specific instance be explained by a specific cause, and there is no necessity to admit a separate common cause of the nature of three guṇas. If for the explanation of the ordinary pleasurable and painful experiences a separate pleasure-and-pain complex be admitted as the cause, then there may be further inquiry regarding this pleasure-and-pain complex and this will lead to infinite regress. Again if the three guṇas are regarded as the cause of the world, then that would not lead to the affirmation that the world is produced out of one cause; for though the three guṇas may be in a state of equilibrium, they may still be regarded as having their special contribution in generating the varied types of effects. Thus, the triguṇa or the prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya can never be proved by inference. The only mode of approach to the doctrine of prakṛti is through the scriptures. The three guṇas rest in the prakṛti, and in accordance with the gradual prominence of sattva, rajas, and tamas, three kinds of mahat are produced. From these three types of mahat three kinds of ahamkāras are produced. Out of the first type (i.e. sattvika ahamkāra) the eleven senses are produced. Out of the last type (viz. the tāmasa ahamkāra) the tanmātras (also called the bhūtādi) are produced. The second type of ahamkāra (called rājas ahamkāra) behaves as an accessory for the production of both the eleven senses and the bhūtādi. There are some who say that the conative senses are produced by rājas ahamkāra. This cannot be accepted, as it is against the scriptural testimony. The tanmātras represent the subtle stage of evolution between the tāmasa ahamkāra and the gross elemental stage of the bhūtās.

potential) is produced from bhūtādi, and from it the gross elemental sound is produced. Again the rūpa-tanmātra (light-heat-potential) is produced from the bhūtādi or the tāmasa ahamkāra, and from the rūpa-tanmātra (light-heat-potential) gross light-heat is produced, and so on. Lokācārya, however, says that there is another view of the genesis of the tanmātra and the bhūta which has also the support of the scriptures and cannot therefore be ignored. This is as follows: śabda-tanmātra is produced from the bhūtādi and the ākāśa is produced from the śabda-tanmātra (sound-potential); the ākāśa again produces the sparśa-tanmātra (the touch-potential) and air is produced from the touch-potential. Again from air heat-light-potential (rūpa-tanmātra) is produced and from heat-light-potential tejas (heat-light) is produced; from tejas, rasa-tanmātra (taste-potential) is produced, and from it water. From water again the gandha-tanmātra (smell-potential) is produced, and from it the earth.

The view is explained by Varavara on the supposition that just as a seed can produce shoots only when it is covered by husks, so the tanmātras can be supposed to be able to produce further evolutes only when they can operate from within the envelope of the bhūtādi.

The process of evolution according to the said interpretation is as follows. Śabda-tanmātra is produced from bhūtādi which then envelops it, and then in such an enveloped state ākāśa is produced. Then from such a śabda-tanmātra, sparśa-tanmātra is produced which

1 This view seems to be held in the Viṣṇu-purāṇa, i. 3. 66, etc. where it is distinctly said that the element of ākāśa produces sparśa-tanmātra (touch-potential). Varavara, however, in his commentary on the Tattvatrāya of Lokācārya, wishes to point out that according to Parāśāra’s commentary this has been explained as being the production of tanmātras from tanmātras, though it clearly contradicts the manifest expressions of the Viṣṇu-purāṇa when it states that tanmātras are produced from the bhūtādi. He further points out that in the Mahābhārata (Śāntiparva Mokṣadharma, Ch. xxx) the vikāras or pure modifications are described as sixteen and the causes (prakṛti) as eight. But in this counting the sixteen vikāras (eleven senses and the five categories—śabda, etc.), the distinction between the five tanmātras and the five elements has not been observed on account of there not being any essential difference, the grosser stages being only modified states of the subtler ones (tanmātraṁ bhūtebhyaḥ svarūpa-bhedā-bhāvāt avastha-bhedā-mātrattvāt). According to this interpretation the eight Prakṛtis mean the prakṛti, the mahat, the ahaṅkāra and five categories of ākāśa, etc., in their gross forms. The five categories included under the sixteen vikāras are the tanmātras which are regarded as modifications of the elemental states of the bhūtas.

2 yathā tvak-sīnyam-ujjasyaṁkura-śaktir nāsti,
tathā tvacarana-sūnyasyottara-kāra-śaktir nāstīti bhānāt
kāraṇa-guṇanā vimoccitoorrowtara-guṇa-viśeṣaṁ... sva-viśeṣasyaṁkta-guṇa-tiṣayā-nupapateḥ.

Varavara’s bhāṣya on Tattvatrāya, p. 58.
envelops the śabda-tanmātra. The sparśa-tanmātra, as enveloped by the śabda-tanmātra, produces the vāyu through the accessory help of ākāśa. Then from this sparśa-tanmātra the rūpa-tanmātra is produced. The rūpa-tanmātra in its turn envelops the sparśa-tanmātra and then from the rūpa-tanmātra, as enveloped by the sparśa-tanmātra, tejas is produced through the accessory help of vāyu. Again the rasa-tanmātra is produced from the rūpa-tanmātra, which again envelops the rasa-tanmātra. From the rasa-tanmātra enveloped by the rūpa-tanmātra water is produced through the accessory help of tejas. From the rasa-tanmātra the gandha-tanmātra is produced which again, enveloped by rasa-tanmātra, produces earth through the accessory help of water.

Varavara points out that in the Tattva-nirūpana another genesis of creation is given which is as follows. śabda-tanmātra is produced from bhūtādi and as a gross state of it ākāśa is produced. The bhūtādi envelops the śabda-tanmātra and the ākāśa. From the transforming śabda-tanmātra, through the accessory of the gross ākāśa as enveloped by bhūtādi, the sparśa-tanmātra is produced and from such a sparśa-tanmātra vāyu is produced. The śabda-tanmātra then envelops both the sparśa-tanmātra and the vāyu, and from the transforming sparśa-tanmātra, through the accessory of vāyu as enveloped by śabda-tanmātra, the rūpa-tanmātra is produced. From the rūpa-tanmātra, similarly, tejas is produced, and so on. In this view, in the production of the sparśa and other tanmātras the accessory help of the previous bhūtas is found necessary.

As Venkaṭanātha accepts the view that the gross bhūta of ākāśa acts as accessory to the production of the later bhūtas, he criticizes the Śāṅkhya view that the gross bhūtas are produced from the synthesis of tanmātras. The Śāṅkhyaists, again, think that the evolution of the different categories from prakṛti is due to an inherent teleology and not to the operation of any separate agent. Venkaṭa, however, as a true follower of Rāmānuja, repudiates it and asserts that the evolving operation of the prakṛti can only proceed through the dynamic operation of God Himself.

1 Varavara's bhāṣya on Tattvatrāya, p. 59.
(c) Refutation of the Atomic Theory of Nyāya in relation to Whole and Part.

In refuting the Nyāya view that the parts attach themselves to each other and thereby produce the whole, and ultimately the partless atoms combine together to form a molecule, Veṅkaṭa introduces the following arguments. So far as the association of the wholes through their parts (beginning from the molecules) through the association of the parts are concerned, Veṅkaṭa has nothing to object. His objection is against the possibility of an atomic contract for the formation of molecules. If the atoms combine together through their parts, then these parts may be conceived to have further parts, and thus there would be infinite regress. If these parts are regarded as not different from the whole, then the different atoms could well be regarded as occupying the same atomic space, and thus they would not produce a conglomeration bigger in size than the constituent atoms. Further, it is not possible to imagine that there should be wholes without the parts also being present. Proceeding in this way, if the atomic combination cannot account for the origin of bigger measures, the possibility of objects of different magnitude through conglomeration (e.g. a hill or a mustard seed) would be inexplicable. If it is said that parts refer to the different sides of an atom, then also it might be urged that a partless atom cannot have sides.

It is held that knowledge, though one, can refer to many, though it is partless. It may also be urged in this connection that if it refers to all objects in their entirety, then the constituent entities would not be referred to separately, and it cannot also refer to the objects separately in parts, for then intelligence itself would not be partless. The Naiyāyika may also, on this analogy, urge that any solution that the idealist may find to his difficulty also applies to the atomic theory. To this the obvious answer of the idealist is that in the case of intelligence, experience testifies that though one and partless it can refer to many, and the Naiyāyikas have no such advantage to show in their favour, for the Naiyāyikas do not admit that in any case wholes may combine except through their parts. The objection cannot be laid against the Buddhist theory of conglomeration (saṅghāta), for there such conglomeration is not due to contact. The Naiyāyikas may be supposed to raise an objection regarding the association of all-pervasive entities (vibhu) with finite
ontological categories according to Venkatanātha

objects; such an association has to be admitted, for otherwise the association of the self or the ākāśa with objects cannot be explained; it is not also possible to hold that all pervasive entities have parts. So ultimately it has to be admitted that the partless all-pervasive entities have contact with finite objects, and if their procedure is accepted, then the same might explain the contact of partless atoms. To this Veṅkaṭa's reply is that the illustration of the contact of all-pervasive entities with finite objects might well be thrown in our face, if we had attempted to refute the view that wholes had no specific qualities; but our main object is to show the inconsistency to which the Naiyāyikas are exposed when they apply their theory that all combinations of wholes must be through parts to the combination of the supposed partless atoms. As a matter of fact, the error lies in the assumption that the atoms are partless. If it is supposed that division of particles must ultimately take us to partless atoms, the obvious reply is that from the division of parts we could not go to the partless, the better way being the acceptance of the smallest visible particles called the trasarenu. If it is urged that if trasarenu is the atom, then it must be invisible, the obvious reply is that there is no such general concomitance between atomic nature and invisibility. The better course, therefore, is to accept the trasarenu as ultimate particles of matter. There is, therefore, no necessity to admit devyanuka also.

Veṅkaṭanātha further objects to the Nyāya doctrine of the formation of wholes (avayava) from parts (avaya) and points out that if this is to be admitted, then the weight of an object must be due to the weight of the atoms; but the Naiyāyikas hold that the atoms have no weight. The proper view therefore is that the effect, or the so-called whole, is to be regarded as being only a modified condition of the parts. The causal operation in such a view is justified in producing the change in the condition of the causal object and not in producing a new object in the effect or the whole as is supposed by the Naiyāyikas. Again in the consideration of the production of the wholes from parts, when the thread is regarded as the cause of the production of the whole, the cloth, it may be observed that in the process of the production we find various accretions through the gradual addition of one thread after another. In each such addition we have separate wholes, since the process may easily be stopped anywhere; and in such a view we have the
addition of a part to a whole for the production of another whole. This is obviously against the Nyāya view, which would not lend any support to the doctrine that the addition of parts to wholes would produce other wholes. The Naiyāyikas urge that if a whole as a different entity from the parts be not admitted, and if a whole be regarded as nothing more than a collection of atoms, then, the atoms being invisible, the wholes would be invisible. The production of gross wholes not being admitted, the supposed explanation that there is an illusion of grossness in the atoms would also be inadmissible\(^1\). The question now is what is meant by grossness. If it means a new measure, then it is quite admissible in the Rāmānuja view in which the production of separate wholes is not admitted; for just as the atomists would think of the production of the new wholes from atoms, so the Rāmānujist may also agree to the production of a new measure (parimāṇa). If the Naiyāyikas object to this and urge that the production of a new measure from the atomic is inadmissible, then they may as well be asked how they would also account for the notion of plurality in a collection of separate entities, each of which may be regarded as one in itself. If it is said that the conception of number as plurality proceeds from a mental oscillation incorporating the diversity, then it may also be argued that from the absence of any such oscillation there may be a failure in noting the separateness which may give rise to a notion of gross measure. Moreover, there is nothing incongruous in the fact that if individuals are not visible the collection may be visible. If the grossness is supposed to mean the occupation of more spatial units than the individual entities, then also it is not inadmissible; for in a collection of small particles they are cognized as occupying different spatial units. If it is urged that since no separate wholes are admitted to be produced the gross dimension cannot be perceptible, the obvious reply is that the perception of grossness has no connection with the perception of wholes. Even before the dyad is produced the combining atoms have to be admitted as occupying more space in their totality than in their individual capacity; for otherwise they in their totality could not produce a bigger dimension. Thus, there is no reason for admitting the production of wholes separate from the parts. Under the same specific

\(^1\) *sthūla-dravyā-bhāve ca’nu-saṁhatau sthūlatvā-dhyāso na siddhyet. Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 46.
kind of combination of threads in which the Naiyāyikas think that a cloth could be produced, the Rāmānujists think that the threads under the selfsame condition are the cloth and there is no separate production of cloth. But it should not be thought that any slight change in the condition of an object would mean that thereby there is a new object so long as the object remains sufficiently unchanged to be recognized as the same for all practical purposes. The causal operation, according to the Rāmānujists, only brings about new changes of conditions and states in the already existent causal substance. This is thus different from the Sāṃkhya theory of sat-kārya-vāda, according to which the effect is already existent in the cause even before the causal operation is set in motion. Veṅkaṭa, therefore, criticizes the Sāṃkhya theory of sat-kārya-vāda.

(d) Criticism of the Sāṃkhya Theory of Sat-kārya-vāda.

The Sāṃkhya is wrong in supposing that the effect (e.g. the jug) was pre-existent in its cause (e.g. earth), for had it been so the causal operation would have been fruitless. The Sāṃkhya may, however, say that the causal operation serves to manifest what was potentially existing in the cause; the function of causal operation is thus manifestation and not production. This, however, is wrong, for manifestation (vyaṅga) and production (kārya) are two different words having two different concepts. Manifestation can occur only in the operation of a manifesting agent with the help of its accessories in making an object manifested with regard to a particular sense-organ in a particular place where the manifesting agent exists. It would first be proved that the pre-existent effect is manifested and not produced; only then would it have been worth while to inquire into the conditions of the causal operation to see whether it satisfied the necessary conditions of a manifesting agent. But the Sāṃkhya can hardly succeed in showing that it is so. The Sāṃkhyaist says that the effect is pre-existent before the causal


operation; but the causal operation is itself an effect, and if their previous assertion is correct then it was non-existent when the effect was non-manifested. If the causal operation was also existent at the particular time of the occurrence of the cause, then the effect would also have been present in the cause in a manifested state. The Sāmkhya says that what is non-existent cannot be produced, and this implies that a thing is existent because it can be produced, which is, on the face of it, self-contradictory. The theory that the effect is pre-existing in the cause could have been admitted as a last resort if there were no other theory available, but the ordinary notion of causality as invariable and immediate antecedent is quite sufficient to explain the phenomenon of production. Therefore, there is no necessity for such a chimerical theory. Again instead of holding that the effect is nothing more than the potential power in the cause, it is much better to say that the cause has such power by which it can produce the effect under certain conditions. Again it may be thought about the instrumental and other accessory agents that if they lead to the generation of effort, as indeed they do, they should also be accepted as subtle potential states of the effect. But this is not admitted by the Sāmkhyist, for according to him it is only the material cause which is regarded as the potential effect. Otherwise even the puruṣa, which, teleologically, is to be regarded as the instrumental cause of the world phenomenon, has to be regarded as a part of prakṛti. Again consider the destructive agents. Are the destructible effects already present in the destructible agent? It cannot be so, for they are entirely opposed to each other. If it were not so, it could not destroy it. If it were not so and yet if it would be destroyed by the destructive agent, then everything could be destroyed by everything.

Turning to the function of the material cause, it may be pointed out that it cannot be defined as that from which an effect is produced (tajjanyatva); for then even an instrumental cause would be included in the material cause. Nor can it be regarded as a modification (tadevikāratva), for then the effect would be only the quality of the cause, and there would be no difference between the cause


2 nāśaṣeṣu ca nāśya-vṛttir asti na vā. asti cet bahunau tūlavaḥ virodhaḥ na cet katham tadeva tasya nāśakam. Ibid. p. 60.
and the effect. But we see that the cloth is different from threads. If the effect is regarded as identical with the cause on the ground that though there cannot be any contact between the effect and the cause yet the former is never outside the latter, the obvious reply is that in the view that the effect is not a substance there need not be any contact, and if it is a property of the cause it is never beside it. On the view that the effect is a manifestation, it may be asked whether such a manifestation is eternal or itself an effect. In the former case no causal operation is necessary for the manifestation. In the latter case, if the manifestation be regarded as a separate effect, then it virtually amounts to a partial sacrifice of sat-kārya-vāda. If for the manifestation of a manifestation causal operation is necessary, then that will lead to a vicious infinite. Moreover, if manifestation is itself regarded as an effect, then since it did not exist before, its coming into being would involve the sacrifice of sat-kārya-vāda.

It may be urged that the production of an effect is not of the nature of the effect itself, for one always speaks of an effect as being produced. Thus the effect is different from production. If this is admitted, then what is the difficulty in accepting the view that the effect may be manifested? If the word production be considered more logical, then with regard to it also there may be the same question, whether a production is produced or manifested, and in the former case there would be infinite regress, and in the latter no necessity for the causal operation. With regard to the manifestation also there would be the same difficulty as to whether it is produced or manifested, and in both cases there would be vicious infinite. The reply to this is that production means the operation of the causal agents, and if this operation be again admitted to be produced by the operation of its own causal constituent, and that by another, there is no doubt an infinite regress, but it is not vicious and is admitted by all. When there is a movement of a specific nature in the thread, we say a cloth is produced, or rather at the very first moment of such a movement involving the cloth-state of the thread

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1 Food-dharmatva-śīrṣa-kta-doṣād eva ubhayastra paśa-vasthā tantvā-tmā na bhavati tantubhyo bhimatvāt ghaṭavad iti pratī-prayogasya śākyatvācca. Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 60.
2 Tadātmaya-virahēpi anuyataśrayādṛṣṭvāt samyogā-hāvah tad-dharma-
svabhāvatvād eva aprāpti-parihārāt iti anyathā-siddhasya asādhakatvāt. Ibid. p. 61.
we say that a cloth is produced\textsuperscript{1}. It is for this reason that we can speak of an effect as being produced. Such a production has no further production.

\textit{(e) Refutation of the Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness.}

The Buddhists hold that the theory of causal efficiency proves that whatever is existent must be momentary; for the same efficiency cannot be produced again and again. So, in accordance with each efficiency or the production of effects, a separate entity has to be admitted. Since the efficiency at two different moments cannot be identical, the entities producing them also cannot be identical. Since the different characters that are supposed to belong to the same object represent different efficiencies, their attribution to the same object is also erroneous. Therefore, there are as many different entities as there are different character points in a particular moment (\textit{yo yo} \textit{viruddha-dharma-dhyāsavān sa sa nānā}). To this Venkaṭanātha’s reply is that things are not associated with diverse opposite characters, and that though in certain cases, e.g. the flowing river or the flame of a lamp, changing entities may show the appearance of an unchanging whole, there are undeniable cases of true recognition in all such cases where we perceive that it is the same thing which we both see and touch. The fact that in such cases subconscious impressions may also be working should not be exaggerated to such an extent as to lead us to believe that recognition is a mere affair of memory. Recognition is a case where perception predominates, or at the worst it may be said to be a joint complex of memory and perception. The objection that the presence of memory falsifies recognition is wrong, for not all memory is false. It is also wrong to think that memory is only subjective and as such cannot lead us to an objective determination; for memory is not only subjective but has also an objective reference involving the time character of the objects as past. Again the Buddhists say that the association of many characters to an object is wrong, for each character-point represents the efficiency of a momentary unit, and that, therefore, the association of many characters in recognition is false. To this Venkaṭa’s reply is that if each momentary unit

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{yadā hi} \textit{tantra-dayāḥ vyāpriyante} \textit{tadā pāṭa utpadyate} \textit{iti} \textit{vyavaharanti} \textit{ādya-kṣaṇā-vacchinna-pāṭatvā-vaśthāi-va} \textit{vā pāṭo’ipattīr} \textit{ucyate} \textit{saś’eva} \textit{tadavasthasyo’ipattīr} \textit{iti} \textit{bhāsyam api} \textit{tad-abhiprāyam eva}. \textit{Sarvārtha-siddhi}, p. 62.
is by itself capable of producing any effect, it ought to do it by its own nature, and it ought not to wait for the assistance of other accessories. Following the same analogy, even the unique nature of any momentary unit would not be the same with any other unique nature of any other moment, and thus the idea of identity would be impossible and would land us in nihilism. It is, therefore, wrong to suppose that there is a separate entity corresponding to each and every character unit. The Buddhists are supposed to urge further that the experience of recognition identifies a past moment with a present, which is impossible. The reply of Veṇkaṭa is that though it would be absurd to connect a past moment with the present, there is no incongruity in associating them with an entity which has lived through the past and is also persisting in the present moment. It is true that the affirmation of a past time in the present is contradictory, but the real mystery of the situation is that one time appears as many under diverse conditions (upādhi). In such cases the contradiction arises in associating the different conditions in each other's conditioned time unit, but this does not imply that the reference to the different conditions and time is inadmissible; for had it been so, even the concept of a successive series of moments would be inadmissible, since the notion of successive moments implies a reference of before and after, and hence in some way or other it brings together the past, the present and the future. If this be not admitted, the very concept of momentariness would have to be sacrificed. If it is urged that momentariness (kṣaṇa-sambandhitva) means the unique self-identity of any entity, then that leads us to no new knowledge. Thus, the mere association of the past with the present leads us to no temporal self-contradiction.

Again the Buddhists are supposed to urge that perception refers

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2. kāla-dvayasyāḥ nyonyasminn-abhāve'pi tad-ubhaya-sambandhini vastuny abhāvā-bhāvāt yas tu tasmin vastuny asambaddha kālaḥ tasya tatra sādhvāvāṁ na brūmāḥ. Ibid. p. 68.
only to the present moment. It can never lead us to the comprehend-ension of the past. Our notion, therefore, that things existent in the past are persistent in the present is an illusion due to the operation of the subconscious root-impressions which ignore difference between the past and the present, and impose the former on the latter, as silver is imposed on conch-shell. The reply of Veṅkaṭa to this is that perception demonstrates only the presence of an object in the present moment as against its absence; but it does not on that account deny its existence in the past. Just as "this" indicates the presence of an object in the present moment, the perceptual experience "that is this" demonstrates the persistence of the object in the past and in the present. If it is urged that perception reveals its object as a present entity, then the Buddhist theory of perception as indeterminate (nirvikalpa), which cannot reveal the object as qualified by the temporal character as present, fails to the ground. If it is urged that perception reveals the existence of the object at the moment of the perceptual revelation, then also it is impossible in the Buddhist view, for the momentary object with which the sense-organ was in touch has ceased to exist by the time knowledge was produced. So, in whichever way the Buddhist may take it, he cannot prove that perception reveals an object only as present; whereas in the Rāmānuja view, since the sense-contact, the object as associated with it, and the temporal element associated with them, are continuous, the mental state is also continuous and as such the perception reveals the object as that with which the sense was in contact. Even after the cessation of the sense-contact, the mental state, indicating the perception of the object with which the sense was in contact, is comprehended.

Again if it is argued that whatever is invariably produced from anything must also be produced unconditionally without awaiting any causal operation, then it must be said that when leaves and flowers grow from a plant they do so unconditionally, which is absurd. Moreover, when in a series of momentary entities one entity follows another, it must do so without awaiting any cause; then, on the one hand, since each of the preceding entities has no

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1 yathā idam iti tat-kāla-sattā grhyate tathā tad idam iti kāla-dvaya-sattvam api pratyakṣenai'va grhitam. Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 69.
special function to fulfil, it is without any causal efficiency and as such is non-existent; and, on the other hand, since each succeeding entity rises into being without waiting for any cause, it may rise into being in the preceding moment as well, and if this is so there would be no series at all. Again it is argued that since whatever is produced must necessarily be destroyed, destruction as such is unconditioned and takes place without awaiting any cause. Negation can be unconditioned only when it is an implication of position which as such is never produced but is always associated with any and every position (e.g. cow implies the negation of a horse). But negations which are produced always depend on certain causes which can produce them just as much as any positive entity, as in the case of the destruction of a jug by the stroke of a stick. If it is argued that the stroke of a stick does not produce any destruction but only starts a new series of existence in the form of the particles of the jug, then also there are many other illustrations (e.g. the blowing out of a flame) in which the explanation of the starting of a new series is not available. If it is argued that negation is mere nothing and as such does not depend on a cause like chimerical entities, e.g. the lotus of the sky, such an explanation would be meaningless; for negations or destructions are conditioned in time just as are any positive entities, and as such are different from chimerical entities (pratiyogīvac eva niyata-kālatayā pramitasya atyanta-tucchatā-yogāt). If negations be regarded as similar to chimerical entities, then the former would be as beginningless as the latter, and, if this were so, then there would be no positive entities, all being beginningless negations. If negation were chimerical, then even at the time of negation there could be the positive entities, for negation being chimerical could not condition anything and this would amount to the persistence of all entities and cannot be acceptable to momentarists like the Buddhists. If negations were devoid only of certain specific characters, then they would be like the unique-charactered entities (svalakṣaṇa) which are also devoid of certain specific characters. If they were devoid of all characters (sarva-svabhāva-viraha), then they could have no place in a proposition which must affirm some predicate of them. If it is said that negation has a character as such, then that being its character it would not be devoid of any character. If such negations were not pre-existent, then their coming into being must depend on some
causal operation. If they were pre-existent, then there would not be any positive entities (prāk-sattve tu bhāvā-pahnavah).

If it is urged that the effect-moment as destruction is simultaneous with the cause-moment, then the positive entity and its destruction would occur at the same moment; and if this were so, there is no reason why the destruction should not precede the positive entity. If destruction is admitted to appear at a moment succeeding that of the production of the positive moment, then the destruction would not be unconditioned. If the sequence of the positive entity and its destruction be with reference to the positive entity itself and not to its production, then the positive entity would be the cause of the destruction. It cannot be said that destruction is conditioned only by the position, for its dependence on other accessory agents cannot be repudiated. It cannot be argued that the production of a moment is also its destruction, for that would be self-contradictory. It is sometimes maintained that difference does not constitute destruction, and hence the rise of a different-charactered moment does not imply the destruction of the previous moment. The destruction of a moment has thus to be regarded as a separate fact, and as such it is involved and inherent in the very production of a moment\(^1\). To this the reply is that a different-charactered entity must also be regarded as the destruction of the previous entity, for otherwise it would be impossible to assign any cause to the rise of such a different-charactered entity. If, again, the destruction be the very essence of an entity, then such an essence might as well manifest itself at the time of the rise of the present entity, and thus reduce it to the negation which would mean the universal negation of all things. If it is urged that an entity produces its own destruction by itself, then it would be meaningless to hold that destruction is unconditioned; and if it is thus conditioned by itself, it would be idle to suppose that it does not depend on any other condition, for there is no means of knowing it. If it is admitted that an entity produces its own destruction with the help of other accessories, then the doctrine of momentariness fails. It has also been shown before that the affirmation of momentariness is distinctly contradicted by the phenomenon of recognition.

\(^1\) yad yato bhidyate na tat tasya dhvamsah yathā ripasya rasah. dhvamsas tu kasyacid eva bhavati iti tad-ātmakah. atah svo-tpattāv eva svātmani dhvamse sannihite katham kṣaṇā-ntaram prāpnyāt. Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 72.
as elaborated above. Again when the momentarist says that all things are momentary, how does he explain the fact that the effect-moment is caused by the cause-moment? If causation means nothing more than immediate succession, then the universe at a particular moment is caused by the universe at the preceding moment. The problem is whether such immediacy of succession is by itself competent to produce the effect-moment or needs the accessories of space and time. If such accessories are not necessary, then spatial co-existence or concomitance (as in the case of smoke and fire) ought not to lead to any inference. If such accessories are awaited, then it would mean that whatever is produced at any unit of space has also its cause in that unit of space and that unit of time. On such a view the effect-moment would be in the space and time of the cause, and thus the cause-space or cause-time would be co-extensive in two moments. If this were admitted, then the momentarist might as well admit that the cause persists in two moments. So, the momentarist who does not admit persisting time and space cannot also admit that any sequence should be conditioned by them. If it is said that a cause-moment starts its effect in the very space or time in which it exists, then there would be no unity of the series between the cause and the effect; and, by supposition, they are regarded as having different sets of moments for themselves. There might be superimposition but no unity of the series. If the unity of the series be not admitted, then the expectation that just as when a cotton-seed is dyed there is redness in the cotton, so in the moral sphere whenever there is the vāsanā or root-inclination there is also its fruit, fails. The co-existence of the causal-moment and the effect-moment does not imply the unity that is expected in a normal cause and effect relation, and it would therefore be difficult to say that such an effect has such a cause, for the momentaristic theory cannot establish the bond between cause and effect.

Let us now analyse the concept of momentariness. It may mean the fact that (1) an entity is associated with a moment (kṣaṇa-sambandhavattva), or (2) association with a momentary unit of time (kṣaṇa-kāla-sambandhatvam), or (3) existence for only one moment (kṣaṇa-mātra-vartitva), or (4) absence of relation with two moments (kṣaṇa-dvaya-sambandha-śūnyatva), or (5) identity with the moment of time (kṣaṇa-kālatvam), or (6) being determinant of the moment-
character (ksaṇa-pādhītvam). The first alternative is inadmissible, for even those who believe in persistent entities admit that such entities, since they persist in time, are associated with a moment. The second alternative is inadmissible because the Buddhists do not believe in any separate category of time apart from the kṣaṇa. On such an admission, again, an entity as time which is beyond a kṣaṇa has to be virtually accepted, which contradicts the doctrine of momentariness. The third alternative is directly contradicted in the experience of recognition which testifies to the fact that we touch what we see. The fourth view is also for the same reason contradicted in experience; and if any supposed entity which is not itself a kṣaṇa is not associated with two time-moments, then it can have only a chimerical existence, and, curiously enough, the Buddhists often compare all existent entities with chimerical objects. The fifth alternative is also inadmissible, for just as an entity exists in a unit of space and cannot be identical with it, so also it cannot be identical with the time in which it exists, and it is directly contradicted in experience. The sixth alternative is also inadmissible for the reason that if objects were in their own nature determinants of moments, then there would be nothing to explain our notion of temporal succession; and all our experiences depending on such a succession would be contradicted. If things did not persist in time and were absolutely destroyed without leaving any trace (nirānaya-vināśaḥ), then the ordinary experience of the world in which things are done for the purpose of reaping their benefits could not be explained. The man who had done some work would not wait a moment for his reward. In the Rāmānuja view persistence of the self is well explained in self-consciousness. The theory that such a self-consciousness refers only to the succeeding terms produced in the series of the ālaya-vijñāna is only a theory which has no verification, and such a theory is directly contradicted by the well attested maxim that the experience of one individual cannot be remembered by another (na nyāya-drśtam smaraty anyāḥ). There is also no way in which the

1 kālam eva'nicchatas te ko'sau kṣaṇa-kālah kaś ca tasya sambandhaḥ. Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 74.
2 yasminnāmiṣṭaṁ nāsti kāryata'pi na vidyate tasmin yathā kha-puspādāviti śakyaṁ hi bhāṣitum. Ibid. p. 75.
3 yadā hi ghatā-dayah svarūpaṇa kṣaṇa-pādhayaḥ syuh kāla-tāratamya-dhiḥ kutrā'pi na bhavet. Ibid.
terms of the ālaya-vijñāna series may be associated with volitional notions.

If the momentariness of entities means that they are modified or conditioned by moments, then also the question arises if they are not themselves momentary, how can they be conditioned by moments? If the conditioning by moments means that causal collocations represent only the previous moment of the effect (kārya-prāga-bhāva-samanvita), then it may be urged by the opponent that it would be difficult to refute such momentariness. On the side of the opponent it may be further said that the criticism that the conglomeration of the causes is something different from, or identical with the conglomering entities, cannot be made; for, in either case, since such an entity would, according to the Rāmānujists, be a persisting one, it would not condition a moment. The reply is that conglomeration can neither mean relation nor the related entities; for the word “conglomeration” cannot apply specifically to each of the entities, and as such it is to be admitted that the causal entities, collected together by some condition, represent the conglomeration. If such entities are regarded as determining the moment, then they must necessarily be persistent. If it is held that the combining condition is the condition of the kṣaṇa, then the reply is that the production must be due to the joint operations of the combining conditions and the specific collocating entities. Of these the combining condition is not momentary, and since the collocating entities would stay till they were combined, they are also not momentary. The condition of the kṣaṇa seems, therefore, to be the last accessory agent or operation which associates with it the previous entities or operations and thereby behaves as the condition of the moment immediately antecedent to the effect. There is thus nothing momentary in it. Time being unlimited in its nature cannot be parcelled out in moments. The supposed moments can be attributed to an operation or an existing entity only for specifying particular states or conditions for practical purposes; but an entity that exists, exists in time, and thus outgrows the limits of a previous or later moment. So, though a specific unit of time may be regarded as momentary, the entity that exists, therefore, is not momentary in the nature of its own existence. Since the Buddhists do not admit time, they are not justified in speaking of momentary time in which things are sup-
posed to exist. Nor are they justified in holding that nature in itself suffers change in every moment, for that virtually amounts to the existence of a persisting entity which suffers modification.\(^1\)

The Buddhist assumption that things are destroyed entirely, and there are no elements in them that persist (niranvaya-vināśa), on the analogy that flames are destroyed without leaving any trace of their existence, is false. For, from various other instances, e.g. the case of jugs, cloth, etc., we find that their destruction means only a change of state and not entire annihilation; and from this analogy it is reasonable to suppose that the elements of the flame that are destroyed are not completely annihilated but persist in invisible forms. Even when a flame is destroyed, the tip of the wick is felt to be slightly warm, and this is certainly to be interpreted as a remnant of the heat possessed by the flame. If the last stage in the destruction of an entity be regarded as lapsing into entire annihilation, it would have no causal efficiency and as such would be non-existent. If the last stage is non-existent, then its previous stage also would have no causal efficiency and would be non-existent, and so on. This would lead to universal non-existence.

(f) \textit{Refutation of the Cārvāka criticism against the Doctrine of Causality.}

The problem of causality naturally brings in the question of time relation between the cause and the effect, i.e. whether the effect precedes the cause, or whether the cause precedes the effect, or whether they are simultaneous. If the effect precedes the cause, then it would not depend upon causal operation for its existence and it would then be an eternally existent entity like space. If it is not existent, then it cannot be brought into existence by any means, for a non-existent entity cannot be produced. If the effect were produced before the cause, then the so-called “cause” could not be its cause. If the cause and effect were simultaneous, then it would be difficult to determine which is the cause and which the effect. If the cause precedes the effect, then, again, it may be asked whether the effect was already existent or beside it. If it is already existent, there is no need of causal operation, and that which is to happen

\(^1\) sarva-ksanikatvam sādhatum upakramya sthira-dravya-cṛttita-ksanikavikāravad iti katham dṛṣṭāntayaṁ tēṣu ca na tvad-abhimatam kṣanikatvam pradīpā-di vad āsūṭāra-vināśīva-mātrena kṣanikato-kteḥ. Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 77.
later cannot be considered to be co-existent with that which was at a prior moment. If the effect was not co-existent with the cause, then what would be the bond which would determine why a particular cause should produce a particular effect and not others? Since production cannot be synonymous with what is produced, it must be different from it. Being a different entity, it may be demanded that production should have a further production, and that another, and this will lead to infinite regress.

To these objections Venkatanātha’s reply is that the opposition of negation with position can hold good only with reference to the same unit of time and space. Therefore, the non-existence of the effect at a prior moment has no opposition to its existence at a later moment. That there is a relation between the cause of a prior moment and the effect of a later moment can be directly experienced. Such a relation is, of course, not contact, but one of dependence, of one another, as prior and later, as is perceived in experience. The dialectical criticism that production, being a separate entity, demands a further production and so forth cannot be applied to the Rāmānuja view; for here the effect is regarded as only a modified condition or state of the cause. The effect depends upon the cause in the sense that it is identical with it as being its state\(^1\). Identity here, of course, does not mean oneness but identity in difference. The objection that no bond can be established in difference is found contradicted in our experience of cause and effect, and in many other cases, e.g. in the instance where a speaker tries to produce a conviction in his hearers who are different from him. The objection that a cause can be called a cause only by virtue of its doing some operation (\(kiṇcit\)-\(kara\)) and that its causality towards that operation must again involve the effectuation of some other operation, and thus there is an infinite regress, is invalid; for the existence of a number of operations (as given in experience) in producing an effect cannot lead to a vicious infinite, for only those operations which are revealed in experience can be accepted as having happened. In the case of spontaneous production (\(dvārā-n\)-\(tara-nirapekṣa\)), there is no necessity to admit any series of operations as the causality as invariable antecedent is directly given in

\(^1\) na hi vayam abhiyaktiṁ vā kāraṇa-samavāyā-dikāṁ vā jānme' ti brūmah. kintu' pādāṁ-vasthā-vrīḍāṁ tasya kāryā-vasthā-sāmānādhikaraṇya-vyapadesāḥ tādāmyena tad-āśraya-vṛttāḥ. Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 80.
experience. The objection that a cause is a cause because it produces the effect involves the previous existence of the effect, and hence the futility of the causal operation is invalid; for causality means the happening of an operation suitable to the becoming of the effect. This does not involve the prior existence of the effect, since the happening of the operation leading to the effect refers to the effect not as an existing fact but as anticipated in the mind of the observer (kārya-karātva eva karanasya kurvattvam). The objection that effect was a nature of the cause then it would be already there, and if it was not it could not come into being at any time, is also invalid on the supposition that there is an invariable uniformity of relationship (pratisambandhi-svabhāvacatā eva). The effect entity is numerically and characteristically different from the cause entity, but yet the former and the latter are related to one another as mutually determining each other (anyo-nirūpyatayā). The objection, that since the separate entities in a causal conglomeration cannot produce the effect, the conglomeration as a whole could not produce the effect, is invalid; for the capacity of the individual entities is defined in terms of their capacity in joint production (samuditānām kārya-karātva eva hi pratyekam api hi saktih). The further objection that since the cause is destroyed on its way to produce the effect, it (cause) itself being destroyed, ought not to be able to produce the effect, is not valid; for the production of the effect requires only the existence of the cause at a prior moment (purva-ksana-sattvam eva hi kāraṇasya kāryo-payogi).

Again it is urged that the concept of invariable priority which determines causation is itself indeterminable, for time as duration has no quality in itself. Priority and posteriority therefore have to be determined by other imposed conditions (upādhi), and the causal phenomena could be regarded as such an imposed condition. If this is so, priority and posteriority, which are in this view supposed to originate from causal conditions, cannot be regarded as determining causality. Again if conditions are supposed to split up time as pure duration into succession, then, since time is not regarded as discrete, the supposed conditions would have to refer to the whole of time, in which case there would be no succession.

Moreover, if the conditions were to refer to certain parts, discrete time has first to be accepted\(^1\). The reply to the above objection is that if by the force of the above argument time as succession is not admitted, then if things are in time they are eternal, and if they are not, they are chimerical; which is absurd. The objector is again supposed to urge that, all universals being eternally existing, priority and posteriority can never be referred mutually among them, or between them and individuals. Where the rise of the constellation Rohini is inferred from the rise of the constellation Kṛttikā, priority and posteriority are not between the two. The reply is to be found in the experience that such a qualified entity is produced from such other qualified entity where the universal and the individual merge together in a complex whole—a qualified entity\(^2\). Definite causal relations with definite effects are known from large experience of invariable antecedence between them, and this repudiates the idea of any denial of the uniformity of causal relation relating specific cause to specific effect. The notion of the plurality of causes is also therefore repudiated for the same reason. Where the same effect seems to be produced by different causes it is due to mal-observation and non-observation. A closer observation by experts reveals that though certain effects may be apparently similar yet they have specificity in their individual nature. By virtue of such specificity, each one of them can be referred to its own determinate cause. The negation-antecedent-to-being (prāga-bhāva) cannot by itself be regarded as determining the effect, for such negations in themselves, being beginningless, could not explain the occasion of an effect’s coming into being. Moreover, such negations involve in some form or other the effect to which it would give rise as its constituent; for, otherwise it could not be referred to or defined as a negation-antecedent-to-being of the effect. If an effect, being existent, be without any cause, it would be eternal; and if it be non-existent without any cause, then it would be chimerical. If the effect could happen by fits and starts, then its uniform dependence upon the immediate and invariable ante-

\(^1\) kāle ca pūrvattvam upādhi-kṛtaṁ sa ca upādhī yady ayam eva tadā tad-adhitanaḥ kālaḥ pūrvattvam kālaḥ-dhitanaḥ pādher ity anyonyā-srayaḥ. anyā-pekyāyām cakrakam anavasthaḥ pi kālasya kramavat upādhi-sambandha-bhedād bhedaścā kṛtnai-ka-deśa-vikalpa-duṣṭha iti. Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 82.

\(^2\) etad-dharmakād etad-dharmakam upajātām iti jāty-upādhi-krofi-kṛta-rūpena vyaktiṣu niyama-siddhaḥ. Ibid. p. 83.
cedents could not be explained. Thus the doctrine of causality stands unimpeached by any of the objections brought forward by the Carvākas.

(g) *The Nature of the Senses according to Veṅkaṭanātha.*

The Naiyāyikas think that the visual organ has for its material cause the eight elements, for though it cannot perceive any other sense-data it can grasp colours like a lamp; and, following a similar course of argument, they hold that the tactile organ is made up of air, the gustatory organ, of water, the smell-organ, of earth, and the auditory organ, of space-element (ākāśa). Veṅkaṭanātha’s main objection is directed against viewing the senses as the specific and most important instruments of the corresponding perceptions on the ground that in the act of perception many accessories, such as the subject, object, light, sense-organ, sense-contact, absence of obstruction, and other accessories participate in such a manner that it is impossible to single out the sense-organ as being the most important instrument (karāṇa). Even if the sense-faculties be regarded as different from the sense-organs, they may be considered as the special ways of the ego-hood (ahamkāra), and this is testified by scriptural texts. Merely on the ground that the visual sense-faculty can perceive colours, it would be wrong to argue that this sense-faculty is made up of the same element as colour; for the visual sense-faculty is not by itself responsible for the colour-perception. The special predominance of the visional organ over other accessories in colour-perception, by which its affinity with the colour element may be shown, cannot be established.

Veṅkaṭa urges that the same reasons that lead to the acceptance of the five cognitive senses lead also to the admission of the five conative senses and manas (mind). The function of the cognitive senses is believed to be of a special kind by which the senses can operate only in a special manner and under special conditions, and the same applies also to the conative senses. These are as much associated with the subtle body as the cognitive senses, and the view of Yadāvaprakāśa that the conative senses came into being with this body and were destroyed with its destruction is regarded as false. Manas, being a part of the evolution of prakṛti, cannot be regarded as all-pervasive. The ordinary argument that that which,

1 Nyāya-siddhānjana, p. 24.
being eternal, is not the material constituent of any other thing is all-pervasive, is faulty, for this is directly contradicted by the testimony of the scriptures, and according to the Rāmānuja view atoms are not the ultimate constituent of things. Again the argument that that which is devoid of specific qualities, like time, is all-pervasive is also untenable, for according to the Rāmānuja view there is nothing which is devoid of specific quality. The argument that since mind can remember very distant experiences it is all-pervasive is also faulty, for such remembrances are due to the contact of mind with specific subconscious root-impressions.

The senses are to be regarded as subtle (suksma) or atomic, and yet by their functioning or in association with other things they may behave as being spread out. It is for this reason that in the bodies of animals of different dimensions the same senses may spread over smaller or larger areas through such functions without which they have to be admitted as becoming larger or smaller according to the dimensions of the bodies in which they may operate. If manas is all-pervasive, or if it occupies the span of the body, then the cognition by all the five senses may arise at one moment. The senses are regarded by Veṅkaṭaṇā as abiding in the heart, whence they move through respective nerves to the particular sense-organs.

The sense operates by its function called vṛtti, which moves almost with the speed of light and grasps its object. There is thus a gradual operation of the sense-function passing from one place to another which, on account of its high speed, seems to be operative with regard to the object near at hand and also at a distance. This produces the appearance of simultaneous perception. The same process also holds good in the case of auditory perception. Since, according to the Rāmānuja school, senses are immaterial, their functions also are to be described as immaterial.

1 siddhe'pi hy anutve vikāsatayā vṛtti-viśeṣa-dvārāpyāyaka-pracayād vā prthuivam anigkāryam. Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 98.

2 According to the Śaṅkhya view, where also the senses are regarded as immaterial, the vṛtti is regarded as their transformation in the form of the object and not contact. The Yoga view, however, as explained by Bhikṣu, is that the citta passes through the senses and comes in contact with the object and is transformed into its form in association with the senses. The transformation, therefore, is not of the citta alone but of the citta together with the senses.
(h) The Nature of ākāśa according to Veṇkataṇātha.

Veṇkaṭaṇa tries to establish in some detail the supposed fact that the ākāśa is perceived by the visual organ, as in our well attested experience in perceiving the blue sky or the scarlet sky in the evening and also the movement of the birds through the sky. He denies the position that the existence of ākāśa can only be inferred through movements, for the ākāśa exists even in thick walls where no movement is possible. Ākāśa is not its pure vacuity; its existence is manifested by its non-obstruction to the movements of animals. Some of the Buddhists and the Carvākas argue that there are only four elements and that ākāśa is only the negation (āvaranā-bhāva). We do not perceive any ākāśa in a wall, but when it is split up we say that we perceive ākāśa. Such an ākāśa cannot be anything but a negation of obstruction; for if this is not admitted, then there is no negation of obstruction anywhere, all such cases being explainable on the supposition of ākāśa. It is this negation of obstruction, pure vacuity, which produces the illusion of some positive entity like a mirage. Such experiences may well be illustrated in those instances where the negation of pain is experienced as pleasure and negation of light as blue darkness. We are all familiar with the fact that mere linguistic usage sometimes produces an idea without there being an entity behind it, when someone says “the sharp horn of a hare.”

To this Veṇkaṭaṇa’s reply is that the existence of categories can only be justified by an appeal to experience, and we all have a positive experience of ākāśa. What we call negation is also a positive entity. The very negative concept can well be regarded as a positive notion. It is useless to argue that the negative concept differs from all positivity, for each specific category has its own special notion, and it is futile to argue why a particular entity should have its own peculiar concept. A negation is always defined as the absence of the positive entity of which the negation is affirmed. The positivity of ākāśa is established by its positive experience. The view that there is no ākāśa in occupied space is wrong, for when the occupying object is cut asunder we perceive the ākāśa and we affirm of it the negation of occupation. Thus the negation of occupation (āvar-
Ontological categories according to Venkaṭanātha

anā-bhāvā) is the predicate which is affirmed of the positive entity ākāśa, for in our experience of ākāśa we perceive that there is no occupation (āvarṇa) in the ākāśa (iḥa’varāṇaṁ nāsti). If this is not admitted, then such perceptions as “Here is an object” would be inexplicable, for the word “here” would have no meaning if it were mere absence of negation. If, again, ākāśa was absent in an occupying object, it would be unreasonable to define ākāśa as the absence of such an object; since nothing exists in itself, everything would on the above analogy become its own negation. The fact that ākāśa sometimes seems to show the false appearance of a surface is due also to the fact that it is an entity on which certain qualities are illusorily imposed. If it were mere nothing, there could have been no predication of false qualities to it. When it is said that the negation of pain is falsely conceived as pleasure, the fact is that the so-called negation is only another kind of positivity.

In the case of chimerical entities such as the sharp hare’s horn there is an affirmation of horn in the hare, and when the horn is known there is a deliberation in our mind whether our notion of sharpness is true or false. The affirmation of sharpness, therefore, is not on mere negation. The falsity of chimerical predication also consists of affirming a predicate to a subject which in the course of nature it does not possess, and there is nothing like pure falsity or non-existence in such notions. When one says that there is no occupation here he must show the locus where the occupation is denied or negated; for a negation implies a locus. The locus of the negation of occupation would be pure space (ākāśa). If the negation of occupation meant absolute non-existence, then that would land us in nihilism. If the occupation (āvarana) did exist anywhere or did not exist anywhere, then in either case the production or destruction of such occupation would be undemonstrable; for an existent thing is never produced nor destroyed and a non-existent thing is neither produced nor destroyed. Thus, for these and other considerations, ākāśa, which is neither eternal nor all-pervasive, has to be regarded as a separate positive entity and not as mere negation of occupation. Dīk or the quarter of the sky, north, south, etc., should


2 duḥkhā-bhāve sukhā-ropāt abhāvavya bhāvā-nyatva-mātram eva hy asatvaṁ siddham tena ca svarūpa-sann eva’sau. Ibid.
not be regarded as separate entities, but it is the sky, or ākāśa, which appears as different kinds of dik on account of its association with different conditions of the perceiver and the perceived space-relations.

(i) Nature of Time according to Veṅkaṭanātha.

Time is eternal and beginningless, for any conception in which it might be held that time were produced would involve the view that time was non-existent before its production. This, as it is easy to see, involves a notion of before and after, and as such it may be presumed that without the assumption of time even the production of time cannot be perceived. Time is directly perceived as a quality of all perceived entities. If time is regarded as being only inferable, then since it is intimately associated with all perceptible things the non-apprehension of time by direct perception would mean that the perceived objects also are not directly apprehended but known by inference. Even those who deny the separate existence of time explain it as an unreal notion of things in relation with the movement of the sun. Thus, the category of time, whether it is admitted as real or unreal, is taken as a quality or mode of perceived things and is apprehended along with them. There is no other time than what is conceived as before and after, as modes of our experience. It may be argued that with the exception of recognition all our experiences relate to the present and as such in the apprehension of objects by perception there is no notion of before and after which constitutes time, so there is no direct perception of time. To this the suggested discussion is whether, when objects are apprehended, they are apprehended as present or not, or whether only the notion of "the present" is apprehended without any association of any other object. Such views are directly contradicted in such experience as "I see this," where the object is demonstrated as being perceived at the present time. Perception thus refers both to the object and to its temporal character as present. It cannot be said that the temporal character is only illusorily imposed upon the perceived object; for in that case it must be shown that the temporal character was at least somewhere perceived or known independently by itself. It is argued that the sense-characters are perceived as "present," and this notion of the "present" is illusorily imposed upon time. To this it may be replied that in the passing series of the momentary
sense-characters it is impossible to point out anything as “present,” since these are only perceived as “before” and “after”; by the time anything could be designated as “present” it is already past. Thus the point of time as present is undemonstrable. If the time as present may be affirmed of any sense-character, it may be affirmed of time itself. Again if time were non-existent, what is the use of assuming its imposition? If it is held that there is only the imposition of time-conception without any entity of which it is affirmed, then it would become the blind phenomenalism of the nihilists. In the Rāmānuja view of things it is possible somehow to affirm the notion as “present” of time just as it is affirmed of the sense-characters. It cannot be said that time is merely a character of the sensibles, and that there is no other entity as time apart from these sensibles; for the temporal character of the sensibles as “present” is only possible on the assumption that there is such a thing as “present” time. Again if the “present” is denied, then that would mean universal negation, for the past and future are never perceived by us. Moreover, the present cannot be conceived as something different or unrelated and independent of the past and the future. If the past and the future were regarded as constituting the present, then our experience would only be related to the past and the future and there would be no possibility for any of our present afflictions. “Present” thus may be regarded as that series of operations which has begun but has not as yet ended in fruition.

Though time is one and eternal it can appear as limited and many, like all other objects which, though they may remain as one, may yet be supposed to be many and different in respect of the states through which they may seem to pass by virtue of the various conditional qualities (upādhi-sambandha) with which they may be associated. Though this view may be regarded as sufficient in explaining the notion of limited time, yet there are others who think that unless time itself is supposed to be constituted of moments through which time as changeable may be apprehended, the association of conditions to explain the notion of limitation will be impossible; for such an association presupposes the fact of limitation in time to which alone the conditions could be referred. Thus, Yādavaprakāśa holds that time is beginningless and endless, and continually transforms itself through moments by which the divisions of time as hours, days and nights can be spanned; through
which again the transformation of all changeable objects can be measured. In this view the conditions are relative from the point of view of each person, who collects the passing time-units and forms his own conceptions of minutes, hours and days from his own point of calculation according to his own needs. A valid objection, however, may be raised against such a view when it is pointed out that the criticism that was made against the association of conditional qualities to partless time may also be raised against the present view in which time is regarded as constituted of parts as moments. For it may well be said that the parts would require further parts for associating the conditional qualities; and if it does, there would be a vicious infinite and if it does not, then it will be admitted that the whole of a moment would not require a specification of parts for the association of conditional qualities. If the whole of a moment does not stand in need of any specification of parts for such association, why should time as a whole require it? The explanation that the association of a conditional quality with a part means its association with the whole on the analogy of the association of qualities in a substance is equally applicable to partless time. Venkata points out that though the moments are adventitiously conceived on account of the variety of conditional qualities, time in itself is eternal. "Eternal" means that it is never destroyed. Time is thus co-existent with God. It is a material cause with reference to its own modifications and is the efficient cause with reference to everything else. The scriptural pronouncements that God is all-pervading can be harmonized with the all-pervading character of time by conceiving it to be co-existent with God.

(j) The Nature of Soul according to Veṅkaṭanātha.

Veṅkaṭanātha first tries to establish the existence of the soul as different from the body, and in this connection tries to refute the well-known Carvaka arguments which do not admit the existence of a soul as different from the body to which the former may be supposed to belong. The main emphasis of Veṅkaṭa's arguments lies in the appeal to the testimony of our experience which manifests the body as a whole and its parts as belonging to an "I," as

when we say “my body,” “my head,” etc. He says that though we have various parts of one body and though some of these may be destroyed, yet in spite of such variations they are all supposed to belong to one unchangeable unity, the self, which seems to persist through all changes of time. If the experiences belonged to the different parts of the body, then on the removal of any of the limbs the experiences which are associated with that limb could not be remembered; for it cannot be admitted that there is a transmission of experiences from one limb to another. Even a mother’s experience cannot be shared by the foetus. It cannot also be supposed that the experiences of the different limbs are somehow collected as impressions in the heart or brain; for it can neither be directly perceived, nor is there a datum which can lead to such an inference. Moreover, if there is a continual accumulation of impressions in the heart or brain, such a matter of conglomeration would be different at each moment through dissipation and aggregation of its constituent impressions, and as such it would be impossible to explain the fact of memory through such a changing entity\(^1\).

The unified behaviour of an individual cannot also be regarded as being due to the co-operation of a number of individual units of consciousness; for, in that case there must be individual purposes in each of them, leading to a conflict, and if they have no such purposes, there is no reason why they should co-operate together. If it is assumed that these individual constituent conscious-entities are naturally such that they are engaged in serving one another without any conflict, then the more normal possibility would be that, having no natural attachment or antipathy, they would cease to act, and this would result in a cessation of all activities on the part of the constituted individual as a whole. Again whenever an animal is born it is perceived as endowed with certain instinctive tendencies towards certain action, such as sucking the mother’s breast, which demonstrates its attachment in that direction and necessarily presupposes an experience of that kind in a previous birth. This shows that there is a self which is different and distinct from the body and its parts. The experiences and their root-impressions

\(^1\) sarva-bodhaiś ca hṛt-kośe samskārā-dhānam ityāpi
na dṛṣṭam na ca tat-kliptau liṅgaṁ kim api dṛṣyate
na ca samskāra-kośas te saṅghātā-tmā pratī-kaṇaṁ
pracayā-pacayābhāyāṁ syād bhinnāḥ smartātra ko bhavet.

also explain the diversity of intellectual powers, tendencies and inclinations. It cannot also be held that the units of consciousness of the different parts of the body are in themselves too subtle and potential to manifest themselves in their individual capacity, but they may yet co-operate together jointly to manifest the consciousness of the individual as a whole; for even the smallest molecular animals are found to be endowed with behaviouristic action. Moreover, if the units of consciousness emanating from the different parts of the body are admitted to be only potentially conscious, then it is absurd to suppose that they will be able to produce actual consciousness by mere conglomeration.

Again consciousness is a quality and as such it must await a substratum to which it would belong, but in the view in which consciousness is supposed to be material, the fundamental distinction between a quality and a substance is not observed. It cannot also be held that consciousness is but a special modification of certain of the bodily elements, for this would only be a theory, which cannot be attested by any experience. Again to such of the Čārvākas as admit the validity of inference, it may be urged that the body is a matter-complex; and, being but a conglomeration and sensible, is material like any other material object, whereas consciousness, being something entirely different from the body by virtue of its being consciousness, is also entirely distinct from it. The ordinary illusory notion which confuses the self with the body can be explained in diverse ways. The objector may say that if from such notions as "my body," "my hand," etc., it is argued that the self is something different from the body, then from such expressions as "my self" one may as well argue that the self has a further self. To this Veṅkaṭa's reply is that such expressions as "my hand" and "my body" are like such other expressions as "my house" and "my stick," where the distinction between the two things is directly apprehended. In such an expression as "my self" we have a linguistic usage in which the possessive case can be explained only in the sense of ideality, having only such an imaginary distinction between the two terms as may be in the mind of the observer at the

2 nanu caitanyam iti na kaścid gunah, yasya'dhāro'peksyāḥ kintu ya'sau yuṣ-mākam caitanya-sāmāgri sa vā caitanya-pādārthāḥ syāt. Ibid. p. 154.
moment and due to his emphasizing a difference from a conditional point of view. Veṅkaṭa holds that further arguments may also be brought forward by the Carvākas\(^1\), to which effective replies may be given. But instead of going into a big chain of arguments and counter arguments the most effective way is to appeal to the testimony of scripture which in its self-validity affirms both positively and by implication the existence of the permanent self as distinct from the body. The testimony of the scriptures cannot be rebutted or refuted by mere speculative arguments.

There is a view that consciousness belongs to the senses and that cognitions through the different senses are integrated together in the same body, and it is by that means that an object perceived by the eye is also identified as the same entity as that grasped by the tactile apprehension. Another view is that the pleasurable, painful feelings associated with sense-cognitions can themselves attract or repulse an individual to behave as a separate entity who is being attracted or repelled by a sense-object. Veṅkaṭa objects to such a doctrine as being incapable of explaining our psychological experience in which we feel that we have touched the very thing that we have seen. This implies that there is an entity that persists over and above the two different cognitions of the two senses; for the

\(^1\) The additional arguments of the Carvākas are as follows:

When one says “I, a fat person, know,” it is difficult to say that the fatness belongs to the body and the knowledge to some other entity. If the expression “my body” seems to imply that the body is different, the expression “I am fat” demonstrates the identity of the body and the self. What is definitely perceived cannot be refuted by inference, for in that case even fire could be inferred as cold. Perception is even stronger than scriptures and so there is no cause of doubt in our experience; therefore there is no reason to have recourse to any inference for testing the perceptual experience. The Sāṃkhya argument, that those which are the results of aggregation must imply some other entity for which the aggregation has been named (just as a bedstead implies someone who is to lie on the bed), is ineffective; for the second-grade entity for which the first-grade conglomeration is supposed to be intended may itself await a third grade entity, and that another, and this may lead to a vicious infinite. To stop this vicious infinite the Sāṃkhya thinks that the self does not await for any further entity. But instead of arbitrarily thinking the self to be ultimate, it is as good to stop at the body and to think that the body is its own end. The argument that a living body must have a soul because it has life is false, for the supposed self as distinct from the body is not known to us by other means. One might as well say that a living body must have a sky-lotus because it has life. The Carvāka ultimately winds up the argument and says that the body is like an automatic machine which works by itself without awaiting the help of any other distinct entity presiding over it, and is the result of a specific modification of matter (ananyā-dhiṣṭhita-svāyam-vāhaka-yantra-nyāyād vicitra-bhūta-parinatī-viśeṣa-sambhava-yām deha-yantraḥ). Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 157.
visual and the tactile sense-organs are limited to the apprehension of their own peculiar sense-data or sensibles, and none of them is competent to affirm the identity of the object through two different sense-appearances or sense-characteristics. Veṅkaṭa further says that the view that the impressions of the various senses accumulate in the heart, and that it is through such an integration of experiences in the heart that there is an appearance of one concrete individual, is wrong; for no such centre of integration of impressions inside our bodies is known to us, and if such a centre in the body is to be admitted there is no harm in admitting a separate soul in which these impressions inhere\(^1\).

Consciousness also cannot be regarded as the self, for consciousness is an experience and as such must belong to some individual separate and distinct from it. In the passing conscious states there is nothing that abides and persists which can integrate the past and present states in itself and develop the notion of the person, the perceiver. Therefore, it has to be admitted that there is a conscious ego to which all cognitions and experiences belong. Such an ego is self-luminous in the sense that it is always manifest by itself to itself and not merely the locus of self-knowledge. Such a self-revealing ego is present even in our dreamless sleep, and this is attested by later recollections in which one feels "I slept happily"; and it is not contradicted by any experience. Even when one is referred to by another as "you" or "this," the ego in the latter is all the time self-manifested as "I." Such an ego refers to the soul which is a real agent and experiencer of pleasure and pain and a cognizer of all cognitions and as such is a real moral agent and is therefore distinguished from other kindred souls by its specific efforts leading to specific kinds of deeds and their fruits. The efforts, however, of the individual agents are themselves pre-determined by the resulting fruits of actions in previous births, and those by other actions of other previous births. Those who say that efforts lead to no efforts contradict themselves in all the practical behaviour which presupposes a belief in the efficacy of efforts. Only such of the efforts as are directed towards the attainment of the impossible or towards objects which require no effort are found

\(^1\) tvad-\(iṣṭa\)-\(sāmkṛa\)-\(kośe\) māṇā-\(bhāvāt\), anekeśām aham-\(arthaḥ\)aṁ eka-\(śaṅkṛa\)-yoge ca tataś ca varam yatho-\(palambham\) ekasminn aham-arthe sarvais \(sāmkṛa\)-\(dhānam\). Survārtha-siddhi, p. 160.
to be ineffective, whereas all other efforts are attended with fruition.

Venkata urges that the theory which holds that there is but one Brahman which appears as many by its association with different minds is false; for we know that the same individual is associated with different bodies in the series of his transmigrations, and such an association with different bodies cannot produce any difference in the individual. And if this is so, that is, if association with different bodies cannot induce a difference in the individual, there is no reason why one Brahman should become many by its association with different minds. Again the view that holds that the individuals, though really different from one another, are so far identical that they are all but parts of pure Being—the Brahman—is equally false; for if the Brahman is thus one with the individual, it should also be exposed to all its sufferings and imperfections, which is absurd.

Brahmadatta held that Brahman alone is eternal and unborn and the individual souls are born out of it. Venkata criticizes this view and propounds the theory that the souls are all uncreated and unborn. They are to be regarded as permanent and eternal; for if they are believed to be changing during the continuance of their body, then the continuity of purposive activity will be inexplicable. If they are destroyed with the death of the body, then the *karma* theory and all theories of moral responsibility have to be given up.

The soul, however, is not all-pervasive; for the Upaniṣads speak of it as going out of the body. The argument for all-pervasiveness of the soul as given by the *Naiyāyikas* is as follows. Virtue and vice are associated with a particular soul and may produce such changes in the material world, even in distant places, as would conduce to the enjoyment or suffering of that particular individual; and since virtue and vice are associated with a particular soul, they could not produce their effects on a distant place unless the soul, their locus, is co-extensive with those places. This, however, does not apply to the Rāmānujists, for according to them virtue and vice are only terms which mean that God has either been pleased or displeased owing to the particular kinds of deeds of an individual, and God’s pleasure or displeasure has no limitations of operation.

1 *iha hi dharmā-dharma-sabdaḥ karma-nimite-svara-priti-kopa-rūpa-buddhi-dyotakah. asti hi śubhe tv asau tasyati duṣkyte tu na tasyate' sau paramah śarīr iiti. Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 179.*
From the opponent’s point of view, even if the self is regarded as all-pervasive, that would not explain the happening of favourable or unfavourable effects; for though the self may be co-extensive with those distant places, yet its adṛṣṭa or unseen merit occurs not throughout the entire pervasive self, but only in a part of it, and as such, since it is not in touch with the place where the effect will happen, it cannot very well explain it.

\[(k)\] The Nature of Emancipation according to Venkatanātha.

Venkatanātha says that an objection has been raised by some that if individuals had been in the state of bondage from beginningless time, there is no reason why they should attain emancipation at some future date. To this the reply is that it is admitted by all that there is every hope that at some time or other there will be such a favourable collocation of accessories that our \textit{karma} will so fructify that it will lead us out of bondage, through the production of sight of discrimination and disinclination, to enjoyment of all kinds that it may give God an opportunity to exercise His mercy. Thus, though all are in a state of bondage from beginningless time, they all gradually find a suitable opportunity for attaining their emancipation. Thus, God extends His grace for emancipation only to those who deserve it by reason of their deeds, and it is theoretically possible that there should be a time when all people would receive their salvation and the world process would cease to exist. Such a cessation of the world-process will be due to His own free will, and thus there is not the slightest reason for fear that in such a state there will have been any obstruction to God’s free and spontaneous activity from extraneous sources. Man is led to the way of emancipation by his experience of suffering, which nullifies the pleasure of our mundane life. He feels that worldly pleasures are limited (\textit{alpa}) and impermanent (\textit{asthira}) and associated with pain. He thus aspires to attain a stage in which he can get unlimited pleasure unmixed with suffering. Such an emancipation can be brought about only through the love of God (\textit{bhakti}). \textit{Bhakti}, however, is used here in the sense of meditation or thinking with affection\textsuperscript{1}. Such a \textit{bhakti} also produces knowledge, and such a

\[1\] mahanita-viśaye prittir bhaktih prity-ādayaś ca jñāna-viśeśā iti vakṣyate sneha-pūrvam anudhyānam bhaktih. \textit{Sarvārtha-siddhi}, p. 190.
knowledge is also included in bhakti. Bhakti is defined here as unceasing meditation (dhruvā-nusmṛti), and this therefore has to be continually practised. The Śankarite view that emancipation can be attained by mere knowledge is false. In the Upaniṣads knowledge means unceasing meditation, and this has to be continued and only then can it be regarded as upāsanā, which is the same as bhakti.

The performance of the prescribed duties is helpful to the production of knowledge in the sense of bhakti by counteracting the wrong influence of such karmas as are antagonistic to the rise of true knowledge. Thus the prescribed duties are not to be performed along with the practice of bhakti, and they are not both to be regarded as joint causes of emancipation; but the performance of duties is to be interpreted as helping the rise of bhakti only by removing the obstructive influences of other opposing karmas. The performance of scriptural duties including sacrifices is not incompatible with devotional exercises, for the gods referred to in the Vedic sacrifices may also be regarded as referring to Brahman, the only god of the Vaiṣṇavas. The absolutely (nitya) and the conditionally (naimittika) obligatory duties should not be given up by the devotee, for mere cessation from one’s duties has no meaning; the real significance of the cessation from duties is that these should be performed without any motive of gain or advantage. It is wrong to suppose that emancipation can be attained only by those who renounce the world and become ascetics, for a man of any caste (varna) and at any stage of life (āśrama) may attain it provided he follows his normal caste duties and is filled with unceasing bhakti towards God.

It is well to point out in this connection that duties are regarded as threefold. Those that are absolutely obligatory are called nitya. No special good or advantage comes out of their performance, but their non-performance is associated with evil effects. Those that are obligatory under certain circumstances are called naimittika. If these duties are not performed under those special circumstances, sin will accrue, but no special beneficial effects are produced by

their performance. Those duties which are to be performed only if the person is desirous of attaining special kinds of pleasurable ends such as residence in Heaven, the birth of a son, and the like, are called kāmya. Now a man who wishes to attain emancipation should give up all the kāmya duties and refrain from all actions prohibited in the scriptures, but he should perform the nitya and the naimittika duties. Though the performance of the nitya and the naimittika duties is associated with some kind of beneficial results, inasmuch as such performance keeps away the evil and the sinful effects which would have resulted from their non-performance, yet these, being fruits of a negative nature, are not precluded for a person who intends to attain emancipation. For such a person only the performance of such actions as bring positive pleasures is prohibited. When it is said that actions of a devotee should have no motive, this does not mean that it includes also actions which are performed with the motive of pleasing God; for actions with motive are only such actions as are performed with motives of one’s own pleasure, and these are always associated with harmful effects.

It has already been said that the naimittika duties should be performed; but of these there are some which are of an expiatory nature, called prāyaścitta, by which the sinful effects of our deeds are expiated. A true devotee should not perform this latter kind of expiatory duties, for the meditation of God with love is by itself sufficient to purge us of all our sins and indeed of all our virtues also; for these latter, as they produce heavenly pleasures as their effects, obstruct the path of emancipation as much as do our sins. All that narrows our mind by associating it with narrow ends is to be regarded as sinful. Judged from this point of view even the so-called meritorious actions (punya) are to be regarded as harmful to a devotee who intends to attain emancipation. Virtue (dharma) can be regarded as such only relatively, so that actions which are regarded as virtuous for ordinary persons may be regarded as sinful for a person inspired with the higher ambition of attaining emancipation. For a true devotee who has attained the knowledge...
of Brahman and is pursuing the meditation of God, sinful or virtuous actions are both inefficacious, the older ones being destroyed by the meditation itself and the new ones incapable of being associated with him—the wise man.

The eschatological conception of the Rāmānuja school as explained by Veṅkaṭa is that the soul of the true devotee escapes by a special nerve in the head (mūrdhanya-nādi) and is gradually lifted from one stage to another by the presiding deities of fire, day, white fortnight, the vernal equinox, year, wind, the sun, the moon, lightning, Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati, who are appointed by God for the conducting of the departed devotee.\(^1\)

The state of final emancipation is regarded as the rise of the ultimate expansion of the intellect. But though this is a state which is produced as a result of devotional exercises, yet there is no chance that there would ever be a cessation of such a state, for it is the result of the ultimate dissociation of all causes, such as sins or virtues, which can produce a contraction of the mind. Therefore, there can never be a falling off from this state.

An emancipated person can assume bodies at his own will. His body is not a source of bondage to him, for only those whose bodies are conditioned by their *karma* may be supposed to suffer bondage through them. The state of emancipation is a state of perfect bliss through a continual realization of Brahman, to whom he is attached as a servant. This servitude, however, cannot beget misery, for servitude can beget misery only when it is associated with sins. The emancipated person is omnipotent in the sense that God is never pleased to frustrate the fulfilment of his wishes.

The emancipated person regards all things as being held in Brahman as its parts and as such no mundane affair can pain him, though he may have the knowledge that in the past many things in the world caused him misery.

Veṅkaṭa denied the possibility of attaining emancipation in this life, for the very definition of emancipation is dissociation from life, sense-organs and the body generated by *karma*. So when we hear of *jīvanmukta* or those emancipated in their lifetime, it is to be interpreted to mean a state similar to the state of emancipation. The contention of the Advaitins that the principal *avidyā* vanishes with knowledge, yet that its partial states may still continue binding

\(^1\) Sarvārtha-siddhi, pp. 226–227.
the emancipated person with a body, is false. For if the principal avidyā has vanished, its states cannot still continue. Moreover, if they do continue in spite of the knowledge, it is impossible to imagine how they will cease at the death of the emancipated person.

**God in the Rāmānuja School.**

We have seen that according to Rāmānuja the nature and existence of God can be known only through the testimony of the scriptures and not through inference. Veṅkaṭa points out that the Śāmkhya theory that the world-creation is due to the movement of prakṛti, set in operation through its contiguity with the puruṣas, is inadequate; for the Upaniṣads definitely assert that just as the spider weaves its net, so does God create the world. The scriptures further assert that God entered into both the prakṛti and the puruṣas, and produced the creative movement in them at the time of creation¹. The Yoga view of God—that He is only an emancipated being who enters into the body of Hiranyagarbha or adopts some such other pure body—is also against all scriptural testimony. It is also idle to think that the world-creation is the result of the cooperative activity of the emancipated spirits, for it is much against the scriptural testimony as also against the normal possibility, since there cannot be such an agreement of wish among the infinite number of emancipated beings that would explain the creation of the world by unobstructed co-operation. Thus, on the strength of the scriptural testimony it has to be admitted that God has engaged Himself in world-creation, either for the good of the created beings or through His own playful pleasurable activity. The enjoyment of playful activity is not to be explained as anything negative, as avoidance of ennui or langour, but as a movement which produces pleasure of itself². When we hear of God’s anger, this is not to be regarded as indicating any disappointment on God’s part, for He is ever complete in Himself and has nothing to attain or to lose. So God’s anger is to be interpreted simply as meaning His desire to punish those who deserve punishment.

¹ prakṛtiṁ puruṣam ca’va pravītyā’tme-cchayā harih. kṣobhayāmāsa samprāptē sarga-kāle vyāyā-tyayyau. Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 252.

According to the Rāmānuja system the individual souls and the material world form the body of God (śāriṇa). Anantārya of the Śeṣārya family, following Venkaṭa’s treatment of this doctrine in the Nyāya-siddhā-ñjana, elaborates upon the same and enters into a critical analysis of the conception and significance of the notion of the body of God, which is not unworthy of our notice. He refuses to accept the view that the notion of body (śāriṇa) involves a class-concept (jāti); for though the notion of a body is found applicable in each specific instance of a body, the existence of such a notion is always associated with one or other of those specific instances and as such it does not justifi the assumption of the existence of a separate category as a self-existent universal bodiness. All that one can say is that there is a universal notion of bodiness associated with the individual bodies\(^1\). All notions of class-concepts may therefore be explained in the same manner as notions which are associated with particular kinds of groupings in their aggregate characters, and in this way they may be regarded as somewhat similar to collective notions such as an army or assembly\(^2\). Vātṣya Śrīnivāsa, however, in his Rāmānuja-siddhānta-saṅgīraha, explains the notion of class-concepts as being based upon the notion of close similarity of collocative groupings. He says that when two collocative groupings are both called cow, nothing more is seen than those individual collocative groupings. That they are both called cow is due to the fact of close similarity (sausādrśya) subsisting between those groupings\(^3\). Thus there is no other entity apart from

\(^1\) *na ce'daṁ śāriṇam idaṁ śāriṇam ity anugata-pratītīr eva tat-sādhikā, anugata-pratītīḥ bādhaka-virāhe jāti-sādhakatvād iti vācyam, siddhānte anugata-pratītīḥ samsthāṇa-viṣayakatvena tad-atirikta-jāti-sādhakatvā-sambhavāt. Anantārya, Śāriṇa-vāda (MS.).*


\(^3\) *ayaṁ sāśnā-dimāṁ ayam api sāśnā-dimar iti sāśnā-dir eva anuvṛttā-vyavahāra-viṣayo drīṣyate, anuvṛtta-dhi-vyavahāra-viṣayas tad-atirikto na kaścid api drīṣyate. tasmād ubhaya-sampratīpanna-samsthānena vai susadrśo-pādhī-vaśād anugata-dhi-vyavahāro-papattāv atirikta-kalpane mānā-bhāvāt, susadrśatvam eva gotvā-dimāṁ anuvṛttāḥ. Rāmānuja-siddhānta-saṅgīraha (MS.).*

Vātṣya Śrīnivāsa defines close similarity as the special character which may be regarded as the cause of the apprehension of generality amidst differences (pratiyogyi-nirūpya-pratītyakṛti-vilākṣana-viṣayā niśṭha-sādṛśa-vyavahāra-sādṛśa-ṛaṇa-kāraṇa-dharma-viśeṣas sausādrśyam). This similarity leads to the application of names to similar objects. When it subsists between two substances, we call it similarity of character (dharma-sādṛśya). When it subsists between entities other than substances (a-dravya) we call it similarity of essence (sva-rūpa-sādṛśya).
our notion of universality arising from specific similarity of similar groupings (tāvad-visayaka-jñana-rūpa-jāti-visayakatvā-ṅgikāreṇa).

Anantārya refers to the definition of śarīra in the Rāmānuja-bhāṣya as that which is liable to be held or controlled in its entirety for the purpose of spirit, and is thus merely a means to its end (cetanasya yad dravyaṁ sarvā-tmanā svārthe niyantum dhārayitum śakyam tac ceṣṭai-ka-svarūpaṇca tat tasya svarūpaṁ). Sudarśanacārya, the author of the Śruta-prakāśikā, interprets this definition as meaning that when the movement of anything is wholly determined by the desire or will of any spirit and is thus controlled by it, the former is said to be the body of the latter (kṛti-prayukta-svīya-cesṭā-sāmānyakatva-rūpa-niyāmyatvam śarīra-pada-pravṛtti-nimittam). When it is said that this body belongs to this soul, the sense of possession (ādheyatva) is limited to the fact that the movements in general of that body are due to the will of that spirit or soul. A servant cannot be called the body of his master on the same analogy, for only some of the movements of the servant are controlled by the will of the master. The assumption that underlies the above definition is that the movement in the animal and vegetable bodies presided over by individual souls and in the inanimate objects presided over by God is due to the subtle will-movements in these specific souls, though they may not always be apprehended by us.

But anticipating the objection that there is no perceptual evidence that the physico-biological movements of bodies are due to subtle volitions of their presiding souls, a second definition of śarīra has been suggested in the bhāṣya of Rāmānuja. According to this definition a body is said to be that which may as a whole be held fast and prevented from falling by the volitional efforts of a spirit. But an objection may still be raised against such a definition, as it cannot explain the usage which regards the souls as being the

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1 Śarīra-vāda (MS.).
2 etaj-jīvasedam sarīram ity-ādau ādheyatvam tasya ca śartrā-padārthai-kadeśe krtau anuyavād vā taj-jīva-nīṣṭha-kṛti-prayukta-svīya-cesṭā-sāmānyakam īdam iti bodhaḥ. Ibid.
3 jīva-sarīre vyāsādau tīvra-sarīre parvaṭādau ca sūkṣmasya tat-tat-kṛti-prayukta-cesṭā-viśeṣasya anāgyādān na śarīra-ṛṇavahūra-viśayate-vā-nupapattih. Ibid.
bodies of God (yasyātmā śarīram). The souls have no weight and as such it is absurd to suppose that God prevents them from falling down, and in that way they are related to Him as bodies. The definition may therefore be modified to the extent that a body is that which is wholly held together in a contactual relation with a particular spirit through its own volition. But a further objection may also be raised against this modification, for the definition, even so modified, fails to include time and other entities which are all-pervasive. Now the contactual relation subsisting between two all-pervasive entities is held to be eternal and uncaused. So the contactual relation of God with time and the like cannot be held to be caused by the volition of God, and if this be held to be the connotation of the body, time, etc., cannot be regarded as the body of God. So a different definition has been given which states that a body is a substance which is wholly dependent upon and subservient to a spirit. Dependence and subserviency are to be understood in the sense of productivity of a special excellence. Now, in the present context the special excellence which is produced in the spirit is its determination either as a cause or as an effect. When Brahman is regarded as cause, such causality can be understood only in relation to its association with the subtle constituents of matter and individual souls, and its evolution into the effect-stage as the manifold world is intelligible only through the transformation of the subtle matter-constituents in gross material forms and the spirits as endeavouring towards perfection through their deeds and rebirths. Brahman as such, without its relation to matter and souls, can be regarded neither as cause nor as effect. That it can be viewed as cause and effect is only because it is looked at in association with the causal or the effectuated states of matter and souls. The latter, therefore, are regarded as His body because they by their own states serve His purpose in reflecting Him as cause and effect.

The definition, however, needs a further modification in so far as the determining relation of the body is such that there is never a time when such a relation did not subsist. The relation conceived in this way (aprthak-siddha) is not something extraneous, but is a defining constituent of both the body and the soul, i.e. so long as either of them exists they must have that relation of the

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Determiner and the determined (yāvat sattvam asambandhanārthayor evā’prthak sambandhā-bhyupagamāt)\(^1\). Thus, even the emancipated souls are associated with bodies, and it is held that with death the body associated with the living soul is destroyed; the so-called dead body is not the body with which the living soul was in association\(^2\). But it may again be objected that the soul also determines the actions and efforts of the body and being inseparably connected with it, the soul may also be called the body of the body according to the definition. To meet this objection the definition is further modified, and it is held that only such inseparable relation as determines the causality or effectness in association with the production of knowledge can be regarded as constituting the condition of a body. The whole idea is that a body, while inseparably connected with the soul, conditions its cognitive experiences, and this should be regarded as the defining characteristic of a body\(^3\).

This definition of Śarīra is, of course, very different from the Nyāya definition of “body” (śarīra) as the support (āśraya) of effort (ceṣṭā), senses (indriya), and enjoyment (bhoga)\(^4\). For in such a definition, since there may be movement in the furthest extremities of the body which is not a direct support of the original volition of the soul, the definition of the notion of support has to be so far extended as to include these parts which are in association with that which was directly moved by the soul. Extending this principle of indirect associations, one might as well include the movement of objects held in the hand, and in that case the extraneous objects might also be regarded as body, which is impossible.

The defence of the Naviyāyikas would, of course, be by the

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\(^1\) Śarīra-vāda, p. 8 (MS.).

\(^2\) mṛta-sarīrasya jīva-sambandha-rahitatayā’pi avasthāna-darśanena yāvat-sattvam asambandhā-narhatra-virahad iti cet na pūrva-sarīratayā vāsthitasya dravyasya cetana-viyogā-nantara-kṣane eva nāśā-bhyupagamena anupapatti-virahāt. Ibid.


Brahman as associated with subtle matter and spirits is the cause, and as associated with gross matter and the souls passing through diverse gross states may be regarded as effect. The subtle and the gross states of matter and spirits may thus be regarded as determining the causal and effect states of the Brahman, — śākmap-cid-acid-viśisṭa-brahmanah kāraṇatvāt sthūla-cid-acid-viśisṭasya ca tasya kāryatvāt brahma-miṣṭha-kāryatva-kāraṇatvā-nyatara-vacchedakatva-syā prapañca-sāmanye sattvāt. Ibid.

\(^4\) Ceṣṭe-indriyā-rthā-śrayah śarīram. Nyāya-sūtra, 1. 1. 11.
introduction of the relation of inseparable coherence (\textit{samavāya}) in which the parts of a body are connected together in a way different from any other object. But it has already been pointed out that the \textit{samavāya} relation is not admitted by the Rāmānujists.

Brahman may be regarded as the material cause of the world through its body as \textit{prakṛti} and the souls. Though a material cause, it is also the instrumental cause just as the individual souls are the efficient causes of their own experiences of pleasure and pain (through their own deeds), of which, since the latter inhere in the former, they may be regarded as their material causes. On the other hand, God in Himself, when looked at as apart from His body, may be regarded as unchangeable. Thus, from these two points of view God may be regarded as the material and efficient cause and may also be regarded as the unchanging cause.

Bhāskara and his followers hold that Brahman has two parts, a spirit part (\textit{cidamśa}) and a material part (\textit{acidamśa}), and that it transforms itself through its material part and undergoes the cycles of \textit{karma} through the conditions of such material changes. Bhāskara thinks that the conditions are a part of Brahman and that even in the time of dissolution they remain in subtle form and that it is only in the emancipated stage that the conditions (\textit{upādhi}), which could account for the limited appearance of Brahman as individual souls, are lost in Brahman. Venkaṭa thinks that the explanation through the conception of \textit{upādhi} is misleading. If the \textit{upādhi} constitutes \textit{jīvas} by mere conjunction, then since they are all conjoined with God, God Himself becomes limited. If the conception of \textit{upādhi} be made on the analogy of space within a jug or a cup, where space remains continuous and it is by the movement of the conditioning jugs or cups that the space appears to be limited by them, then no question of bondage or emancipation can arise. The conception of \textit{upādhi} cannot be also on the analogy of the container and the contained, as water in the jug, since Brahman being continuous and indivisible such a conception would be absurd. The \textit{upādhis} themselves cannot be regarded as constitutive of individual souls, for they are material in their nature. Yādavaprakāśa holds that Brahman is of the nature of pure universal being (\textit{svacā-tmakaṁ sad-rūpaṁ brahma}) endowed with three distinct powers as consciousness, matter and God, and through these powers it passes through the various phenomenal changes which are held up in it
and at the same time are one with it, just as one ocean appears in diverse forms as foam, billows and waves. Veṅkaṭa says that instead of explaining the world-creation from these makeshift points of view, it is better to follow the scriptures and regard Brahman as being associated with these changes through its body. It is wrong also to regard God, world and spirit as being phenomenal modifications of one pure being as Kātyāyana does¹. For the scriptures definitely assert that God and the changeless Brahman are one and identical. If the transformation is regarded as taking place through the transformation of the powers of Brahman, then the latter cannot be regarded as the material cause of the world, nor can these transformations be regarded as creations of Brahman. If it is said that Brahman is both identical and different from its powers, then such a view would be like the relative pluralism of the Jains. There is a further view that Brahman in His pure nature exists as the world, the souls and God, though these are different and though in them His pure nature as such is not properly and equally evident. Veṅkaṭa holds that such a view is contradicted by our experience and by scriptural texts. There is again another view according to which Brahman is like an ocean of consciousness and bliss, and out of the joy of self-realization undergoes various transformations, a small portion of which he transforms into matter and infuses the spiritual parts into its modifications. Thus, Brahman transforms itself into a number of limited souls which undergo the various experiences of pleasure and pain, and the whole show and procedure becomes a source of joy to Him. It is not a rare phenomenon that there are beings who derive pleasure from performing actions painful to themselves. The case of incarnations (avatāra) again corroborates this view, otherwise there would be no meaning in the course of misery and pain which they suffer of their own free will. Veṅkaṭa observes that this view is absolutely hollow. There may be fools who mistake painful actions for sources of pleasure. But it is unthinkable that Brahman, who is all-knowing and all-powerful, should engage in an undertaking which involves for Him even the slightest misery and pain. The misery of, even a single individual is sufficient evil and the total miseries of the whole

¹ ścava-vaṇkṛta-prāṇair vīrāt-sindhur iṇo’rmibhiḥ
yat pranṛtya divā bhāti tasmiṃ sad-brahmane naṃḥ.
Kātyāyana-kārikā, quoted in Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 298.
world of individual selves are intolerable in the extreme. Therefore, how can Brahman elect to shoulder all this misery of His own free choice without stultifying Himself? The case of incarnations is to be understood as that of actors on the stage. Further, this view contradicts the testimony of all scriptures. Veṅkaṭa thinks that the view of his school is free from all these objections, as the relation of the Brahman and individuals is neither one of absolute identity nor one of identity and difference but one of substance and adjuncts. The defects in the adjuncts cannot affect the substance nor can the association between them be a source of pollution to Brahman, the substance, because association becomes so only when it is determined by *karma*.

On the theological side Veṅkaṭa accepts all the principal religious dogmas elaborated in the *Pañcarātra* works. God is, of course, omniscient, omnipotent and all-complete. His all-completeness, however, does not mean that He has no desires. It only means that His desires or wishes are never frustrated and His wishes are under His own control. What we call our virtue and sins also proceed through His pleasure and displeasure. His displeasure does not bring any suffering or discomfort. But the term "displeasure" simply indicates that God has a particular attitude in which He may punish us or may not extend His favour.

The scriptural injunctions are but the 'commands of God. There is no separate instrumental as *apūrva* or *adṛśta* which stands between the performance of deeds and their fruition and which, while it persists when the deeds are over, brings about the effects of these actions. But God alone abides and He is either pleased or displeased by our actions and He arranges such fruits of actions as He thinks fit. The scriptures only show which kinds of actions will be pleasing to God and which are against His commands. The object of the scriptural sacrifices is the worship of God, and all the different deities that are worshipped in these sacrifices are but the different names of God Himself. All morality and religion are thus

2. *āptā-kāma-sabdas tāvad īṣitūr ēṣṭavīyah-ḥāvam icchā-rāhityaṁ vā na brūte īṣṭaṁ sarvam asya prāṇāṁ eva bhavattī tātparyāṁ grāhīyaṁ...sarva-kārya-viṣaya-prathitāḥ-nāyāṁ-dhīne-chācān śvaram, ītva tu na tathā. Ibid. p. 386.*
reduced in this system to obedience to God’s commands and the worship of Him. It is by God’s grace that one can attain emancipation when there is an ultimate expansion of one’s intellect, and by continual realization of the infinite nature of God one remains plunged as it were in an ocean of bliss compared with which the so-called worldly pleasures are but sufferings. It is not ultimately given to man to be virtuous or vicious by his own efforts, but God makes a man virtuous or vicious at His own pleasure or displeasure, and rewards or punishes accordingly; and, as has already been said, virtue and vice are not subjective characters of the person but only different attitudes of God as He is pleased or displeased. Whomsoever He wishes to raise up He makes perform good actions, and whomsoever He wishes to throw down He makes commit sinful actions. The final choice and adjudgment rests with Him, and man is only a tool in His hands. Man’s actions in themselves cannot guarantee anything to him merely as the fruits of those actions, but good or bad fruits are reaped in accordance with the pleasure or displeasure of God.

Dialectical criticism against the Śaṅkara School.

The readers who have followed the present work so far must have noticed that the chief philosophical opponents of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava school of thought were Śaṅkara and his followers. In South India there were other religious opponents of the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, Śaivas and the Jainas. Mutual persecution among the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, Śaivas and the Jainas is a matter of common historical knowledge. Conversion from one faith to another also took place under the influence of this or that local king or this or that religious teacher. Many volumes were written for the purpose of proving the superiority of Nārāyaṇa, Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa to Śiva and vice versa. Madhva and his followers were also opponents of the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, but there were some who regarded the philosophy of the Madhvas as more or less akin to the Śrī Vaiṣṇava thought.

1 Tattva-muktā-kalāpa, pp. 663, 664.
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There were others, however, who strongly criticized the views of Madhva, and Mahācārya’s Pārāśarya-vijaya and Parakāla Yati’s Vijayendra-parājaya may be cited as examples of polemical discussions against the Madhvas. The Śrī Vaiṣṇavas also criticized the views of Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa, and as examples of this the Vedārtha-samgraha of Rāmānuja, or the Vāditraya-khaṇḍana of Veṅkaṭa may be cited. But the chief opponents of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava school were Śaṅkara and his followers. The Śata-duśaṇi is a polemical work of that class in which Veṅkaṭaṇāṭha tried his best to criticize the views of Śaṅkara and his followers. The work is supposed to have consisted of one hundred polemical points of discussion as the name Śata-duśaṇi (century of refutations) itself shows. But the text, printed at the Śrī Sudarśana Press, Conjeeveram, has only sixty-six refutations, as far as the manuscripts available to the present writer showed. This printed text contains a commentary on it by Mahācārya alias Rāmānujadāsa, pupil of Vādhūla Śrīnivāsa. But the work ends with the sixty-fourth refutation, and the other two commentaries appear to be missing. The printed text has two further refutations—the sixty-fifth and sixty-sixth—which are published without commentary, and the editor, P. B. Anantācārya, says that the work was completed with the sixty-sixth refutation (samāptā ca Śata-duśaṇi). If the editor’s remark is to be believed, it has to be supposed that the word Śata in Śata-duśaṇi is intended to mean “many” and not “hundred.” It is, however, difficult to guess whether the remaining thirty-four refutations were actually written by Veṅkaṭa and lost or whether he wrote only the sixty-six refutations now available. Many of these do not contain any new material and most of them are only of doctrinal and sectarian interest, with little philosophical or religious value, and so have been omitted in the present section, which closes with the sixty-first refutation. The sixty-second refutation deals with the inappropriateness of the Śaṅkara Vedāṇṭa in barring the Sudrās from Brahma-knowledge. In the sixty-third, Veṅkaṭa deals with the qualifications of persons entitled to study Vedāṇṭa (adhikāri-viveka), in the sixty-fourth with the inappropriateness of the external garb and marks of the ascetics of the Śaṅkara school, in the sixty-fifth with the prohibition of association with certain classes of ascetics, and in the sixty-sixth with the fact that Śaṅkara’s philosophy cannot be reconciled with the Brahma-sūtra.
First Objection. The view that Brahman is qualityless cannot give any satisfactory account of how the word Brahman can rightly denote this qualityless entity. For if it is qualityless it cannot be denoted by the term Brahman either in its primary sense or in any secondary sense of implication (laksanā); for if the former is not possible, the second is also impossible, since an implicative extension of meaning can take place only when in any particular content the primary meaning becomes impossible. We know also from the scriptural testimony that the word Brahman is often used in its primary meaning to denote the Great Being who is endowed with an infinite number of excellent qualities. The fact that there are many texts in which an aspect of qualitylessness is also referred to cannot be pushed forward as an objection, for these can all be otherwise explained, and even if any doubt arises the opponent cannot take advantage of it and assert that Brahman is qualityless. It is also not possible to say that the word Brahman denotes the true Brahman only by implication, for the scriptures declare the realization of the meaning of the word Brahman as being one of direct perception. So in the opponent’s view of Brahman, the word Brahman would be rendered meaningless.

Second Objection. There cannot be any inquiry regarding Brahman according to Śaṅkara’s interpretation of the term as a qualityless something. Śaṅkara says that Brahman is known in a general manner as the self in us all; the inquiry concerning Brahman is for knowing it in its specific nature, i.e. whether it is the body endowed with consciousness, the overlord, pure self, or some other entity regarding which there are many divergences of opinion. Veṅkaṭa urges that if the self-revelation of Brahman is beginningless it cannot depend on our making any inquiry about it. All that depends on causes and conditions must be regarded as an effect and in that sense Brahma-revelation would be an effect which is decidedly against Śaṅkara’s intention. Thus, therefore, an inquiry regarding the general and specific nature of Brahman cannot deal with its own real pure nature. If, therefore, it is urged by the Śaṅkarites that this inquiry does not concern the real nature of Brahman, but only a false appearance of Brahman (upahita-svarūpa), then the knowledge derived from this inquiry would also be of this false appearance and nothing would be gained by this false knowledge. Again, when Brahman is partless and self-re-
vealing, there cannot be any meaning in knowing it in a general manner or in a specific manner, for no such distinction can be made in it. It must be known in its entirety or not known at all; there cannot be any distinction of parts such that there may be scope for different grades of knowledge in it. All inquiry (jñānasā) however must imply that its object is known generally but that greater detail is sought; since Śaṅkara’s unqualified homogeneous Brahman cannot be the object of such an inquiry, no such Brahman can be sought. Therefore, an inquiry can only be regarding a qualified object about which general or special knowledge is possible. The Śaṅkarites cannot legitimately urge that a distinction of general and specific knowledge is possible in their view; for it may be maintained that, though the Brahman may be known in a general manner, there is room for knowing it in its character as different from the illusory appearances, since if Brahman has no specific nature it is not possible to know it in a general manner (nirviṣēṣe sāmānya-niṣedhah). If it is urged that the knowledge of the world-appearance as false is the knowledge of Brahman, then there would be no difference between Vedānta and the nihilism of Nāgārjuna.

Third Objection. Veṅkaṭa here introduces the oft-repeated arguments in favour of the doctrine of the theory of jñāna-karma-samuccaya as against the view of Śaṅkara that a wise man has no duties.

Fourth Objection. Veṅkaṭa here says that all errors and illusions do not vanish merely by the knowledge that all world-appearance is false. The performance of the scriptural duties is absolutely necessary even when the highest knowledge is attained. This is well illustrated in the ordinary experience of a jaundiced person where the illusion of yellow is not removed merely by the knowledge of its falsity but by taking medicines which overcome the jaundice. Ultimate salvation can be obtained only by worshipping and adoring God the supreme Lord and not by a mere revelation of any philosophical wisdom. It is impossible to attain the final emancipation merely by listening to the unity texts, for had it been so then Śaṅkara himself must have attained it. If he did so, he would have been merged in Brahman and would not have been in a position to explain his view to his pupils. The view that the grasping of the meaning of the unity texts is an immediate perception is also untenable, for our ordinary experience shows that scriptural know-
Fifth Objection. Śaṅkara’s reply to the above objection is that though the final knowledge of the identity of all things with self be attained yet the illusion of world-appearance may still continue until the present body be destroyed. To this Veṅkaṭa asks that if avidyā be destroyed through right knowledge, how can the world-appearance still continue? If it is urged that though the avidyā be destroyed the root-impressions (vāsanā) may still persist, then it may be replied that if the vāsanā be regarded as possessing true existence then the theory of monism fails. If vāsanā is regarded as forming part of Brahma, then the Brahma itself would be contaminated by association with it. If vāsanā is, however, regarded as a product of avidyā, then it should be destroyed with the destruction of avidyā. Again, if the vāsanā persists even after the destruction of avidyā, how is it to be destroyed at all? If it can be destroyed of itself, then the avidyā may as well be destroyed of itself. Thus there is no reason why the vāsanā and its product, the world-appearance, should persist after the destruction of avidyā and the realization of Brahma-knowledge.

Seventh Objection. Śaṅkara and his followers say that the utterance of the unity text produces a direct and immediate perception of the highest truth in the mind of a man chastened by the acquirement of the proper qualifications for listening to the Vedāntic instructions. That the hearing of the unity texts produces the immediate and direct perception of the nature of self as Brahma has to be admitted, since there is no other way by which this could be explained. To this Veṅkaṭa replies that if this special case of realization of the purport of the unity texts be admitted as a case of direct perception through the instrumentality of verbal audition only because there is no other means through which the pure knowledge of Brahma could be realized, then inference and the auditory knowledge of other words may equally well be regarded as leading to direct perception, for they also must be regarded as the only causes of the manifestation of pure knowledge. Moreover, if the causes of verbal knowledge be there, how is that knowledge to be prevented, and how is the direct and immediate perception to be produced from a collocation of causes which can never produce it? Any knowledge gained at a particular time cannot be regarded
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as the revelation of one individuated consciousness which is identical with all knowledge of all times or of all persons, and therefore the words which may lead to any such knowledge cannot be regarded as producing any such immediate realization (āparokṣya). If it is held that there is no other cause leading to the realization of pure consciousness apart from what leads to the apprehension of the specific forms of such consciousness, then the same is true of all means of knowledge, and as such it would be true of inference and of verbal expressions other than the unity texts. It is not possible therefore to adduce for the unity texts claims which may not be possessed by other ordinary verbal expressions and inferential knowledge. In the case of such phrases as "You are the tenth," if the person addressed had already perceived that he was the tenth, then the understanding of the meaning of such a phrase would only mean a mere repetition of all that was understood by such a perception; if, however, such a person did not perceive the fact of his being the tenth person, then the communication of this fact was done by the verbal expression and this so far cannot be regarded as direct, immediate or perceptual. It may be noted in this connection that though the object of knowledge may remain the same, yet the knowledge attained may be different on account of the ways of its communication. Thus, the same object may be realized perceptually in some part and non-perceptually in another part. Again, though Brahman is admittedly realized in direct perception, yet at the time of its first apprehension from such verbal phrases as "Thou art he" it is a verbal cognition, and at the second moment a realization is ushered in which is immediate and direct. But if the first cognition be not regarded as direct and immediate, why should the second be so? Again, the position taken by Śaṅkara is that since disappearance of the falsity of world-appearance cannot be explained otherwise, the communication imparted by the understanding of the unity texts must be regarded as being immediate; for falsehood is removed by the direct and immediate realization of the real. But the world is not false; if it is regarded as false because it is knowable, then Brahman, being knowable, would also be false. Again, if the world-appearance be regarded as false, there is no meaning in saying that such an appearance is destroyed by right knowledge; for that which never exists cannot be destroyed. If it is held that the world-appearance is not destroyed but only its knowledge
ceases, then it may be pointed out that a false knowledge may cease naturally with the change of one’s mental state, just as the illusion of false silver may cease in deep dreamless sleep, or it may be removed by inferential and other kinds of cognition. There is no necessary implication that false knowledge must be removed only by direct and immediate knowledge. Again, if it is held that the cessation of the world-appearance means the destruction of its cause, then the reply is that no direct realization of reality is possible unless the cause itself is removed by some other means. So long as there is a pressure on the retina from the fingers there will be the appearance of two moons. Thus it is meaningless to suppose that it is only by direct and immediate perception that the falsity of the world-appearance would cease. If the removal of the falsity of world-appearance simply means that the rise of a knowledge is contradictory to it, then that can be done even by indirect knowledge, just as the false perception of two moons may be removed by the testimony of other persons that there is only one moon. But not only is the world not false and therefore cannot be removed, but verbal knowledge cannot be regarded as leading to immediate perception; even if it did, there must be other accessory conditions working along with it, just as in the case of visual perception, attention, mental alertness, and other physical conditions are regarded as accessory factors. Thus, mere verbal knowledge by itself cannot bring about immediate realization. Nor is it correct to suppose that perceptual knowledge cannot be contradicted by non-perceptual knowledge, for it is well known that the notion of one continuous flame of a lamp is negated by the consideration that there cannot be a continuous flame and that what so appears is in reality but a series of different flames coming in succession. Thus, even if the realization of the purport of unity texts be regarded as a case of direct perception, there is no guarantee that it could not be further contradicted by other forms of knowledge.

_Tenth Objection_. In refuting the reality of pure contentless consciousness, Veṅkaṭa urges that even if such a thing existed it could not manifest by itself its own nature as reality, for if it did it could no longer be regarded as formless; since if it demonstrated the falsity of all content, such content would be a constituent part of it. If its reality were demonstrated by other cognitions, then it was obviously not self-luminous. Then, again, it may be asked, to
whom does this pure consciousness manifest itself? The reply of the Śaṅkarites is that it does not reveal itself to this or that person but its very existence is its realization. But such a reply would be far from what is normally understood by the term manifestation, for a manifestation must be for some person. The chief objection against the existence of a contentless consciousness is that no such thing can be experienced by us and therefore its priority and superiority or its power of illuminating the content imposed upon it cannot also be admitted. The illustration of bliss in the deep dreamless sleep is of no use; for if in that state the pure contentless consciousness was experienced as bliss, that could not be in the form of a subjective experience of bliss, as it could not be called contentless. A later experience after rising from sleep could not communicate to the perceiver that he was experiencing contentless consciousness for a long period, as there is no recognition of it and the fact of recognition would be irreconcilable to its so-called contentless character.

Eleventh Objection. In attempting to refute the existence of indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpa) Veṅkaṭa says that the so-called indeterminate knowledge refers to a determinate object (nirvikalpakam api saviśeṣa-viśayakameva). Even at the very first moment of sense-contact it is the object as a whole with its manifold qualities that is grasped by the senses and it is such an object that is elaborated later on in conceptual forms. The special feature of the nirvikalpa stage is that in this stage of cognition no special emphasis is given to any of the aspects or qualities of the object. If, however, the determinate characters did not in reality form the object of the cognition, such characters could never be revealed in any of the later stages of cognition and the nirvikalpa could never develop into the savikalpa state. The characters are perceived in the first stage, but these characters assume the determinate form when in the later moments other similar characters are remembered. Thus a pure indeterminate entity can never be the object of perception.

Twelfth Objection. The contention of the Śaṅkarite is that perception is directly concerned with pure being, and it is through nescience that the diverse forms are later on associated with it, and through such association they also seemingly appear as being directly perceived. Veṅkaṭa says that both being and its characters are simultaneously perceived by our senses, for they form part of
the same object that determines our knowledge. Even universals can be the objects of our direct knowledge: it is only when these universals are distinguished from one another at a later moment that a separate mental operation involving its diverse functions becomes necessary. Again, if perception only referred to indeterminate being, how then can the experience of the diverse objects and their relative differentiation be explained?

**Thirteenth Objection.** In refuting the view of the Śaṅkara school that the apprehension of “difference” either as a category or as a character is false, Veṅkaṭa says that the experience of “difference” is universal and as such cannot be denied. Even the much-argued “absence of difference” is itself different from “difference” and thus proves the existence of difference. Any attempt to refute “difference” would end in refuting identity as well; for these two are relative, and if there is no difference, there is no identity. Veṅkaṭa urges that a thing is identical with itself and different from others, and in this way both identity and difference have to be admitted.

**Fourteenth Objection.** The Śaṅkarites say that the world-appearance, being cognizable, is false like the conch-shell-silver. But what is meant by the assertion that the world is false? It cannot be chimerical like the hare’s horn, for that would be contrary to our experience and the Śaṅkarite would not himself admit it. It cannot mean that the world is something which is different from both being and non-being, for no such entity is admitted by us. It cannot also mean that the world-appearance can be negated even where it seems to be real (pratipanno-pādhau niṣedha-pratīyogītavam), for if this negation cannot further be negated, then it must be either of the nature of Brahman and therefore false as world-appearance or different from it. The first alternative is admitted by us in the sense that the world is a part of Brahman. If the world-appearance can be negated and it is at the same time admitted to be identical with Brahman, then the negation would apply to Brahman itself. If the second alternative is taken, then since its existence is implied as a condition or explication of the negation, it itself cannot be denied. It cannot also be said that falsity means the appearance of the world in an entity where it does not exist (svā-tyantā-bhāva-samāna-dhikaraṇatayā pratīyamānatvam), for such a falsity of the world as not existing where it appears cannot be understood by
perception, and if there is no perception for its ground no inference is also possible. If all perception is to be regarded as false, all inference would be impossible. It is said that world-appearance is false because it is different from the ultimate reality, the Brahman. Veṅkaṭa, in answer to this, says that he admits the world to be different from the Brahman though it has no existence independent and separable from it. Still, if it is argued that the world is false because it is different from reality, the reply is that there may be different realities. If it is held that since Brahman alone is real, its negation would necessarily be false, then the reply is that if Brahman is real its negation is also real. The being or reality that is attributed by Veṅkaṭa to the world is that it is amenable to proof (prāmāṇika). Truth is defined by Rāmānuja as that which is capable of being dealt with pragmatically (vyavahāra-yogyatā sattvam), and the falsity of the assertion that the world is false is understood by the actual perception of the reality of the world. Again, the falsity of the world cannot be attempted to be proved by logical proof, for these fall within the world and would therefore be themselves false. Again, it may be said that Brahman is also in some sense knowable and so also is the world; it may be admitted for argument’s sake that Brahman is not knowable in an ultimate sense (pāramārthika), so the world also is not knowable in an ultimate sense; for, if it were, the Śaṅkarite could not call it false. If that is so, how could the Śaṅkarite argue that the world is false because it is knowable, for in that case Brahman would also be false?

Sixteenth Objection. Again, it may be argued that the objects of the world are false because, though being remains the same, its content always varies. Thus we may say a jug exists, a cloth exists, but though these so-called existents change, “being” alone remains unchanged. Therefore the changeable entities are false and the unchangeable alone is real. Now it may be asked: what is the meaning of this change? It cannot mean any difference of identity, for in that case Brahman being different from other entities could be regarded as false. If, however, Brahman be regarded as identical with the false world, Brahman itself would be false, or the world-appearance would be real being identical with the real Brahman. Spatial or temporal change can have nothing to do with determining falsehood; the conch-shell-silver is not false because it does not exist elsewhere. Brahman itself is changeable in the sense that
it does not exist as unreal or as an entity which is neither being nor non-being. Change cannot here legitimately be used in the sense of destruction, for, even when the illusion of conch-shell-silver is discovered, no one says that the conch-shell-silver is destroyed (bādha-vidnyāyor ivediṣṭatayayā eva vyutpatteḥ). Destruction (vidnyā) is the dissolution of an entity, whereas ādha or contradiction is the negation of what was perceived. In such phrases as “a jug exists” or “a cloth exists,” the existence qualifies jug and cloth, but jug and cloth do not qualify existence. Again, though Brahman abides everywhere, it does not cause in us the cognition “jug exists” or “cloth exists.” Again, temporal variation in existence depends upon the cause of such existence, but it cannot render the existence of anything false. If non-illumination at any particular time be regarded as the criterion of falsehood, then Brahman also is false for it does not reveal itself before the dawn of emancipation. If it is held that Brahman is always self-revealing, but its revelation remains somehow hidden until emancipation is attained, then it may be said with the same force that the jug and the cloth also remain revealed in a hidden manner in the same way. Again, the eternity of illumination, or its uncontradicted nature, cannot be regarded as a criterion of reality, for it is faultlessness that is the cause of the eternity of self-illumination, and this has nothing to do with determining the nature of existence. Since the ordinary things, such as a jug or a cloth, appear as existent at some time, they are manifestations of the self-illumination and therefore real.

An opposite argument may also be adduced here. Thus, it may be said that that which is not false does not break its continuity or does not change. Brahman is false, for it is without any continuity with anything else, and is different from everything else.

Seventeenth Objection. The Śaṅkarites hold that since it is impossible to explain the existence of any relation (whatever may be its nature) between the perceiver and the perceived, the perceived entity or the content of knowledge has to be admitted as false. In reply to this Veṅkaṭa says that the falsity of the world cannot be adduced as a necessary implication (arthāpatti), for the establishment of a relation between the perceiver and the perceived is possible not by denying the latter but by affirming it. If, however, it is said that since the relation between the perceiver and the perceived can be logically proved chimerical, the necessary deduction
is that the perceived entity is false. To this the reply is that the falsity of the relation does not prove the falsity of the relata; the relation between a hare and a horn may be non-existent, but that will not indicate that both the hare and the horn are themselves non-existent. Following that argument, the perceiver might just as well be declared as false. If, however, it is contended that the perceiver, being self-luminous, is self-evident and cannot therefore be supposed to be false, the reply is, that even if, in the absence of the act of perceiving, the perceiver may be regarded as self-revealing, what harm is there in admitting the perceived to have the same status even when the perceiver is denied? If, however, it is said that the cognition of objects cannot be admitted to be self-established in the same way as the objects themselves, it may be asked if consciousness is ever perceived to be self-revealed. If it is said that the self-revealing character of consciousness can be established by inference, then by a counter-contention it may be held that the self-revealing character of the universe can also be proved by a suitable inference. It may again be questioned whether, if the Śaṅkarite wishes to establish the self-revealing nature of Brahman by inference, its objectivity can be denied, and thus the original thesis that Brahman cannot be the object of any process of cognition must necessarily fail.

The Śaṅkarite may indeed contend that the followers of Rāmānuja also admit that the objects are revealed by the cognition of the self and hence they are dependent on the perceiver. The reply to such a contention is that the followers of Rāmānuja admit the existence of self-consciousness by which the perceiver himself is regarded as cognized. If this self-consciousness is regarded as false, then the self-luminous self would also be false; and if this self-consciousness be admitted as real, then the relation between them is real. If the self-revealing consciousness be regarded as impossible of perception and yet real, then on the same analogy the world may as well be regarded as real though unperceived.

The objection that the known is regarded as false, since it is difficult logically to conceive the nature of the relation subsisting between the knower and the known, is untenable, for merely on account of the difficulty of conceiving the logical nature of the relation one cannot deny the reality of the related entity which is incontestably given in experience. Therefore the relation has some-
how to be admitted. If relation is admitted to be real because it is experienced, then the world is also real because it is also experienced. If the world is false because it is inexplicable, then falsity itself would be false because it is inexplicable.

The objection that there can be no relation between the past and the future is groundless, for the very fact that two things exist in the present time would not mean that they are necessarily related, e.g. the hare and the horn. If, however, it is said that it may be true that things which exist in the present time are not necessarily related, yet there are certain entities at present which are related, so also there are certain things in the present which are related with certain other things in the past and the future. It is no doubt true that the relation of contact is not possible between things of the present and the future, but that does not affect our case, for certain relations exist between entities at present, and certain other relations exist between entities in the present and the future. What relations exist in the present, past and future have to be learnt by experience. If spatial contiguity be a special feature of entities at present, temporal contiguity would hold between entities in present, past and future. However, relation does not necessarily mean contiguity; proximity and remoteness may both condition the relation. Relations are to be admitted just as they are given by experience, and are indefinable and unique in their specific nature. Any attempt to explain them through mediation would end in a conflict with experience. If an attempt is made to refute all relations as such on the ground that relations would imply further relations and thus involve a vicious infinite, the reply is that the attempt to refute a relation itself involves relation and therefore according to the opponent's own supposition stands cancelled. A relation stands by itself and does not depend on other relations for its existence.

Eighteenth Objection. In refuting the view of the Śaṅkarites that self-luminous Brahman cannot have as an object of illumination anything that is external to it, Veṇkaṭa argues that if nescience be itself inherent in Brahman from beginningless time, then there would be no way for Brahman to extricate itself from its clutches and emancipation would be impossible. Then the question may be asked, whether the avidyā is different from Brahman or not. If it be different, then the monism of the Śaṅkara philosophy breaks
down; if it be non-different, then also on the one hand Brahman could not free itself from it and on the other hand there could be no evolution of the avidyā which has merged itself in the nature of the Brahman, into the various forms of egoism, passions, etc. If this avidyā be regarded as false and therefore incapable of binding the free nature of Brahman, the objection may still be urged that, if this falsehood covers the nature of Brahman, how can it regain its self-luminosity; and if it cannot do so, that would mean its destruction, for self-luminosity is the very nature of Brahman. If the avidyā stands as an independent entity and covers the nature of Brahman, then it would be difficult to conceive how the existence of a real entity can be destroyed by mere knowledge. According to Rāmānuja's view, however, knowledge is a quality or a characteristic of Brahman by which other things are known by it; experience also shows that a knower reveals the objects by his knowledge, and thus knowledge is a characteristic quality of the knower by which the objects are known.

Nineteenth Objection. In refuting the view of Śaṅkara that ignorance or avidyā rests in Brahman, Vēṅkaṭa tries to clarify the concept of ajñāna. He says that ajñāna here cannot mean the absolute negation of the capacity of being the knower; for this capacity, being the essence of Brahman, cannot be absent. It (ajñāna) cannot also mean the ignorance that precedes the rise of any cognition, for the Śaṅkarites do not admit knowledge as a quality or a characteristic of Brahman; nor can it mean the negation of any particular knowledge, for the Brahman-consciousness is the only consciousness admitted by the Śaṅkarites. This ajñāna cannot also be regarded as the absence of knowledge, since it is admitted to be a positive entity. The ajñāna which can be removed by knowledge must belong to the same knower who has the knowledge and must refer to the specific object regarding which there was absence of knowledge. Now since Brahman is not admitted by the Śaṅkarites to be knower, it is impossible that any ajñāna could be associated with it. The view that is held by the members of the Rāmānuja school is that the individual knowers possess ignorance in so far as they are ignorant of their real nature as self-luminous entities, and in so far as they associate themselves with their bodies, their senses, their passions, and other prejudices and ideas. When they happen to discover their
folly, their ignorance is removed. It is only in this way that it can be said to be removed by knowledge. But all this would be impossible in the case of Brahman conceived as pure consciousness. According to the view of Rāmānuja’s school, individual knowers are all in their essential natures omniscient; it is the false prejudice and passions that cover up this omniscience whereby they appear as ordinary knowers who can know things only under specific conditions.

Twentieth Objection. Veṅkaṭa, in refuting the definition of immediate intuition (anubhūti) as that which may be called immediate perception without being further capable of being an object of awareness (avedyate sati aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatvam), as given by Citsukhācārya in his Tatvā-pradīpikā, raises certain objections against it as follows. It is urged by the Śaṅkarites that if the immediate intuition be itself an object of further cognitive action, then it loses its status as immediate intuition and may be treated as an object like other objects, e.g. a jug. If by the words “immediate intuition” it is meant that at the time of its operation it is self-expressed and does not stand in need of being revealed by another cognition, then this is also admitted by Rāmānuja. Furthermore, this intuition at the time of its self-revelation involves with it the revelation of the self of the knower as well. Therefore, so far as this meaning of intuition is concerned, the denial of self-revelation is out of place.

The words “immediate intuition” (anubhūti) are supposed to have another meaning, viz. that the intuition is not individuated in separate individual cognitions as limited by time, space or individual laws. But such an intuition is never experienced, for not only do we infer certain cognitions as having taken place in certain persons or being absent in them, but we also speak of our own cognitions as present in past and future, such as “I know it,” “I knew it” and the like, which prove that cognitions are temporally limited. It may be asked whether this immediate intuition reveals Brahman or anything else; if it reveals Brahman, then it certainly has an object. If it is supposed that in doing so it simply reveals that which has already been self-expressed, even then it will be expressive of something though that something stood already expressed. This would involve a contradiction between the two terms of the thesis *avedyate sati aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatvam*,
for, following the arguments given above, though the Brahman may be regarded as immediate, yet it has been shown to be capable of being made an object of intuition. If on the other alternative this intuition expresses something else than Brahman, that would bring the opponent to a conclusion not intended by him and contradictory as well.

Just as one may say that one knows a jug or a cloth or an orange, so one may say that one knows another man’s awareness or one’s own. In this way an awareness can be the object of another awareness just as another object. Again, if one cannot be aware of another man’s awareness, the use of language for mental understanding should cease.

If the immediate intuition itself cannot be made an object of awareness, that would mean that it is not known at all and consequently its existence would be chimerical. It cannot be urged that chimerical entities are not perceivable because they are chimerical, but entities do not become chimerical because they cannot be perceived, for the concomitance in the former proposition is not conditional. The Śaṅkarites would not hold that all entities other than immediate intuition are chimerical. It may also be held that chimerical entities are not immediate intuition because they are chimerical; but in that case it may also be held that these objects (e.g. a jug) are not immediate intuition because of their specific characters as jug, etc. The whole point that has to be emphasized here is that the ordinary objects are other than immediate intuition, not because they can be known but because of their specific characters. The reason that an entity cannot be called immediate intuition if it can be known is entirely faulty.¹

If, again, Brahman is manifest as only immediate intuition, then neither the scriptures nor philosophy can in any way help us regarding the nature of Brahman.

Twenty-first Objection. The Śaṅkarites deny the production of individual cognitions. In their view all the various forms of so-called cognitions arise through the association of various modes of avidyā with the self-luminous pure consciousness. In refuting this view Venkata urges that the fact that various cognitions arise in time is testified by universal experience. If the pure consciousness be always present and if individual cognitions are denied, then all

¹ Śata-duṣṣanī, ii. 78.
objects ought to be manifested simultaneously. If, however, it is ascertained that though the pure consciousness is always present yet the rise of various cognitions is conditioned by other collocating causal circumstances, the reply is that such an infinite number of causal conditions conditioning the pure consciousness would be against the dictum of the Śaṅkarites themselves, for this would be in conflict with their uncompromising monism. Now if, again, it is held that the cognitive forms do really modify the nature of pure consciousness, then the pure consciousness becomes changeable, which is against the thesis of Śaṅkara. If it is held that the forms are imposed on pure consciousness as it is and by such impositions the specific objects are in their turn illuminated by consciousness, then the position is that in order that an object may be illuminated such illumination must be mediated by a false imposition on the nature of pure consciousness. If the direct illumination of objects is impossible, then another imposition might be necessary to mediate the other false impositions on the nature of pure consciousness, and that might require another, and this would result in a vicious infinite. If the imposition is not false, then the consciousness becomes changeable and the old objection would recur. If, however, it is urged that the objects are illuminated independent of any collocating circumstances and independent of any specific contribution from the nature of the pure consciousness, then all objects (since they are all related to pure consciousness) might simultaneously be revealing. If, again, all cognitions are but false impositions on the nature of pure consciousness, then at the time of an illusory imposition of a particular cognition, say, a jug, nothing else would exist, and this would bring about nihilism. It may also be asked, if the Śaṅkarite is prepared to deny the world on account of the impossibility of any relation subsisting between it and the perceiver, how can he launch himself into an attempt to explain the relation of such a world with Brahman?

On the other hand, the experience of us all testifies to the fact that we are aware of cognitions coming into being, staying, passing away, and having passed and gone from us; except in the case of perceptual experience, there is no difficulty in being aware of past and future events; so the objection that the present awareness cannot be related to past and future events is invalid. The objection that there cannot be awareness of past or future entities because
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they are not existing now is invalid, for past and future entities also exist in their own specific temporal relations. Validity of awareness consists in the absence of contradiction and not in the fact of its relating to an entity of the present moment, for otherwise an illusory perception of the present moment would have to be considered as valid. Thus, since it is possible to be aware of an awareness that was not there but which comes into being both by direct and immediate acquaintance and by inference, the view of the Śaṅkarites denying the origination of individual awareness is invalid. In the view of Rāmānuja, knowledge is no doubt admitted to be eternal; yet this knowledge is also admitted to have specific temporal characters and also specific states. Therefore, so far as these characters or states are concerned, origination and cessation would be possible under the influence of specific collocative circumstances. Again, the objection that since pure consciousness is beginningless it cannot suffer changes is invalid, for the Śaṅkarites admit avidyā also as beginningless and yet changeable. It may also be pointed out in this connection that the so-called contentless consciousness is never given in experience. Even the consciousness in dreamless sleep or in a swoon is related to the perceiver and therefore not absolutely contentless.

Twenty-second Objection. It is urged by the Śaṅkarites that the pure consciousness is unchanging because it is not produced. If, however, the word unchanging means that it never ceases to exist, it may be pointed out that the Śaṅkarites admit ajñāna to be unproduced and yet liable to destruction. Thus there is no reason why a thing should not be liable to destruction because it is not produced. If it is urged that the destruction of avidyā is itself false, then it may be pointed out with the same force that the destruction of all things is false. Moreover, since the Śaṅkarites do not admit any change to be real, the syllogism adduced by them that an entity which is unproduced is not changeable falls to the ground. The difference between Śaṅkara’s conception of Brahman and that of Rāmānuja is that according to the former Brahman is absolutely unchangeable and characterless, and according to the latter the Brahman is the absolute, containing within it the world and the individual beings and all the changes involved in them. It is unchangeable only in so far as all the dynamical change rises from within and there is nothing else outside it which can affect it. That
is, the absolute, though changeable within it, is absolutely self-contained and self-sustained, and is entirely unaffected by anything outside it.

Twenty-third Objection. The Śaṅkarites urge that since consciousness is unproduced it cannot be many, for whatever is many is produced, e.g. the jug. If it is a pure consciousness which appears as many through the conditioning factors of avidyā, it may be asked in this connection whether, if the pure consciousness cannot be differentiated from anything else, it may as well be one with the body also, which is contrary to Śaṅkara’s thesis. If, however, it is replied that the so-called difference between the body and the pure consciousness is only a false difference, then it would have to be admitted and that would militate against the changeless character of Brahman as held by the Śaṅkarites. Again, if the real difference between the body and the pure consciousness be denied, then it may be urged that the proposition following from it is that things which in reality differ are produced (e.g. the jug); but according to the Śaṅkarites jug, etc., are also not different from Brahman, and thus a proposition like the above cannot be quoted in support. Moreover, since the avidyā is unproduced, it follows that according to the maxim of the Śaṅkarites it would not be different from Brahman which, however, the Śaṅkarites would undoubtedly be slow to accept. It cannot also be held that an awareness does not differ from another awareness on the supposition that different awarenesses are but seeming forms imposed upon the same consciousness, for so long as we speak of difference we speak only of apparent difference and of apparent divergent forms; and if the apparent divergent forms are admitted, it cannot be said that they are not different. Again, it is urged that the same moon appears as many through wavy water, so it is the same awareness that appears as many, though these are identically one. To this the reply is that the analogy is false. The image-moon is not identical with the moon, so the appearances are not identical with awareness. If it is said that all image-moons are false, then on the same analogy all awarenesses may be false and then if only one consciousness be true as a ground of all awarenesses then all awarenesses may be said to be equally true or equally false. Again, as to the view that the principle of consciousness as such does not differ from individual cognitions, such a position is untenable, because the Rāmānujists
do not admit the existence of an abstract principle of consciousness; with them all cognitions are specific and individual. It may be pointed out in this connection that according to the Rāmānujists consciousness exists in the individuals as eternal qualities, i.e. it may suffer modification according to conditions and circumstances.

Twenty-fourth Objection. In objecting to the unqualified character of pure consciousness Veṅkaṭa says that to be unqualified is also a qualification. It differs from other qualities only in being negative. Negative qualifications ought to be deemed as objectionable as the positive ones. Again, Brahman is admitted by the Śaṅkarites to be absolute and unchangeable, and these are qualifications. If it is replied that these qualifications are also false, then their opposite qualifications would hold good, viz. Brahman would be admitted as changeable. Again, it may be asked how this unqualified character of Brahman is established. If it is not established by reason, the assumption is invalid; if it is established by reason, then that reason must exist in Brahman and it will be qualified by it (the reason).

Twenty-fifth Objection. Veṅkaṭa denies the assumption of the Śaṅkarites that consciousness is the self because it reveals it to itself on the ground that if whatever reveals it to itself or whatever stands self-revealed is to be called the self, then pleasure and pain also should be identical with the self, for these are self-revealed. Veṅkaṭa further urges that the revelation of knowledge is not absolutely unconditional because revelation is made to the perceiver's self and not to anything and everything, a fact which shows that it is conditioned by the self. It may also be pointed out that the revelation of knowledge is not made to itself but to the self on one hand and to the objects on the other in the sense that they form constituents of knowledge. Again, it is testified by universal experience that consciousness is different from the self. It may also be asked whether, if consciousness be identical with the self, this consciousness is unchangeable or changeable. Would later recognition be impossible? In the former alternative it may further be asked whether this unchanging consciousness has any support or not; if not, how can it stand unsupported? If it has a support, then that support may well be taken as the knower, as is done by the Rāmānujists. It may also be pointed out here that knowledge being
a character or a quality cannot be identified with that (viz. the self) which possesses that character.

Twenty-sixth Objection. The Śaṅkarites assert that the self is pure consciousness. Therefore the perception of self as "I" is false, and therefore this notion of "I" is obsolete both in dreamless sleep and emancipation. To this Venkaṭa’s reply is that if the notion of "I" is obsolete in dreamless sleep, then the continuity of self-consciousness is impossible. It is no doubt true that in dreamless sleep the notion of the self as "I" is not then manifestly experienced, but it is not on that account non-existent at the time, for the continuity of the self as "I" is necessarily implied in the fact that it is experienced both before the dreamless sleep and after it. Since it is manifestly experienced both before and after the dreamless sleep, it must be abiding even at the time of the sleep. And this self-consciousness itself refers to the past and the present as a continuity. If this ego-notion was annihilated during the dreamless sleep, then the continuity of experience could not be explained (madhye ca’hama-rthā-bhāve sanskāra-dhārā-bhāvāt, pratisandhāṇā-bhāva-prasangaś ca). It is a patent fact that in the absence of the knower neither ignorance nor knowledge can exist. It cannot also be said that the continuity of experience is transmitted to pure consciousness or avidyā during the dreamless sleep; for the pure consciousness cannot be a repository of experiences, and if avidyā is the repository it would be the knower, which is impossible; and the fact of recognition would be unexplainable, for the experience associated with avidyā cannot be remembered by the entity to which the ego-notion refers. Moreover, the experience of a man rising from sleep who feels "I slept happily so long" indicates that the entity referred to by the ego-notion was also experienced during the sleep. Even the experience referring to the state in dreamless sleep as "I slept so soundly that I even did not know myself" also indicates that the self was experienced at that time as being ignorant of its specific bodily and other spatial and temporal relations. It cannot be contended that the entity denoted by the ego-notion cannot abide even in emancipation, for if there was no entity in emancipation no one would attempt to attain to this stage. The existence of pure qualityless consciousness at the time of emancipation would mean the annihilation of the self, and no one would ever be interested in his own self-destruction. Moreover, if the entity
denoted by the ego-notion is not a real entity, then the view (often put forward by the Śaṅkarites) that the entity denoted by the ego-notion is often falsely identified with the body or the senses would be meaningless. If the illusion be due to a false imposition of false appearances, such as the body or the senses, on the pure consciousness, then that cannot be called the delusion of the ego-entity as the body and the senses. It cannot also be said that in the experience of the self as "I" there are two parts, the pure consciousness which is eternal and real and the egohood which is a mere false appearance. For if it is so in the ego-experience it might also be so in other experiences as objectivity as this or that. Moreover, if this is so, what is there to distinguish the specific experience as subjectivity from the experience as objectivity? What is it that constitutes the special feature of subjectivity? Thus it may be confidently stated that the ego-entity is the real nature of the self.

Twenty-seventh Objection. It is urged by the Śaṅkarites that the notion of the self as the knower is false because the ultimate reality, being the self-luminous Brahman, is absolutely unchangeable. The attribution of the characteristic of being a knower would be incompatible with this nature. To this it may be replied that if the fact of being a knower is regarded as a changeable character, then being or self-luminosity would also be a character, and they also would be incompatible with this nature. The change of the states of knowledge does not in any way affect the unchangeable nature of the self, for the self is not changed along with the change of the cognitions.

Twenty-eighth Objection. It is well known that the Śaṅkarites conceive of pure consciousness which is regarded as the witness (sākṣin), as it were, of all appearances and forms that are presented to it, and it is through its function as such a witness that these are revealed. It is through this sākṣi-consciousness that the continuity of consciousness is maintained, and during dreamless sleep the blissfulness that is experienced is also made apparent to this sākṣi-consciousness. The Rāmānujists deny this sākṣi-consciousness because it is unnecessary for them; its purpose is served by the functions of a knower whose consciousness is regarded as continuous in the waking state, in dreams, and also in dreamless sleep. Veṅkaṭa urges that the manifestation of blissfulness which is one with pure consciousness is implied by the very nature of pure consciousness as self-revealed. It may also be pointed out that the sensuous
pleasures cannot be manifested during dreamless sleep; if this is so, why should a sākṣi-consciousness be admitted for explaining the experience of blissfulness during dreamless sleep? Since Brahman is not admitted to be a real knower, the conception of sākṣi is not the same as that of a knower. It cannot also be a mere revelation; for if it be a revelation of itself as Brahman, then the mediation of the function of sākṣi-consciousness is unnecessary, and if it be of avidyā, then through its association Brahman would be false. It cannot be that the functioning of the sākṣi-consciousness is one with the nature of Brahm, and yet that partakes of the nature of avidyā; for it cannot both be identical with Brahm and the avidyā. If the functioning of the sākṣi-consciousness be false, a number of other sākṣins is to be admitted, leading to a vicious infinite. Thus in whatsoever way one may try to conceive of the sākṣi-consciousness, one fails to reconcile it either with reason or with experience.

Twenty-ninth and thirtieth Objections. Veṇkaṭa urges that the Śaṅkarites are wrong in asserting that scriptural testimony is superior in validity to perceptual experience. As a matter of fact, scriptural knowledge is not possible without perceptual experience. Therefore scriptures are to be interpreted in such a way that they do not come into conflict with the testimony of perceptual knowledge. Therefore, since the perception proves to us the reality of the many around us, the scriptural interpretation that would try to convince us of their falsity is certainly invalid. The Śaṅkarites further urge and adduce many false illustrations to prove the possibility of attaining right knowledge through false means (e.g. the fear that arises from the perception of false snakes, representations of things that are made by letters, and the combinations of letters which are combinations of lines). But Veṇkaṭa’s reply to it is that in all those cases where falsehood is supposed to lead us to truth it is not through falsehood that we come to truth but from one right knowledge to another. It is because the lines stand as true symbols for certain things that they are represented by them, and it is not possible to adduce any illustration in which falsehood may be supposed to lead us to truth. If, therefore, scriptures are false (in the ultimate sense) as Śaṅkarites would say, it would be impossible for them to lead us to the true Brahma-knowledge.

Thirty-first Objection. The view of the Śaṅkarites that the emancipation may be attained by right knowledge even in this life
before death, called by them \textit{jivanmukti} or emancipation in life, is denied by the Rāmānujists, who hold that emancipation cannot be attained by right knowledge but by right actions and right feelings associated with right knowledge, and consequently emancipation is the result. Real separation of the association of the worldly things from the self can only come about after the body ceases to exist. Vēṅkaṭa points out that, so long as the body remains, perception of the ultimate truth as one is impossible, for such a person is bound to be aware of the existence of the body and its manifold relations. If it be said that though the body persists yet it may be regarded as absolutely false or non-existent, then that would amount to one's being without any body and the distinction of emancipation in life and emancipation in death would be impossible.

\textit{Thirty-second Objection.} The Śaṅkarites assert that \textit{ajñāna} or ignorance, though opposed to knowledge, is a positive entity as it is revealed as such by perception, inference and scriptural testimony. Vēṅkaṭa, in refusing this, says that if \textit{ajñāna} be regarded as opposed to knowledge, it can only be so if it negates knowledge, i.e. if it be of the nature of negation. Such a negation must then obviously refer to a content of knowledge; and if this be admitted then the content of knowledge must have been known, for otherwise the negation cannot refer to it. To this the Śaṅkarites are supposed to say that the negation of knowledge and the content to which it refers are two independent entities such that the experience of the negation of knowledge does not necessarily imply that the content should be known. Therefore it is wrong to say that the negation of knowledge is a contradiction in terms. To this the obvious reply is that as in the case of a negation, where the presence of the object of negation contradicts a negation, so when there is a negation of all contents of knowledge the presence of any content necessarily contradicts it. So the experience that "I do not know anything" would be contradicted by any knowledge whatsoever. If it is urged that a negation of knowledge and its experience may be at two different moments so that the experience and the negation may not be contradictory, the reply is that perceptual experience always grasps things which are existent at the present time. Though in the case of the supposed perception of \textit{ajñāna} during dreamless sleep the experience of \textit{ajñāna} may be supposed to be
known by inference, and in cases of such perception as "I am ignorant," "I do not know myself or anything else," there is obviously perceptual experience of ajñāna. It is, therefore, impossible that "I" should perceive and be at the same time ignorant. Perception of ignorance would thus be absurd. Again, the experience of a negation necessarily must refer to a locus, and this implies that there is a knowledge of the locus and that this would contradict the experience of a universal negation which is devoid of all knowledge. It may, however, be urged that the perception of ignorance is not the experience of a negation, but that of a positive entity, and so the objections brought forward in the above controversy would not apply to it.

To this the reply is that the admission of a positive category called ajñāna which is directly experienced in perception may imply that it is of an entity which is opposed to knowledge; for the negative particle "a" in "ajñāna" is used either in the sense of absence or negation. If it does so, it may well be urged that experience of opposition implies two terms, that which opposes and that to which there is an opposition. Thus, the experience of ajñāna would involve the experience of knowledge also, and, therefore, when the opposite of ajñāna shines forth, how can ajñāna be perceived? It is clear, therefore, that no advantage is gained by regarding ajñāna as a positive entity instead of a mere negation. The conception of a positive ajñāna cannot serve any new purpose which is not equally attainable by the conception of it as negation of knowledge. If a positive entity is regarded as able to circumscribe or limit the scope of manifestation of Brahman, a negation also may do the same. The Śaṅkarites themselves admit that knowledge shines by driving away the ignorance which constituted the negation-precedent to the production of (prāga-bhāva) knowledge, and thus in a way they admit that ajñāna is of the nature of negation. The supposed experience of dullness (mugdho'smi) involves in it the notion of an opposition. The mere fact that the word "dull" (mugdha) has no negative particle in it does not mean that it has no negative sense. Thus, a positive ignorance cannot be testified by perception.

It has been suggested that the existence of ajñāna may be proved by inference on the supposition that if light manifests itself by driving away darkness, so knowledge must shine by driving away
positive ignorance. Now inference is a mode of knowledge and as such it must drive away some ignorance which was hiding its operation. Since this ajñāna could not manifest itself, it must imply some other ajñāna which was hiding it, and without driving which it could not manifest itself, and there would thus be infinite regress. If the ajñāna be regarded as hiding, then the inference may as well be regarded as destroying the ignorance directly. Whenever a knowledge illuminates some contents, it may be regarded as dispelling the ignorance regarding it. The scriptural texts also do not support the conception of a positive ajñāna. Thus, the concept of a positive ajñāna is wholly illegitimate.

Fortieth Objection. The supposition that the ajñāna rests in the individual jīvas and not Brahman is also false. If the ajñāna is supposed to rest in the individual in its own real essence (i.e. as Brahman), then the ajñāna would virtually rest in Brahman. If it is supposed that ajñāna rests in the individual jīvas, not in their natural state but in their ordinarily supposed nature as suffering rebirth, etc., then this amounts to saying that the ajñāna is associated with the material stuff and as such can never be removed; for the material limitations of an individual can never have a desire to remove the ajñāna, nor has it the power to destroy it. Again, it may be asked whether the ajñāna that constitutes the difference of individual jīvas is one or many in different cases. In the former case in the emancipation of one, ajñāna would be removed and all would be emancipated. In the second case it is difficult to determine whether avidyā comes first or the difference between individual jīvas, and there would thus be anyonyā-śraya, for the Śaṅkarites do not admit the reality of difference between jīvas. In the theory that ajñāna is associated with Brahman, the difference between jīvas being false, there is no necessity to admit the diversity of ajñānas according to the diversity of jīvas. In any case, whether real or fictitious, avidyā cannot explain the diversity of the jīvas. Again, if the ajñānas which are supposed to produce the diversity of the jīvas be supposed to exist in the Brahman, then Brahman cannot be known. In the view that these ajñānas exist in the jīvas, the old difficulty comes in as to whether the difference of avidyās is primary or whether that of the jīvas is primary. If the difficulty is intended to be solved by suggesting that the regression is not vicious as in the case of the seed and the shoot, then it may be pointed out that
in the supposition that the ajñānas which produce difference in jīvas have these as their support then there is no scope for such a regression. The seed that produces the shoot does not produce itself. If it is suggested that the avidyā of the previous jīvas produces the later jīvas, then the jīvas would be destructible. Thus, from whichever way we may try to support the view that the avidyā rests in individual jīvas we meet with unmitigated failure.

Forty-first Objection. It is said that the defect of avidyā belongs to Brahman. If this defect of avidyā is something different from Brahman, then that virtually amounts to the admission of dualism; if it is not different from Brahman, then Brahman itself becomes responsible for all errors and illusions which are supposed to be due to avidyā, and Brahman being eternal all errors and illusions are bound to be eternal. If it is said that the errors and illusions are produced when Brahman is associated with some other accessory cause, then about this also the old question may be raised as to whether the accessory cause or causes are different or not different from Brahman and whether real or not. Again, such an accessory cause cannot be of the nature of a negation-precedent-to the production of the true knowledge of the identity of the self and the Brahman; for then the doctrine of a positive ignorance propounded by the Śaṅkarites would be wholly unnecessary and uncalled for. Further, such a negation cannot be identical with Brahman, for then with true knowledge and with the destruction of ignorance Brahman itself would cease. Again, since everything else outside Brahman is false, if there is any such entity that obstructs the light of Brahman or distorts it (if the distortion is in any sense real), then that entity would also be Brahman; and Brahman being eternal that distortion would also be eternal. If the defect which acts as an obstructive agent be regarded as unreal and beginningless, then also it must depend on some cause and this will lead to an infinite regress; if it does not depend upon any cause, then it would be like Brahman which shines forth by itself without depending on any defect, which is absurd. If it is supposed that this defect constructs itself as well as others, then the world-creation would manifest itself without depending upon any other defect. If it is said that there is no impropriety in admitting the defect as constructing itself, just as an illusion is the same as the construction, i.e. is made by it, then the Śaṅkarites would be contradicting their own views;
for they certainly do admit the beginningless world-creation to be due to the operation of defects. If the avidyā is not itself an illusory imposition, then it will be either true or chimerical. If it is regarded as both an illusory construction and a product, then it would not be beginningless. If it has a beginning, then it cannot be distinguished from the world-appearance. If illusion and its construction be regarded as identical, then also the old difficulty of the avidyā generating itself through its own construction would remain the same. Again, if the avidyā appears to Brahman without the aid of any accessory defect, then it will do so eternally. If it is urged that, when the avidyā ceases, its manifestation would also cease, then also there is a difficulty which is suggested by the theory of the Śaṅkarites themselves; for we know that in their theory there is no difference between the illumination and that which is illuminated and that there is no causal operation between them. That which is being illuminated cannot be separated from the principle of illumination.

If it is urged that the avidyā is manifested so long as there is no dawning of true knowledge, then may it not be said that the negation-precendent-to the rise of true knowledge is the cause of world-appearance and that the admission of avidyā is unnecessary? If it is said that the negation cannot be regarded as the cause of the very varied production of world-appearances, then it can be urged with as much force that the position may also be regarded as capable of producing the manifold world-appearance. If it is held that positive defects in the eye often produce many illusory appearances, then it may also be urged on the other side that the non-observation of distinctions and differences is also often capable of producing many illusory appearances. If it is urged that negation is not limited by time and is therefore incapable of producing the diverse kinds of world-appearances under different conditions of time, and that it is for that reason that it is better to admit positive ignorance, then also it may be asked with as much force how such a beginningless ignorance unconditioned by any temporal character can continue to produce the diverse world-appearance conditioned in time till the dawning of true knowledge. If in answer to this it is said that such is the nature and character of avidyā, then it may well be asked what is the harm in admitting such a nature or character of “negation.” This, at least, saves us from admitting a strange and
uncalled for hypothesis of positive ignorance. It may be urged that negation is homogeneous and formless and as such it cannot undergo transformations of character, while avidyā, being a positive stuff, can pass through a series of transformations of character (vivarta-paramparā). In this connection it may be urged that the nature of avidyā is nothing but this succession of transformations of character; if it is so, then since it is the nature of avidyā to have a succession of diverse kinds of transformations, there may be all kinds of illusions at all times. It cannot also be regarded as an effect of transformation of character, for the avidyā is supposed to produce such effects. If it is urged that avidyā is a distinct entity by itself, different from the appearance of its character that is perceived, then also the old question would recur regarding the reality or unreality of it. The former supposition would be an admission of dualism; the latter supposition, that is, if it is false, the succession of it as various appearances conditioned by diverse kinds of time and space would presuppose such other previous presuppositions ad infinitum. If it is held that there is no logical defect in supposing that the previous sets of transformations determine the later sets in an unending series, it is still not necessary to admit avidyā in order to explain such a situation. For it may well be supposed that the different transformations arise in Brahman without depending upon any extraneous cause. The objection that such a supposition that Brahman is continually undergoing such diverse transformations of character (real or unreal) would inevitably lead to the conclusion that there is no Brahman beyond such transformations is invalid; for our perceptual experience shows that the transformatory change of a lump of clay does not invalidate its being. In such a view Brahman may be regarded as the ground of all illusory appearances. On the other hand, it is only on the assumption of false avidyā that one cannot legitimately affirm the existence of a basis, for the basis of falsehood would itself be false. Therefore, if Brahman be regarded as its basis, then it would itself be false and would land us in nihilism.

Again, it may well be asked whether avidyā shines by itself or not. If it does not, it becomes chimerical; if it does, then it may again be asked whether this shining is of the nature of avidyā or not. If it is, then it would be as self-shining as Brahman and there would be no difference between them. Again, if the shining cha-
racter of avidyā belongs to Brahman, the Brahman being eternal, there would never be a time when avidyā would not shine. The shiningness cannot also be regarded as a character of either Brahman or the avidyā, for none of them is regarded as being a knower of it. If it is urged that the character as the knower is the result of an illusory imposition, then the objection is that the meaning of such an imposition is unintelligible unless the conception of avidyā is clarified. The character as knower is possible only on the supposition of an illusory imposition, and on the above supposition the illusory imposition becomes possible on the supposition of the knower. If it is due to Brahman, then Brahman, being eternal, the illusory impositions would also be eternal. If it be without any reason, then the entire world-illusion would be without any cause.

Again, any conception regarding the support of avidyā is unintelligible. If it has no support, it must be either independent like Brahman or be like chimerical entities. If it has a support and if that support be of the nature of Brahman, then it is difficult to conceive how the eternally pure Brahman can be the support of the impure avidyā which is naturally opposed to it. If the solution is to be found in the supposition that the impure avidyā is false, then it may well be urged that if it is false there is no meaning in the effort to make it cease. If it is said in reply that though it is non-existent yet there is an appearance of it, and the effort is made to make that appearance cease, then also the reply is that the appearance is also as false as itself. If it is admitted that though false it can yet injure one’s interest, then its falsehood would be only in name, for its effects are virtually admitted to be real. If Brahman in its limited or conditioned aspect be regarded as the support of avidyā, then since such a limitation must be through some other avidyā this would merely bring us into confusion. If it is held that avidyā has for its support an entity quite different from Brahman conditioned or unconditioned, then the view that Brahman is the support of avidyā has to be given up, and there would be other difficulties regarding the discovery of another support of this support. If it be said that like Brahman avidyā is its own support but Brahman is not its own support, then the support of avidyā would have no other support. If it is said that the support can be explained on the basis of conditions, then also it would be difficult to imagine how a condition of the nature of a receptacle (ādhārā-kāro-pādhi) can itself
be without any support. If further supports are conceived, then there would be a vicious infinite. Again, if it is held that what is false does not require any support, then it may be urged that according to the Śaṅkarites the support is regarded as the basis on which the illusion occurs, and even the jug is regarded as an illusion on the ground. Moreover, this false experience of avidyā is not any of the illusory or limited perceptions, such as ego-experience or the experience of other mental states; for these are regarded as the effects of avidyā. If they are not so, then they must be due to some other defects, and these to other ones, and so there would be a vicious infinite. If it is held that avidyā is nothing different from its experience, then since all experience is of the nature of Brahman, Brahman itself would be false. Again, if the avidyā manifests itself as Brahman by hiding its (Brahman) nature, then all pure revelation being hidden and lost, avidyā itself, which is manifested by it, would also be naturally lost. If it be manifested as Brahman and its own nature be hidden, then Brahman alone being manifested there would be no question of bondage. It is obvious that it cannot manifest itself both as avidyā and as Brahman, for that would be self-contradictory, since knowledge always dispels ignorance. If it is held that just as a mirror reflects an image in which the character of the mirror and the real face is hidden, so avidyā may manifest itself and hide both itself and the Brahman. To this the reply is that in all cases of illusions of identity (tādātmya-dhyāsa) the non-observation of the difference is the cause of the error. The cause of the illusion of the face and the mirror is the non-observation of the fact that the face is away from the mirror. But Brahman and avidyā are neither located in a proximate space so that it is possible to compare their illusion of identity by the illustration of other illusions which depend upon such proximity. If it is said of avidyā, not being a substance, that all criticism that applies to real and existent entities would be inapplicable to it, then such a doctrine would be almost like nihilism, for all criticisms against nihilism are accepted by nihilists as not invalidating their doctrine.

Forty-second Objection. It is held by the Śaṅkarites that avidyā and māyā are two distinct conceptions. Māyā is supposed to be that by which others are deluded, and avidyā is supposed to be that which deludes one's self. The word māyā is used in various senses but none of these seems to satisfy the usage of the word in Śaṅkarite
manner. If it is supposed that the word māyā, of which Brahman is supposed to be the support, has this peculiarity that it manifests its various forms to others as well as deludes them, then it is hard to distinguish it from the conception of avidyā. If it is held that the word avidyā is restricted to mean the agent that causes false perceptions as in the case of conch-shell-silver, then māyā may also be called avidyā, for it also causes the false world-appearance to be perceived. There is no reason why the cause of the false perception of the conch-shell-silver should be called avidyā and not those relatively true cognitions which contradict such illusory perceptions.īśvara also may be said to be suffering from avidyā, for since He is omniscient He has the knowledge of all individual selves of which falsehood is a constituent. If God has no knowledge of illusions, He would not be omniscient. It is wrong also to suppose that māyā is that which manifests everything else except Brahman in its nature as false; for if the Brahman knows the world-appearance as false without being under an illusion, it would still be hard to repudiate the ignorance of Brahman. If Brahman knows all things as the illusions of others, then He must know the others and as such their constituent illusions, and this would mean that Brahman is itself subject to avidyā. It is difficult also to conceive how one can have any cognition of falsehood without being under illusion, for falsehood is not mere non-existence but the appearance of an entity where it does not exist. If Brahman sees other people only under illusions, that does not mean that Brahman deludes others by His māyā. There may be a magician who would try to show his magic by mere false tricks. If the Brahman tried to show His magic by mere false reflections, He would indeed be mad. It may be supposed that the difference between avidyā and māyā is that avidyā, by producing illusory experiences, hurts the real interests of the perceiving selves, yet the Brahman Who perceives these illusory selves and their experiences does so through the agency of māyā which does not injure His interest. To this the reply is that if māyā does not injure anybody's interest, it cannot be called a defect. It may be objected that defects have no connection with harmful or beneficial effects but they have a relation only to truth and error. Such a view cannot be accepted, for truth and error have a pragmatic value and all that is erroneous hurts one's interests; if it were not so, nobody would be anxious to remove them.
If it is argued that māyā is not a defect of Brahman but a quality, then it may be said that if it were so then no one would be anxious to remove it. If, again, māyā were a quality of Brahman and served the purpose of such a mighty person, how could the poor individual selves dare it? And if they could, they would be able to injure the practical interests of an Omnipotent Being, for māyā being a quality would certainly be of great use to Him. Māyā cannot be destroyed by itself without any cause, for that would land us in the doctrine of momentariness. If the māyā were eternal and real, that would be an admission of dualism. If māyā be regarded as being included in Brahman, then Brahman, being only self-manifesting, and māyā being included within it would not have the power of producing the world-delusions which it is supposed to produce. Again, māyā being eternal cannot also be false. Again, if the manifestation of māyā from Brahman be regarded as real, then the ignorance of Brahman becomes also real; if it is a false manifestation from Brahman, then it would be meaningless to suppose that Brahman should be using the māyā as an instrument of play. It is absurd to suppose that Brahman would be playing with false reflected images, like a child. Again, if the jīvas and Brahman be identical, then it is unreasonable to suppose that the ignorance of the jīvas would not imply the ignorance of Brahman. If, again, the jīvas and the Brahman be really different, then how can there be any emancipation by the knowledge of their identity? So the conception of a māyā and an avidyā different from it is wholly incomprehensible.

Forty-third Objection. It is held by the Śaṅkarites that a knowledge of monistic identity produces emancipation. Now such a knowledge cannot be different from the Brahma-knowledge; for if it is a contentless entity, then it would be no knowledge, since the Śaṅkarites hold that knowledge can only be a mental state associated with a content (vṛtti-rūpaṁ hi jñānam saviṣayam eva iti bhavatāṁ api siddhāntah). It cannot also be identical with Brahma-knowledge, for if such a knowledge can produce emancipation the pure Brahma-knowledge would have done the same. It may be held that in the case of the illusion of conch-shell–silver, when there is a true shining regarding the nature of the “this” in its own character, then that is equivalent to the contradiction of the illusory appearance of silver, and the manifestation of identity showing the
real nature of Brahman may be regarded as contradictory to world-illusion. To this the reply is that there is no identity between the existence of the "this" as conch-shell and its appearance as silver. Thus, one knowledge may contradict the other, but in the case under review there is no new element in the notion of the identity which was not already present in the Brahma-knowledge itself. If the notion of identity be regarded as a contentful knowledge, then it would be different from the Brahma-knowledge, and being itself false it could not remove the error. The case where a thing known is again recognized is also not a proper instance for supporting the Śaṅkarite position, for here also the knowledge of recognition is not the same as the knowledge of original acquaintance, whereas the notion of identity is supposed to be the same as the Brahma-knowledge. Again, if it is supposed that a mental state of a particular content removes the illusions and produces Brahma-knowledge, then the illusions would be real entities since they were capable of being destroyed like other entities.

If it is held that the notion of identity has a reference to Brahman as limited by avidyā, then that will be like the manifestation of the illusory world-creations through the शक्ति-consciousness, and such a manifestation would not remove errors.

Again, it may be asked whether the knowledge that produces the notion that all else excepting Brahman is false can itself be regarded as constituting falsehood, for that would be self-contradictory. If the notion of the falsehood of the world-appearance be itself regarded as false, then the world would have to be regarded as real. If it is urged that as in the supposition of the death of a barren woman's son both the barren woman's son and his death are false, so here also both the world and its falsehood may be equally false. But it may be replied that in the instance put forward the falsehood of the barren woman's son and that of his death are not both false. Again, if the falsehood of the world-appearance were real, then that would imply dualism.

Again, if inferences led to the contradiction of world-appearance, then there would be no reason to suppose that the contradiction of the world-appearance would be possible only through listening to the Vedāntic texts of identity. If the contradiction of world-appearance is produced by Brahman itself, then Brahman being eternal there would be no world-illusion. Again, Brahman
has been regarded as helping the process of world-illusion in its own pure nature for otherwise there would have been no illusion at all. It is a curious doctrine that though Brahman in its pure nature helps illusion, yet, in its impure nature, as the scriptural texts or the knowledge arising out of them, it would remove it. So in whichever way we may think of the possibility of a removal of ajñāna we are brought into confusion.

**Forty-fourth Objection.** The conception of the cessation of the avidyā is also illegitimate. For the question that arises in this connection is whether the cessation of avidyā is itself real or unreal. If it is unreal, then the hope that the avidyā is rooted out with such a cessation is baffled, for the cessation itself is a manifestation of avidyā. It cannot be said that the cessation of avidyā has as its ground a real entity, the ātman, for then the ātman will have to be admitted as suffering change. And if in any way the cessation of avidyā is to be regarded as having a true cause as its support, then the cessation being real there would be dualism. If it is regarded as an illusion, and there is no defect behind it, then the assumption of avidyā as a defect for explaining the world-illusion would be unnecessary. If it is without any further ground like avidyā and Brahman, then there is no meaning in associating avidyā with it. There is also no reason why, even after the cessation of avidyā, it may not rise up again into appearance. If it is suggested that the function of the cessation of avidyā is to show that everything else except Brahman is false and as soon as this function is fulfilled the cessation of avidyā also ceases to exist, then also another difficulty has to be faced. For if the cessation of avidyā itself ceases to exist, then that would mean that there is a cessation of cessation which means that avidyā is again rehabilitated. It may be urged that when a jug is produced it means the destruction of the negation-precedent-to-production (prāga-bhāva), and when this jug is again destroyed it does not mean that the negation-precedent again rises into being; so it may be in this case also. To this the reply is that the two cases are different, for in the above case the negation of one negation is through a positive entity, whereas there is nothing to negate the cessation of avidyā; so in this case the negation would be a logical negation leading to a position of the entity negated, the avidyā. If it is said that there is the Brahman which negates the cessation of avidyā, then the difficulty would be that Brahman, the
negation of both avidyā and its cessation, being eternal, there ought to be no illusory world-creation at any time.

If the cessation of avidyā is not itself of illusory nature and if it is regarded as included in the being of Brahman, then Brahman being beginningless the avidyā should be regarded as having always remained arrested. It cannot be said that the existence of Brahman is itself the cessation of ajñāna, for then it would be impossible to connect the cessation of avidyā with the realization of the nature of Brahman as cause and effect.

If it is suggested that a mental state reflecting the nature of Brahman represents the cessation of ajñāna of Brahman and that this mental state may be removed by other causes, then the reply is that this would mean that such a mental state is illusory; and this implies that the cessation of avidyā is illusory. The criticism of such a view is given above. The cessation of avidyā is not real, being outside Brahman; neither real, something different from real, and unreal, for that could not lead to a real cessation. So ultimately it must be neither unreal nor something different from any of the above entities, for the cessation of positive and negative entities only are of the nature of real and unreal. Ajñāna is something different from real and unreal; its cessation is valid, being amenable to proofs. So the cessation has to be admitted as being something unique and different from all existent and non-existent entities. In reply it may be said that if the ajñāna is admitted to be like-a-non-existent entity (asatīva), then in both the two meanings of negation, that is, in the view that negation is but the other name of position and that negation is a separate category in itself, the admission of avidyā would involve dualism. If it is regarded as something chimerical, it could never show itself, and such a chimerical entity would have no opposition to the world-cycle. So the cessation of avidyā cannot lead to emancipation. Again, if the cessation of avidyā is non-existent, that would imply the existence of avidyā. The cessation of avidyā is not like the destruction of a jug which has a real existence, so that though it may appear like a non-being, yet the jug may be regarded as a positive entity. The destruction of avidyā is not of that nature, for it has no definite form. If it is held that the cessation of avidyā is of the fifth type, that is, different from existent, non-existent, existent-and-non-existent and different-from-existent-and-non-existent, then this is virtually the admission
of the mādhyamika doctrine of indescribability of all phenomena, for it also describes the world-phenomena as being of the fifth type. There is also really no way in which such an absolutely unique and indefinable category can be related to anything else.

Forty-fifth Objection. It is argued by the Śaṅkarites that the scriptural texts cannot signify Brahman, which is devoid of all and every specific quality. To this Veṅkaṭa replies that Brahman is endowed with all specific qualities and, therefore, it is quite legitimate that texts should signify it. It is wrong also to suppose that Brahman, being self-luminous, cannot be manifested by words, for it has been shown by the Rāmānuja school that even the self-luminous can be the object of further awareness. Brahman is also sometimes described by the Śaṅkarites as the state of being quality-less, but is itself a quality since it is used adjectively to Brahman. Moreover, if Brahman could not be signified by the scriptural texts, the texts themselves would be meaningless. It is wrong also to suppose that the scriptural words refer to Brahman only in a secondary manner, just as one may point to a tree-top in order to show that the moon is visible (śākhā-candra-darśana); for whatever be the method, Brahman is indicated by the texts. Even a state of non-conceptual meditation (asamprajñāta-samādhi) is not absolutely unpredicatable. In that state one cannot apply the concepts or words. If Brahman is absolutely without any character, it cannot be admitted that it should be implied or signified in a remote manner (laksya) by the scriptures. The passages which say that Brahman is beyond word (yato vācō nivartante) indicate only that the qualities of Brahman are infinite. Thus, it is wholly unjustifiable on the part of the Śaṅkarites to say that Brahman is not indicated by the texts.

Forty-seventh Objection. It is maintained by the Śaṅkarites that all determinate knowledge is false because it is determinate in its nature like the conch-shell–silver. If all that is determinate is false, then since all distinctions must involve determinateness they would all be false and thus ultimately we have monism. The futility of such a position is shown by Veṅkaṭa, who points out that such an inference involves determinate concepts in all its limbs, and would thus be absolutely unwarrantable according to the thesis itself. Moreover, if the determinate knowledge is false, the indeterminate would also be false for want of corroboration. It is wrong also to suppose that determinate perceptions are false for want of cor-
roborative evidence from other awarenesses; for an illusion may be further corroborated by other illusions and may yet be false, and the last corroborative knowledge would be false for want of further corroborations, which would lead to the falsehood of the whole set of corroborations which is dependent on it. It is also wrong to suppose that determinate conceptions do not stand the test of causal efficiency, for all our practical experiences depend on determinate notions. It cannot also be held that the conceptual cognitions involving universals are false, for they are neither contradicted nor found to be doubtful in any way. Thus, if all determinate cognitions are regarded as false, then that would lead us to nihilism and not to monism. Moreover, if the indeterminate nature of Brahma is to be inferred from the indeterminate nature of our perception of external things, then on the analogy of the falsehood of the former the latter may also be false.

Fifty-fifth Objection. The Śaṅkarites hold that all effects are false, for they seem to contradict themselves if an attempt is made to conceive the logical situation. Is the effect produced out of the cause related with it or unrelated? In the first alternative the cause and the effect, being but two relata connected together by relation, there is no reason why the effect should be produced by the cause and not the cause by the effect. If the cause produces the effect without being related to it, then anything might produce anything. Again, if the effect be different from the cause, things which are different from one another would be productive of one another. If they are identical, then one could not produce the other. If it is said that cause is that which invariably precedes and effect is that which invariably succeeds, then a thing ought to be existent before the negation-precedent-to-production. Again, if the effect be regarded as having been produced from a material cause which has undergone transformation, then it may further be asked whether these transformations are produced from other transformations, and this would lead to a vicious infinite. If the effect be regarded as produced from a cause which has not undergone any transformation, then it would abide the whole time in which the material cause remains. Moreover, an effect is like the illusory silver which is non-existent in the beginning and in the end. The production of an entity cannot be either from a positive entity or a negative entity; for an effect, say, the jug, cannot be produced from its cause, the
earth-matter, without producing some change in it, that is, without negating it in some way or the other. On the other hand, if the production is regarded as being from a negation, then it will itself be a negation. So in whichever way a causal relation may be viewed, it becomes fraught with contradictions.

The reply of Venkata to this is that the objection as to whether the effect is related to the cause in its production or unrelated to it is overcome by the view that the effect is unrelated to the cause; but that need not imply that all that is unrelated to the cause should be the effect, for mere unrelatedness does not induce the production of the effect such that the very unrelatedness will connect anything with any other thing as effect. The special powers associated with causal entity are responsible for the production of the special effects, and these can be known by the ordinary methods of agreement and difference. The relations of the causal elements among themselves are transferred to the effect. It is well known that causes produce effects of an entirely different nature, just as when a jug is produced by a stick and the potter's wheel. Even the material cause is very different from the material cause as the effect. It is indeed admitted that the effect is produced from a modified (vikṛta) cause, for any change in the cause, even the proximity of an accessory condition, would be a modification. But if modification or vikāra cannot be affirmed of the cause in the sense in which the effect is regarded as a modification, it may be said in that sense that the effect is produced from an unmodified cause. It would be wrong to suggest that any and every effect might spring from any and every unmodified cause, for an effect is produced from an unmodified cause under proper temporal conditions and the association of collocative agents. It is also wrong to suggest that in the supposition that an effect is analysable as a course of changes, the cause as the immediate antecedent would be undiscoverable; and the cause being undiscoverable the effect would also be inexplicable; for it is the effect which is recognized as perceived and this implies the existence of the cause without which it could not come into being. If it is urged that the effect is not perceived, or that it is contradicted, then the obvious reply is that both non-perception and contradiction are effects, and in denying effects through them the criticism becomes self-contradictory.

When a material cause is changed into an effect, there are cer-
tain parts of it which remain unchanged, even when that effect is changed into other objects called effects, and there are some characters which are formed only in certain effects. Thus, when gold is changed into a bangle and the bangle into a necklace, the persisting qualities of gold continue the same both in the bangle and in the necklace; but the special form of the bangle does not pass into that of the necklace. Again, the objection that if the effects were already existent in the cause, then there is no necessity of the causal operation as has elsewhere been repudiated, and it has also been pointed out that the assertion that all effects are false like conch-shell-silver is false, for these effects are not found to be contradicted like these illusory appearances. It is wrong also to suggest that because an effect does not exist in the beginning or in the end it also does not exist in the middle, for its existence in the middle is directly experienced. It may also be suggested on the other hand that because an effect exists in the middle it must also exist in the beginning and in the end.

It is suggested by the Śaṅkarites that all notions of difference as effects are illusorily imposed upon one permanent entity which permeates through all so-called different entities, and that it is this permeating entity which is real. Against such a supposition the Śaṅkarites may be asked to discover any entity that permeates both through Brahman and avidyā. It would be wrong to suggest that Brahman is both in itself and in the avidyā; for Brahman cannot have any dual entity, and also cannot be illusorily imposed upon itself.

The suggestion that since the unity of a flame is perceived to be false all perception is false is obviously wrong, for in the former case the illusion is due to the rapid coalescing of similar flames, but this does not apply to all perception.

In the sense of substance (dravya) an effect exists in the cause, but in the sense of an effect-state the effect does not exist in the cause. The objections of the Śaṃkhyists that if the effect-state did not exist in the cause it could not be produced and that similarly anything could be produced from anything are futile, for the effects are produced by specific powers which manifest themselves as effects in definite spatial and temporal conditions.

A question is asked whether the effects are produced from a positive or a negative entity, that is, whether when the effects are
produced they are produced as states of a substance which persists through them or not. Venkâta’s reply is that the substance persists; only states and conditions change when the effect is produced. For in the production of an effect there is change only in the causal state and not in the causal substance. There is thus an agreement between the cause and the effect only so far as the substance is concerned and not with reference to their states; for it is by the negation of the causal state that the effect-state arises. It is sometimes suggested that since an effect is neither permanently existing nor permanently non-existing it must be false. But this suggestion is obviously wrong, for the fact that an entity may be destroyed at a later moment does not mean that it was non-existent at the moment when it was perceived. Destruction means that an entity which was existent at a particular moment was non-existent at another. Contradiction means that a thing is non-existent even when it is perceived. Mere non-existence is not destruction, for the negation-precedent-to-production might also be called destruction since it is also non-existent. Non-existence at a later point of time also does not mean destruction, for then even chimerical entities might also be called destruction. The case of conch-shell-silver is not a case of destruction, for clearly that is a case of contradiction in experience. Thus, if the concepts of production, destruction and non-existence be analysed, then it will be found that the concept of effect can never be regarded as illusory.

Fifty-seventh Objection. It is said that Brahman is of the nature of pure bliss (ānanda); but it may well be said that in whichever sense the word ānanda may be used it will not be possible to affirm that Brahman is of the nature of pure bliss. For if ānanda means an entity the awareness of which induces an agreeable experience, then Brahman will be knowable. If it means merely an agreeable experience, then Brahman would not be pure indeterminate consciousness. If it means a mere agreeable attitude, then duality will be implied. If it means negation of pain, then Brahman would not be positive and it is well admitted on all hands that Brahman is neutral. Moreover, according to the Sankarites themselves the state of intuition of Brahman is regarded as a positive state like the state of dreamless sleep. Thus, in whichever way one may look at the problem the assertion that the indeterminate Brahman is of the nature of pure bliss becomes wholly unwarrantable.
Fifty-eighth Objection. The eternity of Brahman cannot be maintained, if it is regarded as indeterminate. If eternity means existence in all times, then avidyā also would be eternal; for it is also associated with all time, and time is itself regarded as its product. If it is urged that association with all time does not mean existence in all time, then it is wrong to regard existence in all times as a definition of eternity, for it will be enough to say that existence itself is eternal. The “inclusion of all time” as distinguished from mere existence shows the difference between existence and eternity. Eternity would thus mean existence in all time, which can be affirmed of avidyā also. Eternity cannot also be defined as that which does not cease in time since such a definition would apply to time also which does not cease in time. It cannot also be said that eternity means that which is not contradicted in the beginning or in the end, for then the world-appearance also would be eternal. Again, it is difficult to understand how consciousness is regarded as eternal by the Śaṅkarites, for if it is affirmed of ordinary consciousness, then that is directly against perceptual experience; and if it is affirmed of transcendental consciousness, then that is directly against experience. Further, eternity cannot be regarded as the essence, for then it would be identical with self-luminosity, and its predication, such as Brahman is eternal, would be unnecessary. If it is regarded as a knowable quality, then if such a quality existed in consciousness, consciousness would become knowable. If it did not exist in consciousness, then its knowledge would not imply the eternity of consciousness. It cannot also be said that whatever is not produced is eternal, for then negation-precedent-to-production would be eternal. If it is said that any positive entity which is not produced is eternal, then avidyā would also be eternal. Thus, in whichever way one may try to prove the eternity of the indeterminable pure consciousness one fails.

Sixty-first Objection. It is often asserted by the Śaṅkarites that there is a unity of the self. If by self here they mean the “ego,” then clearly all the egos cannot be regarded as identical, for it is well known that the experiences of other people are never identified by us as ours. Nor can it be said that there is unity of consciousness of us all, for then each of us would know the minds of others. It is not maintainable that our underlying being is the same, for that would not mean the identity of our selves. One may think of
universal existence, but that would not mean the identity of the existents. Again, the identity of the selves cannot be regarded as real since the selves (jīvas) themselves are regarded as unreal. If the identity of the selves be regarded as false, then there is no reason why such a doctrine should be propounded. In any case, when one has to deal with our experiential life, one has to admit the diversity of selves and there is no other proof by which their identity may be established. Thus it would be wrong to think, as the Śaṅkarites do, that there is one self.

Meghanādārī.

Meghanādārī, son of Ātreyanātha sūri, seems to be one of the earliest members of the Rāmānuja school. He wrote at least two books, Naya-prakāśikā and Naya-duṣya-manī, both of which are still in manuscript and only the latter has been available to the present writer. Most of the important contributions of Meghanādārī on the subject of the Rāmānuja theory of the pramāṇas have already been discussed in some detail in connection with the treatment of that subject under Veṇkataṭanātha. Only a few of his views on other topics of Rāmānuja philosophy will therefore be given here.

Svatah-pramāṇya-vāda. Veṇkata, in his Tattva-muktā-kalāpa and Sarvartha-siddhi, says that all knowledge manifests the objects as they are. Even errors are true at least so far as they point to the object of the error. The erroneousness or error is due to the existence of certain vitiating conditions. When there is knowledge that there is a jug, the existence of the object is the validity (pramāṇa) of it and this is made known by the very knowledge that the jug exists. Even where there is the knowledge of silver in a conch-shell, there is the knowledge of the existence of the objective silver implied in that very knowledge, and thus even in erroneous knowledge there is the self-validity so far as it carries with it the existence of the object of perception.

Meghanādārī however, who in all probability preceded Veṇkata, gives a somewhat different account of the doctrine of svatah-
prāmānya. He says that validity (prāmānya) proceeds from the apprehension of cognition (prāmānyamjñāna-sattā-pratiti-kāraṇādeevam), for the validity must have a cause and no other cause is traceable.¹

The Naiyāyikas, arguing against the svatah-prāmānya doctrine of the Mīmāṃsakas, are supposed to say that the self-validity cannot be regarded as being produced in every case of knowledge, for the Mīmāṃsakas hold that the Vedas are eternal and thus their self-validity cannot be regarded as being produced. Self-validity cannot be regarded as produced in some cases only, for if that were the case the thesis that all cognitions are self-valid cannot stand. Therefore the proper view is that only that knowledge is self-valid which is uncontradicted in experience (abādhita-vyavahāra-heturvam eva jñānasya prāmānyam)². Self-validity cannot be regarded as a special potency, for such a potency is non-sensible and has therefore to be known by inference or some other means; neither can it be regarded as being one (svarūpa) with the sense-organs by which knowledge is acquired, for the existence of such sense-organs is itself inferred from mere knowledge and not from what is only true knowledge. Arguing against the Śaṅkarites, the Naiyāyikas are supposed to say that in their view knowledge being self-luminous, there would be no way of determining validity either from uncontradicted experience or by any other means; and since, according to them, everything is false, the distinction of validity and invalidity also ought to have no place in their system, for if such distinctions are admitted it would land them in dualism. To this Meghanādārī says that if self-validity is not admitted, then the whole idea of validity has to be given up; for if validity is said to be produced from a knowledge of the proper conditions of knowledge or the absence of defects, such a knowledge has to be regarded as self-valid, for it would have to depend on some other knowledge and that again on some other knowledge, which would mean a vicious infinite. So knowledge is to be regarded as self-valid by nature and its invalidity occurs only when the defects and vitiating contributions of the causes of knowledge are known by some other means. But the method of establishing self-validity according to the followers of Kumārila is liable to criticism, for according to that system the existence of knowledge is only inferred from the fact of the revelation of the objects, and that implication cannot also further

¹ Naya-dyu-maṇi, p. 21 (MS.). ² Ibid. p. 22.
lead to the self-validity of knowledge. The theory of self-validity that it is caused by the same constituents which produce the knowledge is also inadmissible, for the senses have also to be regarded as the cause of knowledge and these may be defective. Again, it is held that knowledge which corresponds with the object (tatha-bhūta) is valid and that which does not correspond with the object is invalid and that such validity and invalidity are therefore directly manifested by the knowledge itself. Meghanādārī replies that if such correspondence be a quality of the object, then that does not establish the validity of knowledge; if it is a quality of knowledge, then memory has also to be regarded as self-valid, for there is correspondence in it also. Again, the question arises whether the self-validity is merely produced or also known. In the former case the self-manifestation of self-validity has to be given up, and in the latter case the Kumārila view is indefensible for by it knowledge being itself an implication from the revelation of objects its self-validity cannot obviously be self-manifested.

Meghanādārī, therefore, contends that an intuition (anubhūti) carries with it its own validity; in revealing the knowledge it also carries with it the conviction of its own validity. The invalidity, on the other hand, is suggested by other sources. This intuition is in itself different from memory\(^1\). The whole emphasis of this contention is on his view that each cognition of an object carries with it its cognizability as true, and since this is manifested along with the cognition, all cognitions are self-valid in this sense. Such a self-validity is therefore not produced since it is practically identical with the knowledge itself. Meghanādārī points out that this view is in apparent contradiction with Rāmānuja's own definition of svatah-prāmāṇya as that which is produced by the cause of knowledge; but Rāmānuja's statement in this connection has to be interpreted differently, for the knowledge of God and the emancipated beings being eternal and unproduced any view which defines self-validity as a production from the same source from which knowledge is produced would be inapplicable to them\(^2\).

**Time.** Time according to Meghanādārī is not to be regarded as a separate entity. He takes great pains to show that Rāmānuja has

\(^1\) *anubhūtītvam vā prāmāṇyam astu; tāc ca jñāṇa-vāntara-jātiḥ; sā ca smṛti-jñāna-jāttitah prthaktaḥ eva siddhā; anubhūteḥ svasattayā eva sphūrteḥ.*

*Naya-duyamani, p. 31.*

himself discarded the view that time is a separate entity in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, the Vedānta-dīpa and the Vedānta-sāra. The notion of time originates from the relative position of the sun in the zodiac with reference to earth. It is the varying earth-space that appears as time, being conditioned by the relative positions of the Sun\(^1\). This view is entirely different from that of Veṅkaṭa which will be described later on.

**Karma and its fruits.** According to Meghanādāri deeds produce their fruits through the satisfaction and dissatisfaction of God. Though ordinarily deeds are regarded as virtuous or vicious, yet strictly speaking virtue and vice should be regarded as the fruits of actions and these fruits are nothing but the satisfaction and dissatisfaction of God. The performance of good deeds in the past determines the performance of similar deeds in the future by producing helpful tendencies, capacities and circumstances in his favour, and the performance of bad deeds forces a man to take a vicious line of action in the future. At the time of dissolution also there is no separate dharma and adharma, but God’s satisfaction and dissatisfaction produced by the individual’s deeds determine the nature and extent of his sufferings and enjoyment as well as his tendencies towards virtue or vice at the time of the next creation. The fruits of actions are experienced in the Heaven and Hell and also in the mundane life, but not while the individual is passing from Heaven or Hell to earth, for at that time there is no experience of pleasure or pain, it being merely a state of transition. Again, except in the case of those sacrifices which are performed for injuring or molesting other fellow beings, there is no sin in the killing of animals in sacrifices which are performed for the attainment of Heaven or such other pleasurable purposes\(^2\).

**Vātsya Varada.**

Regarding the doctrine of Vedic injunction that one should study the Vedas, Vātsya Varada in his *Prameya-mālā* holds the view, in contradistinction to the Śabara Bhāṣya, that Vedic injunction is satisfied only in the actual reading of the Vedic texts and that the Vedic injunction does not imply an inquiry into the mean-

\(^1\) *śūryā-di-sambandha-viśeṣo-pādhitaḥ prthivyā-dideśānām eva kāla-samjña*, *Naya-dyu-mañi*, p. 168.

ing of those texts. Such an inquiry proceeds from the normal inquisitive spirit and the desire to know the various applications in the practical performances of sacrifices. These do not form a part of the Vedic injunction (vidhi).

Vātsyā Varada holds that the study of the Vedic injunction and the inquiry relating to Brahman form the parts of one unified scripture, i.e. the latter follows or is a continuation of the former; and he mentions Bodhayana in his support.

Śaṅkara had thought that the study of the Mīmāṃsā was intended for a class of people but not necessarily for those who would inquire into the nature of Brahman. The Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and the Uttara-mīmāṃsā were intended for different purposes and were written by different authors. These should not therefore be regarded as integrally related as two parts of a unified work. To this Vātsyā Varada, following Bodhayana, takes exception, for he thinks that though the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and Uttara-mīmāṃsā are written by different authors yet the two together uphold one common view and the two may be regarded as two chapters of one whole book.

Vātsyā Varada also, in referring to Śaṅkara’s view that the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā assumes the existence of a real world, whereas the purport of the Brahma-sūtra is to deny it and therefore the two cannot be regarded as having the same end in view, challenges it by affirming the reality of the world. Śaṅkara’s argument, that all which is cognizable is false, would imply that even the self is false; for many Upaniṣads speak of the perceptibility of the self. His declaration of the falsity of the world would also imply that the falsehood itself is false, for it is a part of the world. Such an argument ought to be acceptable to Śaṅkara, for he himself utilized it in refuting the nihilists.

Regarding the denial of the category of difference by the Śaṅkarites Vātsyā Varada says that the opponent cannot by any means deny that difference is perceived, for all his arguments are based on the assumption of the existence of difference. If there were no difference, there would be no party and no view to be refuted. If it is admitted that the category of difference is perceived, then the opponent has also to admit that such a perception must have its own peculiar and proper cause. The real point in the conception of difference is that it constitutes its other as a part of itself. An object in its own nature has twofold characteristics, the
characteristic of its universal similarity with other things of its class and the characteristic in which it differs from others. In its second characteristic it holds its others in itself. When it is said that a thing is different it does not mean that the difference is identical with the thing or but another name for the thing, but what is meant is that a thing known as different has an outside reference to other entities. This outside reference to other entities, when conceived along with the object, produces the perception of difference.

The conception of difference involves the conception of negation as involved in the notion of otherness. If this negation is different in nature from the object which is conceived as "different" or as the "other" of other objects, then since this negation cannot be directly known by perception "difference" also cannot be known directly by perception. The Viśiṣṭā-dvaita theory admits that "difference" can be directly perceived. In order to prove this point Vātsyāya Varada gives a special interpretation of "negation" (abhāva). He holds that the notion of negation of an entity in another entity is due to the latter's being endowed with a special character as involving a reference to the former. The notion of negation thus proceeds from a special modified character of an object in which the negation is affirmed. There are many Śaṅkararitäes who regard negation as positive, but in their case it is held to be a special category by itself which is perceived in the locus of the negation by the special pramāna of non-perception. Though positive its notion is not produced according to them by the special modified nature of the object perceived in which the negation is affirmed. But Vātsyāya Varada holds that the notion of negation is due to the perception of a special modified nature of the entity in which the negation is affirmed¹. The negation revealed to us in one object as the otherness of another object means that the latter is included in a special character of the former which makes the reference as the otherness possible.

Vātsyāya Varada also emphasizes the view that the tests referring to Brahman as satya, jñāna, ananta, etc., indicate the fact of the possession of these qualities by God and that the monistic interpretation that these together refer to one identical being, the Brahman, is false. He also describes the infinite and unlimited nature of

Brahman and explains the exact sense in which the world and the individuals may be regarded as the body of God and that the individuals exist for God who is their final end. He also deals in this work with certain topics regarding the external rituals, such as shaving of the head, wearing the holy thread, etc., by ascetics.

Varada, in his Tattva-sāra, collects some of the specially interesting points of the Bhāṣya of Rāmānuja and interprets them in prose and verse. Some of these points are as follows: (i) The view that the existence of God cannot be logically proved, but can be accepted only from scriptural testimony. (ii) The special interpretation of some of the important Upaniṣadic texts such as the Kāpyāsa text. (iii) The results of the discussions of the important adhikaraṇas of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja. (iv) The doctrine that negation is only a kind of position. (v) The interpretation of the apparent dualistic and monistic texts. (vi) The discussion regarding the reality of the world, etc.

This Tattva-sāra provoked a further commentary on it called Ratna-sārīṇī by Vira-rāaghava-dāsa, a son of Bādhūla Narasimha Guru, disciple of Bādhūla Varada Guru, son of Bādhūla Veṅkaṭācārya. Some of Vātsyya Varada's other works are: Sārā-rtha-catuṣṭaya, Ārādhanā-saṅgraha, Tattva-nīrṇaya, Prapanna-pārijāta, Yati-linga-samarthana and Puruṣa-nīnṇaya.

Rāmānujācārya II alias Vādi-Haṁsa-Navāmvuda.

Rāmānujācārya II, the son of Padmanābha, belonged to the Atri lineage. He was the maternal uncle of Veṅkaṭā's, the famous writer of the Rāmānuja school. He wrote the Nyāya-kulīṣa which has often been referred to in Veṅkaṭā's Sarvārtha-siddhi. He also wrote another work called Mokṣa-siddhi. Some of his interpretations of Rāmānuja's ideas have already been referred to in dealing with the Rāmānuja theory of knowledge as explained by Veṅkaṭā. Other contributions by him are mentioned in brief below.

Negation. Negation as a separate category is denied by Rāmānujācārya II. He thinks that negation of an entity means only another entity different from it. The negation of a jug thus means the

1 In his Tattva-nīrṇaya he tries to prove that all the important Śruti texts prove that Narāyaṇa is the highest God. He refers in this work to his Puruṣa-nīrṇaya where, he says, he has discussed the subject in more detail.
existence of some other entity different from it. The real notion of negation is thus only "difference." A negation is described as that which is antagonistic to a positive entity and there is thus no way in which a negation can be conceived by itself without reference to a positive entity. But a positive entity never stands in need of its specification through a reference to negation. It is also well known that the negation of a negation is nothing else than the existence of positive entity. The existence of negation cannot be known either by perception, inference, or by implication. Veṅkaṭa, in further explaining this idea, says that the idea of absence in negation is derived from the association of the object of negation with a different kind of temporal or spatial character. Thus, when it is said that there is no jug here, it merely means that the jug exists in another place. It is argued that negation cannot be regarded as the existence of positive entity, and it may be asked if negation cannot be regarded as negation, how can negation of negation be regarded as the existence of positive entity. Just as those who admit negation regard negation and existence of positive entity as mutually denying each other, so the Rāmānujas also regard the existence of positive entities and negations as denying each other in their different spatial and temporal characters. Thus it is not necessary to admit negation as a separate category. When an existing entity is said to be destroyed, what happens is that there is a change of state. Negation-precedent-to-production (prāga-bhāva) and the negation of destruction do not mean anything more than two positive states succeeding each other, and there may be an infinite series of such states. If this view is not admitted, and if the negation of destruction (pradhvamsā-bhāva) and the negation-precedent-to-production (prāg-abhāva) be regarded as separate categories of negation, then the destruction of negation-precedent-to-production and negation-precedent-to-production of destruction will depend upon an infinite series of negations which would lead to a vicious infinite. It is the succession of a new state that is regarded as the destruction of the old state, the former being a different state from the latter. It is sometimes held that negation is mere vacuity and has no reference to the existence of positive entity. If that were so, then on the one hand

1 athā’bhāvasya tad-rūpam yad-bhāva-pratipakṣatā naî’vam adyā’py asau yasmāḥ bhāva-tirṛṭṭaṁ sādhitaḥ. Nyāya-kulīṣā. MS.
negation would be causeless and on the other it could not be the cause of anything; and so negations would thus be both beginningless and eternal. In that case the whole world would be within the grasp of negation and everything in the world would be non-existing. Thus it is unnecessary to admit negation as a separate category. The difference of one positive entity from another is regarded as negation.

Another problem that arises in this connection is that if negation is not admitted as a separate category how can negative causes be admitted. It is well known that when certain collocations of causes can produce an effect they can do so only when there are no negative causes to counteract their productive capacity. This capacity (śakti) is admitted in the Rāmānuja school as the collocation of accessories which helps a cause to produce the effect (kāraṇasya kāryo-payogī sahakāri-kalāpah śaktir ity ucyate)\(^1\). To this Rāmānujacārya’s reply is that the absence of counteracting agents is not regarded as a separate cause, but the presence of the counteracting agents along with the other accessory collocations is regarded as making those accessory collocations unfit for producing the effect. Thus there are two sets of collocations where the effect is or is not produced, and it is the difference of two collocations that accounts for the production of the effect in one case and its non-production in another; but this does not imply that absence or negation of the obstructive factors should be regarded as contributing to the causation. In one case there was the capacity for production and in another case there was no such capacity\(^2\). Capacity (śakti) is not regarded by Rāmānujacārya as a separate non-sensible (atindriya) entity, but as an abstract specification of that which produces any effect (śakti-gata-jāty-anabhyyapagane tadbhāvāt śaktasya’eva jātiḥ kārya-niyāmikā na tu śakti-jātir iti)\(^3\).

\(^1\) Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 685.
\(^3\) Ibid.
ing to him any unified assemblage of parts similar to such other assemblages of parts (susadrśa-saṃsthāna) is called a universal.¹

Veṅkaṭa, a follower of Rāmānujācārya, defines jāti as mere similarity (sausāḍṛśya). Criticizing the Naiyāyika theory of jāti he says that if that which manifests universals is itself manifested through universals, then these universals should have to be manifested by others which have to be manifested by further universals and this would lead to a vicious infinite. If to avoid such a vicious infinite it is held that the second grade parts that manifest a jāti (universal) do not require a further jāti for their manifestation, then it is better to say that it is the similar individuals that represent the notion of jāti and that it is not necessary to admit any separate category as jāti. It is clear that the notion of universals proceeds from qualities or characters in which certain individuals agree, and if that is so it should be enough to explain the notion of universals. It is these characters, the similarity of which with the similar characters of other individuals is remembered, that produce the notion of universals.² When some parts or qualities are perceived in some things they of themselves naturally remind us of other similar parts in other things and it is this fact, that the two mutually stand, one beside the other, in the mind, which is called similarity.³ It is inexplicable why certain qualities or characters remind us of others and it can only be said that they do so naturally; and it is this fact that they stand beside each other in the mind which constitutes their similarity as well as their universal. There is no other separate category which may either be called similarity (sāḍṛśya) or universal. There is not, however, much difference between Rāmānujācārya’s definition of universals and Veṅkaṭa’s definition of it, for though the former defines it as any assemblages that are similar and the latter as similarity, yet the very conception of similarity of Veṅkaṭa involves within it the assemblage of parts as its constituent; for the notion of similarity according to Veṅkaṭa is not

¹ Nyāya-kulīsa. MS.
³ yady apy ekaikasthaṃ sāsnā-di-dharma-svarūpam tathāpi tan-nirupadhi-niyataḥ svabhāvaṇo nīyataḥ tais tais sāsnā-dibhir anya-niṣṭhais sa-pratīdvandvikam syāt; idam eva anyonya-sa-pratīdvandvika-rūpaṃ sāḍṛśya-sabdā-vacyaṃ abhidhyate. Ibid.
anything abstract, but it means the concrete assemblages of parts that stand beside one another in memory. Veṇkaṭa, however, points out that the notion of “universal” does not necessarily mean that it can be with regard to assemblages of parts only, for in case of those partless entities, such as qualities, there cannot be any assemblage of parts, yet the notion of universals is still quite applicable. It is for this reason that Veṇkaṭa makes “similarity” only as the condition of “universals” and does not include assemblages of parts (samsthāna) as is done by Rāmānuja Śārya.

Svatah-prāmāṇya (self-validity). It is sometimes argued that as in all things so in the determination of validity and invalidity the application of the methods of agreement and difference is to be regarded as the decisive test. The presence of qualities that contribute to validity and the absence of defects that make any perception invalid is to be regarded as deciding the validity or invalidity of any perception. To this Rāmānuja Śārya says that the ascertainment of qualities that contribute to validity cannot be determined without an assurance that there are no defects, and the absence of defects cannot also be known without the knowledge of the presence of qualities that contribute towards validity; and so, since they mutually depend upon each other, their independent determination is impossible. Thus the suggestion is that there is neither the determination of validity nor invalidity, but there is doubt. To this the reply is that unless something is known there cannot be any doubt. So there is a middle stage before the determination of validity or invalidity. Before it is known that the knowledge corresponds with the object or does not do so, there must be the manifestation of the object (artha-prakāśa) which, so far as it itself is concerned, is self-valid and does not depend for its validity upon the application of any other method; for it is the basis of all future determinations of its nature as true or false. So this part of knowledge—the basic part—the manifestation of objects—is self-valid. It is wrong to say that this knowledge is in itself characterless (nīḥsvabhāva), for it is of the nature of the manifestation of an objective entity like the determination of tree-ness before its specific nature as a mango or a pine tree. The knowledge of the contri-

butory qualities is not the cause of validity, but when validity is determined they may be regarded as having contributed to the validity. The self-validity is of the knowledge (jñāna) and not of its correspondence (tathātva). If the correspondence were also directly revealed, then there can never be any doubt regarding such correspondence. When the followers of Kumārila say that knowledge is self-valid, they cannot mean that knowledge itself imparts the fact that there has been a true correspondence, for they do not admit that knowledge is self-revealing. They have therefore admitted that there are some other means by which the notion of such validity is imparted. The validity of those will again have to depend upon the validity of other imparting agents, and there will thus be a vicious infinite. For the determination of validity one is bound to depend on the ascertainment by corroboration and causal efficiency. If validity thus depends upon the ascertainment of contributory qualities, then there is no self-validity. The Vedas also cannot be self-valid in this view. If there are no defects in them because they have not proceeded from any erring mortals, then they have no contributory qualities also because they have not proceeded (according to the Mimāṃśā view) from any trustworthy person. So there may legitimately be a doubt regarding their validity. The truth of any correspondence depends upon something other than the knowledge itself, e.g. the falsehood of any mis-correspondence. If it depended merely on the cause of the knowledge, then even a false knowledge would be right. For establishing the validity of the Vedas, therefore, it has to be admitted that they have been uttered by an absolutely trustworthy person. Knowledge does not manifest merely objectivity but a particular thing or entity and it is valid so far as that particular thing has been manifested in knowledge. The validity of knowledge thus refers to the thing in its general character as the manifestation of a particular thing and not regarding its specific details in character. Such a validity, however, refers only to the form of the knowledge itself and not to objective corroboration. Whatever may be doubtful in it is to be ascertained by contributory qualities, corroboration and the like, and when the

1 yad dhi jñāne vidyate tad eva tasya laksāṇam ucitam vastu-prakāśatvam eva jñāne vidyate na tu viṣaya-prakāśatvam yato viṣāye samutpanne viṣaya' yam iti na' bhātī kintu ghaṭo' yam iti. Nyāya-kulīsa. MS.
2 jñānānāṁ sāmānyā-rūpam eva prāmāṇyaṁ na vaiśeṣikām rūpam. Ibid.
3 tasmād bodha'tmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā. Ibid.
chances of error are eliminated by other sources the original validity stands uncontradicted.

_Saprakāśatva (self-luminosity)._ Rāmānujacārya first states the Naiyāyika objection against self-luminosity. The Naiyāyikas are supposed to argue that things are existent but they become knowable only under certain conditions and this shows that existence (sattā) is different from cognition or its self-illumination (_prakāśa_). Arguing from the same position it may be said that knowledge as an existent entity is different from its illumination as such. If knowledge itself were self-revealing, then it would not depend upon any conditioning of it by its contiguity or relating with objects and as such any individual cognition would mean universal cognition. If, on the other hand, knowledge requires a further conditioning through its relating with objects, then knowledge would not be self-revealing. Further, knowledge being partless, there cannot be any such conception that one part of it reveals the other. In the case of partless entities it is not possible to conceive that knowledge should be self-revealing, for it cannot be both an agent and an object at the same time. Again, if knowledge were self-revealing, then the difference between consciousness and its re-perception through introspection cannot be accounted for. Further, it must be remembered that the difference between one cognition and another depends upon the difference of its objective content. Apart from this there is no difference between one cognition and another. If the objective content was not a constituent of knowledge, then there would be no difference between the illumination of knowledge as such and the illumination of an object. If knowledge were by itself self-illuminating, then there would be no place for objects outside it and this would bring us to absolute idealism. So the solution may be either on the Mīmāṃsā lines that knowledge produces such a character in the objective entity that by that cognized character of objects cognition may be inferred, or it may be on _Nyāya_ lines that knowledge manifests the objects. Thus it has to be admitted that there must be some kind of cognitive relation between the object and its knowledge, and it would be the specific nature of these relations that would determine the cognitive character in each case. Now it may again be asked whether this cognitive relation is only object-pointing or

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1 _sarrasya hi svatah sva-gocara-jñānā-dhīnāḥ prakāśāḥ saṃvidām api tathā'va abhyupag.intum ucitah._ Nyāya-kulīśa. MS.
whether it is object-knowledge-pointing. In the former case the object alone would be manifested and in the latter case knowledge would be its own object, which is again absurd. If knowledge manifested the object without any specific relation, then any knowledge might manifest any object or all objects. Knowledge implies a cognitive operation and if such an operation is not admitted knowledge cannot be manifested, for the very objectivity of knowledge implies such an operation. Hence the conclusion is that as knowledge manifests other objects so it is also manifested by a further cognition of re-perception. When one says "I perceive it," it is not a case of mere knowledge-manifestation but a re-perception of having perceived that particular object. So knowledge is manifested by a further re-perception and not by itself. To this Rāmānujacārya raises an objection: it may be asked whether this re-perception of knowledge takes place in spite of the absence of any desire to re-perceive on the part of the knower or as the result of any such desire. In the former case, since the re-perception takes place automatically, there will be an infinite series of such automatic re-perceptions. In the latter case, i.e. when the re-perception takes place in consequence of a desire to do so, then such a desire must be produced out of previous knowledge and that would again presuppose another desire, and that another knowledge, and there would thus be a vicious infinite. To this the Naiyāyika reply is that the general re-perception takes place without any desire, but the specific re-perception occurs as a result of a desire to that effect. This ordinary re-perception of a general nature follows as a natural course, for all mundane people have always some knowledge or other throughout the course of their experience. It is only when there is a desire to know some specific details that there is a specific mental intuition (mānasa-pratyakṣa) to that effect.

To this Rāmānujacārya's reply is that in the case of an ordinary existent thing there is a difference between its existence as such and its manifestation of knowledge, for it always depends upon specific relations between itself and knowledge; but in the case of a self-luminous entity where no such relations are needed there is no difference between its existence and its manifestation. The fire illuminates other objects but it does not need any other assistance to manifest itself. It is this that is meant by self-luminosity. Just as no entity depends upon any other entity of its own class for its
manifestation, so knowledge also does not need assistance from knowledge for its manifestation. The relations that are needed for the manifestation of other objects are not needed for the manifestation of knowledge itself\(^1\). Knowledge thus being self-luminous helps our behaviour directly but does not depend upon anything else for lending such assistance. It is against all experience that knowledge for its manifestation requires some other knowledge, and if it has no support in our experience there is no justification for making such an extraordinary theory that any knowledge for its manifestation should require the operation of another knowledge. That only can be called an object of knowledge which though existent remains unmanifested. But it cannot be said that there was knowledge which was not known, for a cognition would not last like other objective entities awaiting the time when it might be manifested. In the case of a past knowledge which is merely inferred now, there is no notion of that knowledge, so one can always draw a distinction between the known and the unknown. If only the object were illuminated and not the knowledge of it, no one would fail for a moment to perceive that. If knowledge were merely inferred from its effect, everyone would have so experienced it, but no one has a moment's hesitation in discriminating between what is known and unknown. It is again wrong to say that knowledge arises only after inquiry, for in the present knowledge whatever is sought to be known is known directly, and in the past knowledge also there is no such inference that there was knowledge because it is remembered, but the past knowledge directly appears as memory; for if that is called an inference, then even re-perception may be regarded as an inference from memory.

Again, a thing that exists without being an object of knowledge at the same time is liable to erroneous manifestation on account of the presence of defects in the collocation conditioning the knowledge, but knowledge itself is never liable to error, and consequently it has no existence apart from being known. Just as there cannot be any doubt whether a pleasure or a pain is experienced, so there cannot be any doubt about knowledge, and this shows that whenever there is knowledge it is self-manifested. When one knows an object one is also sure about one's knowledge of it. Again, it is

\(^1\) jñānam ananyā-dhīna-prakāśam artha-prakāśakatvāt dipavat. Nyāya-kulīśā. MS.
wrong to suppose that if knowledge is self-manifested then there would be no difference between itself and its objective content, for the difference is obvious; knowledge in itself is formless, while the object supplies the content. Two entities which appear in the same manifestation, such as quality and substance, things and their number, are not on that account identical. It cannot also be said that knowledge and its object are identical because they are simultaneously manifested, for the very fact that they are simultaneously manifested shows that they are two different things. Knowledge and the object shine forth in the same manifestation and it is impossible to determine which of them shines before or after.

The self also is to be regarded as being of the nature of knowledge from the testimony of the scriptures. Self being of the nature of knowledge is also self-luminous, and it is not therefore to be supposed that it is cognized by mental intuition (mānasa-pratyakṣa).

Rāmānujadāsa alias Mahācārya.

Rāmānujadāsa, called also Mahācārya, was the pupil of Bādhūla Śrīnivāsācārya. He is not, however, to be confused with Rāmānujācārya II, the son of Padmanābhārya and the maternal uncle of Vedaṁṭa-deśika—who was also known as Vādi-haṁsa-nāvāmbuda. He wrote at least three books: Sad-vidyā-vijaya, Advaita-vijaya, and Parikara-vijaya.

In his Sad-vidyā-vijaya, in refuting the Śaṅkarite doctrine that the existence of positive nescience (bhāva-rūpa-jñāna) can be known by the different pramāṇas of perception, inference and implication, he says that intuitive experience of ignorance, such as “I am ignorant,” cannot be regarded as an experience of nescience as such in its entirety (kṛṣṇā-jñāna-pratītis tāvat asiddha), for it can never refer to all objects as negating all knowledge. A perceptual mental state of the antaḥkaraṇa is not admitted by the Śaṅkarites to refer to entities past and gone. Even when a man intuits that he is ignorant, there is at that stage an illumination of his own ego and the fact of his being ignorant, and it cannot be said that in such an experience the nescience in its entirety has been illuminated, for the ego is also illuminated at the time. If nescience in its entirety
is not illuminated, then the nescience is only illuminated with reference to particular objects, and if that is so the assumption of a positive nescience is useless. Again, if nescience or want of knowledge refers to a particular object, then there is a knowledge of that object implied in it; and therefore nescience as such is not experienced and a supposition of a positive nescience is no better than the ordinarily accepted view that in such cases there is only a negation of the knowledge of an object except in deep dreamless sleep. In all other stages all experiences of ignorance refer to the negation of knowledge of particular objects. All cases of ignorance mean that their objects are known only in a general manner, but not in their specific details. Again, it cannot be said that nescience is regarded as positive merely to denote that it is of the nature of a stuff that is opposed to knowledge in general (jñāna-samānya-virodhi); for in such experiences as "I am ignorant" there is the knowledge of the subject to which the ignorance belongs and also some general content regarding which there is the ignorance. Further, since the nescience has the pure consciousness as its support and since the mind (antaḥkaraṇa) is not regarded as its support, how can the experience "I am ignorant" be said to refer to the experience of this stuff? If it be held that since the mind is an illusory construction on the pure consciousness which is the support of the nescience (ajñāna), the latter may appear as a mental function, for both the ego and the nescience, being illusory impositions on the pure consciousness, may shine forth from the same identical basis of consciousness. The reply is that such an explanation is obviously wrong, for if both the ego-consciousness and the ajñāna shone forth from the same basic consciousness, the latter could not appear as the predicate of the former. If the one pure consciousness manifests both the ego and the ajñāna, they would not appear as different and arranged in a definite subject-predicate order. Again, if it is held that the ajñāna shines only as a predicative to the ego because they are based on pure consciousness, then how can such an ajñāna refer to the objective things (which are independent impositions on pure consciousness) in such experiences as "I do not know a jug?" If it is said that since there is the one identical consciousness on which the objective entities, the ajñāna and the ego-entity, are all imposed, and the ajñāna is always in relation with the objective entities, then it may be said that even when a jug is known, the ajñāna, being in
relation with other entities (such as cloth) and through them with the pure consciousness underlying them, is also in relation with the pure consciousness on which the jug is a construction. As such it would also be in relation with the jug, with the result that there would be the experience that the jug is not known. It may be argued that the very fact of the positive perception of the jug may be an obstacle to the association of ājnāna with it. To this the reply is that just as when one says “I do not know this tree” there is knowledge regarding the “this” and ignorance regarding the nature of the tree, so here also there may be a partial knowledge and ignorance in different aspects of the same jug. In cases of doubt one has to admit knowledge and ignorance subsisting in the same entity, and this is true in all cases of inquiry where a thing may be known in a general way and yet remain unknown so far as its specific details are concerned.

Again, it is wrongly contended by the Śaṅkarites that during deep dreamless sleep there is a direct intuition of ājnāna; for if ājnāna were then known in its own nature as such, a man could not wake up and remember that he knew nothing. He should then have remembered that he had a direct intuition of ājnāna. If during deep dreamless sleep the pure consciousness illuminated ājnāna, it must have also illuminated all known and unknown things in the world, which is absurd, for then these would have been remembered during the waking period. It cannot be said that during deep dreamless sleep only ājnāna is manifested and nothing else, for according to the testimony of waking consciousness time is also perceived during dreamless sleep which accounts for the memory of the waking stage “so long I did not know anything.” Further, if it is held that whatever is illuminated by pure sākṣi-consciousness (i.e. without passing through the vṛtti stage) then the ājnāna also would not be remembered. If it is held that the objects of ājnāna only are not illuminated by the sākṣi-consciousness but only the ājnāna, then that could not account for the memory in the waking stage “I did not know anything,” where “anything” definitely refers to some object of ājnāna. Moreover, if the above supposition were correct, then the pure bliss could not be illuminated during dreamless sleep and remembered later in the waking stage. If in reply to this it were contended that certain specific characters were remembered during the waking period in addition to the ājnāna
because they were represented through the modes of avidyā, the reply is that instead of assuming that there were specific modes of avidyā one might as well admit them to be due to mental modes or states, and the experience of ajñāna might well be accounted for as being the experience of absence of knowledge. Since absence of knowledge is acceptable to all, there is no justification for admitting a new entity such as a positive ajñāna.

Again, in the case of loss of memory of a perceived object, a person might say that he did not know the object, but that does not prove that while he knew the object he had an intuition of the ajñāna of that object. After an illusory perception of conch-shell-silver one says "I did not know silver so long"; and how is this to be explained? Moreover, when one sees an object at the present moment, one may say "I did not know this object so long." How is this to be explained? The obvious reply is that in all such cases we infer only that there was an absence of knowledge of those entities. In the instance under discussion also we may hold the same view and say that we infer that during dreamless sleep we had no knowledge. But we cannot say that we then intuited directly a positive ajñāna. The Śaṅkarites say that the existence of ajñāna as a positive stuff can be proved by inference also, for according to them just as light manifests things by removing the positive stuff of darkness, so knowledge also manifests things by removing the ajñāna stuff that was hiding them. In refuting this, Mahācārya enters into a long discourse of formal and scholastic criticism of the Śaṅkarite mode of syllogism which cannot appropriately be treated here. The main point that is worthy of our notice here and which has a philosophical significance is the view of the Rāmānuja school that the illumination of things by knowledge does not presuppose that some positive stuff of ajñāna must have been removed. The Śaṅkarites object that unless ajñāna is admitted as a separate stuff, hiding the pure bliss of the self, it is difficult to explain emancipation. To this Mahācārya’s reply is that emancipation can well be explained as cessation of bondage. People are as anxious to gain positive pleasure as to remove negative pain. It is wrong to suppose that unless the bondage were false it could not be removed, for it is well known that the effects of poison can be removed by the meditation of the mythical bird Garuḍa. So worldly bondage can also be removed by the meditation of God, though it be real. Meditation
as knowledge can remove not only ignorance but also the real fact of bondage. Emancipation may thus be regarded as the eternal manifestation of bliss and it is not indispensably necessary that all manifestation of bliss or happiness must be associated with a body like other ordinary bodily pleasure\(^1\).

The Śaṅkarites say that since the unchangeable self cannot be the material cause of the world phenomena nor anything else, it comes by implication that there must be an ājñāna stuff which is the material cause of the world, for it is only such a material cause that can explain the ājñāna characteristics of the world-phenomena. Brahman has often been designated as the material cause of the world, and this is true only so far as it is the basic cause (adhiśṭhāna-kāraṇa), the pure being that underlies all phenomena. The ājñāna is the changing material cause (parināmi-kāraṇa), and as such the world participates in the nature of ājñāna in its characters.

To this Mahācārya’s reply is that even though the world-creation may be supposed to be false, that does not necessarily imply the assumption of a positive ājñāna. Thus the illusory silver is produced without any cause, or the self may be regarded as the material cause of the world-creation, which though partless may appear as the world through error. It cannot be said that a false effect must have a false entity as its cause, for no such generalization can be made. The presence of the common characteristic of falsehood cannot determine the supposition that a false entity must necessarily be the cause of a false effect, for there must be other common characteristics in other respects too and there is certainly no absolute similarity of characteristics between the cause and the effect\(^2\). Moreover, an effect does not necessarily possess the same identity of existence as its changing material cause; it is therefore not impossible for the Brahman to be the material cause of the world, though its purity may not be found in the world. If the Brahman is regarded as the parināmi-kāraṇa of the world, it cannot of course have the same identical existence as the world, but if an entity can show itself in another form we may call it a parināmi-kāraṇa, and it is not necessary for it to have the same existence as that effect. Thus, destruction and the cessation of avidyā are both regarded as

\(^1\) Sad-vidyā-vijaya, pp. 39–75 (MSS.).

\(^2\) nanu upādāno-pādeyayoḥ sālaksana-niyamo-darśanād eva tat-siddhir iti cet sarvathā sālaksanayasya myrd-ghaśayoh ṛopa adarśanāt yat hiṇcit sārūpyaṁyā sukti-rajata-dāc api padārthatvā-dinā satvāt. Ibid. p. 77.
effects and yet they have not the same existence as their causes. It cannot therefore be argued that if Brahman be regarded as the parināmi-kāraṇa of the world, the world would thereby be as real as Brahman. Again, the non-appearance of the Brahma-character of the world may well be explained as being due to the influence of karma. Even for explaining the non-appearance of the Brahma-character of the world the assumption of an ajñāna is not necessary. It is also not necessary to define emancipation as the cessation of ajñāna, for that stage, being itself a state of bliss, can thereby be regarded as an object of our efforts, and the supposition of avidyā and its cessation is wholly groundless.

Mahācārya also made a vigorous effort to show by textual contents that the existence of avidyā as a positive ignorance is not admitted in the Vedic scriptures.

In the second chapter Mahācārya attempts to show that there is no necessity to admit an ajñāna as an independent hiding stuff. The Śaṅkarites argue that though the self is experienced in the notion of our ego, yet the self is not expressed in our ego-experience as identical with Brahman as the fullness of bliss, and for this it is necessary to admit that there is an ajñāna stuff which hides the pure character of Brahman. To this Mahācārya's reply is that since ajñāna is regarded as beginningless its hiding capacity will also be eternal and no emancipation is possible; and if Brahman could be hidden, it will cease to have its own nature as self-luminous and will be ignorant. Moreover, the experience is of the form "I am ignorant" and as such the ajñāna seems to have reference only to the ego. If it is held that the existence of the veil is admitted only to explain the limited appearance of Brahman through mind (antahkarana), then it may well be pointed out that the limited appearance of Brahman as ego may well be explained through the limitation of the antahkarana through which it manifests itself, and for that it is not necessary to admit a separate veil of ajñāna.

Again it may be asked whether the veiling is identical with ajñāna or different from it. In the former case it would ever remain

1 vad uktam brahmaṇah parināmitayā upādānatve parināmasya parināmi-

samāna-sattākāita-viṣayam kārayasya’pi satyatva-prasanga iti. tatra kim pari-
nāma-sabdāna kārya-mātram tvākṣitiṃ, uta rūpā-ntarā-pattih; dhvamsasya

avidyā-miṣṭaśeṣa parināmi-samāna-sattākāte-bhāvāt na hi tad-rūpena parināmi

kiṃcid asti. na dvitiyam rūpā-ntarā-patteh parināmi-mātra-sāpekṣāt vā gauravena

unmanifested, and the manifestation of the world-appearance would be impossible. If the veiling is something different from ājñāna, then since that something is not in any way related with pure consciousness its operation would not explain the world-illusion. If this veiling is supposed to render the ājñāna indefinable, then it may be asked if this veiling is something different from ājñāna or identical with it; in the latter case it would not depend on it and in the former case it is meaningless to regard ājñāna as antagonistic to Brahman. Thus, since the limitations through which the Brahman manifests itself are sufficient to explain the limited appearance of Brahman as world-objects, it is unnecessary to admit a separate ājñāna.

Again, if ājñāna can veil the pure sākṣi-consciousness, then the whole world would be blind and there would be no knowledge at all. If the sākṣi-consciousness cannot be veiled, then the Brahman also cannot be veiled. Further, if Brahman is always self-luminous, then it can never be hidden by ājñāna. If it is said that the self-luminosity of Brahman means that it cannot be the object of cognition (a-vedyātva) or of immediacy (aparokṣa), then it is unnecessary to indulge in the conception of veiling, for the non-cognizability is neither of the two. Again, the Śaṅkarites hold that the ājñāna hides the bliss part of Brahman but not the part of its consciousness. This is obviously impossible, for they hold that bliss and pure consciousness are identical; and if that were so, how can the bliss part be covered without covering also the part of consciousness, and how can one identical partless being, the Brahman, be divided into two parts of which one is covered while the other is not? Again, if the self is admitted to be of the nature of pure bliss, and if our love of pleasure is explained as being due to the illusory construction of the ego on this self, then since all things of the world are but illusory impositions on the self, all things in the world would be dear to us and even pain would be pleasurable.

In the third chapter Mahācārya refutes the Śaṅkarite theory of the support of ājñāna. It is held by some exponents of the Śaṅkara school that the ājñāna-constituents of the objects are supported in the pure consciousness underlying these objects. Though there are the modifications of these ājñāna entities, yet they may have relation with our ego-consciousness, for both the ego and the objects are but the states of a ground-ājñāna. To this Mahācārya says that
if all objects of the world have separate and different ajñāna materials as their causes, then it is wrong to suppose that the illusory silver is produced by the ajñāna of the conch-shell. It would be much better to say that the ajñāna of the subject (pramāṭā) as it comes out with the antaḥkaraṇa has produced the illusory silver. Again, if the ajñāna of the conch-shell is regarded as beginningless, it is meaningless to regard it as being a modification of a ground-ajñāna, and if it is not regarded as a mode its perception cannot be explained.

There are again others who hold that the ajñāna constituting an external object in some sense subsists in the subject as well and thus there may be a connection between the subject and the object. To this Mahācārya says that such a view is impossible, for the consciousness underlying the object is different from that underlying the subject; and if it is held that pure consciousness is ultimately one, then all objects ought to be illuminated just as much as any particular object is illuminated at the time of any particular cognition. Again, if the consciousness underlying the objects and the subject is without any distinction, why should a man know himself to be ignorant when he says “I am ignorant”? There is no reason why this feeling of ignorance should be felt in the subject and not in the object when the consciousness underlying them are one and the same. Moreover, in that case where one person knows an object, there would be a knowledge of that object with all persons.

There are again others who say that the ajñāna constituent of the conch-shell has the consciousness underlying the ego-experience as its support and the consciousness underlying the conch-shell as its object. To this Mahācārya says that the ajñāna supported by the consciousness underlying the ego-experience cannot undergo transformation, and, if this is so, it cannot explain the diverse objects.

There are others again who think that when a man says that he does not know the conch-shell his ignorance refers to the root-ajñāna; for though the ajñāna refers to the pure consciousness, that being identical with the pure consciousness underlying the conch-shell, the ajñāna also refers to the conch-shell and may be so apprehended. One has also to admit that the illusory silver is also made up of the stuff of ajñāna, for since the illusory silver appears in perception, it must have some stuff as its material cause.

To this Mahācārya’s reply is that if the apperception of self-
ignorance has a reference to the root-ajñāna, there is no justification for admitting separate ajñānas constituting the stuff of the objects. It cannot be suggested that the existence of such ajñāna may be proved by the fact that each perception implies the cessation of a particular ajñāna, for the disappearance of such an ajñāna is only a matter of inference, and it may as well be assumed that it does not mean anything more than that a particular cognition follows only the absence of that particular knowledge. A negation-precedent-to-a-production is always destroyed by the production of a particular entity. When one says “I did not know the jug long, but I know it now,” the cessation of the absence of knowledge or the ajñāna has a direct and immediate reference to the subject, the knower. But the removal of the ajñāna hiding the objects is only a matter of inference from the fact of cognition, and it can never be immediate or intuitive. Again, if the root-ajñāna is supposed to veil the pure consciousness as underlying the objects, it is unnecessary to suppose the existence of separate ajñānas hiding the objects. If it is supposed that the pure consciousness underlying the objects, being identical with Brahman, which is referred to by the root-ajñāna, may appear in consciousness as being limited under the object-appearance, it may be asked how on account of the association of the root-ajñāna the object may appear to be unknown even when it is known. Again, the root-ignorance implied in such an experience as “I do not know” cannot belong to the mind (antahkarana), for it is a material object and it cannot belong to the self-shining pure consciousness. Being what it is, it cannot be ignorant about itself.

Further, it may well be said that though the self is manifested in self-consciousness yet it often appears as associated with the body, and though objects may generally be known as “knowable” yet their specific nature may not be known and it is this that often leads to doubt; all these are inexplicable except on the assumption of ignorance. They may all be admitted, but even then the assumption that ajñāna acts as a veiling agent is wholly unwarrantable. Uncertainty (anavadarana) and veiling (āvaraṇa) are not one and the same thing. In the appearance of water in a mirage there may be doubt due to uncertainty, and it cannot be denied that there is all the appearance of water which could not have been if the so-called ajñāna had veiled it. Nor can it be said that the uncertainty
is due to the veiling, for it may well be urged that since veiling cannot manifest itself either as being or as self-luminous, it is itself a mere consequence or result of the factor of uncertainty. If it is urged that the factor of indefiniteness or uncertainty itself constitutes the nature of veiling (anavadhāraṇatvam eva āvāraṇam), then it may be said that the fact that the individual ego is not felt to be identical is regarded as being due to the veiling operation; but that does not mean that there is any uncertainty in our experience as the limited individual. If there were any such uncertainty, then ego-experience would not have stood as an indubitable fact. Again, if ajñāna be itself of the nature of uncertainty, then there is no meaning in ascribing a separate veiling character to it. If it is held that ajñāna is supported only by pure consciousness, then there would be no reason why the individual selves should pass through the cycles of birth and rebirth, for such ajñāna would have no association with the individual selves. If it is urged that the same consciousness manifests itself through the individual self, then it may also be urged that since the consciousness underlies both the individuals and God, God may equally well be supposed to undergo the cycle of birth and rebirth.  

It is sometimes said that it is the mind (antahkaranā) which experiences pleasure and pain and it is this that constitutes bondage. The mind itself being an illusory construction on the pure consciousness, the characters of the mind are felt to belong to the consciousness. To this Mahācārya’s reply is that if the bondage belonged to the mind, then the pure consciousness cannot be supposed to suffer bondage. For if the suffering of bondage is due to the false notion of the identification of the pure consciousness with the mind, the bondage is not due to mind but to that false notion. In a similar manner Mahācārya enters into a criticism of many alternative interpretations that are offered by various writers of the Śaṅkara school in support of the existence of ajñāna and such of its relations as may explain the world creation, and finally tries to establish his view that in whichever way the relation of ajñāna may be conceived it is fraught with diverse kinds of contradictions which baffle explanation.  

Again, in the fourth chapter Mahācārya contends that the

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avidyā cannot be regarded as ultimately real (paramārthikī) for then there would be no monism. It cannot be regarded as the stuff of all that is cognized in practical experience (vyavahārikī), for then it could not be called the stuff of illusory experiences. It is sometimes urged that even from false things, such as a false fear, there may be real illness or even death, and so even from ignorance there can be real knowledge. Mahācārya points out that this analogy is false, for even in the above instances it is knowledge that produces the said results. If avidyā is false, then all its material transformations must also be false, for the effect is always identical with the cause. It is urged that since the world-objects are false their knowledge must also be false; then the Brahman, which is the knowledge which is itself a product of avidyā, is also false.

Further, if ajñāna be regarded as one, then with the knowledge of conch-shell all ajñāna should cease; for without the cessation of ajñāna the conch-shell could not have been known. It cannot be said that with the knowledge of the conch-shell only the veil hiding it has been removed and that the ajñāna did not cease, for experience testifies to the disappearance of ajñāna and not that of the veil. Thus one is forced to admit the existence of many ajñānas. For if it is held that knowledge removes only the veil, then even the last emancipating knowledge would also remove only a particular veil and that would not result in the destruction of the ultimate ajñāna. Again, ajñāna is defined as that which is destroyed by knowledge (jñāna). If that is so, it is obviously wrong to define knowledge as being itself a product of ajñāna. The effect cannot destroy the causal entity. Again, if at the time of emancipation of a man the ajñāna is supposed to be destroyed, such an ajñāna if it is one only would be wholly destroyed and there would be no other ajñāna left which could bind the other unemancipated individuals. It is supposed that ajñāna must be false, for it is destroyed by knowledge, but at the same time it is admitted that the ajñāna is destroyed by the true scriptures (śruti), and when a thing is destroyed by another real and true entity the former cannot be regarded as false.

Again, avidyā is sometimes defined as something the cessation of which can be produced by knowledge (jñānajanya). Now Brahman is itself the cessation of avidyā, but it is not produced by knowledge. If knowledge is regarded as a means to the cessation of knowledge (jñānasādhyatvāt), then it does not necessarily mean that
it has produced the cessation (na ca sva-janyatvam eva sva-sā-dhyatvam). If the two concepts are regarded as identical, then the relationing of avidyā to which avidyā may be regarded as a means would also have to be admitted as being produced by avidyā, which is reasoning in a circle\textsuperscript{1}. Arguing on the same analogy, one might as well say that the cessation of the relationing with avidyā depends on the cessation of avidyā, but in that case since the cessation of avidyā itself means a relationing with avidyā it becomes a tautology only.

Again, in order to differentiate any ordinary erroneous view, which is removed by right knowledge from avidyā, it has been defined as being beginningless yet destructible by knowledge. Now, it may be asked, what is the nature of this knowledge which destroys avidyā? Does it mean pure consciousness or only mental states? If it is pure consciousness, then it cannot destroy the root-impressions (samskāra); for it is only the mental states (vṛtti) which can destroy the mental root-impressions, and if avidyā is a beginningless samskāra it cannot be removed by knowledge as pure consciousness and thus the assumption of its being beginningless serves no useful purpose. The second supposition, that knowledge which destroys avidyā is only a mental state, cannot also be correct, for it is held that knowledge as mental state can remove only the veil of ajñāna but not the ajñāna itself. If it is said that the mental state removes both the veil and the ajñāna, then the definition of ajñāna as that which can be removed by knowledge becomes too wide, as it would also signify the veil (āvarana) which is not intended to be covered within the definition of ajñāna. Again, if ajñānas are regarded as many, then such cognitive states can remove only the ajñānas veil ing the ordinary objects, and cannot therefore be applied to one undifferentiated ajñāna-whole which can be removed only by the intuition of the partless real, for this knowledge would not be a mental state which is always limited\textsuperscript{2}. Here also the ajñāna must be supposed to be hiding the nature of Brahman, and the cessation of the ajñāna is directly consequent upon the cessation of the veil. So, firstly, the direct cause of the cessation of the ajñāna is not knowledge but the removal of the veil; secondly, it is the removal of the veil that is caused by the knowledge, and so it is this that ought to be called ajñāna according to the definition, for the veil is both beginningless and destructible by knowledge.

\textsuperscript{1} Sad-vidya-vijaya, p. 116.  
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
Mahācārya enters into a series of further criticisms of the definition of avidyā which are more or less of a scholastic nature and may therefore be omitted here.

In the fifth chapter Mahācārya disputes the possibility that the avidyā is illuminated or manifested. If avidyā was self-manifesting, then it would be real and spiritual like the Brahman. If the manifestation of Brahman were the manifestation of the manifestation of the avidyā, then the former being eternal the manifestation of the avidyā would also be eternal; yet avidyā is always regarded as existing only so long as it shines, and therefore as false (mithyā-ṛthasya pratibhāsa-samāna-kālīnatva-niyamāt). If the manifestation (prakāśa) of avidyā be regarded as its non-distinguishingness (abhedā) with the manifestation of Brahman, then so long as the manifestation of Brahman remains, the avidyā would also remain and hence avidyā itself would be eternal. Again, if it is urged that, when the avidyā ceases, its non-distinguishingness with the Brahman-manifestation would also cease, and hence Brahman would be eternal and avidyā would be destructible, a further difficulty may be pointed out to this contention, namely, that if the avidyā be indistinguishable from the Brahman-manifestation, then either the latter would be false or the former real. It would be absurd to suggest in reply that, though different, they have an identical being (bhinnatve saty abhinās-attākatvam). The criticisms suggested here-in will apply to the doctrine if the illumination of avidyā be explained as the manifestation of Brahman, as limited by avidyā (avidyā-vacchinnam brahma-svarūpam avidyā-prakāśah) or as conditioned by it or reflected through it.

In the next chapter Mahācārya tries to show the incompatibility of the conception that avidyā may be brought to an end. He says that pure consciousness cannot be supposed to destroy avidyā. Then avidyā can never exist, for the pure consciousness is eternally existing and as such by itself destroys avidyā and no other effort is necessary. If pure consciousness cannot destroy avidyā, it cannot do so when reflected through a mental state (vṛtti-prativimбитam), for it is not more than the unlimited consciousness (caitanyād adhika-viśayatvā-bhāve tadvad eva nivarttakatvā-sambhavat). If the pure consciousness reflected through a vṛtti cannot remove avidyā, then it cannot do so when limited by a vṛtti or conditioned by it. The vṛtti itself also cannot remove it, for it is itself material. If it
is held that the knowledge which contradicts the illusory notion brought about by the *ājñāna* destroys it and not the intuition of the reality, then if that contradiction is something identical with pure consciousness, it is the pure consciousness which is to be supposed as destroying the *ājñāna*; the objections against such a view have already been dealt with. If knowledge and *ājñāna* are different, then it is wrong to suppose that knowledge destroys *ājñāna*; for knowledge is the contradiction that is supposed to destroy *avidyā* and by supposition *avidyā* is not knowledge. Moreover, since that illumination which destroys *ājñāna* cannot be supposed to have a further veil which is removed by it, it cannot rightly be called knowledge; for knowledge according to the supposition of the Śaṅkarites operates by removing a veil. Further, this knowledge is supposed to be opposed to all things in the world, and if that is so how can it be said that by this knowledge only the *ājñāna* is destroyed? Again, if it is supposed that illusion consists in identifying everything with Brahman and knowledge is supposed to remove this false identification, then since knowledge is supposed to operate by removing a veil, it has to be supposed that *ājñāna* was veiling the false identification, and if that were so there could have been no knowledge in our world-experience.

Again, the cessation of *avidyā* is also incomprehensible in itself, for it cannot be different from the nature of Brahman; if it were there would be duality and emancipation would be impossible. If it were one with the Brahman, then being so it would exist always and there would be no scope for making any effort about it. It cannot also be said that *avidyā* and Brahman mutually negate each other; for *avidyā* has Brahman for its support and as such is not antagonistic to it.

**Prapatti Doctrine as expounded in Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa of Lokācārya and Saumya Jāmāṭr Muni’s Commentary on it.**

According to the *Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa* the mercy of God remains always as submerged in His justice, but yet it always exists and its apprehension by us is obstructed by certain conditions. It is not produced by our efforts, for then God would not always be merciful (anudbhūta-dayā-dy-udbhāvaka-puruṣa-kāra-sāpeṣakatvenityo-dbhūta-dayā-di-mattvam vyāhatāṁ syāt 35. B.).
The mercy of God is dependent on Him and on no one else; yet there exists in Nārāyaṇa the deity Lakṣmī who is like the essence of Him or the body of Him, and who has voluntarily reconciled her will absolutely with that of Nārāyaṇa. Though in such a conception the Lakṣmī is dependent on Nārāyaṇa, yet for the devotees Nārāyaṇa and Lakṣmī go together, and for him the mercy of God is to be attributed to both Lakṣmī and Nārāyaṇa taken as a whole.

The conception of Lakṣmī is such that she is the greatest object of love for Nārāyaṇa, who has conceived her as a part of Himself, and Lakṣmī has also so identified herself with Him that there is no separate existence for her. As such Lakṣmī has not to make any special effort for bringing Nārāyaṇa in consonance with her will; for there is practically no existence of duality, and for this reason there is no necessity for devotees to cling separately to Lakṣmī. The nature of Lakṣmī is the pure essence of the mercy of God.

When the devotee is in a state of separation from God through the wrong conception of his own independence and separate individuality, he has to make an effort in the negative direction in forsaking his own sense of freedom and adopting God as his ultimate end. But once he has forsaken his false egoism and surrendered himself entirely to God, there is no need of further effort on his part. At such a stage through the influence of Lakṣmī all the sins of the devotee are destroyed and through her influence God extends His mercy to him. Lakṣmī also rouses in the human mind through internal moral persuasion the belief in the necessity of seeking His friendship. She performs the dual function, first that of turning the minds of the people, who are under the sway of beginningless avidyā by which they are always being attracted by mundane interest to God; and, secondly, she also melts the heart of God Who is bent upon giving fruits in accordance with the deserts of the people, and persuades Him to extend His bliss to all people by overruling the bondage of karma.

The prapatti, as seeking the protection of God, is not restricted

1 devyā kārṇya-rūpaye’ti tad-guṇa-sāratvena kārṇyaṁ svayam eve’ti. Srivacana-bhūṣaṇa. MS.
2 prapatter deśa-niyamah kāla-niyamah prakāra-niyamah adhikāri-niyamah phala-niyamaḥ ca nāsti. Srivacana-bhūṣaṇa-yaśākiyā. MS.

The above idea is supported in the commentary by a quotation from Bhāradvāja-samhitā which runs as follows:

brahma-kṣatra-viśāḥ śūdraḥ striyaḥ ca’ntara-jātayah sarva eva prapadyeran sarva-dhātāram acyutam. Ibid.
by any limiting conditions of holy or unholy places, or of any special
time, or of any special mode, or of any caste restriction, or that it
can produce only this or that result. When God accepts any person
through prapatti He forgives all his faults of commission and
omission. The only fault that He does not forgive is insincerity or
cruelty (kraurya). People take to prapatti either because they feel
helpless and know no other means of saving themselves, or because
they are very wise and definitely know that this is the best means,
or because they are naturally attached to God, like the Ārvārs1. In
the first case true knowledge and devotion are at the minimum; in
the second case there is not so much ignorance but devotion also is
of the normal extent. In the third case ignorance is least and attach-
ment is at its highest and as such even true knowledge of the nature
of God is engulfed as it were by an excess of attachment. In the
first case the consciousness of one’s own ignorance is strongest; in
the second case the consciousness of one’s humbleness and ignor-
ance is equally balanced with the true knowledge of the essence of
God and the relation of one’s nature with Him.

The devotee who has in great love surrendered himself to God
has occasional communion and detachment with Him. In the first
case he is filled with ecstatic joy by coming in direct contact with
God as associated with noble qualities. But at the moment of de-
tachment the memory of that communion and ecstasy of joy is a
source of dire pain. It has been related above that God’s mercy is
continuous and ever-flowing; but in spite of this, on account of
obstructive tendencies which by investing us with a false belief in
our own independence lead to the assertion of our false individu-
ality, the course of God’s mercy is obstructed. The adoption of
prapatti removes the obstructive attitude and renders it possible for
God to extend His mercy to us. In such a conception prapatti is to
be regarded only as a negative means. The positive means (upāya)
is God Who extends His mercy. Prapatti therefore should not be
regarded as the cause of our deliverance. It only removes our ob-
structive tendencies, and cannot therefore be regarded as an ele-
ment of the cause that secures our deliverance—that cause being God

1 As an illustration of the last type a few lines from Śrīvacana-bhusana-
vyākhyā may be quoted: bhakti-pārvatasyena prapannā bhagavat-prema-paṇḍ-
kalyena pādau stadbhau manah sithilaṃ bhavati caṣṇur bhavanati pādau hastau ca
nīceṣtau ity ukha-prakāreṇa sīthila-karanatvena sādhana-mūṣthiṇa-yogītāt-bhūvad
ananya-gatiḥs santas tasmin bhara-samarpanāṃ kṛtaṃ. MS.
and God alone. God is thus both the means and end of attainment, and the only absolute means for the devotee to attain Him. The prapatti view here propounded flatly denies the necessity of any other means. The essence of prapatti consists in the passivity involved in the mental attitude of the devotee surrendering himself to God and thus giving occasion for God’s affecting powers to affect him favourably. When the devotee ceases to concern himself with any anxiety as to how he may be saved, then God exerts His will to save him. This view of God’s relationship with the devotee involves within it the philosophical doctrine that the individual souls exist for God and have no end to realize for themselves. It is only through ignorance that the individual seems to possess an independent end for himself. The denial of this position through excessive love of God renders the philosophical reality of their mutual relationship realizable as a spiritual fact.

The definition of soul as consciousness and bliss and as atomic is only an external description (tattāstha). The internal situation (antarāṅga) of the relation of the individual soul with God may best be described as his servitude to Him.

The nature of emotional attachment which is associated with prapatti is such that the devotee by his tender love for God induces the same in Him so that the emotion of love may be regarded on the one hand as a consciousness of bliss and on the other hand as a relation in which the lover and the beloved are the constituents. The first inferior stage of prapatti is not always actuated by deep natural attachment, but by a sense of one’s own insignificance and helplessness. In the second stage called the upāya the devotee is so much actuated by his deep love for God that he loses all considerations for himself, and the intoxication of love may grow so deep that it may lead to the annihilation of his body. But the prospect of such an annihilation does not deter him from moving forward in the path of intoxication, for at that stage he loses all interest in the consequences of such an attachment. He is simply lost in God through intoxicating emotion. This is technically called rāga-prāpta-prapatti.

The relation between the devotee and God is interpreted on the analogy of the wedding of the mistress with her lover, of the

1 asya icchā niyāttā cet tasye’cchā asya kāryakarti bhavati. Śrīvacana-bhūṣana-vyākhya. MS.
2 This is regarded as the upāya stage where the devotee seeks God as the means to his highest attainment.
Gopikā with Kṛṣṇa, and it is held that the deep emotion is like the erotic emotion that leads to the wedding of the bridegroom with the bride. *Bhakti* or devotion is described as a special kind of consciousness dissociated from ignorance which reveals itself in the form of a deep emotion. The devotee is supposed to pass through all the stages which a love-stricken woman would do. All the emotions of the devotee, the lover, are for rousing the pleasure of God. Just as a woman’s behaviour under the influence of love is intended to bring a smile or twinkle into the eyes of her lover, so the emotion of the devotee is intended solely to please God. This is regarded as *siddha-prema* or natural love. Devotees intoxicated by such a love are not necessarily subjected to any kind of code of duty. It is only those whose intoxication by love is so great that they cannot wait and pass through any such discipline as is prescribed in the *vaidhī* or the *upāya* stage of *prapatti* who are driven to embrace God as it were with their melting hearts. The ordinary rules of *prapatti* are utterly unbinding on these people. In the adoption of *prapatti* of all the three types mentioned above the personal effort (*purusakara*) necessary is limited to the extent that the individual should hold himself in absolute self-surrender so that God may be inclined to accept even his faults and defects as they are and remove them by His divine grace. In the case of those who are advanced in the stage of *prapatti*—the *paramārtas*—God removes even all the *prārābda-karmas* and grants them immediate emancipation.

The person who adopts the path of *prapatti* is not anxious to attain even emancipation. He has also no specific preference as to the nature of the spiritual emancipation that may be granted to him. To desire emancipation and to attach any preference to any possible state of existence involves an egoistic desire. But the person who has sincerely adopted the path of *prapatti* must annihilate altogether even the last traces of egoism. On the one side egoism means ignorance, for it is only by false knowledge that a man asserts...
himself as having an independent being. On the other side egoism means insincerity (kraurya). It has been said above that God may forgive all our sins excepting insincerity. The fundamental requirement of prapatti therefore consists in the annihilation of egoism. It is only through the annihilation of egoism that the perfect self-surrender required by prapatti is possible.\(^1\)

The four stages precedent to the attainment of the summum bonum through prapatti are as follows: (i) jñāna-daśā, i.e. the state in which through the instructions of the teacher the devotee attains self-knowledge in relation to God. (ii) varāṇa-daśā, the state in which the devotee adopts God in a spirit of helpless surrender as the only protector. (iii) prāpti-daśā, the state in which he realizes God. (iv) prāpyā-nubhava-daśā, i.e. the state in which, having realized God, he attains the summum bonum.\(^2\)

The doctrine of prapatti is, indeed, very old. It is found in the Ahirbudhnya-samhitā, Lakṣmī Tantra, Bharadvāja-samhitā and other Paṇca-rātra works. The Śrīvaiṣṇava writers trace its origin to much older literature such as the Taittiriyopaniṣad, Kāthopaniṣad and the Śvetāśvatara, the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa. The nature of prapatti in the Ahirbudhnya-samhitā has already been discussed. In the Bharadvāja-Samhitā the prapatti is described as self-surrender to God, and the descriptions that it gives are more or less the same as those found in the Ahirbudhnya. The devotee who adopts the path of prapatti is not exempted from the ordinary duties of a Vaiṣṇava or from the regular caste duties. The Bharadvāja-samhitā describes in some detail the courses of action which are favourable or unfavourable to the adoption of such a path. Rāmānuja, in his Śaraṇā-gati-gadya, advocates the path of prapatti in which the devotee seeks protection not only of Nārāyaṇa but also of Lakṣmī. But it does not appear either in the Śaraṇā-gati-gadya or in his commentary of the Gītā that a person who has adopted the path of prapatti is exempted from the normal caste and other duties, nor is the function of Lakṣmī in awarding the fruits of prapatti explained by him. In his explanation of the Bhagavad-gītā text (sarva-dharmān-parityajya, etc., 18. 66), he says that the devotee should perform all his normal duties without any motive of

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\(^1\) Śrīvacana-bhūṣana-vyākhyā. MS.
\(^2\) etad-anubhava-jānita-priti-kārīta-kāṅkaryam eva parama-puruṣā-ṛthaḥ. Ibid.
attaining fruits thereby. As regards the destruction of the prārabdha-karma also, Rāmānuja and Venkaṭanātha hold that though most of it is destroyed by the grace of God, yet a trace of it is left. Vātsyāya Varada, in his Prapanna-pārijāta, follows the same idea. Venkaṭanātha also repeats the same view in his Nyāsa-vimsati and Nyāsa-tilaka, and Anṇayārya, a disciple of Vedānti Rāmānuja, follows the idea in his Prapatti-prayoga. Varadanātha, the son of Venkaṭanātha, also repeats the idea in his Nyāsa-tilaka-vākhyā and Nyāsa-kārikā. The view of Lokācārya and Saumya Jāmāṭr muni, the leaders of the Teṅgalai school, differs from it to the extent that while the above-mentioned prapatti doctrine may be true of the inferior devotees, the superior devotees who are absolutely intoxicated with God’s love are through the very nature of their psychological intoxication unable to follow any of the normal duties and are entirely exempted from them. Their prārabdha-karma may also be entirely destroyed by God’s grace. The distinction

1 Venkaṭanātha in his Tatparya-dīpikā on Rāmānuja-bhāṣya on the Gītā (verse 18. 66) says: etac-chlokhā-pāta-pratitvā kūta-yuktibhiṣa yathā varṇā-
śrama-dharma-svarūpa-tvāgā-di-paśko no deti tathā upapādītam.


In the Nyāsa-vimsati and the Nyāsa-tilaka as commented in the Nyāsa-
tilaka-vyākhyā by Venkaṭanātha’s son Varadanātha prapatti is defined in the
same manner as that by Lokācārya. Prapatti is an old doctrine in Southern Vaishnavism and its fundamental characters are more or less final. In the Nyāsa-
tilaka-vyākhyā great emphasis is laid on the fact that prapatti as a path of
approach to God is different from the path of bhakti and superior to it. In the
Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa there is a tendency to treat bhakti as an intermediary way to
prapatti. In the Nyāsa-tilaka-vyākhyā it is said that the chief difference between
bhakti and prapatti is firstly that the former is of the nature of unbroken medita-
tion, while the latter has to be done once for all; secondly, the prārabdha-karma
cannot be destroyed by the former, whereas in the latter it can be so done by the
grace of God; thirdly, the former needs various accessory methods of worship—
continual effort and continual action—whereas in the latter we have excessive
faith; fourthly, the former produces fruit after a long time whereas the latter
applies only to those who want immediate fruit; fifthly, the former may have
different objectives and may yield different fruits accordingly, whereas the latter
being of the nature of absolutely helpless surrender produces all fruits im-
mediately. High faith is the foundation of prapatti. In and through many
obstacles this faith and attachment to God leads the devotee to his goal. For
these reasons the path of bhakti is inferior to the path of prapatti. Prapatti to the
teacher is regarded as a part of prapatti to God. The difference between the
concept of prapatti in the Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa and the Nyāsa-tilaka is that the
latter holds that even those who adopt the path of prapatti should perform the
obligatory duties imposed by the scriptures and refrain from committing the acts
prohibited by them; for the scriptures are the commands of God. The former
however thinks that a man who adopts the path of prapatti by the very nature of
the psychological state produced by it is unable to adhere to any programme of
duties outlined by the scriptures. He therefore transcends it.
between the Varagalai and Teṅgalai schools depends largely on the emphasis given by the latter to the superior type of prapatti.

Kastūrī Raṅgācārya.

Kastūrī Raṅgācārya, otherwise called Śrī Raṅgasūrī, was a disciple of Saumya Jāmāṭr muni and probably lived late in the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century. Rāmānuja’s views do not seem to have undergone great changes of interpretation, and we do not find the emergence of different schools of interpretation as in the case of the philosophy of Śaṅkara. The followers of Rāmānuja throughout the succeeding centuries directed their efforts mostly to elucidating Rāmānuja’s views and adducing new arguments for his doctrines or refuting the arguments of his opponents and finding fault with the theories of other schools. A sectarian difference, however, arose with Venkatanātha’s efforts to explain the nature of devotion and the ultimate nature of emancipation and various other problems associated with it. Some external ritualistic differences can also be traced from his time. One sect1 (Vaḍkalai or Uttara-kalārya) was led by Venkatanātha and the other school (called Teṅgalai or Daksīṇa-kalārya) by Lokācārya and Saumya Jāmāṭr muni.

Kastūrī Raṅgācārya wrote two works called Kāryā-dhikaraṇa-vāda and the Kāryā-dhikaraṇa-tattva, in which he discussed some of the most important differences of these two schools and lent his support to the Teṅgalai or the Daksīṇa-kalārya school. The discussion began on the occasion of the interpretation of Rāmānuja of a topic in the Brahma-sūtra (4.3.6–15) called the Kāryā-dhikaraṇa-vāda, in which some Upaniṣad texts raised certain difficulties regarding the attainment of absolute immortality as conditioned by wisdom or worship (upāsanā). Vādari says that the worship of Hiranya-garbha, the highest of the created beings, leads to absolute immortality; Jaimini says that only the worship of the highest Brahman can produce immortality. Bādarāyaṇa, however, rejects their views and holds that only those who regard their souls as naturally dissociated from Prakṛti and as parts of Brahman attain absolute immortality.

Those who cannot realize their essential difference from the material qualities with which they are seemingly associated cannot attain the highest immortality and have ultimately to follow the cycles of births and rebirths. Those alone who worship Brahman with a proper apprehension of their own nature in relation to it can attain the highest immortality. The nature of this worship has been described by Raṅgacārya in accordance with the Gītā which enjoins the worship of Brahman with śraddhā (śraddhā-pūrvakam brahmo-paśanam). The word śraddhā ordinarily means faith. This faith undergoes a special characterization at the hands of Raṅgacārya and other thinkers of the Teṅgalai school. Thus it is said that the first stage is the full apprehension of the great and noble qualities of God; the second stage is the attachment produced by such apprehension; the third stage is to regard Him as the ultimate end and fulfilment of our nature; the fourth stage is to think of Him as the only dear object of our life; the fifth stage is the incapacity to bear separation from God through intense love for Him; the sixth stage is absolute faith in God as the only means of self-fulfilment; the seventh and last stage is the enkindling of the spirit in its forward movement to hold fast to Him. It is this last stage as associated with all the previous stages and as integrated with them which is called śraddhā. The worship of God with such faith (śraddhā) is also called devotion or bhakti. The worship of God again means intense joy in Him (priti-rūpo-paśāntatva-lakṣanam). The mere realization of one’s self as dissociated from the material elements is not sufficient. Those who follow the process of Paṅcāgni-vidyā rest only with self-discriminative wisdom and do not take to God as the final end of self-fulfilment.

The first point of dispute between the followers of Uttara-kalārya and Daksīna-kalārya concerns the nature of emancipation called kaivalya which consists in self-realization as the ultimate end (ātmā-nubha-va-lakṣāna-kaivalyā-khya-puruṣā-rthah). Veṅkaṭa-natha, the leader of the Uttara-kalārya, thinks that those who attain such emancipation have again to come back, i.e. such an emancipation is destructible. The Daksīna-kalārya school, however, thinks that such an emancipation is eternal. Thus Veṅkaṭa, in his Nyāya-siddhānta, says that mere realization of self as distinguished from all material elements is not sufficient, for it should also be supplemented by the knowledge that that self is a part of God and is
entirely subordinate to Him, and that this view is held in the Śrī-
bhāṣya. He draws a distinction between the realization of one's
own nature as bliss and the realization of the blissful nature of God.
The former may happen without the latter. It has to be admitted
that in the state of kaivalya there is an association of materiality
(acit-samsarga), since the karma in its entirety is not destroyed in
this case; for to know one's proper essence is to know oneself as a
part of God and so long as this state is not attained one is under
the influence of māyā. In the case of such a person the māyā obstructs
his vision of God. Veṅkaṭa, however, cannot say anything de-
finately as to the ultimate destiny of those who attain kaivalya. He
asserts only that they cannot attain the eternal Brahmahood. He is
also uncertain as to whether they are associated with bodies or not.
He is also aware that his interpretation of the nature of kaivalya is
not in harmony with all the scriptural texts, but he feels that since
some of the texts definitely support his views other texts also should
be taken in that light.

Kastūrī Raṅgacārya, however, asserts that, according to the
testimony of the old Drāvidā texts and also of the Gītā and such
other texts, those who attain emancipation through self-knowledge
attain the state of absolute immortality. The difference between
liberation through self-knowledge and the liberation through one's
self-knowledge in association with God is only a difference in the
richness and greatness of experience, the latter being higher than
the former in this respect. Other points of difference between the
Uttara-kalāryās and the Dākṣiṇa-kalāryās are closely connected
with the point discussed above. They have been enumerated in
the second chapter of Kāryā-dhikarana-vāda and are as follows. The
Uttara-kalāryās think that those who attain the emancipation of
a self-realization as kaivalya pass to a higher world through other

1 parama-puruṣa-vibhūti-bhūtasya prāptur ātmānāh svarūpa-yāthāmya-veda-
nam apavarga-sādhanā-bhūta-parama-puruṣa-vedano-payogitayā āvaśyakam. na
svata eva upāyatena ity uktam. Nyāya-siddhānta, p. 82.

Vēkkaṭa also refers to Varada Viṣṇumīśra in support of his views. “nihēṣa-
karma-kṣaya-bhāvāt kaivalya-prāptau na muktih.”

He refers to Sangati-mālā, where Śri Viṣṇucitta says that a person wishing to
attain Brahmā may commit such errors of conception that instead of attaining
the true Brahmahood he may attain only the lower state of kaivalya just as a man
performing sacrifices to attain Heaven may commit errors for which he may be-
come a brahma-rākṣasa instead of attaining Heaven. Ibid. p. 84.

2 Kāryā-dhi karana-vāda, 3. 79. Kastūrī Raṅgacārya goes through a long
course of references to scriptural texts, Dravidian and Sanskritic, in support of
his views.
channels than those adopted by persons who attain ultimate emancipation. This is denied by the Ďaksiṇa-kalāryas. Secondly, the former hold that the absolute dissociation of all trace of the elements of prakṛti is the same as emancipation, but the latter deny it. Thirdly, the former hold that those who attain the kaivalya are associated with subtle material impurities and may still be regarded as attaining immortality in a remote sense; this is desired by the latter. Fourthly, the former hold that those who attain kaivalya remain in a place within the sphere of the material world and their state is therefore not unchangeable, but the latter deny it. Fifthly, the former hold that those who attain wisdom through the five sacrifices (pañcāgni-vidyā) are different from those that attain kaivalya, but the latter hold that they may or may not be so. Sixthly, the former hold that those who attain wisdom through the five sacrifices may remain within the sphere of the material world when they attain only self-knowledge, but when they realize the nature of their relation with Brahman they pass away beyond the sphere of the material world (prakṛti); the latter, however, deny this. Seventhly, the former hold that those who attain wisdom through pañcāgni-vidyā, those who realize the nature of their relation to God, have the same characteristics, but the latter deny it. Eighthly, the former hold that outside the sphere of the material world (prakṛti) there cannot be any difference in the nature of one’s highest experience, but this also is denied by the latter 1.

In his Kāryā-dhikaraṇa-tattva, Raṅgācārya only repeats the same arguments and the topic of discussion is also the same as that in Kāryā-dhikaraṇa-vāda.

Śaila Śrīnivāsa.

Śaila Śrīnivāsa was the disciple of Kaunḍinya Śrīnivāsa Dikṣita, the son of Śrīnivāsa Tātācārya, and the brother of Anvayārya Dikṣita. He was very much influenced by the writings of his elder brother Anvayārya and some of his works are but elaborations of the works of his elder brother who wrote many books, e.g. Virodha-bhañjanī, etc. Śaila Śrīnivāsa wrote at least six books: Virodha-nirodha, Bheda-darpaṇa, Advaita-vana-kutthāra, Sāra-darpaṇa, Mukti-darpaṇa, Jñāna-ratna-darpaṇa, Gūna-darpaṇa, and Bheda-mani.

1 Kāryā-dhikaraṇa-vāda, II. 7.
In his *Virodha-nirodha*, probably the last of his works, he tries mainly to explain away the criticisms that are made on the different Rāmānuja doctrines by the Śaṅkarites, and also by the writers of other Vedāntic schools—viz. that the Rāmānuja views are not strictly faithful to the scriptural texts—by showing that the scriptural texts favour the Rāmānuja interpretations and not the views of the other Vedāntic writers.

In the first chapter of the *Virodha-nirodha* Śaila Śrīnīvāsa first takes up the view that the Brahmān is both the material and efficient cause of the world—which he thinks is possible only in the conception that Brahmān has the individual souls and the matter-stuff associated with Him (*brahmaṇi cid-acid-viśiṣṭa-rūpatām antarena na ghaṭate*). The Brahmān remains unchanged in itself but suffers transformations through its two parts, the soul and the matter-stuff. Brahmān as cause is associated with souls and the matter-stuff in their subtle forms, and when it undergoes transformation the souls expand and broaden as it were through the various intellectual states as a result of their *karma*, and the matter-stuff passes through its grosser stages as the visible material world; the portion of God as the inner controller of these two suffers transformation only so far as it is possible through its association with these two transforming entities¹. When the scriptural texts deny the changing character of the Brahmān, all that is meant by them is that it does not undergo the changes through which matter and individual souls pass through their *karma*, but that does not deny the fact that Brahmān is the material cause². Brahmān has two parts, a substantive and a qualifying part, and it is the substantive part that through its subtle material parts becomes the transforming cause of the grosser qualifying material part. This material part being inseparable from Brahmān may be regarded as subsisting in it. So also the Brahmān has a spiritual part which undergoes a sort of expansion through thought-experiences and behaves as individual souls. Thus Brahmān suffers modification through its physical and spiritual parts, and from this point of view God is

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subject to development through its two parts and through their association independently as their inner controller. Unlike Venkaṭa, Śaila Śrīnivāsa holds that this causal transformation is like the Sāmkhyist causal transformation\(^1\); *vikāra* or change here means change of states. Brahman thus suffers change directly in the spiritual and the intellectual part and indirectly as their inner controller, though in itself it suffers no change. To the objection that if matter and spirit are regarded as suffering transformation there is no meaning in attributing causality to Brahman as qualified by them, the reply is that the causality of Brahman is admitted on the strength of scriptural testimony. So far as Brahman remains as the inner controller and does not suffer any change in itself, it is regarded as the efficient cause\(^2\).

In the second chapter Śaila Śrīnivāsa replies to the criticisms against the Rāmānuja doctrine of soul, and says that the contraction and expansion of soul due to ignorance and increase of knowledge does not imply that it is non-eternal, for non-eternity or destructibility can be affirmed only of those who undergo accretion or decrease of parts (*avayavo-pacayā-pacayayor eva anityatva-vyāpyatayā*). Knowledge is partless and so there is no contraction or expansion of it in any real sense. What are called contraction and expansion consist in reality of its absence of relationship with objects due to the effects of *karma* or the natural extension of relations with objects like the ray of a lamp; *karma* is thus regarded as the *upādhi* (limiting condition) which limits the natural flow of knowledge to its objects and is figuratively described as contraction. It is on account of this nature of knowledge that unless obstructed by *karma* it can grasp all sensations of pain and pleasure spreading over all parts of the body, though it belongs to soul which is an atomic entity. So knowledge is all-pervading (*vibhu*)\(^3\). Knowledge also is eternal in its own nature though changeful so far as its states are concerned.

In the third chapter Śrīnivāsa deals with the question as to

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1 *viśīṣṭam brahma kāraṇam ity uktam tena kāryam api viśīṣṭaṁ eva tatra ca brahmaṁ upādānatvam viśīṣṭāṁ niśam viśīṣṭāṁ niśam prati tatra ca'cid-āṃśam prati yad-upādānatvam tat sūkṣmā-vasthā-cid-āṃśa-dvāra-karṇam tatra tatra dvāra-bhūtā-cid-āṃśa-gata-svarūpā nyathā-bhāva-rūpa eva vikāraḥ sa ca aprthaka-siddha-vastu-gatavāt brahma-gato'py...evaṁ ca sāmkhyā-bhikṣu-pādānatāyaḥ siddhāntēpy anāpāyāt na ko'pi viroḍhah. Virodha-nirodha. M.S.
whether the souls are produced or eternal, and his conclusion is that in their own nature they are unproduced, but they are produced so far as their own specific data of knowledge are concerned. The production of eternal knowledge is possible only so far as its contraction and expansion are concerned, which is due to the action of the body and other accessories. It is only in this sense that knowledge though eternal in itself can be said to be suffering production through its various kinds of manifestation (abhivyakti).

In the fourth chapter Śrīnivāsa discusses the same question in which the Upaniṣads urge that by the knowledge of one everything is known. He criticizes the Madhva and the Śaṅkarite views and holds that the knowledge of one means the knowledge of Brahman which, being always associated with the individual souls and matter, involves the knowledge of these two entities. His exposition in this subject is based throughout on the interpretations of scriptural texts.

In the fifth chapter Śrīnivāsa explains the same question in which the individual souls can be called agents (kartā). Agency (kartrtvā) consists in an effort that may lead to the production of any action (kāryā-nukula kṛtimattvam). In the Rāmānuja view effort means a particular intellectual state and as such it may well belong to the soul, and so the effort that may lead to any action also belongs to the soul which, though eternal in itself, is changeful so far as its states are concerned. The agency of the individual souls, however, is controlled by God, though the fruits of the action are enjoyed by the former, for the direction of God which determines the efforts of the individuals is in accordance with their actions. This virtually means an admixture of determinism and occasionalism.

In the seventh chapter Śrīnivāsa contends that though knowledge is universal it only manifests itself in accordance with the deeds of any particular person in association with his body, and so there is no possibility that it should have all kinds of sufferings and enjoyments and should not be limited to his own series of experiences. In the eighth and ninth chapters he tries to establish

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1 tatra niśedhāḥ viyad-ādivat jīva-svarūpo-tpattim pratiśedhanti utpatti-
vidhayaas tu svā-sādhāraṇa-dharma-bhūta-jñāna-visiṣṭa-veṣeṇa utpattim vadanti. Virodhā-nirodha. MS.

2 prayatnā-der buddhi-viśeṣa-rūpatayā kāryā-nukula-kṛtimattvasyāpi kart-
rtvasya jñāna-viśeṣa-rūpatayā tasya svābhāvikatayā tadv-ātmanā jīvasya jñānasya
nityatve’pi tat-parināma-viśeṣasya anityatvāt. Ibid.

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the view that during emancipation the individuals are cleanly purged of all their deeds, virtues and sins, but at this stage God may be pleased to endow them with extraordinary bodies for the enjoyment of various kinds of pleasures. In the remaining nineteen chapters Śaila Śrīnivāsa introduces some of the relatively unimportant theological doctrines of the Rāmānuja system and discusses them on the basis of scriptural texts which may very well be dropped for their insignificance as philosophical contribution.

In the *Bhedā-darpana* also Śaila Śrīnivāsa takes some of the important doctrines where the Rāmānujists and the Śaṅkarites part company, and tries to show by textual criticism that the Rāmānuja interpretation of the scriptural texts is the only correct interpretation\(^1\). The work, therefore, is absolutely worthless from a philosophical point of view. In most of his other works mentioned above, Śaila Śrīnivāsa prefers to discuss the doctrines of Rāmānuja philosophy in the same style of scriptural criticism, and any account of these is therefore of very little value to students of philosophy.

Śrī Śaila Śrīnivāsa, in his *Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi*, discusses the nature of Brahma-causality. Brahma is both the instrumental (*nimitta*) and the material (*upādāna*) cause of the world. Such a Brahma is the object of our meditation (*dhyāna*). An object of meditation must have knowledge and will. A mere qualityless entity cannot be the object of meditation. In order that Brahma may be properly meditated upon it is necessary that the nature of His causality should be properly ascertained. It is no use to attribute false qualities for the sake of meditation. If the world is an illusion, then the causality of Brahma is also illusory, and that would give us an insight into His real nature. If God is the real cause of the world, the world must also be real. It is sometimes said that the same entity cannot be both a material and instrumental cause (*samavāya-samavāyi-bhinnam kāraṇaṁ nimitta-kāraṇamiti*). The material cause of the jar is earth, while the instrumental cause is the potter, the wheel, etc. To this the reply is that such an objection is groundless; for it is difficult to assert that that which is an instrumental cause cannot be a material cause, since the wheel of the potter, though an instrumental cause in itself, is also the material

\(^1\) *Bhedā-bheda-śrutī-ctrāta-jāta-sandeha-santatāḥ bheda-darpanam ādāya niscinvantu vipaścītah.* _Bhedā-darpana._ MS.
cause of its own form, colour, etc. There is thus nothing which can lead us to suppose that the material cause and the instrumental cause cannot exist together in the same entity. It may further be contended that the same entity cannot behave as the material and instrumental cause with regard to the production of another entity. To this the reply is that the internal structure of rod is both the material cause for its form as well as the instrumental cause for its destruction in association with other entities. Or it may be contended that time (kāla) is the cause for both the production and destruction of entities (kāla-ghaṭa-saṃyogā-dikṣam prati kālasya nimittatvād upādānavācca). To this the obvious reply would be that the behaviour of the same entity as the material and the instrumental cause is limited by separate specific conditions in each case. The association of separate specific conditions renders a difference in the nature of the cause; and therefore it would be inexact to say that the same entity is both the material and the instrumental cause. This objection, however, produces more difficulty in the conception of the causality of Brahma according to the Viśiṣṭādvaita theory, for in our view Brahma in His own nature may be regarded as the instrumental cause and in His nature as matter (acit) and souls (cit). He may be regarded as the material cause. It is sometimes objected that if Brahma as described in the texts is changeless, how can He be associated with changes as required by the conception of Him as the material and instrumental cause, which involves the view of associating Him with a body? Moreover, the association of body (śarīra) with God is neither an analogy nor an imagery. The general conception of body involves the idea that an entity is called the body where it is only controlled by some spiritual substance. To this the reply is that Brahma may Himself remain unchangeable and may yet be the cause of changes in His twofold body-substance. The objection is that the material world is so different from the bodies of animals that the conception of body cannot be directly applied to it. The reply is that even among animal bodies there is a large amount of diversity.

1 evam hi brahmany api no'pādānātva-nimittatvayor virodhaḥ; tasya cid-acid-visiṣṭa-veṣeṇa upādānāvatāt svarūpaṇa nimittātvāc ca. tat-tad-avacchedaka-bhedā-prayuktā-tad-bhedasya tasya tatrā'pi niśpratyūhavatāt. Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi. MS.

2 yasya cetanasya yad dravyaṃ sarvā-tmanā svātthe niyāmyam tat tasya śarīram. Ibid. This subject has been dealt with elaborately in Śri Śaila Śrīnivāsa's Sāra-darpaṇa.
e.g. the body of a man and the body of a microscopic insect. Under the circumstances we are to fall upon a general definition which would cover the concept of all bodies and ignore the individual differences. The definition given above suits the concept of bodies of all living beings and applies also to the concept of the world as the body of Brahman. This is also supported by the Šrutti texts of the Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa, where the world has been spoken of as the body of God. If there is an apparent difference in our conception of body as indicated in the definition as testified by the Vedic texts, with our ordinary perception of the world which does not reveal its nature as body, the testimony of the Vedic texts should prevail; for while our perception can be explained away as erroneous, a scientific definition and the testimony of texts cannot be dismissed. Our ordinary perception is not always reliable. We perceive the moon like a small dish in size, whereas the scriptural testimony reveals its nature to us as much bigger. When there is a conflict between two sources of evidence, the decision is to be made in favour of one or the other by the canon of unconditionality (ananyathā-siddhatva). An evidence which is unconditional in its nature has to be relied upon, whereas that which is conditional has to be subordinated to it. It is in accordance with this that sometimes the Vedic texts have to be interpreted in such a manner that they may not contradict perceptual experience, whereas in other cases the evidence of perceptual experience has to be dismissed on the strength of scriptural testimony. It cannot also be said that the evidence of a later pramāṇa will have greater force, for there may be a series of errors, in which case there is no certitude in any of the later pramāṇas. Again, there is no force also in mere cumulation of evidence, for in the case of a blind man leading other blind men mere cumulation is no guarantee of certitude. In the case of the conflict of pramāṇas, the dissolution of doubt and the attainment of certitude are achieved on the principle of unconditionality. That which is realized in an unconditional manner should be given precedence over what is realized only in a conditional manner. Our powers of perception are limited by their own limitations and can-

1 na ca paramātma  ātma-ātmanā ca eva pratibhā-ātmanā ca. Siddhānta-cintāmani. MS.
2 ananyathā-siddhatvam eva vāyupiśhā-ātmanā ca. Siddhānta-cintāmani. MS.
not therefore discern whether the world may after all be the body of the transcendent Brahman, and therefore it cannot successfully contradict the testimony of the Vedic texts which declare the world to be the body of God. The Vedic texts of pure monism are intended only to deny the duality of Brahman, but it can well be interpreted on the supposition of one Brahman as associated with his body, the world. The denial of dualism only means the denial of any other being like Brahman. Thus Brahman as cit and acit forms the material cause of the world, and Brahman as idea and will as affecting these is the instrumental cause of the world. The twofold causality of Brahman thus refers to twofold conditions as stated above which exist together in Brahman.

In the Vedantic texts we have expressions in the ablative case indicating the fact that the world has proceeded out of Brahman as the material cause (upādāna). The ablative case always signifies the materiality of the cause and not its instrumentality. But it also denotes that the effect comes out of the cause and it may be objected that the world, being always in Brahman and not outside Him, the ablative expressions of the Vedantic texts cannot be justified. To this the reply is that the conception of material cause or the signification of the ablative cause does not necessarily mean that the effect should come out and be spatially or temporally differentiated from the cause. Even if this were its meaning, it may well be conceived that there are subtle parts in Brahman corresponding to cit and acit in their manifested forms, and it is from these that the world has evolved in its manifested form. Such an evolution does not mean that the effect should stand entirely outside the cause, for when the entire causal substance is transformed, the effect cannot be spatially outside the cause.

1 sarva-śarira-bhūtā-vibhakta-nāma-rūpā-vasthā panna-cid-acid-viśīṣṭa-veśena brahmaṇāh upādānataḥ; tad-upayukta-samkalpā-di-viśīṣṭa-svārūpenanirmitātvaṁ ca nispratyāhah iti nimitatto-pādānātvaṁ yo dūra' py avaccheda-bhedaprayukta-bhedasya durapahāvatvā ttau eva kāśraya-vyāttivyasa prāg upāpādita-vat na brahmaṇo abhinma-nimitto-pādānave kaś cid virodhaḥ. Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi. MS.

2 Such as yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante.

3 upādānataḥ-sthale'i pi na sarvatra loke'pi viśeṣaḥ kṛṣṇa-parināma tad a-sambhavāt kintu ekadeśa-parināma eva'eti tad-abhiprāyakam pratyāhārāṇam vācyam. lac ce'hā' pi sambhavati. viśīṣṭai-kadeśa-parināmā-ṅgkhārā. ato na tad-virodhaḥ; kiśeṣa sūkṣma-cid-acid-viśīṣṭam upādānataṁ iti vakṣyate tasmāt ca sthūlā-vastharrya viśeṣo yujyate viśeṣo hi na sarvā-tmanā kāraṇa-deśa-parityagav. Ibid. MS.
material causes suffer a transformation; but in the Viśiṣṭādvaita view there is no difficulty, for it is held here that Brahmān suffers this modification and controls it only so far as it has reference to his body, the cit and acit. God’s instrumentality is through His will, and will is but a form of knowledge.

In the Bheda-darpana Śrīnivāsa tries to support all the principal contentions of the Viśiṣṭādvaita theory by a reference to Upaniṣadic and other scriptural texts. In his other works mentioned above the subjects that he takes up for discussion are almost the same as those treated in Virodha-nirodha, but the method of treatment is somewhat different; what is treated briefly in one book is elaborately discussed in another, just as the problem of causality is the main topic of discussion in Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi, though it has been only slightly touched upon in Virodha-nirodha. His Naya-dyu-maṇi-samgraha is a brief summary in verse and prose of the contents of what the author wrote in his Naya-dyu-maṇi, a much bigger work to which constant references are made in the Naya-dyu-maṇi-samgraha. Śrī Śaila Śrīnivāsa wrote also another work called Naya-dyu-maṇi-dīpikā which is bigger than Naya-dyu-maṇi-samgraha. It is probably smaller than Naya-dyu-maṇi, which is referred to as a big work. There is nothing particular to be noted which is of any philosophical importance in Naya-dyu-maṇi-dīpikā or Naya-dyu-maṇi-samgraha. He generally clarifies the ideas which are already contained in the Śruta-prakāśikā of Sudarṣana Śūrya. He also wrote Oṃkāra-vādārtha, Ānandatāra-tamya-kaṇḍana, Arunādhikaraṇa-saraṇī-vivarani and Jijñāsā-darpana. He lived probably in the fifteenth century.

Śrīnivāsa wrote first his Sāra-darpana which was followed by Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi, and Virodha-nirodha. In fact Virodha-nirodha was one of his last works, if not the last. In the first chapter of this work he deals with the same subject as he did in the Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi, and tries to explain the nature of Brahmān as the material and instrumental cause of the world. In the second chapter he tries to refute the objections against the view that the souls as associated with knowledge or rather as having their character interpreted as knowledge should be regarded as the means for God’s manifestation as the world. The objector says that thought is always moving, either expanding or contracting, and as such it can-

1 Unfortunately this Naya-dyu-maṇi was not available to the present writer.
not be the nature of self which is regarded as eternal. In the case of the Jains the soul is regarded as contracting and expanding in accordance with the body that it occupies, and it may rightly be objected that in such a conception the soul has to be regarded as non-eternal. But in the Viśiṣṭādvaita conception it is only thought that is regarded as expanding or contracting. The expansion or contraction of thought means that it conceives greater or lesser things, and this is different from the idea of an entity that grows larger or smaller by the accretion or dissociation of parts. The expansion or contraction of thought is due to one's karma and as such it cannot be regarded as non-eternal. Knowledge in its own nature is without parts and all-pervading; its contraction is due to the effect of one's bad deeds which is often called māyā or avidyā. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins do not regard knowledge as produced through the collocations of conditions as the Naiyāyikas think, but they regard it as eternal and yet behaving as occasional (āgantuka-dharmavattvam) or as being produced. Earth in its own nature is eternal, and remaining eternal in its own nature suffers transformation as a jug, etc. In this way the conception of the eternity of the soul is different from the conception of knowledge as eternal, for in the case of knowledge, while remaining all-pervasive in itself, it seems to suffer transformation by virtue of the hindrances that obstruct its nature in relation to objects. Universal relationship is the essential nature of knowledge, but this nature may be obstructed by hindrances, in which case the sphere of relationship is narrowed, and it is this narrowing and expansive action of knowledge which is spoken of as transformation of knowledge or as the rise or cessation of knowledge. A distinction has thus to be made between knowledge as process and knowledge as essence. In its nature as essence it is the eternal self; in its nature as process, as memory, perception, thinking, etc., it is changing. The Jaina objection on this point is that in the above view it is unnecessary to admit a special quality of ajñāna as the cause for this expansion or contraction of thought, for it may well be admitted that the soul itself undergoes such a

1 jñānasya svābhāviham prasaraṇam aupadhiḥkas tu saṁkocah; upādhis tu prācinaṁ karma eva. Virodha-nirodha, pp. 39, 40 (MS.).

2 na hi yādṛśam ātmano nityatvam tadṛṣa jñānasyāḥ pi nityatvam abhyapugacchāmah karoṣa-tyāpāra-vaiyarthya prasaṁgāt. kintu tārkikeyādy abhimataṁ jñānasya āgantuka-dharmatvaṁ ni ākartum drier eva svarūpato nityatvam āgantukā°-vasthā-śrayatvam ca; tēna rūpena nityatvam tu ghaṭatvā°-dy-avasthāviśiṣṭa-veṣaṇa mṛḍaeriva iṣṭam eva. Ibid. p. 44.
transformation through the instrumentality of its deeds. To this the reply is that the Vedic texts always declare that the soul is in itself unchangeable, and if that is so the change has to be explained through the instrumentality of another factor, the ajñāna. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as the pure essence or nature of the soul and not as its dharma or character, and it is this character that is in itself universal and yet is observed to undergo change on account of obstructions. Thus, the soul in itself is eternal, though when looked at in association with its character as knowledge which is continually expanding or contracting it may seemingly appear to be non-eternal. Thought in itself has no parts and therefore cannot itself be regarded as non-eternal. It is nothing but relationship, and as such the analogy of change which, in other objects, determines their non-eternity cannot apply to it.

Now there are different kinds of Upanisadic texts, from some of which it may appear that the soul is eternal, whereas from others it may appear that the soul is created. How can this difficulty be avoided? On this point Śrīnivāsa says that the eternity and uncreated nature of the self is a correct assertion, for the soul as such is eternal and has never been created. In its own nature also the soul has thought associated with it as it were in a potential form. Such an unmanifested thought is non-existent. But knowledge in its growing richness of relations is an after-production, and it is from this point of view that the soul may be regarded as having been created. Even that which is eternal may be regarded as created with reference to any of its special characteristics or characters. The whole idea, therefore, is that before the creative action of God the souls are only potentially conscious; their real conscious activity is only a result of later development in consequence of God’s creative action.

Again, the Upanisads assert that by the knowledge of Brahman everything else is known. Now according to the Śaṅkarite explanation the whole world is but a magical creation on Brahman which alone has real being. Under the circumstances it is impossible that

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1 nityā-ntyā-vibhu-ṣvarupa-dvārakatva-svabhāva-dvārakatvābhyām vya-vasthita iti na kat c id dosah. Virodha-nirodha. MS.

prāk śrṣṭer jīvānām niskṛiyatvō-ktyā ca idam eva darsitam. Ibid.
by the knowledge of Brahman, the real, there would be the know-
ledge of all illusory and unreal creation, for these two, the reality
and the appearance, are entirely different and therefore by the
knowledge of one there cannot be the knowledge of the other. In
the Viśiṣṭādvaita view it may be said that when God as associated
with his subtle body, the subtle causal nature of the souls and the
material world, is known the knowledge of God as associated with
the grosser development of His body as souls and the world is also
by that means realized\(^1\).

In performing the actions it need not be supposed that the
eternal soul undergoes any transformation, for the individual soul
may remain identically unchanged in itself and yet undergo trans-
formation so far as the process of its knowledge is concerned. In the Viśiṣṭādvaita view, will and desire are regarded as but modes of
knowledge and as such the psychological transformations of the
mind involved in the performance of actions have reference only to
knowledge\(^2\). It has already been shown that possibly knowledge in
its essential form is unchangeable and yet unchangeable so far as its
nature as process is concerned. Such an activity and performance of
actions belongs naturally to the individual souls.

The Virodha-nirodha is written in twenty-seven chapters, but
most of these are devoted to the refutation of objections raised by
opponents on questions of theological dogma which have no
philosophical interest. These have therefore been left out in this
book.

Raṅgācārya\(^3\).

A follower of Śaṅkara named Umā-Maheśvara wrote a work
named Virodha-varūthini in which he proposed to show one
hundred contradictions in Rāmānuja's bhāṣya and other cognate

\(^1\) sūkṣma-cid-acic-charitrake brahmanī jñāte sthūla-cid-acic-charitrakasya tasya jñānam atrā' bhimamat. Virodha-nirodha. MS.

\(^2\) iha prayatnāder buddhi-viśeṣa-rūpatayā kāryā-nukula-kṛtimattvasyā'pi kartṛtvasya jñāna-viśeṣa-rūpatayā tasya svābhāvīkatayā tad-ātmanā jīvasya jñānasya nityate'pi tat-parināma-viśeṣasya antyatvāc ca. Ibid.

\(^3\) "śrī-rāmānuja-yogi-pāda-kamala-sṭhānā-bhīṣekam gato jñātā so' yam ananta-puruṣa-guru-simhāsanā-dhītvaraḥ
śrī-raṅga-sūriḥ śrīśaile tasya simhāsane stithaḥ Ku-dṛṣṭī-dhvānta-mārtandaṁ prakāśayati sampratī."

He was thus a disciple of Anantārya of the middle of the nineteenth century. At the end of his San-mārga-dīpa he says that it was written in refutation of Rāma Miśra's work on the subject. Rāma Miśra lived late in the nineteenth century and wrote Sneha-pūrti.
literature of the school, such as \textit{Satadūṣanī}, etc., but through illness he lost his tongue and could offer criticisms on only twenty-seven points. As a refutation of that work Raṅgācārya wrote his \textit{Ku-dṛṣṭi-dhvānta-mārtanda}. It also appears that Annāyārya’s grandson and Śrīnivāsa-tāyārya’s son, Śrīnivāsa-dīkṣita, also wrote a work called \textit{Virodha-varūthinī-pramāthinī} as a refutation of \textit{Virodha-varūthinī}. The first chapter of \textit{Ku-dṛṣṭi-dhvānta-mārtanda} is also called \textit{Virodha-varūthinī-pramāthinī}.

Umā-Maheśvara says that according to the view of Rāmānuja the manifold world and the individual souls (\textit{acit} and \textit{cit}) exist in an undivided and subtle state in Brahman, the original cause. In the state of actualized transformation, as the manifested manifold worlds and the experiencing selves, we have thus a change of state, and as Brahman holds within Himself as qualifying Him this gross transformation of the world He is associated with them. He must, therefore, be supposed to have Himself undergone change. But again Rāmānuja refers to many scriptural texts in which Brahman is regarded as unchanging.

To this the reply is that the mode in which the \textit{cit} and the \textit{acit} undergo transformation is different from the mode in which the all-controlling Brahman produces those changes in them. For this reason the causality of Brahman remains unaffected by the changes through which the \textit{cit} and the \textit{acit} pass. It is this unaffectedness of Brahman-causality that has often been described as the changelessness of Brahman. In the Śaṅkara view, the manifested world being the transformation of māyā, Brahman cannot on any account be regarded as a material cause of it. The Brahman of Śaṅkara being only pure consciousness, no instrumental agencies (\textit{nimittakāraṇatā}) can be attributed to it. If Brahman cannot undergo any change in any manner and if it always remains absolutely changeless it can never be regarded as cause. Causality implies power of producing change or undergoing change. If both these are impossible in Brahman it cannot consistently be regarded as the cause. According to the Rāmānuja view, however, Brahman is not absolutely changeless; for, as producer of change it also itself undergoes a change homogeneous (\textit{brahma-samasattāka-vikāra-ṅgikārā}) with
it. As the change is of a homogeneous nature, it may also be regarded as unchanged. The Brahman is the ultimate upholder of the world; though the worldly things have their intermediate causes, in which they may be regarded as subsisting, yet since Brahman is the ultimate and absolute locus of subsistence all things are said to be upheld in it.

Causation may be defined as unconditional, invariable antecedence (ananyathā-siddha-niyata-pūrva-vartītā). Brahman is certainly the ultimate antecedent entity of all things, and its unconditional character is testified by all scriptural texts. The fact that it determines the changes in cit and acit and is therefore to be regarded as the instrumental agent does not divest it of its right to be regarded as the material cause; for it alone is the ultimate antecedent substance. Brahman originally holds within itself the cit and the acit in their subtle nature as undivided in itself, and later on undergoes within itself such changes by its own will as to allow the transformation of cit and acit in their gross manifested forms. It leaves its pristine homogeneous character and adopts an altered state at least with reference to its true parts, the cit and the acit, which in their subtle state remained undivided in themselves. It is this change of Brahman's nature that is regarded as the pariṇāma of Brahman. Since Brahman is thus admitted to be undergoing change of state (pariṇāma), it can consistently be regarded as the material cause of the world. The illustration of the ocean and the waves is also consistent with such an explanation. Just as mud transforms itself into earthen jugs or earthen pots, and yet in spite of all its changes into jugs or pots really remains nothing but mud, so Brahman also undergoes changes in the form of the manifested world with which it can always be regarded as one. As the jug and the pot are not false, so the world also is not false. But the true conception of the world will be to consider it as one with Brahman. The upper and the lower parts of a jug may appear to be different when they are not regarded as parts of the jug, and

1 vahu syām prajāye'tyā-di-vrūtibhiḥ sṛṣṭeḥ praṇāḥ nāma-rūpa-vibhāga-
bhūtena ekatvā-vasthāpamasya sūkṣma-cid-vaiśīṣṭa-brahmanāḥ paścān-nāma-
rūpa-vibhāgena ekatvā-vasthā-prahāṇa-pūrvakaṁ sthūla-cid-acid-vaiśīṣtya-lakṣaṇa-
vahuteḥ-pattir-hi prasphuṭam pratipādyate; sai'va hi brahmanāḥ pariṇāmo nāma; 
prāg-avasthā-prahāṇenaśvasthā-ntara-prāptevi pariṇāma-sabdā-rthatvāt... yathā sarvam myā-dravya-vikṛti-bhūtam ghaṭā-di-kārya-jātam kāraṇa-bhūta-
myā-dravyā-bhinname va na tu dravyā-nāraṁ tathā brahma'pi jagataḥ abhinnam 
in that condition to consider them as two would be false; for they attain their meaning only when they are taken as the parts of one whole jug. When the Upaniṣads say that plurality is false, the import of the text is that plurality attains its full meaning only in its unified conception as parts of God, the Absolute.

The Śaṅkarites do not admit the theory of illusion as one thing appearing as another (anyathā-khyāti). According to them illusion consists in the production of an indefinable illusory object. Such an object appears to a person only at a particular moment when he commits an error of perception. It cannot be proved that the illusory object was not present at the time of the commission of illusory perception. Under the circumstances the absence of that object at other times cannot prove its falsity; for an object present at one time and not present at another cannot indicate its false nature. Falsity has then to be defined as relative to the perceiver at the time of perception. When the perceiver has knowledge of the true object, and knows also that one object is being perceived as another object, he is aware of the falsity of his perception. But if at the time of perception he has only one kind of knowledge and he is not aware of any contradiction, his perception at any time cannot be regarded as false. But since the dream experiences are not known to be self-contradictory in the same stage, the experience of conch-shell–silver is not known to be illusory at the time of the illusion; and as the world experience is uncontradicted at the time of our waking consciousness, it cannot be regarded as false in the respective stages of experience. The falsehood of the dream experiences therefore is only relative to the experience of another stage at another time. In such a view of the Śaṅkarites everything becomes relative, and there is no positive certainty regarding the experience of any stage. According to the Buddhists and their scriptures, the notion of Brahman is also false; and thus, if we consider their experience, the notion of Brahman is also relatively true. In such a view we are necessarily landed in a state of uncertainty from which there is no escape.

1 Raṅgācārya wrote at least one other work called San-mārga-dīpa which, being of a ritualistic nature, does not warrant any treatment in this work.
CHAPTER XXI
THE NIMBĀRKA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

Teachers and Pupils of the Nimbārka School.

NIMBĀRKA, Nimbāditya or Niyamānanda is said to have been a Telugu Brahmin who probably lived in Nimba or Nimbapura in the Bellary district. It is said in Harivyāsadeva’s commentary on Daśa-ślokī that his father’s name was Jagannātha and his mother’s name was Sarasvatī. But it is difficult to fix his exact date. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, in his Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems, thinks that he lived shortly after Rāmānuja. The argument that he adduces is as follows: Harivyāsadeva is counted in the Guru-paramparā list as the thirty-second teacher in succession from Nimbārka, and Bhandarkar discovered a manuscript containing this list which was written in Samvat 1806 or A.D. 1750 when Dāmodara Gosvāmī was living. Allowing fifteen years for the life of Dāmodara Gosvāmī we have A.D. 1765. Now the thirty-third successor from Madhva died in A.D. 1876 and Madhva died in A.D. 1276. Thus thirty-three successive teachers, on the Madhva line, occupied 600 years. Applying the same test and deducting 600 years from A.D. 1765, the date of the thirty-third successor, we have 1165 as the date of Nimbārka. This, therefore, ought to be regarded as the date of Nimbārka’s death and it means that he died sometime after Rāmānuja and might have been his junior contemporary. Bhandarkar would thus put roughly eighteen years as the pontifical period for each teacher. But Pandit Kiśoradāsa says that in the lives of teachers written by Pandit Anantarām Devācārya the twelfth teacher from Nimbārka was born in Samvat 1112 or A.D. 1056, and applying the same test of eighteen years for each teacher we have A.D. 868 as the date of Nimbārka, in which case he is to be credited with having lived long before Rāmānuja. But from the internal examination of the writings of Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa this would appear to be hardly credible. Again, in the Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Private Libraries of the North Western Provinces, Part 1, Benares, 1874 (or N.W.P. Catalogue, MS. No. 274), Madhva-mukha-mardana, deposited in the
Madan Mohan Library, Benares, is attributed to Nimbārka. This manuscript is not procurable on loan and has not been available to the present writer. But if the account of the authors of the Catalogue is to be believed, Nimbārka is to be placed after Madhva. One argument in support of this later date is to be found in the fact that Mādhava who lived in the fourteenth century did not make any reference in his Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha, to Nimbārka’s system, though he referred to all important systems of thought known at the time. If Nimbārka had lived before the fourteenth century there would have been at least some reference to him in the Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha, or by some of the writers of that time. Dr Rajendra Lal Mitra, however, thinks that since Nimbārka refers to the schools (saṁpradāya) of Śrī, Brahmā and Sanaka, he lived later than Rāmānuja, Madhva and even Vallabha. While there is no positive, definite evidence that Nimbārka lived after Vallabha, yet from the long list of teachers of his school it probably would not be correct to attribute a very recent date to him. Again, on the assumption that the Madhva-mukha-mardana was really written by him as testified in the N.W.P. Catalogue, one would be inclined to place him towards the latter quarter of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century. Considering the fact that there have been up till now about forty-three teachers from the time of Nimbārka, this would mean that the pontifical period of each teacher was on the average about ten to twelve years, which is not improbable. An internal analysis of Nimbārka’s philosophy shows its great indebtedness to Rāmānuja’s system and even the style of Nimbārka’s bhāṣya in many places shows that it was modelled upon the style of approach adopted by Rāmānuja in his bhāṣya. This is an additional corroboration of the fact that Nimbārka must have lived after Rāmānuja.

The works attributed to him are as follows: (1) Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha. (2) Daśa-śloki. (3) Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja. (4) Guru-paramparā. (5) Madhva-mukha-mardana. (6) Vedānta-tattva-bodha. (7) Vedānta-siddhānta-pradīpa. (8) Sva-dharmā-dhva-bodha. (9) Śrī-kṛṣṇa-stava. But excepting the first three works all the rest exist in MS. most of which are not procurable. Of these the present writer

1 Vedānta-tattva-bodha exists in the Oudh Catalogue, 1877, 42 and VIII. 24, compiled by Pandit Deviprasad. Vedānta-siddhānta-pradīpa and Sva-dharmā-dhva-bodha occur in the Notices
could secure only the *Sva-dharmā-dhva-bodha*, which is deposited with the Bengal Asiatic Society. It is difficult to say whether this work was actually written by Nimbārka. In any case it must have been considerably manipulated by some later followers of the Nimbārka school, since it contains several verses interspersed, in which Nimbārka is regarded as an *avatāra* and salutations are offered to him. He is also spoken of in the third person, and views are expressed as being *Nimbārka-matam* which could not have come from the pen of Nimbārka. The book contains reference to the *Kevala-bheda-vādī* which must be a reference to the Madhva school. It is a curious piece of work, containing various topics, partly related and partly unrelated, in a very unmethodical style. It contains references to the various schools of asceticism and religion.

In the *Guru-parampara* list found in the *Har-iguru-stava-mālā* noted in Sir R. G. Bhandarkar’s *Report of the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts 1882–1883*, we find that Haṁsa, the unity of Rādhā and Krṣṇa, is regarded as the first teacher of the Nimbārka school. His pupil was Kumāra of the form of four *vyūhas*. Kumāra’s pupil was Nārada, the teacher of *prema-bhakti* in the Tretā-yuga. Nimbārka was the pupil of Nārada and the incarnation of the power (*sudarśana*) of Nārāyaṇa. He is supposed to have introduced the worship of Krṣṇa in Dvāpara-yuga. His pupil was Śrīnivāsa, who is supposed to be the incarnation of the conch-shell of Nārāyaṇa. Śrīnivāsa’s pupil was Viśvācārya, whose pupil was Puruṣottama, who in turn had as his pupil Svarūpa-cārya. These are all described as devotees. Svarūpa-cārya’s pupil was Mādhavācārya, who had a pupil Balabhadrācārya, and his pupil was Padmācārya who is said to have been a great controversialist, who travelled over different parts of India defeating people in discussion. Padmācārya’s pupil was Śyāmācārya, and his pupil was Gopālācārya, who is described as a great scholar of the Vedas and the Vedānta. He had as pupil Krṣpācārya, who taught Devācārya, who is described as a great controversialist. Devācārya’s pupil was Sundara Bhaṭṭa, and Sundara Bhaṭṭa’s pupil was Padmanā Bhaṭcārya. His pupil was Upendra Bhaṭṭa; the succession of pupils is in the following order:


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Rāmacandra Bhaṭṭa, Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, Padmākara Bhaṭṭa, Śravaṇa Bhaṭṭa, Bhūri Bhaṭṭa, Madhva Bhaṭṭa, Śyāma Bhaṭṭa, Gopāla Bhaṭṭa, Valabhadra Bhaṭṭa, Gopinātha Bhaṭṭa (who is described as a great controversialist), Keśava, Gaṅgala Bhaṭṭa, Keśava Kāśmīra, Śrī Bhaṭṭa and Harivyāsadeva. Up to Harivyāsadeva apparently all available lists of teachers agree with one another; but after him it seems that the school split into two and we have two different lists of teachers. Bhandarkar has fixed the date for Harivyāsadeva as the thirty-second teacher after Nimbārka. The date of Harivyāsadeva and his successor in one branch line, Dāmodara Gosvāmī, has been fixed as 1750-1755. After Harivyāsadeva we have, according to some lists, Paraśurāmadeva, Harivāmadeva, Nārāyaṇadeva, Vṛndāvanadeva and Govinda. According to another list we have Svabhūrāmadeva after Harivyāsadeva, and after him Karmaharadeva, Mathuradeva, Śyāmadeva, Sevadeva, Naraharideva, Dayārāmadeva, Pūrnadeva, Maniśideva, Rādhā-krṣṇaśaraṇadeva, Ṣaṅkaradeva and Vrajabhūṣaṇaśaraṇadeva who was living in 1924 and Santadāsa Vāvājī who died in 1935. A study of the list of teachers gives fairly convincing proof that on the average the pontifical period of each teacher was about fourteen years. If Harivyāsadeva lived in 1750 and Šantadāsa Vāvājī who was the thirteenth teacher from Harivyāsadeva died in 1935, the thirteen teachers occupied a period of 185 years. This would make the average pontifical period for each teacher about fourteen years. By backward calculation from Harivyāsadeva, putting a period of fourteen years for each teacher, we have for Nimbārka a date which would be roughly about the middle of the fourteenth century.

Nimbārka’s commentary of the Brahma-sūtras is called the Vedānta-pārijata-saurabhā as has been already stated. A commentary on it, called the Vedānta-kaustubha, was written by his direct disciple Šrīniṣā. Kesava-kāśmīra Bhaṭṭa, the disciple of Mukunda, wrote a commentary on the Vedānta-kaustubha, called the Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā. He also is said to have written a commentary on the Bhagavat-gītā, called the Tattva-prakāśikā, a commentary on the tenth skanda of Bhāgavata-purāṇa called the Tattva-prakāśikā-veda-stuti-tīkā, and a commentary on the Taittṛiya Upaniṣad called the Taittṛiya-prakāśikā. He also wrote a work called Krama-dīpikā, which was commented upon by Govinda
Bhattacarya\(^1\). The *Krama-dīpikā* is a work of eight chapters dealing mainly with the ritualistic parts of the Nimbārka school of religion. This work deals very largely with various kinds of *Mantras* and meditations on them. Śrīnivāsa also wrote a work called *Laghu-stava-raja-stotra* in which he praises his own teacher Nimbārka. It has been commented upon by Puruṣottama Prasāda, and the commentary is called *Guru-bhakti-mandakini*. The work *Vedānta-siddhānta-pradīpa* attributed to Nimbārka seems to be a spurious work so far as can be judged from the colophon of the work and from the summary of the contents given in R. L. Mitra’s *Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts* (MS. No. 2826). It appears that the book is devoted to the elucidation of the doctrine of monistic Vedānta of the school of Śaṅkara. Nimbārka’s *Daśa-ślokī*, called also *Siddhānta-ratna*, had at least three commentaries: *Vedānta-ratna-maṇjuśā*, by Puruṣottama Prasāda; *Laghu-maṇjuśā*, the author of which is unknown; and a commentary by Harivyāsa muni. Puruṣottama Prasāda wrote a work called *Vedānta-ratna-maṇjuśā* as a commentary on the *Daśa-ślokī* of Nimbārka, and also *Guru-bhakti-mandakini* commentary as already mentioned. He wrote also a commentary on the *Śrī-kṛṣṇa-stava* of Nimbārka in twenty chapters called *Śruti-anta-sura-druma*, and also *Stotra-trayī*\(^2\). The discussions contained in the commentary are more or less of the same nature as those found in *Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra*, which has been already described in a separate section. The polemic therein is mainly directed against Śaṅkara *vedānta*. Puruṣottama also strongly criticizes Rāmānuja’s view in which the impure *cit* and *acit* are regarded as parts of Brahman possessed of the highest and noblest qualities, and suggests the impossibility of this. According to the Nimbārka school the individual selves are different from Brahman. Their identity is only in the remote sense inasmuch as the individual selves cannot have any separate existence apart from God. Puruṣottama also criticizes the dualists, the Madhvas. The dualistic texts have as much force as the identity texts, and therefore on the strength of the identity texts we have to admit that the world exists in Brahman, and on the strength of the duality texts we have to

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\(^1\) This Kesava Kāśmīrī Bhaṭṭa seems to be a very different person from the Kesava Kāśmīrī who is said to have had a discussion with Caitanya as described in the *Caitanya-caritāmṛta*.

\(^2\) The *Śrī-kṛṣṇa-stava* had another commentary on it called *Śruti-siddhānta-maṇijārta*, the writer of which is unknown.
admit that the world is different from Brahman. The real meaning of the view that God is the material cause of the world is that though everything springs from Him, yet the nature of God remains the same in spite of all His productions. The energy of God exists in God and though He produces everything by the diverse kinds of manifestations of His energies, He remains unchanged in His Self.

Puruṣottama makes reference to Devācārya’s Siddhanta-jāhnāvī, and therefore lived after him. According to Pandit Kiṣoradāsa’s introduction to Śrutya-anta-sura-druma, he was born in 1623 and was the son of Nārāyaṇa Śarmā. The present writer is unable to substantiate this view. According to Pandit Kiṣoradāsa he was a pupil of Dharmadevācārya.² Devācārya wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sūtras called the Siddhānta-jāhnāvī, on which Sundara Bhaṭṭa wrote a commentary called the Siddhānta-setukā.

A General Idea of Nimbārka’s Philosophy.

According to Nimbārka, the inquiry into the nature of Brahman can take place only after one has studied the literature that deals with the Vedic duties leading to various kinds of beneficial results and discovered that they are all vitiated by enjoyment and cannot bring about a state of eternal bliss. After such a discovery, and after the seeker has learnt in a general manner from the various religious texts that the realization of Brahman leads to the unchangeable, eternal and ever-constant state of bliss, he becomes anxious to attain it through the grace of God and approaches his teacher with affection and reverence for instruction regarding the


² Pandit Kiṣoradāsa contradicts himself in his introduction to Vedānta-mañjuśā and it seems that the dates he gives are of a more or less fanciful character. Pandit Kiṣoradāsa further says that Devācārya lived in A.D. 1055. This would place Nimbārka prior even to Rāmānuja, which seems very improbable.
nature of Brahman. The Brahman is Śrī Kṛṣṇa, who is omniscient, omnipotent, the ultimate cause, and the all-pervading Being. Such a Being can be realized only through a constant effort to permeate oneself with His nature by means of thought and devotion. The import of the first aphorism of the Brahma-sūtra consists in the imposition of such a duty on the devotee, namely, the constant effort at realizing the nature of Brahman¹. The pupil listens to the instruction of his teacher who has a direct realization of the nature of Brahman and whose words are therefore pregnant with his concrete experience. He tries to understand the import and meaning of the instruction of his teacher which is technically called śravaṇa. This is indeed different from the ordinary accepted meaning of the śravaṇa in the Śaṅkara literature where it is used in the sense of listening to the Upaniṣadic texts. The next step is called manana—the process of organizing one’s thought so as to facilitate a favourable mental approach towards the truths communicated by the teacher in order to rouse a growing faith in it. The third step is called nididhyāsana—the process of marshalling one’s inner psychical processes by constant meditation leading ultimately to a permanent conviction and experiences of the truths inspired and communicated by the teacher. It is the fruitful culmination of the last process that brings about the realization of the nature of Brahman. The study of the nature of the Vedic duties, technically called dharma, and their inefficacy, rouses a desire for the knowledge of the nature of Brahman leading to eternal bliss. As a means to that end the pupil approaches the teacher who has a direct experience of the nature of Brahman. The revelation of the nature of the Brahman in the pupil is possible through a process of spiritual communication of which śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana are the three moments.

According to Nimbārka’s philosophy which is a type of Bhedā-bhedā-vāda, that is, the theory of the Absolute as Unity-in-difference, Brahman or the Absolute has transformed itself into the world of matter and spirits. Just as the life-force or prāṇa manifests itself into the various conative and cognitive sense-functions, yet keeps its own independence, integrity and difference from them,

¹ As the nature of this duty is revealed through the text of the Brahma-sūtra, namely, that the Brahma-hood can be attained only by such a process of nididhyāsana, it is called the apārva-vidhi.
so the Brahman also manifests itself through the numberless spirits and matter without losing itself in them. Just as the spider spins out of its own self its web and yet remains independent of it, so the Brahman also has split itself up into the numberless spirits and matter but remains in its fullness and purity. The very existence and movement of the spirits and indeed all their operations are said to depend upon Brahman (tad-āyatata-sthiti-pūrvekā) in the sense that the Brahman is both the material and the determining cause of them all.

In the scriptures we hear of dualistic and monistic texts, and the only way in which the claims of both these types of texts can be reconciled is by coming to a position of compromise that the Brahman is at once different from and identical with the world of spirits and matter. The nature of Brahman is regarded as such that it is at once one with and different from the world of spirits and matter, not by any imposition or supposition, but as the specific peculiarity of its spiritual nature. It is on this account that this Bhedā-bheda doctrine is called the svābhāvi kā bhedā-bheda-vāda. In the pure dualistic interpretation of the Vedānta the Brahman is to be regarded only as the determining cause and as such the claims of all texts that speak of the Brahman as the material cause or of the ultimate identity of the spirits with the Brahman are to be disregarded. The monistic view of the Vedānta is also untenable, for a pure differenceless qualityless consciousness as the ultimate reality is not amenable to perception, since it is super-sensible, nor to inference, since it is devoid of any distinctive marks, nor also to scriptural testimony, as no words can signify it. The supposition that, just as one’s attention to the moon may be drawn in an indirect manner by perceiving the branch of a tree with which the moon may be in a line, so the nature of Brahman also may be expressed by demonstrating other concepts which are more or less contiguous or associated with it, is untenable; for in the above illustration the moon and the branch of the tree are both sensible objects, whereas Brahman is absolutely super-sensible. Again, if it is supposed that Brahman is amenable to logical proofs, then also this supposition would be false; for all that is amenable to proofs or subject to any demonstration is false. Further, if it is not amenable to any proof, the Brahman would be chimerical as the

1 Śrīnivāsa’s commentary on Nimbārka’s Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha on Brahma-sūtra, 1. 1. 1–3.
hare’s horn. If it is held that, Brahman being self-luminous, no proofs are required for its demonstration, then all the scriptural texts describing the nature of Brahman would be superfluous. Moreover, the pure qualityless Brahman being absolutely un-associated with any kind of impurity has to be regarded as being eternally free from any bondage, and thus all scriptural texts giving instruction in the methods for the attainment of salvation would be meaningless. The reply of the Sāṅkarites, that all duality though false has yet an appearance and serves practical purposes, is untenable; for when the scriptures speak of the destruction of bondage they mean that it was a real bondage and its dissolution is also a real one. Again, an illusion is possible in a locus only when it has some specific as well as some general characters, and the illusion takes place only when the object is known in a general manner without any of its specific attributes. But if the Brahman is absolutely qualityless, it is impossible that it should be the locus of any illusion. Again, since it is difficult to explain how the ajñāna should have any support or object (āśraya or viṣaya), the illusion itself becomes inexplicable. The Brahman being of the nature of pure knowledge can hardly be supposed to be the support or object of ajñāna. The jīva also being itself a product of ajñāna cannot be regarded as its support. Moreover, since Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination and ajñāna is darkness, the former cannot legitimately be regarded as the support of the latter, just as the sun cannot be regarded as the supporter of darkness.

The operation that results in the formation of illusion cannot be regarded as being due to the agency of ajñāna, for ajñāna is devoid of consciousness and cannot, therefore, be regarded as an agent. The agency cannot also be attributed to Brahman because it is pure and static. Again, the false appearance of Brahman as diverse undesirable phenomena such as a sinner, an animal, and the like, is inexplicable; for if the Brahman is always conscious and independent it cannot be admitted to allow itself to suffer through the undesirable states which one has to experience in various animal lives through rebirth. If the Brahman has no knowledge of such experiences, then it is to be regarded as ignorant and its claim to self-luminosity fails. Again, if ajñāna is regarded as an existent entity, there is the change to dualism, and if it is regarded as non-existent then it cannot hide the nature of Brahman. Further, if
Brahman is self-luminous, how can it be hidden and how can there be any illusion about it? If the conch-shell shines forth in its own nature, there cannot be any misperception of its nature as a piece of silver. Again, if the nature of Brahman is admitted to be hidden by ājñāna, the question that naturally arises is whether the ājñāna veils the nature of the Brahman as a whole or in part. The former supposition is impossible, for then the world would be absolutely blind and dark (jagad-āndhya-prasaṅgāt), and the latter is impossible, for the Brahman is a homogeneous entity and has no characters or parts. It is admitted by the monists to be absolutely qualityless and partless. If it is held that ordinarily only the "bliss" part of the Brahman is hidden by ājñāna whereas the "being" part remains unveiled, then that would mean that Brahman is divisible in parts and the falsity of the Brahman would be demonstrable by such inferences as: Brahman is false, because it has parts like the jug (brahma mithyā sāmśatvāt, ghaṭādivat).

In reply to the above objections it may be argued that the objections against ājñāna are inadmissible, for the ājñāna is absolutely false knowledge. Just as an owl perceives utter darkness, even in bright sunlight, so the intuitive perception "I am ignorant" is manifest to all. Anantarāma, a follower of the Nimbārka school, raises further objections against such a supposition in his Vedānta-tattva-bodha. He says that this intuitively felt "I" in "I am ignorant" cannot be pure knowledge, for pure knowledge cannot be felt as ignorant. It cannot be mere egoism, for then the experience would be "the egoism is ignorant." If by "ego" one means the pure self, then such a self cannot be experienced before emancipation. The ego-entity cannot be something different from both pure consciousness and ājñāna, for such an entity must doubtless be an effect of ājñāna which cannot exist before the association of the ājñāna with Brahman. The reply of the Śaṅkarites that ājñāna, being merely false imagination, cannot affect the nature of the Brahman, the abiding substratum (adhiṣṭhāna), is also inadmissible; for if the ājñāna be regarded as false imagination there must be someone who imagines it. But such an imagination cannot be attributed to either of the two possible entities, Brahman or the ājñāna; for the former is pure qualityless which cannot therefore imagine and the latter is inert and unconscious and therefore devoid of all imagination. It is also wrong to suppose that Brahman
as pure consciousness has no intrinsic opposition to ajñāna, for there can be no knowledge which is not opposed to ignorance. Therefore the Śaṅkarites are not in a position to demonstrate any entity which they mean by the intuition “I” in “I am ignorant.”

The final conclusion from the Nimbārka point of view therefore is that it is inadmissible to accept any ajñāna as a world-principle producing the world-appearance by working in co-operation with the Brahman. The ajñāna or ignorance is a quality of individual beings or selves who are by nature different from Brahman but are under its complete domination. They are eternal parts of it, atomic in nature, and are of limited powers. Being associated with beginningless chains of karma they are naturally largely blinded in their outlook on knowledge.

The Śaṅkarites affirm that, through habitual failure in distinguishing between the real nature of the self and the not-self, mis-perceptions, misapprehensions and illusions occur. The objection of Anantarāma against such an explanation is that such a failure cannot be attributed either to Brahman or to ajñāna. And since all other entities are but later products of illusion, they cannot be responsible for producing the illusion.

In his commentary Śaṅkara had said that the pure consciousness was not absolutely undemonstrable, since it was constantly being referred to by our ego-intuitions. To this the objection that naturally arises is that the entity referred to by our ego-intuitions cannot be pure consciousness; for then the pure consciousness would have the characteristic of an ego—a view which is favourable to the Nimbārka but absolutely unacceptable to the Śaṅkarites. If it is held to be illusory, then it has to be admitted that the ego-intuition appears when there is an illusion. But by supposition the illusion can only occur when there is an ego-intuition. Here is then a reasoning in a circle. The defence that reasoning in a circle can be avoided on the supposition that the illusory imposition is beginningless is also unavailing. For the supposition that illusions as such are beginningless is false, as it is well known that illusions

1 paramā-tma-bhūmo'lpā-aktis tad-adhīnah sanātanas tad-amśa-bhūto
2 adhyastattve tu adhyāse sati bhāsamānatvam, tasmin sati sa ity anyonyā-
are possible only through the operation of the subconscious impressions of previous valid cognitions. Again, the reflection of the pure consciousness in the ajñāna is impossible, for reflections can take place only between two entities which have the same order of existence. From other considerations also the illusion has to be regarded as illegitimate. Illusions take place as the result of certain physical conditions such as contact, defect of the organs of perception, the operation of the subconscious impressions, etc. These conditions are all absent in the supposed case of the illusion involved in the ego-intuition.

The Śaṅkarites described māyā as indefinable. By "indefinable" they mean something that appears in perception but is ultimately contradicted. The Śankarites define falsehood or non-existence as that which is liable to contradiction. The phenomena of māyā appear in experience and are therefore regarded as existent. They are liable to contradiction and are therefore regarded as non-existent. It is this unity of existence and non-existence in māyā that constitutes its indefinability. To this Anantārāma's objection is that contradiction does not imply non-existence. As a particular object, say a jug, may be destroyed by the stroke of a club, so one knowledge can destroy another. The destruction of the jug by the stroke of the club does not involve the supposition that the jug was non-existent. So the contradiction of the prior knowledge by a later one does not involve the non-existence or falsity of the former. All cognitions are true in themselves, though some of them may destroy another. This is what the Nimbārkists mean by the sat-khyāti of knowledge. The theory of sat-khyāti with them means that all knowledge (khyāti) is produced by some existent objects, which are to be regarded as its cause (sad-dhetukā khyāti, sat-khyāti). According to such a view, therefore, the illusory knowledge must have its basic cause in some existent object. It is wrong also to suppose that false or non-existent objects can produce effects on the analogy that the illusory cobra may produce fear and even death. For here it is not the illusory cobra that produces fear but the memory of a true snake. It is wrong therefore to suppose that the illusory world-appearance may be the cause of our bondage.

Since illusions are not possible, it is idle to suppose that all our

perceptual, inferential, and other kinds of cognitions are produced as associated with an ego through sheer illusion. Right knowledge is to be regarded as a characteristic quality of the self and the production of knowledge does not need the intervention of a vṛtti. The ajñāna which prevents the flashing in of knowledge is our karma which is in accumulation from beginningless time. Through the operation of the sense-organs our selves expand outside us and are filled with the cognition of the sense-objects. It is for this reason that when the sense-organs are not in operation the sense-objects do not appear in cognition, as in the state of sleep. The self is thus a real knower (jñātā) and a real agent (kartā), and its experiences as a knower and as an agent should on no account be regarded as the result of a process of illusion\(^1\).

The self is of the nature of pure consciousness, but it should yet be regarded as the real knower. The objection that what is knowledge cannot behave in a different aspect as a knower, just as water cannot be mixed with water and yet remain distinct from it, is regarded by the Nimbārkists as invalid. As an illustration vindicating the Nimbārka position, Puruṣottama, in his Vedāntaratna-maṇjuśā, refers to the case of the sun which is both light and that from which light emanates. Even when a drop of water is mixed with another drop the distinction of the drops, both quantitative and qualitative, remains, though it may not be so apprehended. The mere non-apprehension of difference is no proof that the two drops have merged into identity. On the other hand, since the second drop has its parts distinct from the first one it must be regarded as having a separate existence, even when the two drops are mixed. The character as knower must be attributed to the self; for the other scheme proposed by the Śaṅkarites, that the character as knower is due to the reflection of the pure consciousness in the vṛtti, is inefficacious. The sun that is reflected in water as an image cannot be regarded as a glowing orb by itself. Moreover, reflection can only take place between two visible objects; neither pure consciousness nor the antahkaraṇa-vṛtti can be regarded as visible objects justifying the assumption of reflection.

The ego-intuition refers directly to the self and there is no illusion about it. The ego-intuition thus appears to be a continuous revelation of the nature of the self. After deep dreamless sleep one

\(^1\) Vedānta-tattva-bodha, p. 20.
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The experience “I did not know myself” refers to the absence of the intuition of the body and the mental psychosis, but it does not indicate that the self-conscious self had ever ceased to shine by itself. The negation involved in the denial of the perception of one’s self during dreamless sleep refers to the negation of certain associations (say, of the body, etc.) with which the ego ordinarily links itself. Similar experience of negation can also be illustrated in such expressions as “I was not so long in the room,” “I did not live at that time,” etc., where negations refer to the associations of the ego and not to the ego. The self is not only to be regarded as expressed in the ego-intuition, but it is also to be regarded as distinct from the knowledge it has. The perception of the self continues not only in the state of dreamless sleep but also in the state of emancipation, and even God in His absolute freedom is conscious of Himself in His super-ego intuition. He is also all-Merciful, the supreme Instructor, and the presiding deity of all our understanding. Like individual selves God is also the agent, the creator of the universe. If the Brahman were not an agent by nature, then He could not have been the creator of the universe, even with the association of the māyā conditions. Unlike Brahman the activity of the individual souls has to depend upon the operation of the conative organs for its manifestation. The self also really experiences the feelings of pleasure and pain. The existence and agency of the human souls, however, ultimately depend on the will of God. Yet there is no reason to suppose that God is partial or cruel because He makes some suffer and others enjoy; for He is like the grand master and Lord who directs different men differently and awards suffering and enjoyment according to their individual deserts. The whole idea is that though God awards suffering and enjoyment to individuals and directs their actions according to their deserts, He is not ultimately bound by the law of karma, and may by His grace at any time free them from their bondage. The law of karma is a mechanical law and God as the superintendent decides each individual case. He is thus the dispenser of the laws of karma but is not bound by it. The human souls are a part of the

nature of God and as such are dependent on Him for their essence, existence, and activities (tad-āyatta-svarūpa-sthiti-pūrvikāh). God being the ultimate truth, both the human souls and inanimate nature attain their essence and existence by virtue of the fact that they are parts of Him and participate in His nature. They are therefore entirely dependent on Him for their existence and all their operations.

The individual souls are infinite in number and atomic in size. But though atomic in size they can at the same time cognize the various sensations in various parts of the body through all-pervading knowledge which exists in them as their attribute. Though atomic and partless in their nature, they are completely pervaded by God through His all-pervading nature. The atomic souls are associated with the beginningless girdle of karma which is the cause of the body, and are yet through the grace of God finally emancipated when their doubts are dissolved by listening to the instructions of the śāstras from the teachers, and by entering into a deep meditation regarding the true essence of God by which they are ultimately merged in Him. God is absolutely free in extending His mercy and grace. But it so happens that He actually extends them to those who deserve them by their good deeds and devotion. God in His transcendence is beyond His three natures as souls, the world and even as God. In this His pure and transcendent nature He is absolutely unaffected by any changes, and He is the unity of pure being, bliss and consciousness. In His nature as God He realizes His own infinite joy through the infinite souls which are but constituent parts of Him. The experiences of individuals are therefore contained in Him as constituents of Him because it is by His own ikṣaṇa or self-perceiving activity that the experiences of the individual selves can be accounted for. The existence and the process of all human experience are therefore contained and controlled by Him. The individual selves are thus in one sense different from Him and in another sense but constituent parts of Him. In Bāskara's philosophy the emphasis was on the aspect of unity, since the differences were due to conditions (upādhi). But though Nimbrarka's system is to be counted as a type of Bhedā-bheda or Dvaitā-dvaita theory, the emphasis here is not merely on the part of the unity but on the difference as well. As a part cannot be different from the whole, so the individual souls can never be dif-
ferent from God. But, in the state of bondage the individuals are apt to forget their aspects of unity with God and feel themselves independent in all their actions and experiences. When by absolute self-abnegation springing from love the individual feels himself to be absolutely controlled and regulated by God and realizes himself to be a constituent of Him, he loses all his interests in his actions and is not affected by them. The ultimate ideal, therefore, is to realize the relation with God, to abnegate all actions, desires and motives, and to feel oneself as a constituent of Him. Such a being never again comes within the grasp of mundane bondage and lives in eternal bliss in his devotional contemplation of God. The devotee in the state of his emancipation feels himself to be one with God and abides in Him as a part of His energy (tat-tādātmyā-nubha-va-pūrvakaṁ viśvarūpe bhagavati tac-chaktyā-tmanā avasthānam).

Thus, even in the state of emancipation, there is a difference between the emancipated beings and God, though in this state they are filled with the utmost bliss. With the true realization of the nature of God and one’s relation with Him, all the three kinds of karma (sañcita, kriyamāna and ārabdha) are destroyed. Avidyā in this system means ignorance of one’s true nature and relationship with God which is the cause of his karma and his association with the body, senses and the subtle matter. The prārabdha karma, or the karma which is in a state of fructification, may persist through the present life or through other lives if necessary, for until their fruits are reaped the bodiless emancipation cannot be attained.

Sainthood consists in the devotional state consisting of a continual and unflinching meditation on the nature of God (dhyāna-paripākena dhriva-smṛti-para-bhakti-ākhya-jñāna-dhiγame). Such a saint becomes free from the tainting influence of all deeds committed and collected before and all good or bad actions that may be performed later on (tatra uttara-bhāvinah kriyamānasya pāpasya āśleṣah tat-prāg-bhūtasya sañcitasyatasyanāsah. Vedānta-kuṣṭhā-prabhā, tv. 1. 13). The regular caste duties and the duties of the various stages of life help the rise of wisdom and ought therefore always to be performed, even when the wisdom has arisen; for the flame of

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1 Para-paṣa-giri-tujra, p. 591.
2 Ibid. p. 598.
3 Ibid.
4 viduṣo vidyā-māhātmyāt sañcita-kriyamānasyayor āśleṣa-vināśau, prārabdhasya tu karmano bhogena vināśaḥ, tatra prārabdhasya etac charitreṇa itara-sarirair vā bhuktva vināśaṁ-mokṣa iti samkṣepaḥ. Ibid. p. 583.
this light has always to be kept burning (tasmāt vidyō-dayāya svā-
śrama-karmā-ghnihotā-di-rūpaṁ grasthena, tapo-jāpā-dīni karmāṇi
ārdhva-retobhir anuṣṭheyāni iti siddham). But the conglomeration
of deeds which has started fructifying must fructify and the results of
such deeds have to be reaped by the saint either in one life or in many
lives as the case may be. The realization of Brahma consists in the
unflinching meditation on the nature of God and the participation
in Him as His constituent which is the same thing as the establish-
ment of a continuous devotional relationship with Him. This is in-
dependent of the ontological fusion and return in Him which may
happen as a result of the complete destruction of the fructifying
deeds (prārabdhā karma) through their experiences in the life of the
saint (vidyā-yoni-śarīra) or in other lives that may follow. A saint,
after the exhaustion of his fructifying deeds, leaves his gross body
through the susumna nerve in his subtle body, and going beyond
the material regions (prākṛta-mandala) reaches the border region—
the river virajā—between the material regions and the universe of
Viṣṇu. Here he leaves aside his subtle body in the supreme being
and enters into the transcendent essence of God (Vedānta-
kaustubha-prabhā, iv. 2. 15). The emancipated beings thus exist in
God as His distinct energies and may again be employed by Him
for His own purposes. Such emancipated beings, however, are
never sent down by God for carrying on an earthly existence.
Though the emancipated beings become one with God, they have
no control over the affairs of the world, which are managed entirely
by God Himself.

Though it is through the will of God that we enjoy the dream
experiences and though He remains the controller and abides in us
through all stages of our experiences, yet He is never tainted by the
imperfections of our experiential existence (Vedānta-kaustubha and
its commentary Prabha, III. 2. 11). The objects of our experiences
are not in themselves pleasurable or painful, but God makes them
so to us in accordance with the reward and punishment due to us
according to our good or bad deeds. In themselves the objects are

\[1\] para-loka-gamane dehād utsarpak-samaye eva viṇḍuṣah punya-pāpe nira-
vaśeṣam kuṣṭaye, . . . vidyā hi sva-sāmarthyād eva sva-phala-bhūta-brahma-prāpti-
pratipādanāya . . . eva sva-yānena ātma-ganayitum sūkṣma-sartraṁ sthāpayati.
\[2\] muktasya tu para-brahma-sādharmye'pi nikhila-cetanā-cetana-patitva-
tan-miyantarvā-tad-vidhārakatva-sarva-gatavā-dy-asambhavāt jagad-vyāpāra-
varjam aśiṣvaram. Ibid. iv. 4. 20.
but indifferent entities and are neither pleasurable nor painful (Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, III. 2. 12). The relation of God and the world is like that of a snake and its coiled existence. The coiled (kundala) condition of a snake is neither different from it nor absolutely identical with it. So God’s relation with the individuals also is like that of a lamp and its light (prabhā-tadvator iva) or like the sun and the illumination (prakāśa). God remains unchanged in Himself and only undergoes transformation through His energies as conscious (cic-chakti) and unconscious (acic-chakti). As the individuals cannot have any existence apart from Brahman, so the material world also cannot have any existence apart from Him. It is in this sense that the material world is a part or constituent of God and is regarded as being one with God. But as the nature of the material world is different from the nature of God, it is regarded as different from Him.

The Vedic duties of caste and stages of life are to be performed for the production of the desire of wisdom (vividīṣā), but once the true wisdom is produced there is no further need of the performance of the duties (Ibid. III. 4. 9). The wise man is never affected by the deeds that he performs. But though ordinarily the performance of the duties is helpful to the attainment of wisdom, this is not indispensable, and there are many who achieve wisdom without going through the customary path of caste duties and the duties attached to stages of life.

Controversy with the Monists by Mādhava Mukunda.

(a) The Main Thesis and the Ultimate End in Advaita Vedānta are Untenable.

Mādhava Mukunda, supposed to be a native of the village of Arunaghaṭi, Bengal, wrote a work called Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra or Hārda-saṅcaya, in which he tried to show from various points of


view the futility of the monistic interpretation of Vedānta by Śaṅkara and his followers.

He says that the Śaṅkarites are interested in demonstrating the identity of the individuals with Brahman (jīva-brahma-kya) and this forms the principal subject-matter of all their discussions. This identity may be illusory or not. In the former case duality or plurality would be real, and in the latter case, i.e. if identity be real, then the duality presupposed in the identification must also be real. It is not the case of the single point of an identity that Śaṅkarites are interested in, but in the demonstration of an identification of the individuals with Brahman. The demonstration of identity necessarily implies the reality of the negation of the duality. If such a negation is false, the identification must also be false, for it is on the reality of the negation that the reality of the identification depends. If the negation of duality be real, then the duality must also be real in some sense and the identification can imply the reality of the negation only in some particular aspect.

The objections levelled by the Śaṅkarites against the admission of “duality” or “difference” as a category are, firstly, that the category of difference (bheda) being by nature a relation involves two poles and hence it cannot be identical in nature with its locus in which it is supposed to subsist (bhedaṣya na adhikaraṇa-svarū-patvam). Secondly, that if “difference” is different in nature from its locus, then a second grade of “difference” has to be introduced and this would imply another grade of difference and so on ad infinitum. Thus we have a vicious infinite. To the first objection, the reply is that “difference” is not relational in nature with this or that individual locus, but with the concept of the locus as such (bhūtalatvā-dinā nir apeksatve’pi adhikaraṇātmakatvena sāpeksatve kṣater abhāvāt). The charge of vicious infinite by the introduction of differences of differences is invalid, for all differences are identical in nature with their locus. So in the case of a series of differences the nature of each difference becomes well defined and the viciousness of the infinite series vanishes. In the instance “there is a jug on the ground” the nature of the difference of the jug is jugness, whereas in the case of the difference of the difference, the second order of

difference has a separate specification as a special order of differenceness. Moreover, since difference reveals only the particular modes of the objects, these difficulties cannot arise. In perceiving difference we do not perceive difference as an entity different from the two objects between which it is supposed to subsist\(^1\). One might equally well find such a fault of mutual dependence on the identification of Brahman with \(jīva\), since it depends upon the identification of the \(jīva\) with the Brahman.

A further discussion of the subject shows that there cannot be any objections against “differences” on the score of their being produced, for they merely subsist and are not produced; or on the possibility of their being known, for if differences were never perceived the Śaṅkarites would not have been so anxious to remove the so-called illusions or mis-perception of differences, or to mis-spend their energies in trying to demonstrate that Brahman was different from all that was false, material and the like; and the saint also would not be able to distinguish between what was eternal and transitory. Again, it is held that there is a knowledge which contradicts the notion of difference. But if this knowledge itself involves difference it cannot contradict it. Whatever may signify anything must do so by restricting its signification to it, and all such restriction involves difference. Even the comprehension that demonstrates the illusoriness of “difference” (e.g. this is not difference, or there is no difference here, etc.) proves the existence of “difference.” Moreover, a question may be raised as to whether the notion that contradicts difference is itself comprehended as different from difference or not. In the former case the validity of the notion leaves “difference” unmolested and in the second case, i.e. if it is not comprehended as different from “difference,” it becomes identical with it and cannot contradict it.

If it is contended that in the above procedure an attempt has been made to establish the category of difference only in indirect manner and that nothing has been directly said in explanation of the concept of difference, the reply is that those who have sought to explain the concept of unity have fared no better. If it is urged that if ultimately the absolute unity or identity is not accepted then

that would lead us to nihilism, then it may also be urged with the same force that, differences being but modes of the objects themselves, a denial of difference would mean the denial of the objects, and this would also land us in nihilism. It must, however, be noted that though difference is but a mode of the objects which differ, yet the terms of reference by which difference becomes intelligible (the table is different from the chair: here the difference of the table is but its mode, though it becomes intelligible by its difference from the chair) are by no means constituents of the objects in which the difference exists as their mode. The Śaṅkarites believe in the refutation of dualism, as by such a refutation the unity is established. The thesis of unity is thus though, on the one hand dependent upon such refutation and yet on the other hand identical with it because all such refutations are believed to be imaginary. In the same manner it may be urged that the demonstration of difference involves with it a reference to other terms, but is yet identical in nature with the object of which it is a mode; the reference to the terms is necessary only for purposes of comprehension.

It must, however, be noted that since difference is but a mode of the object the comprehension of the latter necessarily means the comprehension of all differences existing in it. An object may be known in a particular manner, yet it may remain unknown in its differential aspects, just as the monists hold that pure consciousness is always flashing forth but yet its aspect as the unity of all things may remain unknown. In comprehending a difference between any two objects, no logical priority which could have led to a vicious circle is demanded. But the two are together taken in consciousness and the apprehension of the one is felt as its distinction from the other. The same sort of distinction has to be adduced by the monists also in explaining the comprehension of the identity of the individual souls with the Brahman, otherwise in their case too there would have been the charge of a vicious circle. For when one says “these two are not different,” their duality and difference depend upon a comprehension of their difference which, while present, prevents their identity from being established. If it is held that the duality is imaginary whereas the identity is real, then the two being of a different order of existence the contradiction of the one cannot lead to the affirmation of the other. The apology that in comprehending identity no two-term reference is needed is futile, for an
identity is comprehended only as the negation of the two-term duality.

Thus, from the above considerations, the main thesis of the Śaṅkarites, that all things are identical with Brahman, falls to the ground.

According to Nimbārka the ideal of emancipation is participation in God's nature (tad-bhāvā-patti). This is the ultimate end and summum bonum of life (prayojana). According to the Śaṅkarites emancipation consists in the ultimate oneness or identity existing between individual souls and Brahman. The Brahman in reality is one with the individual souls, and the apparent difference noticed in our ordinary practical life is due to misconception and ignorance, which impose upon us a false notion of duality. Mādhava Mukunda urges that in such a view, since the individual souls are already one with Brahman, they have nothing to strive for. There is thus really no actual end (prayojana) as the goal of our strivings. Mādhava Mukunda, in attempting to emphasize the futility of the Śaṅkarite position, says that, if the ultimate consciousness be regarded as one, then it would be speckled with the various experiences of individuals. It cannot be held to be appearing as different in accordance with the variety of conditions through which it appears, for in our experiences we find that though through our various cognitive organs we have various experiences they are also emphasized as belonging to one being. Variability of conditions does not necessarily imply a variety of the units of experience of individual beings, as is maintained by the Śaṅkarites. The pure and ubiquitous differenceless consciousness (nirviśeṣa-caitanya) cannot also be regarded as capable of being identified as one with the plurality of minds (antahkaraṇa). Again, it is admitted by the Śaṅkarites that in dreamless sleep the mind is dissolved. If that were so and if pure consciousness is regarded as being capable of manifesting itself through false identification with minds, there would be no explanation of the continuity of consciousness from day to day in the form of memory. It cannot be urged that such a continuity is maintained by the fact that minds exist in a state of potency (samskāra-tmanā vasthitasya) in the deep dreamless sleep; for the mind in a potent state cannot be regarded as carrying impressions and memories, since in that case there would be memories even in dreamless sleep.
Further, if the experiences are supposed to belong to the states of ignorance, then emancipation, which refers only to pure consciousness, would refer to an entity different from that which was suffering from bondage. On the other hand, if the experiences belong to pure consciousness, then emancipation will be associated with diverse contradictory experiences at the same time according to the diversity of experiences.

The Śaṅkarites may urge that the conditions which bring about the experiences are associated with pure consciousness and hence in an indirect manner there is a continuity of the being that experiences and attains salvation. To this the reply is that the experiencing of sorrow is a sufficient description of the conditions. That being so, where the experiencing of sorrow does not exist, the conditions, of which it is a sufficient description, also do not exist. Thus, the discontinuity of the entities which suffer bondage and attain emancipation remains the same.

Again, since it is held that the conditions subsist in the pure consciousness, it may well be asked whether emancipation means the dissolution of one condition or many conditions. In the former case we should have emancipation always, for one or other of the conditions is being dissolved every moment, and in the latter case we might not have any emancipation at all, for all the conditions determining the experiences of infinite individuals can never be dissolved.

It may also be asked whether the conditions are associated with the pure consciousness in part or in whole. In the first alternative there would be a vicious infinite and in the second the differentiation of the pure consciousness in various units would be inadmissible.

Moreover, it may be asked whether conditions are associated with pure consciousness conditionally or unconditionally. In the former alternative there would be a vicious infinite and in the second case there would be no chance of emancipation. The theory of reflection cannot also explain the situation, for reflection is admitted only when the reflected image has the same order of existence as the object. The avidyā has a different order of existence from Brahman, and thus reflection of Brahman in avidyā cannot be justified. Again, in reflection that which is reflected and that in which the reflection takes place must be in two different places,
whereas in the case of avidyā and Brahman the former is supposed to have Brahman as its support. The conditions (upādhi) cannot occupy a part of Brahman, for Brahman has no parts; nor can they occupy the whole of it, for in that case there will be no reflection.

In the Nimbārka system both the monistic and the dualistic texts have their full scope, the dualistic texts in demonstrating the difference that exists between souls and God, and the monistic texts showing the final goal in which the individuals realize themselves as constituents of Him and as such one with Him. But in the Śaṅkara system, where no duality is admitted, everything is self-realized, there is nothing to be attained and even the process of instruction of the disciple by the preceptor is unavailable, as they are all but adumbrations of ignorance.

(b) Refutation of the Śaṅkara Theory of Illusion in its various Aspects.

The Śaṅkarite doctrine of illusion involves a supposition that the basis of illusion (adhiṣṭhāna) is imperfectly or partly known. The illusion consists in the imposition of certain appearances upon the unknown part. The stump of a tree is perceived in part as an elongated thing but not in the other part as the stump of a tree, and it is in reference to this part that the mis-attribute of an illusory appearance, e.g. a man, is possible by virtue of which the elongated part is perceived as man. But Brahman is partless and no division of its part is conceivable. It must therefore be wholly known or wholly unknown, and hence there can be no illusion regarding it. Again, illusion implies that an illusory appearance has to be imposed upon an object. But the avidyā, which is beginningless, cannot itself be supposed to be an illusory appearance. Following the analogy of beginninglessness Brahman may be regarded as illusory. The reply that Brahman being the basis cannot be illusory is meaningless; for though the basis is regarded as the ground of the imposition, there is no necessary implication that the basis must also be true. The objection that the basis has an independent reality because it is the basis associated with ignorance which can become the datum of illusion is futile; because the basis may also be an unreal one in a serial process where at each stage it is associated with ignorance. In such a view it is not the pure Brahman which becomes the basis but the illusory Brahman which is associated with
ignorance. Moreover, if the *avidyā* and its modifications were absolutely non-existent they could not be the subject of imposition. What really exists somewhere may be imposed elsewhere, but not that which does not exist at all. The pure chimericals like the hare's horn can never be the subjects of imposition, for that which is absolutely non-existent cannot appear at all.

Again, illusions are supposed to happen through the operation of impressions (*samskāra*), but in the beginningless cosmic illusion the impressions must also be beginningless and co-existent with the basis (*adhisthāna*) and therefore real. The impressions must exist prior to the illusion and as such they cannot themselves be illusory, and if they are not illusory they must be real. Again, the impressions cannot belong to Brahma, for then it could not be qualityless and pure; they cannot belong to individual souls, for these are produced as a result of illusory impositions which are again the products of the operation of impressions. Further, similarity plays an important part in all illusions, but Brahma as the ground or basis which is absolutely pure and qualityless has no similarity with anything. There cannot also be any imaginary similarity imposed upon the qualityless Brahma, for such an imaginary imposition presupposes a prior illusion. Again, all illusions are seen to have a beginning, whereas entities that are not illusory, such as the individual souls, are found to be beginningless. It is also erroneous to hold that the ego-substratum behaves as the basis of the illusion, for it is itself a product of the illusion.

Furthermore, the supposition that the world-appearance is a cosmic illusion which is related to pure consciousness in an illusory relation (*ādhyāsika-sambandha*) is unwarrantable. But the Śaṅkarites admit that the relation between the external world and the knower is brought about by the operation of the mind in modification, called *vrtti*. Moreover, if the pure consciousness be admitted to be right knowledge or *pramāṇa*, then its object or that which shines with it must also be right knowledge and as such it cannot be the basis of false knowledge. If the pure consciousness be false knowledge, it cannot obviously be the basis of false knowledge. The mere fact that some of the known relations, such as contact, inseparable inherence, do not hold between the object of knowledge and knowledge does not prove that their relation must be an illusory one, for other kinds of relations may subsist between them.
the-known may itself be regarded as a unique kind of relation. It is also wrong to suppose that all relations are false because they are constituents of the false universe, for the universe is supposed to be false because the relations are false, and hence there would be a vicious infinite. Again, the objection that, if relations are admitted to establish connection between two relata, then further relations may be necessary to relate the relation to relata and that this would lead to a vicious infinite, and also that, if relations are identical in essence with the relata, then relations become useless, is futile. The same objections would be admissible in the case of illusory relations. If it is held that, since all relations are illusory, the above strictures do not apply, then it may be pointed out that if the order of the relations be subverted, then, instead of conceiving the jug to be a product of māyā, māyā may be taken as a product of the jug. Thus, not only the Śaṅkarites but even the Buddhists have to admit the orderly character of relations. In the Nimbārka view all relations are regarded as true, being the different modes of the manifestation of the energy of God. Even if the relations be denied, then the nature of Brahman cannot be described as this or that.

(c) Refutation of the Śaṅkarite View of Ajñāna.

Ajñāna is defined as a beginningless positive entity which is destructible by knowledge (anādi-bhāvatve sati jñāna-nivartyatvam). The definition is unavailing as it does not apply to ignorance that hides an ordinary object before it is perceived. Nor does ajñāna apply to the ignorance regarding the negation of an object, since it is of a positive nature. Again, in the case of the ignorance that abides in the saint who has attained the knowledge of Brahman, the ajñāna is seen to persist even though knowledge has been attained; hence the definition of ajñāna as that which is destructible by knowledge fails. In the case of the perception of red colour in the crystal through reflection, the ignorant perception of the white crystal as red persists even though it is known to be false and due to reflection. Here also the ignorance is not removed by knowledge. It is also wrong to suppose that ajñāna, which is but the product of defect, should be regarded as beginningless. Moreover, it may be pointed out that all things (excluding negation) that are beginningless are also eternal like the souls and it is a curious assumption that
there should be an entity called \textit{ajñāna} which is beginningless and yet destructible. Again, \textit{ajñāna} is often described as being different both from being and non-being, but has yet been defined as a positive entity. It is also difficult to imagine how, since negative entities are regarded as products of \textit{ajñāna}, \textit{ajñāna} may itself be regarded as a positive entity. Moreover, the error or illusion that takes place through absence of knowledge has to be admitted as a negative entity; but being an illusion it has to be regarded as a product of \textit{ajñāna}.

There is no proof of the existence of \textit{ajñāna} in the so-called perception “I am ignorant.” It cannot be the pure Brahman, for then that would have to be styled impure. It cannot be a positive knowledge by itself, for that is the very point which has to be proved. Further, if in establishing \textit{ajñāna} (ignorance) one has to fall back upon \textit{jñāna} or knowledge, and if in establishing the latter one has to fall back upon the former, then that would involve a vicious circle. It cannot be the ego-substratum (\textit{aham-artha}), for that is itself a product of \textit{ajñāna} and cannot be in existence as the datum of the perception of \textit{ajñāna}. The ego itself cannot be perceived as ignorant, for it is itself a product of ignorance. The ego is never regarded as synonymous with ignorance, and thus there is no means of proving the supposition that ignorance is perceived as a positive entity either as a quality or as a substance. Ignorance is thus nothing but “absence of knowledge” (\textit{jñāna-bhāva}) and ought to be recognized by the Śaṅkarites, since they have to admit the validity of the experience “I do not know what you say” which is evidently nothing but a reference to the absence of knowledge which is admitted by the Śaṅkarites in other cases. There is no proof that the cases in point are in any way different from such cases of absence of knowledge. Again, if the \textit{ajñāna} is regarded as hiding an object, then in the case of mediate knowledge (\textit{parokṣa-vṛtti}—where according to the Śaṅkarites the \textit{vṛtti} or the mental state does not remove the veil of \textit{ajñāna}) one ought to feel that one is ignorant of the object of one’s mediate knowledge, for the veil of \textit{ajñāna} remains here intact\textsuperscript{1}. Moreover, all cases of the supposed perception of ignorance can be explained as the comprehension of the absence of knowledge. In the above manner Mukunda criti-

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1} \textit{parokṣa-vṛtti viṣayā-varakā-jñāna-nivartakatvena parokṣato jñāte'pi na jñānām'ty amubhava-pātāc ca. Para-paśa-giri-vajra, p. 76.}
\end{footnotesize}
The Nimbārka School of Philosophy

The Nimbarka School of Philosophy criticizes the theories of ajñāna and of the illusion in their various aspects. But as the method of the dialectic followed in these logical refutations is substantially the same as that attempted by Venkata-nātha and Vyāsatīrtha which have been examined in detail it is not necessary to give a detailed study of Mukunda's treatment.

The Pramāṇas according to Mādhava Mukunda.

The followers of Nimbārka admit only three (perception, inference and testimony) out of the following eight pramāṇas, viz. perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), similarity (upamāna), scriptural testimony (śabda), implication (arthāpatī), non-perception (anupalabdhi), inclusion of the lower within the higher as of ten within a hundred (sambhava), and tradition (aītihya). Perception is of two kinds, external and internal. The external perception is of five kinds according to the five cognitive senses. The mental perception called also the internal perception is of two kinds, ordinary (laukika) and transcendent (alaukika). The perception of pleasure and pain is a case of ordinary internal perception, whereas the perception of the nature of self, God and their qualities is a case of transcendent internal perception. This transcendent internal perception is again of two kinds, that which flashes forth through the meditation of an entity and that which comes out of meditation on the essence of a scriptural text. The scriptural reference that the ultimate truth cannot be perceived by the mind means either that the ultimate truth in its entirety cannot be perceived by the mind or that unless the mind is duly trained by a teacher or by the formation of right tendencies it cannot have a glimpse of the transcendent realities. Knowledge is a beginningless, eternal and all-pervasive characteristic of individual selves. But in our state of bondage this knowledge is like the rays of a lamp in a closed place, in a state of contraction. Just as the rays of a lamp enclosed within a jug may go out through the hole into the room and straight through the door of the room and flood with light some object outside, so the knowledge in each individual may by the modification of the mind reach the senses and again through their modification reach the object and, having flood-lit it, may illuminate both the object and the knowledge. The ajñāna (ignorance) that ceases with the knowledge of an object is the partial cessation of a state of contraction.
leading to the flashing of knowledge. What is meant by the phrase "knowledge has an object" is that knowledge takes a particular form and illuminates it. The objects remain as they are, but they are manifested through their association with knowledge and remain unmanifested without it. In the case of internal perception the operation of the senses is not required, and so pleasure and pain are directly perceived by the mind. In self-consciousness or the perception of the self, the self being itself self-luminous, the mental directions to the self remove the state of contraction and reveal the nature of the self. So God can be realized through His grace and the removal of obstruction through the meditative condition of the mind.1

In inference the knowledge of the existence of the hetu (reason) in the minor (pakṣa) having a concomitance (vyāpti) with the probandum (śādhyā), otherwise called parāmarśa (vahni-vyāpyadhūmavān ayam evam-rūpah), is regarded as the inferential process (anumāṇa) and from it comes the inference (e.g. "the hill is fiery"). Two kinds of inference, i.e. for the conviction of one's own self (svārthānumāṇa) and for convincing others (parārthānumāṇa), are admitted here; and in the latter case only three propositions (the thesis, pratiṣṭā, the reason, hetu, and the instance, udāharaṇa) are regarded as necessary. Three kinds of inference are admitted, namely kevalā-nvayi (argument from only positive instances, where negative instances are not available), kevala-vyatireki (argument from purely negative instances, where positive instances are not available), and anvaya-vyatireki (argument from both sets of positive and negative instances). In addition to the well-known concomitance (vyāpti) arising from the above three ways, scriptural assertions are also regarded as cases of concomitance. Thus there is a scriptural passage to the following effect: The self is indestructible and it is never-divested of its essential qualities (avānātī vā are ātma an-ucchitti-dharmā), and this is regarded as a vyāpti or concomitance, from which one may infer the indestructibility of the soul like the Brahman.2 There are no other specially interesting features in the Nimbārka doctrine of inference.

Knowledge of similarity is regarded as being due to a separate pramāṇa called upamāṇa. Such a comprehension of similarity (sādṛṣya) may be due to perception or through a scriptural assertion

of similarity. Thus a man may perceive the similarity of the face to the moon or he may learn from the scriptures that the self and God are similar in nature and thus comprehend such similarity. This may be included within the proposition of instance or illustration in an inference (upamāṇasya dṛṣṭānta-mātrā-ika-vigraha-tvenā'numānā-vaṭaye udāharaṇe antarbhāvaḥ. Para-paṅgṣa-girī-vajra, p. 254).

That from which there is a communication of the negation or non-existence of anything is regarded as the pramāṇa or anupalabdhi. It is of four kinds: firstly, the negation that precedes a production, called prāg-abhāva; secondly, the negation of one entity in another, i.e. the negation as "otherness," called anyonyā-bhāva; thirdly, the negation as the destruction of an entity, called dvamśābhāva; fourthly, the negation of an entity in all times (kālatraye'pi nasti ti pratīti-viśayaḥ atyantā-bhāvaḥ). But it is unnecessary to admit abhāva or anupalabdhi as a separate pramāṇa, for according to the Nimbārkas negation is not admitted as a separate category. The perception of negation is nothing but the perception of the locus of the object of negation as unassociated with it. The negation-precedent (prāg-abhāva) of a jug is nothing but the lump of clay; the negation of destruction of a jug is nothing but the broken fragments of a jug; the negation of otherness (anyonyā-bhāva) is the entity that is perceived as the other of an another, and the negation existent in all times is nothing but the locus of a negation. Thus the pramāṇa of negation may best be included with perception. The pramāṇa of implication may well be taken as a species of inference. The pramāṇa of sambhava may well be regarded as a deductive piece of reasoning.

The Nimbārkas admit the self-validity of the pramāṇas (svatah-prāmāṇya) in the manner of the Śaṅkarites. Self-validity (svatavsta) is defined as the fact that in the absence of any defect an assemblage forming the data of cognition produces a cognition that represents its nature as it is (doṣā-bhāvate yāvat-scā-śraya-bhūta-pramāgrāhaka-sāmagri-mātrā-grāhyatvam)1. Just as the eye when it perceives a coloured object perceives also the colours and forms associated with it, so it takes with the cognition of an object also the validity of such a cognition.

The nature of God can, however, be expressed only by the

1 Para-paṅga-girī-vajra, p. 253.
scriptural texts, as the signifying powers of these texts directly originate from God. Indeed, all the powers of individual minds also are derived from God, but they cannot signify Him as they are tainted by the imperfections of the human mind. The Mīmāṃsāists are wrong to think that the import of all parts of the Vedas consists in enjoining the performance of the Vedic duties, for the results of all deeds ultimately produce a desire for knowing Brahman and through it produce the fitness for the attainment of emancipation. Thus considered from this point of view the goal of the performance of all duties is the attainment of emancipation\(^1\). There cannot be any scope for the performance of duties for one who has realized the Brahman, for that is the ultimate fruit of all actions and the wise man has nothing else to attain by the performance of actions. Just as though different kinds of seeds may be sown, yet if there is no rain these different kinds of seeds cannot produce the different kinds of trees, so the actions by themselves cannot produce the fruits independently. It is through God’s grace that actions can produce their specific fruits. So though the obligatory duties are helpful in purifying the mind and in producing a desire for true knowledge, they cannot by themselves be regarded as the ultimate end, which consists in the production of a desire for true knowledge and the ultimate union with God.

**Criticism of the views of Rāmānuja and Bhāskara.**

The view of Rāmānuja and his followers is that the souls and the inanimate world are associated with God as His qualities. The function of qualities (vīṣeṣaṇa) is that by their presence they distinguish an object from other similar objects. Thus, when one says “Rāma the son of Daśaratha,” the adjective “son of Daśaratha” distinguishes this Rāma from the other two Rāmas, Balarāma and Paraśurāma. But no such purpose is served by styling the individual souls and the inanimate nature as being qualities of Brahman, for they do not distinguish Him from any other similar persons; for the Rāmānujists also do not admit any other category than the conscious souls, the unconscious world and God the controller of them both. Since there is nothing to differentiate, the concept of the souls and matter as quality or differentia also fails. Another

\(^1\) *Para-pākṣa-giri-vajra*, pp. 279–280.
function of qualities is that they help the substance to which they belong to become better known. The knowledge of souls and matter as qualities of God does not help us to know or comprehend Him better.

Again, if God be associated with matter and souls, He is found to be associated with their defects also. It may be argued whether the Brahman in which the souls and matter are held to abide is itself unqualified or qualified. In the former alternative the Rāmānujas like the Śaṅkarites have to admit the existence of an unqualified entity and a part in Brahman has to be admitted which exists in itself as an unqualified entity. If the Brahman be in part qualityless and in part associated with qualities, then it would in part be omniscient only in certain parts of itself. Again, if the pure unassociated Brahman be regarded as omniscient, then there would be one Brahman associated with omniscience and other qualities and another Brahman associated with matter and soul, and the doctrine of qualified monism would thus break down. The pure Brahman being outside the souls and matter, these two would be without a controller inside them and would thus be independent of God. Moreover, God in this view would be in certain parts associated with the highest and purest qualities and in other parts with the defiled characters of the material world and the imperfect souls. In the other alternative, i.e. if Brahman as associated with matter and souls be the ultimate substance which is qualified with matter and souls, then there would be two composite entities and not one, and God will as before be associated with two opposite sets of pure and impure qualities. Again, if God be admitted to be a composite unity and if matter and souls which are regarded as mutually distinct and different are admitted to be constituents of Him though He is different in nature from them, it is difficult to imagine how under the circumstances those constituents can be at once one with God and yet different from Him.

In the Nimbārka view Śri Kṛṣṇa is the Lord, the ultimate Brahman and He is the support of the universe consisting of the souls and matter which are derivative parts of Him and are absolutely under His control and thus have a dependent existence only (para-tantra-sattva). Entities that have dependent existence are of two kinds, the souls which, though they pass through apparent

1 Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra, p. 342.
birth and death, are yet eternal in their nature and the substance of the corporeal structure that supports them, the matter. The scriptural texts that speak of duality refer to this duality that subsists between the ultimate substance, the Brahman, which alone has the independent existence, and souls and matter which have only a dependent existence. The scriptural texts that deny duality refer to the ultimate entity which has independent existence which forms the common ground and basis of all kinds of existence. The texts that try to refer to Brahman by negations (ne'ti, ne'ti) signify how Brahman is different from all other things, or, in other words, how Brahman is different from matter and the souls which are limited by material conditions. Brahman is thus the absolute Being, the abode of all good and noble qualities, which is different from all entities having only dependent existence. The monistic texts refer to the fact, as has already been noted, that the world of matter and the infinite number of souls having but dependent existence cannot exist independent of God (tad-aprthak-siddha) and are, in that sense, one with Him. They also have the essence of their being in Brahman (brahmā-tmatva), are pervaded through and through by it (tad-vyāpyatva), are supported in it and held in it and are always being completely controlled and dominated by it. Just as all individual objects, a jug, a stone, etc., may be said to have substantiality (dravyatva) permeating through them by virtue of their being substances, so the souls and the matter may be called God by virtue of the fact that God permeates through them as their inner essence. But just as none of these individual objects can be regarded as substance per se, so the souls and matter cannot also be identified with God as being one with Him.

The Bhāskarites are wrong in asserting that the individuals are false inasmuch as they have only a false appearance through the

The limitations (upādhi) imposed upon the pure Brahman. The nature of the imposition of Brahman by the so-called conditions is unintelligible. It may mean that the atomic individual is the result of the imposition of the conditions on Brahman by which the Brahman as a whole appears as the individual soul or by which the Brahman is split asunder, and being thus split appears as the individual self or the Brahman as qualified by the conditions or that the conditions themselves appear as the individuals. The Brahman being homogeneous and unchangeable cannot be split asunder. Even if it can be split asunder, the individual selves being the products of such a splitting would have a beginning in time and would not thus be eternal; and it has to be admitted that on such a view Brahman has to be split up into as many infinite parts as there are selves. If it is held that the parts of Brahman as limited by the conditions appear as individual souls, then Brahman would be subject to all the defects of the conditions which could so modify it as to resolve it into parts for the production of the individual selves. Moreover, owing to the shifting nature of the conditions the nature of the selves would vary and they might have in this way spontaneous bondage and salvation. If with the shifting of the conditions Brahman also shifts, then Brahman would not be partless and all-pervasive. If it is held that Brahman in its entirety becomes envisaged by the conditions, then, on the one hand, there will be no transcendent pure Brahman and, on the other, there will be one self in all the different bodies. Again, if the individuals are regarded as entirely different from Brahman, then the assertion that they are but the product of the conditioning of Brahman has to be given up. If it is held that the conditions themselves are the individuals, then it becomes a materialistic view like that of the Cārvākas. Again, it cannot be held that the conditions only cover up the natural qualities of Brahman such as omniscience, etc., for these being natural qualities of Brahman cannot be removed. Further questions may arise as to whether these natural qualities of Brahman are different from Brahman or not, or whether this is a case of difference-in-identity. They cannot be absolutely different, for that would be an admission of duality. They cannot be identical with Brahman, for then they

\[ ki\text{\textasciitilde} ca \text{up\textasciitilde}d\text{hau gacchatI sati up\textasciitilde}dhin\text{\textasciitilde} sv\text{\textasciitilde}va-vacch\text{\textasciitilde}na-brahma-prade\text{\textasciitilde}n-kar\text{\textasciitilde}san\text{\textasciitilde}a-yog\text{\textasciitilde}t anu\text{\textasciitilde}sa\text{\textasciitilde}nam \text{up\textasciitilde}d\text{h\textasciitilde}i-s\text{\textasciitilde}amyuk\text{\textasciitilde}ta-prade\text{\textasciitilde}a-bhed\text{\textasciitilde}t k\text{\textasciitilde}\text{\textasciitilde}sane k\text{\textasciitilde}\text{\textasciitilde}sane bandha-mok\text{\textasciitilde}\text{\textasciitilde}a\text{\textasciitilde}mok\text{\textasciitilde}\text{\textasciitilde}a\text{\textasciitilde} sv\text{\textasciitilde}t\text{\textasciitilde}t. \text{Para-pak\textasciitilde}\text{\textasciitilde}va-giri-vajra, p. 357. \]
could not be regarded as qualities of Brahman. If it be its own
essence, then it cannot be covered up, for in that case Brahman
would lose all its omniscience. If it is held that it is a case of dif-
ference-in-identity, then it comes to an acceptance of the Nimbārka
creed.

Again, if it is held that the so-called natural qualities of omni-
sience, etc., are also due to conditions, it may be asked whether
such conditions are different from or identical with Brahman. In
the latter alternative they would have no capacity to produce any
plurality in Brahman. In the former alternative, it may be asked
whether they are moved by themselves into operation or by some
other entity or by Brahman. The first view would be open to the
criticism of self-dynamism, the second to that of a vicious infinite,
and the third to a vicious circle. Moreover, in this view, Brahman
being eternal, its dynamism would also be eternal; at no time would
the conditions cease to operate, and thus there would be no
emancipation. The conditions cannot be regarded as false, unreal
or non-existent, for then that would be an acceptance of the
Nimbārka creed.

It may further be asked whether the conditions are imposed by
certain causes or whether they are without any cause. In the former
alternative we have a vicious infinite and in the latter even emanci-
pated beings may have further bondage. Again, it may be asked
whether the qualities, e.g. omniscience, that belong to Brahman
pervade the whole of Brahman or whether they belong only to
particular parts of Brahman. In the former view, if there is entire
veiling of the qualities of Brahman there cannot be any emancipa-
tion and the whole field of consciousness being veiled by ignorance
there is absolute blindness or darkness (jagad-āndhya-prasaṅga). In
the second view the omniscience of Brahman being only a quality
or a part of it the importance of Brahman as a whole fails.

Following the Bhāskara line it may be asked whether the em-
ancipated beings have separate existence or not. If the former
alternative be admitted, and if after destruction of the conditions
the individuals still retain their separate existence then the view
that differences are created by the conditions has to be given up
(aupādhika-bheda-vādo datta-jalānjaliḥ syāt). If the distinctness of
the souls is not preserved in their emancipation, then their very

1 Para-paśa-giri-vajra, p. 358.
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essence is destroyed, and this would almost be the same as the māyā doctrine of the Śaṅkarites, who hold that the essential nature of both God and souls is destructible.

It is wrong to suppose that individuals are but parts of which a structural Brahman is constituted, for in that case, being made up of parts, the Brahman would be itself destructible. When the scriptures speak of the universe and the souls as being but a part of Brahman, the main emphasis is on the fact that Brahman is infinite and the universe is but too small in comparison with it. It is also difficult to imagine how the minds or the antahkaranas can operate as conditions for limiting the nature of the Brahman. How should Brahman allow these so-called conditions to mutilate its nature? It could not have created these conditions for the production of individual souls, for these souls were not in existence before the conditions were in existence. Thus the Bhāskara doctrine that the concept of distinction and unity of Brahman is due to the operation of conditions (aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda) is entirely false.

According to the Nimbārka view, therefore, the unity and difference that exist between the individuals and Brahman is natural (svābhāvika) and not due to conditions (aupādhika) as in the case of Bhāskara. The coiling posture (kuṇḍala) of a snake is different from the long snake as it is in itself and is yet identical with it in the sense that the coiling posture is an effect; it is dependent and under the absolute control of the snake as it is and it has no separate existence from the nature of the snake as it is. The coiled state of the snake exists in the elongated state but only in an undifferentiated, unperceivable way; and is nothing but the snake by which it is pervaded through and through and supported in its entirety. So this universe of matter and souls is also in one aspect absolutely identical with God, being supported entirely by Him, pervaded through and through by Him and entirely dependent on Him, and yet in another aspect different from Him in all its visible manifestations and operations. The other analogy through which the Nimbārkists try to explain the situation is that of the sun and its rays which are at once one with it and are also perceived as different from it.

The difference of this view from that of the Rāmānujists is that while the latter consider that the souls and the matter qualify the nature of Brahman and are in that sense one with it, the former repudiate the concept of a permanent modification of the nature of Brahman by the souls and matter.

The Reality of the World.

The Śaṅkarites hold that if the world which is of the nature of effect were real it would not be liable to contradiction at the time of Brahma-knowledge; if it were chimerical it would not appear to our sense. The world, however, appears to our senses and is ultimately liable to contradiction; it has therefore an indefinable (anirvacaniya) nature which is the same thing as saying that the world is false. But what is the meaning of this indefinability? It cannot mean the absolutely non-existent, like the chimerical entities of the hare’s horn; it cannot mean that which is absolutely non-existent, for then it would be the souls. But all things must be either existent or non-existent, for there is no third category which is different from the existent and the non-existent. It cannot also be that of which no definition can be given, for it has already been defined as indefinability (na’pi nirvacanā-narhattvam anena’va nirucyamānātayā asambhavāt). It cannot be said to be that which is not the locus of non-existence, for even the chimericals are not so, and even Brahman, which is regarded as existent and which is absolutely qualityless, is not the locus of any real existence; for Brahman is only existent in its own nature and is not the locus of any other existence. If it is said that Brahman is the locus of the existence of false appearances, then that may be said to be true as well of the so-called indefinable. Brahman is not the locus of any existence that has the same status as itself. It cannot be defined as that which is not the locus of either the existent or the non-existent, for there is nothing which is the locus of absolute non-existence, since even the chimerical is not the locus of its own non-existence. Moreover, since Brahman and the chimerical have the quality of being qualityless, they may themselves be regarded as the locus of that which is both existent and

non-existent, and as such may themselves be regarded as indefinable.

It cannot also be said that indefinability is that of which no sufficient description can be given that "this is such" or that "this is not such," for no such sufficient description can be given of Brahman itself. There would thus be little difference between Brahman and the indefinable. If it is held that "the indefinable" is that regarding the existence of which no evidence can be put forward, then the same may be said about Brahman, because the Brahman being the conceptless pure essence, it is not possible to prove its existence by any proof.

Again, when it is said that the indefinable is that which is neither existent nor non-existent, the meaning of the two terms "existence" and "non-existence" becomes somewhat unintelligible. For "existence" cannot mean only "being" as a class concept, for such a concept does not exist either in Brahman or in the world-appearance. Existence cannot be defined as causal efficiency (artha-kriyā-kārītea), nor as that which is never contradicted; nor non-existence as that which is contradicted, for the world-appearance which is liable to contradiction is not supposed to be non-existent; it is said to be that which is neither existent nor non-existent. Existence and non-existence cannot also be defined as that which can or cannot be proved, for Brahman is an entity which is neither proved nor unproved. Moreover, the world-appearance cannot be said to be that which is different from all that which can be called "existent" or "non-existent," for it is admitted to have a practical existence (vyavahārika-sattā). Again, it cannot be urged that if the nature of anything cannot be properly defined as existent or non-existent that it signifies that such an entity must be wholly unreal (avāstava). If a thing is not properly describable as existent or non-existent, that does not imply that it is unreal. The nature of the final dissolution of avidyā cannot be described as existent or not, but that does not imply that such a dissolution is itself unreal and indefinable (nā'nirevācyāṣṭa tat-ksayaḥ).

Again, from the simple assertion that the world is liable to dissolution through knowledge, its falsity does not necessarily follow. It is wrong to suppose that knowledge destroys only false ignorance, for knowledge destroys its own negation which has a content similar to that of itself; the knowledge of one thing, say
that of a jug, is removed by the knowledge of another, the sub-
conscious impression is removed by recognition, attachment is
removed by the knowledge of the defects of all worldly things and
so also virtuous actions destroy sins. In the case under discussion
also it may well be supposed that it is not merely the knowledge of
Brahman but meditation of its nature that removes all false notions
about the world. Thus, even if the bondage is real, there cannot be
any objection that it cannot be cut asunder through the meditation
of the nature of Brahman if the scriptures so direct. It does not
follow from any legitimate assumption that what can be cut asunder
or removed must necessarily be false. Again, it is well known in
experience that what demolishes and what is demolished have the
same status of existence; if the knowledge of Brahman can destroy
our outlook of the world, that outlook must also be a real and true
one. As the knowledge and the object of knowledge have the same
status, the defects, as also the locus wherein the defects are im-
posed, have the same status; the Brahman and the ajañāna also have
the same status and both are equally real.

Further, if what is called ajañāna is merely false knowledge, then
even when it is removed by the realization, there is no reason why
it should still persist in the stage of jīvanmukti or sainthood. The
mere fact, therefore, that anything is removable by knowledge does
not prove its falsity but only its antagonism to knowledge. So the
world is real and the bondage also is real. The bondage is removed
not by any kind of knowledge but by the grace of God1. The func-
tion of true knowledge is to awaken God to exert His grace to cut
asunder the knots of bondage.

Again, all the scriptures agree in holding that the world we see
around us is being protected and maintained by God. If the world
were but a mere false appearance, there would be no meaning in
saying that it is being maintained by God. For knowing the world-
appearance to be false, He would not be tempted to make any effort
for the protection and maintenance of that which is false and unreal.
If God Himself is admitted to be under the influence of ignorance,
He cannot be entitled to be called God at all.

Pursuing the old dialectical type of reasoning, Mādhava
Mukunda urges that the sort of falsehood that is asserted of the

1 vastutas tu bhagavat-prasādād eva bandha-nivṛttir na prakārā'ntareṇa.
Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra, p. 388.
world can never be proved or demonstrated. One of the reasons that is adduced in favour of the falsity of the world is that it is knowable or the object of an intellectual state (drṣya). But if the Vedāntic texts refer to the nature of Brahmaṇ, the due comprehension and realization of the meaning of such texts must involve the concept of the nature of Brahmaṇ as its object, and thus Brahmaṇ itself would be the object of an intellectual state and therefore false. If it is urged that the Brahmaṇ can be the object of an intellectual state only in a conditioned form and that the conditioned Brahmaṇ is admitted to be false, then the reply is that since the Brahmaṇ in its pure form can never manifest itself its purity cannot be proved. If the Brahmaṇ does not express itself in its purity through an ideational state corresponding to scriptural texts describing the nature of Brahmaṇ, then it is not self-luminous; if it is expressed through such a state, then being expressible through a mental state it is false. It cannot also be said that since all that is impure is known to be non-self-luminous it follows that all that is pure is self-luminous, for the pure being absolutely unrelationed cannot be referred to or known by way of a negative concomitance. Thus the impure is known only in itself as a positive entity and not as the opposite of the pure, for such a knowledge would imply the knowledge of purity. If, therefore, the predicate of self-luminosity is not denied of impurity as an opposite of “purity,” the predicate of self-luminosity cannot also be affirmed of “purity.” Moreover, if the pure Brahmaṇ is never intelligibly realizable, then there would be no emancipation, or there would be an emancipation only with the conditioned Brahmaṇ.

Moreover, if all objects are regarded as illusory impositions on pure Brahmaṇ, then in the comprehension of these objects the pure Brahmaṇ must also be comprehended. The scriptures also say: “Brahmaṇ is to be perceived with the mind and with the keen intellect” (manasaitva’ nudraṣṭavyaṁ...drṣyate tvagrayā buddhyā). There are also scriptural passages which say that it is the pure Brahmaṇ which is the object of meditation (taṁ paśyati niskalam dhyāyamānam).

Again, if perceivability or intelligibility determining falsehood is defined as relationing with consciousness, then since pure consciousness is supposed to have a relationing through illusion it also is liable to the charge of being perceivable. In this connection it is
difficult to conceive how Brahman, which has no opposition to ajñāna, can have an opposing influence against it when it is in conjunction with a mental state or vr̥tti. Instead of such an assumption it might as well be assumed that the object itself acquires an opposing influence to its own ignorance when it is in association with a mental state having the same content as itself. On such a supposition perceivability does not consist in relation with consciousness as conditioned by mental state, for the conditioning has a bearing on the object and not on the consciousness. Thus it may well be assumed that an object becomes perceivable by being conditioned by a mental state of its own content. The assumption that the vr̥tti or the mental state must be reflected on pure consciousness is unnecessary, for it may well be assumed that the ignorance is removed by the mental state itself. An object comes into awareness when it is represented by a mental state, and in order to be aware of anything it is not necessary that the mental state, idea or representation should be reflected in consciousness. Again, if Brahman cannot be its own object, it cannot also be termed self-luminous. For self-luminous means that it is manifest to itself independently, and this involves the implication that the Brahman is an object to itself. If that which is not an object to itself can be called self-luminous, then even material objects can be called self-luminous. Moreover, in the differenceless Brahman there cannot be any immediacy or self-luminousness apart from its nature (nirviśeṣe brahmani svarūpa-bhinna-parokṣasya abhāvena).

In the monistic view the self is regarded as pure knowledge which has neither a subject nor an object. But that which is subjectless and object-less can hardly be called knowledge, for knowledge is that which manifests objects. If that which does not manifest objects can be called knowledge, even a jug can be called knowledge. Again, the question naturally arises whether, if knowledge be regarded as identical with the self, such knowledge is valid or invalid; if it be valid, then the ajñāna which shines through it should also be valid, and if it be invalid, then that must be due to some defects and there are no such defects in the self. If it is neither false nor right knowledge, it would not be knowledge at all. Again, if the world-appearance is an illusion, then it must be an imposition on the Brahman. If Brahman be the basis (adhiṣṭhāna) of the illusory imposition, then it must be an entity that is known in a general
manner but not in its details. But Brahman is not an entity of which we can have either any general or specific knowledge. Brahman cannot therefore be regarded as the basis of the imposition of any illusion. In this connection it has further to be borne in mind that if the world were non-existent then it could not have appeared in consciousness; the chimerical entities are never perceived by anyone. The argument that even the illusory snake can produce real fear is invalid, for it is not the illusory snake that produces fear but the real knowledge of snakes that produces it. The child is not afraid of handling even a real snake, for it has no knowledge of snakes and their injurious character. Even dreams are to be regarded as real creation by God and not illusory impositions. The argument that they are false since they can only be perceived by the dreamer and not by others who are near him is invalid, for even the feelings and ideas felt or known by a person cannot be perceived by others who are near him.

The world is thus not an illusory imposition on the pure Brahman, but a real transformation of the varied powers of God. The difference of this view from that of Sāmkhya is that while the Sāmkhya believes in the transformation of certain primary entities in their entirety, the Nimbārkists believe in the transformation of the various powers of God. God Himself remains unchanged and unmodified, and it is only His powers that suffer modification and thereby produce the visible world.

The explanation that the world is produced through the reflection of Brahman in māyā or by its limitation through it is invalid, for since the māyā is an entity of an entirely different order, there cannot be any reflection of Brahman in it or a limitation by it. It is not possible to bind down a thief with a dream-rope.

Vanamāli Miśra.

Vanamāli Miśra, a native of Triyaga, a village within two miles of Brindavan, of Bharadvāja lineage, in his Vedānta-siddhānta-saṅgraha, called also Śruti-siddhānta-saṅgraha, gives some of the important tenets of the Nimbārka school. The work is written in the form of Kārikās and a commentary on it and is based on the commentary on the Brahma-sūtra by Nimbārka and other commentaries on it.

1 Para-pākṣa-giri-vajra, p. 420.  
2 Ibid. p. 429.
He regards sorrow as being due to attachment to things that are outside one’s own self, and the opposite of it as happiness. All actions performed with a view to securing any selfish end, all performance of actions prohibited by Vedic injunctions and non-performance of duties rendered obligatory by Vedas produce sins. The opposite of this and all such actions as may please God are regarded as producing virtue. It is the power of God which is at the root of all virtue and vice which operates by veiling the qualities of God to us. This nescience (avidyā) is real and positive and different in different individuals. It produces the error or illusion which consists in regarding a thing as what it is not; and it is this false knowledge that is the cause of rebirth. This avidyā is different with different individuals. It is through this avidyā that one gets attached to one’s possession as “mine” and has also the false experience of individual freedom. In reality all one’s actions are due to God, and when a person realizes this he ceases to have any attachment to anything and does not look forward for the fruits of his deeds. The avidyā produces the mind and its experiences of sorrows and pleasures; it also produces the false attachment by which the self regards the experiences as its own and ceases to realize its own nature as pure knowledge and bliss. Only the videhi-muktas enjoy this state; those in the state of jīvamukti or sainthood enjoy it only to a partial extent. It is on account of attachments produced by ignorance that man is stirred to be led by the will of God. But as the ignorance is a true ignorance, so the experience of sorrow is also a true experience. All our rebirths are due to our actions performed against the mandates of the Vedas or for the fulfilment of our desires. The purity of the soul is attained by the realization of the idea that all our actions are induced by God and that the performer has no independence in anything. When a person feels that it is through false association with other things, and by considering oneself as the real independent agent that one gets into trouble, one naturally loses all interest in one’s actions and experience of

1 Śruti-siddhānta-saṅgraha, 1. 9, 10, 11.
2 prati-jīvaṁ vibhinna syāt satya ca bhāva-rūpiṇī | a-tasminś tad-dhiyo hetur nidānaṁ jīva-saṁsṛtau. || Ibid. 1. 15.
3 atah kāmam niśiddham ca duḥkh-avajam tyajed budhah. Śruti-siddhānta-saṅgraha, 1. 63. According to Vanamāli Miśra at death a person goes to Heaven or to Hell according to his deeds and then after enjoying the fruits of his actions or suffering therefrom he is born as plants and then as lower animals, then as Yavanas or mlecchas and then in lower castes and finally as Brahmins.
pleasure and pain, and regards all objects as being invested with harmful defects. It is this disinclination or detachment that pleases God. The process of attaining devotion is also described in the scriptures as listening to the Upanishads (śravana), realizing their meaning with logical persuasion (manana), and continual meditation on the nature of God as an unceasing flow (nididhyāsana)\(^1\). The last can come only as a result of the first two; for meditation involves a direct realization which is not possible without the performance of śravana and manana. It is only through the purification of the mind by the above processes that God is pleased and makes Himself directly intuited (aparokṣa) by the devotee, just as one can intuit the musical melodies and tunes through musical discipline. This direct intuition is of the very nature of one’s own self. For at this stage one has no functioning of the mind. The destruction of experiential knowledge is identical with the intuition of God. This stage therefore implies the annihilation of avidyā or the mind\(^2\). It is in this way that the nature of God as bliss is realized by man in his state of supreme emancipation; but even then it is not possible for him to know all the qualities of God, for even God Himself does not know all His qualities. Such an emancipation can be realized only through the grace of God. In the state of emancipation, man exists in God just as the fish swims about in the ocean. God creates because of the spontaneity of His grace and not in order to increase His grace; so also emancipated souls dally in God out of the spontaneity of their essence as bliss and not in order to increase their bliss\(^3\). The nature of God is always within us, and it is only when it is directly intuited that we can attain salvation. Some people attain emancipation in this world while others attain it in the upper worlds through which they pass as a result of their deeds. But emancipation of all kinds may be defined as the existence of man in his own nature as a result of the destruction of nescience\(^4\). The jīvamuktas or saints are those whose avidyā has

\(^1\) Sruti-siddhānta-samgraha, II. 13.

\(^2\) brahma-gocarasya vedānta-vāsita-manasi utpannasya ā-parokṣyasya yah prāga-bhavah tasya abhāva dharmas jñāna-tad-dharmasā-nyatarama-rūpo jñāna-brahmanah sambandhah, samsāra-dāśāyah nāsti. Ibid. II. 19.

\(^3\) ānanda-drekaṃ visvoryathā sṛṣṭyā-di-cesṭamam, tathā mukta-citāṃ kriḍā na te ānanda-vivṛddhaye. Ibid. II. 37.

\(^4\) sva-rūpaṃ sthitir muktir ajñāna-dharmasā-pārthaham (Ibid. II. 58). This mukti can be of four kinds: sārūpya, i.e. the same external form as Kṛṣṇa;
been destroyed, but who have still to suffer the effects of their prārabdha karma. The realization of God can destroy the sañcita and kriyamāṇa karma, i.e. previously collected karma and those that are performed in the present life, but not the prārabdha karma, i.e. the karma that is already in a state of fruition.

It is wrong to suppose that the attainment of a state of bliss can be desired by any person; the state desired can only be one in which a person enjoys unobstructed bliss. In a state of deep dreamless sleep one can enjoy a little bliss, but not the full bliss, as the māyāvādins hold. There is but little difference between the māyāvādins and the Buddhists; the difference is only in the mode of expression.

The self is regarded as atomic, but its existence is definitely proved by the notion of the ego (aham-pratyayavedya) who enjoys all his experiences. Even though he may be dependent upon God, yet he is a real and active agent who works through the influence of avidyā. The existence of the self is also proved by the continuity of experiences through all stages of life. The self-love manifested in all beings for selfish ends also shows that each person feels a self or soul within himself and that this self is also different in different individuals. The difference between jīva and iṣvara is that the former is of little power and little knowledge and always dependent, and the latter is omniscient, omnipotent and independent; He makes the jīvas work or assert their supposed independence by His avidyā-power. The jīvas are thus different from God, but as they exist in Him at the time of emancipation and as all their actions are guided by the avidyā-power of God, they are regarded also as being

sālokya, i.e. existence in the same sphere as God; sāyujya, as being merged in God; sāmipya, as existence in proximity to God as associated with a particular form of Him. The merging in God called sāyujya should not be regarded as being unified with God. This merging is like the animals roaming in the forest. The emancipated beings are different from God, but exist in Him (evam muktvā harer bhinna ramante tatra modataḥ (Ibid. n. 61). They can thus come out of God also, and we hear of them as entering in succession the bodies of Aniruddha, Pradyumna, Saṃkṛṣaṇa and Vāsudeva. Such emancipated beings are not associated with the creation and destruction of the worlds, but remain the same in spite of all cosmic changes. They are like the being of Śvetadvīpa referred to in the Nārāyanīya section of the Mahābhārata. But they are still always under the control of God and do not suffer any sorrow on account of such control.

1 puruṣā-rtham sukhitvam hi na tv añanda-svarūpatā. Śruti-siddhānta-saṁgraha, II. 96.
2 meyato na viśeṣo'-sti māyi-saṅgatayor mate bhāṅgi-mātra-bhidā tu syāt ekasminn api darśane. Ibid. II. 136.
one with Him. The mind of the individual being a creation of God’s avidyā, all His world experience is also due to God’s activity. In His own nature as self the jīvas, the individuals, have the revelation of God’s nature which is pure bliss. The existence of individuals in their own essential nature is therefore regarded as a state of salvation. The individuals in their essential nature are therefore of the nature of sat, cit and ānanda, and though atomic they can enjoy the experiences all over the body through their internal functioning just as a lamp illuminates the whole room by rays. The experience of sorrow also is possible through the expansion or dilatation of the mind (antah-karana) through the various parts of the body and by means of the help of avidyā by which the jīva wrongly identifies himself with other objects. As the relation of the self with other objects takes place through the antah-karana of each person the sphere of experience of each of the jīvas is limited by the functioning of his own antah-karana. The antah-karana is different in different persons.

The Upaniṣads speak of God as the all (sarvam khalv’idam Brahma), and this is due to the fact that He pervades all things and controls all things. It means that the souls are dependent on Him or maintained in Him (tad-ādhāratva), but it does not mean their identity with Him. God is Himself able to create all things by Himself; but for His pleasure, for His mere sportive dalliance, He takes the help of prakṛti and the destiny born out of the deeds of human beings as His accessories. Though God makes all persons act in the manner in which they do act, yet His directive control is regulated in accordance with the adṛṣṭa or the destiny of the human beings which is beginningless. The theory of karma doctrine herein suggested is different from that propounded by Patañjali. According to Patañjali and his commentators, the fruits of the deeds, i.e. pleasure or pain, are enjoyed by the persons while they are free to act by themselves. Here, however, the freedom of the individuals is controlled and limited by God in accordance with the previous good or bad deeds of the individual, which are beginningless. Thus in our ordinary life not only our pleasures and pains but also our power to do good or bad actions are determined by previous deeds and the consequent control of God.
CHAPTER XXII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIJÑĀNA BHIKSU

A General Idea of Vijñāna Bhikṣu’s Philosophy.

The ultimate goal is not the cessation of sorrow, but the cessation of the experience of sorrow; for when in the state of emancipation one ceases to experience sorrow, the sorrow as such is not emancipated since it remains in the world and others suffer from it. It is only the emancipated individual who ceases to experience sorrow. The ultimate state of emancipation cannot be a state of bliss, for since there are no mental organs and no mind in this state there cannot be any experience of bliss. The self cannot itself be of the nature of bliss and be at the same time the expericer of it. When it is said that self is of the nature of bliss (ānanda), the word bliss is there used in a technical sense of negation of sorrow.

Bhikṣu admits a gradation of realities. He holds that one is stabler and more real than the other. Since paramātmā is always the same and does not undergo any change or transformation or dissolution, he is more real than the prakṛti or puruṣa or the evolutes of prakṛti. This idea has also been expressed in the view of the Purāṇas that the ultimate essence of the world is of the nature of knowledge which is the form of the paramātman. It is in this essential form that the world is regarded as ultimately real and not as prakṛti and puruṣa which are changing forms; prakṛti, so far as it exists as a potential power in God, is regarded as non-existent but so far as it manifests itself through evolutionary changes it is regarded as existent. The state of emancipation is brought about by the dissociation of the subtle body consisting of the five tammātras and the eleven senses. Consequent upon such a dissociation the self as pure consciousness is merged in Brahman as the rivers mingle with the ocean, a state not one of identity but identity-in-difference. According to the Sāṃkhya, emancipation cannot be attained until the fruits of the karmas which have ripened for giving experiences of pleasure and pain are actually exhausted through experiencing them, i.e. even when ignorance or avidyā is destroyed the attainment of the emancipation is delayed until the prārabdha
karma is finished. The Yogin, however, can enter into an objectless state of meditation (asamprajñātā yoga) and this wards off the possibility of experiencing the prārabdha karma. From the state of asamprajñāta samādhi he can at will pass into a state of emancipation. The state of emancipation is reached not merely by realizing the purport of the text of the Upaniṣads but by philosophic wisdom attained through a reasoned process of thought and by the successive stages of Yoga meditation.

The world does not emanate directly from Brahman as pure consciousness, nor are the kāla, prakṛti and puruṣa derived from Brahman through transformatory changes (parināma). Had the world come into being directly from Brahman, evil and sins would have been regarded as coming into being from it. With the association of sattva through the beginningless will of God at the beginning of the previous cycles the Brahman behaves as Īśvara and brings into actual being the prakṛti and the puruṣa which are already potentially existent in God, and connects the prakṛti with the puruṣa. The moment of God’s activity in bringing out the prakṛti and puruṣa may be regarded as kāla. In this sense kāla is often regarded as the dynamic agency of God. Though puruṣas in themselves are absolutely static, yet they have a seeming movement as they are always associated with prakṛti, which is ever in a state of movement. kāla as the dynamic agency of God is naturally associated with the movement of prakṛti, for both the prakṛti and the puruṣa are in themselves passive and are rendered active by the dynamic agency of God. This dynamic agency is otherwise called kāla, and as such it is an eternal power existing in Brahman, like the prakṛti and puruṣa. In all other forms of actual existence kāla is determinate and conditioned, and as such non-eternal and to some extent imaginary. It is only as the eternal power that subsists in and through all the operations of dynamic activity that kāla may be called eternal. The kāla that produces the connection of the prakṛti and the puruṣa and also produces the mahat is non-eternal and therefore does not exist at the time of pralaya when no such connection exists. The reason for this is that the kāla that produces the connection between prakṛti and puruṣa is a determinate kāla which is conditioned, on the one hand by the will of God, and, on the other, by the effects it produces. It is this determinate kāla that can be designated as present, past and future. But the terms pre-
sent, past and future imply an evolutionary change and such a change implies activity; it is this activity as dissociated from the manifest forms of kāla as present, past and future that can be regarded as eternal.

The reference to the *Atharva-Veda*, as noted below in the footnote, will show how the conception of time in very ancient eras reveals “time” as a separate entity or energy which has brought everything into being, maintains it, and destroys everything. The God, paramēṣṭhin Brahman or prajāpati is said to be derived from it. In the *Maitri Upaniṣad* we also hear of the conception of kāla or time as akāla or timeless. The timeless time is the primordial time which is only the pure energy unmeasured and immeasurable. It appears in a measurable form when, after the production of the sun from it, it is measured in terms of the movement of the sun. The entire course of natural phenomena is thus seen to be an emanation or manifestation of the energy of time undirected by any other superintendent. Such a conception of time seems to be of an atheistic character, for even the highest gods, the paramēṣṭhin and the prajāpati, are said to be produced from it.

In the first chapter of the anuṣāsana parvan of the *Mahābhārata* there is a dialogue between Gautamī, whose son was bitten by a serpent, the hunter who was pressing for killing the serpent, the serpent, the mrtyu or death and kāla. It appears from the dialogue that time is not only the propeller of all events by itself but all states of sattva, rajas and tamas, all that is moving and the unmoved in the heaven and in the earth, all our movements and cessation of movements, the sun, the moon, the waters, the fire, the sky, the earth, the rivers, the oceans and all that is being or not being are of the 1

1 *Atharva-Veda*, xix. 54. In the *Atharva-Veda* time is regarded as a generator of the sky and the earth and all beings exist through time. Tapas and Brahman exist in time and time is the god of all. Time produced all creatures. The universe has been set in motion by time, has been produced by it and is supported in it. Time becoming Brahman supports paramēṣṭhin. In the *Svetāsvatara Upaniṣad* time is regarded as being held by the sun as the ultimate cause. In the *Maitri Upaniṣad*, vi. 14, it is said that from time all creatures spring, grow and decay. Time is a formless form (kālāt svavanti bhūtāni, kālāt vyādhiṁ prayānti ca. | kāle cāstaṁ niyachanti kālo mūrtir amūrtiṁāṁ).

It is again stated in the same work that there are two forms of Brahman, Time and no-Time.

2 That which is before the sun is no-Time and is devoid of parts, and that which is after the sun is Time with parts.
nature of time and brought into being by time and dissolved in time. Time is thus the original cause. Time, however, operates in accordance with the laws of \textit{karma}; there is thus the beginningless relation between time and \textit{karma} which determines the courses of all events. \textit{Karma} in itself is also a product of time and as such determines the future modes of the operation of time. Here we have an instance of the second stage, the conception of time as the transcendent and immanent cause of all things. Here time is guided by \textit{karma}. In the third stage of the conception of time, which is found in the \textit{purāṇas} and also adopted by Bhikṣu, it is regarded as the eternal dynamic power inherent in Brahman and brought into operation by the will of God\footnote{1}. 

The word \textit{puruṣa} is often used in the scriptural text in the singular number, but that signifies only that it is used in a generic sense, cf. \textit{Sāmkhya-sūtra}, i. 154 (nā'\textit{dvaita-śrutī-virodho jāti-paratvāt})\footnote{2}. The difference between the superior \textit{puruṣa} or God and the ordinary \textit{puruṣas} is that while the latter are subject to experiences of pleasure and pain as a result of the actions or \textit{karma}, the former has an eternal and continual experience of bliss through its reflection from its \textit{sattvamaya} body to itself. The ordinary \textit{puruṣas}, however, have not the experience of pleasure and pain as of constitutive definition, for in the stage of saintliness (\textit{jīvanmukti}) they have no such experiences. God can, however, have an experience of the experiences of pleasure and pain of other \textit{puruṣas} without having been affected by them. The ultimate principle or the Brahman is a principle of pure consciousness which underlies
the reality of both the puruṣas, prakṛti and its evolutes; and it is because they are emergent forms which have their essence in the Brahman that they can appear as connected together. The movement of the prakṛti is also ultimately due to the spontaneous movement of the pure consciousness, the basic reality.

The viveka and the aviveka, the distinction and the non-distinction, are all inherent in buddhi, and this explains why the puruṣas fail to distinguish themselves from the buddhi with which they are associated. The association of the puruṣas with the buddhi implies that it has in it both the characters of distinction and non-distinction. The difficulty is that the “revelation of the distinction” is so opposed by the force of non-distinction that the former cannot find scope for its manifestation. It is the purpose of yoga to weaken the force of the tendency towards non-distinction and ultimately uproot it so that revelation of distinction may manifest itself. Now it may be asked what is the nature of this obstruction. It may be replied that it is merely a negative condition consisting in the non-production of the cognition of the distinction through association with the products of prakṛti, such as attachment and antipathy, through which we are continually passing. The Sāṁkhya, however, says that the non-production of the distinction is due to the extreme subtleness of the nature of buddhi and puruṣa which so much resemble each other that it is difficult to distinguish their nature. But this view of the Sāṁkhya should not be interpreted as meaning that it is only the subtleness of the natures of these two entities that arrests our discriminating knowledge regarding them. For had it been so, then the process of yoga would be inefficacious in attaining such a knowledge. The real reason is that our association with attachment and antipathy with regard to gross objects obstructs our discriminating vision regarding these subtle entities. Our attachment to gross objects is also due to our long association with sense-objects. A philosopher, therefore, should try to dissociate himself from attachment with gross objects. The whole purpose of creation consists in furnishing materials for the experiences of puruṣa which seems to undergo all experiential changes of enjoyment and suffering, of pleasure and pain, in and through the medium of buddhi. With the dissociation of buddhi, therefore, all experience ceases. The God is essentially pure consciousness, and though the knowledge of Him as such
brings about liberation, yet epithets of omnipotence, all-pervasiveness and other personal characteristics are attributed to Him because it is through an approach to God as a super-personal Being that devotion is possible, and it is through devotion and personal attachment that true knowledge can arise. It is said in the scriptures that God cannot be realized by tapas, gifts or sacrifices, but only by bhakti. The highest devotion is of the nature of love (atyyuttamā bhaktih prema-lakṣanā).

God remains within all as the inner controller and everything is revealed to His super-consciousness without the mediation of sense-consciousness. God is called all-pervasive because He is the cause of all and also because He is the inner controller.

_Bhakti_ consists in the whole process of listening to God’s name, describing His virtues, adoration to Him, and meditation ultimately leading to true knowledge. These are all to be designated as the service of God. These processes of operations constituting _bhakti_ are all to be performed with love. Bhikṣu quotes _Garuḍa purāṇa_ to prove that the root “bhaj” is used in the sense of service. He also refers to the Bhāgavata to show that the true _bhakti_ is associated with an emotion which brings tears to the eyes, melts the heart and raises the hairs of the body. Through the emotion of _bhakti_ one dissolves oneself as it were and merges into God’s existence, just as the river Ganges does into the ocean.

It will be seen from the above that Bhikṣu urges on the doctrine of _bhakti_ as love, as a way to the highest realization. The metaphysical views that he propounded give but small scope for the indulgence of such an attitude towards divinity. For, if the Ultimate Reality be of the nature of pure consciousness, we cannot have any personal relations with such a Being. The ultimate state of realization is also the entrance into a state of non-difference with this Ultimate Being, who is not Himself a person, and therefore no personal relations ought to be possible with Him. In the _Vījnāna-mrta-bhāṣya_, iv. 1. 3, Bhikṣu says that at the time of dissolution or emancipation the individuals are not associated with any content of knowledge, and are therefore devoid of any consciousness, and being of the nature of unconscious entities like wood or stone they

\[ \text{aham prakṛṣṭah bhaktito'anyaih sādhanaïh dṛṣṭum na śakyah, bhaktir eva kevala mad-darśane sādhanaṁ.} \]

_Isvara-gitā-ṭkā_ (MS. borrowed from N. N. Gopinātha Kavirāja, late Principal, Queen’s College, Benares).
enter into the all-illuminating great Soul just as rivers enter into the ocean. Again, it is this great Soul that out of its own will sends them forth like sparks of fire and distinguishes them from one another and goads them to action. This great Soul or paramātman is the inner-controller and mover of our selves. But it may be remembered that this great Soul is not also the Ultimate Principle, the pure consciousness, but is the manifestation of the pure consciousness in association with the sattvamaya body. Under the circumstances the metaphysical position does not allow of any personal relation between the human beings and the Ultimate Entity. But yet the personal relation with the divinity as the ultimate consciousness not being philosophically possible, that relation is ushered in more out of a theistic tendency of Bhikṣu than as a necessary natural conclusion. The theistic relation is also conceived in a mystical fashion in the indulgence of the emotions of love rising to a state of intoxication. Such a conception of Divine love is found in the Bhāgavata-purāṇa; and later on in the school of Vaiṣṇavism preached by Caitanya. It is different from the conception of devotion or bhakti as found in the system of Rāmānuja, where bhakti is conceived as incessant continual meditation. He seems to have been, therefore, one of the earliest, if not the earliest, exponent of emotionalism in theism, if we do not take into account the Purānic emotionalism of the Bhāgavata-purāṇa. There are instances in the writings of modern European philosophers also, where the difficult position does not justify an emotionalism that is preached merely out of the theistic experiences of a personal nature, and as an illustration one may refer to the idea of God of Pringle Pattison. In the conception of jīva or individuals also there seems to be an apparent contradiction. For while the puruṣas are sometimes described as pure consciousness, they are at other times described as inert and wholly under the domination of paramātman. The contradiction is to be solved by the supposition that the inertness is only relative, i.e. the puruṣas are to be regarded as themselves inactive, being goaded to action by the inlying controller,
paramātman. They are called “jāda,” resembling stone or wood only in the sense that they are inactive in themselves. But this inactivity should not be associated with want of consciousness. Being sparks of the eternal consciousness they are always of the nature of consciousness. Their activity, however, is derived from the paramātman, so that, drawn by Him, they come out of the Eternal consciousness and play the role of a mundane individual and ultimately return to Brahman like rivers into the ocean at the time of emancipation. This activity of God is an eternal activity, an eternal creative impulse which is absolutely without any extraneous purpose (carama-kāraṇasya kṛteḥ nityatvāt)¹. It proceeds from the spontaneous joy of God in a spontaneous manner like the process of breathing, and has no reference to the fulfilment of any purpose. In the Vyāsa-bhāṣya it is said that the creation of God is for the benefit of living beings. But Bhikṣu does not support any purpose at all. This activity is sometimes compared with the purposeless playful activity. But Bhikṣu says that even if there is any slight purpose in play that also is absent in the activity of God. The action also proceeds spontaneously with the creative desire of God, for which no body or senses are necessary. He is identical with the whole universe and as such His action has no objective outside of Himself, as in the case of ordinary actions. It is He who, depending upon the beginningless karma of human beings, makes them act for good or for evil. The karma itself, also being a part of His energy and a manifestation of His impulse, cannot be regarded as limiting His freedom². The analogy of the doctrine of grace where the king bestows his grace or withholds it in accordance with the good or bad services of his servants is also regarded as helpful to conceive of the freedom of God in harmony with the deeds of the individual. If it is argued now, if the creative activity of God is eternal, it can depend on the karma, Bhikṣu’s reply is that the karmas act as accessory causes determining the eternal creative impulse of God as producing pleasurable and painful experiences. Following the trend of the Purānic method Bhikṣu further suggests that it is the Hiranyagarbha created by God who appears as the law-giver of the law of karma, as manifested in the spontaneous activity of God. It is He, therefore, who is responsible for the suffering of humanity

¹ See Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya, II. 1. 32.
² Ibid. II. 1. 33.
in accordance with their *karmas*. God helps the process only by letting it go on in an unobstructed manner\(^1\). In another passage he says that God perceives within Himself as parts of Him the *jīvas* and their conditioning factors (*upādhi*) as associated with merit and demerit (*dharma* and *adharma*); associating these conditions with the *jīvas* He brings them out of Himself. He is thus the maker of souls, just as the potter is the maker of pots\(^2\).

The self is regarded as being itself untouchable and devoid of any kind of association (*a-śaṅga*). The association between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, therefore, is not to be interpreted in the sense of a direct contact in the ordinary sense of the term, but the association is to be understood only as transcendental reflection through the conditioning factors which make the pure soul behave as a phenomenal self or *jīva*. The self has no knowledge as its quality or character, and is in itself pure consciousness, and there is at no time a cessation of this consciousness, which exists even during dreamless sleep. But in dreamless sleep there is no actual knowledge, as there is no content present at the time; and it is for that reason that the consciousness though present in the very nature of the self cannot be apperceived. The *vāsanās* or desires existing in the *antāḥkarana* cannot affect the pure soul, for at that time the *antāḥkarana* remains in a dissolved condition. Knowledge of contents or objects is possible only through reflections from the states of the *buddhi*. The pure consciousness being identical with the self, there cannot also be the self-consciousness involving the notion of a duality as subject and object during dreamless sleep. The pure consciousness remains the same and it is only in accordance with changes of mental state that knowledge of objects arises and passes away\(^3\). The *jīvas* are thus not to be regarded as themselves the products of the reflection of *paramātmā* as the Śaṅkarites suppose; for in that case the *jīvas* would be absolutely unreal, and bondage and emancipation would also be unreal.

\(^1\) *Vijñāné-mṛta-bhāsya*, II. 1. 33.


\(^3\) *Ibid.* II. 3. 5.
The Brahman and the World according to Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya.

The production, existence, maintenance, modification, decay and destruction of the world are from Brahman as God. He holds within Himself all the energies constituting the prakṛti and puruṣas, and manifests Himself in other diverse forms; Brahman as pure consciousness is associated with the conditioning factor of His own being, the māyā as pure sattva quality in all this creative activity, so from that great Being who is devoid of all afflictions, karmas and their fruits are also produced. The fact that the Brahma-sūtra, II. 2, says that Brahman is that from which the world has come into being and is being maintained implies that the world as it is in its own reality is an eternal fact in the very being of the ultimately real and the unmanifested. The production, the transformation and the destruction of the world are only its phenomenal aspect¹. Brahman is here regarded as the adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇa. This means that Brahman is the basis, the ground, the ādhāra (container) as it were of the universe in which it exists as undivided and as indistinguishable from it and which also holds the universe together. Brahman is the cause which holds together the material cause of the universe so that it may transform itself into it². Brahman is the principle of ultimate cause which renders all other kinds of causality possible. In the original Brahman, the prakṛti and the puruṣas exist in the eternal consciousness and as such are held together as being one with it. The Brahman is neither changeable nor identifiable with prakṛti and puruṣa. It is because of this that, though Brahman is of the nature of pure consciousness and unchangeable, yet it is regarded as being one with the universe and as the material cause. The material cause or upādāna-kāraṇa is the name which is given to changing material cause (the vikāri-kāraṇa) and to the ground cause or the adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇa. The underlying principle of both the ground cause (adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇa) and the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) is that the effect is held in it as merged in it or

¹ atra ca iti vacanād avyakta-rūpeṇa jagan nityam eva ity dāryyā-sayah. Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya, 1. 1. 2.
² kīm punar adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇatvam ucyate tad eva dhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇam yatram vībhaktam yena pastabdham ca sad upādāna-kāraṇam kāryā-kāreṇa pārāṇam. Ibid.
The idea involved in *avibhāga* or oneness with the cause is not regarded as an ordinary relation of identity but as a sort of non-relational relation or a situation of uniqueness which cannot be decomposed into its constituents so that a relational bond may be affirmed of them. The upshot of the whole position is that the nature of the universe is so founded in Brahman which forms its ground that it cannot be regarded as a mere illusory appearance of it or as a modification or a product of it; but while these two possible ways of relation between the cause and the effect fail, the universe as such has no existence, significance or meaning without the ground in which it is sustained and which helps its evolutionary process. The ordinary relation of the sustainer and the sustained is inadequate here, for it implies a duality of independent existence; in the present case, however, where Brahman is regarded as the ground cause there is no such duality and the universe cannot be conceived as apart from Brahman which forms its ground and essence while remaining unchanged in its transcendent reality. Thus, though it may have to be acknowledged that there is a relation between the two, the relation has to be conceived as the transcendental one, of which no analogy is found elsewhere. The seeming pictorial analogy which falls far short of the situation is to be found in the case where water is mixed with milk. Here the existence of the water is dependent upon the existence of the milk so long as the two exist in a mixed condition; and neither of them can be conceived without the other. The nature of the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* is also manifested from the essence of God's nature as pure consciousness. The causality of substance, qualities and actions is also due to the underlying essence of God which permeates all things. The difference between the relation of *samavāya* and this unique relation of indistinguishableness in the ground is that while the former applies to the case of the intimate relation of the effects in and through themselves, the latter refers only to the special fact of the indistinguishable character of the effect in the cause, and has no reference to the relation of the effect-parts among themselves with reference to the whole as an inseparable concatenation of effects. The ordinary organic relation such

1 *Kāryā-vibhāga-dhāratvasyai' vo' pādāna-sāmānya-lakṣaṇatvāt*. Viśnunāmyta-bhāṣya, i. 1. 2.
2 *avibhāgas ca' dhāratāvat svarūpa-sambandha-eihe' tyanta-sammiśraṇa-rūpo dugdha-jalādy-ekatā-pratyaya-niyāmakāh*. Ibid.
as that which subsists between the parts of a living body is thus different from that which is referred to here as the indistinguishable character of the effects in the ground. The parts of the universe as comprising the living and the non-living may be regarded as in-separably united with one another in the whole, but such a relation is an intimate relation between the effects, and the whole is nothing but an assemblage of these. This is what may be called the special feature of samavāya relation. But in the unique relation of indistinguishableness in the ground the effect subsists in the ground in such a manner that the effect has no separate reality from the cause\(^1\). Brahman in this view is the basis or the substratum—the ground which supports the totality of the unity of prakṛti and the puruṣas to evolve itself into the universe with its varied forms\(^2\). It does not, therefore, in itself participate in the changing evolution and transformation of world-forms, but it always exists as one with it, and being in it and supported by it, it develops into the world.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu says that the Vaiṣeṣikas believe that God is the dynamic or the instrumental agent, whereas he thinks that the causality of God cannot be regarded as being either of the samavāyi, asamavāyi or nimitta types, but is a fourth kind of conception—cause as ground or container\(^3\). He also describes this type of causation as being adhiṣṭhāna, a term with which we are familiar in Śaṅkara Vedānta. But the difference between the two kinds of conception of adhiṣṭhāna kāraṇa is indeed very great, for while Bhikṣu considers this to be the unchangeable ground which sustains the movements of the principle of change in it in an undivided unity, Śaṅkara regards adhiṣṭhāna as the basis of all changes which are unreal in themselves. According to Bhikṣu, however, the changing phenomena are not unreal, but they are only changes which are the modifications of a principle of change which subsists in an undivided unity with the ground cause. When they say that the world is both being and non-being (sad-asadrūpa), and is hence unreal and illusory, the Śaṅkarites suffer from a grave misconception.

\(^1\) tatra samavāya-sambandhena yatra' vibhāgas tad vikāri-kāraṇam; yatra ca kāryasaṁy kāraṇā vibhāgena avibhāgas tad adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇam. Ibid.
\(^2\) yadi hi paramā-tmā dehavat sarvaṁ kāraṇam na'dhiṣṭheta tarhi dravya-guna-karmā-di-sādhārayā-khila-kārye ittham mūla-kāraṇam na syāt. Isvara-gītā-bhāṣya. MS.
\(^3\) asmābhis tu samavāy-asamavāyibhyām udāsinaṁ nimitta-kāraṇebhyai ca vilakṣanaṇatayā caturtham adhāra-kāraṇatvam. Ibid.
world is called sat and asat (being and non-being), because it represents the principle of becoming or change. It is affirmed as "this" and yet because it changes it is again not affirmed as "this."
The future forms of the changing process are also non-existent as it were in the present form and the present form is also non-existent as it were in the future forms that are to be. Thus, any of its forms may be regarded as not existing and hence false when compared with an entity that always exists and in the same form. All objects of the world so far as they are past and future are contradicted by their present states and are therefore regarded as false, but so far as they are perceived in their present state they are regarded as real.

The universe has, however, an eternal and immutable form as pure consciousness in the very nature of Brahman from which it is separated out as the world of matter and souls. The pure consciousness in itself is the only ultimate reality which is ever the same and is not subject to any change or process of becoming. Both the individual souls and the world of matter are ultimately dissolved and merged in Brahman, the pure and ultimate consciousness. These, therefore, are regarded as being names and forms when compared with the ultimate changeless Reality, Brahman. But this does not mean that the universe of matter and souls is absolutely unreal and mere mâyâ or illusion. If all that appears were absolutely false, then all moral values would disappear and all notions of bondage and emancipation would become meaningless. If the falsity of all things except the pure consciousness can be proved by any means, that itself would prove that such proofs have validity and that therefore there are other things over and above pure consciousness which may be valid. If such proofs are invalid but can establish the validity of pure consciousness as against the validity of all other things, then such proofs may also prove the reality of all other things in the world. It may be held that what ordinary people consider as true can be proved to be invalid by what is regarded by them as valid means of proof; but on the Śaṅkarite view nothing is regarded as valid and therefore there are 1 eka-dharmena sativa-daśâyam pariñāmi-vastūnām aśī-tā-nāgata-dharmena asattvā. Viśṇu-mūrti-bhāṣya, I. 1. 3.

2 ghaṭā-dayo hi anāgatā-dy-avasthāśu vyaktā-dy-avasthābhir bādhyante iti. ghaṭā-dayo mithyā-sabdēna ucyante vidyāmāna-dharmaś ca taddāniṃ na bādhyante iti satyā ity api ucyante. Ibid.

3 jñāna-svarūpah paramā-tmā sa eva satyāḥ jīvāḥ ca'niśatayā amiṣiny ekābhūtāḥ athavā' vayavattvēna paramā-tmā-pekṣayā te' py asantaḥ. Ibid.
no proofs by which the validity of the world-process can be maintained. But the reply that naturally comes to such a view is that though the validity of the world may not be proved, yet that does not lead to the conclusion that the world-process is unreal; for even if its validity is not proved, its validity or reality may at least be doubtful. There is, therefore, nothing by which we may come to any conclusion about its invalidity and unreality. The reality of the universe is of a different order from that of Brahman, which is of the nature of pure consciousness, as the former consists of practical efficiency (artha-kriyā-kāritva). But even though in the state of a changing process the reality of the world is only its reality as becoming and as causal efficiency, yet it has also an ultimate reality in itself, since it has come into being from the ultimate reality, Brahman. The world of matter and souls exists in God as pure consciousness and therefore as one with Him. When from out of its state as pure consciousness it is manifested as the world of matter and souls, we mark it as the stage of creation. When again they retire back into God as being one with His consciousness, that is marked as the state of dissolution. The universe of matter and souls is also ultimately to be regarded as being of the nature of consciousness, and is as such a constituent of the ultimate pure consciousness in which it remains as it were merged and lost. The world of visible forms and changes is also thus of the nature of thought, and only the ignorant regard them as mere objects. When the scriptural texts speak of the identity of the world and Brahman they refer to this ultimate state in which the world exists in the pure consciousness—Brahman as one with it. But it is not only in the state of dissolution that the world exists in Brahman in undivided unity, but in the state of creation also the world exists in Brahman as one with it, for all the so-called mechanical and other kinds of forces that are to be found in matter and which constitute its reality are but the energy of God. And as the energy is always conceived as being one with that which possesses it, it is believed that the world with all its changes exists in God. In the state of

1 pralayehi pun-prakṛtyā-dikam jñāna-rūpenai' va rūpyate na tv artha-rūpeṇa arthato vyatijaka-syāpāraḥ-bhūvāt. Viṃṇā-mṛta-bhāṣya, 1. 1. 4.
2 jñāna-svarūpaṁ akhilāṁ jagad etad ahuddhayah 1. artha-svarūpaṁ paśyanto bhṛāmyante moha-sampriyāvete. Ibid.
3 śaktimat-kārya-kāraṇā-bhedenai' ca brahmā-devaitam bodhayanti... ayam ca sārva-kālo brahmani prapañcā-bhedah. Ibid.
pralaya the world-energies exist in God as some form of consciousness or conscious energy which is later on manifested by Him as material energy or matter. The unity of the world-energies in God is such that though these retain some kind of independence yet it is so held up and mixed up as it were in the reality of God that it cannot be separated from Him. Their independence consists in the fact that they are of the nature of energy, but as God possesses them they can have no existence and they cannot be conceived as apart from Him. As thus described the world of matter has no permanent reality, and the consciousness of this fact may be called the badha or contradiction (paramarthika-sattvā-bhava-nisaya eva bādhah)\(^1\). But in spite of this bādha the universe has a relative or vyavahārika existence (tādṛśa-bādhe'pi ca sati jñāna-sādhana-dināṃ vyavahārika-sattvāt).

The causality of prakṛti and puruṣa is limited to their specific capacities which determine the nature of modifications. But God is the universal all-cause behind them which not only shows itself through these specific limitations but which regulates the inner harmony and order subsisting in them and in their mutual relations. Thus the visual organ is limited in its function to the operation of vision, and the tactile organ is limited in its function to the operation of touch, but the functions and activities of all these are organized by the individual self which operates and manifests itself through them. Thus Brahman in this sense may be regarded as being both the instrumental and the material cause\(^2\). According to Sāmkhya and Yoga the prakṛti is supposed to be associated with the puruṣas through the inner and inherent teleology, but according to the Vedāntic view as interpreted by Bhikṣu their mutual association is due to the operation of God\(^3\).

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1 Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya, I. 1. 4.
3 Sāmkhya-yogibhyam puruṣa-rtha-prayuktā pravṛttih svayam eva puruṣena ēdyā-jīvena saṃyuyyate... asmābhīs tu prakṛti-puruṣa-saṃyoga śivareṇa kriyate. Ibid.
The Individual.

In his commentary on the *Isvara-gītā*, Bhikṣu says that the more universal has a wider sphere than the less universal and therefore it is called Brahman in relation to it. The cause of an effect is wider and more universal than the effect and is therefore called Brahman in comparison with it. Thus there is a hierarchy of Brahmans. But that which is at the apex of the hierarchy is the highest universal and the ultimate cause, and is therefore called the highest Brahman. Brahman is thus the highest and the ultimate reality. The determinations that make the universe of matter exist in Brahman as merged in its nature as thought. Creation means that these determinations which exist there in a potential form and without any operation are manifested and made operative as the world of nature. God in His nature as pure consciousness has a full and complete acquaintance of all the possible developments and modifications of the pre-matter as evolving into the actual universe. The starting point in the evolution of the pre-matter or *prakṛti* is the moment of its association with the spirits. The scriptural text says that the Lord entered into the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣas*, disturbed the equilibrium and associated them with one another. The *puruṣas* are, however, like sparks of consciousness and it is not possible to produce any disturbance in them. The disturbance is thus produced in the *prakṛti* and the effect of such disturbance in the *prakṛti* on the *puruṣas* is interpreted as seeming disturbances in the *puruṣas* as well. The *puruṣas* are to be conceived as being parts of God and there cannot be a real identity between the *puruṣas* and the Brahman. The so-called identity between the *puruṣas* and the Brahman refers merely to the fact of the *puruṣas* being the constituent entities in the being of God such as that which exists between the parts and the whole. The assertion of the Śaṅkarites that the individual soul is the same as Brahman and that the difference is due to external limitations of nescience or on account of reflections through it is wrong. The kind of unity that exists between the individual souls and the Brahman lies in the fact that they are indistinguishable in character from it (*avibhāga*). If the reality of individual souls is denied, that would amount to a denial of religious and moral values and of bondage and emancipation.
In this connection it is also urged that the individual souls are derived from God just as sparks come out of fire or the son comes out of the father. The individual souls resemble God so far as they are of the nature of pure consciousness. But though they have come out of Him, yet they retain their individuality and thus preserves for them the sphere of their moral career. The individual souls are free and emancipated in their own nature, they are all-pervasive and they also hold the universe within them in their consciousness. In all these they share the nature of Brahman. But in association with the limiting conditions (upādhi) they appear as finite and limited. When the entire career of the individual souls is known as existing in Brahman as part of it, as being manifested out of it as separate entities, as leading a career of their own in association with the limiting conditions and ultimately dissociating themselves from them and realizing their own natures as one with Brahman and in a sense different from it, this is the true philosophic knowledge and realization of their own nature. When the individuals start their career and destiny in life they are different from Brahman; but there was a time when they remained in one undivided unity with Brahman. But in spite of this unity the Brahman is always felt as different and as the other of the individuals, and this difference is never sublated¹. But the difference of this view from the Śaṁkhya is that the Śaṁkhya is satisfied only with considering the individuality and separateness of the puruṣas, but the Vedāntic view as interpreted herein cannot ignore the fact that in spite of their separateness they are one in essence with Brahman and have sprung out of it, and after the fulfilment of their career of individuality and destiny will again be merged in it, and even during their mundane career have an aspect of undividedness with Brahman inasmuch as they are the powers or energies of it². The difference that exists between the individuals and Brahman is most apparent during the mundane career on account of the fact that the world of nature has a separate existence in the consciousness of the individual centres and each one of them is limited to his own experiences. But at the time of dissolution, when the world of nature merges in the Brahman as a potential level of its energies, the individuals are

also merged in it and have no separate spheres of experience for themselves and thus cease to have any descriptive definition of themselves.

The nature of the relation of part and whole that exists between the individuals and Brahman is regarded as that subsisting between the son and the father. The father is reborn in the son. Before birth the son lies in a state of undivided unity in the vital energy of the father and yet when he separates out of him it is the same vital energy of the father that repeats itself in its new career and has a sphere of activity which is definitely its own. Again, when it is said that the individuals are parts of Brahman, it should not be interpreted to mean that they have any share in the existence of Brahman as God or world-creator. God is not homogeneous in His nature, but the element of individuation and differentiation always exists in Him. Had He been a homogeneous being His parts would have no specific differentiation and they would be like the parts of space which are always indistinguishable from one another. But the fact that God has within Him the principle of differentiation explains the fact that the individuals resemble Brahman only in the aspect of their consciousness but have no share in His creative functions or omnipotence. The Śāṁkhyaists hold that salvation is attained through dissociation of attachment as "mine" to one's experiences, mental faculties, senses, understanding and body, owing to one's knowledge of the fact that the self is the self-shining entity to which all experiences appear and within which they are held together as one with it though they are all different from it. But the Vedanta as herein interpreted holds that the attachment as "mine" vanishes with the knowledge of self as pure consciousness, with the knowledge of God as the being from which they come into being, by which they are maintained and into which they ultimately return, and with the knowledge that they all exist in the consciousness of God as parts of it; and that the self is not the real enjoyer of the experiences but is only the consciousness in which the universe and its experiences shine forth. Thus, though both in the Śānkhya and in the Vedānta as herein interpreted salvation is attained through the dissolution of the false attachment as "mine-ness," the dissolution of "mine-ness" is here due to an entirely different philosophic conception.

1 Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya, p. 56.
Consciousness is not a quality but it is the very substance of the self. Just as light is a substance which illuminates other things, so consciousness is also a substance which illuminates other things. When one says "I know it," knowledge appears to be a quality of "I" which is neither self nor a homogeneous entity. The "I" is a complex of sense-faculties, understanding, etc., to which a quality can be attributed; the self is not a complex entity, but a homogeneous simple substance—the consciousness. The complex entity, the "I," expresses all things by a manifestation of consciousness.

Bliss or happiness, however, cannot be regarded as a self-revealing substance, but it is an independent substance like sorrow which is revealed by consciousness. Neither the Brahman nor the self can therefore be regarded as being of the nature of bliss or happiness as this is a modification of prakrti and has therefore to be regarded as expressible (drśya) and not as expressing (darśana). The consciousness requires the intermediary of intellectual functions for the illumination of objects, but consciousness in itself does not require the intermediary of any other functions, as such a view would lead only to an infinite regressus without solving the point at issue. It is also wrong to suppose that the principle of consciousness exercises any operation in order to reveal itself, for an entity cannot operate on itself (karma-kartṛ-virodhāt). If for the above reasons the self cannot be regarded as being of the nature of bliss, then at the time of salvation also there cannot be any bliss in the self. There is only a cessation of sorrow at that time, or rather a cessation of both happiness and sorrow which is technically called a state of happiness or sukha (sukham duḥkha-sukhā-tyayah). At the time of emancipation all conditioning factors such as the intellectual functions and the like are dissolved and as a consequence thereof all experiences of pleasure and pain also vanish, for these are substances belonging to objects which were presented to the self through these conditions. When the Upaniṣads say that the self is dearest to us, it need not necessarily be supposed that it is the pleasure that is dearest to us, for the self may be regarded as being valued for its own sake; it may also be supposed that pleasure here means the cessation of pain. The desire for immortality or con-

1 Vijnāna-mṛtā-bhāṣya, 1. 1. 2.
2 ātmatvasyā'pi prema-prayojakatvāt duḥkha-nivṛtti-rūpattvād vā bodhyam. Ibid.
continued existence of the self illustrates the feeling of fondness that we all have for ourselves. The other view, that the ultimate object of realization is extermination of all sorrow is also not open to any objection on the ground that pleasure and pain never belonged to the selves; for the association of pleasure and pain is only with reference to their enjoyment and suffering and not directly as a bond of attachment to the self. The term “bhoga,” which may be translated only semi-accurately as “experience,” has a twofold application as referring to buddhi or psychosis and to puruṣa. The prakṛti is composed of sukha, duḥṣa and moha substances, and buddhi is an evolute of the prakṛti; therefore, when the buddhi is in association with sukha or duḥṣa, such an association supplies the buddhi with the stuff of which it is made and thus sustains and maintains its nature and constitution. But when the word bhoga has a reference to puruṣa, it means that the pleasure or sorrow held in the buddhi is reflected on it and is thereby intuited. It is this intuition of pleasure and pain through their reflection in the puruṣa that is regarded as their bhoga or experience by puruṣa. The buddhi cannot have any bhoga or experience, even in a remote sense of the term, for the simple reason that it is unconscious. But it may well be argued that since the puruṣa is not in reality the ego, it cannot have any experience in any real sense of the term; and since it cannot in reality have any experience of sorrow, it cannot in reality regard its cessation as being of the utmost value to it. The reply to such an objection is that the realization of the fact that the cessation of sorrow is of ultimate value to the experincer, the puruṣa, leads the sūddhi on its onward path of progress. Had it not been so there would be no movement of the buddhi on lines of utility. So though pleasure and pain do not belong to puruṣa, they may yet be experienced by it and the buddhi may be guided by such experiences.

When the Upaniṣad says “that art thou,” the idea at the back of it is that the self is not to be identified with any of the elements of the psychosis—the buddhi—or with any of the evolutes of the prakṛti. The self is part of the pure consciousness—the Brahman. When a man learns from the Upaniṣad text or one’s teacher that he is a part of Brahman he tries to realize it through a process of meditation. The difference of the Vedāntic view from that of Śaṅkhya is that the latter rests with the individual selves as the ultimate entities whereas the former emphasizes the Brahman as
the ultimate reality, and also the fact that the reality of all other things, the selves and the matter, depends ultimately on their participation in it.

Brahma-Experience and Experience.

Cause may be defined as the productivity due to direct and immediate perception of the material cause. The buddhi is regarded as an effect because, like jugs and other things, it is produced through some direct and immediate intuition of its causal material. This naturally implies that the buddhi has a causal material which is directly perceived by some Being and to which His creative activity is directed and this Being is God. It is said in the Brahma-sūtras that Brahman can be known by the testimony of the scriptures. But this cannot be true, for the Upaniṣads say that the Brahman cannot be expressed by words or known by intellect. The reply to this is that the denial contemplated in such passages refers only to the fact that Brahman cannot be known in entirety or in its uniqueness by the scriptural texts, but these passages do not mean that it is not possible to have a generic knowledge of the nature of Brahman. It is only when we have such a generic knowledge from the scriptures that we enter the sphere from which we may proceed further and further through the processes of Yoga and have ultimately a direct intuitive apperception of it. The specific nature of God as devoid of any quality or character only means that His nature is different from the nature of all other things, and though such a nature may not be realized by ordinary perception, inference or other sources of knowledge, there cannot be any objection to its being apprehended by the intuition of Yoga meditation. There are some Vedāntists who think that the Brahman cannot be felt or apprehended intuitively, but there is a mental state or function (vṛttī) which has the Brahman as its object. Such a mental state destroys the nescience and as a result of this the Brahman shines forth. But Bhikṣu objects to this and says that the vṛttī or mental function is admitted for relating the consciousness or the self with the objects, but once this connection is effected the objects are directly apprehended; so, in order to bring Brahman within the sphere of knowledge, the intuitive apperception is in itself sufficient for the purpose. It cannot be held that, since Brahman is itself of
the nature of pure illumination, no special intuitive apprehension is necessary and that the existence of the mental function or vṛtti was admitted for explaining the dissolution of ajñāna; for Brahman, being of the nature of consciousness, can be realized only through intuitive apprehension which is itself of the nature of knowledge. Since all apprehension is direct and immediate, self-knowledge must also be of the same kind. There is also no necessity to assume a principle of obstruction which has to be overcome as a condition of the rise of knowledge. In the state of deep dreamless sleep a principle of obstruction in the shape of the function of tamas has to be admitted in order to explain the absence of knowledge which leads to the absence of all cognitive or practical behaviour. To the opponent's idea that since Brahman is self-luminous it cannot have any relation with anything else, and that since Brahman and the self are identical there cannot be any self-knowledge of Brahman, for the Brahman cannot be both the knower and the known, Bhikṣu's reply is that self-luminousness does not mean unrelatedness; and the absolute identity of the self and the Brahman cannot also be admitted, and even if it be admitted we can explain the method of Brahma-knowledge by the same manner in which our experiential knowledge or self-consciousness can be explained.

Bhikṣu thinks that since we do not find in the Brahma-sūtras any account of the origin and growth of knowledge, the Sāmkhya-Yoga account of knowledge may well be accepted on account of the general affinity of the Sāmkhya-Yoga ideas with the Vedānta. According to the Sāmkhya-Yoga there is first a contact of the senses with their respective objects and as a result the tamas aspect of the buddhi is subordinated at the time; and the buddhi as pure sattva assumes the form of the object. This state of buddhi is called an objective state of the buddhi or a sensory idea or state (sā buddhya-vasthā viṣayā-kārā buddhi-vṛtti ity ucyate). During dreams and contemplative states images of external objects arise in the mind and are directly perceived and therefore valid. The connection of the puruṣa with the external objects is thus effected through the intermediary of the buddhi. So long as the buddhi remains impure the puruṣa cannot get itself related to objects through it. It is for this reason that during deep sleep when the buddhi is dominated by tamas the puruṣa-consciousness cannot manifest itself or make itself related with other objects. As soon as the buddhi is
modified into a sensory or image-state it is reflected in the *puruṣa*, which then reveals it as a flash of conscious state. It is in this manner that the pure infinite consciousness can manifest itself into finite forms of objects. As the *buddhi* is constantly transforming itself into various forms and reflecting them on the *puruṣa* from beginningless time there is a continuous flow of conscious states only occasionally punctuated by dreamless sleep. The *puruṣa* in its turn is also reflected in the *buddhi* and thereby gives rise to the notion of ego. In this connection Bhikṣu criticizes the view of Vācaspati that the reflection of the *puruṣa* in the *buddhi* is sufficient to explain the cognitive situation, and says that a reflection of consciousness cannot itself be conscious and hence cannot explain why the states of *buddhi* should appear as conscious. But the assumption that the states of *buddhi* are reflected in the consciousness explains their real connection with consciousness. It may be said that since it is only the reflections that are associated with consciousness, the things as they exist are not known. The reply to such an objection is that the *buddhi*-states are but copies of the external objects; and if the copies are intelligized, we have in the validity of such direct acquaintance of the copies the guarantee of their application to objects. It may be said again that when the reflections of the *buddhi*-states in the consciousness appear as one with it and therefore produce the phenomenon of knowledge we have in such phenomena an illusory unity of the consciousness with the states; our knowledge then becomes illusory. The reply to such an objection is that even if there is an element of illusion in knowledge, that does not touch the reality and validity of the objects to which such knowledge refers. Valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) thus consists of this reflection of the *buddhi*-states in the *puruṣa*. The fruit of the cognitive process (*pramāṇa-phala*) belongs to the pure consciousness or the *puruṣa* who thus behaves as the knower, though he is absolutely unattached to all experiences. The Vaiśeṣikas lay stress on the appearance of knowledge as produced and destroyed and therefore regard knowledge as being produced or destroyed by the collocation of causes. The reflection of the mental states to *puruṣa* is explained by them as if the knowledge belonged to the self. The Vedāntic epistemological process in which the *puruṣa* appears to be the knower and the enjoyer is explained by them as being due to a separate cognitive process called *anu-vyavasāya*. 
The transcendental experience of God has also to be explained on the basis of the origin of ordinary experiential knowledge. Through the understanding of the meaning of the scriptural texts and by the processes of Yoga there arises in the buddhi a modification of the form “I am Brahman.” This valid form of modification, being reflected in the puruṣa, is revealed as an intuitive apperception of the fact as true self-knowledge belonging to puruṣa. The difference between ordinary experiential knowledge and this knowledge is that it destroys egoism (abhimāna). In such a conception of self-knowledge the objection that the self cannot be both the knower and the known does not hold good; for the self that is known, being a mental state, is different in character from the transcendent self which knows it. The transcendent self as such is the knower, while its reflection in the buddhi as coming back to it is the self that is known. The objection that the admission of the possibility of self-knowledge stands against the doctrine of the self-luminosity of the self is not valid. The self-luminosity of the self simply means that it shines by itself and does not require the aid of any conditions to manifest itself.

Self-Luminosity and Ignorance.

Citsukha has defined self-luminosity as that which not being knowable may yet be treated or felt as immediate (avedyatve sati aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatvam). Bhikṣu argues that such a definition of self-luminosity (svaprakāśatva) is quite inadmissible. It is nowhere so defined in the Upaniṣads and it does not follow from the etymology of the word svaprakāśatva. The etymology only indicates the meaning “known by itself.” Again, if a thing is not known or cognized, it cannot for that simple reason have any relation to us; and such a meaning would be directly against the scriptural testimony which affirms that the ultimate truth can be apprehended or intuited. It may be suggested that though the Brahma-state of the mind cannot be directly known yet it will have the effect of removing the avidyā in the puruṣa. But this is open to various objections. Firstly, the self-luminous is a valid means of knowledge—a pramāṇa; but the mere removal of the avidyā from

1 ātmāpi bimba-rūpeṇa jñātā bhavati svagata-sva-pratibimba-rūpeṇa ca jñeyah. Vijnānā-myṛta-bhāṣya, 1. 1. 3.
the puruṣa cannot be regarded as valid knowledge or a pramāṇa. In this connection it is also relevant to ask the meaning of the term “avidyā.” If it means an illusory mental state, it must be a state of the buddhi, and its destruction must also belong to the buddhi and not to the puruṣa. If it means the psychical instincts or root-inclinations which are the cause of errors, then also since such root-inclinations belong to the guṇas of the prakṛti the destruction of such root-inclinations must also qualify the prakṛti. If it is regarded as a tamas—substance which covers the self, the supposition would be inadmissible, for if the tamas inherent in the buddhi is not removed there cannot be any modification of the buddhi copying the object in it, and if the tamas in the buddhi is once so removed then there cannot be any reflection of it in the puruṣa. Thus the view that knowledge leads to the dissolution of the veil of ignorance cannot be supported. The veil is only related to the instruments of knowledge, such as the eye, and cannot therefore be regarded as having anything to do with the pure consciousness. The explanation of the rise of knowledge as being due to the removal of the veil in the pure consciousness cannot therefore be justified. There cannot be any veil in the self. If the self be of the nature of pure consciousness, there cannot be any veil of ignorance inherent in it as the two suppositions are self-contradictory. Again, if it is supposed that the world-appearance is due to the operation of the principle of ignorance or avidyā in the mind and if it is supposed that true knowledge dispels such ignorance, then we are led to the absolutely unwarrantable conclusion that the world may be destroyed by knowledge, or that when one self attains true knowledge the world-appearance as such ceases, or that when emancipation is attained during the lifetime of a saint he will have no experience of the world around him. If it is held that the emancipated saint has still an element of ignorance in him, then the theory that knowledge destroys ignorance has to be given up. Moreover, if the self be regarded as being absolutely unattached to anything (a-saṅga), it is wrong to suppose that it would be associated with avidyā or ignorance. The veil can have reference only to the mental states, but it cannot have any relation to pure and unchangeable consciousness; for we have no analogy for such a thing. Again, if it is held that there is natural association of ignorance with pure consciousness, such an association can never be broken off. If such an
association be regarded as the consequence of some causal condition, it may well be said that such causality may be found in the mental states themselves. At least this would be a much simpler supposition than the primary assumption of a relationship of avidyā with pure consciousness and then to assume the operation of the mental states to dissolve it. The association of a veil with the mental states has to be admitted at least in the case of deep sleep, swoon or senility. Thus, if the veil has to be associated with the mental states, as the instrument of knowledge, it is quite unnecessary to assume it with reference to the self or pure consciousness. Patanjali, in his Yoga-sūtra, has defined avidyā as a mental state which apprehends the non-eternal as the eternal, the impure as the pure, the pleasure as sorrow. It is not, therefore, to be regarded as a separate substance inseparably associated with pure consciousness. In the same way it is wrong to define knowledge as the cessation of avidyā, which belongs to the puruṣa in this capacity. The proper way of representing it would be to say that knowledge arises in the puruṣa with the cessation of avidyā in the mental states. With the rise of the final knowledge as “I am Brahman” towards which the whole teleological movement of the prakṛti for the puruṣa was tending, the ultimate purpose of the prakṛti for the sake of the puruṣa is realized, and that being so the teleological bond which was uniting or associating the buddhi with the puruṣa is torn asunder and the mind or the buddhi ceases to have any function to discharge for the sake of the puruṣa. With the destruction of false knowledge all virtue and vice also cease and thus there is the final emancipation with the destruction of the integrity of the buddhi. Avidyā (false knowledge), asmitā (egoism), rāga (attachment), dveṣa (antipathy), abhiniveṣa (self-love) may all be regarded as avidyā or false knowledge which is their cause, and avidyā may also be regarded as tamas which is its cause. This tamas obstructs the manifestation of sattva and it is for this reason that there is false knowledge. When the tamas is dominated by the sattva, the sattva manifests through its instrumentality the ultimate self. The words “knowledge” (jñāna) and “ignorance” (ajñāna) are used in the scriptures to denote sattva and tmas. The word tmas is used to denote ajñāna and there is no such ajñāna as indescribable or indefinite entity as is supposed by the Śaṅkarites. In ordinary experiential knowledge this tmas is only temporarily removed, but
in the case of the rise of true and ultimate knowledge the power of the gunas to undergo modification for the sake of the relevant puruṣa is destroyed. Before the sattva can show itself in its own vr̥tti or state, it must dominate the tamas which would have resisted the sattva state. Thus the ontological opposition of the sattva and the tamas must settle their differences before a psychological state can make its appearance.

Relation of Sāmkhya and Vedānta according to Bhikṣu.

Bhikṣu thinks that the Sāmkhya and Yoga philosophies are intimately connected with the Vedānta and are referred to in the Upaniṣads. For this reason when certain topics, as for example the problem of experiential knowledge, are not described in the Vedānta, these are to be supplemented from the Sāmkhya and Yoga. If there is any seeming antagonism between the two, these also have to be so explained that the opposition may be reconciled. Bhikṣu takes this attitude not only towards Sāmkhya-yoga but also towards Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and the Pañcarātra. According to him all these systems have their basis in the Vedas and the Upaniṣads and have therefore an internal affinity which is not to be found in the Buddhists. The Buddhists are therefore the only real opponents. Thus he attempts to reconcile all the āstika systems of philosophy as more or less supplementary to one another or at least presenting differences which can be reconciled if they are looked at from the proper angles of vision. Bhikṣu collects his materials from the Upaniṣads, the Purāṇas and the smṛtis and tries to build his system of interpretation on that basis. It may, therefore, be regarded on the whole as a faithful interpretation of the theistic Vedānta which is the dominant view of the Purāṇas in general and which represents the general Hindu view of life and religion. Compared with this general current of Hindu thought, which flows through the Purāṇas and the smṛtis and has been the main source from which the Hindu life has drawn its inspiration, the extreme Sāmkhya, the extreme Vedānta of Śaṅkara, the extreme Nyāya, and the extreme dualism of Madhva may be regarded as metaphysical formalisms of conventional philosophy. Bhikṣu’s philosophy is a type of bhedā-bheda which has shown itself in various forms in Bhartr-prapañca,
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Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Nimbarka and others. The general viewpoint of this bheda-bheda philosophy is that it believes in the reality of the universe as well as in its spirituality, the distinctness of the individual souls as well as in their being centres of the manifestation of God, moral freedom and responsibility as well as a spiritual determinism, a personal God as well as an impersonal reality, the ultimate spirit in which matter and pre-matter are dissolved into spirituality, an immanent teleology pervading through matter and souls both in their origin and mutual intercourse as well as in the holiness of the divine will, omnipotence and omniscience, in the superior value of knowledge as well as of love, in the compulsoriness of moral and social duties as well as in their abnegation.

The ordinary classical Samkhya is well known to be atheistic and the problem arises as to how this may be reconciled with theism and the doctrine of incarnations. In interpreting sūtra 1. 1. 5, of the Brahma-sūtra, Bhikṣu says that since the scriptures say that “it perceived or desired,” Brahman must be a Person, for desire or perception cannot be attributed to the inanimate pre-matter (prakṛti). Śaṅkara, in interpreting this sūtra, asserts that the purpose of the sūtra is that prakṛti is not the cause of the world because the idea of a prakṛti or pradhāna is unvedic. Bhikṣu quotes a number of passages from the Upaniṣads to show that the idea of a prakṛti is not unvedic. Prakṛti is spoken of in the Upaniṣads as the cause of the world and as the energy of God. Prakṛti is also spoken of as māyā in the Śvetāsvatara, and God is spoken of as māyāvī or the magician who holds within Himself the magic power. The magician may withhold his magic, but the magic power lies all the same in him (māyāyā vyāpāra-nirṛttir eva’ vagamyate na nāsaḥ)\(^1\). The ordinary prakṛti is always undergoing change and transformation and it is only the special sattva-stuff associated with God that is always regarded as unchanging.

A question that may naturally arise in this connection is, if God is Himself unchangeable and if the sattva-body with which He is always associated is also always unchangeable, how is it that God can have a desire to produce the world at any particular time? The only explanation of this is that the attribution of will to God at a particular creative moment is only a loose usage of language. It

\(^1\) Vijnana-mrta-bhasya, 1. 1. 5.
means only that when the proper collocation of the causal conditions is ready for emergence into creative production at any particular point of time, it is designated as the manifestation of the creative will of God. God’s knowledge and will cannot have a beginning in time. But if God’s creative will be regarded as the cause of the movement of the prakṛti, then the Sāmkhya view that the movement of the prakṛti is solely due to its inherent teleology to be of service to the puruṣas becomes indefensible. The sattva, rajas and tamas in the mahat are indeed regarded in Sāmkhya as the triad of three persons, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara—the three created gods as it were (janye-śvara). But the Sāmkhya does not believe in any eternal God (nitye-śvara). According to Yoga the sattva part of mahat associated with eternal powers and existing eternally in the emancipated state is the person called Īśvara. His sattva body is, however, of the nature of an effect as it is derived from the sattva part of mahat and His knowledge is also not timeless.

In justification of Sāmkhya, Bhikṣu maintains that the denial of God by the Sāmkhya may be interpreted to mean that there is no necessity of admitting God for salvation. Salvation may be achieved by self-knowledge also. If this process is to be adopted, then it becomes quite unnecessary to prove the existence of God. It may, however, be remarked in this connection that this explanation of Bhikṣu can hardly be regarded as correct, for the Sāmkhya-sūtra is not merely silent about God, but it makes a positive effort to prove the non-existence of God, and there is not one redeeming statement that can be interpreted to mean that Sāmkhya was not antagonistic to theism. Bhikṣu, however, further reiterates that Sāmkhya was not atheistic and refers to the statement in the Śvetāsvatara (vi. 16) that salvation can be obtained by knowing the ultimate cause as declared in the Sāmkhya-yoga and to the statement of the Gītā where atheism is regarded as a demonic view.

In referring to Yoga, Bhikṣu says that it is curious that though the Yoga admitted the existence of God yet it did not make any effort to repudiate the idea that He might be partial or cruel; and instead of giving God His true cosmological place accepted a naturalistic view that prakṛti of itself passes through the transformative changes, being determined by its own inherent teleology in relation to the puruṣas. Īśvara, in Patañjali’s Yoga-sūtra, is an

1 Vijñānā-mṛta-bhāṣya, i. 1. 5.
object of Yoga meditation and He shows His mercy to his devotees and other beings. Bhikṣu, however, thinks that unless God is made to serve a cosmological purpose the association of prakṛti with the puruṣas cannot be explained.

The Īśvara is not conditioned in His activities by any entities which are associated with rajas or tamas which are of a fluctuating nature but with an entity which is always the same and which is always associated with eternal knowledge, will and bliss. The natural implication of this is that the will of God behaves like an eternal and unchangeable law. This law, however, is not a constituent of God but a constituent of prakṛti itself. It is through this part, an eternal unchangeable law which behaves as the eternal will and knowledge of God, that the phenomenal or the changeable part of prakṛti is determined.

In the Gītā Śri Kṛṣṇa says that He is the highest puruṣa and that there is nothing higher than Him. Bhikṣu gives two explanations of such statements which seem to be in opposition to the concept of God explained above. One explanation is that the reference of Kṛṣṇa as God to Himself is only a relative statement, made in a popular manner which has no reference to the nature of absolute God who is unrelatable to ordinary experience. The other explanation is that Kṛṣṇa calls Himself God by feeling Himself as identified with God. There is thus a distinction between para-brahma and kārya-brahma; and Śri Kṛṣṇa, being the kārya-brahman, popularly describes Himself as the kāraṇa-brahma. When other beings identify themselves with brahma, such identification is true only with reference to kārya-brahma, Śri Kṛṣṇa or Nārāyaṇa. They therefore have no right to speak of themselves as the absolute God. Beginningless absolute Brahman is unknown and unknowable, even by the gods and the sages. It is only the Nārāyaṇa who can know Him in His absolute nature. Nārāyaṇa is therefore to be regarded as the wisest of all beings. Those beings who in the previous creation became one with God by sāvjugya-mukti exist in the Vāsudeva-vyūha. In the Vāsudeva-vyūha Vāsudeva alone is the

1 rajas-tamah-sambhīmatayā malinam kārya-tattvām parameśvarasya no' pādihī kintu keralam nitya-jañāne-cchā-mandā-dimāt-sadai-ka-rūpam kāraṇa-
sattvām eva tasyo' pādihī. Īśvara-gītā. MS.
2 añīdayam tām para-m bṛhma na detā

ekas tad reda bhagavān dhātā nārāyaṇah

prabhuh. Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya, l. 1. 5.
eternal God; the other beings are but His parts. The other vyūhas, such as the Saṃkārṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, are but the manifestations of Vāsudeva (vibhūti) and they are to be regarded as partial creation of God or as Brahmapūra, Viṣṇu and Rudra. The power of the lesser gods, Viṣṇu or Śiva, is limited, since they cannot produce any change in the regulation of the cosmic affairs. When they speak of themselves as the Supreme God they do so only by a process of self-identification with the absolute God. The mahattatva, with its threefold aspect as sattva, rajas and tamas, forms the subtle body of Brahmapūra, Viṣṇu and Śiva or Saṃkārṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. These three gods, therefore, are supposed to have the one body, the “mahat,” which forms the basic foundation and substratum of all cosmic evolution. It is for this reason that they are said to have the cosmos or the universe as their body. These three deities are regarded as mutually interdependent in their operations, like vāta, pitta and kapha. It is for this reason that they are said to be both different from one another and yet identical. These three deities are identical with “mahat” which again is the unity of puruṣa and prakṛti. It is for this reason that Brahmapūra, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara are to be regarded as the partial manifestations (āmsāvatām) of Gods and not direct incarnations.

The penetration of Īśvara into pradhāna and puruṣa is through His knowledge, will and effort by which He rouses the gunas and helps the production of the mahat. Bhikṣu takes great pains to show that Bhagavān or absolute God is different from Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu who are direct manifestations of Him just as sons are of the father. Bhikṣu here differs from the opinion of the Pāṇcarātra school and of other thinkers such as Madhva, Vallabha and Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas who regard Nārāyaṇa, Viṣṇu and Kṛṣṇa as identical with God. The other avatāras, such as the Matsya, Kūrma, etc., are regarded by Bhikṣu as the lilā-vatāra of Viṣṇu and the āveśā-vatāra of God as bhagavān or parame-śvara.

1 Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya, i. i. 5.
2 In this connection Bhikṣu quotes the famous verse of the Bhāgavata, etc. cā mśa-kalāḥ pumāḥ kṛṣṇas tu bhagavān svayam. i. 1. 5. He, however, paraphrases Kṛṣṇa as Viṣṇu and explains svayam bhagavān as being the part of God just as the son is the part of the father: atra kṛṣṇo viṣṇuh svayam parame-śvaras tasya putravat sāksād amśa ity arthaḥ. Ibid. This, however, goes directly against the interpretation of the verse by the Gauḍīya school of Vaiṣṇavas who regard Kṛṣṇa as being the absolute God.
Māyā and Pradhāna.

Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra, 1. 1. 4, discusses the meaning of the term avyakta and holds that it has no technical meaning but is merely a negation of vyakta or manifested form. He says that the word avyakta is compounded of the negative particle na and vyakta. He points out that since the term avyakta has thus a mere etymological meaning and signifies merely the unmanifested, it cannot be regarded as having a technical application to the Pradhāna of Sāmkhya. The avyakta according to Śaṅkara thus means the subtle cause, but he does not think that there is an independent subtle cause of the world corresponding to the Pradhāna of the Sāmkhya. He holds that this primal state of the existence of the universe is dependent upon God and is not an independent reality. Without the acceptance of such a subtle power abiding in God, God cannot be a creator. For without power God cannot move Himself towards creation; it is the seed power called avidyā which is denoted by the term avyakta. It is the great sleep of māyā (māyāmayi mahā-supti) depending upon God. In it all the jīvas lie without any self-awakening. The potency of the seed power is destroyed by knowledge in the case of emancipated beings and for that reason they are not born again. Vācaspati, in commenting on it in his Bhāmati, says that there are different avidyās with reference to different selves. Whenever an individual attempts to gain wisdom, the avidyā associated with him is destroyed, though the avidyā associated with other individuals remains the same. Thus, even though one avidyā is destroyed, the other avidyās may remain in an operative condition and may produce the world. In the case of the Sāmkhyists, however, who admit one pradhāna, its destruction would mean the destruction of all. Vācaspati says further that if it is held that though the pradhāna remains the same yet the avidyā as non-distinction between puruṣa and the buddhi is responsible for bondage, then there is no necessity of admitting the prakṛti at all. The existence and the non-existence of avidyā would explain the problem of bondage and emancipation.

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1 yadi vayam sva-tantram kāncit prāg-avasthām jagatah kāraṇatvenā bhupagacchena praśaṅjayema tadā pradhāna-kāraṇa-vādam. Vedānta-sūtra, 1. 4. 3.
2 muktānām ca punar an utpattih; kutah vidyayā tasyā vijā-śakter dāhāt. Ibid.
The objection that the distinction of selves depends upon avidyā and the distinction of avidyā upon the distinction of the selves is invalid, for the process is beginningless. The term avyakta refers to avidyā in a generic sense as including all avidyās. The avidyā rests in the individual but is yet dependent upon God as its agent and object. The avidyā cannot come into operation without having the Brahman as its support, though the real nature of the selves is Brahman; yet, so long as they are surrounded by avidyā, they cannot know their real nature.

In reply Bhikṣu says that since without power God alone is unable to create the manifold universe it has to be admitted that God does so by a power distinct from Him, and this power is the prakṛti and the puruṣa. If it is said that this power is avidyā, then also since it is a dual factor separate from Brahman that may as much nullify the monistic doctrine as the admission of prakṛti and puruṣa. It cannot also be said that in the time of pralaya the avidyā is non-existent, for in that case there being only Brahman the world would have to be admitted as coming into being from Brahman alone, and the selves that lie identified with Brahman and one with Him would, even though emancipated, undergo the world-process (samsāra). If it is held that bondage and emancipation are all imaginary, then there is no reason why people should undergo so much trouble in order to attain an imaginary emancipation. If it is held that avidyā may be said to have a secondary or vyavahārika existence at the time of pralaya, and if it is argued that under the circumstances bondage and emancipation may also be regarded as having a merely secondary existence, the view of monism would be unexceptional. But if such an avidyā be admitted which has mere vyavahārika or secondary existence, the same may be supposed with regard to pradhāna. If we inquire into the meaning and significance of the term vyavahārika, we find that its connotation is limited to the power of effectuation and service towards the fulfilment of the purpose. If that is so, then prakṛti may also be admitted to have a similar kind of existence. It is true no doubt that the pradhāna is regarded as eternal, but this eternity is an eternity of ceaseless change. Avidyā is regarded by the Vedāntists as apāramārthikā, that is, avidyā is not true

1 pradhāne' pidaṃ tulyam pradhāne artha-kriyā-kāritva-rūpa-vyavahārika-sattvasyai'vā'smākam iṣṭattvāt. Vijñāna-mṛta-bhāṣya, 1. 4. 3.
absolutely. This negation of absolute truth may mean that it is not immediate and self-apparent or that it cannot manifest itself as being or that it has no existence in all times. But such limitations are true also of pradhanā. The pradhanā is eternal as changeful, but it is non-eternal in all its products. All the products of prakṛti are destructible; being unintelligent by nature they can never be self-apparent. Again, though pradhanā may be said to be existent in any particular form at any particular time, yet even at that time it is non-existent in all its past and future forms. Thus, since vyavahārikatva cannot mean absolute non-existence (like the hare’s horn) and since it cannot also mean absolute existence it can only mean changefulness (parināmita); and such an existence is true of the pradhanā. Thus Śaṅkarites do not gain anything in criticizing the doctrine of pradhanā, as a substitute of the avidyā is supposed by them to be endowed with the same characteristics as those of the prakṛti.

It is thus evident that Śaṅkara’s criticism against prakṛti may well apply to the prakṛti of Isvara Kṛṣṇa, but it has hardly any application to the doctrine of prakṛti as conceived in the Purāṇas as interpreted by Bhikṣu, where prakṛti is regarded as a power of Brahman. If avidyā is also so regarded, it becomes similar to prakṛti. As it is believed to be existent in a potential form in God, even in the pralaya, most of the connotations of avidyā that distinguish it from the absolute reality in the Brahman are also the connotations of prakṛti.

According to the view propounded by Bhikṣu pradhanā is not regarded as having a separate and independent existence but only as a power of God1.

In explaining Brahma-sūtra 1. 4. 23, Bhikṣu points out that Isvara has no other upādhi than prakṛti. All the qualities of Isvara such as bliss, etc., proceed from prakṛti as is shown in Patañjali-sūtra. Prakṛti is to be regarded as the characteristic nature of Brahman, which is not directly the material cause of the world, but is only the abiding or the ground cause (adhiśthāna-kāraṇa), and prakṛti, as it were, is its own character or part (svīyo bhāvaḥ padarthā upādhī ity arthāḥ). The relation between this upādhi and prakṛti is one of the controller and the controlled or the possessor

1 Prakṛtisasya tadbudhādhyaye pradhanāṁ kāraṇatva-saritravac chakti-vadhisyaś- vocyate na svatantryenāya u tadvāryata ity arthah. Vijñāna-mṛta-bhasya, 1. 4. 4.
Bhikṣu’s criticism of the Sāṁkhya and Yoga.

In commenting on the Brahma-sūtra, n. i. i., 1, 2, 3, Bhikṣu says that Manu speaks of the original cause as being the prakṛti, and so also does the Sāṁkhya, and both of them are regarded as authoritative. But since the Sāṁkhya doctrine of atheism is contradicted by the opinions of Patañjali and Parāśara, the view of the Brahma-sūtras cannot be interpreted merely on the atheistic suggestion of Sāṁkhya. It has also to be admitted that the atheistic portion of Sāṁkhya has no authoritative support either in the Vedas or in the Purāṇas and has therefore to be regarded as invalid.

It is wrong, however, to suppose that Kapila really intended to preach atheism. He quoted atheistic arguments from others and showed that even if God were not accepted emancipation could be obtained by differentiation of prakṛti from puruṣa. The Sāṁkhya also emphasizes the fact that emancipation can be obtained merely by knowledge. This, however, should not be interpreted as being in conflict with the Upaniṣadic texts which declare that emancipation can be obtained only by the true knowledge of God. For these signify only that there are two ways of obtaining emancipation, the inferior one being through knowledge of the distinction of prakṛti and puruṣa, and the superior one through the true knowledge of God. The Yoga also shows two ways of emancipation, the inferior one being through the ordinary Yoga processes, and the superior one through the renunciation to God of all actions and through devotion to Him. It is also wrong to suppose that the Sāṁkhya is traditionally atheistic, for in the Mahābhārata (Śānti-parvan 318. 73) and Matsya Purāṇa (4. 28) we hear of a twenty-sixth category,

1 sāṁkhyaṁ yogam pāñca-rātram vedāḥ pāśupatām tathā 1. paras-parāny angāny etāni hetubhir na virodhayet. Vijnānā-mṛta-bhāṣya, n. i. i.
2 itāś ca āstvarā- pratīṣṭhāḥ-mīśa kapila-smṛteḥ mūlānām anupalabdheḥ a-pratyakṣatvāt dūrvālāvatvam ity āha. Ibid.
the God. So the difference between the theistic and the atheistic Sāṃkhya is due to the difference of representation as the true Sāṃkhya doctrine and the Sāṃkhya doctrine which proposes to ensure emancipation even for those who are not willing to believe in God. In this connection Bhikṣu admits the probability of two different schools of Sāṃkhya, one admitting Isvara and the other not admitting it, and it is only the latter which he thinks to be invalid. He also refers to the Kūrma Purāṇa in which the Sāmkhyists and the Yogins are said to be atheistic. The chief defect of the Śaṅkara school is that instead of pointing out the invalidity of theistic Sāṃkhya, Śaṅkara denies all theistic speculations as non-vedic and misinterprets the Brahma-sūtras accordingly. Bhikṣu refers to Praśna, 4. 8, where the twenty-three categories of Sāṃkhya are mentioned and only prakṛti has been omitted. The mahat-tattva is not mentioned directly, but only as buddhi and citta. The fourfold division of the buddhi-tattva as manas, buddhi ahamkāra and citta is also admitted there. In the Garbha Upaniṣad eight prakṛtis and sixteen vikāras are mentioned. In the Maitreyo-paniṣad we hear of the three guṇas and their disturbance by which creation takes place. We hear also that the puruṣas are pure consciousness. In Maitri Upaniṣad, v. 2, it is said that the tamas, being disturbed by the supreme being, gives rise to rajas and that to sattva. In the Cūlikā Upaniṣad the categories of the Sāṃkhya doctrine are also mentioned in consonance with the monistic doctrine of the Vedāṅga. It also says that there are various schools of the Sāṃkhya, that there are some who admit twenty-six categories, others twenty-seven, and again others who admit only twenty-four categories. There is also said to be a monistic and also a dualistic Sāṃkhya and that they find expression in three or five different ways. Thus Vijñāna Bhikṣu says that the Sāṃkhya doctrine is definitely supported by the Upaniṣadic texts.

Concerning the Yoga also it can be said that only that part of it may be regarded as opposed by the Upaniṣads which holds a separate and independent existence of prakṛti as apart from Isvara. In the Sūtras of Patanjali it is said that God helps the movement of the prakṛti only by removing the obstacles, just as a ploughman enables

1 athavā kapilai-ka-deśaḥ prāmāṁyam aṣṭu. Vijñānā-mṛta-bhāṣya, i. 1. 2.
2 tamo va īdm ekamgre āśtvai rajāsas tat pereśitam viṣamattam prayāty etad rūpaṁ tad rajah khalv t-ritam viṣamattam prayāty etad vai sattvasya rūpaṁ tat sattvam eva. Maitri Upaniṣad, v. 2.
Bhikṣu's criticism of the Sāṁkhya and Yoga

water to pass from one field to another. But the Upaniṣads definitely say that God is the generator of the movement and the disturbance of the prakṛti. The sattva body of God is thus there held to be a product of prakṛti as it comes into being from the prakṛti through desire in a previous creative cycle. The sattva body of God is thus derived from the prakṛti, through the will of God serving as the vehicle of the will of God for the removal of the obstructions in the course of the evolutionary process of the prakṛti. Prakṛti in itself therefore is not regarded by Patañjali as the upadhi of Isvara. Bhikṣu seeks to explain this part of the Yoga doctrine also in the same manner as he did with the Sāṁkhya by accepting the so-called abhyupagama-vāda. He maintains that the Yoga holds that even if it is considered that the prakṛti is independent and runs into evolutionary activity by herself, undetermined by the eternal knowledge and will of God, and even if it be admitted that the eternal God has no eternal knowledge and will and that the movement of prakṛti is due to an inner teleology in accordance with karma, and that in the beginning of the creation prakṛti is transformed into the sattva-prādhi of God, even then by self-abnegation to God kaivalya can be attained. Thus, in the Yoga view the upādhi of Īśvara is a product and not the material or the instrumental cause of the world, whereas in the Vedānta view as propounded by Bhikṣu the upādhi of Īśvara is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world, and this upādhi which forms the material stuff of the world is prakṛti herself and not her product. In the Yoga view God is eternal, but His thought and will are not eternal. This thought and will are associated with the sattva part of prakṛti which lies embedded in it at the time of pralaya which only shows itself at the beginning of a new creative cycle through the potency left in it by the will of God in the previous creative cycle. God, in the view of Yoga, is thus not both the material and the instrumental cause of the world as the Vedānta holds. According to the Vedānta as explained by Bhikṣu, the prakṛti plays her dual part; in one part she remains as the eternal vehicle of the eternal knowledge and will of God, and through the other part she runs through an evolutionary process by producing disturbances of sattva, rajas and

tamas. This also explains the Purānic view of the gradual derivation of sattva, rajas and tamas as stages in the evolution of prakṛti through which at a later stage the cosmic evolution takes place. Thus the prakṛti which remains associated with God as the vehicle of His knowledge and will is unchangeable and eternal.

Īśvara-gītā, its Philosophy as expounded by Vijñāna Bhikṣu.

In the second part (uttara-vihāga) of the Kūrma Purāṇa the first eleven chapters are called Īśvara-gītā. In the first chapter of this section Suta asks Vyāsa about the true knowledge leading to emancipation as originally instructed by Nārāyaṇa in his incarnation as a tortoise. It is reported by Vyāsa that in Vadārikāśrama in an assembly of the sages Sanat-kumāra, Sanandana, Sanaka, Aṅgirā, Bhṛgū, Kaṇāda, Kapila, Garga, Valadeva, Śukra, and Vasīṣṭha Rṣi Nārāyaṇa appeared and later on Śiva also came there. Śiva then at the request of the sages gave a discourse regarding the ultimate nature of reality, the world and God. The real discourse begins with the second chapter. Vijñāna Bhikṣu wrote a commentary on the Īśvara-gītā; he thought that since the Īśvara-gītā contains the main purport of the Bhagavad-gītā it was unnecessary for him to write any commentary on the latter. Apart from the Śāṅkhya and Yoga works, Vijñāna Bhikṣu wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, a commentary on the Upaniṣads, and a commentary on the Īśvara-gītā of the Kūrma Purāṇa. In his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra he quotes a passage from Citsukhācārya of the thirteenth century. He himself probably flourished some time in the fourteenth century. Bhikṣu’s other works are Śāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya, Yoga-vārtika, Yoga-sūtra, Śāṅkhya-sūtra, and the Upadeśa-ratnamālā. In his interpretation of the Brahma-sūtra and of the Īśvara-gītā he has followed the line of interpretation of Vedānta as adopted in the Purāṇas, where the Śāṅkhya-yoga and Vedānta appear to be wielded together into one indivisible harmonious system. The philosophy of the Īśvara-gītā as dealt with here is based upon Bhikṣu’s commentary, called the Īśvara-gītā-bhāṣya which was available to the present writer as a manuscript by courtesy of M. M. Gopinātha Kavirāja, of the Benares Sanskrit College.

1 Vijñāna-mṛta-bhaṣya, pp. 271, 272.
The main questions that were asked by the sages which led to the discourse of Śiva are the following: (1) What is the cause of all? (2) Who suffers rebirth? (3) What is the soul? (4) What is emancipation? (5) What is the cause of rebirth? (6) What is the nature of rebirth? (7) Who can realize all? (8) What is the ultimate reality, the Brahma? The answers to these questions are not given serially, but the most important topics as they appeared to the instructor, Śiva, were handled by him in his own order of discourse. Thus the eighth question was taken up for answer before all other questions. This answer begins with a description of the nature of Ātman not as the individual soul, but as the highest self.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu seems to acknowledge the doctrine of absolute absorption or assimilation of the individual soul within the universal and infinite soul. And even during his existence in this world, the soul is said to be merely a witness.

He explains that in the answer to the eighth question in the Kūrma Purāṇa, i. 1, 7, p. 453, the word ātmā refers to the Godhead, though in ordinary usage it stands only for the finite souls, and suggests the self-sameness of the finite and infinite souls. The reference here is thus to the prākṛtā-tmā and not to the jīvā-tmā. God is called sarvā-ntara as He has already entered the hearts (anātah) of the diverse living beings and exists there in the capacity of being only a witness (sarvesāṁ sva-bhīmānāṁ antāḥ-sākṣitvena' nugataḥ). A sākṣi (witness) is he who illuminates (sva-pratimūbha-vaṣṭu-bhāsakaḥ), without any efforts on his part (vyāpāraṁ vinai' va). He is called antaryāmi on account of his association with finite intelligences and through this association even the individual soul shares the greatness of the highest self.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu says that the line “asmīd vijñāyate viśvam atrai' va pravīlīyate” occurs here by way of giving a reason for the sakti-śaktimad-a-bhedatva doctrine so ably put forth by calling the ultimate Reality or paramā-tman, antaryāmin and then explaining the doctrine a little by giving him a few adjectives more to bring out the significance of the esoteric doctrine or suggestion of sakti-śaktimad-abhedatva. Now it is said that as it is from Him that the inverse-effects are created, in Him they exist and in Him they are

1 Bibliotheca Indica edition, 1890.
2 See Isvara-gitā-bhāṣya, MS.
3 evam antaryāmi-saṁta-saṁbandhāt cin mātro'pi paramā-ntaryām bhavati sarvā-ntarāteṇa sarva-śaktiśe' avibhāga-lakṣaṇā-bhedat. Ibid.
annihilated. He is non-different (or better, inseparable) from \textit{puruṣa} and \textit{prakṛti}, because of His being the support and the ground of the whole universe beginning from \textit{puruṣa} and \textit{prakṛti}; i.e. of the effects right down from \textit{puruṣa} and \textit{prakṛti} and inclusive of them. If like the body He had not superintended all the causal agencies, then the cause, like the \textit{dravya}, \textit{guna}, \textit{karma}, etc., could not have effected any causal function (\textit{vadi hi paramā-tmā dehavat sarvam kāraṇam nādhiśṭheta} tarhi \textit{dravya-guṇa-karma-di-sādhā-raṇā-khila-kriyā-rtha-mūla-kāraṇam na syād iti})\textsuperscript{1}. If it is said that the sentence speaks of effectedness (or causality) as common to all tangible manifestations, then the idea of the previous sentence maintaining the identity between Brahman and the world would not be admissible\textsuperscript{2}.

Brahman is the \textit{upādāna-kāraṇa} of the universe, but this universe is a \textit{parināmi-rūpa} of Brahman. His is not therefore the \textit{parināmi-rūpa}, because that will contradict the statements made by the scriptures declaring the Brahman to be unchangeable (\textit{kūṭastha}). Then Vijnāna Bhikṣu defines that God being the ultimate substratum of all, the functioning of all types of causes is helped in its operation by Him and it is this that is called the \textit{adhisthāna-kāraṇatā} of God.

Then he maintains his doctrine of \textit{jīvātma-paramā-tmanor aṃśāṃsi-abheda} by the line "\textit{sa māyī mārayā baddhah karoti vividhās tanūḥ}" and says further that \textit{Yājñavalkya-smṛti} and \textit{Vedānta-sūtra} also preach the same doctrine. \textit{Śrīmad-bhagavad-gitā} says the same thing. Then comes the elaboration of the same idea. A reference to Śaṅkara by way of criticizing him is made\textsuperscript{3}. \textit{Māyā-vāda} is called a sort of covert Buddhism and for support a passage from \textit{Padma-purāṇa} has also been quoted.

\textit{Adhiśṭhāna-kāraṇatva}, or the underlying causality, is defined as that in which, essence remaining the same, new differences emerge just as a spark from the fire. This is also called the \textit{aṃśāṃsi-bhāva}, for, though the \textit{niravaya-ta} Brahman cannot be regarded as having parts, yet it is on account of the emergence of different characters from a common basis that the characterized units are called the parts of the common basis. It should be noted that Vijnāna Bhikṣu is against the view that the Brahman undergoes any transformatory

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Īśvara-gītā-bhāṣya}. MS.  
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid.
change. Though the Brahman does not undergo any transformatory change, yet new differences emerge out of it. In the sentence “Sa māyā māyayā baddhah" the idea is that the māyā itself is an integral part of the Divine entity and not different from it. The māyā is like an aṁśa which is identical with the aṁśin.

Though in the scriptures both the distinction and the identity of the individual with the Brahman have often been mentioned, yet it is by the realization of the difference of the individual with the Brahman that ultimate emancipation can be attained\(^1\).

The self is of the nature of pure consciousness and is not in any way bound by its experiences. The assertion of Śaṅkara that ātmā is of the nature of joy or bliss is also wrong; for no one can always be attached to himself, and the fact that everyone seeks to further his own interest in all his actions does not imply that the soul is of the nature of bliss. Moreover, if the soul is of the nature of pure consciousness, it cannot at the same time be of the nature of pure bliss; at the time of acquiring knowledge we do not always feel pleasure.\(^2\)

Egoism (abhimāna) also does not belong to the soul but like sukha and duśkha belongs to prakṛti, which are wrongly attributed to the self.\(^3\) The soul is, however, regarded as an enjoyer of its experiences of pleasure and pain, a reflection of them on it through the vṛtti, and such a reflection of pleasure and pain, etc., through the vṛtti is regarded as the realization (sākṣātkāra) of the experiences. Such an enjoyment of experiences, therefore, is to be regarded as anaupādhika (or unconditional). This is also borne out by the testimony of the Bhagavad-gītā and Śaṁkhyā. Such an enjoyment of the experiences does not belong to the prakṛti (sākṣātkāra-rūpa-dharmasya drṣya-dharmatva-sambhavāti)\(^4\). The passages which say that the experiences do not belong to the puruṣa refer to the modifications of vṛtti in connection with the experiences. The assertion of Śaṅkara, therefore, that the ātman is as incapable of experiences (bhoga) as of the power of acting (kartrtvā) is therefore false.

Ajñāna, according to Vijñāna Bhikṣu, means anyathā-jñāna. Pradhāna is so called because it performs all the actions for the sake of the puruṣa; and it is through the fault of his association with pradhāna that the puruṣa is associated with false knowledge.

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1. Īśvara-gītā-bhāṣya.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
The ātman remains unchanged in itself and the differences are due to the emergence of the association of buddhi and other faculties which give rise to experience. At the time of emancipation jīvas remain undifferentiated with Brahman. Prakṛti, puruṣa, and kāla are ultimately supported in Brahman and yet are different from it.

There are indeed two kinds of scriptural texts, one emphasizing the monistic side, the other the dualistic. A right interpretation should, however, emphasize the duality-texts, for if everything were false then even such a falsity would be undemonstrable and self-contradictory. If it is argued that one may accept the validity of the scriptural texts until the Brahman is realized and when that is done it matters little if the scriptural texts are found invalid, the reply to such an objection is that, whenever a person discovers that the means through which he attained the conclusion was invalid, he naturally suspects the very conclusion arrived at. Thus the knowledge of Brahman would itself appear doubtful to a person who discovers that the instruments of such knowledge were themselves defective.

The individual soul exists in the paramā-tman in an undifferentiated state in the sense that the paramā-tman is the essence or ground-cause of the jīvas; and the texts which emphasize the monistic side indicate this nature of paramā-tman as the ground-cause. This does not imply that the individual souls are identical with Brahman.

Pleasure and pain do not belong to the self; they really belong to the antahkarana and they are ascribed to the self only through the association of the antahkarana with the self. In the state of emancipation the self is pure consciousness without any association of pleasure and pain. The ultimate end is the cessation of the suffering of sorrow (duḥkha-bhoga-nivṛtti) and not the cessation of sorrow (na duḥkha-nivṛttih); for when one has ceased to suffer sorrow, sorrow may still be there and the avoidance of it would be the end of other persons. The assertion of Śaṅkara that there is bliss in the stage of emancipation is wrong. For during that stage there is no mental organ by which happiness could be enjoyed. If the self be regarded as of the nature of bliss, then also the self would be both the agent and the object of the enjoyment of bliss, which is impossible. The ascription of ananda in the state of emancipation only refers to it in a technical sense, i.e., ananda means the absence of pleasure and pain.
Bhikṣu admits a gradation of realities. He holds further that when one entity is stabler than another, the former is more real than the latter. Since paramā-tman is always the same and does not undergo any change or transformation or dissolution, He is more real than the prakṛti or puruṣa or the evolutes of prakṛti. This idea has also been expressed in the view of the Purāṇas that the ultimate essence of the world is of the nature of knowledge which is the form of the paramā-tman. It is in this essential form that the world is regarded as ultimately real and not as prakṛti and puruṣa which are changing forms.

The prakṛti or māyā has often been described as that which can be called neither existent nor non-existent. This has been interpreted by the Śankarites as implying the falsity of māyā. But according to Vijnāna Bhikṣu it means that the original cause may be regarded as partly real and partly unreal in the sense that while it is unproductive it is regarded as unreal, and when it passes through the course of evolutionary changes it is regarded as real (kiñcit sad-rūpā kiñcit asad-rūpā ca bhavati).

Now coming to sādhanā he says that by āgama, anumāna and dhyāna one should attain self-knowledge. This self-realization leads to the asamprajñāta-yoga which uproots all the vāsanās. It is attained not only by the cessation of ajñāna but also by the destruction of the karmas. He also maintains that the emphasis of Śaṅkara on the understanding of the Upaniṣadic texts as a means to the attainment of self-realization is also wrong.

In the state of mukti, self having dissociated itself from the liṅga-sarīra becomes one with Brahman, just as the river becomes one with the sea. This is not a case of identity, but one of non-difference (liṅga-sarīra-tmaka-śoḍaśa-kala-śūnyena ekatām avi-bhāga-lakṣaṇā-bhedam atyantam vrajat). Here in the state of mukti the identity and difference of jīva and Brahman have been indicated on the analogy of the river and the sea.

Bhikṣu says that there is a difference between the Sāmkhya and Yoga regarding the attainment of emancipation. The followers of the Sāmkhya can attain emancipation only by the cessation of their prārabdha karmas. Since avidyā has been destroyed, the realization of emancipation has only to wait till the prārabdhas exhaust themselves. The followers of Yoga, however, who enter into a state of asamprajñāta-samādhi have not to suffer the fruits of the prārabdha,
because being in a state of **asamprajñāta** meditation the **prārabdhā** can no longer touch them. They can, therefore, immediately enter into a state of emancipation at their own sweet will.

According to Bhikṣu, though **Īśvara** transcends the **gunas**, yet through his body as pure **sattva** he carries on the creative work and the work of superintending and controlling the affairs of the universe. Though his agency is manifested through his body as pure **sattva** as a directive activity, yet it is without any association of passions, antipathies, etc.

In the third chapter of the *Kūrma Purāṇa* it is said that **pradhāna**, **puruṣa** and **kāla** emerge from **avyakta**, and from them the whole world came into being. Bhikṣu says that the world did not emanate directly from Brahman but from **pradhāna**, **puruṣa** and **kāla**. There cannot be any direct emanation from Brahman; for that would mean that Brahman undergoes a change. A direct emanation would imply that evil and hell also sprang from Brahman. The emanation of **prakṛti**, **puruṣa** and **kāla** from Brahman is explained on the supposition that Brahman is a kind of ground-cause of **prakṛti**, **puruṣa**, and **kāla** (**abhivyakti-kāraṇa** or **ādhāra-kāraṇa**). But this emanation of **prakṛti**, **puruṣa** and **kāla** is not through modificatory processes in the manner in which curd is produced from milk. In the time of dissolution **prakṛti** and **puruṣa** are unproductive of any effects and may therefore be regarded as it were as non-existent. It is through the will of God that the **prakṛti** and **puruṣa** are drawn out and connected together, and the point of motivation is started for the processes of modification of the **prakṛti**. This point of motivation is called **kāla**. It is by such a course that all these three may be regarded as producing an effect and therefore as existent. It is in this sense that **prakṛti**, **puruṣa** and **kāla** are regarded as brought into being by God\(^1\).

**Avyakta** as God is so called because it transcends human knowledge. It is also so called because it is a state of non-duality, where there is no difference between energy and its possessor, and where everything exists in an undifferentiated manner. **Avyakta** used in

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\(^1\) *na tu sāksād eva brahmaṇaḥ...atra kāla-di-trayasya brahma-kāryatvam abhivyakti-rūpam eva vivakṣitam...prakṛti-puruṣayos ca muhad-ādi-kārya-nmukhataḥ ca parame-śvara-kṛtād anyonya-sanyogād eva bhavati, evam kālaśya prakṛti-puruṣa-samyogāḥ-hhyā-hāryo-nmukhatvam ‘parame-śvare-ch ayai’va bhavati. Īśvara-gītā-bhāya. MS.*
the sense of *prakṛti* is the basis of change, or change as such; and *puruṣa* denotes the knower.

The *paramā-tman* is spoken of as the soul of all beings. This should not, however, be taken to mean that there is only the *paramātman* which exists and that all things are but false impositions on his nature. The *paramā-tman* or *Parameśvara* is both different and identical with *kāla, pradhāna* and the *puruṣa*. The existence of the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* has to be regarded as less ultimate than the existence of God, because the existence of the former is relative as compared with the existence of God (*vikāra-pekṣayā sthiratvena apekṣakam etayos tattvam*, p. 44). Time is regarded as an instrumental cause of the connection of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Time is a superior instrumental agent to deeds, for the deeds are also produced by time (*karma-dinam api kāla-janyatvāt*). Though the time is beginningless, yet it has to be admitted that it has a special function with reference to each specific effect it produces. It is for that reason that at the point of dissolution time does not produce the evolutes of *mahat*, etc. *Mahat-tatva* is in itself a combination of the conscious centres and the material element.

When the word *puruṣa* is used in the singular number, such a use should not be interpreted to mean a denial of the individual *puruṣas*. It only means that in such instances of scriptural texts the word *puruṣa* has been used in a generic sense. *Puruṣas* are also of two kinds—the *apara* and the *para*. Both are in themselves devoid of any qualities and of the nature of pure consciousness. But there is this difference between the *para puruṣa* and the *apara puruṣa*, that while the former never has any kind of association with any experience of pleasure and pain, the latter may sometimes be associated with pleasure and pain which he at that time feels to be his own (*anye guṇā-bhimānāt saṇuṇā iva bhavanti paramātmā tu guṇā-bhimāna-śūnyah*, p. 46). It must be understood, however, that the experiencing of pleasure and pain is not an indispensable part of the definition of *puruṣa*, for at the stage of *jīvan-mukti* the *puruṣas* do not identify themselves with the experiences of pleasure and pain, but they are still *puruṣas* all the same. God, however, who is called the superior *puruṣa*, does not associate Himself with the experiences that proceed as a fruit of *karma* and which are enjoyed in a spatial-temporal manner. But God continues to enjoy eternal bliss in association with His own special *upādhi* or conditions
When the scriptural texts deny the enjoyment of the experiences of pleasure and pain with regard to the Supreme puruṣa, the idea is that though the Supreme puruṣa underlies the ordinary puruṣas as their ground yet he is not in any way affected by their experiences (ekasminn eva buddhāv avasthānena jīva-bhogataḥ prasaktasya paramā-tma-bhogasyai'va pratiṣedhah). So the Supreme puruṣa has in common with ordinary puruṣas certain experiences of his own. These experiences of pure eternal bliss are due to the direct and immediate reflection of the bliss in the puruṣa himself, by which this bliss is directly and immediately experienced by him. By such an experience the puruṣas cannot be admitted to suffer any change. He can, however, be aware of the mental states of ordinary persons as well as their experiences of pleasure and pain in a cognitive manner (such as that by which we know external objects) without being himself affected by those experiences. This enjoyment of experience is of course due to the action of God's mind through the process of reflection.

The monism of such a view becomes intelligible when we consider that the puruṣa, the mahat, the ahamkāra and all its products exist in an undifferentiated condition in the very essence of God. The ultimate puruṣa as the supreme cognitive principle underlies the very being of puruṣas and the faculties such as the buddhi and the ahamkāra, and also all in later material products. For this reason, by the underlying activity of this principle all our cognitions become possible, for it is the activity of this principle that operates as the faculties of the origins of knowledge. In the case of the experience of pleasure and pain also, though these cannot subsist outside the mind and may not apparently be regarded as requiring any separate organ for their illumination, yet in their case also it is the mind, the buddhi, that behaves as the internal organ. So though pleasures and pains cannot be regarded as having an unknown existence, yet their experiences are also interpreted as being due to their reflection in the mind.

When the mahat becomes associated with the puruṣa and no distinction is felt between it, the puruṣas and the original ground-cause, it is then that the cycle of world-existence appears. It is the super-consciousness of God that holds together the objective and the subjective principles. The objective principle, the prakṛti, and
the subjective centres, the puruṣas, are held together in a state of non-distinction. It is this that gives rise to all experiences of sorrow and bondage with reference to the conscious centres. It may be asked how it is that the buddhi and the puruṣa are held in non-distinction instead of being distinguished from one another. The reply is that distinction and non-distinction are both possible elements in the buddhi, and the function of Yoga is to destroy the obstruction in the way of the realization of such a mutual distinction (yogā-dinā tu pratibandha-mātram apākriyate).

Love of God proceeds in two stages: first, from the notion of God as satisfying our highest needs; and, secondly, in the notion of Him as being one with the self of the devotee. These highest needs find their expression firstly in our notion of value as pleasure and satisfaction in our experiences; secondly, in our notion of value in our emancipation; thirdly, in our notion of value in the satisfaction that we achieve in our realization of the sublimity in experiencing the greatness of God (Prema ca aurāga-viśeṣah paramā-tmani iva-sādhanatā-jñānāt ātmavā-jñānāc ca bhavati. iva api devi-vidham bhogā-pavargau tan-mahimā-darśana-ttha-sukham ca iti tad evaṃ māhātmya-pratipādanasya phalam prema-lakṣanā bhaktih).

Māyā, as identified with prakṛti, should be regarded as substantive entity. The prakṛti has two elements in it, sattva and tamas. Through sattva, wisdom or true knowledge is produced; through tamas is produced delusion or false knowledge. It is this aspect of prakṛti as producing false knowledge that is called māyā. Māyā is described as being trigunā-tmikā prakṛti or the prakṛti with three guṇas. But though the māyā is identified with prakṛti, yet this identification is due to the fact that the tamas side of prakṛti cannot be taken as apart from the prakṛti as a whole. When it is said in the scriptures that God destroys the māyā of Yogins, it does not mean that the trigunā-tmikā prakṛti as a whole is destroyed, but only that the operation of the tamas side is suspended or destroyed or ceases only with reference to the Yigin. Māyā is also described as that which cannot produce an illusion in Him on whom it has to depend for its existence, i.e. God, but that it can produce illusion or false knowledge in others (svā-śraya-vyāmohakatve sati para-vyāmohakatvam).

It is further said that God creates the world by his māyā-śakti as composed of the three guṇas. The significance of the designation
māyā in this connection implies that it is by the false identification of the prakṛti and the puruṣa that the latter evolutionary process of the formation of the world and world-experience becomes possible. The term māyā is generally restricted to prakṛti in its relation to God, whereas it is called avidyā as a delusive agent with reference to individuals.

True knowledge does not consist in a mere identification with Brahman as pure consciousness, but it means the knowledge of Brahman, his relationship with pradhāna, puruṣa, and kāla, and the manner in which the whole cosmic evolution comes into being, is maintained, and is ultimately dissolved in Brahman; and also in the personal relationship that he has with the individuals, and the manner in which he controls them and the ultimate ways of attaining the final realization. Kāla is, again, here referred to as the conditional upādhi through which God moves the prakṛti and puruṣa towards the evolution of the cosmic process.

The great difficulty is to explain how God who is regarded in essence of the nature of pure consciousness and therefore absolutely devoid of desire or will can be the cause of the great union of prakṛti with the puruṣas. The answer proposed by Bhikṣu is that in God’s nature itself there is such a dynamization that through it He can continue the actualizing process and the combining activities of the prakṛti and puruṣa lying dormant in Him. Though prakṛti and puruṣa may also be regarded as the causes of the world, yet since the combination happens in time, time may be regarded primarily as a dynamic agent; the condition existing in God through which He renders the union is made possible (mama svīyō bhāvah padārthah sva-bhāva upādhiḥ tatas tasya preranāt bhagavān a-pratihato mahā-yogasya prakṛti-puruṣā-di-samyogasya iśvaras tatra samarthaḥ ...prakṛti-prati-ksaṇa-parināmānam eva kālo-pādhitvāt). Since God moves both the prakṛti and the puruṣa through His own dynamic conditions, the whole universe of matter and spirits may be regarded as His body in the sense that they are the passive objects of the activity of God. God is thus conceived as dancing in his activity among his own energies as prakṛti and puruṣas. It may be argued that puruṣa being itself absolutely static, how can these be moved into activity consists of the fact that they are turned to the specific operations or that they are united with the prakṛti. Sometimes it is also suggested that the prakṛti is the condition of
the *puruṣas* and that the movement of the *prakṛti* in association with the *puruṣas* is interpreted as being the movement of the *puruṣas*.

In the seventh chapter of *Īśvara-gitā* Brahman is defined as the Universal. Thus any cause may be regarded as Brahman in relation to its effect. So there may be a hierarchy of Brahmans as we proceed from a lesser universal to a higher universal. The definition of Brahman is: "*yad yasya kāraṇaṁ tat tasya brahma tad-apekṣayā vyāpakatvāt.*" As God contains within Himself all the universals, He is called *brahma-māyā*. God is always associated with the *puruṣas*. But yet His dynamic activity in association with the *puruṣas* consists in bringing about such an association with *prakṛti* that the objects of the world may be manifested to them in the form of knowledge.

The *jīva* or individual is regarded as being a part of God, the relation being similar to that of a son and father. When the *jīvas* dedicate all their actions to God with the conviction that if it is God who works through them, then virtues and vices lose their force and become inefficacious to cause any bondage to them. As all *jīvas* are the parts of God, there is a great similarity between them in spite of their diversity. God exists in the *jīvas* just as the whole exists in the parts.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu conceives of the *adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇa* as the ground cause, as one which in itself remains the same and yet new differences emerge out of it. This is also his doctrine of the part and the whole. The parts are thus supposed to be emergents from the whole which does not itself participate in any change. The relation is thus not organic in the sense that the dissolution of the parts would mean the dissolution of the whole. In the *pralaya* the parts are dissolved, yet pure Brahman remains just as it was in the stage of creation. So, again, when the parts are affected pleasures and pains are experienced, but the affection of the parts does not involve in the least the affection of the whole. But the whole is not affected by the sufferings that exist in the emergents. It is further stated that it is through the function of the ground-cause that the emergents, e.g. substance, quality and action, can express themselves or operate in their specific forms. The underlying whole, the ground-cause, has really no parts in itself. Yet from this common basis various emergents of appearances as characterized units show themselves, and since they are seen to emerge from it they are in
this specific technical sense called the parts of the underlying ground cause.

It will thus be seen that the Brahman, the ground-cause, always remains unchangeable in itself, but it is said that the Brahman is associated with māyā and is united by it (sa māyī māyayā baddhah). The idea is that the māyā is an integral part of the divine entity and not different from it. Māyā is like a part which is identical with the whole.

Though in the scriptures both the distinction and the identity of the individual with the Brahman have often been mentioned, yet it is by the realization of the difference of the individual from the Brahman that the ultimate emancipation can be attained.1

In the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad, II. 4. 5, it is stated that all other things are desired because we desire the self. Śaṅkara infers from it that we are primarily attached to the self, and since all attachments imply attachment to pleasure, it follows that the self is of the nature of pleasure or bliss. Other things are desired only when they are falsely regarded as ourselves or parts of ourselves. Bhikṣu denies this proposition. He says that firstly it is not true that we are always attached to our own selves; nor, therefore, is it true that seeking of happiness from other sources is always the seeking of the selves. It is, therefore, wrong to suppose that self is of the nature of bliss. If the soul is of the nature of pure consciousness, it cannot be the nature of pure bliss. If bliss and consciousness were the same, all knowledge would imply pleasure, but our knowledge is as much associated with pleasure as with pain. Pleasure and pain, as also egoism (abhimāna), belong to prakṛti or its product buddhi and are transferred through its function (vṛtti) to the self, which is the real enjoyer and sufferer of pleasure and pain. The self is thus the real experiencer and the experiences therefore do not belong to the prakṛti but to the self.2 Through the operation of the sense-contact with the object and light the mental states are generated. These mental states are called vṛtti and belong to buddhi and therefore to prakṛti, but corresponding to each such mental state there is an intuition of them on the part of the puruṣa (vṛtti-sākṣatākāra)

1 yady api bhedā-bhedā-vubhāvo eva śruti-smṛtyoruktau tathāpi yathokta-bheda-jñāna-rūpa-śvivekad eva sarvā-bhimāna-nirṛtyā sākṣat mokṣāh. Īśvara-gītā. MS.
2 sākṣat-kāra-rūpa-dharmasya drīya-dharmateva-sambhavāt. Bhikṣu’s commentary on Īśvara-gītā. MS.
and it is this intuition that constitutes the real experience of the puruṣa. The word bhoga has an ambiguity in meaning. It sometimes refers to the mental states and at other times to their intuition and it is as the former state that the bhoga is denied of the puruṣa.

The ajñāna (ignorance) in this system means false knowledge. When the puruṣa intuits the vṛttis of the buddhi and thereby falsely regards those vṛttis as belonging to itself there is false knowledge which is the cause of the bondage. The intuition in itself is real, but the associations of the intuitive characters with the self are erroneous. When the self knows its own nature as different from the vṛttis and as a part of Brahman in which it has an undifferentiated reality, we have what is called emancipation. The existence of the self as undifferentiated with Brahman simply means that the Brahman is the ground-cause, and as such an unchangeable ground-cause Brahman is of the nature of pure consciousness. It is in its nature as pure consciousness that the whole world may be regarded as existing in the Brahman of which the prakṛti and the puruṣa, the one changing by real modifications and the other through the false ascription of the events of prakṛti to itself, may be regarded as emergents. The world is ultimately of the nature of pure consciousness, but matter and its changes, and the experience itself are only material and temporary forms bubbling out of it. But since these emergent forms are real emanations from Brahman an over-emphasis on monism would be wrong. The reality consists of both the ground-cause and the emergent forms. Śaṅkara had asserted that the duality was true only so long as the one reality was not reached. But Bhikṣu objecting to it says that since the monistic truth can be attained only by assuming the validity of the processes that imply duality, ultimate invalidation of the dualistic processes will also nullify the monistic conclusion.
CHAPTER XXIII

PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATIONS OF SOME OF THE SELECTED PURĀNAS

The readers who have followed the philosophy of the Vedānta as interpreted by Vijñāna Bhikṣu in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra and the Īśvara-gītā section of the Kūrma Purāṇa must have noticed that, according to him, the Vedānta was associated with the Sāṃkhya and Yoga, and in support of his view he referred to many of the Purāṇas, some of which are much earlier than Śaṅkara. Vijñāna Bhikṣu, therefore, quotes profusely from the Purāṇas and in the writings of Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha, Jīva Goswāmi and Baladeva we find profuse references to the Purāṇas in support of their views of the philosophy of the Vedānta.

It is highly probable that at least one important school of ideas regarding the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and the Brahma-sūtra was preserved in the Purāṇic tradition. Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Upaniṣads and the Brahma-sūtra seems to have diverged very greatly from the semi-realistic interpretation of them as found in the Purāṇas. It was, probably, for this reason that Śaṅkara seldom refers to the Purāṇas; but since Śaṅkara's line of interpretation is practically absent in the earlier Purāṇas, and since the extreme monism of some passages of the Upaniṣads is modified and softened by other considerations, it may be believed that the views of the Vedānta, as found in the Purāṇas and the Bhagavad-gītā, present, at least in a general manner, the oldest outlook of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and the Brahma-sūtra.

It seems, therefore, desirable that the treatment of the philosophy of Rāmānuja and Vijñāna Bhikṣu should be supplemented by a short survey of the philosophy as found in some of the principal Purāṇas. All the Purāṇas are required to have a special section devoted to the treatment of creation and dissolution, and it is in this section that the philosophical speculations are largely found1. In the present section I shall make an effort to trace the philosophical speculations as contained in the sarga-pratisarga portions

1 sargaś ca pratisargaś ca vaṃśo manv-antarāṇi ca | vaṃśā-nucaritaṁ ca'īva purāṇam pāṇca-laksanam. || Kūrma Purāṇa, 1. 12.
of some of the selected Purāṇas so as to enable readers to compare
this Purānic philosophy with the philosophy of Bhāskara Rāmānuja, Vijnāna Bhikṣu, and Nimbārka.

The first manifestation of Brahman according to the Viṣṇu Purāṇa is purusa; then come the other manifestations as vyaktā-vyakta and kāla. The original cause of pradhāna, puruṣa, vyakta and kāla is regarded as the ultimate state of Viṣṇu. Here then we find Brahma-Viṣṇu.

In Viṣṇu Purāṇa, I. 2. 11, it is said that the Ultimate Reality is only pure existence, which can be described only as a position of an eternal existence. It exists everywhere, and it is all (this is Pantheism), and everything is in it (this is Panentheism) and therefore it is called Vāsudeva. It is pure because there is no extraneous entity to be thrown away. It exists in four forms: vyakta, avyakta, puruṣa and kāla. Out of His playful activity these four forms have come out. Prakṛti is described here as sadasad-ātmaka and as triguna. In the beginning there are these four categories: Brahman, pradhāna, puruṣa and kāla, all these being different from the unconditional (Trikālika) Viṣṇu. The function of kāla is to hold together the puruṣa and the pradhāna during the creational period, and to hold them apart at the time of dissolution. As such it (kāla) is the cause of sensibles. Thus there is a reference to the ontological synthetic activity and the ontological analytical activity of kāla ("Ontological" in the sense that kāla appears here not as instrumental of the epistemological aspect of experience, but as something "being" or "existing," i.e. ontological.) As all manifested things had returned to the prakṛti at the time of the last dissolution, the prakṛti is called pratisaṅcara. Kāla or time is beginningless

1 Brahman is also regarded as sraṣṭā, Hari as pātā (Protector), and Maheśvara as saṃhāritā.

2 saṁcārāśaṁ samastāṁ ca vasāty atre'ī vai yataḥ.

3 Heyā-bhūvā-cā nirālom. Ibid. I. 2. 13.

4 praśkām viṣṇu sabhāva sṛṣṭiḥ vyaktaṁ puruṣaḥ kāla eka ca 1. kṛiḍato bālakasye'va cēṣṭāṁ tasya niśānaya. Ibid. I. 2. 18.

5 Ibid. I. 2. 19.

6 Ibid. I. 2. 21.

7 Viṣṇu Purāṇa, I. 2. 23.

8 Viṣṇuḥ svarūpāḥ parato hi tenye rūpe pradhānam puruṣaśca vipra tasyai'va tenyena dhṛte vyukte rūpā-dī yat tad dvija kāla-saṃjñām. Ibid. I. 2. 24.

9 Ibid. I. 2. 25.
and so exists even at the time of dissolution, synthesizing *prakṛti* or *puruṣa* together and also holding them out as different at the time of creation. At that time God enters by His will into *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* and produces a disturbance leading to creation\(^1\). When God enters into *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* His proximity alone is sufficient to produce the disturbance leading to creation; just as an odorous substance produces sensation of odour by its proximity without actually modifying the mind\(^2\). He (God) is both the disturber (*ksobhd*) or disturbed (*ksobhya*), and that is why, through contradiction and dilation, creation is produced\(^3\). Here is once again the Pantheistic view of God, its first occurrence being manifested ultimately in four main categories, all of which are, so to speak, participating in the nature of God, all of which are His first manifestations, and also in which it is said that all is God, and so on. *Anu* means *jīvā-tman*\(^4\). *Viṣṇu* or *Īśvara* exists as the *vikara*, i.e. the manifested forms, the *puruṣa* and also as Brahman\(^4\). This is clear Pantheism.

The commentator says that the word “*kṣetrajña*” in “*kṣetrajña-dhiṣṭhānāt*” means *puruṣa*. But apparently neither the context nor the classical Sāṃkhya justifies it. The context distinctly shows that *kṣetrajña* means *Īśvara*; and the manner of his *adhiṣṭhātṛtva* by entering into *prakṛti* and by proximity has already been described\(^5\). From the *pradhāna* the *mahat-tattva* emerges and it is then covered by the *pradhāna*, and being so covered it differentiates itself as the *sāttviḥa*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa* *mahat*. The *pradhāna* covers the *mahat* just as a seed is covered by the skin\(^6\). Being so covered there spring from the threefold *mahat* the threefold *ahamkāra* called *vaikārika*, *taijasa* and *bhūta-di* or *tāmasa*. From this *bhūta-di* or *tāmasa* *ahamkāra* which is covered by the *mahat* (as the *mahat* itself was covered by *pradhāna*) there springs through its spontaneous self-modification the *śabda-tanmātra*, and by the same process there springs from that *śabda-tanmātra* the *ākāśa*—the gross element. Again, the *bhūta-di* covers up the *śabda-tanmātra* and the *ākāśa* differentiated from it as the gross element. The *ākāśa*, being thus conditioned, produces spontaneously by self-modification the

\(^1\) *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, 1. 2. 29.
\(^2\) Ibid. 1. 2. 30.
\(^3\) Ibid. 1. 2. 31.
\(^4\) Ibid. 1. 2. 32.
\(^5\) *guna-sāmyat tatās tasmāt kṣetrajña-dhiṣṭhitam mune
guṇa-vyayaṇa-sambhūṭih sarga-kāle dvīja-ttama. Ibid. 1. 2. 33.
\(^6\) *pradhāna-tattvena samam tvacā bijam ivā’értam. Ibid. 1. 2. 34.*
sparśa-tanmātra, which produces immediately and directly the gross vāyu. The bhūtādi again covers up the ākāśa, sabda-tanmātra, sparśa-tanmātra and the differentiated vāyu which later then produces the rūpa-tanmātra which immediately produces the gross light-heat (jyoti). The sparśa-tanmātra and the vāyu cover up the ākāśa, sabda-tanmātra and the differentiated vāyu which later then produces the rūpa-tanmātra. Being thus conditioned, the differentiated gross jyoti produces the rasa-tanmātra from which again the gross water is produced. In a similar manner the rasa-tanmātra and the rūpa-tanmātra, being covered up, the differentiated gross water produces the gandha-tanmātra, from which again the gross earth is produced. The tanmātras are the potential conditions of qualities and hence the qualities are not manifested there. They are, therefore, traditionally called aviśeṣa. They do not manifest the threefold qualities of the guṇas as śānta, ghora and mūḍha. It is for this reason also that they are called aviśeṣa.

From the taijasa-ahamkāra the five conative and cognitive senses are produced. From the vaikārika-ahamkāra is produced the manas. These elements acting together in harmony and unity, together with the tanmātras, ahamkāra and mahat, form the unity of the universe under the supreme control of God. As the universe grows up, they form into an egg which gradually expands from within like a water-bubble; and this is called the materialistic body of Viṣṇu as Brahman. This universe is encircled on the outer side by water, fire, air, the ākāśa and the bhūtā-di and then by the mahat and the avyakta, each of which is ten times as large as the earth. There are thus seven coverings. The universe is like a cocoanut fruit with various shell-coverings. In proper time, again by causing a preponderance of tamas, God eats up the universe in His form as Rudra, and again creates it in His form as Brahmā. He maintains the world in His form as Viṣṇu. Ultimately, however, as God holds the universe within Him, He is both the creator and the created, the protector and the destroyer.

Though the Brahman is qualityless, unknowable and pure, yet

1 The commentator notes that when the ākāśa is said to produce sparśa-tanmātra, it is not the ākāśa that does so but the bhūtā-di manifesting itself as ākāśa, i.e. it is through some accretion from bhūtā-di that the ākāśa can produce the sparśa-tanmātra. Ākāśaḥ ākāśamayo bhūtā-diḥ sparśa-tanmātraṃ sasārja.
2 See the commentary to sloka. Viṣṇu Purāṇa, i. 2. 44.
3 The commentator notes that the word manas here means antaḥkaraṇa, including its four functions as manas, buddhi, citta and ahamkāra.
it can behave as a creative agent by virtue of its specific powers which are incomprehensible to us. As a matter of fact the relation between the powers or energies and the substance is unthinkable. We can never explain how or why fire is hot. The earth, in adoring Hari, described Him as follows: ‘Whatever is perceived as having visible and tangible forms in this world is but your manifestation. The ordinary people only make a mistake in thinking this to be a naturalistic universe. The whole world is of the nature of knowledge, and the error of errors is to regard it as an object. Those who are wise know that this world is of the nature of thought and a manifestation of God, who is pure knowledge. Error consists in regarding the world as a mere naturalistic object and not as a manifestation of the structure of knowledge.’

In the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, i. 4. 50–52, it is said that God is only the dynamic agent (nimitta-mātram), the material cause being the energies of the objects of the universe which are to be created. These energies require only a dynamic agent to actualize them in the form of the universe. God is here represented to be only a formative agent, whereas the actual material cause of the world is to be found in the energies which constitute the objects of the world, through the influence and presence of God. The commentator notes that the formative agency of God consists merely in his presence (sā nidhyā-mātreinā’va).

In the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, i. 4, we find another account of creation. It is said that God in the beginning thought of creation, and an unintelligent creation appeared in the form of tāmas, moha, mahā-moha, tāmisra and audha-tāmisra. These were the five kinds of avidyā which sprang from the Lord. From these there came a creation of the five kinds of plants as vṛksa, gulma, lātā, virūt and

1 Viṣṇu Purāṇa, i. 3. 1–2.

2 yad etad dhīyate mūrtam, etad jñāna-tmanas tava.
   bhrānti-jñānena paśyanti jagad-rūpaṃ ayagināh.  Ibib. 1. 4. 39.
   jñāna-svarūpaṃ akhilam jagad etad abudhāhayah
   artha-svarūpaṃ paśyanto bhrāmyante moha-sampave.

3 nimitta-mātram eva’sit srjya-nām sarga-karmanī
   pradhāna-kāraṇaḥ bhūtā yato vai srjya-saktayah.  Ibib. 1. 4. 51.
   nimitta-mātram muktavai’kaṃ nā’nyat kīcchd avēksyate
   nīyate tapatām śreṣṭha svā-saktīvā rastu vastutāṃ.  Ibib. 1. 4. 52.
   sisṛṣkuḥ sakti-yuktō’sau srjya-sakti-pracoditāḥ.  Ibib. 1. 5. 65.

In this passage it is hinted that the will of God and His power to create is helped by the energies of the objects to be created.
tṛṇa (to which are to be added the mountains and the hills) which have no inner or outer consciousness and may be described as having, as it were, closed souls (saṁvṛtā-tman). Not being satisfied with this He created the animals and birds, etc., called tiryak-srotas. The animals, etc., are called tiryag, because their circulation is not upwards but runs circularly in all directions. They are full of tamas, and are described as avedinah. The commentator notes that what is meant by the term avedin is that the animals have only appetitive knowledge, but no synthetic knowledge, i.e. cannot synthesise the experience of the past, the present and the future and cannot express what they know, and they have no knowledge about their destinies in this world and in the other, and are devoid of all moral and religious sense. They have no discrimination regarding cleanliness and eating; they are satisfied with their ignorance as true knowledge, i.e. they do not seek the acquisition of certain knowledge. They are associated with the twenty-eight kinds of vādha. They are aware internally of pleasure and pain but they cannot communicate with one another. Then, being dissatisfied with the animal creation, God created “the gods” who are always happy and can know both their inner feelings and ideas, and also the external objects, and communicate with one another. Being dissatisfied with that creation also He created “men,” which creation is called arcāk-srotas as distinguished from the creation of gods which is called urddhva-srotas. These men have an abundance of tamas and rajas, and they have therefore a preponderance of

1 In the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, 49, we hear of twenty-eight vādhās. The reference to vādhās here is clearly a reference to the technical vādhās of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, where it also seems certain that at the time of Viṣṇu Purāṇa the technical name of the Sāṃkhya vādhās must have been a very familiar thing. It also shows that the Viṣṇu Purāṇa was closely associated with the Sāṃkhya circles of thought, so that the mere allusion to the term vādhā was sufficient to refer to the Sāṃkhya vādhās. The Viṣṇu Purāṇa was probably a work of the third century B.C.; and the Kārikā of Iśvara Kṛṣṇa was composed more or less at the same time. In the Mārkandeya Purāṇa (Veṅkatesvara edition, ch. 44, v. 20) we have the reading Aṣṭāvimsād-vidhātmikā. In the B. 1. edition of Mārkandeya by K. M. Banerji we have also in ch. 47, v. 20, the same reading. The reading vādhānvitā occurs neither in the Mārkandeya nor in the Padma Purāṇa 13, 65. The supposition, therefore, is that the twenty-eight kinds in Mārkandeya were changed into twenty-eight kinds of vādhā through the Sāṃkhya influence in the third century. The Mārkandeya is supposed to have been written in the first half of the second century B.C. It is not easy to guess what twenty-eight kinds of animal creation were intended by Mārkandeya. But the identification of them with the twenty-eight kinds of Sāṃkhya vādhā seems to be quite inappropriate.

2 antah prakāśas te sarva ācētās tu paras-param. Viṣṇu Purāṇa, 1. 5. 10.
suffering. There are thus nine creations. The first three, called the unintelligent creation (avuddhi-pūrvaka), is the naturalistic creation of (i) mahat, (ii) the tanmātras, and (iii) the bhūtas, the physiological senses. The fourth creation, called also the primary creation (mūkhya-varga), is the creation of plants; fifth is the creation of the tiryag-srotas; sixth the ūrdha-srotas; seventh the arvāk-srotas or men. The eighth creation seems to be the creation of a new kind. It probably means the distinctive characteristic of destiny of each of the four creations, plants, animals, gods and men. The plants have, for their destiny, ignorance; the animals have mere bodily energy; the gods have pure contentment; and the men have the realization of ends. This is called the anugraha-sarga. Then comes the ninth sarga, called the kaumāra-sarga, which probably refers to the creation of the mental children of God such as Sanatkumāra, etc.

There are four kinds of pralayas: they are called the naimittika or brāhma, the prakṛtika, the ātmyantika and the nitya. The naimittika-pralaya takes place when Brahmā sleeps; the prakṛtika occurs when the universe merges in prakṛti; the ātmyantika-pralaya is the result of the knowledge of God, i.e. to say, when Yogins lose themselves in paramā-tman, then occurs the ātmyantika-pralaya; and the fourth, viz. the nitya-pralaya, is the continual destruction that takes place daily.

In the Vāyu Purāṇa we hear of an ultimate principle which is associated with the first causal movement of God. This is regarded as the transcendental cause (kāraṇam aprameyam) and is said to be known by various names, such as Brahman, pradhāna, prakṛti, prasūti (prakṛti-prasūti), ātman, guha, yoni, caṅkṣas, kṣetra, amṛta,

1 The Vāyu Purāṇa, vi. 68, describes it as follows:

sthāvareṇa viparyāsas tiryag-yonīṁ śaktīṁ
siddhā-māno manuṣyāṁ tu tuṣṭir deveṣu kṛśnaṁ.

The sixth sarga is there described as being of the ghosts.

bhūtā-dikāṃṣa sattvānāṁ sāṃsthā śargaḥ sa ucyate.

Ibid. vi. 58-59.

The sixth sarga is there described as being of the ghosts.

bhūtā-dikāṃṣa sattvānāṁ sāṃsthā śargaḥ sa ucyate.

Ibid. vi. 58-59.

In the Mārkandeya Purāṇa, anugraha-sarga is described as the fifth sarga.

In the Kurma Purāṇa, 7. 11, these bhūtas are regarded as being the fifth sarga. The Kurma Purāṇa describes the first creation as the mahat-sarga, the second as bhūta-sarga, the third as Vaikārike-nādiya-sarga, the fourth as the mukhya-sarga, and the fifth as tiryak-sarga. There is thus a contradiction, as the fifth sarga was described in the eleventh verse in the same chapter as the creation of ghosts. This implies the fact that probably two hands were at work at different times, at least in the seventh chapter of the Kurma Purāṇa.
aksara, śukra, tapas, satyam, atiprakāsa. It is said to cover round the second puruṣa. This second puruṣa is probably the loka-pitā-maha. Through the association of time and preponderance of rajas eight different stages of modification are produced which are associated with kṣetrajña. In this connection the Vāyu Purāṇa speaks also of the prākṛtika, the naimittika and the ātyantika-pralaya. It also says that the categories of evolution have been discovered both by the guidance of the śāstras and by rational argument, and that prakṛti is devoid of all sensible qualities. She is associated with three guṇas, and is timeless and unknowable in herself. In the original state, in the equilibrium of guṇas, everything was pervaded by her as tamas. At the time of creation, being associated with kṣetrajña, mahat emerges from her. This mahat is due to a preponderance of sattva and manifests only pure existence. This mahat is called by various names, such as manas, mahat, mati, brahmā, pur, buddhi, khyāti, Īśvara, cīti, prajñā, smṛti, saṃvit, vipura. This mahat-prajñā, being stirred by desire to create, begins the work of creation and produces dharma, adharma and other entities. Since the cause of the gross efforts of all beings exists always as conceived in a subtle state in the mahat, it is called “manas.” It is the first of all categories, and of infinite extent and is thus called mahān. Since it holds within itself all that is finite and measurable and since it conceives all differentiations from out of itself and appears as intelligent puruṣa, by its association with experience it is called mati. It is called brahman since it causes all growth. Further, as all the later categories derive their material from it, it is called pur. Since the puruṣa understands all things as beneficial and desirable and since it is also the stuff through which all understanding is possible, it is called buddhi. All experience and integration of experience and all suffering and enjoyment depending upon knowledge proceed from it; therefore it is called khyāti. Since it directly knows everything as the great Soul it is called Īśvara. Since all sense-perceptions are produced from it, it is called prajñā. Since all states of knowledge and all kinds of

1 Vāyu Purāṇa, 3. 11, and compare the Pañcarāṇa doctrine as elaborated in Ahirbudhnya.
2 Vāyu Purāṇa, 3. 23.
3 tac-chāstra-yuktyā sva-mati-prayatnāt
   samastam āviṣkṛta-dhi-dhṛtibhyah. Ibid. 3. 24.
It speaks of five pramāṇas. Ibid. 4. 16.
4 Ibid. 4. 25.
5 Ibid. 4. 24.
karman and their fruits are collected in it for determining experience, it is called citi. Since it remembers the past, it is called smṛti. Since it is the storehouse of all knowledge, it is called mahā-tman. Since it is the knowledge of all knowledge, and since it exists everywhere and everything exists in it, it is saṁvit. Since it is of the nature of knowledge, it is called jñāna. Since it is the cause of all desideratum of conflicting entities, it is called vipūra. Since it is the Lord of all beings in the world, it is called Īśvara. Since it is the knower in both the kṣetra and the kṣetrajña, and is one, it is called ka. Since it stays in the subtle body (puryaṁ sete) it is called puruṣa. It is called svayambhu, because it is uncaused and the beginning of creation. Mahān being stirred up by the creative desire manifests itself in creation through two of its movements, conception (saṁkalpa) and determination (adhyavasāya). It consists of three guṇas, sattva, rajas, and tamas. With the preponderance of rajas, āhāmkāra emerged from mahat. With the preponderance of tamas there also emerges from mahat, bhūtā-di, from which the bhūtas and tanmātras are produced. From this comes the ākāśa as vacuity which is associated with sound. From the modification of the bhūtā-di the sound-potential (śabdatanmātra) has been produced. When the bhūtādi covers up the sound-potential, then the touch-potential was produced. When the ākāśa covers up the sound-potential and the touch-potential, the vāyu is produced. Similarly the other bhūtas and qualities are produced. The tanmātras are also called aviśeṣas. From the vaikārika or sāttvika-āhāmkāra are produced the five cognitive and the five conative senses and the manas¹.

These guṇas work in mutual co-operation, and thereby produce the cosmic egg like a water-bubble. From this cosmic egg, the kṣetrajña called Brahmā—also called Hiranyagarbha (the four-faced God)—is produced. This god loses His body at the time of each pralaya and gains a new body at the time of a new creation². The cosmic egg is covered by water, light, heat, air, ākāśa, bhūtādi, mahat, and avyakta. The eight prakṛtis are also spoken of, and probably the cosmic egg is the eighth cover³.

¹ This is different from other accounts. No function is ascribed to the rājas a āhāmkāra, from which the conative senses are generally derived.
² Vāyu Purāṇa, 4. 68.
³ The passage is obscure, as it is difficult to find out exactly what these eight prakṛtis are. Ibid. 4. 77–78.
In Chapter VIII it is said that *rajas* remains as the dynamic principle inherent in *sattva* and *tamas*, just as oil remains in sea *amum*. It is further said that Mahēśvara entered the *pradhāna* and *puruṣa*, and with the help of the dynamic principle of *rajas* produced a disturbance in the equilibrium of the *prakṛti*\(^1\). By the disturbance of the *guna* three gods are produced, from *rajas* Brahmā, from *tamas* Agni, and from *sattva* Viṣṇu. The Agni is also identified with *kāla* or Time.

The *Vāyu Purāṇa* also describes the nature of *māheśvara-yoga*\(^2\). This is said to be constituted of five elements or *dharmas*, such as *prānāyāma*, *dhyāna*, *pratyāhāra*, *dhyāna*, and *smaraṇa*. *Prānāyāma* is of three kinds, *manda*, *madhyama*, and *uttama*. *Manda* is of twelve *mātrās*, *madhyama* of twenty-four, and *uttama* of thirty-six. When the *vāyu* is once controlled by gradual practice, then all sins are burnt and all bodily imperfections are removed. By *dhyāna* one should contemplate the qualities of God. Then *prānāyāma* is said to bring about four kinds of results: (i) *śānti*, (ii) *prasānti*, (iii) *dīpti*, and (iv) *prasāda*. *Śānti* means the washing away of sins derived from impurities from parents and from the association of one’s relations. *Prasānti* means the destruction of personal sins, as greed, egotism, etc. *Dīpti* means the rise of a mystical vision by which one can see past, present and future and come in contact with the wise sages of the past and become like Buddha. *Prasāda* means the contentment and pacification of the senses, sense-objects, mind, and the five *vāyus*.

The process of *prānāyāma* beginning with *āsana* is also described. *Pratyāhāra* is regarded as the control of one’s desires and *dharma* is regarded as the fixing of the mind on the tip of the nose, or the middle of the eyebrows, or at a point slightly higher than that. Through *pratyāhāra* the influence of external objects is negated. By *dhyāna* one perceives oneself like the sun or the moon, i.e. there is an unobstructed illumination. The various miraculous powers that the *yogi* attains are called the *upasargas* and it is urged that one should always try to keep oneself free from the callings of these miraculous powers. The various objects of *dhyāna*

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\(^1\) It has been noted before that the creation of the material world proceeded from the *tāmasa ahāṃkāra*, and that of the cognitive and conative senses from the *sāttvika ahāṃkāra*. The *rājasa ahāṃkāra* was not regarded as producing anything, but merely as a moment leading to disturbance of equilibrium. See also *Vāyu Purāṇa*, 5. 9.

\(^2\) Ibid. chap. 11-15.
are regarded as being the elements originating from the earth, manas and buddhi. The Yogin has to take these objects one by one, and then to leave them off, so that he may not be attached to any one of them. When he does so and becomes unattached to any one of these seven and concentrates on Mahesvara associated with omniscience, contentment, beginningless knowledge, absolute freedom (svātantrya), unobstructed power, and infinite power, he attains Brahman. So the ultimate object of Yoga realization is the attainment of Brahmahood as Mahesvara which is also called apavarga.

In the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, yoga is described as a cessation of ajñāna through knowledge, which is, on the one hand, emancipation and unity with Brahman, and, on the other, dissociation from the gunas of prakṛti. All sorrows are due to attachment. With the cessation of attachment there is also the cessation of the feeling of identifying all things with oneself (mamatva); and this leads to happiness. True knowledge is that which leads to emancipation, all else is ajñāna. By experiencing the fruits of virtues and vices through the performance of duties and other actions, through the accumulation of fruits of past karman (apūrva), and through the exhaustion of certain others, there is the bondage of karma. The emancipation from karma, therefore, can only result from an opposite procedure. The prāṇāyāma is supposed to destroy sins. In the ultimate stage the yogi becomes one with Brahman, just as water thrown in water becomes one with it. There is no reference here to chitta-vṛtti-nirodha as yoga.

Vasudeva is described here as the ultimate Brahman, who by His creative desire has created everything through the power of time. Through this power He separated the two entities of pra-

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1 There is no reference in the chapters on yoga of the Vāyu Purāṇa to vṛtti-nirodha and kūivalya.
2 There is a chapter both in the Vāyu Purāṇa and in the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa on arīṣṭa, similar to what is found in the Jayākhya-samhitā where signs are described by which the yogin is to know the time of his death, though the description of his death is entirely different from that given in the other two works.
4 The method of prāṇāyāma and other processes of yoga is more or less the same as that found in the Vāyu Purāṇa.
5 Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, 40. 41.

The Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, in this connection, says that the yogin should know the approach of his death by the signs described in ch. 40, so that he may anticipate it and may not get dispirited.
dhāna and puruṣa from within Himself and connected them both. The first entity that emerged from prakṛti in this creative process was mahat, from which emerged ahamkāra, and from which again emerged sattva, rajas and tamas. From tamas came the five tanmātras and the five bhūtas; from rajas came the ten senses and the buddhi. From sattva came the presiding gods of the senses and the manas. It is further said that Vāsudeva exists in the prakṛti and the puruṣas and all the effects, both as pervading through them and also separate from them, that is, He is both immanent and transcendent. Even when He exists as pervading through them, He is not in any way touched by their limitations and impurities. True knowledge is that which takes account of the nature of all those which haveemanated from Vāsudeva in their specific forms as prakṛti, puruṣa, etc., and also of Vāsudeva in His pure and transcendent form.

It should be noted that in the Padma Purāṇa there is a mention of brahma-bhakti, which is either kāyika, vācika and mānasika or laukikā, vaidikā and ādhyātmikā. This ādhyātmikā-bhakti is further subdivided into the sāmkhya-bhakti and yoga-bhakti. The knowledge of twenty-four principles and of their distinction from the ultimate principle called puruṣa, as also of the relation among puruṣa and prakṛti and the individual soul, is known as sāmkhya-bhakti. Practice of prāṇayāma and meditation upon the Lord Brahma constitute the yoga-bhakti. The term bhakti is here used in a very special sense.

In Nārādiya Purāṇa Nārāyaṇa is said to be the Ultimate Reality, that is, if seen in theological perspective it may be said to create from itself Brahmā the creator, Viṣṇu the protector and preserver, and Rudra the destroyer. This Ultimate Reality has also been called Mahā-viṣṇu. It is through his characteristic power that the universe is created. This sakti or power is said to be both of the type of existence and non-existence, both vidyā and avidyā. When the universe is seen as dissociated from Mahā-viṣṇu, the vision is clearly due to avidyā ingrained in us; when, on the other hand, the consciousness of the distinction between the knower and the known disappears and only the consciousness of

1 Skanda Purāṇa, 11. 9. 24, verses 1-10.
2 Ibid, verses 65-74.
3 Padma Purāṇa, 1. 15, verses 164-177.
4 Ibid, verses 177-186.
5 Ibid. verses 187-190.
6 Nārādiya Purāṇa, 1. 3. 4.
7 Ibid. verse 9.
unity pervades, it is due to *vidyā* (it is *vidyā* itself). And just as Hari permeates or pervades through the universe, so also does His *sakti*. Just as the quality of heat exists by pervading, i.e. as in and through Agni its support, even so the *sakti* of Hari can never be dissociated from Him. This *sakti* exists in the form of *vyaktā-vyakta*, pervading the whole universe. *prakṛti*, *puruṣa* and *kāla* are her first manifestations. As this *sakti* is not separate from Maha-viṣṇu, it is said that at the time of first or original creation Mahā-viṣṇu, being desirous of creating the universe, becomes, i.e. takes the forms of *prakṛti*, *puruṣa* and *kāla*. From *prakṛti*, disturbed by the presence of the *puruṣa*, comes out *mahat*, and from *mahat* comes into existence *buddhi*, and from *buddhi*, *ahāmkāra*.

This Ultimate Principle has also been called Vāsudeva, who is said to be the ultimate knowledge and the ultimate goal.

Sorrow or misery of three kinds is necessarily experienced by all beings born in the universe—and the only remedy that sets them free from misery is the final obtaining of the Lord (or God). The ways to find God are two, the way of knowledge (*jñāna*) and that of action (*karma*). This *jñāna* springs up either from the learning of scriptural texts or from *vīveka* (discriminative knowledge).

1. Nārādiya Purāṇa, 1. 3, verses 7–9.
2. Ibid, verse 12.
3. It should be distinctly noted here that the creation of the universe has been attributed to Hari through the *upādhi avidyā*, which is His own *sakti*. The whole account sounds the note of the Vedānta philosophy. The following line should be particularly noted:


   And this line should be read with the previous verse—

   viṣṇu-sakti-samudbhutam etat sarvam cara-caṣam
   yasmād bhinnam idam sarvam yace’yaṃ yacca teṣātī
gatim upādhibhir yathā’kāśo bhinnatvena pratiyate.


5. Ibid. verses 28, 31.
6. Ibid. verse 80.
7. For the concept of antaryāmin see verse 26 of Adhyāya 3 and also verse 48 of Adhyāya 33.

The attributes of Vāsudeva are described in following four verses. It should also be noted that Bhagavān means Vāsudeva. (*Ibid*. verse 19.)
yoga is also defined in the next chapter. It is described as Brahma-laya. The manas is the cause of bondage and emancipation. Bondage means association with sense-objects, and emancipation means dissociation from them. When, like a magnet, the self draws the mind inside and directs its activities in an inward direction and ultimately unites with Brahman, that is called yoga.

Viṣṇu is described as having three kinds of sakti (power): parā or ultimate, the aparā (which is identical with individual efforts), and a third power which is called vidyā and karma. All energies belong to Viṣṇu, and it is through His energies that all living beings are moved into activity.

The word bhakti has also been used in another chapter in the sense of śraddhā, and is held to be essential for all the various actions of life.

According to the Kūrma Purāṇa it seems that God exists firstly as the unmanifested, infinite, unknowable and ultimate director. But He is also called the unmanifested, eternal, cosmic cause which is both being and non-being and is identified with prakṛti. In this aspect He is regarded as para-brahman, the equilibrium of the three guṇas. In this state the puruṣa exists within Himself as it were, and this is also called the state of prakṛta-pralaya. From this state of unmanifestedness God begins to assert Himself as God and enters into prakṛti and puruṣa by His own inner intimate contact. This existence of God may be compared with the sex-impulse in man or woman which exists within them and manifests itself only as a creative impulse although remaining one and the same with them all the while. It is for this reason that God is regarded as both passive (kṣobhya) and dynamic (kṣobhaka). It is therefore said that God behaves as prakṛti by self-contraction and dilatation. From the disturbed prakṛti and the puruṣa sprang up the seed of mahat, which is of the nature of both pradhāna and puruṣa (pradhāna

1 atma-prayatna-sāpeksā viiṣṭā yā mano-gatih
tasyā brahmani saṃyogo yoga ity abhidhityate.  
Nārada Purāṇa, 47. 7.

There is also a description of prānāyāma, yama, and niyama, etc., from v. 8 to v. 20. 
2 Ibid. 1. 47, verses 36–38.  
3 Ibid. verses 47–49.  
4 Ibid. 1, verse 4.

Kūrma Purāṇa contains the following verse:

mahēśvarah paro'vyaktas catur-vyūhah sanātanaḥ
anantaś c'd'prameyāś ca niyantā sarvato-mukhaḥ.

(4. 5.)

Two points should be noted here. Firstly, that the Ultimate Reality has been called Mahēśvara and not Viṣṇu. Secondly, catur-vyūha is one of the adjectives mentioned in this verse to explain the nature of that Ultimate Reality.
philosophical speculations of selected purāṇas [CH.

puruçāt-makam). From this came into existence mahat, also called ātman, mati, brahmā, prabuddhi, khyāti, Īśvara, prajñā, dhṛti, smṛti, samvit. From this mahat came out the threefold ahaṃkāra-vaiķārika, taijasa and bhūtādi (also called tāmasa ahaṃkāra). This ahaṃkāra is also called abhimāna, kartā, mantā, and ātman, for all our efforts spring from this.

It is said that there is a sort of cosmic mind called manas which springs directly from the avyakta and is regarded as the first product which superintends the evolution of the tāmasa ahaṃkāra into its products¹. This manas is to be distinguished from the manas or the sense which is the product of both the taijasa and vaiķārika ahaṃkāra.

Two kinds of views regarding the evolution, the tanmātras and the bhūtās, are given here in succession, which shows that the Kūrma Purāṇa must have been revised; and the second view, which is not compatible with the first, was incorporated at a later stage. These two views are as follows:

(1) Bhūtādi has, in its development, created the śabda-mātra, from which sprang into existence the ākāśa, which has sound as its quality. The sparśa-mātra was created from the ākāśa, developing itself; and from the sparśa-tanmātra came out vāyu, which, consequently has sparśa as its quality. Vāyu, in the state of development, created the rūpa-mātra from which came into existence jyoti (light-heat), which has colour (rūpa) as its quality. From this jyoti, in the condition of development, sprang up rasa-mātra (taste-potential), which created water, which has taste for its quality. The water, in the state of development, created the smell-potential (gandha-mātra), from which came into existence the conglomeration, which has smell as its quality.

(2) Ākāśa as the sound-potential covered up the touch-potential, and from this sprang up vāyu, which has therefore two qualities—the sound and touch. Both the qualities, śabda and sparśa, entered the colour-potential, whence sprang up the vahni (fire), with three qualities—the śabda, the sparśa, and the rūpa. These qualities, viz. śabda, sparśa and rūpa, entered the taste-potential, whence came into existence water having four qualities.

¹ manas tv avyakta-jam pro'ktam vikārah prathamah smṛtah yenā'sau jāyate kartā bhūtā-dīnī ca'nupaśyatī.

Kūrma Purāṇa, 4. 21.
—śabda, sparśa, rūpa and rasa. These four qualities entered smell-potential, from which sprang into existence gross bhūmi (the earth), which has all the five qualities of śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa, and gandha.

Mahat, ahamkāra and the five tanmātras are in themselves unable to produce the orderly universe, which is effected through the superintendence of the puruṣa (puruṣā-dhiṣṭhitatvāc ca) and by the help of avyakta (avyaktā-nugraheṇa). The universe thus created has seven coverings. The production of the universe, and its maintenance and ultimate dissolution, are all effected through the playful activity (sva-lilayā) of God for the benefit of his devotees.

1 The God is called Nārāyaṇa, because He is the ultimate support of all human beings:

naraṇām ayaṇaṁ yasmāt tena nārāyaṇas smṛtaḥ.

Kūrma Purāṇa, iv. 62.
APPENDIX TO VOLUME I

THE LOKAYATA, NASTIKA AND CARVAKA

The materialistic philosophy known as the Lokayata, the Cārvāka or the Bārhaspatya is probably a very old school of thought. In the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad a number of heretical views are referred to and among these we find the doctrine which regarded matter or the elements (bhūtāni) as the ultimate principle. The name Lokayata is also fairly old. It is found in Kauṭilya’s Artha-śāstra, where it is counted with Śaṅkhya and Yoga as a logical science (ānvikṣikī)¹. Rhys Davids has collected a number of Pāli passages in which the word Lokayata occurs and these have been utilized in the discussion below². Buddhaghoso speaks of Lokayata as a vitanḍā-vāda-sattham³. Vitanḍā means tricky disputation and it is defined in the Nyāya-sūtra, 1. 2. 3, as that kind of tricky logical discussion (jalpa) which is intended only to criticize the opponent’s thesis without establishing any other counter-thesis (sā pratipakṣa-sthāpanā-hīnā vitanḍā), and it is thus to be distinguished from vāda which means a logical discussion undertaken in all fairness for upholding a particular thesis. Vitanḍā, however, has no thesis to uphold, but is a kind of jalpa or tricky argument which seeks to impose a defeat on the opponent by wilfully giving a wrong interpretation of his words and arguments (chala), by adopting false and puzzling analogies (jāṭi), and thus to silence or drive him to self-contradiction and undesirable conclusions (nigraha-sthāna) by creating an atmosphere of confusion. But vitanḍā cannot then be a vāda, for vāda is a logical discussion for the ascertainment of truth, and thus the word vitanḍā-vāda would be self-contradictory. Jayanta, however, points out that the Buddhists did not make any distinction

¹ Kauṭilya, Artha-śāstra, 1. 1.
² Dialogues of the Buddha, vol. 1, p. 166. In recent times two Italian scholars, Dr Piszzagalli and Prof. Tucci, have written two works called Nāstika, Cārvāka Lokayatika and Linee di una storia del Materialismo Indiano respectively in which they attempt to discover the meaning of the terms nāstika, cārvāka and lokayata and also the doctrines of the sects. Most of the Pāli passages which they consider are those already collected by Rhys Davids.
³ Abhidhāna-ppadipikā, v. 112, repeats Buddhaghoso’s words “vitanḍā-sattham viṇīyaṃ yaṃ tāṃ lokayatam.”
between a pure logical argument and a tricky disputation and used the same word vāda to denote both these forms of argument\(^1\). This explains why Lokāyata, though consisting merely of \(\text{vitanā} \), could also be designated as vāda in Buddhist literature. A few examples of this \(\text{vitanā} \) are given by Buddhaghoso in the same commentary in explaining the term "loka-\(\text{khāyikā} \)" (lit. "popular story," but "popular philosophy" according to P.T.S. Pāli Dictionary) —the crows are white because their bones are white, the geese are red because their blood is red\(^2\). Such arguments are there designated as being \(\text{vitanā-sallāpa-kathā} \), where sallāpa and kathā together mean conversational talk, sallāpa being derived from \(\text{sam} \) and lap. According to the definitions of the Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 18, these would not be regarded as instances of \(\text{vitanā} \) but of jāti, i.e. inference from false analogies where there is no proper concomitance, and not \(\text{vitanā} \) as just explained. Rhys Davids quotes another passage from the Sadda-niti of the Aggavamsa (early twelfth century) which, in his translation, runs as follows: "Loka means 'the common world' (bāla-loka). Lokāyata means 'āyatanti, ussāhanti vāyamanti vādassadenāti'; that is, they exert themselves about it, strive about it, through the pleasure they take in discussion. Or perhaps it means 'the world does not make any effort (yatati) by it,' that it does not depend on it, move on by it (na yatati na īhati vā). For living beings (sattā) do not stir up their hearts (cittam na uppādentī) by reason of that book (tam hi gandham nissāyā)\(^3\)." Now the Lokāyata is the book of the unbelievers (titthia-sattham yam loke \(\text{vitanā} \)-\(\text{sattham} \) uccati), full of such useless disputations as the following: "All is impure; all is not impure; the crow is white, the crane is black; and for this reason or for that" —the book which is known in the world as the \(\text{vitanā}-\text{sattha} \), of which the Bodhisattva, the incomparable leader, Vidhura the Pundit, said: "Follow not the Lokāyata, that works not for the

\(^1\) _ity udāhṛtam idam kathā-trayaṁ yat parasaṁvivikta-lokṣaṇam_ sthūlam apy anavalokyā kathyate vāda eka iti śākya-siśyakāḥ._

_Nyāya-maṇḍarī, p. 596._

\(^2\) _Sumangala-vilāsinī, 1. 90, 91._

\(^3\) This translation is inexact. There is no reference to any book in the Pāli passage; in the previous sentence there was a word _vādassādana_ which was translated as "through the pleasure they take in discussion," whereas the literal translation would be "by the taste (_assādu_ ) of the disputation," and here it means "pursuing that smell" people do not turn their minds to virtuous deeds.
progress in merit. Thus, from the above and from many other passages from the Pāli texts it is certain that the Lokāyata means a kind of tricky disputation, sophistry or casuistry practised by the non-Buddhists which not only did not lead to any useful results but did not increase true wisdom and led us away from the path of Heaven and of release. The common people were fond of such tricky discourses and there was a systematic science (śāstra or sattha) dealing with this subject, despised by the Buddhists and called the vitanda-sattha. Lokāyata is counted as a science along with other sciences in Dighanikāya, III. 1. 3, and also in Aṅguttara, I. 163, and in the Divyāvadāna it is regarded as a special branch of study which had a bhāsy a and a pravacana (commentaries and annotations on it).

There seems to be a good deal of uncertainty regarding the meaning of the word Lokāyata. It consists of two words, loka and āyata or ayata; āyata may be derived as ā+yam+kta or from ā+yat (to make effort)+a either in the accusative sense or in the sense of the verb itself, and ayata is formed with the negative particle a and yat (to make effort). On the passage in the Aggavamsa which has already been referred to, it is derived firstly as a+yatanti (makes great effort) and the synonyms given are ussāhanti vāyamanti, and secondly as a+yatanti, i.e. by which people cease to make efforts (tena loko na yatati na ihati vā lokāyata). But Prof. Tucci quotes a passage from Buddhaghoso’s Sārattha-pakāsini where the word āyata is taken in the sense of

1 See Dialogues of the Buddha, 1. 168. The translation is inexact. The phrase “All is impure; all is not impure” seems to be absent in the Pali text. The last passage quoted from Vidhura-pandita-jātaka (Fausboll, vi, p. 286) which is one of the most ancient of the jātakas runs as follows: “na seve lokāyatikam na’ etam paññāya vaddhanam.” The unknown commentator describes the lokāyati ka as “lokayātikān ti anatha-nissitam sogga-maggānam adiyakaṁ antyyanikam vitanda-sallāpam lokāyatika-vādaṁ na sevyya.” The Lokāyata leads to mischievous things and cannot lead to the path of Heaven or that of release and is only a tricky disputation which does not increase true wisdom.

2 Rhys Davids seems to make a mistake in supposing that the word Vidaddha in Vidaddha-vādi is only the same word as vitanda wrongly spelt (Dialogues of the Buddha, 1. 167) in the Aṭṭhasālīni, pp. 3, 90, 92, 241. The word vidaddha is not vitanda but vidagdha which is entirely different from vitanda.

3 lokāyataḥ bhāsyā-pravacanam, Divyāvadāna, p. 630; also chandasi vā vyākarāṇe vā lokāyate vā pramāṇa-mānāmsāyān vā na cai-sām uhā-pohaḥ prajñāyate. Ibid. p. 633.

It is true, however, that lokāyata is not always used in the sense of a technical logical science, but sometimes in its etymological sense (i.e. what is prevalent among the people, lokesu āyato lokā-yataḥ) as in Divyāvadāna, p. 619, where we find the phrase “lokāyata-yajña-mantreṣu niṣṭātah.”
"The Lokāyata, Nāstika and Cārvāka

āyatana (basis), and lokāyata according to this interpretation means ‘the basis of the foolish and profane world’. The other meaning of lokāyata would be lokesu āyata, i.e. that which is prevalent among the common people, and this meaning has been accepted by Cowell in his translation of Sarva-darśana-samgraha and here the derivation would be from a + yam + kta (spreading over). The Amara-kośa only mentions the word and says that it is to be in the neuter gender as lokāyatam. It seems that there are two lokāyata words. One as adjective meaning “prevalent in the world or among the common people” and another as a technical word meaning “the science of disputation, sophistry and casuistry” (vitaṇḍā-vāda-sattham); but there seems to be no evidence that the word was used to mean “nature-lore,” as suggested by Rhys Davids and Franke, or “polity or political science” as suggested by other scholars. The Śukra-nīti gives a long enumeration of the science and arts that were studied and in this it counts the nāstika-śāstra as that which is very strong in logical arguments and regards all things as proceeding out of their own nature and considers that there are no Vedas and no god. Medhātithi, in commenting upon Manu, vii. 43, also refers to the tarka-vidyā of the Cārvākas, and all the older references that have been discussed show that there was a technical science of logic and sophistry called the Lokāyata. Fortunately we have still further conclusive evidence that the Lokāyata-śāstra with its commentary existed as early as the time of Kātyāyana, i.e. about 300 B.C. There is a Vārtika rule associated with vii. 3. 45 “varṇaka-tāntave upasamkhyaṇam,” that the word varṇaka becomes varṇakā in the feminine to mean a blanket or a wrapper (prāvarana), and Patañjali (about 150 B.C.), in interpreting this vārtika sutra, says that the object of restricting the formation of the word varṇaka only to the sense of a cotton or woollen wrapper is that in other senses the feminine form would

1 Linee di una storia del Materialismo Indiano, p. 17. Sārattha-pakāsinī (Bangkok), ii. 96.
2 Rhys Davids describes lokāyata as a branch of Brahmanic learning, probably Nature-lore, wise sayings, riddles, rhymes and theories, handed down by tradition, as to the cosmogony, the elements, the stars, the weather, scraps of astronomy, of elementary physics, even of anatomy, and knowledge of the nature of precious stones, and of birds and beasts and plants (Dialogues of the Buddha, i. 171). Franke translates it as “logische beweisende NaturerkläRUNG,” Dīgha, 19.
3 yuktir vāltaśyā yatra sarvam svabhavikaṁ matam-kasyā’pi ne śvaraṁ kartā na vedo nāstikaṁ hi tat. Śukra-nīti-sāra, iv. 3. 55.
be *varṇikā* or *varttikā* (e.g. meaning a commentary) as in the case of the Bhāguri commentary on the *Lokāyata—varṇikā bhāguri-lokāyatasya, vartikā bhāguri lokāyatasya*\(^1\). Thus it seems to be quite certain that there was a book called the *Lokāyata* on which there was at least one commentary earlier than 150 B.C. or even earlier than 300 B.C., the probable date of Kātyāyana, the author of the *varttika-sūtra*. Probably this was the old logical work on disputation and sophistry, for no earlier text is known to us in which the *Lokāyata* is associated with materialistic doctrines as may be found in later literature, where *Cārvāka* and *Lokāyata* are identified\(^2\). Several *sūtras* are found quoted in the commentaries of Kamalaśīla, Jayanta, Prabhācandra, Guṇaratna, etc. from the seventh to the fourteenth century and these are attributed by some to *Cārvāka* by others to *Lokāyata* and by Guṇaratna (fourteenth century) to Brhaspati\(^3\). Kamalaśīla speaks of two different commentaries on these *sūtras* on two slightly divergent lines which correspond to the division of *dhūrta* Cārvāka and *susīkṣita* Cārvāka in the *Nyāya-maṇḍarī*. Thus it seems fairly certain that there was at least one commentary on the *Lokāyata* which was probably anterior to Patañjali and Kātyāyana; and by the seventh century the *lokāyata* or the *Cārvāka-sūtras* had at least two commentaries representing two divergent schools of interpretation. In addition to this there was a work in verse attributed to Brhaspati, quotations from which have been utilized for the exposition of the Cārvāka system in the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*. It is difficult, however, to say how and when this older science of sophistical logic or of the art of disputation became associated with materialistic theories and revolutionary doctrines of morality, and came to be hated by Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism alike. Formerly it was hated only by the Buddhists, whereas the Brahmins are said to have learnt this science as one of the various auxiliary branches of study\(^4\).

It is well known that the cultivation of the art of disputation is very old in India. The earliest systematic treatise of this is to be found in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* (first century A.D.) which is only a

1 Patañjali’s *Mahā-bhāṣya* on *Pāṇini*, VII. 3. 45, and Kāvyāṭa’s commentary on it.
2 *tan-nāmāni cārvāka-lokāyate-tyādini.* Guṇaratna’s commentary on *Sad-darśana-saṃuccaya*, p. 300. Lokāyata according to Guṇaratna means those who behave like the common undiscerning people—lokā nirvīcārāḥ sāmānyā lokās tadvād ācaranti sma iti lokāyatā lokāyatikā ity api.
4 *Aṅguttara*, I. 163.
revision of an earlier text (*Agniveśa-samhitā*), which suggests the existence of such a discussion in the first or the second century B.C. if not earlier. The treatment of this art of disputation and sophistry in the *Nyāya-sūtras* is well known. Both in the Āyur-veda and in the Nyāya people made it a point to learn the sophistical modes of disputation to protect themselves from the attacks of their opponents. In the *Kathā-vatthu* also we find the practical use of this art of disputation. We hear it also spoken of as *hetu-vāda* and copious reference to it can be found in the *Mahābhārata*¹. In the *Āṣva-medha-parvan* of the *Mahābhārata* we hear of *hetu-vādins* (sophists or logicians) who were trying to defeat one another in logical disputes². Perhaps the word *vākōvākya* in the *Chāndogya Upanisad*, vii. 1, 2, vii. 2. 1, vii. 7. 1, also meant some art of disputation. Thus it seems almost certain that the practice of this art of disputation is very old. One other point suggested in this connection is that it is possible that the doctrine of the orthodox Hindu philosophy, that the ultimate truth can be ascertained only by an appeal to the scriptural texts, since no finality can be reached by arguments or inferences, because what may be proved by one logician may be controverted by another logician and that disproved by yet another logician, can be traced to the negative influence of the sophists or logicians who succeeded in proving theses which were disproved by others, whose findings were further contradicted by more expert logicians³. There were people who tried to refute by arguments the Vedic doctrines of the immortality of souls, the existence of a future world either as rebirth or as the *pitr-yāna* or the *deva-yāna*, the efficacy of the Vedic sacrifices and the like, and these logicians or sophists (*haituka*) who reviled the Vedas were called *nāstikas*. Thus, Manu says that the Brahmīn who through a greater confidence in the science of logic (*hetu-śāstra*) disregards the authority of the Vedas and the *smṛti* are but *nāstikas* who should be driven out by good

¹ *Mahābhārata*, iii. 13034, v. 1983; xiii. 789, etc.

² Ibid. xiv. 85. 27.

³ Compare *Brahma-sūtra* “tarkā-pratiṣṭhānad apy anyathā-numānam iti ced evam api avimokṣa-prasāṅgah,” i. 1. 11.

Śaṅkara also says: *yasmān nirāgamaḥ puruṣo-prekṣā-mātra-nibandhanāḥ tarkāḥ a pratiṣṭhitā bhavanitā utprekṣāyāḥ nirānkuśatvāt haśrī apy utprekṣitāt santāḥ tato’nyair abhiśayanet iti na pratiṣṭhitatvam tarkānām śākyam aśrayitum. Vācакṣari, commenting on the commentary of Śaṅkara, quotes from *Vākyapādya*: *yatnena’ numito’ py arthaḥ kuśalaṁ anumāṇīrbhīḥ abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathai’vo’papādyate*.
men. The Bhāgavata-purāṇa again says that one should neither follow the Vedic cult, nor be a heretic (pāṣandī, by which the Buddhists and Jains were meant), nor a logician (haituka) and take the cause of one or the other party in dry logical disputations. Again, in Manu, iv. 30, it is said that one should not even speak with the heretics (pāṣandino), transgressors of caste disciplines (vikarmasthān), hypocrites (vaiḍala-vratika), double-dealers and sophists (haituka). These haitukas, sophists or logicians thus indulged in all kinds of free discussions and controverted the Vedic doctrines. They could not be the Naiyāyikas or the Mīmāṃsikas who were also sometimes called haituka and tarkā because they employed their logical reasonings not only in their discussions, but also for repudiating the Vedic, and probably also the Buddhistic doctrines, for which they were hated both by the Vedic people and the Buddhists; and thus the sophistical or logical science of disputation and criticism of Vedic or Buddhistic doctrines grew among the Brahmanic people and was cultivated by the Brahmins. This is testified by Manu, ii. 11, where Brahmans are said to take this hetu-śāstra, and this also agrees with Aṅguttara, i. 163, and other Buddhistic texts.

But who were these nāstikas and were they identical with the haitukas? The word is irregularly formed according to Panini's rule, iv. 460 (asti-nasti-diśtaṃ matih). Patañjali, in his commentary, explains the word āstika as meaning one who thinks "it exists" and nāstika as one who thinks "it does not exist." Jayāditya, in his Kāśikā commentary on the above sutra, explains āstika as one who believes in the existence of the other world (para-loka), nāstika as one who does not believe in its existence, and diśtika as one who believes only what can be logically demonstrated. But we have the

\[1\] yo'vamanyeta te mule hetu-śāstra-śrayādvijah | sa sādhubhir vahiṣ-kāryo nāstiko veda-mindakah. Manu, ii. 11.


\[3\] Medhātithi here describes the haitukas as nāstikas, or those who do not believe in the future world (para-loka) or in the sacrificial creed. Thus he says, haitukā nāstikā nāsti paraloko, nāsti dattam, nāsti hutam ity evāṁ sthita-prajñāḥ. Manu, xii. 111.

\[4\] paralokah asti'iti yasya maitri asti sa āstikah, tadviparito nāstikah; pramāṇā-nupātini yasya mathi sa diśtikah. Kāśikā on Panini, iv. 4. 60. Jayāditya lived in the first half of the seventh century.
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The definition of nāstika in Manu’s own words as one who controverts the Vedic doctrines (veda-nindaka\(^1\)). Thus the word nāstika means, firstly, those who do not believe in the existence of the other world or life after death, and, secondly, those who repudiate the Vedic doctrines. These two views, however, seem to be related to each other, for a refusal to believe in the Vedic doctrines is equivalent to the denial of an after-life for the soul and also of the efficacy of the sacrifice. The nāstika view that there is no other life after the present one and that all consciousness ceases with death seems to be fairly well established in the Upaniṣadic period; and this view the Upaniṣads sought to refute. Thus, in the \textit{Katha Upaniṣad} Naciketa says that there are grave doubts among the people whether one does or does not exist after death, and he was extremely anxious to have a final and conclusive answer from Yama, the lord of death\(^2\). Further on Yama says that those who are blinded with greed think only of this life and do not believe in the other life and thus continually fall victims to death\(^3\). Again, in the \textit{Brhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad} (II. 4. 12, IV. 5. 13) a view is referred to by Yājñavalkya that consciousness arises from the elements of matter and vanishes along with them and that there is no consciousness after death\(^4\). Jayanta says in his \textit{Nyāya-maṅjarī} that the Lokāyata system was based on views expressed in passages like the above which represent only the opponent’s (purva-pakṣa) view\(^5\). Jayanta further states in the same passage that no duties are prescribed in the lokāyata; it is only a work of tricky disputation (vaitandika-kathai’vā’saus) and not an āgama\(^6\).

References to the nāstikas are found also in the Buddhist litera-

\(^1\) \textit{Manu}, II. 11. Medhatithi in explaining nāstikā’-krāntam (\textit{Manu}, VIII. 22) identifies nāstikas with lokāyatas who do not believe in the other world. Thus he says, yathā nāstikaiḥ para-lokā-pavādibhir lokāyatikā-dyair ākrāntam. But in \textit{Manu}, IV. 163, nāstikya is explained by him as meaning the view that the Vedic doctrines are false: veda-pramāṇakāṅkāṁ arthānāṁ mithyātevā-dhyaṇasāyasya nāstikya-sadbena pratiṣṭānam.

\(^2\) ye’yaṁ prete vicikitsā maṇuṣye aṣṭi’ty eke nā’yaṁ aṣṭi’ ti ca’i ke, etad-vidyāṁ anuśīṣas tvayā’ham varāṇāṁ esa varas tritīyāḥ. \textit{Katha}, I. 20.

\(^3\) na sāmpāraṇāḥ pratiḥātī bālam pramādy-antaṁvita-mohena mūḍham; ayaṁ loko nāsti para iti mānt punah punar vaśam āpadyate me. \textit{Ibid.} II. 11. 6.

\(^4\) vijñāna-ghana eva etehbhayaḥ bhūtebhayo samutthāya tāṇya eva’nuvinaśyati, na pretya samajñā’sti ity are bravīmi. \textit{Brhad-āraṇyaka}, II. 4. 12.


\(^6\) nahi lokāyate kiṁ cī kartavyam upadiśyate vaitandika-kathai’vā’san na punah kaś cid āgamaḥ. \textit{Ibid.} p. 270.
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ture. The P.T.S. Pāli Dictionary explains the meaning of the word natthika as one who professes the motto of "natthi," a sceptic, nihilist, and natthika-dīthi as scepticism or nihilistic view. It may, however, seem desirable here to give brief accounts of some of the heretics referred to in Buddhistic literature who could in some sense or other be regarded as sceptics or nihilists. Let us first take up the case of Pūraṇa Kassapa described in Dīgha Nikāya, ii. 16, 17. Buddhaghoso, in commenting on the Dīgha Nikāya, i. 1. 2, in his Sumangala-vilāsinī, says that, in a family which had ninety-nine servants, Kassapa was the hundredth servant and he having thus completed (pūraṇa) the hundredth number was called by his master pūraṇa (the completer), and Kassapa was his family name. He fled away from the family and on the way thieves robbed him of his cloth and he somehow covered himself with grass and entered a village. But the villagers finding him naked thought him to be a great ascetic and began to treat him with respect. From that time he became an ascetic and five hundred people turned ascetics and followed him. King Ajātaśatru once went to this Purāṇa Kassapa and asked him what was the visible reward that could be had in this life by becoming a recluse, and Pūraṇa Kassapa replied as follows: “To him who acts, O king, or causes another to act, to him who mutilates or causes another to mutilate, to him who punishes or causes another to punish, to him who causes grief or torment, to him who trembles or causes others to tremble, to him who kills a living creature, who takes what is not given, who breaks into houses, who commits dacoity, or robbery, or highway robbery, or adultery, or who speaks lies, to him thus acting there is no guilt. If with a discus with an edge sharp as a razor he should make all the living creatures on the earth one heap, one mass of flesh, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the south bank of the Ganges giving alms and ordering gifts to be given, offering sacrifices or causing them to be offered, there would be no merit thence resulting, no increase of merit. In generosity, in self-mastery, in control of the senses, in speaking truth, there is neither merit, nor increase of merit. Thus, Lord, did Pūraṇa Kassapa, when asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, expound his theory of non-action (akīriyam)\(^1\).” This theory definitely repudiates the doctrine of karma and holds

\(^1\) Dialogues of the Buddha, i. 69–70.
that there is neither virtue nor vice and thus no action can lead to any fruit. This is what is here called the doctrine of akirya and it is in a way an answer to the question what may be the visible reward in this life of being a recluse. Since there is neither virtue nor vice, no action can produce any meritorious or evil effect—this is one kind of nattikavada. But it is wrong to confuse this akirya doctrine with the doctrine of inactivity (akaraka-vada) attributed to Sāmkhya by Śilānka in his commentary on Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra, 1. 1. 13. That akaraka doctrine refers to the Sāmkhya view that the souls do not participate in any kind of good or bad deeds.

Let us now turn to another nihilistic teacher, viz. Ajita Keśakambalī. His doctrines are briefly described in Dīgha, ii. 22–24, where Ajita says: “There is no such thing as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next (n'atthi ayam loko na paro loko). There is neither father nor mother, nor beings springing into life without them. There are in the world no recluses or Brahmīns who have reached the highest point, who walk perfectly and who, having understood and realized, by themselves alone, both this world and the next, make their wisdom known to others. A human being is built up of the four elements; when he dies the earth in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, his wind to the air, and his faculties pass into space. The four bearers, with the bier as the fifth, take the dead body away; till they reach the burning ground men utter eulogies, but there his bones are bleached and his offerings end in ashes. It is a doctrine of fools, this talk of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk, when men say there is profit therein. Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off, annihilated and after death they are not.”

Ajita Keśakambalī was so called because he used to wear a garment made of human hair which was hot in summer and cold in winter and was thus a source of suffering.

It is easy to see that Ajita Keśakambalī’s views were very similar to

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2. This has been interpreted by Dr Barua as representing the doctrine of Pūrāṇa Kassapa, which is evidently a blunder. Prebuddhistic Indian Philosophy, Calcutta, 1921, p. 279.
4. Sumangala-vilāsint, 1. 144.
the views of the Cārvākas as known to us from the fragments preserved as quotations and from accounts of them given by other people. Thus, Ajita did not believe in the other world, in virtue or vice, and denied that karmas produced any fruits. He, however, believed in the view that the body was made up of four elements, that there was no soul separate from the body, that with the destruction of the body everything of this life was finished, and that there was no good in the Vedic sacrifices.

Let us now turn to the doctrine of Makkhali Gosāla or Mankhali-putta Gosāla or Makkhali Gosāla who was a contemporary of the Buddha and Mahāvīra. Buddhaghosā says that he was born in a cow-shed (go-sāla). As he grew up he was employed as a servant; while going in the mud to bring oil he was cautioned by his master to take care not to let his feet slip (mākhali) in the mud; but in spite of the caution he slipped and ran away from his master, who, following him in a rage, pulled the ends of his dhoti, which was left in his hands, and Makkhali ran away naked. Thus left naked he afterwards became an ascetic like Pūraṇa Kassapa1. According to the Bhagavati-sūtra, xv. 1, however, he was the son of Makkhali who was a mānkha (a mendicant who makes his living by showing pictures from house to house) and his mother's name was Bhaddā. He was born in a cow-shed and himself adopted the profession of a mānkha in his youth. At his thirtieth year he met Mahāvīra and after two years he became his disciple and lived with him for six years practising penances. Then they fell out, and Makkhali Gosāla, after practising penances for two years, obtained his Jina-hood while Mahāvīra became a Jina two years after the attainment of Jina-hood by Gosāla. After this Gosāla continued to be a Jina for sixteen years and Mahāvīra met him at the end of that period in Sāvatthi where there was a quarrel between the two and Gosāla died through fever by the curse of Mahāvīra. Hoernlé shows in his edition of the text and translation of Uvāsagadasāno, pp. 110–111, that Mahāvīra died in 450–451 B.C. at the age of 56. Makkhali was the founder of the Ājīvaka sect. Ājīvakas are mentioned in the rock-hewn cave (which was given to them) on Barabar hills near Gaya, in the seventh Pillar Edict of Asoka in 236 B.C. and in the rock-hewn caves on Nāgārjuni hill in 227 B.C. in the reign of Asoka’s successor Dāśaratha. They are also mentioned in the

1 Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī, 1. 143, 144.
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_Bṛhaj-jātaka_ (xv. i) of Varāha Mihira in the middle of the sixth century A.D. Silāńka (ninth century) also refers to them in his commentary on the _Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra_ (i. 1. 3. 12 and i. 3. 3. 11), in which the _Ājīvakan_ are mentioned along with _Trai-rāśikas_ as being followers of Makkhali Gosāla. Halāyudha also mentions the ājīvaks as being the same as the Jains in general; but does not distinguish the nirgranthas from the _Digambaras_ or identify the latter with the _Ājīvakan_ as Hoernlé says in his article on the _Ājīvakan_. Hoernlé further points out in the same article that in the thirteenth-century inscriptions on the walls of the Perumāl Temple at Poygai near Virinchipuram reference is made to the taxes imposed on the _Ājīvakan_ by the Chola king Rājarāja in the years A.D. 1238, 1239, 1243 and 1259. Thus it is clear that the _Ājīvakan_ school of Makkhali which was started by Makkhali in the fifth century B.C. continued to exist and spread not only in North India but also in South India, and other schools also have developed out of it such as the _Trai-rāśikas_. Pāṇini’s grammar has a rule (iv. 1. 154), _maskara-maskariṇau venuparivṛājakayoḥ_, which signifies that _maskara_ means a bamboo and _maskarin_ a travelling ascetic. Patañjali, however, in commenting on it, says that _maskarins_ were those who advised the non-performance of actions and held that cessation (_sānti_) was much better (_māskṛta karmāṇi sāntir vah śreyasī ityāha ato maskari parivṛājakah_). The word, therefore, does not necessarily mean _ekadaṇḍins_ or those who bore one bamboo staff. The identification of Makkhali with _maskarins_ is therefore doubtful. It is also very doubtful whether the _Ājīvakan_ can be regarded as the same as _Digambara_ Jains, as Hoernlé supposes, for neither Varāha nor Bhoṭṭolpala identifies the _Ājīvakan_ with the Jains, and Silāńka treats them as different and not as identical. Halāyudha also does not speak of the _Digambaras_

1 The _Trai-rāśikas_ are those who think that the self by good deeds becomes pure and free from _karma_ and thus attains _mokṣa_, but seeing the success of its favourite doctrines it becomes joyous and seeing them neglected it becomes angry, and then being born again attains purity and freedom from _karma_ by the performance of good deeds and is again born through joy and antipathy as before. Their canonical work is one containing twenty-one _sūtras_. In commenting on i. 3. 3. 11 Silāńka mentions also the _Digambaras_ along with the _Ājīvakan_, but it does not seem that he identifies them in the way Hoernlé states in his scholarly article on the _Ājīvakan_ in the _Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics_. The exact phrase of Silāńka is _ājīvaka-dīnāṁ para-līthrīhānāṁ digamvarānāṁ ca asad-ācaranair upaneyā_.

2 Hoernlé, in his article on the _Ājīvakan_ in the _Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics_, says: “From this fact that Gosāla is called Makkhaliputta or Mankhali (Maskarin), i.e. the man of the bamboo staff, it is clear that originally he belonged
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as Ājīvakas\(^1\). It is, therefore, very doubtful whether the Ājīvakas could be identified with the Digambara Jains unless by a confusion in later times, probably on account of the fact that both the Digambaras and the Ājīvakas went about naked\(^2\).

The fundamental tenet of Gosāla appears in more or less the same form in Uvāsagadasā, I. 97, 115, II. 111, 132, Samyutta Nikāya, III. 210, Aṅguttara Nikāya, I. 286 and the Dīgha Nikāya, II. 20. In the last-mentioned work Gosāla is reported to say to king Ajātashatru: “There is no cause for the sufferings of beings; they therefore all suffer without any cause; there is no cause for the purity (viśuddhi) of beings; they all become pure without any cause; there is no efficiency in one’s own deeds or in the deeds of others (n’atthi atta-kāre na’tthi parakāre) or in one’s free efforts (purīsa-kāre); there is no power, no energy, no human strength or heroic endeavours (parākkama)\(^3\). All vertebrates (sabbe sattā), all animals with one or more senses (sabbe pāṇā), all lives emanating from eggs or ovaries (sabbe bhūtā), all vegetable lives, are without any power or efficiency. They become transformed in various forms by their inherent destiny, by their manifestation in various life-forms, and by their different natures (niyati-saṅgati-bhava-parinati), and it is in accordance with their six kinds of life-states that they suffer pains and enjoy pleasures.” Again, in the Sūtra-krtāṅga sūtra, II. 6. 7, Gosāla is reported to say that there is no sin for ascetics in having intercourse with women\(^4\). These doctrines of Gosāla to the class of eka-dandins (or dandin) ascetics; and, though he afterwards joined Mahāvira and adopted his system, he held some distinguishing tenets of his own, and also retained his old distinguishing mark, the bamboo staff.” This is all very doubtful, for firstly mankha and maskarīn cannot be identified; secondly, mankha means a beggar who carried pictures in his hands—mankhaś citra-phaḷaka-vaγgra-karo bhikṣuka-rīṣeṣaḥ (Abhayadeva Sūri’s comment on the Bhagavati-sūtra, p. 662. Nirmaya Sagara ed.). Gosāla’s father was a mankha and his name was Mankhali from which Gosāla was called Makkhaliputta. Both Jacobi (Jaina Sūtras, II. 267 footnote) and Hoernlé (Ājīvaka, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, p. 266) are here wrong, for the passage referred to is Śīlaṅka’s commentary on Sūtra-krtāṅga-sūtra, III. 3. 11 (ājīvakā-dīnām para-tīrṭhikānām digamvarāṇāṁ ca), and the “ca” in the passage which is to be translated as “and” and not as “or” distinguishes the Ājīvakas from the Digambaras.

\(^1\) nāgaṇā to dig-vāsāḥ kṣapaṇāḥ śramaṇāḥ ca jīvako jainaḥ, ājīvo mala-dhārt nirgrantaḥ kathiyate sadbhīḥ. II. 190.

\(^2\) Dītyāvadāṇa, p. 427, refers to an episode where a Buddha image was dishonoured by a nirgrantha and in consequence of that 8000 Ājīvakas were killed in the city of Pundravardhana. Dr Barua also refers to this passage in his small work, The Ājīvakas.

\(^3\) As Buddhaghosho says, these are all merely specifications of puriṣa-kāra (sarvaiva puriṣa-kāra-viśecam eva). Sumaṅgala-tilāsīṁ, II. 20.

\(^4\) There is another passage in the Sūtra-krtāṅga-sūtra, III. 4. 9 (evamege u asattha pāṇavanti anāriyaḥ; itthivāsam gayā bālā jinasāsana-parāmmuhā), where
interest us only so far as they may be considered similar to the other nāstika teachings. But unlike other nāstikas, Gosāla believed not only in rebirths but also introduced a special doctrine of re-animation. Several other doctrines which are not of philosophical, ethical or eschatological interest but which refer only to Ājīvaka dogmatics are related both in the Dīgha Nikāya, II. 20, and in the Bhagavatti-sūtra, xv, and have been elaborately dealt with by Hoernlé in his article on the Ājīvaka and his translation of the Uvāsaṇaśāsana. The two important points that we need take note of here are that the Ājīvakas who were an important sect did not believe in the efficiency of our will or our karma and regarded sex-indulgence as unobjectionable to recluses. Other heretics are also alluded to in the Sūtra-kṛtaṅga sūtra, I. III. 4. 9–14, where they also are alluded to as having similar tendencies. Thus it is said: “Some unworthy heretics, slaves of women, ignorant men who are averse to the Law of the Jainas, speak thus: ‘As the squeezing of a blister or boil causes relief for some time, so it is with (the enjoyment of) charming women. How could there be any sin in it? As a ram it is said that some wrongdoers and others who belong to the Jaina circle have turned their faces from the laws imposed upon them by Jina and are slaves of women. Hoernlé says (Ajīvaka, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, p. 261) that this passage refers to the followers of Gosāla. But there is no evidence that it is so, if at least we believe in Śilānka’s commentary. Śilānka explains “eke” or “eka” as bauddha-vaīśeṣā nīla-paṭādayāḥ nātha-vadikā-mandala-pravīṣṭāḥ vā śaiva-vaīśeṣāḥ and paśaṭhasasā sad-amuṣṭhānāt pārśve tiṣṭhanti iti pārśva-sthāṇa svam-yūhyā vā pārśva-sthāṇa-vasanna-kuśa-lā-dayāḥ stṛ-pariṣada-parājitaḥ. Thus, according to him, it refers to some Buddhists wearing blue garments, the nātha-vādins, the Saivas, or some Jains with bad characters, or bad people in general.

1 Gosāla thought that it was possible that one person’s soul could reanimate other dead bodies. Thus, when he was challenged by Mahāvīra, who forbade his disciples to hold any intercourse with him, he is reported to have said that the Makkhaliputta Gosāla who was the disciple of Mahāvīra was long dead and born in the abode of the gods while he was in reality Uḍāyī-kunḍiyāṇiṣya, who in the seventh and the last change of body through reanimation had entered Gosāla’s body. According to Gosāla, a soul must finish eighty-four thousand mahā-kalpas during which it must be born seven times in the abode of the gods and seven times as men, undergoing seven reanimations, exhausting all kinds of karmas. See Bhagavati-sūtra, xv, 673, Nirṇaya Sagaraed. See also Hoernlé’s two Appendices to his translation of Uvāsaṇaśāsana and the article on Ajīvika, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, p. 262. A mahā-karpa is equal to 300,000 sara and one sara is the time required to exhaust the sands of the seven Ganges (each Ganges being 500 yojanas or 2250 miles in length, 2½ miles in breadth, and 50 dhanus or 100 yards in depth), at the rate of putting 100 years for the removal of one grain of sand. See ibid.; also Rockhill’s Appendix 1 to his Life of the Buddha.

2 According to Śilānka they were a sect of Buddhists wearing blue garments, Saivas, the Nāthis, and some degraded Jains also.
drinks the quiet water, so it is with (the enjoyment of) charming women. How can there be any sin in it?" So say some unworthy heretics who entertain false doctrines and who long for pleasures as the ewe for her kid. Those who do not think of the future but only enjoy the present will repent of it afterwards when their life or their youth is gone."

Again, some heretics (identified by Śīraṅka with the Lokāyata) are reported in the Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra, II. 1. 9–10, as instructing others as follows: Upwards from the sole of the feet up to the bottom of the tips of hair and in all transverse directions the soul is up to the skin; so long as there is the body there is the soul and there is no soul apart from this body, so the soul is identical with the body; when the body is dead there is no soul. When the body is burnt no soul is seen and all that is seen is but the white bones. When one draws a sword from a scabbard, one can say that the former lies within the latter, but one cannot say similarly of the soul that it exists in the body; there is in reality no way of distinguishing the soul from the body such that one may say that the former exists in the latter. One can draw the pith from a grass stalk, or bones from flesh or butter from curd, oil from sesamum and so forth, but it is not possible to find any such relation between the soul and the body. There is no separate soul which suffers pains and enjoys pleasures and migrates to the other world after the death of the body, for even if the body is cut into pieces no soul can be perceived, just as no soul can be perceived in a jug even when it is broken to pieces, whereas in the case of a sword it is found to be different from the scabbard within which it is put. The Lokāyatas thus think that there is no fault in killing living beings, since striking a living body with a weapon is like striking the ground. These Lokāyatas, therefore, cannot make any distinction between good and bad deeds as they do not know of any principle on which such a distinction can be made, and there is thus no morality according to them. Some slight distinction is made between the ordinary nihilists and the haughty nihilists (pragālbha nāstika) who say that if the soul was different from the body then it would have some specific kind of colour, taste or the like, but no such separate entity is discoverable, and therefore it cannot be believed that there is a separate soul. The Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra, II. 1. 9 (p. 277), speaks

1 See Jacobi's translation of Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra. Jaina Sūtras, II. 270.
of these Pragalbha Nastikas as renouncing (niskramya) the world and instructing other people to accept their doctrines. But Śilāṅka says that the Lokāyata system has no form of initiation and thus there cannot be any ascetics of that school; it is the ascetics of other schools such as the Buddhists who sometimes in their ascetic stage read the Lokāyata, became converted to lokāyata views, and preached them to others.1

After the treatment of the views of the lokāyata nāstikas the Sūtra-kṛtāngā-sūtra treats of the Śāmkhyas. In this connection Śilāṅka says that there is but little difference between the lokāyata and the Śāmkhya, for though the Śāmkhyas admit souls, these are absolutely incapable of doing any work, and all the work is done by prakṛti which is potentially the same as the gross elements. The body and the so-called mind is therefore nothing but the combination of the gross elements, and the admission of separate puruṣas is only nominal. Since such a soul cannot do anything and is of no use (akimcitkara), the Lokāyatas flatly deny them. Śilāṅka further says that the Śāmkhyists, like the Lokāyatikas, do not find anything wrong in injuring animal lives, for after all the living entities are but all material products, the so-called soul being absolutely incapable of taking interest or part in all kinds of activities.2 Neither the nāstikas nor the Śāmkhyists can, therefore, think of the distinction between good and bad deeds or between Heaven and Hell, and they therefore give themselves up to all kinds of enjoyments. Speaking of the lokāyata nāstikas, the Sūtra-kṛtāngā-sūtras say as follows: ‘Thus some shameless men becoming monks propagate a law of their own. And others believe it, put their faith in it, adopt it (saying): ‘Well you speak the truth, O Brahmana (or) O Śramaṇa, we shall present you with food, drink, spices and sweetmeats, with a robe, a bowl, or a broom.’ Some have been induced to honour them, some have made (their proselytes) to honour them. Before (entering an order) they were determined to become Śramaṇas,

1 yady api lokāyatikānām nāṣtī dīkṣādikām tathā'pi apareṇa śākyā-dīnā pravrajyā-vidhāñena pravrajyā paścat lokāyatikām adhīyānasya tathāvīdha-parināteḥ tad eva'bhirucitam. Śilāṅka’s commentary on the Sūtra-kṛtāngā-sūtra, p. 280 a (Nirṇaya Sagaraed).

In pp. 280–281 Śilāṅka points out that the Bhāgavatas and other ascetics at the time of their renouncement of the world take the vow of all kinds of self-restraint, but as soon as they become converted to the lokāyata views they begin to live an unrestrained life. They then wear blue garments (nīla-pāṭa).

2 Ibid. pp. 281, 283.
houseless, poor monks, who would have neither sons nor cattle, to
eat only what should be given them by others, and to commit no
sins. After having entered their Order they do not cease (from sins),
they themselves commit sins and they assent to another’s com-
mitting sins. Then they are given to pleasures, amusements and
sensual lust; they are greedy, fettered, passionate, covetous, the
slaves of love and hate."

But we find references to the *lokāyata* doctrines not only in the
*Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra* but also in the *Byhad-āranyaka*, the *Katha* as
described above and in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, viii. 7, 8, where
Virocana, the representative of the demons who came to Prajāpati for
instruction regarding the nature of self, went away satisfied with the
view that the self was identical with the body. Prajāpati asked both
Indra and Virocana to stand before a cup of water and they saw
their reflections, and Prajāpati told them that it was that well
dressed and well adorned body that was the self and both Indra
and Virocana were satisfied; but Indra was later on dissatisfied and
returned for further instructions, whereas Virocana did not again
come back. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* relates this as an old story
and says that it is for this reason that those, who at the present time
believe only in worldly pleasures and who have no faith (in the
efficiency of deeds or in the doctrine of the immortality of the soul)
and who do not perform sacrifices, are called demons (*asura*); and it
is therefore their custom to adorn the dead body with fine clothes,
good ornaments and provide food for it with which they probably
thought that the dead would conquer the other world.

This passage of the *Chāndogya* seems to be of special import-
ance. It shows that there was a race different from the Aryans,
designated here as *asuras*, who dressed their dead bodies with
fine clothes, adorned them with ornaments, provided them with
food, so that when there was a resurrection of these dead bodies
they might with that food, clothes and ornaments prosper in the
other world and it is these people who believed that the body was
the only self. The later *Lokāyatas* or *Cārvākas* also believed that this
body was the self, but the difference between them and these
*dehātmavādins* referred to in the *Chāndogya* is that they admitted
"another world" where the bodies rose from the dead and pro-
spered in the fine clothes, ornaments and food that were given to

the dead body. This custom is said to be an *asura* custom. It seems possible, therefore, that probably the *lokāyata* doctrines had their beginnings in the preceding Sumerian civilization in the then prevailing customs of adorning the dead and the doctrine of bodily survival after death. This later on became so far changed that it was argued that since the self and the body were identical and since the body was burnt after death, there could not be any survival after death and hence there could not be another world after death. Already in the *Katha* and the *Brhad-āranyaka* we had proof of the existence of people who did not believe in the existence of any consciousness after death and thought that everything ended with death; and in the *Chāndogya* we find that Virocana believed in the doctrine that the body was the ātman and this doctrine is traced here to the custom of adorning the dead body among the *asuras*.

The tenets and doctrines of these *asuras* are described in the *Gītā*, xvi. 7–18, as follows: The *asuras* cannot distinguish between right and wrong conduct; they do not have any purity, truthfulness and proper behaviour. They do not think that the world is based on any truth and reality; they do not believe in God and consider all beings to have come out from the desires of the sexes and from nothing more than from mutual sex-relations. These foolish people with such views do harm to the world, engage themselves in ferocious deeds and destroy their own selves (as they have no faith in the other world or in the means thereto)\(^1\). Full of insatiable desire, egoism, vanity and pride, they take the wrong course through ignorance and live an impure life. They think that existence ends finally at death and that there is nothing beyond this world and its enjoyments, and they therefore give themselves up to earthly enjoyments. Bound with innumerable desires, anger, attachment, etc., they busy themselves in collecting materials of earthly enjoyments through wrong means. They always think of their riches, which they earn daily, and which they accumulate, with which they fulfil their desires in the present or wish to fulfil in the future; of the enemies whom they have destroyed, or whom they wish to destroy; of their powers, their success, their joys, their strength, and so forth.

A doctrine similar to that of the *Lokāyatikas* is preached by Jābāli in *Rāmāyaṇa*, ii. 108, where he says that it is a pity that there

\(^{1}\) Śridhara says that these refer to the *Lokāyatikas*. *Gītā*, xvi. 9.
should be some people who prefer virtue in the other world to earthly goods of this world; the performance of the different sacrifices for the satisfaction of the dead is but waste of food, for being dead no one can eat. If food eaten by people here should be of use to other bodies, then it is better to perform śrāddhas for people who make a sojourn to distant countries than to arrange for their meals. Though intelligent men wrote books praising the merit of gifts, sacrifices, initiation and asceticism, in reality there is nothing more than what is directly perceived by the senses.

In the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (1, 6. 29–31) certain people are alluded to who did not believe in the efficacy of the performance of sacrifices and spoke against the Vedas and the sacrifices; and in the Mahābhārata, xii. 186, it has been urged by Bharadvāja that life-functions can be explained by purely physical and physiological reasons and that the assumption of a soul is quite unnecessary. In the Mahābhārata references are made also to haitukas who did not believe in the other world; they were people with strong old convictions (dṛḍha-pūrve) who could hardly change their views; they were learned in the Vedas (vahusṛuta), were well read in older śāstras, made gifts, performed sacrifices, hated falsehood, were great orators in assemblies, and went among the people explaining their views. This passage reveals a curious fact that even in the Vedic circles there were people who performed sacrifices, made gifts and were well read in the Vedas and in older literature, who despised falsehood, were great logicians and speakers and yet did not believe in anything except what exists in this world (nai’tad asti’ti-vādinah). We know from the Buddhistic sources that the Brahmins were well versed in the lokāyatu learning; we know also that in the Upaniṣadic circles the views of those who did not believe in life after death are referred to and reproached, and the Chāndogya refers to people among whom the doctrine that the self and the body were identical was current as a corollary underlying their custom of adorning the dead. In the Rāmāyaṇa we find that Jávālī taught the doctrine that there was no life after death and that the ritualistic offerings for the satisfaction of the dead were unnecessary. In the Gitā we find also the holders of such views referred to, and they are there reported as performing sacrifices only in name, as they did not adhere to the proper ritualistic course. But in the

1 yojante nāma-jāśñais te dambhenā’vibhi-pūrvekaṃ. Gitā, xvi. 17.
Mahābhārata certain people are referred to who were well read in the Vedas and other older literature and yet did not believe in the other world and in the immortality of the soul. This shows that this heterodox view (that there was no life after death) was gradually spreading amongst certain sections of the Vedic people, and that though some of them were worthless people who utilized the doctrine only to indulge in sense-gratifications and to live in a lower plane of life, there were others who performed the Vedic practices, were well read in Vedic and other literature and yet did not believe in the doctrine of immortality or in a world beyond the present. Thus, even in those early times, on the one hand there were in the Vedic circle many moral and learned people who believed in these heretical views, whereas there were also immoral and bad people who lived a vicious life and held such heretical views either tacitly or openly.

We thus know that the lokāyata views were very old, probably as early as the Vedas, or still earlier, being current among the Sumerian people of pre-Aryan times. We know further that a commentary on the Lokāyata-śāstra by Bhāgurī was very well known in 200 or 300 B.C., but it is exceedingly difficult to say anything regarding the author of the Lokāyata-śāstra. It is attributed to Brhaspati or to Cārvāka. But it is difficult to say who this Brhaspati may have been. One Brhaspati-sūtra, a work on polity, has been edited with translation by Dr F. W. Thomas and published from Lahore. In this work the lokāyatas have been mentioned in ii. 5, 8, 12, 16, 29, and iii. 15. Here they are very severely abused as thieves who regard religion as a mere means of advantage and who are destined to go to Hell. It is therefore absolutely certain

1 The Maitrāyaṇa Upaniṣad, vii. 8, 9, says that there are many others who by adopting useless arguments, illustrations, false analogies and illusory demonstrations wish to oppose the Vedic ways of conduct; they do not believe in the self and are like thieves who would never go to Heaven and with whom no one should associate. One sometimes forgets that the doctrine of these people is nothing new but is only a different kind of Vedic science (veda-cidyā'ntarān tu tat). Brhaspati became Śukra and taught the Āsuras this doctrine so that they might be inclined to despise the Vedic duties and consider bad to be good and good to be bad.

2 The Maitrāyaṇiṇī attributes these doctrines to Brhaspati and Śukra; the Prabodha-candro-daya of Kṛṣṇa Miśra says that these were first formulated by Brhaspati and then handed over to Cārvāka who spread them among people through his pupils.

See also Mr D. Śāstri’s Cārvāka-ṣaṭṭī, pp. 11–13, where he refers to a number of authorities who attribute this to Brhaspati.
that the Brhaspati who was the author of these sūtras on polity could not have been the author of the lokāyata science. Nor could it have been the legal writer Brhaspati. In Kauṭilya’s Artha-śāstra a Brhaspati is referred to as a writer on polity, but this must be a different one from the Bārhaspatya-sūtra published by Dr. Thomas.1 The Brhaspati of Kauṭilya’s Artha-śāstra is reported there as admitting agriculture, trade and commerce (vārtā), law and statecraft (daṇḍa-nīti), as the only sciences; in the next passage of the same chapter (Vidyā-samuddesa) daṇḍa-nīti is regarded as the one subject of study by Uśanas. In the Prabodha-candro-daya Kṛṣṇa Miśra makes Cārvāka hold the view that law and statecraft are the only sciences and that the science of vārtā (i.e. agriculture, commerce, trade, dairy, poultry, etc.) falls within them. According to this report the Cārvākas took only daṇḍa-nīti and vārtā into account, and thus their views agreed with those of Brhaspati and Uśanas, and more particularly with those of the latter. But we cannot from this assume that either Brhaspati or Uśanas mentioned by Kauṭilya could be regarded as the author of the original lokāyata. Brhaspati, the author of the Lokāyata-śāstra, is thus a mythical figure, and we have practically no information regarding the originator of the lokāyata system. It is probable that the original lokāyata work was written in the form of sūtras which had at least two commentaries, the earliest of which was probably as early as 300 or 400 B.C. There was at least one metrical version of the main contents of this system from which extracts are found quoted in Mādhava’s Sarva-darśana-samgraha and in other places.

It is difficult to say whether Cārvāka was the name of a real person or not. The earliest mention of the name is probably to be found in the Mahābhārata, xii. 38 and 39, where Cārvāka is described as a Rākṣasa in the garb of an ascetic Brahmin with three staffs (tridāndī), but nothing is said there about the doctrine that he professed. In most of the early texts the lokāyata doctrines are either mentioned as the lokāyata view or attributed to Brhaspati. Thus, in the Padma Purāṇa in the Sṛṣṭ-khaṇḍa, xii. 318–340, some of the lokāyata doctrines are described as being the instructions of Brhaspati. Kamalaśila, of the eighth century, refers to the Cārvākas as being the adherents of the lokāyata doctrine; the Prabodha-candro-daya speaks of Cārvāka as being the great teacher who

1 Kauṭilya’s Artha-śāstra, pp. 6, 29, 63, 177, 192, Mysore ed. 1924.
propagated through a succession of pupils and pupils of pupils the Lokāyata-śāstra written by Vācaspāti and handed over to him. Mādhava, in his Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, describes him as one who follows the views of Brhaspati and the chief of the nihilists (brhaspati-matā-nusārīṇā nāstika-śiromāṇinā). Guṇaratna, however, in his commentary on the Saṅ-darśana-saṃuccaya, speaks of the Cārvākas as being a nihilistic sect who only eat but do not regard the existence of virtue and vice and do not trust anything else but what can be directly perceived. They drank wines and ate meat and were given to unrestricted sex-indulgence. Each year they gathered together on a particular day and had unrestricted intercourse with women. They behaved like common people and for this reason they were called lokāyata and because they held views originally framed by Brhaspati they were also called Bṛhaspatya. Thus it is difficult to say whether the word Cārvāka was the name of a real personage or a mere allusive term applied to the adherents of the lokāyata view.

Both Haribhadra and Mādhava have counted the Lokāyata or Cārvāka philosophy as a darśana or system of philosophy. It had a new logic, a destructive criticism of most of the cherished views of other systems of Indian philosophy, a materialistic philosophy, and it denied morality, moral responsibility and religion of every kind.

Let us, therefore, first take up the Cārvāka logic. The Cārvākas admitted the validity only of perception. There is nothing else but what can be perceived by the five senses. No inference can be regarded as a valid means of knowledge, for inference is possible only when the universal concomitance of the reason (hetus) with the probandum is known, and such a reason is known to be existing in the object of the minor term (vyāpti-pakṣa-dharmatā-śāli hi lingam gamakam). Such a concomitance is possible when it is known not only to be unconditional but when there is no doubt in the mind that it could be conditional. Such a concomitance must first be known before an inference is possible; but how can it be known? Not by perception, for concomitance is not an objective entity with which the senses can come in contact. Moreover, the concomitance of one entity with another means that the entities are associated with each other in the past, present and future (sarvo-pasamhārayatī vyāptih), and the sense-organs can have no
scope with regard to future associations or even with regard to all past time. If it is urged that the concomitance is between the class-character (sāmānya-gocaram) of the probandum (e.g. fire) and the class-character of the reason (e.g. smoke), then it is not necessary that the concomitance of the reason with the probandum should have actually to be perceived at all times by the sense-organs. But if the concomitance is between the class-character of smoke and fire, why should any individual fire be associated with every case of smoke? If the concomitance cannot be perceived by the sense-organs, it cannot be perceived by the mind either, for the mind cannot associate itself with the external objects except through the sense-organs. The concomitance cannot be known through inference, for all inference presupposes it. Thus, there being no way of perceiving concomitance, inference becomes impossible. Again, a concomitance which can lead to a valid inference must be devoid of all conditions; but the absence of such conditions in the past or in the future cannot be perceived at the time of making the inference. Moreover, a condition (upādhi) is defined as that which, having an unfailing concomitance with the probandum, has not the same concomitance with the reason (sādhanā-vyāpakatve sati sādhya-sama-vyāptih)\(^1\).

Again it is said that an inference is possible only when the reason (e.g. smoke) is perceived to be associated with the object denoted by the minor term (pakṣa, e.g. hill), but in reality there is no association of the smoke with the hill nor can it be a character of it, for it is a quality of fire. There is no universal agreement between smoke and hill so that one can say that wherever there is a hill there is smoke. Nor can it be said that wherever there is smoke there is both the hill and the fire. When the smoke is first seen it is not perceived as the quality of fire associated with a hill; therefore it is not enough to say that the reason (e.g. smoke) belongs to the minor term (pakṣa, e.g. hill) as its character (pakṣa-dharma), but that the reason belongs to the minor term associated with the probandum. The assertion that in an inference the reason must be known as a quality of the minor term (pakṣa) has therefore to be interpreted as being a quality of a part of the minor term as associated with the probandum.

A valid inference can be made when the two following con-

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\(^1\) Sarva-darśana-samgraha, 1.
ditions are satisfied: (1) An invariable and unconditional concomitance is known between the reason and the probandum such that in every case when the reason is present the probandum must also be present in all places and in all times, without the association of any determining condition. (2) That a reason having such a concomitance with the probandum must be known to exist in the minor term (pakṣa) in which the probandum is asserted. Now the Cārvāka contention is that none of these conditions can be fulfilled and that therefore valid inference is impossible. Firstly, concomitance is ascertained through an experience of a very large number of cases (bhūyo-darśana) of agreement between the reason (hetu) and the probandum (sādhya). But according to the difference of circumstances, time and place, things differ in their power or capacity and thus since the nature and qualities of things are not constant it is not possible that any two entities should be found to agree with each other under all circumstances in all times and in all places. Again, an experience of a large number of cases cannot eliminate the possibility of a future failure of agreement. It is not possible to witness all cases of fire and smoke and thus root out all chances of a failure of their agreement, and if that were possible there would be no need of any inference. The Cārvākas do not admit “universals,” and therefore they do not admit that the concomitance is not between smoke and fire but between smoke-ness (dhūmatva) and fire-ness (vahnitva). Again, it is impossible to assure oneself that there are no conditions (upādhi) which would vitiate the concomitance between the hetu and the sādhya, for though they may not now be perceivable they may still exist imperceivably. Without a knowledge of agreement in absence (i.e. in a case where there is no fire there is no smoke), there cannot be any assurance of concomitance. It is impossible to exhaust in

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1. Nyāya-maṇjarī, p. 119.
2. Na pratyakṣ-kṛtā yāvad dhūmā-gnī-vyaktayo’khilāh tāvat syād api dhūno’ sau yo’ nagner iti śāṅkyate ye tu pratyakṣato viśvaṃ paśyanti hi bhavādṛṣṭah kim divya-caksuṣāṁ eṣām anumāna-prayojanam vāstavam hi na sāmānyaṁ nāma kiñcana viḍyate. Ibid.
3. Sāmānya-dvārako’ py asti nā’vīnābhāva-nīcayah vāstavam hi na sāmānyam nāma kiñcana viṣyate. Ibid.
experience all cases of absence of fire as being also the cases of the absence of smoke. Thus since without such a joint method of agreement in presence and absence the universal invariable concomitance cannot be determined, and since it is not possible to assure oneself of the universal agreement in presence or in absence, the concomitance itself cannot be determined\(^1\).

Purandara, however, a follower of Čārvāka (probably of the seventh century), admits the usefulness of inference in determining the nature of all worldly things where perceptual experience is available; but inference cannot be employed for establishing any dogma regarding the transcendental world, or life after death or the laws of *Karma* which cannot be available to ordinary perceptual experience\(^2\). The main reason for upholding such a distinction between the validity of inference in our practical life of ordinary experience, and in ascertaining transcending truths beyond experience, lies in this, that an inductive generalization is made by observing a large number of cases of agreement in presence together with agreement in absence, and no cases of agreement in presence can be observed in the transcendent sphere; for even if such spheres existed they could not be perceived by the senses. Thus, since in the supposed supra-sensuous transcendent world no case of a *hetu* agreeing with the presence of its *sādhyā* can be observed, no inductive generalization or law of concomitance can be made relating to this sphere\(^3\). In reply to this contention Vadideva says that such a change may be valid against the Mīmāṃsists who depend upon the joint method of agreement and difference for making any inductive generalization, but this cannot

\(^1\) *niyama-ca-niḥmāṇa-ṅgam grhitah pratipadyate grahaṇam ca’sya nā’nyatra nāśīta-nīcayaṁ vinā darśanā-darśanābhyaṁ hi niyama-grahaṇam yadi tad api asad anagnau hi dhīmasyeṣaṁ adarśanam anagnis ca kiyān sāravāṁ jagāj-tvaḷana-varjitam tatra dhīmasya nāśītaṁ nai‘va paśīyanta avoginah.*

Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 120.

\(^2\) He is mentioned in Kamalaśīla’s *Pañjikā*, p. 431, Purandara’s *tv āha loka-prasiddham anumāṇam caṅvākair api jyate eva*, yat tu kaiś cēt laukikāṁ mārgam atikramya anumāṇam ucyate tan niśīdhyaite. Vāḍideva Sūry also quotes a sūtra of Purandara in his commentary *Śyādecāda-ratnakāra* on his *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvā-loka-lankāra*, n. 131: *pramāṇasya gaṅgāvatvād anumāṇād artha-nīcaya-durlabhāḥ, avyabhicārā-vagamo hi laukikā-hetūnām anumeyat vagame nimittatā sa nāsti tantra-siddheṣu iti na tebhyaḥ parokṣā-rthāvagamo nyāyēta idam uktam anumāṇād artha-nīcaya durlabhāḥ.*
The Lokāyata, Nāstika and Cārvāka

apply against the Jaina view of inference which is based on the principle of necessary implication (*anyathā-nupāpattē va eva tat-svarū-patvena svīkārāt*).

Other objections also made against the possibility of a valid inference are as follows: (1) impressions made by inferential knowledge are dim and not so vivid (*aspaṣṭatva*) as those produced by perception; (2) inference has to depend on other things for the determination of its object (*svārtha-nīcaye parā-pekṣatva*); (3) inference has to depend on perception (*pratyakṣa-pūrvakatva*); (4) inferential cognitions are not directly produced by the objects (*arthā anupajāyamānātva*); (5) inference is not concrete (*avastu-māṇa*); (6) it is often found contradicted (*bādhyamāṇātva*); (7) there is no proof which may establish the law that every case of the presence of the *hetu* should also be a case of the presence of the *sādhyā* (*sādhyā-sādhana-yoh pratibandha-sādhaka-pramānā-bhāvād vā*).\(^1\) None of these can be regarded as a reason why inference should be regarded as invalid from the Jaina point of view. For in reply to the first objection it may be pointed out that vividness has never been accepted as a definition of *pramāṇa*, and therefore its absence cannot take away the validity of an inference; illusory perceptions of two moons are vivid, but are not on that account regarded as valid. Again, an inference does not always depend on perception, and even if it did, it utilized its materials only for its own use and nothing more. Perception also is produced from certain materials, but is not on that account regarded as invalid. The inference is also produced from objects and is as concrete as perception since like it it involves universals and particulars. Again, false inferences are indeed contradicted, but that is no charge against right inferences. The invariable relationship between a *hetu* and a *sādhyā* can be established through mental reasoning (*tarka*).\(^2\)

Jayanta points out in this connection that a law of universal agreement of the *sādhyā* with the *hetu* has to be admitted. For an inference cannot be due to any mere instinctive flash of intelligence (*pratibhā*). If a knowledge of invariable and unconditional agreement was not regarded as indispensable for an inference, and if it was due to a mere instinctive flash, then the people of the Cocoanut

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\(^1\) Vādideva Śūri’s *Syādvāda-ratnakāra*, pp. 131, 132. Nirnaya Sagara Press, 1914.

\(^2\) Ibid.
island who do not know how to make fire would have been able to infer fire from smoke. Some say that the invariable association of the hetu with the sādhyā is perceived by mental perception (mānasa-pratyakṣa). They hold that in perceiving the association of smoke with fire and the absence of the former when the latter is absent, the mind understands the invariable association of smoke with fire. It is not necessary in order to come to such a generalization that one should perceive the agreement of smoke and fire in all the infinite number of cases in which they exist together, for the agreement observed in the mind is not between smoke and fire but between smoke-ness and fire-ness (jvalanatvā-di-sāmānya-puraḥsaratayā vyāpti-grahanāt). The objection against this view would be the denial of class-concepts as held by the Carvākas, Buddhists, and others. There are others, again, who say that even if universals are admitted, it is impossible that there should be universals of all cases of absence of fire as associated with the absence of smoke, and under the circumstances unless all positive and negative instances could be perceived the inductive generalization would be impossible. They, therefore, hold that there is some kind of mystic intuition like that of a yogin (yogi-pratyakṣa-kalpaṁ) by which the invariable relation (pratibandha) is realized. Others hold that an experience of a large number of positive instances unaccompanied by any experience of any case of failure produces the notion of concomitant. But the Nyāya insists on the necessity of an experience of a large number of instances of agreement in presence and absence for arriving at any inductive generalization of concomitance¹. The Carvākas, of course, say to this that in determining the unconditional invariable agreement of every case of a hetu with its sādhyā the absence of visible conditions may be realized by perception; but the possibility of the existence of invisible conditions cannot be eliminated even by the widest experience of agreement in presence, and thus there would always be the fear that the invariable concomitance of the hetu with the sādhyā may be conditional, and thus all inference has the value of more or less probability but not of certainty, and it is only through perceptual corroborations that the inferences come to be regarded as valid². The reply of Nyāya to this is that the assertion that in-

¹ Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 122.
² athā-numānaṁ na pramāṇaṁ yogya-pādhināṁ yogya-nupalabdhyābhāva-nīcaye’py ayogya-pādhi-śaṅkayā ṣyaḥṣya-saṁśayāt sutasah sahacaritayor api ṣyaḥṣya-ḥi-palabdheś ca loke dhūma-di-darśaṁ-ntaram vahmyā-di-tyāvaḥaraś ca
ference is not valid is itself an inference based on the similarity of inferential processes with other invalid mental processes. But this does not properly refute the Cārvāka position that inductive generalizations are only probable, and that therefore (as Purandara says) they acquire some amount of validity by being corroborated by experience and that they have no force in spheres where they cannot be corroborated by perceptual experience.

Since the Cārvākas do not attribute any more validity to inference than probability, other forms of pramānas, such as the testimony of trusty persons or the scriptures, analogy or implication, also were not regarded as valid. According to Udayana's statement, the Cārvākas denied the existence of anything that was not perceived, and Udayana points out that if this doctrine is consistently applied and people begin to disbelieve all that they do not perceive at any particular time, then all our practical life will be seriously disturbed and upset. The school of dhūrta Cārvākas, in their Śūtra work, not only denied the validity of inference but criticized the Nyāya categories as enunciated in the Nyāya-sūtra, i. 1. 1, and tried to establish the view that no such enumeration of categories was possible. It is no doubt true that the Cārvākas admitted perception as the only valid pramāna, but since illusions occurred in perception also, ultimately all pramānas were regarded as indeterminable by them.

The Cārvākas had to contend on the one hand with those who admitted a permanent soul, such as the Jains, the Naiyāyikas, the Sāṃkhya-yoga and the Mīmāṃsā, and on the other hand with the idealistic Buddhists who believed in a permanent series of conscious states; for the Cārvākas denied all kinds of existence after death. Thus they say that since there is no permanent entity that abides after death, there is no existence after death. As the body, understanding and sense-functions, are continually changing, there cannot be any existence after death, and hence no separate soul can be admitted. According to some, Cārvākas consciousness is pro-

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duced (utpadyate) from the four elements, and according to others it is manifested (abhivyajyate) from them like fermenting intoxication (surā) or acids. It is on account of diverse kinds of arrangements and rearrangements of the atoms of air, water, fire and earth that consciousness is either produced or manifested and the bodies and senses are formed or produced. There is nothing else but these atomic arrangements, and there is also no further separate category\(^1\).

The school of *Suśikṣita* Cārvākas holds that, so long as the body remains, there is an entity which remains as the constant perceiver and enjoyer of all experiences. But no such thing exists after the destruction of the body. If there was anything like a permanent self that migrated from one body to another, then it would have remembered the incidents of the past life just as a man remembers the experiences of his childhood or youth\(^2\). Arguing against the Buddhist view that the series of conscious states in any life cannot be due to the last conscious state before death in a previous life, or that no state of consciousness in any life can be the cause of the series of conscious states in another future life, the Cārvākas say that no consciousness that belongs to a different body and a different series can be regarded as the cause of a different series of conscious states belonging to a different body. Like cognitions belonging to a different series, no cognition can be caused by the ultimate state of consciousness of a past body\(^3\). Again, since the last mental state of a saint cannot produce other mental states in a separate birth, it is wrong to suppose that the last mental state of a dying man should be able to produce any series of mental states in a new birth. For this reason the Cārvāka teacher Kambalāśvatara says that consciousness is produced from the body through the operation of the vital functions of *prāṇa*, *apāṇa* and other bio-motor faculties. It is also wrong to suppose that there is any dormant consciousness in the early stages of the foetal life, for consciousness means the cognition of objects, and there cannot be any consciousness in the foetal state when no sense-organs are properly developed; so also there is no consciousness in a state of swoon, and

\(^{1}\) *tat-samudāye viśaye-nḍriya-saṃjñā. Cārvāka-sūtra* quoted in Kamalaśīla’s *Pañjikā*, p. 520.

\(^{2}\) *Nyāya-maṇjarī*, p. 467.

it is wrong to suppose that even in these stages consciousness exists as a potential power, for power presupposes something in which it exists and there is no other support for consciousness excepting the body, and, therefore, when the body is destroyed, all consciousness ceases with it. It cannot also be admitted that at death consciousness is transferred to another intermediary body, for no such body is ever perceived and cannot therefore be accepted. There cannot also be the same series of consciousness in two different bodies; thus the mental states of an elephant cannot be in the body of a horse.

The Buddhist reply to this objection of the Čārvākas is that if by discarding after-life the Čārvākas wish to repudiate the existence of any permanent entity that is born and reborn, then that is no objection to the Buddhists, for they also do not admit any such permanent soul. The Buddhist view is that there is a beginningless and endless series of states of conscious states which, taken as a period of seventy, eighty or a hundred years, is called the present, past or future life. It is wrong on the part of the Čārvākas to deny the character of this series as beginningless and endless; for if it is so admitted, then a state of consciousness at birth has to be regarded as the first and that would mean that it had no cause and it would thus be eternal, for since it existed without any cause there is no reason why it should ever cease to exist. It could not also have been produced by some eternal consciousness or god, for no such eternal entities are admitted; it cannot be admitted as being eternal by itself; it cannot be produced by eternal atoms of earth, water, etc., for it may be shown that no eternal entities can produce anything. Thus, the last alternative is that it must have been produced by the previous states of consciousness. Even if the atoms are regarded as momentary it would be difficult to prove that consciousness was produced by them. The principle which determines causation is, firstly, that something is the cause which, being present, that which was worthy of being seen but was not seen before becomes seen. Secondly, when two instances are such that though all the other conditions are present in them both, yet with the introduction of one element there happens a new phenomenon in the one which does not happen in the other, then that element is the cause of that

1 yeṣam upalambhe sati upalabdhi-laksana-praptam purvam anupalabdham sad upalabhya ity evam ādrayantyam. Kamalaśīla, Pañjikā, p. 525.
phenomenon\(^1\). The two instances, which differ from each other only in this that there is the effect in the one and not in the other, agree with each other in all other respects excepting that that in which there is the effect has also a new element which is not present in the other, and it is only in such a case that that element may be regarded as the cause of that effect. Otherwise, if the cause is defined as that which being absent the effect is also absent, then there is the alternative possibility of the presence of another element which was also absent, and it might be that it was on account of the absence of this element that the effect was absent. Thus, the two instances where an effect occurs and where it does not occur must be such that they are absolutely the same in every respect, except the fact that there is one element in the case where there is the effect which was absent in the other instance. The causal relation between body and mind cannot be established by such a rigorous application of the joint method of agreement and difference. It is not possible to employ the method of agreement to determine the nature of relation between one's own body and mind, for it is not possible to observe the body in the early foetal stage before the rise of mind, for without mind there cannot be any observation. In other bodies also the mind cannot be directly observed and so it is not possible to say that the body is prior to mind. The method of difference also cannot be employed, for no one can perceive whether with the cessation of the body his mind also ceases or not; and since the minds of other people cannot be directly perceived, such a negative observation cannot be made with reference to other people, and no assertion can therefore be made as to whether with the cessation of other people's bodies their minds also ceased or not. No inference can be drawn from the immobility of the body at death that it must be due to the destruction of mind, for it may still exist and yet remain inoperative in moving the body. Moreover, the fact that a particular body is not moved by it, is due to the fact that the desires and false notions which were operative with reference to that body were then absent.

Again, there are other reasons why the body cannot be regarded as the cause of mind; for if the body as a whole was the cause of

\(^1\) satṣu taḍ-anyeṣu samartheṣu ta-dhetuṣu yasyai'kasyai'bhāvai na bhavati'ya evam āśrayatīyam anyathā hi kevalam taḍ-abhāvai na bhavati'ya upadarsane sandīghdham atra tasya sāmarthyam syāt anyasyai'pi taṭ-samarthasyai'bhāvai. Kamalaśila, Pañjikā, p. 526.
mind, then slight deformities of the body would have changed the character of the mind, or minds associated with big bodies like those of elephants would be greater than those of men. If with the change of one there is no change in the other, the two cannot be said to be related as cause and effect. Nor can it be said that the body with the complete set of senses is the cause of mind, for in that case with the loss of any sense the nature and character of the mind would also be changed. But we know that this is not so, and when by paralysis all the motor organs are rendered inoperative, the mind may still continue to work with unabated vigour\(^1\). Again, though the body may remain the same, yet the mental temperament, character or tone might considerably change, or sudden emotions might easily unhinge the mind though the body might remain the same. Even if instances are found which prove that the conditions of the body affect the conditions of the mind, yet that is no reason why the mind or soul should cease to exist with the destruction of the body. If on account of co-existence (saha-sthiti-niyama) of body and mind they may be said to be connected with each other in bonds of causation, then since body is as much co-existent with mind as mind with body, the mind may as well be said to be the cause of body. Co-existence does not prove causation, for co-existence of two things may be due to a third cause. Heated copper melts, so through heat the foetal elements may be supposed to produce on the one hand the body and on the other hand to manifest mind or consciousness. So the co-existence of body and mind does not necessarily mean that the former is the material cause of the latter.

It is said that though the later mental states are perceived to be produced by the previous ones, yet the first manifested consciousness has a beginning and it is produced by the body, and thus the theory of the Buddhists that the series of conscious states is without beginning is false. But if the mental states are in the first instance produced by the body, then these could not in later cases be produced in other ways through the visual or other sense organs. If it is urged that the body is the cause of the first origin of knowledge, but not of the later mental states, then the later mental states ought to be able to raise themselves without being in any way dependent

on the body. If it is held that a mental state can produce a series of other mental states only with the help of the body, then each of them would produce an infinite series of such mental states, but such an infinite number of infinite series is never experienced. It cannot also be said that the body generates consciousness only at the first stage and that in all later stages the body remains only as an accessory cause, for that which once behaves as a generating cause cannot behave as an accessory cause. Thus, even if the physical elements be admitted to be impermanent, they cannot be regarded as the cause. If the mental states be regarded as having a beginning, it may be asked whether by mental states the sense-knowledge or the mental ideas are meant. It cannot be the former, for during sleep, swoon or inattentive conditions there is no sense-knowledge, even though the sense-organs are present, and it has therefore to be admitted that attention is the necessary pre-condition of knowledge, and the sense-organs or the sense-faculties cannot be regarded as the sole cause of sense-knowledge. The mind cannot also be regarded as the sole cause, for unless the sense-data or the sense-objects are perceived by the senses, the mind cannot work on them. If the mind could by itself know objects, then there would have been no blind or deaf people. Admitting for argument's sake that mind produces the cognitions, it may be asked whether this cognition is *savikalpa* or *nirvikalpa*; but there cannot be any *savikalpa* unless the association of names and objects (*saṅketa*) is previously learnt. It cannot be also *nirvikalpa* knowledge, for *nirvikalpa* represents the objects as they are in their unique character, which cannot be grasped by the mind alone without the help of the sense-organs. If it is held that even the sense-data are produced by the mind, then that would be the admission of extreme idealism and the giving up of the Čārvāka position. Thus, the conscious states are to be regarded as beginningless and without any origin. Their specific characters are determined by experiences of past lives, and it is as a reminiscence of these experiences that the instincts of sucking or fear show themselves even with the newly-born baby\(^1\). It has therefore to be admitted that the conscious states are produced neither by the body nor by the mind, but that they are beginningless and are generated by the previous

\(^1\) *tasmāt pūrvā-bhyaśa-kyta eva'yaṃ bālānām īṣṭā-niṣṭo-pādāna-parītyāga-lākṣaṇo vyavahāra iti siddhā buddher anāditā.* Kamalasāla, Pañjikā, p. 532.
The parental consciousness cannot be regarded as being the cause of the consciousness of the offspring, for the latter are not similar in nature, and there are many beings which are not of parental origin. It has, therefore, to be admitted that the conscious states of this life must be produced by the states of another life previous to it. Thus, the existence of a past life is proved. And since the mental states of this life are determined by the mental states of other lives, the mental states of this life also are bound to determine other mental states, and this establishes the existence of future lives; provided, however, that these mental states are associated with the emotions of attachment, anger, antipathy, etc. For the mental states can produce other mental states only when they are affected by the emotions of attachment, anger, etc., and these are inherited by the new-born baby from the mental states of his previous life which determined the series of experiences of his present life. Though the past experiences are transferred to the present life, yet owing to a severe shock due to the intervention of the foetal period these experiences do not at once show themselves in infancy, but reveal themselves gradually with age. One does not always remember what one experienced before; thus, in dreams and deliriums, though the elements of the past experience are present, yet they are reconstructed in a distorted form and do not present themselves in the form of memory. So the past experiences cannot ordinarily be remembered by the infant, though there are some gifted beings who can remember their past lives. It is wrong to suppose that the mind is supported by the body or inheres in it, for the mind is formless. Again, if the mind inhered in the body and was of the same stuff as the body, then the mental states should be as perceptible by the visual organ as the body itself. The mental states can be perceived only by the mind in which they occur, but the body can be perceived both by that mind as well as by others; therefore, these two are of entirely different character and are hence entirely different. The body is continually changing, and it is the unitary series of conscious states that produces the impression of the identity of the body. For though the individual consciousnesses are being destroyed every moment, yet the series remains one in its continuity in the past lives, the present life and the future. When the series is different, as in that of a cow and a horse or between two different
persons, the states of the one series cannot affect those in the other. One conscious state is thus admitted to be determining another conscious state, and that another, and so on, within the series. Thus it has to be admitted that consciousness exists, even in the unconscious state; for had it not been so, then there would be a lapse of consciousness at that time and this would mean the breaking up of the series. States of consciousness are independent of the sense-organs and the sense-objects, as they are determined by the previous states; in dreams, when the sense-organs are not operating and when there is no sense-object contact, the conscious states continue to be produced; and in the case of the knowledge of past or future events, or the knowledge of chimerical things like the hare's horn, the independence of conscious states is clearly demonstrated. Thus it is proved that consciousness is neither produced by the body nor is in any way determined or conditioned by it, and it is determined only by its past states and itself determines the future states. Thus also the existence of the past and the future lives is proved.

The arguments of the Jains and of the Naïyāyikas against the Čārvākas are somewhat of a different nature from those of the idealistic Buddhists just described, as the former admitted permanent souls which the latter denied. Thus Vidyānandi, in his Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika, says that the chief reason why the soul cannot be regarded as a product of matter is the fact of undisputed, unintermittent and universal self-consciousness unlimited by time or space. Such perceptions as "this is blue" or "I am white" depend upon external objects or the sense-organs, and cannot therefore be regarded as typical cases of self-consciousness. But such perceptions as "I am happy" which directly refer to the self-perception of the ego do not depend on the operation of any external instruments such as the sense-organs or the like. If this self-consciousness were not admitted to be established by itself, no other doctrine, not even the Čārvāka doctrine which seeks to demolish all attested convictions, could be asserted, for all assertions are made by virtue of this self-consciousness. If any consciousness required another consciousness to have itself attested, then that would involve a vicious infinite and the first consciousness would have to be admitted as unconscious. Thus, since the self manifests itself in self-consciousness (sva-samvedana), and since the body is perceived
through the operation of the senses like all other physical things, the former is entirely different from the latter and cannot be produced by the latter, and because it is eternal it cannot also be manifested by the latter. Again, since consciousness exists even without the senses, and since it may not exist even when there is the body and the senses (as in a dead body), the consciousness cannot be regarded as depending on the body. Thus, the self is directly known as different from the body by the testimony of self-consciousness. The other arguments of Vidyanandi are directed against the idealistic Buddhists who do not believe in a permanent self but believe in the beginningless series of conscious states, and this discussion had better be omitted here.

Jayanta argues in the Nyāya-manjarī that the body is continually changing from infancy to old age, and therefore the experiences of one body cannot belong to the new body that has been formed through growth or decay, and therefore the identity of the ego and recognition which form the essential constitutive elements of knowledge cannot belong to the body. It is true no doubt that good diet and medicine which are helpful to the body are also helpful to the proper functioning of the intellect. It is also true that curds and vegetable products and damp places soon begin to germinate into insects. But this is no proof that matter is the cause of consciousness. The selves are all-pervading, and when there is appropriate modifications of physical elements they manifest themselves through them according to the conditions of their own karmas. Again, consciousness cannot also be admitted to belong to the senses, for apart from the diverse sense-cognitions there is the apperception of the ego or the self which co-ordinates these diverse sense-cognitions. Thus I feel that whatever I perceive by the eyes I touch by the hand, which shows distinctly that apart from the sense-cognitions there is the individual perceiver or the ego who co-ordinates these sensations, and without such a co-ordinator the unity of the different sensations could not be attained. The Susiksita Cārvākas, however, hold that there is one perceiver so long as the body exists, but that this perceiver (pramātṛ-tattva) does not transmigrate, but is destroyed with the destruction of the body; the soul is thus not immortal, and there is no after-world after the destruction of this body. To this Jayanta's reply is that if

1 Tattvārtha-sūkha-vārtika, pp. 26–52.  
3 Ibid. pp. 467, 468.
a self is admitted to exist during the lifetime of this body, then since this self is different from the body, and since it is partless and non-
physical by nature, there cannot be anything which can destroy it. No one has ever perceived the self to be burnt or torn to pieces by birds or animals as a dead body can be. Thus, since it has never been found to be destroyed, and since it is not possible to infer any cause which can destroy it, it is to be regarded as immortal. Since the self is eternal, and since it has a present and past association with a body, it is not difficult to prove that it will have also a future association with a body. Thus, self does not reside either in any part of the body or throughout the body, but is all-pervading and behaves as the possessor of that body with which it becomes associated through the bonds of *karma*. Para-loka or after-life is defined by Jayanta as rebirth or the association of the soul with other bodies after death. The proofs that are adduced in favour of such rebirths are, firstly, from the instinctive behaviour of infants in sucking the mother’s breast or from their unaccountable joys and miseries which are supposed to be due to the memory of their past experiences in another birth; and, secondly, from the inequalities of powers, intelligence, temper, character and habits, inequalities in the reaping of fruits from the same kind of efforts. These can be explained only on the supposition of the effects of *karma* performed in other births1.

Śaṅkara, in interpreting the *Brahma-sūtra*, III. 3. 53, 54, tries to refute the *lokayatika* doctrine of soullessness. The main points in the *lokayatika* argument here described are that since consciousness exists only when there is a body, and does not exist when there is no body, this consciousness must be a product of the body. Life-movements, consciousness, memory and other intellectual functions also belong to the body, since they are experienced only in the body and not outside of it2. To this Śaṅkara’s reply is that life-movements, memory, etc., do not sometimes exist even when the body exists (at death), therefore they cannot be the products of the body. The qualities of the body, such as colour, form, etc., can be

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1 Nyāya-maṇḍūkya, pp. 470–473.
2 yad dhi yasmin sati bhavaty asati ca na bhavati tat tad-dharmatvena ad-
hyavastiyate yathā’gmi-dharmav auṣṭya-prakāśau; prāṇa-ceṣṭā-caittanya-smṛtyā-
dayaś ca’tma-dharmatvenābhimāta ātma-vā-dināṁ te’ ṣy antar eva deha upala-
bhayamānā bahiś ca’nupalabhyanamā asidde deha-vyat irikte dharmiṇi deha-dharmā 
eva bhavītum arhanti; tasmād avyatireko dehād ātmāna iti. Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on 
Brahma-sūtra, III. 3. 53.
perceived by everyone, but there are some who cannot perceive consciousness, memory, etc. Again, though these are perceived so long as the living body exists, yet there is no proof that it does not exist when this body is destroyed. Further, if consciousness is a product of the body, it could not grasp the body; no fire can burn itself and no dancer can mount his own shoulders. Consciousness is always one and unchangeable and is therefore to be regarded as the immortal self. Though ordinarily the self is found to manifest itself in association with a body, that only shows that the body is its instrument, but it does not prove that the self is the product of the body, as is contended by the Cārvākas. The Cārvākas criticized the entire social, moral and religious programme of orthodox Hindus. Thus Śriharṣa, in representing their views in his Naiṣadha-acarita, says as follows: "The scriptural view that the performance of sacrifices produces wonderful results is directly contradicted by experience, and is as false as the Purānic story of the floating of stones. It is only those who are devoid of wisdom and capacity for work who earn a livelihood by the Vedic sacrifices, or the carrying of three sticks (tridanda), or the besmearing of the forehead with ashes. There is no certainty of the purity of castes, for, considering the irrepressible sex-emotions of men and women, it is impossible to say that any particular lineage has been kept pure throughout its history in the many families on its maternal and paternal sides. Men are not particular in keeping themselves pure, and the reason why they are so keen to keep the women in the harem is nothing but jealousy; it is unjustifiable to think that unbridled sex-indulgence brings any sin or that sins bring suffering and virtues happiness in another birth; for who knows what will happen in the other birth when in this life we often see that sinful men prosper and virtuous people suffer?" The Vedic and the smṛti texts are continually coming into conflict with one another, and are reconciled only by the trickery of the commentators; if that is so, why not accept a view in which one may act as one pleases? It is held that the sense of ego is associated with the body, but when this body is burnt, what remains there of virtue or vice, and even if there is anything that will be experienced by another ego and in another body and as such that cannot hurt me. It is ridiculous to suppose that any one should remember anything after death, or that after death the fruits of karma will be reaped, or that by feeding Brahmins after death the so-called departed soul will have any
satisfaction. The image-worship, or the worship of stones with flowers, or of bathing in the Ganges as a religious practice is absolutely ridiculous. The practice of performing śrāddha ceremonies for the satisfaction of the departed is useless, for if the offering of food could satisfy the dead then the hunger of travellers could also be removed by their relations offering them food at home. In reality with death and destruction of the body everything ends, for nothing returns when the body is reduced to ashes. Since there is no soul, no rebirth, no god and no after-life, and since all the scriptures are but the instructions of priests interested in cheating the people, and the Purāṇas are but false mythical accounts and fanciful stories, the one ideal of our conduct is nothing but sense-pleasures. Sins and virtues have no meaning, they are only the words with which people are scared to behave in a particular manner advantageous to the priests. In the field of metaphysics the Cārvākas are materialists and believe in nothing beyond the purely sensible elements of the atoms of earth, water, air and fire and their combinations; in the field of logic they believe in nothing but what can be directly perceived; they deny *karma*, fruits of *karma*, rebirth or souls. The only thing that the Cārvākas cared for was the momentary sense-pleasures, unrestrained enjoyment of sensual joys. They did not believe in sacrificing present joys to obtain happiness in the future, they did not aim at increasing the total happiness and well-being of the whole life as we find in the ethical scheme of Caraka; with them a pigeon to-day was better than a peacock to-morrow, better to have a sure copper coin to-day than a doubtful gold coin in the future¹. Thus, immediate sense-pleasures were all that they wanted and any display of prudence, restraint, or other considerations which might lead to the sacrifice of present pleasures was regarded by them as foolish and unwise. It does not seem that there was any element of pessimism in their doctrine. Their whole ethical position followed from their general metaphysical and logical doctrine that sense-objects or sense-pleasures were all that existed, that there was no supra-sensible or transcendent reality, and thus there was no gradation or qualitative difference between the pleasures and no reason why any restraint should be put upon our normal tendency to indulge in sense-pleasures.

¹ varam adya kapotah īvo mayūrāt
varam samśāyikān niśkād asamśāyikāh
kārśāpaṇa īti lokāyatikāh. Kāma-sūtra, 1. 2. 29, 30.
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1 The words are arranged in the order of the English alphabet. Sanskrit and Pāli technical terms and words are in small italics; names of books are in italics with a capital. English words and other names are in Roman with a capital. Letters with diacritical marks come after ordinary ones.
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